

Women in the US Army: A Quiet Revolution in Military Affairs

**A Monograph
by
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US Army**



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Abstract

Women In The US Army: A Quiet Revolution in Military Affairs by Major Sherri L. Shadrock, US Army, 145 pages.

This monograph examines the history and significance of women serving in the United States Army from 1942 through 2007. *The author's thesis is that an organizational Revolution in Military Affairs occurred in the US Army pertaining to the permanency, increased scope and exponential expansion of the numbers of women serving.*¹

The monograph contains essentially six chapters consisting of an introduction, four core chapters and a conclusion summarizing key points. Nine appendices are provided at the end of the paper. The introduction presents the purpose, research question and monograph structure as well as the relevance and timeliness of the topic. *The research question posed is: "What is the significance to the U.S. Army regarding the changed nature and expansion of women's military roles?"*

Chapter One focuses on the creation of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) and the Women's Army Corps (WAC) during the World War II era and briefly discusses women's roles in the 1960s. A portion of the chapter lays the foundation for the argument that women's service constitutes a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Chapter Two presents the evolution of roles from the 1970s onward culminating with the revolutionary current Global War on Terrorism operations. Chapter Three presents the dynamic influence of warfare upon women's roles and examines the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) and strategic setting for the twenty-first century. Chapter Four focuses on recommendations the US Army might adopt toward optimizing the current force and its human resources, or soldiers – which are the army's most precious asset.

The army's tremendous need for human resources, in conjunction with the noncontiguous, nonlinear contemporary operational environment upon which the Global War on Terror will be executed presents increased opportunities for highlighting the contributions and sacrifices made by women in the nation's defense. Acknowledging that soldiers, or human resources, are the army's most important asset, several changes in personnel policy, military education and training are recommended. Through careful analysis, the author presents research that supports the argument that women's roles will continue to expand in the twentieth-first century and will continue to be substantially influenced by the Contemporary Operational Environment. This expansion of roles is indicative of a continuation of this organizational RMA. The monograph concludes with a summary of the argument presented and a prompt for further research. Women's military history is a field of scholarship that will provide countless pathways of discovery into the human endeavor and is extremely well-suited for interdisciplinary research. These combined elements make women's military history an exciting field of study.

A wide variety of articles, books and dissertations were available about military women. However, few of these focused solely on the United States Army and even less focused on the historical aspect of women's contributions to the US Army. Many scholarly journal articles were written by sociologists and psychologists, not historians. This paper is unique because of its focus on US Army women's military history and its significance in the larger context of organizing and

¹S. D. McCluskey, "The Heart of Man," *SITREP A Publication of the Royal Canadian Military Institute*, vol.66, no. 3 (May-June 2006), 5. McCluskey argues that military transformation occurs in one of three distinct areas: organizational, doctrinal, or technological.

training personnel for the US's national defense. The monograph conforms to a historical perspective, thereby allowing for analysis with enough distance from most of the events to properly judge and comprehend the significance of the events over time. Often the significance of events is not evident at the time of occurrence. This is certainly the case with many events surrounding women's roles in the US Army. Through analysis and a historical perspective, the significance of the evolution and revolutionary expansion of women's roles may be understood.

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose

Recently, the contemporary operating environment has been the most significant catalyst for changing the nature of women's military roles from non-combatant to combatant. Because of a fundamental change in battlefield geometry and dynamics, the 23,367 women serving in the combat zones of Afghanistan and Iraq potentially face an increased likelihood of exposure to direct ground combat.² Because of this changed nature of warfare, from a linear to a nonlinear, noncontiguous battlefield, sixty-six women died while serving in Afghanistan and Iraq during the Global War on Terror (GWOT).³ To adequately place this final sacrifice in proper perspective, one should compare it to female casualties in previous wars. Doing so reveals a total of twenty-five active duty women killed in the Korean War, the Vietnam Conflict and the Persian Gulf War combined.⁴ The number of female deaths incurred during the GWOT represents a significant increase from previous conflicts. There was a one hundred and eighty-eight percent increase in female deaths from the Vietnam conflict to the Persian Gulf War and a staggering four hundred and forty percent increase from the Persian Gulf War to the GWOT. Due to the changed nature of

²As reported by Tim Russert on *Meet the Press*, National Broadcasting Company, citing Department of Defense statistics for the numbers of women deployed in the combat zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, September 17, 2006. The Department of Defense defined direct ground combat as engaging: "an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force's personnel." US General Accounting Office, *GENDER ISSUES Information on DOD's Assignment Policy and Direct Ground Combat Definition*, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, GAO/NSIAD-99-7, October 1998, 7.

³Of the sixty-six women killed, fifty died as a direct result of hostile action or an aircraft crash. Forty-one of the fifty killed in hostile actions were US Army personnel and nine were other military service personnel. The primary causes of death were due to improvised explosive devices (IED), helicopter crashes and mortar attacks. See, "Grim Toll of Women Lost in War," June 15, 2006 *Center for Military Readiness*, <http://cmrlink.org/terrorismwar.asp?docID=269> (accessed September 28, 2006).

⁴Two women were killed in the Korean War, eight in the Vietnam Conflict and fifteen killed in the Persian Gulf War. See, Hannah Fischer, "American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics," *Department of the Navy, Navy Historical Center*,

warfare and battlefield geometry, it is appropriate to reexamine women's roles and army policies restricting training and employment, hence leadership opportunities, solely based on gender.

The increasing numbers of women volunteering to serve in the army over the past three decades is a trend indicative of a sustained desire to serve the nation. Based on a total US Army strength (Active Duty, US Army Reserve and US Army National Guard) of 1,013,882, women comprise 14 percent of the Active US Army, 23.1 percent of the Army Reserve and 13.2 percent of the US Army National Guard. As of May 31, 2006, there were 156,502 women in the total US Army.⁵ Women are motivated to join the army because of the challenges, opportunities and pride in serving the nation. However, their service remains constrained primarily because of cultural impediments and mores instituted by the Department of Defense after Congressional pressure in the 1950s. The attitude concerning women's service permeating society during the 1950s was that women were noncombatants, and as such, they did not need tactical military training. This belief established the framework for gender exclusion and the reinforcement of attitudes of separation between the sexes.

Research Question

This monograph assesses the nature of women's military roles in the US Army and examines the issues still enabling gender exclusion. Women have become a stable and expanding component of the All Volunteer Force (AVF). The changing nature of warfare, coupled with a noncontiguous battlefield, advancements in technology and the willingness of increasing numbers

<http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/american%20war%20casualty.htm> updated July 13, 2005 (accessed September 28, 2006).

⁵"Statistics on Women in the Military," *Women In Military Service for America Memorial Foundation, Inc.*, <http://www.womensmemorial.org/Press/stats.html> (accessed September 28, 2006). Statistics as of May 31, 2006 breakdown of total US Army strength of 1,013,882 revealed: Active Duty Army strength 487,898; USAR strength 186,140; ARNG strength 339,844. The breakdown of strength for the total US Army (women only) of 156,502 revealed: Active Duty strength 68,441; USAR strength 43,083; ARNG 44,978. The total DoD strength as of May 31, 2006 was 1,402,996.

of women who chose to serve in the military will have profound impacts on the individuals, the US Army and possibly American society. In order to understand the reason for this expansion and the implications of these expanding roles, research is necessary. This provokes the following question: *What is the significance to the US Army regarding the changed nature and expansion of women's military roles?*

Monograph Structure

This monograph is presented in four chapters. The first chapter begins with an introduction of how women became incorporated as permanent members of the army. This chapter briefly explores women's roles in the army from 1942 until 1969. The first chapter highlights women's roles during and after World War II and discusses the significance of women being granted permanency in the US army. The second chapter covers women in the army from roughly 1970 until 2007 and describes a few of the important issues and concerns regarding women serving. Three historical vignettes were provided as an appendix to add context and portray a glimpse of military service as well as convey the expansion of women's roles over three decades of time. The third chapter is devoted to women's roles in the modern or contemporary army and explores the ramifications of the operational environment has on women's roles. The fourth chapter discusses ways and recommendations for optimizing the force and soldiers for the twenty-first century. The monograph concludes with a summary of main points, highlighting the likely continued expansion of women's roles and calls for further research on the subject of women's military history.

Thesis

The author's thesis is that an organizational Revolution in Military Affairs occurred in the US Army pertaining to the permanency, increased scope and exponential expansion of the numbers of women serving.

The author consciously decided to assess women's roles nearly exclusively in the US Army due to the complexity of presenting the multitude of data and analysis required to present all five branches of the armed forces. Such a task would be well beyond the scope of this paper.

Since the beginning of women's desire to serve in a military capacity whether formally or as an auxiliary, controversy surrounded their participation. During the society's times of greatest need, this controversy was generally shadowed by the severity of the need. However, a standard pattern emerged after the need subsided which involved the dismissal of women or the denial of an ability to serve. After the nation was safely out of harms way, some of the men serving and many politicians clung to the notion that a woman's proper place in society was elsewhere besides the profession of arms. Why the thought that women might be equally motivated to serve did not resonate with many of the male policy makers was a product of their upbringing and of the society's values and norms, many of which are still prevalent today.

The reason for gender segmentation regarding military roles is a product of political and cultural expectations derived mostly from English roots and inoculated throughout the centuries. Culture is difficult to change, it does not turn about casually. It is deeply engrained in many aspects of a society, woven so seamlessly within that one hardly chooses to travel against the grain. Most individuals are content to let the cultural river take them where it may, yet in most cultures a slight current of change runs as deep as the ages. This current grows from a barely noticed one to one that runs deeper as the years pass and gathers leverage from lessons learned. Each small victory builds upon the previous centuries successes, singularly these successes seem trivial and inconsequential. However, when comprehended and pieced together they fundamentally represent the emergence of a new societal structure still being carved by the "river". Cultural expectations, political influence and emotions heavily influenced women's ability to serve in the armed forces. Lieutenant General (Retired) John M. LeMoyne, former Department of the army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G-1 remarked that ninety-eight

percent of the factors contributing to the policy debates regarding the roles of women in the army were connected to emotional reasons.⁶ Furthermore, LeMoyne explained that these emotional issues are intertwined with political issues making the subject all the more complex. The limitation of women's roles in the army unfortunately has little to do with physical limitations, mission accomplishment or the needs of the army. This issue has remained a rather sensitive one since the 1950s. There often has been extreme polarization of opinions concerning appropriate and or necessary roles for women.

The notion that warriors are males seems to have been a construction predicated on the truism that most warriors were males. According to cultural anthropologist, David E. Jones, the powerful male warrior concept was fueled by tradition and myth. Many of these traditions and myths remain today. However, the notion that warriors were exclusively males is simply false. In the book *Women Warriors*, Jones explained that both women and men have a "military history and a chivalrous tradition."⁷ Women were full participants in warfare, albeit on a lesser quantitative scale than men were. Jones presented over eleven varied cultural examples of female warriors from a pan-historical and global viewpoint. His analysis of cultures, historical context and historical sequence portrayed examples of women warriors as "part of an ancient global pattern" rather than isolated remarkable and rare events.⁸

Yet legacy of the male warrior image is alive today in the US Army. It survived not because it mirrored reality, but rather because policy makers reinforced this male warrior concept by creating laws and policies limiting women's roles in the armed forces. Congress required limitations be placed on women's roles in the military over fifty years ago based upon two primary conditions. The first condition was the belief that the American public would not tolerate

⁶John M. LeMoyne, Lieutenant General (Retired), US Army, oral interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 30 November 2006. LTG LeMoyne served as US Army G-1 from 2001-2003.

⁷David E. Jones, *Women Warriors* (Washington D.C: Brassey's, 1997), xi.

women in combat. The second condition was that there was no need for women to be combatants in the first place. The draft was in effect and the battlefields of the twentieth century lent themselves to clearly defined rear areas.

At least since the 1950s, the army has wrestled with the subject of how and to what extent to incorporate women into the force. Due to cultural and deeply ingrained societal factors, there is still controversy regarding the issue of women in the army. Although women's roles have expanded exponentially, and evolved over time, gender exclusion still remains concerning admission to certain training, and the opportunity to serve in a few military occupational specialties.

Although women have been a part of America's military history from the Revolutionary War to the present, prior to the Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948, they functioned in an auxiliary and temporary status. This meant that women were not an official part of the regular military forces. The opportunity to serve the nation as a part of the military was by no means guaranteed for women. It might be more correctly understood as a temporary privilege from at least the turn of the twentieth century until 1948. Reviewing the historical events concerning women's opportunities to serve will assist in framing the important issues of women serving in the army today. This study begins by examining the origins of women's military service.

⁸Ibid., 9.

CHAPTER ONE HERE TO STAY, ARRIVAL OF THE ADVANCE GUARD

Women Are Veterans, Too

We weren't just tokens or pretty faces, to decorate your offices and platoons; we weren't dumb, too plain or too stupid to make it in the real world. We've marched your muddy roads, carried and shot your heavy guns. We've been shot at, wounded, and died, and been prisoners of war. We've been active in all services, and risen to high ranks. We've tended your bleeding wounds and held you when you were dying. We've flown your mighty airplanes and navigated your giant ships. We've fixed your broken engines and driven heavy equipment. We've mailed letters for you and brought you news from home. We've stood along side of you without flinching or running away, and continue to stand by you today. We are not asking for special treatment, or that you should go out of your way. We're only asking that you recognize that women are veterans, too.⁹

Lynda K. Dokken, "Women Veterans Poetry Page"

Women Veterans?

Could women be considered veterans if they were not part of the permanent military? Female veterans knew that they served in a surprising variety of capacities throughout the history of our nation's conflict, yet received little recognition for their contributions. Brigadier General Wilma Vaught, US Air Force (Retired), cited this as a reason for her motivation to create the Women in Military Service For America (WIMSA) Memorial in Washington, D.C. Vaught commented that "women who earned their stripes on the World War II battlefields were subsequently passed over for promotions that were given to less qualified men or dismissed from the service due to there no longer being a wartime need for them." General Vaught felt she owed it to these unsung veterans and thought it appropriate to lend part of her life's work toward raising

⁹Lynda K. Dokken, "Women Are Veterans, Too," *Women Veterans Poetry Page*; 1967 [article online]; available from <http://userpages.aug.com/captbarb/poetry.html>; Internet; accessed on 5 Jan 2006.

money for WIMSA. In 1986 Congress approved the memorial but provided no attached funding. In 1987, Vaught began raising money for the memorial. By 1997 the memorial was standing at the gateway of Arlington National Cemetery to honor those serving, as well as the 1.8 million women veterans.¹⁰ The memorial is a physical reminder of the collective efforts of millions of women volunteers who answered the call of duty.

Although women served the nation from its beginning until World War II, women's roles most accurately were described as serving with, rather than in, the armed forces. This was specifically the case until in 1942, during World War II, when the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) was created. It was soon converted into the Women's Army Corps (WAC) in 1943. By 1948, Congress passed the Armed Forces Integration Act, which allowed women to join the armed forces regardless of whether or not the nation was in a war.¹¹ Although women received pay and wore uniforms, they did not have military rank and were not afforded the same status and benefits as males. External and internal factors influenced change for women in the army. One of the most influential internal factors was the perception of military need. The need for personnel was a significant factor that propelled the use of women.¹² The window of opportunity for expanding women's roles was often born of necessity and evolved over time due to a need for skilled people. Changing military needs created opportunities for the women to fill. Often women possessed the desired technical or medical skills sought by the military and the process of using women evolved because of a need for skilled laborers and administrators. This need was most evident during the World War II era.

¹⁰Rosemarie Skaine, *Women at War: Gender Issues of Americans in Combat* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, 1999), 60.

¹¹Robert K. Griffith, Jr., *The US Army's Transition To The All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974*, (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1997), 188.

¹²Ibid.

Limited Participation in the World War II Era: From WAAC to WAC

During the war, many aspects of utilizing female labor by the military were examined. In May 1942, Congress created the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) at the request of General George C. Marshall and the urging of Eleanor Roosevelt. General Marshall and General Dwight D. Eisenhower paid close attention to the allies' use of women in national defense.¹³ World War II signified total war for most European nations forcing them to evaluate how efficiently they utilized womanpower. Modern warfare required a large industrial base and women were being heavily sought for work in armament factories.

The idea that it was beneficial for women to work in order to free up men to fight the war gained notoriety during World War II. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand used women in the anti-aircraft service. In 1942, General Marshall decided to conduct a secret experiment to see whether the WAAC could perform in anti-aircraft combat. Mixed gender crews were tested against all male crews. The results were surprising and revealed a potential military advantage as long as the public would stomach it. The mixed gender crews outperformed the all male crews. The women were more careful, had better attention to detail and generally performed better than males when working the radars and range finders.¹⁴

Regardless of the experiment's results, Marshall refused to assign women permanently and publicly to anti-aircraft units. Marshall's reason was a fear that the American public was not ready for women serving in a combat capacity. This evidence suggests, "America thus drew the gender line against combat for women in 1943."¹⁵ Marshall pledged to keep the experiment secret

¹³D'Ann Campbell, "Women In War" in *The Reader's Companion to Military History*, ed. Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996), 520. use idem if this and next 3 cites are same page as previous.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

and promised Congress that the army would keep women out of combat.¹⁶ This decision had an enduring legacy and became a Defense Department precedent still in effect today.

In June 1943, congress transitioned the WAAC into the Women's Army Corps (WAC), which provided full military status for women. Due to the need for women's service in World War II major breakthroughs regarding their future service occurred. The result was that women could actually *be* in the armed forces, rather than just serving *with* the armed forces as they did in an "auxiliary" capacity and temporary status prior to 1948. The distinction seems subtle today in 2006; however, in 1948 it was much more than quaint semantics.

To understand and appreciate the issues concerning women during the period examination it is appropriate to review briefly the institution of permanent women's service. Women were active participants in the military; however, they were not considered permanent until 1948 with the passing of the Women's Armed Services Integration Act. The US House of Representatives passed the act by a vote of 206 to 133. On June 12, 1948 President Truman signed the bill which then became Public Law 625 establishing a permanent place for women in the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.¹⁷

Prior to 1948, women did not have a permanent place in the military. After World War II, although it was limited, women were allowed to be in the military and were afforded the rank as well as the uniform. It was decided that a small base of women were needed in the military to serve as a basis for expansion of womanpower in the event of a national emergency. Congress initially generated the WAC solely as a wartime organization; however, a primary reason for

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Bettie J. Morden, *The Women's Army Corps 1945-1978*, (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1990) 55.

retaining the WAC in peacetime was because of the army's difficulty in sustaining its required personnel strength levels during the "draft hiatus" of 1947-1948.¹⁸

With the exception of nurses, women's participation in the armed forces was not taken seriously until World War II. During that war, over 350,000 women served in the armed forces.¹⁹ At its peak, 100,000 served in the Women's Army Corps (WAC).²⁰ However, it was not until 1948, three years after the end of the war that women were afforded permanent status in the armed forces. Even with permanent status, their numbers could not exceed more than two percent of the total enlisted population. The number of female officers was limited to ten percent of the enlisted women's strength, and all women were relegated to separate women's "corps." After the war, the few who served were limited predominately to health care and administration. As late as 1965, ninety-three percent of enlisted women served in these occupations.²¹

Prior to 1948, the idea of a permanent place for women in the armed forces, other than in the health professions, was not a forgone conclusion. The Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948, in some ways was a defining moment and the incubus for the creation of women's roles in the military. Major General (Retired) Jeanne Holm interpreted it as the "base of a system of institutional segregation and unequal treatment that would shock modern-day civil libertarians."²² General Holm contended that had women's rights advocates been aware of the struggle fought for women's right to serve militarily, "they would have been dismayed at the degree to which

¹⁸Griffith, 188.

¹⁹Campbell, 520.

²⁰Mattie Treadwell, *US Army In World War II Special Studies The Women's Army Corps*, (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954) xi.

²¹Jeanne Holm, *Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution*, Revised ed. (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1992), 184.

²²*Ibid.*, 178.

women's position in the armed forces had retreated since the enactment of the 1948 Integration Act.”²³

After World War II the military, and most particularly the army, was faced with the significant task of downsizing from an army of ninety-one divisions to seventeen divisions on active duty by June 1946. At its peak strength, in March 1945, the US Army totaled 8,200,000 service personnel.²⁴ The draw down after World War II witnessed seventy-four divisions becoming inactivated or disbanded.²⁵ This was work well suited for people with a keen mind and eye for administration. The workforce needed after a war is vastly different from the force needed to wage the war. To wage a war during this time required massive amounts of combat troops. To downsize a massive army, a robust administrative force was needed. The army needed personnel who could effectively downsize the force; the women who had already previously proven to be excellent administrators, were the perfect fit for this tremendous task.

Few men would have desired to stay in the army to assist with the downsizing once their initial commitment expired. The army faced a critical labor shortage once the draft expired, and women volunteers were an ideal solution to this shortage. In essence this need represented the wellspring for what would later be one of two critical factors solidifying the revolution. The need for human resources was an undying one. The army always needed people willing to serve. As long as women willingly filled this need the flames of the revolution might flicker, but they surely would not die out. The second critical factor helping to sustain the revolution was the fact that the majority of women serving did so in an exceptional fashion. A need arose. Women volunteered to fill the need. Women established their worth to the army through solid performance thereby gaining permanency at the request of the services. This foothold, once

²³Ibid.

²⁴Larry Gormley, *US Army Divisions in World War II*, History Shots, accessed 17 Mar 2006 from <http://www.historyshots.com/usarmy/backstory.cfm>

established, slowly continued to grow with the revolution quietly taking hold during the Cold War Era.

In 1948 in an effort to keep women serving in the military, Congress enacted legislation that created a peacetime WAC that became part of the regular army.²⁶ This occurred due to the passage of Public Law 625, the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948. This enabled women to serve as regular members of the armed forces, rather than only being allowed to serve with the army during wartime. This act was an important legislative and ideological turning point in the role of women. The law established for the first time a permanent place for women in the armed forces. This act created the mobilization base for "womanpower." This institutionalization of women's roles meant they would no longer run the risk of being mobilized in time of need and then immediately discharged at the end of the war or emergency. The generals and admirals were enthusiastic about women's performance during World War II and provided this input to Congress by subsequently requesting women's units be added to each branch of service.²⁷ It is ironic that in some ways the army needed women more so after World War II when the administrative demands increased and the draft expired.

The irony of the Integration Act of 1948 is that it also instituted the concept of sexual discrimination against women in the armed forces. The impacts of this legislation persisted for two decades, until the act was amended. Nevertheless, the notion that military women were to be treated differently had a significantly longer lasting and gripping effect. The act instituted several limitations: no women under age eighteen could enlist; women under age twenty-one needed parental consent. Males could enlist at age seventeen and only needed parental consent if they were under age eighteen. Women could not serve in command positions or hold a permanent rank

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Griffith, 188.

²⁷Campbell, 521.

above lieutenant colonel. Only one woman in each service component could hold the rank of Colonel and that rank was reserved for the duty position of chief or director of her component. Once a woman left that duty position, her rank reverted to lieutenant colonel. Children were not considered dependents unless the father was dead or the mother provided the preponderance of the child's financial needs. Husbands had to demonstrate dependency in order to be entitled to benefits.²⁸

Despite its limitations, at least the Integration Act successfully established a permanent place, albeit it a limited one, for women in the services. The professionalization of women's roles in the armed forces was a significant landmark in women's and military history. This was progress and provided for the professional legitimacy of women serving without fear of being released once a national crisis was over. In this sense, the act was helpful. The new law established limited opportunities for women in each of the four services during peacetime and provided the "framework to mobilize women in the case of a national emergency without having to go through a confusing and time-consuming process of organizing women's programs and policies as was done in 1942 and 1943."²⁹ It was better to have a standing contract and provision for women to serve permanently than no ability to serve. Prior to 1948, there was no standing professional framework from which women were routinely admitted into army service, especially during peacetime. Women were brought in to serve in limited capacities and usually only in times of war or crisis. Once the war was over, the women's service was no longer needed and they ceased serving. The significant change resulting from the Integration Act is that women were admitted on a full professional basis into the army during peacetime and were permanently granted the opportunity to serve.

²⁸Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach, *Women and the Military* (The Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 1977), 11.

²⁹Holm, 113.

The 1948 Integration Act did not pass through Congress easily and it was heavily debated. In the end, General Holm surmised, “the Act was passed largely due to the prevailing concerns about the military’s ability to muster enough men to do the Nation’s military work.”³⁰ This was a concern at the time, which overshadowed any discussions of a woman’s right to serve versus the notion of acquiring enough people to serve.

At the end of World War II, the United States emerged as a superpower with global military commitments. United States troops deployed worldwide and occupied Germany and Japan. However, the postwar demobilization shrunk the military from 12 million to less than 1.4 million in two years.³¹ The magnitude of the reduction of forces presented severe labor challenges and prompted military planners and leaders to reexamine their labor requirements and possible solutions. This situation created circumstances favorable to the expansion of women’s roles in the armed forces.

It is worth noting that women’s roles have not always evolved along a clearly discernable path. The military, civilian, and political establishments often had widely varying opinions as to the roles of women. Each establishment was able to exert varying degrees of influence over women’s roles. Oftentimes, positions taken by various proponents and interest groups were surprising. In some cases, the military leadership urged political leaders to allow for more women to serve and in greater capacities. Curiously and conversely, the wartime directors of the WAC, the Navy’s Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES), the Coast Guard Women’s Reserve (SPARs), and the Women Marines during World War II did not urge for a permanent place for women in the military. All of these directors believed women should only serve during times of war as auxiliaries. This meant after the war they were soon disbanded. Each

³⁰Ibid., 114.

³¹Ibid.

of these directors left military service after the war.³² The directors' belief that women did not need a permanent place in the armed forces was very much an indicator of just how one can be shaped by the prevailing attitudes of the times. The thought that women would remain fringe members of the armed forces prevailed throughout the 1950s.

During World War II, the unprecedented need for a large standing army brought about the most significant numbers of women to serve in the history of the United States. Over 350,000 women served with the armed forces during the World War II era.³³ The numbers of women who served with the army during World War II ballooned from a mere 939 in 1940 and reached a high of 153,644 in 1945; this comprised three percent of the force.³⁴

The difference between the US and its allies was that the US chose not to use women in combat roles. Great Britain and the Soviet Union conscripted women and men for combat roles. This happens still today with US assessing NATO and EU use of women) Researcher M. C. Devilbiss, captured the significance of the US's decision not to allow women to be assigned to combat roles. She wrote, "The importance and reverberations of this decision would be felt throughout the twentieth century."³⁵

Devilbiss's commentary is still relevant and applicable today as the army and nation grapple with questions concerning the assignment and roles of women in the army³⁶. The fact that

³²Holm, 102. In July 1945, Colonel Oveta Culp Hobby resigned as director of WAC. She later served in President Eisenhower's cabinet as the first Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. She was the second woman to serve as a cabinet officer.

³³Women In Military Service For America Memorial, "For the Press Statistics on Women in the Military," www.womensmemorial.org/Press/stats.html (accessed February 7, 2006).

³⁴Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, *Women In The Army Policy Review* (Washington, DC: 12 November 1982).

³⁵M. C. Devilbiss, *Women and Military Service A History, Analysis, and Overview of Key Issues* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1990), 9.

³⁶The questions regarding assignment of women to the newly created Forward Support Companies (FSC) as a part of Army Transformation are one example. There was controversy about whether or not FSCs would be assigned to ground maneuver combat battalions. If FSCs were assigned to ground maneuver combat battalions women assigned to FSCs would be very close to the front combat lines. Previous DoD policy prevented females from assignment to ground maneuver combat arms units below the

the army is currently fighting a war in Afghanistan and Iraq and has worldwide commitments in no less than one hundred and twenty nations is a glimmering indicator of the pressures on the force. The current conditions and strategic environment are ripe for continued change and expansion of women's roles; there is a great need for volunteers to serve the nation.

Despite the fact that there is still some contention over appropriate roles for women, the fact remains that, women's roles have significantly expanded in the army. There is tremendous opportunity for women in the army. Much changed over the course of time, both in the Cold War Era, the Post Cold War Era and the modern era or Information Age.

Women in the 1960s Army

To understand how women's roles evolved it is important to examine from where they began. General Jeanne Holm described the situation of women in the military, during the 1960s, as "typewriter soldiers" and mostly a "token force."³⁷ This token force consisted of approximately 9,300 women.³⁸ In general, the female presence in the army was congenially tolerated, yet not taken too seriously by the operational force. By 1966, women's programs had regressed into something less than those during World War II had and those envisioned at the time of the Integration Act. Women's roles could best be described as "wedded to the dead-ended, outmoded philosophies of women's roles devised in the fifties."³⁹

General Holm described service policies of the sixties as "mirroring the stereotypical thinking of the fifties concerning a woman's proper role in society and the workplace." The sixties also reflected the attitudes of the women's military leadership which was heavily

brigade level. This discussion is outside the scope of this paper but worthy of further study because personnel assigned to FSC would be placed near or collocated with battalion level ground maneuver combat arms units.

³⁷Holm, 175.

³⁸Morden, WAC service statistics taken from June 1965.

³⁹Holm, 175.

influenced by the struggle for survival, acceptance, and by the search for identity in the masculine world of the military. Two themes emerged concerning women's programs in the sixties. The first was the concept of male military elitism, manifested by double standards in recruitment, assignments and other policies. The second was an obsessive emphasis on being feminine and projecting such an image. A typical military women's goal during the sixties focused on acceptance rather than equality.⁴⁰ The services consistently failed to meet their recruiting goals for women in the fifties and when recruiting improved in the early sixties they did not attempt to reach the two percent ceiling authorized by the law. In a 1975 speech to a meeting of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), Holm described the nature of women's service from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s as follows: "It would be no exaggeration to say that probably the most significant accomplishment of the women in the line of the services from 1953 to 1966 was sheer survival."⁴¹

Colonel Barbara J. Bishop, Director of the Women Marines, explained in May 1967 that military women should not try to make comparisons with men because much more is asked of the men. Colonel Bishop remarked, while being interviewed for *Family* magazine, "It behooves every woman to remember she is not going to be asked to put her life at stake as the men are."⁴² The irony of this statement is that women's lives were often put at risk while serving the Nation. Although a women's primary function was not fighting, the implications of modern warfare firmly implanted the notion that all who served in times of war risked something. There truly are no completely safe havens on a modern battlefield. This is especially true concerning irregular warfare and asymmetric, or nonlinear, noncontiguous battlefields. The majority of the US Army's conflicts during the later half of the twentieth century were nonlinear and urban operations that

⁴⁰Ibid., 179.

⁴¹Binkin and Bach, 12.

⁴²Holm, 179.

often transitioned into peace enforcement, peace keeping or stability and reconstruction operations.

In 1967 Congress modified the Integration Act by removing certain grade ceilings; however, it left no doubt as to the continued unequal status of women in the military. The House Armed Services Committee said there could not be complete equality between men and women with regard to military careers. Surprisingly, the women directors of each service proponent were not much help in changing the status quo. They seldom questioned the concept of inequality because they recognized that women in the services fared better than many in other professions in American society dominated by men. The women directors also believed in the “fundamental rightness of this second-class role.”⁴³ The women directors seemed to be incapable of visualizing beyond their current roles and in essence supported the separate and unequal status of women.

In 1969, President Nixon appointed a commission to develop a plan for implementing an all-volunteer force. This commission examined a variety of alternatives for easing the task of attracting the large numbers of volunteers necessary. Fourteen years later in a response to criticism, the commission’s former director, William H. Meckling, commented that he was shocked to find that the commission failed to consider expanding women’s participation considering their near desperate quest for a supply of volunteers. In spite of the growing dire need for more people, the task force assumed women would continue to constitute only about 1.2 percent of the post-Vietnam force.⁴⁴

By the end of June 1968, 10,711 enlisted women served in the WAC. This was less than 0.8 percent of the total enlisted strength of the active army. In 1968, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel contracted the Battelle Institute to determine the personnel requirements for

⁴³Ibid., 178.

⁴⁴Martin Binkin, *Who Will Fight the Next War? The Changing Face of the American Military* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), 5.

the next decade.⁴⁵ The Battelle study, also known as “The Army 75 Personnel Concept Study” or “Army 75” identified two important trends that made it possible to expand the WAC. The first trend was the growing demands made by American women for greater opportunities in the work force. The second trend was the belief that every woman volunteer meant one less man would be drafted. In order for the army to meet future manpower goals as a volunteer organization, the study recommended increasing the WAC enlisted strength to 20,000 by June 1975. The study concluded that this was an appropriate strength for the WAC in a peacetime active force ranging between one and two million men.⁴⁶

In 1969 another central study was commissioned. This work examined the possibility of transitioning to an all-volunteer force. Lieutenant Colonel Jack Butler’s “Project PROVIDE” concluded that the womanpower available was sufficient to provide an almost limitless source of personnel for the army. He recommended the WAC be increased to 22,400 enlisted women over a five-year period. Interestingly, Butler believed the expansion of the WAC required no justification because the need to expand was “self-evident” in the almost daily requests for WAC members to fill male requirements worldwide instigated by the military build up in Vietnam.⁴⁷

What concerned Butler was the impact the WAC expansion would have on the army’s training bases and facilities since the WAC training was not yet integrated into the Regular Army. The major limitation to the expansion of the WAC was not jobs for women but facilities for them. Facility and training space at Fort McClellan, Alabama was minimally sufficient for the three hundred officers and six thousand enlisted women that trained there annually. Existing WAC policy prohibited assignment of women where there was no WAC unit or suitable on post housing for women. This meant separate barracks would have to be built or existing barracks

⁴⁵Griffith, 188.

⁴⁶Ibid., 189.

⁴⁷Ibid.

would need to be converted for WAC use. The PROVIDE study group identified recruiting and the image of the WAC as two impediments to achieving the recommended numbers of women for the army. Butler identified “traditionalism by parents, males, and women themselves,” as factors which discouraged women from seeking army work, let alone a career that was perceived as threatening to their femininity especially given the gripping cultural norms of American society that were just beginning to change.⁴⁸ The influence and significance of culture on women was not easily changed. It took decades and changes in world events for women in general to be able to break free from the mold cast for them by American society. This role cast women as homemakers, mothers and nurturers, not working women and breadwinners.

The idea of women serving in the army, let alone making service a career, took decades to flow into mainstream acceptability and credibility. To many observers, women served silently for decades. To most casual observers, army service women collectively were insignificant. However, over the course of time these seemingly silent server’s sounds began to reverberate. The tone of the sounds had not changed; it was the same sound women had been signaling since the beginning of their military history. The Nation’s ability to decipher or tune into the sound had changed. This change identifies the beginning of the RMA. Countless women veterans deserve credit for their steadfast dedication toward creating change in the military culture.

Although the military services were expanded in the sixties, this did not generate a proportional growth in women’s programs. All of the women’s programs continued to decline during this period. Women’s strengths receded to their lowest levels since before the Korean War. By 1965 there were only 30,600 women in the line in all of the armed forces. The draft was generally accepted as necessary to provide enough manpower. There was virtually no debate or opposition to extending the Universal Military Service and Training Act in 1955, 1959, or 1963.

⁴⁸Ibid., 190.

The army was not looking for women to fill its ranks. Relatively small draft calls and a surplus of young men removed incentives to use more women despite stated policies by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to encourage greater use of women in society.⁴⁹

At the end of 1969, there was little empirical evidence to suggest that any significant expansion for women in the armed services was anticipated. The two percent cap on the numbers of women allowed to serve existed until 1967 when legislation was adopted which altered the law limiting women's career opportunities and retirement options. The changes brought about were due in part to a Pentagon task force established in 1966 and by pressures brought by military officers. These female officers took note of the feminist movement gaining force in the United States. The task force reassessed the role of women in the armed forces and considered their potential for greater employment, recruitment, and retention especially in light of growing demands for administrative skills required for the buildup of forces to be sent to Southeast Asia and elsewhere. At the end of the 1960s, women made up less than two percent of the enlisted force. From 1948 through 1969, the percentage of women serving varied between one and 1.5 percent, averaging only 1.2 percent.⁵⁰

The Quiet Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

The incorporation of women into the US Army was an evolutionary process resulting in a revolution in military affairs. Major Augustine G. Riolo alluded to this revolutionary aspect in his thesis, *Women in the Army*. He noted that no army ever consciously decided to include women permanently as a part of the force during peacetime.⁵¹ This paper argues and demonstrates the

⁴⁹Holm, 177.

⁵⁰Binkin, 4.

⁵¹Augustine G. Riolo, *Women in the Army*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1980) ii. Both the Israelis and Russians utilized women as combat forces during war and in particularly when the existence of the nation was at stake. However, once peace was declared women largely left the military force. Women did not remain a permanent part of the military organization.

conscious inclusion of continually expanding numbers of women into the army and concludes that this represents an unrecognized revolution in military affairs.

Army women have been present on the battlefield since the birth of the United States. Although women willingly volunteered their talents to the nation, their level of commitment was not officially recognized or incorporated by the army in terms of permanent status until 1948. The struggle for inclusion, acceptance and eventually parity evolved during the course of over two hundred years. This evolution of roles combined with several distinct events set the conditions for a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) within the US Army.⁵²

Women's roles transformed extensively from 1970 to 1990. In two decades, the percentage of women in the army rose from less than two percent in 1970 to 11 percent by 1990.⁵³ The revolution in military affairs is simply the extensive, permanent and transformational use of women in the US Army. Overtime this qualitative transformation (evolution) of roles became a quantitative revolution. The US Army's acceptance and expansion of women's roles into the military ranks as permanent members of the force represents an RMA in its own right. This revolution is ongoing, continually expanding, and will likely have significant effects on the military and the fabric of US society over time.

The framework for the RMA argument was based on the definition and analysis provided by noted military historians, MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray. Murray explained that recent military events "suggest major changes in technology and weapons with substantial

⁵²MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, ed., *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 3. Knox and Murray provide excellent analysis of the term revolution in military affairs and provide an historical framework for understanding the concept. Knox and Murray noted that although the term became popular with American military strategists in the 1990s, its current use stems from early modern historians and Soviet military theorists. A definition and discussion of RMA will follow later in this thesis.

⁵³Morden, 409. WAC strength in 1970 was 12,518.

implications for conducting war in this century.”⁵⁴ In a separate work, Murray outlined several factors propelling innovation in military affairs. These factors included the rapid pace of technological change, enormous amounts of money spent on military research, and the expanding sophisticated manner of evaluation for organizations and equipment. “The fusion of technology and potent management skills that mobilize mass organizations makes military change inevitable.”⁵⁵ The technologies influencing civilian life in the twenty-first century may have an even greater impact on the military than the technology of the past century.⁵⁶

To comprehend what Murray implied, definitions of the terms “military revolutions” and “Revolutions in Military Affairs” was necessary. According to Murray, radical innovation and change is attributed to military revolutions and RMAs. Military revolutions were more significant than RMAs. Military revolutions fundamentally changed the nature of warfare in the West. There were four military revolutions: creation of the modern nation state, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and World War I.⁵⁷ Murray compared these revolutions to earthquakes to convey their magnitude. This analogy is helpful considering he used a similar geological terminology to convey the significance of RMAs as after-shocks. Military revolutions recast the nature of society and the state as well as military organizations.⁵⁸ Murray analyzed the twentieth century and made an argument for the following as possible RMAs: World War I as a combined arms war, blitzkrieg, carrier war, strategic air war, submarine war, amphibious war, intelligence, nuclear weapons and people’s war.⁵⁹

⁵⁴Williamson Murray, “Thinking About Revolutions In Military Affairs,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer (1997): 69-76. Interestingly, Murray noted that historians have done little work on RMAs and the work that has been done focused on the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries. This makes it even more applicable to focus research on modern RMAs.

⁵⁵Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, ed., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Murray, “Thinking About Revolutions In Military Affairs,” 70.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid.

Military historians have concentrated on issues such as innovation, effectiveness, adaptation, organizational behavior and battle histories. Murray argued that although technology is important in RMAs, the historical record suggests that technological advances alone do not make up the majority of the elements of an RMA equation. Military history over the past eighty years offers many cases where forces with inferior technology have won conflicts. The historical record suggests that the crucial element in RMAs is “conceptual.” The idea of a conceptual component of an RMA is most applicable to the employment of women in the US Army. The introduction of women in large numbers with the intent that their ability to serve be permanently protected represents a unique element of a conceptual RMA.

In the book, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution*, Knox and Murray explained that American technological changes occurring during the 1970s included “striking new technology” such as precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles and stealth technology.⁶⁰ He analyzed the components of each of these RMAs to gain knowledge of common themes across RMAs. Murray noted that the crucial element in most RMAs is conceptual in nature as opposed to technological. Technological change, although recently in the US Army is receiving much attention, has traditionally represented a relatively small part of the RMA equation. To be sure, technology is important in the current structure of the US Army. However, some conceptual change adopted during the 1970s was as significant as technology is today. The roles performed by women in the army represent two remarkable aspects of change. Women can rightfully claim both evolution and revolution. This change process which begun as an evolution ultimately became a revolution. It became a revolution because of the increasing consistency with which women participated in the military once they were allowed to join and no other nation in the world employs as many women in their armed forces as the US. This is indicative of an organizational transformation

⁶⁰MacGregor and Williamson, 3.

regarding the use of personnel. The conceptual changes implemented by the US Army during the twentieth century represented a conceptual RMA. This conceptual change was the permanent employment of women in relatively large numbers. The concepts, which spurred significant legal and administrative changes, were the Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948, the integration of women into the Regular Army through the disestablishment of the Women's Army Corps and the implementation of the All Volunteer Force (AVF). The redefinition and expansion of women's roles in the US Army and to some extent in American society represented an RMA.

CHAPTER TWO REVELATION OF THE REVOLUTION

Perhaps the best thing about the future is that it comes just one day at a time.

Anonymous

Women's Roles in the US Army 1970-2007

Introduction

Coming of Age, Again

In hindsight, three political decisions were collectively paramount in creating the conditions for the expansion of women's roles in the military during the 1970s and beyond. The title of this introductory section is called "Coming of Age, Again" to signify the stagnation occurring during the 1950s and 1960s that had emerged and taken root in the WAC. In many ways the status and roles of women had subsided since the days of their rather robust efforts and roles during WWII. The times of crisis and need produced marvelous opportunities for women during the war and this example of their abilities would reemerge in a stronger form during the 1970s.

The reason why the opportunities of the 1970s emerged as a stronger form was due to the political and social changes under way in the US and the methods by which these changes were implemented. The changes created in the 1970s were not temporary; they were binding - legally and socially. The level of social activism in American society no doubt swayed policymakers from the president, the Congress and right on down to the military leadership. Many recognized the need to change course in order to rise from the ashes of a failed strategy in Vietnam. The sense action that originated with discontent over Vietnam also permeated throughout other sectors in the society.

There were changes to the federal law and national strategic policies. The first political decision, made in 1967, eliminated the ceilings on the grades and numbers of military women allowed to serve. The second decision eliminated the male draft in 1973. This decision led to the creation of the All-Volunteer Force. The third decision admitted women to the military academies in 1976.⁶¹ The decision to admit women to the service academies was the result of an act of Congress. The effect of these three decisions was synergistic. The three collectively proved to be more significant than any one alone could have proved. Overtime the effects of these decisions were magnified and they certainly contributed to the revolution in military affairs that was taking shape. The interplay of these political, administrative and legal decisions along with the combination of events in American history from 1970 through 2007 undoubtedly forged new and diverse opportunities for women.

The 1970s

This portion of the chapter focuses on two significant events and the tremendous change caused by those events during the pivotal decade of the 1970s. The two most prominent policy and organizational changes adopted during this decade was the US commitment to create an all-volunteer military, and subsequently the dissolution of the Women's Army Corps (WAC). Abolishing the WAC was significant because it meant that military women gained status as members of the regular army. It also integrated women into the regular army force, albeit not the combat arms branches.⁶² Inclusion into the regular army allowed women the same general status

⁶¹Carolyn H. Becraft, *Women and the Military: Bureaucratic Policies and Politics*, ed. E. A. Blacksmith, *Women in the Military*, vol. 64, no. 5, *The Reference Shelf* (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1992), 9.

⁶²Branches in the US Army are divided into three categories: Combat Arms (CA), Combat Support (CS), and Combat Service Support (CSS). The branches in Combat Arms include Infantry, Armor, Special Forces, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Engineers, and Aviation. Until 1993, women were not permitted to be branched into the Combat Arms. In 1993, Combat Aviation was opened to women by order of the Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin.

as their male soldiers. The decision to abolish the WAC would become the crack in the foundation of a gender segregated force and the culture that bred such exclusion. These were unprecedented times for the US Army. The military had not functioned without a draft since 1948.

In several ways the seventies were a time of tremendous change for the army. Significant policy changes were adopted in the 1970s that drastically influenced the army for the subsequent two decades. The 1970s were starkly different from the 1960s for women serving. The sixties saw continuation of the draft and a stagnation of women's roles. The key military events of the 1970s included: establishment of the all-volunteer force in 1973, difficulty meeting male recruiting goals, and the dissolution of the Women's Army Corps in 1978.

During the 1970s the United States Army was faced with four significant events that shaped the nature of the army during this decade. The first event was the legacy of an unpopular war in South East Asia that damaged the army's credibility and distanced it from the society it was designed to serve and protect. The second event was the prominence and impact of the women's movement during the 1970s. The issues highlighted by the women's rights movement eventually ebbed into the policies of the army, with the help of the Supreme Court and Congress. Thirdly, the US Army increasingly began to rely on technology to assist in its war-fighting efforts. Technology began to be viewed as a way to meet the demand to accomplish the fourth event, the growing demand for decreasing the army's need for sheer manpower. This last point produced by the problematic outcomes of the Vietnam War, and largely the expiration of the draft.

Three critical national events coalesced in 1970 marking the year a watershed for women in the military. The first event was President Nixon's announcement on 23 April 1970 of the

decision to end the draft and eventually implement the all-volunteer force.⁶³ The transition from a conscription to volunteer army was arguably the most important transformation of the US military in the past century, according to the editors Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis L. Gilroy and John T. Warner in their book “The All-volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service.”⁶⁴ The second event was the congressional debates over the Equal Rights Amendment. The third event was the introduction of several court suits by women claiming sexual discrimination by the military. Over the next decade, Congress, the courts, and a variety of political pressures compelled the military to change its policies and regulations, so they were more in line with contemporary concepts of equal opportunity and personnel management.⁶⁵

The Twenty-seventh Amendment to the constitution, also known as the Equal Rights Amendment, was finally passed by Congress in 1972.⁶⁶ It had been proposed since 1923 yet was never ratified. This amendment prohibited discrimination based on sex. This amendment signaled positive changes for women choosing to serve in the armed forces and gave a legal basis for calls to open more military fields to women.

As more military work became less physical in nature, it also became less restricted to the sole domain of males and a quiet revolution acquired a strong foothold. The catalyst for this revolution began in 1948 with the passage of the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act. This act established a permanent place for women in the armed forces, and lives on today as reflected by the numbers of women serving.

⁶³Griffith, 42.

⁶⁴Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis L. Gilroy, and John T. Warner, eds, *The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service* (Virginia: Potomac Books, 2004) Accessed info about book online from www.potomacbooksinc.com/Books/subjectDetail.aspx?ID=37.

⁶⁵Holm, 262.

⁶⁶Riolo, 15.

The Volunteer Army Arrives

The aftershocks of the Vietnam War and the desire to end the draft led the army down a path that entailed strategies advocating less of a reliance on large numbers of men to fill a standing army and more reliance on technology to replace people. While this approved concept was considered modern and new, less explicitly articulated was the revolutionary aspect incorporating larger numbers of women into the army. Women were generally more eager than men were to stay in the army to handle the administrative and technological tasks than were men, especially at the tail end of a war. It seemed that once a war or conflict was over few men were interested in duty that entailed administration and paperwork. Women were more likely to find value in performing this type of task since they were not engaged in fighting the battles. Men whose primary mission is combat would have had little interest in performing administrative duties after the conflict. They were more preoccupied with returning to civilian life and exiting the army after their tour concluded.

Events in the last half of the sixties and early seventies combined to gradually end the long period of stagnation and regression in the women's line programs. According to former Department of the Army, Chief of Staff for Personnel, General John M. LeMoyné, the contributions of women during the 1970s enabled the success of the All-Volunteer Army.⁶⁷ Without large numbers of women eager to enlist the idea of the volunteer army likely would have been shelved.

Martin Binkin, Brookings Institution author on military personnel issues commented on the importance of women to the army's efforts to establish the volunteer force. Binkin stated, "The all-volunteer force might not have survived had it not been for the influx of highly qualified

⁶⁷John M. LeMoyné, Lieutenant General (Retired) oral interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 30 November 2006. See also Binkin "Who Will Fight the Next War? The Changing Face of the American Military," 8.

women.”⁶⁸ This highlighted the army’s real need for personnel. This presented a stark difference of view to the naysayer contending that the army is no place for women and would be better without them. Thus far, history has seemingly proved them wrong.

Vietnam created manpower problems. Pressures growing brought the expanding role of women in the labor force and a new more aggressive tide of feminism began to affect the military. The synergistic effects of these forces challenged the services’ traditional attitudes toward women and forced change on a reluctant military. The result was a gradual shift in the change and status of women. This change was accelerated by the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment and the revolutionary idea of implementation of an all-volunteer force for the army and the integration of women into the Regular Army after the WAC was disbanded.

By 1972, the magnitude of the challenge of establishing an all-volunteer force became clearer. The possibility of increasing the numbers of women was taken more seriously. A task force was established by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird to prepare plans to increase the use of women to offset possible shortages in male recruits after the end of the draft.⁶⁹

Beginning in fiscal year 1973, the army with the approval of the Defense Department prepared to increase the size of the WAC by approximately 50 percent in two phases. The timing of the increase was contingent on funding for the construction of housing and training facilities. In June 1971, \$6.3 million in additional funds was requested in the FY 73 Military Construction Appropriation for necessary WAC facilities. When Congress disapproved the request as an economy measure, the Department of the Army directed its field commands to examine no-cost and low-cost means to complete the expansion. The Continental Army Command (CONARC) indicated it could create one additional WAC training company in FY 73 with no additional funds. Because of this information a more modest expansion of the WAC from 12,400 to 13,400

⁶⁸Ibid., 8.

enlisted women by the end of FY 73 was approved. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics again requested funds for an additional WAC housing and training facilities to support a 50 percent increase of the corps by Fiscal Year 1978.⁷⁰

The trickled expansion of the WAC halted in mid-June 1972 when the army realized the stark possibility of not being able to man the force. On 5 June 1972, personnel analysts from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs advised the Secretary of the Army, Robert F. Froehlke, of a potential shortage in male military personnel in the first year following the expiration of the draft (1973). This projected shortage could make it impossible to maintain the army's thirteen active divisions at an appropriate level of readiness. Froehlke immediately asked the Army Chief of Staff to direct a special study to find "ways to reduce our dependence on male military manpower, or, as a last resort, to decrease the total active authorizations to be supported."⁷¹ This looming possibility prompted army planners to seek new and creative ways to address the shortage. What happened over the next several years fundamentally changed the nature of women's service in the army.

By ending conscription, the United States embarked on a "bold and unprecedented experiment" to raise a superpower-sized military force with volunteers.⁷² The 1970s were a tremendously challenging period of transition for the army. The end result of the transition was a force that attracted the best-educated and most trainable recruits in its history. The transition to the all-volunteer force brought dramatic increases in the numbers of women serving.⁷³ The significance of the creation of the all-volunteer force in 1973 should not be underestimated. The

⁶⁹Ibid., 5.

⁷⁰Griffith, 191.

⁷¹Ibid., 192.

⁷²Binkin, vii.

⁷³Ibid.

all-volunteer force provided a framework for reevaluating the role of military women and their contributions to the soon to be created volunteer force of two million.⁷⁴

The decision to end the draft was the most significant event facilitating the expansion of women's participation in the armed force during the 1970s. This decision produced unexpected and unprecedented expansion in women's roles. By 1979, the United States emerged as the world leader in the use of military women both in total numbers and in proportion to the total force. In 1972, 45,000 women served in the armed forces. This comprised 1.9 percent of all active-duty personnel.⁷⁵ The percentage of women in the military increased from less than 2 percent in 1973 to 8 percent in 1980. Most of this expansion occurred in the 1970s.⁷⁶ The proportion of women assigned to traditionally female health care and clerical jobs drastically decreased from more than 90 percent in 1970 to less than 50 percent by 1993. Changes also occurred in the army's force structure. Under a new "total force" policy, the reserve forces became the primary means to expand the army in an emergency and would be heavily relied upon in war plans.⁷⁷

The following excerpt from the "Report on the Utilization of Military Women" mentions the revolutionary change occurring in the 1970s.

It is convenient that the decision to implement the all-volunteer force occurred at the same time as the national drive for women's legal and economic equality because of the synergistic effect created by these two events. The end of conscription and the women's rights movement significantly changed the shape of the armed forces. The pursuit of these two goals, equal opportunity and greater utilization, may well bring about the most revolutionary policy changes experienced in the history of military women.⁷⁸

⁷⁴Holm, 246.

⁷⁵Binkin, 6.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid., 1.

⁷⁸Department of Defense, All-Volunteer Task Force, "Report on the Utilization of Military Women," December 1972.

The impacts of the events occurring in the 1970s can be measured by the number of women serving as well as by the increased variety of jobs they performed.⁷⁹ Explosive growth occurred during the 1970s. From 1972 to 1976 the number of women on active duty more than doubled. By the end of fiscal year 1976, women's numbers reached 109,000, which was just over five percent of the army.⁸⁰

The irony of these monumental changes is that much of the progress and eventual success was largely invisible to those serving. Former WACs, Lieutenant Colonel Sharon Scott and Sergeant Margaret Mosely LaFace echoed sentiments of constraint by being in the army. At the time the events occurred, they did not believe their contributions amounted to much. One is generally most challenged to see the height of the trees whilst standing in the forests midst. The magnitude of events is the work of historians, and those who create the events are the trailblazers and visionaries, usually not content with the status quo. Their stories revealed women clearly frustrated by the practical application of life in the army, and specifically having to function outside the accepted gender norms of their era. It is very true that to appreciate what occurred one needs distance from the events. When analyzing the 1970s, nearly thirty-five years hence, they seemed like times of splendid progress.

It is easy to take for granted the success of the all-volunteer force now since it has been thirty-three years since its implementation. This is a considerable amount of time given America's perspective regarding time. Most serving in the military today have no recollection of a conscripted force. The concept of an all-volunteer force has become second nature. The conditions during the 1970s that brought about the desire for a volunteer force are important because those same conditions helped pave the way for the expansion of women's roles.

⁷⁹Binkin, 6.

⁸⁰Ibid., 6-7.

WAC Success Leads to Integration

The status of women in the army during the early 1970s could best be described as separate and unequal when compared to the men because they had not been integrated into the Regular Army. The WAC was a separate military organization within the army. Although the WAC granted women limited duty status it was still not equal in status, rights or privileges to the Regular Army. For instance, the WAC officers could not command men initially and the WAC director would not be promoted above the rank of Colonel. Although the army came to rely on and need women to fill its ranks in earnest since WW II, it took the army until 1978 to integrate women fully into its ranks. This integration finally occurred when the WAC was disbanded.

In 1972 the army developed plans to double the numbers of women enlisting from 1972 to 1977. From 1972 until 1976 (the years considered as the transition to the all-volunteer force), the number of women on active duty equated to slightly over five percent of the force by the end of fiscal 1976. Although seemingly insignificant at only five percent, the importance of this statistic is that the numbers of women more than doubled from 1972 through 1976.⁸¹ In 1978 the military was directed to double the number of women serving by 1983. In order to double the number of women serving, approximately 200,000 women were needed resulting in an eleven percent force composition.⁸²

Technology was another significant influencer during the 1970s. Since the 1950s the emergence of increasingly sophisticated technology was noticeable in the army. These changes in military technology made warfare more capital intensive while reducing the size of basic weapon

⁸¹Binkin, 6.

⁸²Ibid., 7.

systems.⁸³ Examples of new technologies introduced during the 1970s included advanced signal communications equipment and the use of computers.

The adoption of technology presented a new arena for women to migrate toward. One of the consequences of this new technology was the belief that technology could substitute for some of the traditional units of combat power. The relationship was such that technology had an inverse relationship to manpower. The more technology used, the less manpower was needed to perform tasks because the technology decreased the need for human labor. Another aspect of the use of technology is its ability to decrease the amount of human effort necessary to perform tasks. This technological breakthrough meant that sheer physical strength was not as important as it was prior to technological enablers. The impact of technology provided a solid basis for the expansion of women's roles because it meant that as long as they were physically capable of performing a task, military mission accomplishment would not be degraded. The worry that women could not physically perform strenuous tasks was an often-cited reason for restricting their roles in the military. Technology was a definite door-opener in the expansion of women's roles.

June of 1977 was the established target date to have more than 110,000 line officers and enlisted women were on active duty. This was quite an accomplishment in the increase of numbers of women serving and the numbers were still climbing. This is a stark contrast with 1972, when one in every thirty enlisted recruits was a woman. By 1976 one in every thirteen recruits was a woman.⁸⁴

The expansion of women recruits helped the armed forces meet recruiting goals while providing the army with a much higher quality recruits in a number of increasingly important

⁸³Mady Wechsler Segal and David R. Segal, *Social Change And The Participation Of Women In The American Military*. A paper written as a component part of the compilation report "Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Military Testing Association (23rd) held at Arlington, Virginia 25-30 October 1981, Volume 2. Source: Army Research Institute, for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, VA.

⁸⁴Holm, 250.

areas. These increasingly important areas of specialty included recruits with higher than average mental abilities, higher education levels, increased levels of motivation and discipline. These were the desired traits for the making of a modern army that was adopting technology. The army needed motivated and dedicated recruits who could learn to use this technology. The more technical a system the longer it takes to become proficient on that system. This coexisted perfectly with the adoption of a volunteer force. Personnel turnover is costly and training soldiers to a high level of technical proficiency can not be accomplished overnight.

From 1976 to 1980 army recruits' level of education and entry test scores were problematic. Thirty-eight percent of the recruits were high school drop outs. There was enough of a recruiting challenge to prompt some lawmakers to consider returning to a draft. Women volunteers were generally better educated and attained higher scores than males. In test scores for the recruits between 1974 and 1980, nearly thirty-two percent of males scored in the lowest acceptable category on the standardized entry test compared with fifteen percent of women. The scores of less than twenty-two percent of the men were in the top one-third of the population, whereas more than forty-four percent of the women scored in the top one-third.

The courts were the "ultimate catalyst" in revising discriminatory policies not Congress, the White House, or the Department of Defense (DOD). Beginning in 1970, the services were hit with a series of lawsuits brought by military women who challenged the constitutionality of policies on equal protection grounds. The passage of the Equal Rights Amendment provided some impetus for change even though it was vague about its impact on the military establishment.⁸⁵ Military women challenged the military's personnel policies claiming discrimination based on gender. Although some of the results of the litigation filed by women were mixed, a landmark victory was achieved in 1973 in the case of *Frontiero v. Richardson*

⁸⁵Ibid., 266.

where the Supreme Court struck down the law that denied women dependency benefits that were afforded to males.⁸⁶

When the services began their own internal review of sex discrimination policies, they were surprised by the extent of the problem. Though the Air Force claimed integration, it found thirty-two laws and policies that treated men and women differently. Much change occurred in the 1970s. Gradually, the selection criteria were equalized; most female only procurement and training programs were combined with the previously all-male programs. Promotion lists and career monitoring for women were incorporated with men's systems. Family policies were revised and made equitable amongst the sexes; and the women's support systems created under the WAC were abolished.⁸⁷

The election of President Carter in 1976 added emphasis on equal opportunity, and challenged the Pentagon's plans to slow the expansion of women's roles from 1976 throughout the next five years. Under the Pentagon's plan, the proportion of women in the force would have remained at five percent. The Pentagon's new civilian leadership in the Carter administration pressured the armed forces to recruit more women because of the services' continuing inability to attract enough qualified male volunteers. By 1978 the services were directed to double the number of women by 1983. This doubling raised the female enlisted force to nearly 200,000, which was just over eleven percent of the total force.⁸⁸

With the end of the Women Army Corps, in 1978, women were increasingly integrated into combat service support jobs. In 1977, Secretary of the Army Clifford L. Alexander revised the army's combat exclusion policy permitting women to serve on crews at long-range missile and rocket sites and in nuclear security duties. For the first time, women officers could be

⁸⁶Binkin, 6.

⁸⁷Holm, 260.

⁸⁸Binkin, 7.

commissioned into the Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery. The army also opened assignments in the 82nd Airborne Division this led to women being permitted to attend airborne or parachute training. Some in the army were not in favor of opening these kinds of positions and training for women. They believed that these assignments ought to be restricted to those in the combat arms.⁸⁹

The 1980s

The extent of women's roles ebbed and flowed with the comings and goings of the political administrations and military establishments. President Carter's administration pushed for a level of expansion that exceeded the comfort level of the military. During the Reagan administration, the ambitious plans of the Carter administration were placed on hold. The Reagan Pentagon justified the reevaluation of women's roles by contending that the expansion of the 1970s was generated by social pressures for equal opportunity at the expense of military readiness. The Reagan administration thought it necessary to study the best ways to use women's skills yet not compromise military readiness and efficiency.⁹⁰

One month after Reagan took office, in 1981; the army announced plans to reexamine all matters of women soldiers and decided not to increase the numbers of enlisted women, which stood at 65,000. These changes, rejecting the expansion of women's service, were made without the consent of civilian leaders in the Pentagon. Predictably, the change also caused dismay amongst military women and their congressional supporters.⁹¹

This chapter will presents two military operations conducted in the 1980s, Grenada and Panama. Three personal histories of women serving from the 1970s through 1990s appear as historical vignettes in Appendix 8. One of the women interviewed was branched Military Police.

⁸⁹Ibid., 403.

⁹⁰Ibid., 9.

Interestingly enough she chose Military Police because at that time it was one of few fields, which offered excellent training opportunities for women. The MPs afforded women the same training opportunities as men in the army. This type of opportunity was appealing to both women. The 1980s were also a time of change for the army, but not as drastic as the change of the 1970s. Women's roles were expanded in terms of the types of MOSs available and the units of assignment open to women. The significance of the volunteer force and the importance of building a cohesive army that utilized its assets wisely would become fully apparent in the 1980s. The army no longer had the luxury of excess personnel. This was a drastic change from previous eras of total mobilization and the size of the army that fought in the 1980s was a fraction of the size of the one that fought in Vietnam, Korea and World War II.

During the 1980s when it began to be easier to enlist enough men the army reexamined the roles women were performing in the army. This reexamination coincided with the 1980 election of Republican, Ronald Reagan. Judith Hicks Stiehm noted that there was a "pause" in the planned increase in the numbers of women recruited. Basic training was re-segregated by gender of and some of the MOSs that were previously open to women were closed. Women had already been trained in these MOSs and were already performing these jobs. According to Steihm this continual reevaluation of women's roles has created uneasiness among women interested in making the army a career.⁹²

By 1977 the army had opened up all of its four hundred and sixty seven military occupational specialties (MOSs) except for thirty seven to women. Women were only excluded from Infantry, Special Forces, Armor, cannon Field Artillery and short-range air defense artillery

⁹¹Binkin, 9.

⁹²Judith Hicks Stiehm, *Arms and the Enlisted Woman* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 14.

units.⁹³ Although this represented a vast increase in the number of career fields open to women, there were still severe limitations in the types of units female soldiers were assigned to and certainly their participation in major military operations was restricted by their individual commands. The commands could selectively decide who to deploy and who to leave behind in garrison when a mission occurred. This distinction of women being allowed into a combat zone was highlighted in the operations in Grenada and Panama. In 1983, during Grenada women were not utilized until after combat operations had ceased. By 1989 women were not only present in Panama at “H” hour, the hour that combat operations commence, they were embedded as support personnel assisting the combat operations. These differences in circumstances will be elaborated on later in this chapter.

The remainder of this chapter explores two small-scale US military conflicts during the 1980s--Grenada and Panama--and examines the evolving role of women during both of these military operations. These operations were significant for two reasons. They were the first military test of the All-Volunteer Force. Secondly, they were the first time the military establishment, civilian Department of Defense leaders, and the American public witnessed a gender integrated army in action.

Grenada - Operation Urgent Fury

In October 1983, six days after Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was executed by Bernard Corad’s Stalinist sect, the United States invaded Grenada.⁹⁴ President Ronald Reagan ordered US Marines, Army Rangers, Navy Special Warfare teams, and other military forces to invade Grenada. The planning time used for this operation was “very compressed.” From the time

⁹³ Donna Miles, “The Women Of Just Cause,” *Soldiers*, vol 45 (March 1990), 24.

⁹⁴ Invasion of Grenada. Accessed from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Grenada 16 December 2005.

preliminary planning began until commencement of military operations was only thirteen days. The largest number of US forces present on the island at any one time during the intervention was approximately 6,500.⁹⁵ The reason for the invasion was to protect American lives and interests. The military action was a direct response to the takeover of the tiny Caribbean Island by “a brutal group of leftist thugs.” US troops, plus a small force from six Caribbean nations, overcame surprisingly strong resistance from the Cuban forces, who supported the island’s new regime.⁹⁶ Eighteen US servicemen were killed in action on Grenada, one hundred and sixteen were wounded. Seven US helicopters were destroyed and eleven were damaged.⁹⁷

There were several events that contributed to a need for international intervention in Grenada: the murder of the deposed Prime Minister Bishop, and members of his government, the collapse of all governmental authority, escalating violence, and the likeliness for further violence. The United States Government was concerned about the safety of approximately a thousand of its citizens who would have been endangered by a lapse of law and order, by a shoot-on-sight curfew, and by the unpredictable power struggle that occurred. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) called a meeting at Bridgetown, Barbados, and through a unanimous vote decided that the conditions in Grenada required action under the 1981 treaty that established the organization. The organization asked the United States, Jamaica and Barbados for help. The United States received a formal request for help on 23 October 1983. President Reagan decided that US forces would join with forces of the OECS nations and take action on the island.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ House, Committee On Armed Services, *Full Committee Hearing On the Lessons Learned As a result of the United States Military Operations in Grenada*, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 24 January 1984, 4.

⁹⁶Barbara A. Wilson, *Operation Urgent Fury and Operation Just Cause*. © 1996 to date by Captain Barbara A. Wilson, USAF (Ret) <http://usmilitary.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?zi=1/XJ&sdn=usmilitary&zu=http%3A%2F%2Fuserpages.aug.com%2Fcaptbarb%2Fpanama.html>; Internet; accessed 16 December 2005.

⁹⁷House, Committee On Armed Services, *Full Committee Hearing On the Lessons Learned As a result of the United States Military Operations in Grenada*, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 24 January 1984, 4.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, 1-2.

The collective military action began on 25 October 1983 and was unequivocally successful. American citizens were safely evacuated from the island and order was restored. The extremists' threat was removed and Governor General Scoon was able to reassert his legitimate authority. On 3 November 1983 hostilities were declared over and US combat forces were withdrawn by 15 December. A small non-combat US military support element consisting of approximately three hundred soldiers replaced the combat force on Grenada to provide support and augment the Caribbean Peace Force. This unit was organized around a military police company whose mission was to support the Caribbean Peace Force. This unit was called the US Military Support Element Grenada.⁹⁹ Once the Grenadian Government reconstituted and trained its own police force, the US troops and the Caribbean Peace Force were withdrawn.

The invasion of Grenada revealed many surprising conditions and situations about the secret military agreements that were brewing on the island. There were nearly nine hundred Cuban, Soviet, Korean, Libyan, East German and Bulgarian personnel on the island. A significant number of weapons were found, including: artillery, antiaircraft weapons, armored personnel carriers, rocket launchers, thousands of infantry weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition. This evidence and information obtained from tortured and imprisoned Grenadian indicated an attempt to transform Grenada into a totalitarian dictatorship linked to Cuba and the Soviet Union. According to Admiral Wesley McDonald, the Commander In Chief of US Atlantic Command, the US was closely watching developments in Grenada because of the Soviet and Cuban involvement. The 10,000-foot runway on the southern end of the island seemed excessive for the small tourist industry on the island. The airfield was strategically located and capable of handling aircraft that could be used to resupply Cuban operations overseas, be used as a fueling base for

⁹⁹Ibid., 4.

aircraft transporting supplies to Central America or serve as an operating base for tactical aircraft that could threaten US sea lines of communications in the Caribbean.¹⁰⁰

Nearly two hundred army women participated in Operation Urgent Fury, code name for the invasion of Grenada.¹⁰¹ Female army aircrew personnel had their first “close encounter” with combat in Grenada when they flew missions into hostile territory. Lieutenant Kathryn Henderson flew an OH-58 helicopter on night missions looking for snipers in the hills of the island.¹⁰² Air Force pilot Lieutenant Celeste Hayes delivered a C-141 with paratroopers from the army’s 82nd Airborne Division to Salinas Airfield while combat operations were in progress around the airfield. Other Air Force women served as air crew on the C-141s as flight engineers, loadmasters, and other crew positions. Although these women were present in Grenada on D-Day they were not considered as having been in combat because that was forbidden by Defense Department policy.¹⁰³

The Division Commander, Major General Trobaugh testified to the House Armed Services Committee about the 82d’s operations in Grenada. He was asked if women participated in the “landing aspects” of the operation, to which he replied there were women from the 82d Airborne Division that participated in the operation as well as the subsequent combat support and combat service support aspects of the operation. He stated they did exactly what they were expected to do there under the circumstances. Due to the level and close proximity (400m away) of the combat operations to the 82d Division’s command post, MG Trobaugh sent two female MPs back to Fort Bragg from Grenada on the first day of the fighting. He stated this was prudent

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 14.

¹⁰¹Wilson. Accessed 12/16/05 <http://usmilitary.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?zi=1/XJ&sdn=usmilitary&zu=http%3A%2F%2Fuserpages.aug.com%2Fcaptbarb%2Fpanama.html>. Although Army women participated in the invasion they were not considered as having been in combat because technically that was not allowed. It is interesting to note that the Coast Guard has no gender closed positions and thus women served aboard ships patrolling the waters around Grenada.

¹⁰²Holm, 431.

and in keeping with the service's policy of not allowing females to serve in a direct ground combat area. The females were sent back to Grenada two days later once hostilities subsided.¹⁰⁴

Panama - Operation Just Cause

The United States invaded Panama in December 1989. Operation Just Cause brought a quick and decisive end to General Manuel Noriega's dictatorial regime. Approximately 27,000 American troops hit twenty-seven targets in Panama on 20 December. Most of the stated combat objectives were achieved within hours. This operation was the US military's first significant experience in urban operations since Vietnam. It was recorded as an unqualified military victory. The US ousted a tyrannical dictator, destroyed the military and police organization supporting the dictator, provided for the security of Americans in Panama, and made it possible for the Panamanian people to live in a democratic society.¹⁰⁵

Operation Just Cause demonstrated a new concept of military force projection, the concept of striking anywhere in the world from bases within the US mainland. This concept of force projection became solidified and would be used throughout in military strategy into the post Cold War 1990s. Also changing in the nature of military operations was the blurring boundary between combat and support. Changes in technology, doctrine, and tactics increasingly clouded the issue of categorizing operations. Military operations were seldom solely one type of mission, rather they often were a continuum of several types of missions. This was later categorized as full-spectrum operations.

¹⁰³Ibid., 426.

¹⁰⁴Congress, House, Committee On Armed Services, *Full Committee Hearing On the Lessons Learned As a result of the United States Military Operations in Grenada*, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 24 January 1984, 44.

¹⁰⁵Lawrence A. Yates, "Operation Just Cause in Panama City, December 1989" *Combat Studies Institute*, www-cgsc.army.mil/csi/research/MOUT/MOUTYates.asp.

Women were becoming increasingly more necessary and relevant in the military's full-spectrum operations as a consequence. Operation Just Cause provided an excellent example of women performing a combat support and combat service support roles in a combat environment. In Operation JUST CAUSE, seven hundred and seventy women participated. One of the key differences between Grenada and Panama is that on 20 December when "H" hour was called, there were already six hundred female soldiers on the ground in Panama. They were stationed there. Another one hundred and seventy females were on their way from Forts Ord, Bragg, Benning, Hood and Stewart.¹⁰⁶ The obvious difference between this operation and Grenada is that women were not sent back or delayed from deploying until combat operations were over; they were present from the beginning and throughout the entire time period of combat operations. The proximity of females to the combat operations increased both in scale and scope during Operation JUST CAUSE. Their actions served as a reminder that the distinctions between combat and support positions were blurred and given changes in technology and war-fighting doctrine and tactics were becoming ever more so.¹⁰⁷

It was not until nationwide media coverage in 1989 of military operations in Panama that the myth that women were to be excluded from all forms of combat was exposed. Situations occurring in Panama exposed for the first time just how murky and confusing the issue of trying to exclude women from combat actually was.¹⁰⁸ The operation in Panama was an example of women performing their military duties in a combat situation. Operation JUST CAUSE helped shatter the stereotypes and unflattering depictions of the value of women serving in a "man's army." The female soldiers' performance was first rate under hazardous circumstances and occasionally in the face of direct combat. Not since the Vietnam War had so many women been

¹⁰⁶Miles, 24.

¹⁰⁷Binkin, 17.

¹⁰⁸Holm, 399.

presented with the opportunity to prove themselves under fire. The difference between the 1980s operations and Vietnam was most women serving in Vietnam were nurses or clerks who were not afforded the type of basic combat soldier training skills that women serving in the 1980s received. This is significant and something mentioned by women serving in Panama as extremely important. They valued their training and credited it with enabling them to function in a combat environment.

The performance of women in Panama invited considerable public debate. On 23 January 1990, Colorado Congresswoman Pat Schroeder proposed legislation allowing women into all MOSs, including the closed areas of combat arms for a four year test. Her proposal mirrored a similar recommendation by the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services. At the time the assignments and occupations for women were based on the Combat Exclusion Policy of 1977.¹⁰⁹ This policy held that women were not to be assigned to battalion and smaller size units of infantry, armor, cannon field artillery, combat engineers, low-altitude air defense artillery, and select helicopter units. Women were not supposed to be involved in combat operations or jobs that likely entailed such action. The army's effort to create a method to determine the likelihood of participation in combat produced the Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) system in 1983. This system consisted of seven codes, named P1 through P7. P1 was the code given to indicate the highest probability of direct combat action and P7 was the least likely. Women were restricted to combat support and combat service support MOS which were coded with P2 through

¹⁰⁹An interesting point of history is the need to create a combat exclusion policy. Prior to 1978 no such policy existed, nor was needed because of the limitations of the Women's Army Corps, which by its function was excluded from combat and proximity to combat. It is ironic that at the height of the 1970s after the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment a policy would be needed to exclude a group based solely on gender.

P7 combat probability categories.¹¹⁰ Women could not be assigned to positions coded P1, which were those positions considered to have the highest likelihood of facing direct combat.¹¹¹

Considerable fanfare was made of Captain Linda Bray and the 988th Military Police Company from Fort Benning. Bray was the company commander who ordered an assault team from one of her platoons to fire on Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) soldiers who refused to surrender their position at a PDF dog kennel. Her actions were noted as the first modern instance of an American woman leading US troops in combat. This media attention created a frenzy in the military and unfortunately the events associated with CPT Bray's experience in Panama ultimately contributed to her and her husband leaving the army. The reaction of others brought intense pressure and a backlash on both CPT Bray and her husband once she returned from Panama. In a dissertation on male and female army officers' career progression, a senior male officer interviewed related some of the problems experienced by CPT Bray. This officer knew Bray. She "ran into a macho mentality when she returned to Fort Benning. The animosity even carried into her husband's career. They both ended up leaving the army. The army lost two good officers."¹¹² The ridicule and harassment suffered by both led to their quiet departure from the army.

Here are the specifics of CPT Bray's involvement in Panama. In December 1989, a platoon of the 988th Military Police Company exchanged gunfire with Panamanian soldiers at an attack dog compound near Panama City. The platoon belonged to the company commanded by

¹¹⁰Mary Ellen Condon-Rall, compiler and Cheryl Morai-Young, ed., Department of the Army Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1983, (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1990) accessed March 22, 2007 from <http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/DAHSUM/1983/index.htm#Contents> .

¹¹¹Miles, 24.

¹¹²Tina DiGuglielmo, *Reaching For the Stars: A Comparison Of Female And Male Army Officers' Career Progression* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, 2000), 88.

Captain Bray.¹¹³ When the platoon's assault team requested flares to illuminate the jungle line to prevent the PDG from escaping, Bray personally delivered the flares and joined in the attack. Her troops crashed through the kennel gate with their vehicle and secured the area. They found no PDF soldiers, but did find one hundred twenty one T-65 assault rifles, thirty-one AK-47s, twenty-one 9 mm pistols, three shotguns, several cases of fragmentation grenades and thousands of rounds of ammunition.¹¹⁴

At that time, current laws and military regulations excluded women from direct combat roles, this event fueled the long-standing debate over whether or not these exclusions should be maintained. Interest in allowing women into combat was revived again in January 1990 when the Pentagon confirmed that Captain Linda Bray commanded a unit in the Panama invasion. An administration official called it "the first time that a woman has commanded Americans in battle."¹¹⁵

Women served in a variety of combat support and combat service support roles during the invasion of Panama. These women dodged bullets and returned fire. Private First Class Melissa Smith, 20, spent the early hours of 20 December delivering the 5-78th Infantry Battalion's troops to the front lines in Balboa and Panama City. She was one of the newest truck drivers assigned to A (Alpha) Company/193rd Support Battalion. This company was a supply and transport company. She "hunched down" in her seat as she traveled through pitch black streets under enemy fire delivering the infantry. She described the tracer rounds as being close enough to reach out and grab. Specialist Kimberly Herrera of the 549th Military Police Company fired on a PDF forces vehicle as it attempted to run through a blockade she operated.¹¹⁶

¹¹³E .A. Blacksmith, *Women in the Military*, vol. 64, no. 5, *The Reference Shelf* (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1992), 17.

¹¹⁴Miles, 23.

¹¹⁵Binkin, 16.

¹¹⁶Miles, 22.

Alpha Company was tasked to transport approximately two hundred fifty infantry soldiers to their offensive starting positions. Many of the trucks and drivers stayed with the enemy for days and some of the truck drivers returned hostile fire alongside the infantry troops. Although there is no specification whether or not any of these Alpha company troops that remained with the infantry were females this does serve the purpose of how difficult it can be to separate the combat arms (CA) from the combat service support (CSS) personnel. Alpha company also operated two large scale hot refueling points that dispensed approximately 110,000 gallons of fuel in the first eight days of the operation. This small company also established an ammunition transfer point and a graves registration point.¹¹⁷

Operation JUST CAUSE quickly made it apparent that CSS soldiers were not only rear area support troops; they were a vital part of the combat activities in a “frontless conflict” CSS soldiers transported the infantry, the press corps while receiving sniper fire, LCM-8 (Landing Craft Mechanized) crews performed combat patrols and provided suppressive fires for landing troops, fuel handlers refueled helicopters which receiving covering fire from attack helicopters, and CSS headquarters locations coordinated support while under sporadic mortar fire.¹¹⁸ Without CSS, combat operations can not be sustained long. For combat arms operations to be continued beyond 24-72 hours CSS is essential. Soldiers simply cannot carry enough into battle to sustain themselves without battlefield acquisition of civilian or enemy stocks for generally more than one to three days.

Captain Marie Bezubic was the supply officer for the 154th Signal Battalion. She spent the first hours of Operation JUST CAUSE dodging mortar fire. Later during the operation, she

¹¹⁷Major Christopher R. Paparone and Major John C. Jeong, “Operation Just Cause - Combat Service Support Soldiers Under Fire,” *Army Logistician* (May-June 1990), 8. Major Paparone was the S2/3 officer and Major Jeong was the Executive Officer of the 193d Support Battalion in Panama. Both participated in planning and supporting Operation JUST CAUSE.

¹¹⁸Paparone and Jeong, 8-9.

and four other soldiers were transporting one hundred fifty gallons of fuel down a Panama City street when a civilian just an arm's length away attempted to throw a Molotov cocktail at her vehicle. Because of a concern for other noncombatants near this civilian, Bezubic did not want to shoot the man, but she needed to disarm him. She quickly threw her canteen cup at him and stopped him.¹¹⁹

Sergeant Theresa Kristek of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 154th Signal Battalion "fended off" enemy fire in her unit's defense of a communications and electronics maintenance area in Corozol. She admitted being scared, but said under the circumstances she would have been crazy not to have been scared, regardless of her sex. She said, "There's nothing wrong with fear. Without fear, you can't have acts of courage."¹²⁰ "The women of JUST CAUSE demonstrated tremendous courage, sometimes surprising even themselves." When the bullets flew, Bezubic was too busy doing her job to panic. She said she never thought about half of the things she was doing. She simply relied on her training and concentrated on the mission.

"It's all in the training," according to Staff Sergeant Stromy McLemore, of the 534th Military Police Company. She had the distinction of being attached to Task Force Semper Fi, a Marine Corps task force for the operation. According to McLemore, it did not matter if a person were male or female as long as they were physically fit and competent, that person was part of the team. She thought the events during JUST CAUSE contributed much toward proving this point. Sergeant First Class Joe White was the transportation NCO for the 193rd Support Battalion. He had female soldiers working for him in Panama. One of his soldiers, PFC Jennifer Walker, was tasked to drive a deuce- and-a-half of explosive cargo through heavy PDF fire. White said, "I've seen what these females can do. They're good. They can take care of themselves."¹²¹

¹¹⁹Miles, 22.

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Miles, 23-24.

A snapshot of the armed services by the end of the 1980s is indicated in the chart below that depicted the proportion of jobs open to US military women by service in 1989.

Percentage of Jobs Open to US Military Women in Each Service, 1989	
Coast Guard:	100%
Air Force:	97%
Navy:	59%
Army:	52%
Marine Corps:	20%

1989

Figure 1. Proportion of Jobs Open to US Military Women by Service in 1989.¹²²

In September 1982, fifty-two percent of army Military Operational Specialties (MOSs) were closed to women in 1982. Twenty-three additional MOSs were closed to women this year with the reason being exposure to direct combat. Many of the jobs closed were in fields where the relationship to combat was dubious. Examples of the MOSs closed included: carpenters, masons, interior electricians, and plumbers. The data to support the decisions to close these positions was to be included in the WITA report that was unpublished. Later, thirteen of the twenty-three MOSs that had been closed were reopened, and it was decided that the new physical standards for men and women would be used only as a counseling tool during enlistment.¹²³ Since the army made

¹²²Facts and figures article. Accessed 16 December 2005. <http://usmilitary.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?zi=1/XJ&sdn=usmilitary&zu=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.inform.umd.edu%2FEdRes%2FTopic%2FWomensStudies%2FGovernmentPolitics%2FMilitary%2Ffactsheet>.

¹²³Holm, 402.

the decision to close the positions prior to the report being published, this fueled suspicion about the intent behind the WITA report as being imbalanced and predetermined.

The centerpiece of the army's assignment system was the Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC). The system, put into effect in 1983, was based on the army's interpretation of the intent of the combat exclusion laws used by the Navy and the Air Force. The DCPC attempted to profile a battle area to produce the probability of being involved in direct combat for that area. It established a complex system of coding all positions and units in relation to their probability of being involved in direct combat. The theory behind the system was to prevent women from being assigned to places that due to mission or location had a high probability of direct combat.

For many army women and outside observers, DCPC was an elaborate scheme for putting a cap on the total numbers of women in the army more so than it was a means to reduce women's exposure to combat. The immediate impact of the system was to remove thousands of women from jobs and units where they were performing successfully. The DCPC system was referred to as a "personnel management nightmare."¹²⁴ During a worldwide inspection of soldier assignment policies in 1987, the Army Inspector General found DCPC to be unworkable and recommend the policy be rescinded. The Army Chief of Staff chose not to rescind the policy.¹²⁵

Brigadier General Evelyn "Pat" Foote the commanding general of Fort Belvoir expressed her views on the combat probability coding system prior to her retirement from the army in 1989. She was a very knowledgeable and outspoken critic of the system calling it a "dysfunctional gender based restriction" which placed restrictions on assignments of highly trained army women.¹²⁶ One strong argument waged by DCPC's critics is that it is not possible to manage an organization as large as the army by gender. Doing so creates readiness problems in combat units

¹²⁴Ibid., 404.

¹²⁵Ibid., 405-6.

¹²⁶Ibid.

as a result of understaffing military operational specialties (MOSs) with a high concentration of women. Combat units are routinely understaffed in these low-density MOSs that include medical, clerical, food service, military intelligence, and communications specialists. Women often serve in large numbers in these types of MOSs. In many circumstances, commanders frustrated by a shortage of personnel arranged for the assignment of women to fill these vacancies in direct violation of DCPC.¹²⁷ This is an interesting case of events overriding policy and regulation. The same action is occurring in Iraq where women are providing the required support in lieu of a male performing that support role even though women are not officially allowed to be assigned to company level combat arms units. Commanders on the ground are skirting the issue by attaching women to combat arms units out of necessity. It came down to having a female medic or no medic in a combat zone. This was not a difficult choice for a commander to make. Suddenly gender does not seem so significant.

The first test of the combat probability coding system occurred in October 1983 as integrated units deployed to Grenada for Operation Urgent Fury. This was the first time integrated army units were deployed. Approximately one hundred and seventy army women deployed for this operation. The majority of the army women were from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Initially two military policewomen were returned to Fort Bragg due to the high risk of direct combat exposure. This was disadvantageous for the units, because they lost trained members of the team and bad for women who were furious as being sidelined from performing their job during a critical time. The Commanding General of the 82nd overruled the decision to return the women to Fort Bragg and they were returned to Grenada. Similar instances occurred in

¹²⁷Ibid., 406-7.

1989 when the US sent troops to Panama. These occurrences highlighted the confusion in the field over the application of the coding system.¹²⁸

The most visible women during Operation Just Cause were the military police. They rode in armed jeeps patrolling the island, operated roadblocks, manned checkpoints, and served as perimeter guards. They also guarded prisoner of war and detainee camps. At one point, two of four Military Police Platoon Leaders were women. Women also served as helicopter pilots, crew chiefs and maintenance personnel, intelligence specialists who interrogated prisoners of war, signal and communications specialists, truck drivers, and medical personnel. Army women flew Blackhawk helicopters carrying infantry troops to landing zones and hauling supplies, sometimes under heavy enemy fire.¹²⁹ Twenty-six women were stevedores from a transportation company from Fort Eustis, Virginia. They were responsible for loading captured weapons and ammunition onto ships and planes. One Ordnance captain was responsible for detonating unexploded ammunition.¹³⁰ The general reaction from both males and females was that gender was not a problem. Everyone performed their missions--mission was more important than gender roles.

By 1983, morale of female soldiers might have been described as sinking to a low, reminiscent of the 1960s “token soldier” notion. Army creditability was also negatively affected by the constant testing that seemed to be done with a predetermined outcome. Women in the military were studied and restudied often times to satisfy a political agenda. There is no escaping the reach of politics, not even in the military. DACOWITS Chair Dr. Mary Huey explained the serious morale problems the army created. She questioned the merit of the continuous studying of women’s military participation considering that once a study confirms the positive performance

¹²⁸Holm, 405.

¹²⁹Ibid., 431.

¹³⁰Ibid., 404.

and contribution of women a new study is ordered. She called into question the objectivity of the studies.

In 1987 nearly 12,000 positions in the army's forward support battalions of the combat divisions were opened to women. Changes were made to the DCPC to allow for women to serve in these positions. The army realized that given the large numbers of women in support positions, the readiness of combat units would be hindered if women were not allowed to serve in these types of units.¹³¹ This decision meant that women could serve nearer a forward line of battle if needed.

By the end of the 1980s American military women had taken incremental steps that resulted in monumental changes in the field of aviation. These steps brought women very close to actual combat. As women met each new challenge they successfully demonstrated a capability to perform flying duties and the only limitations imposed on them were from laws and restrictions added to service policies. At the close of the decade, most knowledgeable people no longer made the assertion that women did not have the capability to fly combat aircraft. Women had proven they could. The official position had shifted into the political realm. Whether or not women could fly combat aircraft would now be a matter for Congress to decide. However, repeal of the combat exclusion laws and policies was not desired by the military leadership nor was it desired by the civilian leadership in the Pentagon or Congress. As a result, the Department of Defense decided to provide coherence to the conflicting policies of the services.¹³²

In 1988 the Department of Defense established the Risk Rule. This policy resulted from the urgings of a DoD Task Force on Women in the Military appointed by Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger. The task force examined a wide range of issues affecting women's careers, morale, utilization, and quality of life. The task force found inconsistencies in the services'

¹³¹Ibid., 406.

application of the combat exclusion laws and because of this recommended the services adopt a clear standard for evaluating whether non-combat positions or units should be closed to women.

The 1990s

Stability Operations and the Information Age

By 1990, women totaled eleven percent of the total active-duty armed forces; their numbers totaled 226,000. There are many reasons why women have been excluded from participation in war. One of the reasons most often given for women's exclusion is the fear that capture would lead to rape and other maltreatment. The difference in upper body strength between the average man and average women is one of the most recognizable differences between the sexes. This difference in strength is the basis for the assertion that women are not physically strong enough to sustain the extreme physical demands of war. This line of reasoning has been minimized by the numerous technological advances made in warfare. Sheer physical strength, while still critical for some military specialties, is not considered as important as it once was in previous eras due in part to the more technical nature of modern war and the aid of machinery.

The 2000s

The Metamorphosis and Dawning of a New Age

The change in battlefield geometry necessitates changes in soldier training so that all are prepared to perform their military mission in a combat zone. The battlefields of today are vastly different from the last major war the US fought in Iraq in 1991. That was a linear battlefield and a

¹³²Ibid., 432.

conventional fight. Unfortunately, it is likely that due to the swift success and overwhelming capability of the US forces our enemies recognized that they could not beat the US in a head-on military confrontation. This recognition has likely lead to the use of unconventional tactics and guerilla warfare. The style of warfare creates a battlefield where there are lesser-defined front lines. All of Iraq and Afghanistan is considered a combat zone. The threat is irregular and asymmetric. No longer are just the combat arms troops heavily targeted, logistics troops considered soft targets are frequently engaged by insurgents.

There is the ominous threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which a new and dangerous meaning to vehicular travel. For US units, each time they depart the gates of their forward operating bases (FOB) they are considered to be on a combat operation. Meaning they maneuver and posture their vehicles to be ready to defend themselves with deadly force and confront the unexpected. There may not be a rear area any longer in many of the future military operations. The implication is that anyone in the operational area is in a combat area or zone.

Due to cultural differences between Americans and Iraqis, there are certain military tasks more suited for women to perform rather than their male counterparts. One example is searching Iraqi women during patrols. If male American soldiers searched Iraqi women there would be consternation from the Iraqi populace and extreme disapproval because unknown males touched Islamic women. However, not searching the women proved to be a force protection risk to the Americans since insurgents could have the women hide weapons in their clothing. In order to facilitate this, female soldiers were needed on patrols and missions conducted by the ground combat forces. Having the female soldiers search the women was culturally sensitive and an important component of the counterinsurgency premise - do no harm. This scenario is an excellent example of the interrelatedness of modern day urban operations. There are few places where the military will not have to operate near and amongst a civilian population. Having female soldiers available to assist with civilian concerns is an important capability.

The Global War in Terrorism

The war in Iraq has affected women's roles by providing an opportunity like no other conflict in American military history to contribute in what has been referred to as a "360 degree" war. The actions of women serving in Iraq and Afghanistan provide quantifiable data of their performance in a combat environment. They are performing well and measuring up to the task. If the women were not performing to standard we would have heard about it by now. The need for women Soldiers as contributing members of the army is easily recognized when one considers the sheer numbers serving. Roughly 22,000 women Soldiers are currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, numerically this equates roughly to one army division's worth of personnel.¹³³ Women perform a variety of military functions in today's army ranging from military police, attack helicopter pilots, supply and transportation specialists.

Since the integration of women into the Regular Army the quantities and types of jobs available increased exponentially. The percentage of women serving in nontraditional MOSs increased from 1.8 percent in 1972 to 22.4 percent in 1978 as result of the integration plan.¹³⁴ Enlisted military occupational specialties (MOS) available to women continued to increase exponentially thereafter from 22.4 percent in 1978 to 84 percent (154 out of 183 MOSs open) as of 2006.¹³⁵ Nearly 92 percent of all army specialties (includes enlisted MOSs, Warrant Officer MOSs and Officer AOCs) are open to women; however, only 70.6 percent of these positions are located within the active duty army. Five commissioned officer areas of concentration (AOC) remain closed to women. They are Infantry, Special Forces, Armor, Field Artillery (only cannon

¹³³Levitz.

¹³⁴Morden, 289.

¹³⁵Information on 2006 data supplied by Department of the Army, Women In the Army (WITA) Policy Human Resources Division, "Women In the Army." Briefing presentation, December 2006, slide 10.

and multiple launch rocket system specialties are closed), and Air Defense Artillery (ground surveillance radar and short range systems closed).¹³⁶

The new reality of war's changed dynamics and the challenges of urban operations struck once four Combat Service Support (CSS) Soldiers from the 507th Maintenance Company were captured in 2003 during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Previously, CSS soldiers were at low risk for capture as they primarily transited through secure areas. Private Jessica Lynch, a clerk, and Sergeant Shoshana Johnson were two of the four prisoners of war (POWs).¹³⁷ While convoying near An Nasiriyah their unit was ambushed by Iraqi regular forces and irregulars. Of the thirty-three soldiers in the 507th convoy eleven were killed in combat or died as a result of wounds sustained in combat; seven were captured, and sixteen were able to rejoin friendly forces. Nine of the twenty-two survivors were wounded in action.¹³⁸

The incident involving the 507th is an excellent example that illustrates the relevancy of the Warrior Ethos for *all* who serve, not merely the combat arms soldiers. Soldiers must be ready and vigilant in reacting to the unexpected. This situation highlighted the extreme unpredictability of the COE and reinforced the possibility that anyone may be required to engage in ground combat. With the advent of operations conducted for the GWOT, the sixth stanza of the Soldier's Creed likely has a new and more personal meaning. It reads, "I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat."

Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester, of the 617th Military Police Company from the Kentucky National Guard is an example of exemplary duty performance in a combat zone. She was awarded the Silver Star for valor for her actions while serving as a vehicle commander when her convoy was ambushed. Hester was the first female awarded the Silver Star since World War II.

¹³⁶Ibid., slide 9.

¹³⁷Levitz.

At the time of the ambush, Hester was twenty-three years old, and had served in the National Guard since April 2001. Two other members of the 617th also received the Silver Star for their actions during the ambush. After leading her team through the kill zone, she set up a flanking position to prevent the enemy from escaping. She then assaulted a trench line with grenades and a M203 grenade launcher. While, she and her squad leader, Staff Sergeant Timothy Nein, cleared two trenches, she killed three insurgents with her rifle.¹³⁹

When asked what she thought about being the first female since World War II to receive the award, Hester replied, "It really doesn't have anything to do with being a female. It's about the duties I performed that day as a Soldier."¹⁴⁰ She commented upon receiving the award, "Your training kicks in and the Soldier kicks in."¹⁴¹ Her comments echo what other military personnel attest to that, training is invaluable. It becomes second nature and you merely react in accordance with your training. This supports the criticality of soldier training and is sound justification for expanding the training opportunities made available to all soldiers – females included. This was ahead for the army in the twenty-first century which includes an incorporation of warrior training

¹³⁸ US Army Special Report, "Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company." US Army Public Affairs, July 17, 2003 accessed August 5, 2006 at <http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/reports/> .

¹³⁹ Sergeant Sara Wood, "Female Soldier receives Silver Star in Iraq." American Forces Press Service 17 June 2005 accessed 27 Oct 06 at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/soldierstories/story.php?story_id_key=7474

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

throughout the force. This implies a definite expansion of all soldiers' roles beyond their primary MOS and branch.

Sergeant Hester was recognized in late 2006 as a "Real Hero" on the "America's Army" online video game. She and seven other contemporary Soldiers will be recognized as heroes of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These members received an award for valor for actions in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Action figures and game characters for these eight will be available by late 2006.¹⁴² This may seem trivial to have a female hero action figure; however, the potential social impact on generations of American youth could be profound. This potentially represents a new definition of hero and certainly is a visible symbol of women serving the nation in a capacity of war hero that was previously strictly confined to male domains.

The Military Police (MP) units are more often functioning in ways resembling the infantry on today's battlefield. There has been an increased demand for MP units' presence in Iraq and they have engaged the enemy in close combat. The significant aspect about this is that MP units are not combat arms units; they are combat support units. Sergeant Maria Freudigmann is an MP from the 115th Military Police Company of the Rhode Island National Guard. Her company patrolled the streets of Fallujah for eighty-seven days while her unit was attached to the 3rd Infantry Division.¹⁴³ Freudigmann was a machine gunner armed with a M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) who rode atop the turret of a Humvee.

¹⁴²Army News Service, "Army game update features 'Real Heroes.'" *Fort Leavenworth (Kansas) Lamp* 14 September 2006, 9.

¹⁴³Levitz.

CHAPTER THREE WARFARE'S INFLUENCE ON WOMEN'S ROLES

“New Frontiers”

You speak of new frontiers
The new may not or may
Be better than the old.
Bastilles and moats,
Desert or glacier lines
May more inviting be
Than prison-camps,
Mass-graves
Or barb-wire only eyes can pass.
Mason-Dixon, Maginot—
East, west, lines – lines—
Away with them all
Away with the horizons too.
The sun is beyond them—
The moon and stars do not touch them.
I seek new galaxies—
But only as oases for respite
On my eternal, vast evolving flight
Beyond the cosmic dust
Are new light-bodies forming endlessly—
Firmaments of glory taking shape
One each one I will dwell a little while
To drink the chalice atoms undefiled.
“New Frontiers” you say.
“No Frontiers” say I.¹⁴⁴
Alice Clay Hall, *Chaliced Atoms*

This chapter explores the theme of warfare's influence on women's roles. The analogy of new and the potential for no frontiers is an appropriate beacon for what can be expected in the future regarding women's military service. A careful analysis of the history of women's military service presents a strong willingness by women to serve and likely ever-increasing roles over time. Women found new and exciting frontiers in army service and continued to pursue further training opportunities and roles. This sustained voluntary desire and successful performance made it possible for women to gradually gain acceptance toward further advancing their scope of

service. Paths of divergent and expanding roles were especially prominent from 1993 and forward once President William J. Clinton and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin changed personnel policy allowing for the accession of women into combat arms branches, with the exclusion of branches routinely engaging in direct ground combat.

The central question posed in this chapter is, “Has the changing nature of warfare in conjunction with the way the US Army fights affected women’s roles in a revolutionary way?” If so, what were the implications of this change for the era? The brief answer is a resounding “yes.” Analysis will be presented through two categories of change factors that affected women’s roles in a revolutionary manner. The first category of change was institutional change, specifically, the implementation of the volunteer army, the Warrior Ethos and the revamping of the Officer Education System to introduce the Basic Officer Leader Course. The second category of change was the changed nature and evolution of the art of war. The evolution of the art of war, in this case, refers to both the mental and physical aspects of how warfare is conducted, as well as, experienced by individuals participating in war and military operations.¹⁴⁵

Two significant change factors contributing to the revolutionary expansion of women’s roles in the army were the implementation of the All Volunteer Force (AVF) and the effects of the evolution of warfare, specifically changes regarding the modern battlefield. Both of these factors significantly changed and bolstered women’s roles in the modern army. The adoption of the volunteer army, as well as the country’s need for military volunteers were likely the most

¹⁴⁴Alice Clay Hall, “New Frontiers,” *Chaliced Atoms* (London: Villiers Publications, 1972), 11.

¹⁴⁵Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0 Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 14 June 2001), 1-15. FM 3-0 is the current US Army doctrine governing military operations which are also known as full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations are defined as a range and type of military operations consisting of a varied mixes of offensive, defensive, stability and support operations that may be employed across the spectrum of conflict. This spectrum of conflict generally aligns with the US’s national goals and often consists of fighting and winning wars, deterring wars, resolving conflicts and promoting peace through engagement. The range of army operations generally lies in two categories: war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). Within both of these types

significant factors ultimately affecting women's service. The positive repercussive effects of that policy decision are present today in the statistically significant numbers of women choosing to serve. The need for willing volunteers and the increasing need for all soldiers to be flexible and capable of performing full spectrum military operations are aspects correlated within the two change factors. The need for a flexible force and inability to "pigeon hole" soldiers contributed towards the present day conditions and expansion of women's roles. This chapter presents examples from each category of change factors.

Institutional Change in the US Army

Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, deserves credit for his prescient approval and rapid instatement of the Warrior Ethos into the US Army.¹⁴⁶ His acknowledgement of the need to have all soldiers function as twenty-first century warriors was an important shift in the post cold war military mindset that pervaded much of the army in the last decade of the 1990s. This military mindset often lacked a warrior focus and was impressed by a decade of peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. Some questioned the future direction of the army. General Schoomaker built upon the warrior ethos concept originally constructed during the former Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki's leadership. General Schoomaker directed a simple, yet highly effective, technique for transforming and strengthening the resolve of army culture. The introduction of the Soldier's Creed was a central component of the warrior ethos. Historians will likely highlight General Schoomaker's influence as lasting and exceedingly significant. His positive influence is likely to stand out for years even after he retires for the second time.

The warrior ethos is defined as

of operations, a "full spectrum" of operations may exist. The particulars of any one mission dictate the mix or amount and proportion of the various types of military operations used.

¹⁴⁶General Kevin P. Byrnes, Commander Training and Doctrine Command, "Warrior Ethos Task Force CSA Outbrief, 29 May 2003." TRADOC Information Paper, (20 May 2003).

“the foundation for the American Soldier’s spirit and total commitment to victory, in peace and war, always exemplifying ethical behavior and army values. Soldiers put the mission first, refuse to accept defeat, never quit, and never leave behind a fellow American. Their absolute faith in themselves and their comrades makes the United States Army invariably persuasive in peace and invincible in war.”¹⁴⁷

The introduction of the “warrior ethos” had a significant influence on army training and culture. For women serving, the warrior ethos may very well be a revolution within the army culture that clashes with and destroys the gender exclusionary army policy largely constructed during the World War II and Cold War eras. The warrior ethos feeds into and fuels the formation of smaller task organized complex systems or unit structures. These structures often emerge during times of extreme change and or crisis. During this time, new organizations emerge which are permutations of previous forms, such examples include Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Forward Support Companies (FSC) and various web enabled and virtual forward surgical teams.

The significance and success that transpired during the 1940s and again in the 1970s was a root cause for the numerous opportunities for service women may pursue today. The success of what transpired, especially in the 1970s, could not have occurred without the positive forward movement in service established by army women from the 1940s through 1960s. Women’s military history from the 1970s, most notably the implementation of the volunteer army became a prime and resilient foundation for service that only became stronger with the passing of time.

Ironically, the gender exclusion framework adopted during the 1950s and reaffirmed in 1994 is now incompatible with the military’s “warrior ethos” which calls for every soldier to be part of a cohesive, superbly trained and versatile combat capable force. Individual Soldiers are the tiles in the army mosaic. They represent the distinguishing and essential components of the

¹⁴⁷Ibid. The US Army values are loyalty, duty, respect, selfless-service, honor, integrity and personal courage.

mosaic. The mortar holding all the tiles together is doctrine, education, training and leadership opportunities developed by the army institution.¹⁴⁸ This mortar guides, shapes and strengthens the soldiers and the army. It provides a common grounding for all members that can help inform actions and assist with judgment.

The “Soldiers Creed” is an azimuth indicating the core essence of what a Soldier’s should be. The creed is an elaboration of the expectation to be a versatile warrior. There is no differentiation of a male creed and a female creed. This is good. If the creed represents what every Soldier aspires to be, then the concept of all being part of a combat force is a natural next step. Perhaps the divergence between outmoded American social mores prohibiting women from “being in combat” and contemporary military operations on the modern day battlefield will continue to diminish to the point of extinction.

The Soldier’s Creed appears below.

The Soldier's Creed:

I am an American Soldier.
I am a Warrior and a member of a team.
I serve the people of the United States and
live the Army Values.

I will always place the mission first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I will never leave a fallen comrade.

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and
proficient in my warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my
equipment and myself.
I am an expert and I am a professional.
I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United
States of America in close combat.
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.
I am an American Soldier.

¹⁴⁸James J. Schneider, “Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity, and the Promise of Information Warfare.” *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Spring 1997): 21-28.

The significance of the Soldier's Creed was easily unmistakable to one familiar to the intent or purpose creeds. Creeds serve as a simplistic, encompassing and unifying statement of an organizations ideals and values. Examples of creeds with worldwide acceptance and significance include the Christian Apostle's and Nicene Creeds. These creeds serve as a unifying statement of beliefs across many religious denominations and help focus organizations and succinctly communicate organizational values. The Soldier's Creed is every bit as significant in terms of value to the US Army as these historic and religious creeds are to both Eastern and Western Christian civilization. The combination of a warrior ethos and soldier's creed solidifies the honor and prestige of the profession of arms. Military professionals have an "unlimited liability contract" with America. This is why a values based ethic and ethos is essential and why uncommon commitment is a common trait amongst military professionals. US citizens place great trust and confidence in the ability and restraint of the military. Much is expected of those who serve and soldiers are keenly aware of this expectation and the role of the military in projecting the image and values of America.

The United States was the most technologically advanced military in existence. Fortunately, this is possible due to the combination and application of the elements of national power. The economic prowess of the nation enables research and development to occur which provides superb equipment for the armed forces. The amount of change in technology and weapon systems has increased exponentially in the past decade. There is no doubt that the US is on the cutting edge with regard to applying new military technology.

The army vigorously maintained the principle that soldiers were the cornerstone of the organization and as such represented the true strength of the army. Periodically, it is beneficial for the army to reexamine the effects of the operating environment on its soldiers and when necessary adjust personnel policies in order to create a more effective, integrated force. The army's need for adaptive, highly-trained, and versatile leaders is a paramount concern especially

given the nature of the twenty-first century security environment. This security environment as well as the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) will be discussed as aspects of the second change factor – evolution in the art of war.

Evolution in the Art of War

Complex armies inexorably lead to a revolution in the art of war.

James J. Schneider

At the beginning of this century, unambiguous security threats generated a need for the army to conduct combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and various other places worldwide, as well as, adopt changes concerning its enemy focus. This change in enemy focus resulted in a shifting of priorities away from conventional, large-scale military operations toward a preponderance of counterinsurgency, stability and support operations. The modern battlefield was a great catalyst for changing the functions of soldiers. This change for soldiers also presented new frontiers for those women serving.

In order to conduct such a wide spectrum of military operations, the army required a flexible, trained, multi-operational force. Separate stables of forces earmarked solely for counterinsurgency or stability and support operations do not exist. The army does not have the luxury of multiple stables of forces to employ; therefore increasing the importance of and necessity for a flexible force. Given the significant numbers of women choosing to serve, women have become an integral part of the total army force.

Historians and theorists contend that we have transcended beyond the Industrial Age into the Information Age. This implies a fundamental shift in how humans order their world and interact with others. With the passing of an age such as from the Industrial to the Information Age, various components within the scope of the society were affected. Economics, labor, personal lifestyle and warfare changed as a result of passage into the Information Age. The new

age ushered another RMA whose characteristics included the emergence of operational art, the “empty battlefield,” deep maneuver, and the complexity of modern warfare which entails full spectrum operations ranging from high intensity combat operations to peacekeeping and nation building missions.¹⁴⁹ Simply stated, the operating environment is highly complex. Since the army undoubtedly operates in a complex environment, it behooves the force to study complex systems, learn what it may and adopt similar qualities for itself that may be helpful to function in a world of complexity. If viewed as a complex system there are several lessons one can apply to the realm of personnel management.

Complex systems provide a useful theoretical framework for understanding the modern US Army. Such systems are dynamic, capable of spontaneous self-organization, are adaptive and advantageously inclined. Experiences drive change in complex systems. The system constantly reacts to the environment, adjusting and transforming itself as it anticipates the future.¹⁵⁰ Experiences from operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrated the degree to which lower echelons in the army functioned as a complex system. One example of this complex behavior drawn from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) included attaching female medics to an infantry company. There was a shortage of male medics resulting in commanders being faced with a choice of having a female medic or no medic. The choice was easy, having a medic could mean saving lives. The question of gender was not important on the front lines in Iraq. The reason why these female medics may not be assigned to the Infantry company is due to the policy outlined in Army Regulation 600-13 prohibiting the assignment of females to combat arms units below the brigade level or to units who routinely collocate with ground combat arms units smaller than brigade size.

¹⁴⁹Ibid, 25.

¹⁵⁰Ibid, 26.

One of the remarkable aspects and qualities of the army is its ability to get the job done. Soldiers are amazingly ingenious and highly focused on mission success. Evidence of self-organization is most evident at the lowest levels within the army. Examples include forming new organizations for missions ranging from deployment Port Support Activities to Disaster Assistance operations.

This sort of self-organization and adaptation aimed at successful mission accomplishment and force protection naturally occurred at the lowest levels and was usually prompted because of necessity. It is a byproduct of the ingenuity of Soldiers and commanders conducting missions and making decisions under difficult circumstances. Less of this type of self-organization takes place systemically in army policies and is an area that could stand improvement. Despite the tremendous opportunities available in the army for women today, the fact remains that several of what is considered the premiere leader training opportunities, as well as command positions remain closed solely because of gender. However, the reasons for this are cultural rather than practical. Overcoming this genderfication requires acknowledgement of the cultural and social changes that have occurred over the past six decades as well as policy changes.

The US Army can gain an advantage by taking on qualities of a complex system, especially the characteristic of opportunism or seizing advantages. This requires flexibility beginning with an open mind for multiple solutions. There are advantages associated with functioning as a complex system. One-step closer towards achieving this is to provide versatile training for all soldiers. Prior to the current operations in the war on terror, this versatility was not embraced. The difficulty with theory is often incorporating it into practice. The advantages of being able to function as a complex system provide a useful counter to an asymmetric (irregular, unconventional) threat. The more complex the force, the better suited that force is to fight in the contemporary environment. The nature of modern warfare lends itself toward protraction. Gone are the days of short decisive battles that produced rather sure and settled victory. Given this

protracted nature, the army should incorporate training that helps build hardiness and perseverance in the force. The implementation of the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) in June 2006 was an excellent start.

BOLC was designed as a comprehensive initiative aimed at revamping the Officer Education System. BOLC consists of three phases of training. Phase I is conducted prior to commissioning, Phase II occurs upon commissioning and Phase III is the branch specific technical phase.¹⁵¹ Essentially, BOLC differs from the previous Officer Education System concerning Phase II. The requirement for all officers, regardless of branch, to attend the standardized BOLC Phase II course as their initial entry training is new. BOLC was designed to provide the army's officers with a standardized quality of tough, realistic small unit leadership training. The rigorous course is seven weeks long and provides physical and mental challenges in small unit leadership and tactics. Much of the course is conducted in a field environment. Officers are required to attain proficiency in nine army doctrinal warrior battle drills. Approximately half of the warrior battle drills are related to ground combat skills and tactics. This new requirement for officer training is a strong indication of the army's intent to advance the warrior concept forward for all soldiers, not just the combat arms branches.

After exploring the impact of the warrior ethos and examples of a complex organizations within the army, an examination of the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) as a backdrop is essential to comprehend the answer to the question posed. The combat environment of the twenty first century will be ambiguous and decentralized.¹⁵² The COE is significant because it has a direct relationship and impact on the soldier's ability to perform a military

¹⁵¹ "Benning, Sill to support officer leadership course" AUSA News January 2006 p10. vol 3, no 3.

¹⁵² Leonard Wong "Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom." <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi>, (July 2004): 1. (accessed September 28, 2006).

mission. It must be considered and factored into all military operations. Adaptive leaders will do well in this type of environment.

The current security environment is marked by increased complexity, uncertainty, and unpredictability. This security environment has a direct correlation to what the military refers to as the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). The Department of Defense defined operational environment as “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander.” The COE is the “overall operational environment that exists today and until the year 2020.”¹⁵³ Figure 2 illustrates the security environment and the likelihood of encountering varied operational environments, hence the need for force flexibility.

¹⁵³ “The Contemporary Operational Environment (COE).” <http://www.strategypage.com/articles/operationenduringfreedom/chap1.asp>, (January 30, 2007): 1 (accessed January 30, 2007). The definition of operational environment derives from Joint Pub 1-02.



Figure 2. Twenty-First Security Environment¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Executive Office of the Headquarters Staff Group, "2006 Posture Statement." <http://www.army.mil/features/2006ArmyGamePlan/>, (February 10, 2006): 1. (Accessed March 11, 2007).

Twenty-First Century Critical Variables	
Physical environment	Sociological demographics
Nature and stability of the state	Regional and global relationships
Military capabilities	National will
Technology	Time
Information	Economics
External organizations	

Figure 3. Twenty-First Century Security Critical Variables

The following model is useful to understand how the military uses information. First, it is important to recognize that information is power. The application of information can produce positive decisive effects for an organization. Understanding how military systems use information can help one arrive at informed judgments concerning changes that may be made in the army training in order to produce a more capable force. In the article, “Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity, and the Promise of Information Warfare” Dr. James J. Schneider explained the five uses of information in a military system. They were listed here to illustrate where the army is meeting the mark and where improvement in the application of information could assist the force. For brevity’s sake, only the first two points will be discussed.

5 Uses of Information for Military Systems

1. Describe Self and Enemy
2. Organize Self
3. Analyze and Design Operational Art
4. The Logistics of Information and its Complexity
5. Military Technology Makes Modern Forces Complex

Enormous effort is being expended with much success toward describing self and the enemy. The army is quite good at analyzing itself and conceptualizing future capabilities. The current emphasis on transformation has helped spark self-analysis and encouraged structural change at an unprecedented rate. Army personnel have learned much about understanding the enemy; however, this is an unending process. One of the chief advantages of becoming a complex system is the ability to more effectively organize, interpret data and evolve if necessary.

The type of Soldier needed for success in the twenty-first century will be a new breed of warrior leader that the US Army termed a “pentathlete.” The pentathletes will operate at all levels in the army and will be “multi-skilled, innovative, agile, and versatile.” This new leader will be adaptive to the operating environment, comfortable with change and uncertainty and possess the flexibility to seamlessly transition from one complex task to the next. The Army Posture Statement depicted the qualities of the pentathlete as portrayed below.¹⁵⁵




Figure 4. The US Army "Pentathlete" A Twenty-First Century Leadership Paradigm

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

Forging the pentathlete necessitates breaking down the gender training walls. Some argue that neither Americans, nor the army, are ready for complete gender integration. It is time to shed the Cold War policy of gender exclusion and allow the army's human resources to transcend into the twenty-first century.

The army may now be ready for a culture shift regarding changes made to allow for gender-neutral standards and thereby enable women to have the opportunity for training that is currently closed. This military culture shift could become the wellspring of an American social revolution that alters the dynamics of labor and social roles. Research by Dr. Leonard Wong, of the US Army War College, noted the development of a cohort of junior officers whose military experience was created from the "crucible experience" of Operation Iraqi Freedom.¹⁵⁶ Wong encouraged the army to utilize the experiences of this cohort to inculcate confidence and creativity into the future force. The type of environment these junior officers operated in was fast paced, uncertain, and varied. They are comfortable with change and capable of independently operating and using creative methods of problem solving.

These junior officers, the post September 11 entrants into the army, are well on their way to becoming pentathletes. Their entry into the profession came at a time of tremendous transition for the army and the United States. They had extensive opportunities to gain operational experience throughout the military spectrum of operations. In terms of tested combat and or operational experience they have had many opportunities to acquire exactly what the army has specified as a future vision. The army seeks agile, adaptive and self-aware leaders. This type of leader is not as confined by garrison tradition and policy as many of their predecessors were. Some of the Year Groups ranging from 2001-2006, may know little about garrison policy routines and "traditional ways of business" because of the army OPTEMPO resulting from the

¹⁵⁶Wong, v.

GWOT. Many leaders of this new generation were born in the 1980s. This is a signal that the time may be right for a shift in culture change toward a riddance of gender exclusion particularly concerning training. It is likely that this generation of leaders is more amenable to accepting gender integration. Some may have already experienced it.

What seems to count most, besides luck, in surviving during combat is experience and training. Education also has an influence but studies show that when split-second decisions must be made it is the experience and training that take over and control one's actions.¹⁵⁷ Since soldiering is often a collective task it would serve the army well to open most, if not all, of its training and schooling to be accessible to the entire force. This is not to say that all in the force would obtain the exact same training, merely the intent is not to exclude solely because of gender. To be sure, women's roles on the battlefield have expanded beyond the regulatory coded gender roles.

What has not happened are institutional changes to army schools and training systems to accommodate this changed nature in which women and non-combat arms personnel find themselves immersed in. The value of training and education is crucial. It is commonly acknowledged that Ranger School has a lasting effect on its graduates. It is not uncommon for male Soldiers to reflect on their Ranger School experience and compare it to a current operation. It seems as if they draw strength from having endured Ranger School. Ranger School is one of the premier leader development schools in the army. It is the type of school that builds what Warren Bennis, an influential leadership researcher, referred to as adaptive capacity by presenting students with a "crucible experience." Bennis described a crucible experience as an "intense,

¹⁵⁷Gary Klein, *Sources of Power How People Make Decisions*, (MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001), 1. For fascinating studies on how people make decisions in stressful time constrained environments also termed the field of naturalistic decision-making, see Klein's Chapters 1, 3 and 4.

transformational experience....”¹⁵⁸ “It is a defining moment that unleashes abilities, forces crucial choices, and sharpens focus. It teaches a person who he or she is.”¹⁵⁹ One should consider what is being communicated by the policy of not allowing females to attend such a school.

Looking beyond the question of women in the military is appropriate. It is helpful to focus on the military organization’s scope of missions changed in the twenty-first century. The contemporary strategic environment is “complex, dynamic, and uncertain.” The expectation is that the army will continue to be called to accomplish the US’s national security strategies of engagement abroad. Trends indicate that requirements for the army will reach unprecedented levels and will have to be sustained for years rather than months.¹⁶⁰ To understand the level of increased frequency of military operations during the later half of the twentieth century, a graphic depiction adds clarity.

¹⁵⁸Wong, 2.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

¹⁶⁰Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations, (Department of the Army: Washington, DC, 2003), 1-8.




Figure 5. Increasing Frequency of Military Operations 1950-1999

The role of the military is expanding well beyond combat. Combat is still a core capability and nonnegotiable war-fighting function; however, combat operations were not the activity that consumed the majority of the army's time. Stability operations and support operations occupy this category. Indeed the ability to conduct stability and support operations, and wage peace is recognized as critical for the US's strategic interests. If equal consideration is given to stability operations as was directed in November 2005 by DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations this could be an area of expertise where women's advancement would not be hindered by the inability to have previously commanded combat troops.

In their chapter titled, "Institutional Attitudes" from the book *Women and the Military*, researchers Binkin and Bach appropriately sum up the root cause of the lack of expansion of women's roles in the armed forces. This root cause was and still can be attributed to cultural and

social constraints imposed on women by American society and the power brokers within the society. The United States is still very much a society where male dominance prevails and this influence extends from the Congress into the armed forces and is well entrenched in roles of American men and women. This was the case in the 1970s and is still true today, albeit there are encouraging trends in women's progress in society and certainly the workforce, a simple fact remains. That fact is that males still dominate the military due to their majority status and the perpetuation of the male warrior myth. This is still an issue that many in Congress cling to. The interesting thing is that the war especially in Iraq is proving the point that women can and will perform in a capacity that some contended they were not capable of accomplishing.

CHAPTER FOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OPTIMIZING THE FORCE AND SOLDIERS

There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.

Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*¹⁶¹

The volunteer army faces unprecedented challenges due to the current operational environment. Two of the three major current military operations have required significant personnel involvement and deployments of troops overseas. The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are significant because they are the first lengthy combat operations performed by the volunteer force since it was created in 1973. There is real and growing concern that the GWOT may break the volunteer force. The fear of this happening is alarming especially since most military authorities prefer volunteers rather than conscripted soldiers. The belief is that volunteers are much better suited for maintaining a quality, highly skilled force. According to a GAO report on military personnel, there is growing speculation that commissioning and retaining quality officers may be two of the volunteer army's more difficult challenges.¹⁶²

Opening new and more challenging training opportunities for women may induce some to stay longer than they might initially stay. Several US Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports issued to the House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee indicated a need for a strategic plan to address the army's expected accession and retention challenges. In January 2007 the GAO recommended, and the US Army partially agreed with GAO's recommendation to create and employ a strategic plan for addressing anticipated commissioning

¹⁶¹Peter G. Tsouras, ed, *Warrior's Words a Quotation Book from Sesostris III to Schwarzkopf 1871 BC to AD 1991* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992), 62.

and retention shortfalls.¹⁶³ This author's limited research indicated that four out of five army women contacted mentioned joining the army in search of adventure, challenge, the opportunity for self-development and acquisition of leadership skills.

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¹⁶²House Committee on Armed Services, *Military Personnel Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges* report prepared by Government Accountability Office, January 2007.

¹⁶³*Ibid.* The subject of recruiting and retention occupied the attention of the House Armed Services Committee and the GAO. The GAO issued testimony on recruiting and retention issues within the armed forces was released in March 2005. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) issued three CRS Reports for Congress concerning recruiting, retention and officer shortages from June 2005 through July 2006. A CRS Report for Congress was issued in January 2006 regarding Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom concerning military personnel compensation and force structure.

¹⁶⁴House Committee on Armed Services, *Military Personnel Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges* report prepared by Government Accountability Office, January 2007. The subject of recruiting and retention occupied the attention of the House Armed Services Committee and the GAO. The GAO issued testimony on recruiting and retention issues within the armed forces was released in March 2005. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) issued three CRS Reports for Congress concerning recruiting, retention and officer shortages from June 2005 through July 2006. A CRS Report for Congress was issued in January 2006 regarding Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom concerning military personnel compensation and force structure.

males, were more cost effective than males due to lower costs to recruit, and had less lost time away from the workplace than males.¹⁶⁵

To assist with explaining why increased diversification of roles in the army is needed, information on US demographics is helpful. There are 144 million females to the 138 million males in the US population. As of March 2002, 60 percent of women compared to 74 percent of the US males were in the labor force.¹⁶⁶ Despite the fact that women make up 51 percent of the total US population of 282.1 million,¹⁶⁷ they only represent 14.4 percent of the active duty army, 12.7 percent of the Army National Guard and 23.4 percent of the Army Reserve. From a practical sense, a nation who denies opportunity to over fifty percent of its population could hardly be utilizing its human resources to the fullest extent possible.

According to a 1994 report edited by Elisabetta Addis an international scholar, women soldiers represent 456,840 out of a total of 25,381,960. The United States had the highest number of women soldiers with 216,000 out of a total force of 2,117,900. China was the next nation to follow the United States with 136,000 females and a total force of 3,030,000.¹⁶⁸ The fact that the United States is the largest employer of women in the military should be recognized as significant for its unprecedented nature and for its success. The fact that the Chinese followed suit is a striking example of the United States leadership in world events and change.

Adaptation and change required for success in the twenty-first century call for creative leadership, flexible military qualities, and an increased versatility regarding gender roles. The operating environment thrust these factors upon the military. Rather than fight the factors; the army should embrace them as opportunities for change. Although women have made progress in

¹⁶⁵House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, *Women in the Military: Attrition and Retention*, briefing report prepared by General Accounting Office / NSIAD-89-210BR, Washington, DC: July 1990.

¹⁶⁶Spraggins, 1-3.

¹⁶⁷Ibid, 1.

entering civilian occupations traditionally held by men, especially the executive and professional specialty occupations, the majority of women were still in traditional female occupations. For example, 79 percent eighteen million people in administration support occupations are women. Seventy three percent of the female workforce falls into four occupational groups: administrative support including clerical (23 percent), professional specialty (19 percent), service workers (17 percent), and executive, administrators and managerial (15 percent).¹⁶⁹ The data indicates that employment roles are heavily influenced by societal norms. This lends credibility to the argument that women's army roles (initially created in the late 1940s) were also created to mirror American gender lines more so than because of military necessity or readiness.

During times of war, commanders have occasionally urged for increased use of women, albeit not to serve in a direct combat role. Their requests often went unfulfilled or they received men instead, even though they specifically requested women. The most common example of this scenario were requests for women clerics and administrative support during wartime. Although a request for female cleric support is not likely in the future, a potential need for female linguists, police and medics to operate with ground combat troops in an urban environment is quite likely. Having females trained with these skills who were not only capable of tactically surviving but thriving in a combat environment would be all the better. Of course, none of this happens by accident. It requires creative, detailed, advance planning and execution of training.

Since women have served in the armed forces since the birth of the nation, it seems logical that their participation would be well above the active duty army rate of 14.4 percent. This causes one to ask "*Why hasn't the percentage of women's participation in the army increased to a rate comparable with their demographic representation in US society?*" The answer lies in the highly codified gender roles that exist in US and many other societies. Since the military is a

¹⁶⁸Skaine, 138.

representative subset of the society it serves, the application of US culture and workforce statistics is applicable and essential. A military career is still considered atypical and untraditional even for males in US society, so for the few females serving this is more true. Martin van Creveld, in his book, *The Transformation of War*, alluded to the intricacies of the relationship between society, humans and war. Van Creveld believed one of the best ways to get to the heart of a problem was indirectly. To understand the nature of armed conflict consider the part played- or not played- in it by females. “Were war simply a rational instrument for the attainment of rational social ends, then the role of women should have been just as great as that of the men; after all they comprise half of humanity, and by no means its least important half.”¹⁷⁰

The real reason why women have been excluded from war is cultural and social rather than military. This is a complex issue having many contributing factors that play off one another. “Much of human civilization is best understood as an attempt on the part of the males to sublimate their inability to produce the one most marvelous thing on earth.” This interpretation may explain why most human achievements in religion, art, science, and technology have been the product of men. Noted American cultural anthropologist, Margaret Mead, contended that in most societies, “things are considered important because, and to the extent that, they are the province of men.”¹⁷¹ Conversely, the very fact that any given type of activity is done by women always causes it to be placed lower on the ladder of social prestige. The entry of a few women into a field can cause men to work harder and serve as an incentive to perform. However, there

¹⁶⁹Spraggins, .3.

¹⁷⁰Creveld, 179.

¹⁷¹Tarraugh Flaherty, *Margaret Mead, 1901-1978*, Accessed 21 February 2006 (<http://www.webster.edu/~woolfm/margaretmead.html>, 2006). In 1933, Mead made her great discovery that "human nature is malleable." She had witnessed three specific cultures; Arapesh, Mundugumor and the Tchambuli. Each culture displayed different gender role qualities. In one culture both the women and men were cooperative, in the second they were both ruthless and aggressive, and in the Thambuli culture the women were dominant and the men more submissive. Due to these findings, Mead was one of the first people to propose that masculine and feminine characteristics reflected cultural conditioning (or socialization) not fundamental biological differences.

exists a critical point at around 15 percent where a further increase in women causes men to desert a field and choose another.¹⁷² Van Creveld explained the deeply ingrained beliefs about the nature of war and how these beliefs influenced society and the actions of men who ruled the society.

What applies to economic activities is even truer in war. In every human society that has practiced it, war has been the field in which sexual differences are most pronounced. Throughout history, war has stood out as the most important male preserve by far; the one great occasion in which a display of manliness was considered absolutely essential for success and accordingly, not just permitted but required and desired. The association between man and warrior is indeed, so close that in many languages the two terms are interchangeable. For good or ill, to have women take part in war would have greatly diminished its social prestige, taken away its purpose, and destroyed its *raison d'être*.¹⁷³

The issue of no women in combat is essentially a moot point. The fact is women are in combat in Afghanistan, Iraq and perhaps other unspecified places. Few dispute the fact that women are in combat, politicians on both the left and right noticed. The military at all levels from a team to the army staff acknowledge it is happening and that members serving in Iraq and Afghanistan are susceptible to ground combat. The fine line being stretched thinner is the policy banning women from assignment to direct ground combat positions. Sequestering the ground combatants has been difficult, if not impossible, to achieve especially in Iraq. Unless the army is forced through policy and political pressure to remove the nearly 22,000 female Soldiers serving in the combat zones of Afghanistan and Iraq there is not much that can be done to prevent them from being in combat. Given this reality, the next logical question is “*What should the army do to best train and equip soldiers going into harms way?*”

The army should develop its human resources to the maximum extent possible. Creating the most successful and mission capable force begins with diversifying soldier education and training. Historically, women have had fewer occasions to participate in tactical military training.

¹⁷²Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 182.

¹⁷³*Ibid.*, 183.

Women's roles and opportunities in the army should be expanded further, particularly concerning access to training and military tactical and leadership schools. The US Army should move toward reasonable duty/mission related standards that are gender neutral. The most basic benefit of this recommendation is a more effective and efficient utilization of the army's most precious resource – soldiers. The focus and purpose of this monograph is not to advocate for or against complete gender integration in the army, including ground combat arms units. That might be too broad a leap for a single bound. However, it makes sense to integrate all aspects of training and education in order to best prepare the soldiers and leaders for the world in which they must operate.

Practically, at least in limited circumstances this shift has occurred on the battlefields of Iraq. Formally, the institutional army and American society still cling to the idea that women should not be involved in direct ground combat and that training them to excel in this aspect reflects the potential to employ women as ground combatants, which is currently not admittedly tenable. The processes already occurring on the battlefield should be incorporated into a formal military and political culture change that accepts the expansion of women's military roles.

The army should peruse tangible and intangible retention measures to meet this likely personnel challenge. Intangible options may be an ideal "win-win" strategy for the army because they represent a commitment by the army in people, and evoke a strong commitment from soldiers. When soldiers willingly invest their time, talents and efforts in the army by seeking voluntary training, this fosters an overall increased commitment to the army from its most prized asset. In reality, the army gains more in return in the form of increased and sustained loyalty and commitment from this most important asset – soldiers. This is an excellent return on investment for the army. Such intangible measures could include increased or varied military education and training options, or duty location stabilization. An example of a tangible measure includes offering continuation pays and incentives to those in high demand, critical skill areas or perhaps

for superb performance. In fiscal year 2005 the US Army spent less than any other service on such pays for officers.¹⁷⁴

Expanding the percentage of women in the total army could alleviate the anticipated future personnel shortages. A recent Department of the Army human resources analysis determined that a shortage of qualified male volunteers of enlistment age exists in the US. There are several prudent reasons why women's roles should continue to expand in the army and why the army is an excellent career choice for women. A few of these reasons include a women's patriotic desire to serve the country, challenge themselves mentally and physically, gain career experience, receive equal pay for equal work and benefit from excellent leadership training. Women's roles and opportunities in the army should be expanded further, particularly concerning access to schools and training. Increasing women's roles further would be an effective and efficient utilization of the army's most precious resource – soldiers. These gaps still exist today and are illustrated by current trends in the army and US labor force. An examination of US military statistics revealed that by 2005 more than 90 percent of all career fields in the armed forces were open to women.¹⁷⁵

The significance of the expansion of women's roles to the army and our nation is that this change represents part of the human intellectual transformation and evolution beyond socially stratified roles. At the urging of the Secretary of War, the Congress laid the cornerstone for this process in 1948 by passing the Armed Forces Integration Act. The 1970's represented the tipping point from where the idea crystallized and expanded. After the 1970s, the rate of change and expansion of women's roles was quite phenomenal.

¹⁷⁴Ibid. In FY 2005, the US Army spent \$13,591,000 compared with expenditures of \$18,707,000 by the Marines, \$129,273,000 by the Navy, and \$202,536,000 by the Air Force on continuation pays and incentives awarded to officers.

¹⁷⁵WIMSA www.womensmemorial.org/Press/stats.html (accessed February 7, 2006).

Women's role in the armed forces will ultimately depend on the extent to which national institutions – social, political, judicial, and military – are willing to break with their past – a past reflecting a persistent pattern of male dominance.¹⁷⁶

The reason for excluding women from combat that has withstood rejection and seems to be timelessly relevant is the reaction of men to the presence of women. This cultural phenomenon has remained throughout the ages and spans much of Western civilization. There is unmistakably the belief of men that war should be waged by men and men alone. Many researchers agree upon the common theme that men have been the single greatest limiting factor bearing on the expansion of women's roles in the military.

The focus and purpose of this monograph is not to advocate for or against complete gender integration in the army, including ground combat arms units. That might be too broad a leap for a single bound. However, it makes sense to integrate all aspects of training and education in order to best prepare the soldiers and leaders for the world in which they will operate. Creating the most successful and mission capable force begins with diversification in education and training. Women's roles and opportunities in the army should be expanded further, particularly concerning access to training and military tactical and leadership schools. The US Army should move toward reasonable duty/mission related standards that are gender neutral. The most basic benefit of this recommendation is a more effective and efficient utilization of the army's most precious resource – soldiers.

Practical recommendations include allowing women to attend all army schools and training as long as they meet standard prerequisites. Gender alone would not be used as a disqualifier for attendance. Schools like Ranger School should admit qualified women for a couple of reasons. These reasons span the range from a potential tactical or operational need to

¹⁷⁶Binkin and Bach, 39.

employ a female on a specific mission, to the basic philosophical belief that equal opportunity is good for the army and society, while discrimination is bad.

One might argue that any army leadership school should be available to all who qualify. Why should just the direct ground combatant branches have a monopoly on the premiere small unit leadership training school? No doubt, these types of branches need to receive the majority and priority of training allocations for Ranger School. However, in the mid-1990s, Ranger school was so severely restricted that only Infantry, Armor, and Special Forces branches were permitted to attend. Making this type of training available to all soldiers may serve as an excellent accession and retention incentive for the current force, as well as prospective soldiers. Ranger, Special Forces and Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) training are just three examples of the US Army's high-caliber, world-renowned schools. There are many others.

Graduating from these types of schools is a tremendous accomplishment. The ability to attend such training is one of many intangible offerings the army could grant to the entire force. Another reason to permit women to attend such schools would be to enhance small unit tactical leadership skills. Ranger school is also known as being a premiere small unit tactical leadership course that challenges the student to their mental and physical limits, thereby allowing the student to gain an extremely valuable understanding of themselves, others and their limitations. Gaining this type of knowledge would serve the soldier well in addition to the army, especially given the current strategic environment.

It is no coincidence that the occurrence of shell shock, battle fatigue and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) are modern-day phenomena. Before modern age warfare, soldiers generally needed to be brave at most a day or two at a time. Today, soldiers must be brave repeatedly for months at a time while facing an elusive enemy. This type of warfare evokes the Latin phrase "mens est clavis victoriae" which translates to "the mind is the key to victory." Indeed the mind can prove to be an asset greater than the body especially given the nature of the

contemporary security environment. Training which fosters mental toughness is a combat multiplier and should be systemically and institutionally available to all. Some of the army's premiere leadership development schools and courses are restricted for women, i.e., Ranger School, Sniper School, Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS), and the Special Forces Qualification Course.

CONCLUSION

To summarize an answer to the question “*What is the significance to the U.S. Army regarding the changed nature and expansion of women’s military roles?*” If one were pressed to surmise succinctly the significance of the change in women’s military roles, this continuum of change, which predominantly evolved in a mere one hundred years, represents an organizational Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) on the surface. At a deeper level, the expansion represents an intellectual and physical transformation beyond the socially stratified gender roles entrenched during the twentieth century. The changed nature of women’s roles is far more significant than any one of the numerous events that occurred in the chronology of women’s military service. When analyzed collectively, the US Army’s need for and the American society’s approval of women’s changed and expanded roles in most forms of military operations, is indicative of a revolution in military affairs. Moreover, this change is significant enough that it may potentially trigger a military revolution that entails substantial social change in the fabric of American society.

Although, army women were discussed at length, it is helpful to review by asking the question “*Who are the women in the US military?*” Although myths and extremes of stereotypes exist the simple truth is that they are volunteers serving their country. They are unique because they willingly chose to serve in a profession that is unquestionably predominantly male terms of sheer numbers and positions of authority. Women choosing to serve endure the initial culture shock of transitioning from civilian life to the military. Military women choose a path seemingly harder than other professions. They are intelligent, challenge seekers, and adventurous. They undergo strenuous mental and physical training designed to instill rigor and hardiness, the centuries old qualities desirable in protectors and warriors. They join the military with the knowledge they may be called to serve in harm’s way. They project courage. They are patriotic

women who wear their uniforms proudly--they are gals with the “Star Spangled” heart who still get chills as they salute during the National Anthem.¹⁷⁷

Throughout this paper the author has presented information that supports dismantling the male-only warrior myth. This myth survives largely to due to the worldwide numerically significant numbers of males versus female warriors and the reinforcement of this role from generations upon generations of societies. Mady Segal a sociologists who has focused much current research on military personnel issues offered that “The meaning of gender is socially constructed.”¹⁷⁸ Unraveling gender is a formidable task. Gender is such a complex issue that dealing with it systemically is difficult and confining it to one case fits all is problematic. There are numerous political, emotional and cultural connections embedded in the concept and meaning of gender that make it difficult to isolate and stabilize the issues associated with gender.

The ideas presented in this paper essentially advocate change for what has become entrenched in modern American society. However, this entrenchment of gender roles extends well beyond the American realm. If one takes an anthropological perspective what this author advocates is change to four thousand years of human evolution. Since typical gender roles were not established overnight, they should not be dismantled too hastily. This is why integration is best accomplished over time and why incremental change is preferred. Nevertheless, change is an essential part of society and revolution. Change cannot be stopped; it has inertia of its own. Both man and society must adapt to the changes occurring within their spheres. To fail to adapt means stagnation and eventually death in scientific terms. The United States is at the dawn of a new age, one transformed by information, technology and various new threats. Adaptation is the key to progress and survival.

¹⁷⁷Barbara A. Wilson, “Stop the caterwauling about women in combat!!” *American Women in Uniform, Veterans, Too!*, <http://userpages.aug.com/captbarb/combawomen.html>.

¹⁷⁸Skaine, 173.

The issue has never been whether women could perform in the military. It has always been a question of whether or not they should be allowed to perform certain roles in the military. This antiquated constraint does not serve the military or the American society well in the twenty-first century. Therefore, the army should begin dismantling the practice of gender exclusion, beginning with full integration of women into the army education and training system.

APPENDICIES

APPENDIX 1 Chronology of Women's Service in the United States Military

For sake of brevity, this reflects events predominantly relevant to the US Army.

- 1901 Congress established the Nurse Corps; however, these nurses were not considered full military personnel. They had no rank or military benefits.
- 1948 Congress passed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act to recognize the contributions that women made to the military during World War II. This act authorized career opportunities for women in the regular and reserve forces. This act made it possible for the first time for women to peruse military careers. It also included restrictions including the combat exclusion laws.
- 1951 Defense Advisory Committee on women in the Services (DACOWITS) established.
- 1963 Department of Defense (DoD) established civil rights office and directed each military service to develop internal civil rights monitoring systems.
- 1967 The 2% ceiling on women in the military removed. This contributed to the increase in number of women who may join the military.
- 1972 The Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) admitted women.
- 1973 *Frontiero v Richardson* ruling that dependents of military women could receive same entitlements as dependents of military men.
- 1973 All-Volunteer Force adopted
- 1973 Army flight training opened to women
- 1974 DoD rescinded the policy that involuntarily separated pregnant servicewomen.
- 1976 *Crawford v Cushman* decision that women could not be discharged if she became pregnant or if she had dependents less than 18 years old.
- 1976 Military academies opened to women
- 1977 Army develops a combat exclusion policy resulting in classification of 38 enlisted job categories, combat jobs not open to women.
- 1977 Army begins coeducational basic training for men and women recruits.
- 1978 Women's Army Corps (WAC) terminated by Public Law 95-485. Women were integrated into the Regular Army.

- 1980 DoD issued its first sexual harassment policy, which emphasized that sexual harassment was unacceptable behavior.
- 1982 Army returned to segregated basic training for men and women recruits.
- 1983 Grenada invasion –AF women flew aircraft that delivered supplies and equipment. Army women were present from the second day of the invasion and served in combat support roles.
- 1986 Navy women pilots performed carrier landings as a part of antiterrorism operation against Libya; Air Force women pilots provided combat support to fighter planes attacking Libya
- 1987 Legislation introduced in House and Senate to require all services to open thousands of combat support jobs to women.
- 1987 25% of USS Acadia crew is female. Sent to Persian Gulf to repair damaged USS Stark.
- 1989 OPERATION JUST CAUSE, US invaded Panama. A platoon of MP’s exchanged gunfire with Panamanians. The platoon was led by women making this the first “modern instance of an American woman engaging hostile troops in combat.” Current laws and regulations exclude women from direct combat roles. This incident reopened the debate over the roles of women and whether the exclusion should be maintained.
- 1988 52% of all Army slots are potentially open to assignment of women.
- 1990 -1991 More than 40,000 women participate in Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Two women became prisoners and five died due to hostile action.
- 1992 Defense Authorization Act established the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. Commission found there was no law restricting the Army’s assignment of women. Secretary of the Army has the power to set policies excluding women from direct combat.
- 1993 Secretary of Defense ordered military services to open combat aviation roles to females.
- 1994 DoD opened an additional 260,000 positions to women. 80% of military positions are opened to women.
- 1997 First woman officer promoted to Lieutenant General and senior Army Staff (LTG Claudia Kennedy)
- 2002 Army women deploy and serve during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in multiple theaters of operations.
- 2004 First woman awarded the Bronze Star with “V” Device (CPT Kellie McCoy)

2005 First woman since WWII awarded the Silver Star (SGT Leigh Ann Hester)

APPENDIX 2 Statistics on Women in the Military and Military Strength

Women In Military Service For America Memorial Foundation, Inc.

Dept. 560
Washington, DC 20042-0560



hq@womensmemorial.org
www.womensmemorial.org

(703) 533-1155 • (800) 222-2294
(703) 931-4208 FAX

Statistics on Women in the Military

<u>State</u>	<u>Women Veterans</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Women Veterans</u>
Alabama	31,043	Montana	7,015
Alaska	6,945	Nebraska	10,765
Arizona	42,565	Nevada	19,155
Arkansas	17,797	New Hampshire	8,330
California	165,012	New Jersey	30,487
Colorado	35,843	New Mexico	14,635
Connecticut	14,803	New York	66,958
Delaware	5,848	North Carolina	60,337
Dist. of Columbia	3,319	North Dakota	3,590
Florida	131,098	Ohio	62,485
Georgia	68,133	Oklahoma	23,697
Hawaii	8,487	Oregon	25,141
Idaho	9,436	Pennsylvania	62,922
Illinois	52,990	Rhode Island	5,402
Indiana	32,085	South Carolina	32,016
Iowa	13,675	South Dakota	4,990
Kansas	15,956	Tennessee	37,037
Kentucky	22,067	Texas	132,539
Louisiana	27,062	Utah	9,132
Maine	9,296	Vermont	3,748
Maryland	43,666	Virginia	74,329
Massachusetts	28,295	Washington	49,930
Michigan	47,558	West Virginia	10,427
Minnesota	22,879	Wisconsin	27,213
Mississippi	17,965	Wyoming	3,808
Missouri	34,759	Puerto Rico	7,044
		Terr./Foreign	10,399
		Total	1,712,117

Number of Women Serving

Active Duty, Reserve and Guard as of 5/31/2006. Active
Duty/Reserve Women in the Coast Guard as of 6/15/2006.

ACTIVE DUTY

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>% Women</u>
Army	68,441	487,898	14.0%
Marine Corps	10,918	178,190	6.1%
Navy	49,915	349,301	14.3%
Air Force	68,348	347,758	19.7%
Total DoD	197,622	1,363,147	14.5%
Coast Guard	4,626	39,849	11.6%
Total	202,248	1,402,996	14.4%

RESERVE & GUARD

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>% Women</u>
Army Reserve	43,083	186,140	23.1%
Marine Corps Reserve	1,881	39,226	4.8%
Navy Reserve	14,400	70,632	20.4%
Air Force Reserve	17,838	74,924	23.8%
Total DoD	77,202	370,922	20.8%
Coast Guard Reserve	1,137	8,039	14.1%
Reserve Total	78,339	378,961	20.7%
Army National Guard	44,978	339,844	13.2%
Air National Guard	18,853	105,150	17.9%
National Guard Total	63,831	444,994	14.3%

(More than 90% of all career fields
in the armed forces are now open to women)

Number of Military Women held Prisoners of War during individual military conflicts

Civil War	1
World War II	88
Desert Storm	2
Operation Iraqi Freedom	3

Number of Women who served in the military conflicts

Civil War	Unknown
Spanish-American War	1,500
World War I	35,000
World War II (era)	400,000
Korea (in theater)	1,000
Vietnam (in theater)	7,500
Grenada (deployed)	170
Panama (deployed)	770
Desert Storm (in theater)	41,000

Information courtesy of the US Coast Guard,
Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs.
VA data reported as of September 2005.

Revised 7/17/06

APPENDIX 3 Active Duty Military Personnel by Rank/Grade (Women Only)

Department of Defense Active Duty Military Personnel by Rank/Grade September 30, 2005 (Women Only)

Rank/Grade - All	Services				Total Services
	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	
GENERAL -ADMIRAL					0
LT GENERAL -VICE ADMIRAL				1	1
MAJ GENERAL -REAR ADMIRAL (U)	6	6	1	5	18
BRIG GENERAL -REAR ADMIRAL (L)	5	6	1	12	24
COLONEL -CAPTAIN	447	387	21	424	1,279
LIEUTENANT COL-COMMANDER	1,159	906	43	1,310	3,418
MAJOR -LT COMMANDER	2,013	1,465	96	2,394	5,968
CAPTAIN -LIEUTENANT	4,518	1,073	337	5,065	10,993
1st LIEUTENANT-LIEUTENANT (JG)	1,611	2,837	277	2,300	7,025
2nd LIEUTENANT-ENSIGN	1,740	1,062	204	1,960	4,966
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER W-5	11		4		15
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER W-4	60	12	8		80
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER W-3	304	32	36		372
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER W-2	356	39	53		448
WARRANT OFFICER W-1	245		17		262
TOTAL OFFICER	12,475	7,825	1,098	13,471	34,869
E-9	322	149	52	315	838
E-8	1,034	476	172	626	2,308
E-7	4,329	1,766	402	3,472	9,969
E-6	7,479	5,416	835	7,264	20,994
E-5	11,087	11,648	1,614	16,259	40,608
E-4	16,879	10,206	2,099	13,127	42,311
E-3	9,057	9,236	2,628	10,166	31,087
E-2	4,050	2,334	1,266	1,798	9,448
E-1	3,117	2,557	797	1,879	8,350
TOTAL ENLISTED	57,354	43,788	9,865	54,906	165,913
CADETS-MIDSHIPMEN	625	768	0	774	2,167
GRAND TOTAL	70,454	52,381	10,963	69,151	202,949

APPENDIX 4 WAC Personnel Strength, 1942-1978, and Women In the Army, 1979-1984¹⁷⁹

End of Month	Officers			
	Total	Commissioned	Warrant	Enlisted
Dec 42 .	12,767	1,545	0	11,222
Jun 43 .	60,243	4,917	0	55,326
Jun 44 .	77,152	5,855	10	71,287
Jun 45 .	95,957	5,733	44	90,180
Jun 46 .	17,896	1,793	18	16,699
Jun 47 .	8,134	1,035	5	7,094
Jun 48 .	5,352	611	42	4,699
Jun 49 .	4,909	626	23	4,260
Jun 50 .	7,259	686	22	6,551
Jun 51 .	11,932	1,010	39	10,883
Jun 52 .	11,456	1,171	57	10,228
Jun 53 .	9,924	1,109	55	8,760
Jun 54 .	7,803	964	52	6,787
Jun 55 .	8,640	876	48	7,716
Jun 56 .	8,661	847	44	7,770
Jun 57 .	8,007	808	43	7,156

¹⁷⁹Morden, 409-410. * End of fiscal year changed from 30 June to 30 September in 1977. Source: Strength of the Army Reports (STM-30) June 1942-1959 & (DCSPER 46) June 1960-1984.

Jun 58 .	7,853	740	39	7,074
Jun 59 .	8,608	732	39	7,837
Jun 60 .	9,053	735	39	8,279
Jun 61 .	9,369	771	38	8,560
Jun 62 .	9,549	780	48	8,721
Jun 63 .	9,056	724	40	8,292
Jun 64 .	8,734	739	37	7,958
Jun 65 .	9,285	742	23	8,520
Jun 66 .	9,958	757	22	9,179
Jun 67 .	10,592	817	34	9,741
Jun 68 .	11,604	866	27	10,711
Jun 69 .	11,675	934	20	10,721
Jun 70 .	12,518	1,029	13	11,476
Jun-71	12,781	937	19	11,825
Jun-72	13,269	901	19	12,349
Jun-73	17,551	1,073	21	16,457
Jun-74	27,596	1,249	19	26,328
Jun-75	39,171	1,446	22	37,703
Sep-76	46,413	1,921	31	44,461
Sep 77*	48,548	2,409	45	46,094
Sep-78	52,996	2,636	68	50,292
Sep-79	57,919	3,010	91	54,818
Sep-80	64,916	3,454	11	61,351

Sep-81	69,011	4,009	18	64,884
Sep-82	67,480	3,703	45	63,632
Sep-83	71,154	5,050	63	65,941
Sep-84	72,250	5,408	15	66,627

APPENDIX 5 Arguments For and Against Women in Combat Roles

It is useful to discuss the questions pertaining to women in combat because they indirectly relate to the expansion, or lack thereof, pertaining to women's military roles. Furthermore, a significant portion of the literature on women in the military concerns itself with this controversial subject. To understand the arguments for and against women in combat strikes at the heart of the complex issue of women in the military and indeed sheds light on societal and cultural biases that undoubtedly shape policy and law.

Dr. M.C Devilbiss, a Senior Research Fellow at the Air Force University, and a sociologist by education, has taught and written on women's issues in the armed forces since 1975. She has eight years experience in the Air National Guard and two years active duty experience as a US Army officer. She presented a concise and helpful table in her dissertation, *Women and Military Service A History, Analysis, and Overview of Key Issues*, which captured the pros and cons of the women in combat argument. Her table is included here because many of these arguments have not been resolved and are relevant today.

It is helpful to review these arguments because many were once used as a basis to restrict the assignment of women to MOSs. Many of the MOS restrictions were eliminated, yet one area of military operations where women are still excluded is the policy area of direct ground combat. Of significance is the number of arguments that are concerned with gender roles and acceptability. Despite the arguments that women's full integration into all aspects of military operations would harm morale and unit cohesion, a 1997 RAND study reported that "...gender integration is perceived to have a relatively small effect on unit readiness, cohesion, and morale in the units we studied." This is not to say that gender has no effect, but to emphasize that soldiers perceived other elements, such as leadership and training, to be far more influential. Both women

and men agreed that women performed about as well as men in the military.¹⁸⁰ A US Army War College Strategy Research Project paper summed up the issue of integration's effects on morale by saying, "A Soldier[']s attitude affects unit morale and cohesiveness; gender does not."¹⁸¹

Arguments For and Against Women in Combat Roles¹⁸²

Con

1. The occupational specialization argument: combat is a man's job.
2. The environment/danger argument: a combat environment is unsuitable for women, they should be protected from it.
3. The combat effectiveness argument: the presence of women in a unit would destroy that unit's effectiveness and thus its ability to accomplish its combat mission.
4. The physical strength argument: women are physically weaker than men and thus are unable to perform combat jobs.
5. The national security interests/figurehead force argument: the presence of more women in the military and specifically in combat roles, will lead other nations to perceive United States forces as weak.

Pro

1. The historical argument: women have served in combat roles efficiently and effectively.
2. The sex discrimination argument: the blanket restriction of women as a class from a category of jobs is unjustly discriminatory since some women are just as capable and interested in performing combat jobs as men are.
3. The opportunity argument: women should have the right of equal access to all types of jobs, combat roles included.
4. The citizenship argument: equality of citizenship rights implies equality of sacrifices (a potentiality of combat roles) as well as equality of opportunities.
5. The military necessity argument: because of population profiles, the number of young men eligible for military service in the 1980s declined and the military had to rely increasingly upon women, bringing for the question of women in combat roles.

¹⁸⁰Margaret C. Harrell and Laura L. Miller, *New Opportunities for Military Women Effects Upon Readiness, Cohesion, and Morale* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1997), xvii.

¹⁸¹Henderson Baker II, *Women In Combat: A Culture Issue?*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 15 March 2006), 5.

¹⁸²Devilbiss, 50.

APPENDIX 6 MOS, SQI and ASI not Available to Women Soldiers

Chapter 13 MOS, SQI and ASI not Available to Women Soldiers

13-1. MOS, SQI and ASI closed to women

The Army has recognized the high probability that soldiers classified in some MOS and SQI will routinely engage in direct combat.

13-2. SQI "G" , Ranger; SQI "V" Ranger-Parachutis

SQI "G" , Ranger; SQI "V" Ranger-Parachutist; and the MOS listed in table 13-1 are closed for accession or reclassification of female soldiers (see AR 611-1).

Table 13-1
MOS closed to women

MOS	Title
11B	Infantryman

Table 13-1
MOS closed to women—Continued

MOS	Title
11C	Indirect fire infantryman
11H	Heavy antiarmor weapons infantryman
11M	Fighting vehicle infantryman
11Z	Infantry senior sergeant
12B	Combat engineer
13B	Cannon crewmember
13C	TACFIRE operations specialist
13E	Cannon fire direction specialist
13F	Fire support specialist

DA PAM 611-21 • 31 March 1999

919

Table 13-1
MOS closed to women—Continued

MOS	Title
13M	Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) crewmember
13P	Multiple launch rocket system/LANCE operations/fire direction specialist
13R	Field artillery firefinder radar operator
14J	Early warning system operator
14R	Line of sight-forward-heavy crewmember
14S	AVENGER crewmember
16P	CHAPARRAL crewmember
16R	VULCAN crewmember
16S	MANPADS crewmember
18B	Special forces weapons sergeant
18C	Special forces engineer sergeant
18D	Special forces medical sergeant
18E	Special forces communications sergeant
18F	Special forces assistant operations and intelligence sergeant
18Z	Special forces senior sergeant
19D	Cavalry scout
19E	M48-M60 armor crewman (Reserve Components)
19K	Armor crewman
19Z	Armor senior sergeant
24M	VULCAN system mechanic
24N	CHAPARRAL system mechanic
45D	Self-propelled FA turret mechanic
45E	M1 ABRAMS tank turret mechanic
45N	M60A1/A3 tank turret mechanic (RC)
45T	Bradley fighting vehicle system turret mechanic
63D	Self-propelled field artillery system mechanic
63E	M1 ABRAMS tank system mechanic
63N	M60A1/A3 tank system mechanic (Reserve Components)
63T	Bradley fighting vehicle/cavalry fighting vehicles system mechanic
96R	Ground surveillance systems operator


Source DA PAM 611-21 Military Occupational Classification and Structure, dated 31 March 1999



APPENDIX 7 Briefing Presentation from Department of the Army, Women In the Army Policy Division

For an informative and condensed perspective on women in the US Army see the briefing provided from the Department of the Army, Women in the Army (WITA) Policy Human Resources division. The briefing contains sixteen PowerPoint slides. An electronic copy of the briefing is accessible by clicking the hyperlink below.

[..\WITA Briefing Handout Dec 2006 \(NXPowerLite\).ppt](#)

Slide 1





Women in the Army

Historical Chronology



1901	Army Nurse Corps established
1941	Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, then Army Corps (WAC) established
1948	Women integrated into the Regular Army, with benefits
1960	First woman promoted to Sergeant Major (SGM Carolyn James, HQ, USA Air Defense Command)
1967	President Johnson repeals the women's promotion ceilings
1970	First women promoted to Brigadier Generals (BG Elizabeth Hoisington, and BG Anna Mae Hays)
1972	Women enter Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC); All Volunteer force established
1974	First woman military helicopter pilot graduates Army flight training (Lieutenant Sally Murphy)

Women in the United States Army date back as far as the Revolutionary War, where Margaret Cochran Corbin fought alongside her husband and was the first woman to be awarded a US government pension as a disabled soldier.

Mary Edwards Walker earned the MOH for her service during the Civil War. Only the second female physician in the US, she was denied a commission as a medical officer, but volunteered for the Union Army and served as acting assistant surgeon. She continually risked her life to cross enemy lines to treat civilians. She was help prisoner by the Confederate Army for four months. She was awarded the CMOH on November 11, 1865. In 1917, her MOH, along with those of 910 others was taken away when Congress revised the MOH standards to include "Only actual combat with the enemy". Her great grand niece fought for years to have the medal reinstated and finally on June 11, 1977, President Carter did just that.

WWII marked a time of tremendous growth for women in the Military. In 1941, Congresswoman Edith Rogers (Mass), met with GEN George C. Marshall, CSA to tell him her plan to introduce a bill creating the Women's Army Corps, separate from the existing Army nurse corps. Compromise – the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps – worked *with* the Army and the army provided food, uniforms, quarters and medical care. By 1948, women were fully integrated into the Military with the creation of the Women's Corps.


Slide 3

 **Women in the Army** 



U.S. ARMY

Historical Chronology

- 1976 Women enter U.S. Military Academy (USMA) and are eligible for ROTC scholarships
- 1977 Army initiates Gender-Integrated Training (GIT)
- 1978 Women's Army Corps disestablished
- 1980 First class of women USMA graduates are commissioned
- 1989 First woman commands U.S. Army soldiers under direct enemy fire (Captain Linda Bray, Commander, 988th MP Co, Operation Just Cause)
First woman USMA "First Captain" (Cadet Kristin Baker)
- 1990 Army woman aviator qualifies as astronaut (Colonel Nancy Currie, PhD)
- 1991 First woman Aviator Commander to fly in combat and first woman aviator killed in an active theater of war (Major Marie Rossi-Cayton, Commander, B Company, 159th Aviation Regiment, Operation Desert Storm)




Slide 4

 **Women in the Army** 


U.S. ARMY

Historical Chronology

- 1993 - Combat Aviation opened to women; First women qualified in Army Attack aircraft (Lieutenants Angie Norman and Charlene Wagner, and Chief Warrant Officer Cathy Jarrel)
- 1996 - First woman to earn the silver tomb guard identification badge 3rd U.S. Infantry (The Old Guard), Arlington National Cemetery, and became the first female to guard the Tomb of Unknown (Sergeant Heather Johnson)
- 1997 - First woman officer attains rank of Lieutenant General and senior Army Staff (LTG Claudia Kennedy, DCSINT)
First woman maneuver Brigade Commander (Colonel Jessica Wright, 28th Aviation Brigade, ARNG)
First woman selected as state Adjutant General (TAG) (MG Martha Rainville, Vermont)
- 2002 - First woman selected to be Senior Enlisted Advisor, Chief of Army Reserve (Command Sergeant Major Michele Jones)



Women in the Army



U.S. ARMY





Historical Chronology



2002 - Army women serve in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in multiple theaters


2004 - First female West Point graduate to achieve the rank of general officer (Brigadier General Rebecca Halstead)

2004 - Woman is awarded the Bronze Star with "V" Device. CPT Kellie McCoy


2005 - SGT Hester of the Kentucky National Guard becomes the first female Soldier since World War II to receive the Silver Star - the nation's third-highest medal for valor.



Women in the Army



U.S. ARMY

Assignment Policy Evolution

1967 2% cap on women's integration in the Army lifted

1972 Beginning of the All Volunteer Force

1975 DoD mandated end to involuntary separation for pregnancy

1978 Women's Army Corps disestablished


1982 Direct Combat *Probability* Coding (DCPC) established


1988 DoD Risk Rule applied

1992 AR 600-13 Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers published

1993 Combat Aviation opened to women

1994 Risk Rule rescinded; Direct Combat *Position* Coding established





Current policy -published 27 March 1992, as AR 600-13, which codified where woman could be used on the battlefield.


Commonly referred to as the combat exclusion rule that explicitly prohibits the assignment of women to units below the brigade level which have the primary mission to engage in direct ground combat.

OR


A mission which requires that the unit is routinely collocated with a unit which that has the primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat.


Direct ground combat is defined as engaging the enemy on the ground with an individual or crew served weapon while being exposed to hostile fire and having a high probability of direct physical contact with enemy personnel.

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Women in the Army





Current Policy

Law 10 USC 652 (6 Jan 06)

1. SECDEF required to report to Congress any proposed change to the Ground Combat Exclusion Rule.
2. 30 days notice (Congress in continuous session) prior to implementation.
3. Reportable changes include: opening to women any category of **unit or position** previously closed or closing any category of **unit or position** previously open.
4. One time reporting requirement from SECDEF to Congress on the Services' implementation of DoD DGCAR

DoD Policy. SECDEF Direct Ground Combat Assignment Rule (DGCAR) (1 Oct 1994)


1. Women excluded from assignment to units **below brigade level** whose primary mission is direct ground combat.
2. Policy defines "direct ground combat."
 - Engaging enemy w/ individual/crew served weapons.
 - Exposure to hostile fire and to high probability of direct physical contact w/ enemy.
 - Located well forward on battlefield while locating/defeating enemy w/ fire, maneuver, or shock effect.
3. Further service restrictions **may** include those based on collocation, cost, SOF units, etc. Notify OSD to add restrictions; *policy silent on dropping restrictions.*

Army Combat Exclusion Rule: 27 March 1992, AR 600-13, Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers
 Limits assignment of females as follows "The army's assignment policy for female Soldiers allows women to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty or position except in those specialties/positions or units (**battalion size or smaller**) which are assigned a routine mission to engage in direct combat, or which collocate routinely with units assigned a direct combat mission."


In 1994 Secretary of Defense Aspin asked an IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE to come up with a better way to word the assignment definition...


This was also the first time that a definition was put with the term DIRECT GROUND COMBAT...

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Women in the Army





Occupations & Positions Closed To Women

IAW AR 600-13 policy the following units are P1 (Male Only):

- INFANTRY
- ARMOR
- SPECIAL FORCES
- RANGER (Regiment and Below)



} Battalion (Bn) or Below;
Direct Ground Combat

- CANNON FIELD ARTILLERY (Bn or Below)
- MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET ARTILLERY (Bn or Below)
- BCT ENGINEER COMPANIES
- GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR PLATOONS

} Co-location

ALL OTHERS ARE P2 (INTERCHANGEABLE)

Based on Direct Combat Position Coding (DCPC), these positions are coded P1 - for male only. Seventy percent of all other specialties are coded P2 - gender interchangeable.



Women in the Army

Occupations & Positions Open To Women

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)


Enlisted MOSs	154 of 183	Open to Women
Warrant Officer MOSs	68 of 69	Open to Women
Commissioned Officer AOCs	197 of 202	Open to Women

What is open to women?


Well 91.8% of the specialties---referred to as MOSs are open to women and within those specialties 70.6% of the positions in the active force are open to women----coded P2---thus coded for either women or men.

The higher percentage of positions coded for women are in the Army Reserve 97.4% due to the fact the reserve mission has focus on Combat Service Support...

Lower percent 60.4% in the National Guard which has a higher concentration of combat arms---National Guard has 2ea special forces groups.




Women in the Army




Examples of Units Open To Women

- Forward Support Companies
- Brigade Support Battalions
- Medical Companies
- Maintenance Companies
- Transportation Companies
- Signal Companies
- Military Police Companies
- Military Intelligence Companies
- Brigade Troops Battalions
- Any Brigade Level Staff
- Psychological Operations Battalions
- Civil Affairs Battalions
- Special Forces Group level staff


- Bridging Companies
- TOPO Companies
- Construction Companies
- HHC Engineer Companies



Capt. Jen Mitchell, USMA, 2000, Forward Medical Team, 54th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) near Kirkuk, Iraq.



FISCAL YEAR 2007 WITA STRENGTH STATUS MONTH-END NOV06 (NUMBER OF FEMALES/PERCENT OF SERVICE)





14 Female General Officers as of 1 Dec 06

	ACTIVE ARMY		NATIONAL GUARD		RESERVES	
	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%
ENLISTED	58,000	13.8	42,740	13.8	32,404	23.0
COMMISSIONED	11,412	16.6	3,549	11.8	6,705	25.1
WARRANT	1,042	8.0	532	8.0	252	13.2
TOTAL OFFICER	12,454	15.3	4,081	11.1	6,957	24.3
USMA CADETS	631	14.6				
TOTAL	71,085	14.0	46,821	13.5	39,361	23.2


SOURCE: ACTIVE COMPONENT - ENLISTED MASTER FILE (EMF)
OFFICER MASTER FILE (OMF)
NATIONAL GUARD - DMDC 1147
RESERVES* - DCSPER 46 PART III
*RESERVES - INCLUDE PAID DRILL STRENGTH ONLY

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 **Women in the Army** 

U.S. ARMY **Deployments to Serve the Nation at War**



- Women were 2% of deployed force to Grenada (179)
- Women were 4% of deployed force in Panama (803)
- Women were 8.6% of deployed force in Gulf War (26,000)
- Women were 11% of deployed force to Somalia (2,400)
- Women were 10.4% of deployed force to Bosnia (767)



Women have not just functioned in garrison or in a peacetime army but have also played pivotal roles in deployments, conflicts and war.





Listed are the percentages of women of the deployed force within the past 20 years.

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 **Women in the Army** 

U.S. ARMY **Deployments to Serve the Nation at War**

- **Over 13, 000 women are currently deployed in support of OIF/OEF**



Women in the Army



Global War on Terrorism

10% of the US Army forces in support of OIF/OEF are women. They are serving in every facet of the Global War except Special Forces, ground combat units, and onboard submarines.


In our current Global War on Terrorism woman make up 6% OF THE FORCES DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN and 10% of the force deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Women are performing missions that vary widely. They are nursing sick and wounded, digging trenches, flying aircraft and guarding airports.

The numbers of women in the force, the professional roles that they engage in and the opportunities for women have surged in the past 60 years. Once an auxiliary part of the military force in WWII and we are now a thoroughly integrated and necessary personnel resource during our Global War on Terrorism. With the increase in numbers has been the increase in career opportunities. The integration of women into the Regular Army has contained challenges but none have been so overwhelming as to limit or stymie the growth of the army, its effectiveness, or its cohesion.

 **Women in the Army** 

U.S. ARMY



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APPENDIX 8 Historical Vignettes

Introduction to Historical Vignettes

Although examining the collective experience and progress of women in the army was the main focus of this paper, one must realize that this progress was the result of millions of individuals who answered the nation's call for service. Therefore, it is useful to portray the human element through a few individuals who weathered the storm during uncertain and turbulent times. Three vignettes are presented as a crucial perspective on the history of women's military service. The first vignette portrays the experiences of LTC Sharon Scott, a former WAC whose career spanned from 1973 until 1993. The second vignette tells the story of LTC Yvonne Doll's experiences in the army from being a freshman in the second class of women admitted to at West Point in 1977 until she retired in 2003. The third vignette was from Sergeant Margaret Mosely (now LaFace); who served on active duty from 1983 until 1985. She provided a detailed insight into the social fabric of the 1980s army. She was one of few women deployed to Grenada in 1984. Their contributions of service were an important part to understanding the changing dynamics that occurred in a very short amount of time when compared to scales of change for a cultural and social organization. Some analysts discount the army as not being a social institution. However, portraying it in a limited scope is problematic. One need only query how any voluntary organization might separate itself from the individuals who comprise it to address this issue adequately. Humans are social beings by their very nature; therefore, the army cannot escape its essence.

LTC Sharon Scott, US Army Retired Served from 1973 - 1993

LTC (Ret) Sharon Scott participated in much of the transition occurring in the army during the 1970s. She served on active duty as a Signal Corps officer from 1973 until 1993.¹⁸³ Scott, a self-described Type-A personality, called herself a survivor who changed over the years. A fourteen-year battle with cancer helped change her perspective on life. Her story provided a unique perspective on army service. Her depth of experience was particularly appropriate for this paper since she served on active duty for most of the period covered in this study. She served in the Women's Army Corps, witnessed the birth of the all-volunteer force, made the transition from WAC to Regular Army, and held a variety of leadership positions in the army. Uncovering her story reveals much about just how far women progressed in two decades of service.

Scott's step-father who retired from the US Navy, influenced Scott's desire to serve. She was a military brat, and was amenable to the notion of a career in the military. She was not interested in joining the navy because women's roles in the navy were too administratively focused. She was interested combat arms but knew women were not allowed in combat fields, so she chose the army because there appeared to be more opportunities to serve in a nontraditional fashion.

The ground plod by LTC Scott reads like a milestone journey for women in the army. She was amongst the first women to hold various leadership and teaching positions in the army. Scott was the first female Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) instructor at Fort Leavenworth and the first female company commander of her signal unit in Korea. Although most of Scott's story recounted her firsts at many army events, she also recalled one reverse

¹⁸³Personal interview conducted by author on 2 February 2006 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Lieutenant Colonel Sharon L. Scott.

gender role. In 1974, her training company at the WAC Center at Fort McClellan, Alabama had the first male Drill Sergeant.

Scott remarked that serving twenty years and retiring as a Lieutenant Colonel was beyond her initial expectations of accomplishment for service in the army. She was referring to the fact that two of seven fellow females in her Signal Officer Basic Course from 1973 actually earned the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. She remarked how exhausting it was to continually prove her competency as an officer. Male officers were assumed to automatically possess a basic level of competency. For Scott and many of her female contemporaries, they were tasked with knowing their jobs, and soldiers and the additional requirement to continually prove themselves to their superiors, cohorts and subordinates.

Scott was a direct commission in 1972 as a First Lieutenant due to her previous work experience in teaching. The WAC command tended to select Physical Education teachers to train WAC candidates. In 1972, the only way a woman could be commissioned was through Officer Candidate School (OCS) or a direct commission. The military academies did not admit women and neither did the Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC). She chose Military Police as her first branch choice. However, Scott was ultimately branched into her third choice, the Signal Corps. When commissioned, she was a twenty-five year old college graduate with three and a half years of teaching experience as the head of the Physical Education Department at Sam Houston High School in San Antonio, Texas. After completing the WAC Officer's Orientation Course at Fort McClellan, she completed the Signal Officer's Basic Course at Fort Gordon, Georgia. She was then selected to return to Fort McClellan to train WAC candidates.

When "Scottie" (nickname) was asked about the most memorable and important transitions she recalled about her time of service she cited the policy changes made by the army

that were related to social changes.¹⁸⁴ When she entered the army in 1973, women could not be married, or have children, and remain in the army. Although the army eventually allowed women to be married there was no guarantee that one would be co-located with one's spouse. Uniform changes were constant and costly. Officers had to buy their own uniforms. They did not receive a clothing allowance beyond an initial entry allowance that only covered a fraction of the cost for full uniforms. She remembered the army not having maternity uniforms until the 1990s.

Scott said she is thrilled to see how women have grown as professionals and Soldiers. She is glad to see that there are not so many sexual harassment issues regarding women serving. More cultural acceptance and tolerance exists today than during the 1970s. The reaction to women in the army in the 1970s was one of "what are they doing here?" The need for people to serve in times of war lends itself to forging cooperation between men and women. The positive aspect about the army is that there is room for everyone now. The need for volunteers is great and therefore those willing to contribute are seen as members of a team rather than males or females.

Scott echoed the concerns of other WACs who felt that women serving today were not as concerned about appearance or decorum as the WACs of her day. Proper dress, starch, and polish were a daily necessity for WACs. The level of concern about uniforms and creases in just the right place were reminiscent of the military academies and seemed to be less important in today's army especially during times of war. Crackling starched uniforms and shined boots almost seem trivial for a nation engaged in a protracted war. Although military dress and attention to details serve a necessary function, they are diminished given today's list of tasks and competencies that must be the priority of focus since the army is at war.

¹⁸⁴LTC Sharon L. Scott's nickname given by fellow service members. Nicknames are a term of identification and often show closeness and friendship forged through service. The people giving the nickname generally become especially important to the service member overtime due to the nostalgia associated with acquiring the nickname. The bonds that lead up to acquiring the name are usually personally memorable and become stronger overtime.

Scott wanted a challenge out of the army. She like many other women who joined sought adventure, opportunity and the chance to do more than the typical civilian workplace offered. She volunteered to leave the WAC center for an assignment in Korea and the chance to command a Signal Company. Scott explained that, “nobody wanted to leave the WAC Center except those who wanted to be real soldiers.”¹⁸⁵ She believed an assignment in Korea would be an excellent Signal experience. She had to “fight” to wear the Signal Corps branch insignia. During the WAC years, women were required to wear the WAC insignia, which resembled the Greek goddess of war - the Pallas Athene.¹⁸⁶ This goddess represented strength, wisdom, and a penchant for fighting just causes.

Aggressively seeking the assignment to Korea proved a good move for Scott. In September 1975, she became the proud Company Commander of the 362nd Signal Company / 41st Signal Battalion / 1st Signal Brigade. The company was located in Seoul, Korea. She was the first female to command that company and did so for ten months. The unit was a mixed gender company whose mission included providing telephone service for the brigade and serving as a microwave communications center for Korea. Scott remarked that plenty of people were shocked to see her in command of the company. She was watched closely. She felt the pressure to perform and do her best in the job, especially since the two previous commanders had been relieved of command. After Scott finished command she attended the Signal Officer’s Advanced Course at Fort Gordon and was assigned to teach for a year at the British Woman’s Royal Army Corps Staff College in Camberely, England.

¹⁸⁵Personal interview conducted by author on 2 February 2006 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Lieutenant Colonel Sharon L. Scott.

¹⁸⁶Pallas Athene was the most overtly powerful of the female Greek gods. She is Zeus’s daughter. She is goddess of defensive warfare, considered an excellent strategist and was known for using brains over brawn. For a good summary of Pallas Athene see Robert Rhys, *Pallas Athene Goddess of Knowledge and Defensive Warfare*, accessed 6 APR 06 from <http://www.thevalkyrie.com/stories/html/athene/index.htm>.

Emphasis on professional development was lacking for female officers during the 1970s. The Signal branch did not closely manage female's careers especially since women could not be assigned to divisional units. One of the changes Scott was especially happy to see was the expanded number of jobs and opportunities women now have in the army. During the 1970s, it was hard for Scott to convince her superiors to let women have opportunities beyond attending schools. Scott felt she had to prove herself as well as educate a few of her senior officers who acted as if women should not be in the army. "The men's mindset was a force to deal with," she declared.¹⁸⁷ During the 1980s, roughly at the mid-point of her career, she was able to finally serve in the types of jobs males performed.

An example of the status quo during the 1970s was Physical Training (PT). Women did not have to participate in PT. Only the men were required to do PT. This harkens back toward the Cold War mentality and definitely did not incorporate women into standard training. Contrast this with current army practice and mentality that all soldiers are warriors, and all require physical training and the ability to perform warrior battle drills.

¹⁸⁷Personal interview conducted by author on 2 February 2006 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Lieutenant Colonel Sharon L. Scott.

LTC Yvonne Doll, US Army Retired Served from 1981 - 2003

Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Yvonne Doll's military journey began in 1977 as a cadet (plebe) at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Women were first admitted to West Point in 1976, so being an eighteen year old at West Point in 1977 was like being in uncharted waters. Her class of approximately 1,000 cadets started out with 104 women on the beginning of the first day. By the end of the first day, one woman had already dropped out of West Point. After four years of school and training, 61 of the initial 104 women graduated. Doll graduated in 1981 with a Bachelor of Science degree. She was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Military Police (MP) Corps. She served on active duty in the MP Corps and as a comptroller for twenty-two years.¹⁸⁸

In 1981, Doll was the honor graduate of her Military Police Corps Officer Basic Course. She chose the MP Corps because it was one of the less technical and more people oriented army branches available to women. In the 1980s, the MP Corps was concentrating less on "white hat" missions, like gate security, and focusing on wartime missions that resulted in the MP Corps' recognition as a force multiplier in a combat zone. This aspect was appealing to Doll as well as the opportunities for adventurous training that the MP Corps offered. The MP Corps' self-advertisement claims that one MP platoon has more firepower than an infantry company. The awesome weapons capability of an MP platoon was often demonstrated for prospective cadets at army branch orientations, making the MP Corps alluring.

After graduation from the Basic Course, she served in a variety of worldwide military positions of increasing responsibility, including two company level commands. She commanded

¹⁸⁸Yvonne Doll, personal interview by author conducted at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 17 January 2006.

two United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) Military Police companies while stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The USDB is the Department of Defense's only maximum-security prison. She also served as a Battalion Executive Officer for a Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Command. Two of her comptroller assignments included budget officer and Deputy, Chief of Staff Resource Management responsibilities. After graduating from CGSC, she commanded a Criminal Investigation Field Office company at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. She served as a Brigade Executive Officer for the United States Army Law Enforcement Command at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, followed by two years as the brigade operations officer at the USDB. In 1999, she began teaching Leadership at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where she presently continues in that capacity as a Title X civilian instructor. She is currently pursuing a Doctorate of Management in Organizational Leadership.

When asked about her decision to attend West Point, twenty-eight years ago, she mentioned a desire for challenge as a primary motivator as well as an ability to obtain a top-notch education. Because a standardized interest inventory indicated she might like to be a naval officer, she investigated the possibility of attending one of the United States military academies. She applied to the US Naval Academy at Annapolis and to West Point.

The army seemed a better fit for Doll especially after she discovered that a navy commission meant months on a ship at sea each year. Doll also possessed many of the requisite qualities that military academies and highly competitive universities seek in prospective students. She was the captain of her high school track team, she exercised leadership and initiative by forming a women's basketball program at her high school, and she had a high grade point average (GPA). She embodied the "whole person" concept of a well-developed high school student that West Point sought.

Doll's family was supportive albeit stunned by her decision to attend West Point. Her mother encouraged her and provided her with a boost of confidence about her decision to attend

West Point. Her father was in disbelief. He served in the army for nearly four years and was surprised that his daughter wanted to attend a military academy. He became very proud of Doll's accomplishments. In some ways, she fulfilled his regrets of not staying in the army longer.

The drive from Minneapolis, Minnesota, to West Point was a "big deal" Doll recalled. Her father drove and her mother and grandma came along for the trip to New York. The family had seldom traveled as far as the trip to West Point. The trip was more than a drive across the country; it signified an important family event for Doll and her elders. Their interest in sending her to college and assisting her with the transition at college was significant. The familial support displayed at the onset of her journey buoyed her when times became challenging at West Point. The knowledge that she had family support was comforting and acted as a steadying force during uncertain times. Their support and encouragement had two effects on Doll, first she was highly appreciative of the support, and secondly it functioned as an external motivator to assist with accomplishing her goals. Because of her family's interest and stake in her education, she did not want to let them down.

When recalling her experiences at West Point she noted that it was very stressful, especially the first year. Stress came in three main varieties – physical, mental, and psychological. This stress was not exclusively born by the females. Males found the environment to be as much of a culture shock as the females. The idea at West Point was to determine how a cadet would react to pressure and irrationality. Cadets had to endure upper classmen screaming at them for seemingly minor circumstances. Academics were demanding at West Point. Cadets commonly flunked out of school because of academic failure. West Point was not physically difficult for Doll because she was accustomed to regular physical activity and exceptionally fit upon arrival. She was a good enough athlete letter on the women's basketball team as a plebe. She was also captain of the women's volleyball team. The harder challenges for Doll to adjust to were largely

emotional and psychological. Adjusting to a highly regimented lifestyle, being away from home, having personal liberty and freedom restricted were shocks she could not prepare for in advance.

Women at West Point stood out despite their efforts to blend in and assimilate. Doll said she was issued skirts instead of pants and that she and others did not want to wear the skirts because it only made the women stand out more. In a stressful environment, the less attention called to oneself the better. The women perceived the skirts as a negative attention getter. Since women were newly admitted to West Point in 1976, their goal focused on fitting in with the status quo. Doll recalled differences in the demeanor of upper classmates. It was obvious that some did not want women at the academy. Some tolerated women and others were supportive. There was a noticeable difference in the demeanor of these three types of people.

Doll initially did not give much thought to a twenty-year army career. Her initial army ambitions were to complete her five-year service obligation that resulted from attending West Point. Prior to commissioning her career interests included being a police officer, and a physical education coach. She also cited an interest in contributing to society and serving others. After commissioning, she found that she enjoyed the structure and organization of the military and she very much liked the camaraderie of the soldiers she had the privilege of leading.

SGT Meg LaFace Served from 1983 - 1985

Although she only served on active duty for two years, Margaret Mosely LaFace made up with content and experience what she lacked in actual number of days served on active duty. In just two short years, she graduated from basic training, advanced individual training, Airborne school and deployed to Grenada with the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. When asked why she only served on active duty for two years she replied that she did not believe the army was any place for a woman with ambition. She had dreams of serving her country, and challenging herself in new ways. She accomplished these aspirations but in the end was disappointed with a lack of a clear picture of female inclusiveness in the army of her era.¹⁸⁹ The unfulfilled expectation that LaFace held was that the army was ready to fully receive and welcome women for what they had to offer. Unfortunately, she was a woman a little ahead of her time. The army was not quite the land of endless opportunity for women, but neither was America. Social attitudes do not change overnight. Social change is a slow process; bureaucratic

Social change is even slower. Institutions as steeped in tradition and culture like the army changes even slower.

She could not find women above the rank of Staff Sergeant (E-6) with whom she could relate. Most of the women officers she knew of all had fathers who had been in the service. There did not seem to be any first generation women officers. She suspected that these female officers at least had family support and encouragement with their careers. LaFace could not see a future for herself in the army; she did not envision emulating the few senior ranking women. There is something powerful about the ability to see in others what one aspires for oneself. This was a

¹⁸⁹Margaret LaFace, personal interview by author conducted at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 4 February 2006.

missing link for LaFace. In essence, she had no high-ranking role models or mentors. Another contributing factor, which helped her decide to leave active duty, was her upcoming marriage. Although the army had recently begun the Married Couples Program, there were problems with assignments of women. Her husband was being assigned to Fort Drum, New York. There was no assignment for her as a Military Police NCO at Fort Drum because females could not be assigned to division MP units. The closest location for her to be assigned was West Point, New York, which was three hundred miles away. Therefore, as a Sergeant, LaFace left active duty and went on to serve ten years in the Army Reserve.

For a depiction of just how slow the army had adapted practices one only need to note that by 1985 the army still did not have Battle Dress Uniforms (BDUs) specially suited for pregnant soldiers. Pregnant females had to wear the Class B uniform the once they could no longer fit into their regular BDUs. This is despite the fact that since a 1976 Supreme Court ruling in *Crawford v. Cushman* a women could not be discharged from the armed forces if she became pregnant or if she had dependents less than 18 years old. Previously, women deciding to have children were forced to leave the military. In another example, LaFace explained that Physical Training (PT) was occasionally a time of humiliation. The PT uniform was retched. It was the “banana suit” and was known for being notoriously small and tight fitted. Both males and females wore this uniform. Several times while running down Ardennes Road¹⁹⁰ at Fort Bragg she was slapped on her behind by male soldiers. This left her wondering why men were motivated to do such acts. It seems that practices, uniforms, and local policy would have been adapted to

¹⁹⁰ Ardennes is one of the main roads used by numerous army units while conducting physical training (PT) at Fort Bragg. Ardennes is a two-lane road which is closed to vehicular traffic during PT hours. Instead of vehicular traffic, it is flooded with runners from various units. Often units run in tight formation up and down Ardennes and there are many opportunities for units to show their motivation and esprit d’corps. The atmosphere takes on an intensity of its own. There is limited free space remaining on the road when two units are running in opposite directions. Ardennes becomes quite congested and is similar to a gauntlet if there are mass unit runs occurring on the same time.

incorporate women, make them feel welcome and part of the military team. For years, this was not the consensus. Women were largely accepted only to the extent that they fit in and conformed to the male dominated military and its expectations of its members.

In 1983 when LaFace showed up at the recruiter's station, she was a recruiter's dream. At sixteen, she had already graduated early from high school and was off to college. By nineteen, she completed three years of college and she was "burnt out "on school. She decided that she wanted to try something at the opposite end of the academic spectrum and the army was exactly what she was seeking. Her ASVAB score was a 121, placing her in the top percentages of recruits. She credits some of her family upbringing with spawning her desire to challenge herself. LaFace commented that at least from the age of twelve she was very aware of her own family dynamics which clearly favored developing her brothers' extracurricular over herself and her sisters. She came from a self-described family of male privilege. The idea of desiring a chance for equal opportunity and equal challenge intensely appealed to her in part because of her family upbringing.

LaFace enlisted to become a Military Police (MP). She entered the army with the rank of Private First Class, with a pay grade of E-3, rather than as a Private with a pay grade of E-1 because she had over ninety credit hours of college. Within, three months she was promoted to Specialist with a pay grade of E-4. She chose the MPs because in 1983 it was the only Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) option available to her that that offered gender integrated One Station Individual Training (OSIT). She was stationed at Fort McClellan, Alabama for this training. This meant both males and females would be trained together from Basic Training to Advanced Individual Training. Her company remained the same over the sixteen weeks of training. During this training, there were three platoons of males and one platoon of women. Having the opportunity to receive the same training and challenges as males were afforded was highly sought by LaFace.

Although, LaFace at times felt the male drill sergeant tried to insulate the women from the harshness of a training environment most everything the women did was in the company of males. They trained as a company. Ironically, this may have been more surprising to the males than the females. The first time the army instituted gender integrated training was 1977 with coeducational basic training for men and women recruits. In 1982, the army returned to segregated basic training for men and women recruits. LaFace recalled the frustration of being segregated as the female platoon, which was forced to run at the end of the company formation. The female platoon was forced to run at the back so they would not slow down the rest of the company. However, for those women who were faster than average running at the back and at a slower pace was a morale buster. After many requests, LaFace and one other female soldier were finally allowed to run with the males. LaFace described the general environment of the time for women serving in a male dominated army as being one where any woman's mishap being capable of creating trouble for the rest of the women. All it took was one mistake from one woman to make life difficult for all women in a unit or school. Women had to work twice as hard to look half as good, assuming anyone was even concerned enough to watch.

LaFace graduated both Basic Training and AIT as the female honor graduate. She was encouraged to apply for Officer Candidate School (OCS); however, she made a clear and conscious decision to be an NCO rather than an officer because she believed she could positively affect other soldiers and have a greater ability to make a gender impact. In retrospect, she believed she made the right decision because she noted that her Lieutenant did not have the opportunity to train and participate in the army the way she did as an NCO. The officers were too busy with administrative details and seldom had the time to train and work with soldiers to the extent that NCOs did. In addition, LaFace was tired of the "brain drain" she endured in college and she felt being an officer would require more mental effort. She was interested in practical work and the ability to influence others.

After OSIT, she went to Airborne school at Fort Benning, Georgia. In September 1984, Airborne school was an adventure in and of itself. Women were first allowed to attend airborne training in the early 1980s. There were surprisingly fifteen other women at “jump school” as LaFace referred to the training. Four of these women were warrant officers. After the end of the training, only three enlisted and one of the female warrant officers graduated. She recalled that the “black hats,” the Airborne school instructors were unduly harsh on the women. Often times during the first two weeks of the three week school, she felt the women were singled out and required to do more push-ups and PLFs (parachute landing falls) than the men. Worse than the extra attention the women received from the black hats was the fact that they pitted the women against each other and encouraged the women to quit to save themselves the effort of enduring the hardships of Airborne School.¹⁹¹ This was psychologically draining. After the first two weeks (ground and tower week) LaFace said she could understand why the women may have been pushed so hard by the black hats. It became obvious that they were trying to ensure the women had enough upper body strength to pull the risers on the parachute. This physical act of pulling the risers is an important step in one’s preparation to land. It became obvious that extra strength conditioning was helpful for most of the women. However, LaFace never could justify why the black hats deliberately pitted the women against each other and encouraged their failure. A

¹⁹¹Encouraging trainees to quit is a common military technique perhaps designed to instill discipline and perseverance in the face of difficulty. This technique was likely commonly used on males as well as females. The idea is to place the common goal of the training above one self’s personal desires. Occasionally trainees are taunted with the notion of quitting and the joy of leaving the rigors of the training environment. This is done as a way to test the will and dedication of individuals.

graduation tradition at the school was receiving blood wings by having the airborne insignia slammed into one's chest.¹⁹² The women were not given blood wings like the males, nor were they even asked if they wanted to participate in this tradition. The assumption was that the men wanted blood wings and the women did not.

Airborne School was more than military training for LaFace. A couple of concepts became very clear to her while attending the school. The first was that being a woman would be an issue of sexuality and not one of gender in the eyes of male soldiers. Men saw the benefits of sexual contact with women more so than the skills, knowledge, and abilities women were bringing to the army.

After graduating from Airborne school, LaFace was stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina where she was assigned to Bravo Company, 96th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion. The 96th CA Battalion was a subordinate unit of 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM). At the time, there were only two women in her company – herself and Second Lieutenant Lisa Fortner. The 96th was a unit with minimal staffing at the time. Only two women of the approximate six in the whole battalion lived in the barracks. The other four women in the battalion were married and therefore did not reside in the barracks. Therefore, LaFace and one other female shared a room with a private bathroom. They were the only females in the building.

By this time, LaFace was now a Sergeant (pay grade E-5). She recalled how quickly she and Fortner became friends even though both were cautioned about the inappropriateness of an officer and an NCO being friends. This was seen as detrimental to the good order and discipline

¹⁹²Blood Wings is an unauthorized tradition whereby graduates of the United States Army Airborne School have their silver badge “Airborne Wings” pounded into their chest. The backside of the badge has two pins which become lodged into ones chest, hence the term blood wings. The exact origins of this tradition are unknown, but most likely date back to the initial World War II paratrooper training. This practice is viewed as hazing by some. It sparked public and military controversy when knowledge of it reached the mainstream media. <http://www.cnn.com/US/9707/11/blood.pinning/> accessed 16 Feb 06.

required in military units. However, connecting socially is nearly inescapable; humankind naturally gravitates toward social interaction. This was a problem for women serving in the early 1980s. There was no built in peer group. For a profession as demanding of personal time as the military where a typical duty day lasts ten to twelve hours, making the time to create a social life beyond work is challenging to say the least. In LaFace's situation she would have been a loner, had to dedicate considerable effort to build a social network or do what came naturally, befriend Fortner. This friendship although discouraged by the unit leadership was difficult to avoid especially since they were the only women in the unit. During company training exercises and the deployment to Grenada, they lived in the same billets. It would have been difficult not to develop a social bond given the proximity forced upon the two women. The ability to develop social connections was limited for the women.

Two central themes regarding women serving in the army emerged again at Fort Bragg as they had during LaFace's Airborne school training. These themes were chivalry and sexuality. LaFace explained the idea of chivalry by noting that women were offered protection from male NCO's typically. Although this may have seemed like a nicety extended to watch over the women, at times it was extremely stifling. It also ran the risk of being creepy. You could never be sure if some of the males had ulterior motives by trying to look out after the women. This led to LaFace's description of the other theme: sexuality. The worry was one of being taken advantage of by men and a constant alertness maintained by women serving was common during this time. There was a feeling that you always had to be alert for males' motives. Women commonly felt like they stood out and received unwanted attention.

From February until July 1985 LaFace was deployed to Grenada as a member of the United States Military Support Element-Grenada. The normal tour length was sixty days yet her unit ended up being deployed for six months. She was not sure why there was a difference in the length of her unit's tour versus the others. The United States Army had soldiers in Grenada since

it invaded the tiny island in 1983. This ad hoc unit was created on 15 December 1983 in response to activities following the United States' invasion.

Lieutenant Colonel Earl C. Horan, Jr., age forty-six, and nicknamed the "Earl of Grenada" was the commander of the approximately three hundred soldiers assigned to the unit. The Grenada Beach Hotel located in St. Georges, Grenada was the unit's headquarters and billeting area. Horan deployed from Fort Bragg where he served as the XVIII Airborne Corps' Deputy Chief of Staff G-5, also known as the Civil Affairs section. The job in Grenada seemed tailor made for him. Before deploying, he had the opportunity to assess the situation during the US intervention and afterwards from Fort Bragg. He was involved in the planning for residual forces scheduled to remain on the island through the summer of 1985.

Due to his civil affairs staff position, it seemed only natural that Horan oversee the military support element. Horan was the commander of the military contingent on the island but his duties included many diplomatic missions. His weekly activities included meeting with the United States Embassy and Information Service officials, the local police commissioner, local business people, the Caribbean military counterparts, the international press, and the local public.¹⁹³

LaFace deployed from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as did most of the other soldiers who went to Grenada. The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion was tasked to support the Grenada operations as part of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Forces. She estimated that there were only five US Army females deployed to Grenada at the time and previously there were no females sent from the 96th. LaFace and Fortner were the first females sent from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. LaFace worked in the battalion S-5 or Civil Affairs section. Her primary responsibility was to pay the Grenadian civilian work force for their work on reconstruction projects. She had the unique

opportunity to travel extensively around the island to check on the four construction projects each month. Along with monitoring these projects, she was tasked to assist First Lieutenant Fortner in paying the locally contracted workers. They either drove or flew in a helicopter to four construction sites. Lieutenant Fortner paid workers in cash; Sergeant LaFace served as her armed guard escort, and carried a 9mm pistol. Prior to the deployment, she received pistol marksmanship training. When she was tasked to perform guard duty at the compound soldiers lived at she carried an M-16 rifle.

She and other soldiers lived in the Grenada Beach Hotel, located on the Grande Anse Beach. The hotel was once owned by the Holiday Inn of Canada but later served as the US military headquarters and military compound.¹⁹⁴ It sounds nice compared to living in a tent, however; it was not a luxury accommodation. Living in a bombed out hotel was eerie. There were chunks of concrete missing from the building, signs of war damage. They often did not have running water. Taking a shower was a luxury. She often resorted to swimming in the ocean to get clean. They ate one hot meal per day and two MREs or Meal Ready to Eat (MRE). Due to the difficulty in procuring potable water they were issued two six packs of cola per day. The one hot meal per day came from locally procured food. LaFace still remembers some of the strange varieties of local food. The salad dressing stands out as particularly different even after twenty-one years time has passed. They did not have fresh milk and only had the military issued milk in a box, which did not taste like milk. It was horrible.

Despite the fact that Grenada was a combat zone just two years prior, LaFace and other soldiers deployed there had an unusual ability to travel freely and unencumbered about the country. There was also several morale, welfare and recreational (MWR) activities available for

¹⁹³Jason Brady, "Grenada for Leader, Troops, It's A Special Duty," The Fayetteville Observer (North Carolina), April 4, 1985, sec D.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

soldiers in their off time. As of 1985 the recreational activities included: scuba diving lessons, army vs. Grenadian basketball games, television and weight lifting rooms, shooting matches, nightly telephone linkage to Fort Bragg and a weekly cookout onboard a two-mast schooner.¹⁹⁵ One of the most irritating MWR events that occurred during LaFace's deployment was the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders visit. She was tasked to set up and tear down for the event. She was also supposed to attend the event, as is often the case, soldiers are encouraged to attend these events to show support for MWR activities and partly to enforce "mandatory fun" in the military. LaFace was outraged that she had to be associated with what she termed half-naked women dancing and prancing around the compound. She chose not to attend the event and just performed her set up and tear down duties. She was punished for not attending. The problem was that eventually the cheerleaders left but the raging hormones that were inevitably turned on in many of the males did not leave, and you ended up with an island of horny me. There did not seem to be any clear understanding of the extent of the stimuli the cheerleaders visit had on the males. For the female soldiers staying on the island it was very clear just how much such a visit could instigate sexual desires in the males. The women had to stay on a sort of heightened alert for a week after the visit to be on guard against unwelcome advances from the male soldiers. Women stuck together and did not go anywhere alone. The irony of this is that there were usually males who would voluntarily protect the women and offer to look out for them. Although this could be helpful at times, it was stifling. You also had to sort out whether or not their offer was sincere or whether he had other motives. LaFace indicated that she felt a Sergeant First Class from her unit was unofficially tasked to watch out for her well-being, and sort of serve as a doting father figure. Although, some commander may have been trying to do the right thing by having the females looked after, this was stifling.

¹⁹⁵Ibid.

Members, of the US Support Group-Grenada, including LaFace voluntarily supported a local orphanage in Grenada. LaFace recalled that the people at the orphanage were especially intrigued by American women soldiers. That was a novelty for the local people. The soldier's ability and desire to mingle with the locals was something uncommon for the medical students who had previously been the most common US citizens in Grenada. The medical students were considered elitist and did not interact much with the locals. They mostly stayed on campus and stuck to themselves. The value of having American soldiers in Grenada working essentially as good will ambassadors was paying off. By the time LaFace arrived in Grenada, the Americans were well tolerated and even liked. The Grenadian recognized the financial value of American programs. It was well known that the American government, through the American military had money to spend in Grenada. This was welcome especially since after the invasion Grenada had lost most of its cruise ship business as a port of call.

The remainder of this chapter explores two small-scale United States military conflicts during the 1980s--Grenada and Panama--and examines the role of women during both of these military operations. These operations were significant for two reasons. They were the first military test of the All-Volunteer Force. Secondly, they were the first time the military establishment, civilian Department of Defense leaders, and the American public witnessed a gender integrated army in action.

Doll commented on the military lifestyle's impact on her family. She said she was fortunate that her husband was retired from the army and he could follow and support her career. Balancing a military career and a family was challenging due to successive moves over a typical twenty-year career. By 1991, most of her fellow female officers had resigned their commission due to complications with balancing a family and the army, particularly once children were born. The army was not committed or supportive of joint domicile families at that time. This has since

improved and the Army Married Couples Program/Joint Domicile Program is helpful and a positive sign of the army's interest and commitment to retaining dual military couples.

APPENDIX 9 Acronyms

AD	Active Duty
ARNG	Army National Guard
ASI	Additional Skill Identifier
AVF	All-Volunteer Force
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CA	Combat Arms
COE	Contemporary Operational Environment
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
DACOWITS	Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
DoD	Department of Defense
DCPC	Direct Combat Probability Coding
EU	European Union
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FSC	Forward Support Company
GAO	Government Accountability Office or Government Accounting Office
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MP	Military Police
MRE	Meal Ready to Eat
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPTEMPO	Operations Tempo
OSIT	One Station Installation Training
POW	Prisoner of War
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SAW	Squad Automatic Weapon
SPAR	Coast Guard Women's Reserve
SQI	Skill Qualification Identifier
US	United States
USAR	US Army Reserve
WAAC	Women's Army Auxiliary Corps
WAC	Women's Army Corps
WASP	Women Air Force Service Pilots
WAVES	Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service
WIMSA	Women in Military Service for America
WITA	Women in the Army Policy Review Group

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