

ARMY RESERVE CULTURE: A CRITICAL PART OF TRANSFORMATION

BY

COLONEL LORA L. TUCKER
United States Army Reserve

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Colonel Lora L. Tucker
United States Army Reserve

Richard Meinhart
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

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As the United States Army Reserve undergoes a transformation called by former Chief of the Army Reserve, Lieutenant General Helmly, “the deepest, most profound change it has pursued in more than 50 years,” a top priority must focus on understanding and shaping Army Reserve organizational and leadership culture. While resources, capabilities and an innovative culture are three key areas necessary to complete Army Reserve transformation, this paper focuses on culture because it is critical to sustaining that transformation. To develop an innovative culture, we must first study and understand the culture of the Army Reserve that was born during the strategic reserve time period and must now morph at an unprecedented pace to one that supports an operational reserve concept. This paper examines Army Reserve culture looking through three lenses; a historic lens, an Army Reserve organizational culture lens, and an Army Reserve senior leadership culture lens. This paper concludes by recommending that the Army Reserve formally study its organizational and leadership culture, better understand its officer leadership development, and develop a roadmap to change its organizational and leadership culture to anchor transformation in a time of persistent conflict.

ARMY RESERVE CULTURE: A CRITICAL PART OF TRANSFORMATION

People are central to everything else we do in the Army. Institutions don't transform, people do. Platforms and organizations don't defend this nation, people do. And finally, units don't train, they don't stay ready, they don't grow and develop leadership; they don't sacrifice; and they don't take risks on behalf of the nation; people do.

—General Shinseki, Nov 2001

Today's Army Reserve transformation is considered by key Army leaders as the most comprehensive since World War II. To holistically compliment the Active Army and National Guard during a period of persistent conflict, the Army Reserve is evolving from a strategic reserve to an operational, expeditionary force. This transformation involves creating a new force structure and rebalancing the Army Reserve to reduce operational tempo for Active and Reserve components and respond to different challenges. The new force structure consists of a realignment of legacy regional command and control centers to command and control under new operational functional (O&F) commands while adding predictable combat support and combat service support capabilities.¹ Rebalancing the Army Reserve will result in a total of seven expeditionary sustainment commands, nine sustainment brigades, and three combat service support organizations. Units that will be added by 2013 include military police, chemical, maintenance, transportation, signal, quartermaster, and engineering; units that are critical to support the U.S. military's role in today's global environment defined by the term persistent conflict.

Leading this transformation is Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz Jr., Chief of the Army Reserve and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Reserve Command. This transformation has leadership and force structure challenges, with priority placed on

providing the right resources at the right time and place. The focus of this effort is best illustrated by LTG Stultz when he stated: “The Army Reserve leadership culture is now focused on action and change to keep pace with emerging homeland defense missions and the global war on terrorism. No where is that more evident than in our force structure.”² There are national consequences to Army Reserve transformation as LTG Stultz states: “Failure to ensure that our resources are full, timely and predictable puts America at risk in the future.”³ This resource failure is not the only future risk for the Army Reserve as it continues to transform. Another risk is failing to understand the culture and the leadership culture of the organization you are transforming to ensure resources are properly applied.

While LTG Stultz stated that the Army Reserve leadership culture is focused on action and change, this paper will show that overall organizational culture and the leadership culture in the Army Reserve are not being given the priority needed to help make the Army Reserve’s historic transformation effective. According to noted author Edgar Schein, leadership and culture management “are so central to understanding organizations and making them effective that we cannot afford to be complacent about either one.”⁴ Consequently, neglecting to “anchor” change firmly in an organization’s culture can have serious consequences.⁵ As the United States Army Reserve continues to undergo “the deepest, most profound change it has pursued in more than 50 years,” our top priority must focus on properly changing and shaping Army Reserve culture and officer leadership culture.⁶ However, as the priority for transformation continues to focus on force structure and Army Reserve Force Generation (ARFORGEN) models, which are the more tangible and measurable aspects of transformation, it is the intangible

illustrated by General Shinseki's insightful quote at this paper's beginning of "Institutions don't transform, people do" that has the real power to anchor this transformational change.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 forever changed our military reality as we have been in a persistent state of conflict, an Army serving a nation at war.⁷ While the Army is fully engaged in two campaigns; Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan since October 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom since March 2003, it is also transforming, which is a tremendous and historic challenge. As an integral part of today's Army in responding to the demands of the persistent conflict, the Army Reserve is transforming from a strategic reserve that involves a Soldier serving one weekend a month and two weeks every summer into an operational, expeditionary and domestic force where soldiers serve in a myriad of possible battle assembly combinations and for extended and multiple deployments.

Due to a transformation that is being done at an unprecedented pace, stability is no longer the norm.⁸ The norm is now a volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous global environment in which leadership is required to anchor and drive this change. However, as this paper will show, there is an overall organizational culture and officer leadership culture gap in the Army Reserve, a gap that was born during the time period of the strategic reserve and must now die in order to give birth to the historic transformation into an operational reserve. General Richard B. Myers, the fifteenth Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff illustrates the importance of culture in his quote: "Transformation requires a combination of technology, intellect and cultural adjustments."⁹ If leadership is critical both to the formation of culture and to change culture, the Army Reserve must

examine more carefully the leadership culture within its organization and the need to develop a particular type of leader, called the *culture manager*.¹⁰ A culture manager is one who has developed the emotional strength, depth of vision and capacity for self-insight and objectivity necessary for culture change and management.¹¹

In a new world of almost continuous mobilization, Army Reserve leadership failure can have strategic and global implications. Major General Antonio M. Taguba used these words when describing the failures of the Army Reserve's 800th Military Police Brigade during his report to Congress in May 2004 on the Abu Ghraib fiasco, "Failure in leadership, sir, from the brigade commander on down. Lack of discipline, no training whatsoever and no supervision. Supervisory omission was rampant."¹² Leadership failure is not an option for the Army Reserve. The strategic reserve time period created certain culture and leadership culture artifacts, values and basic assumptions that have caused the Army Reserve to be predisposed to certain kinds of leadership that are not always effective in today's environment. As strategic leaders we must understand and leverage the following paradox: "Leaders create cultures, but cultures, in turn, create their next generation of leaders."¹³

This paper examines culture in the Army Reserve by looking through three lenses: the organizational and leadership culture challenges associated with the historic strategic Army Reserve environment; three levels of organizational culture and their interaction; and senior leadership development and leadership culture in the Army Reserve. From this examination, this paper proposes recommendations for the Army Reserve to consider related to anchoring transformational change, realizing that the

more rapidly things change, the more dependent we are on leaders to manage the changes.¹⁴

Challenges of the Historic Strategic Army Reserve Environment

As the Army Reserve continues to transform at an unprecedented pace the need to adapt or change existing organizational culture and leadership culture to the realities of the new global environment of persistent conflict become critical.¹⁵ As such, it is important to understand the environmental changes that affect the Army Reserve and to recognize the associated culture and leadership cultural challenges of this new environment. When cultural values support organizational adaptation to the new environment, the relationship becomes much stronger. Culture has an important influence on organizational performance when it either helps the organization to anticipate or adapt to the environmental change or interferes with its adaptation to the environment.¹⁶ Before we can understand how the environment changed for the Army Reserve in the 21st Century, we must first study the past. Aristotle illustrates the importance of studying the past when stating: “If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development.”¹⁷ By examining the beginning and the development of the Army Reserve as Aristotle suggests above, critical insights as to why the organizational culture and the leadership culture in the Army Reserve seems to be frozen in time can possibly be found.

The Army Reserve traces its roots back to the French and Indian Wars (1756-1763) through the Civil War (1861-1865), when the Army raised and maintained citizen-soldiers and federal volunteers during wartime under federal constitutional authority to raise armies. On April 23, 1908, Congress passed Senate Bill 1424 that authorized the

Army to establish a reserve corps of medical officers. The Medical Reserve Corps was formed, creating the first reservoir of trained Officers in a Reserve status and the nation's first Federal Reserve force.¹⁸ Hence, a culture of using civilian acquired skills that compliments traditional military training “part-time” was born.

The maturation of Army Reserve culture developed over the years of strategic mobilization and deployment. The first call-up of the Army Reserve came in 1916 as a result of tensions between the United States and Mexico. The National Defense Act of 1916 established the Officers Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps and the Reserve Officers Training Corps. One year later in 1917, the initial Reserve organization, the Medical Reserve Corps, merged into the Officers Reserve Corps. On April 6, 1917, America entered World War I and by the end of June 1917, there were 21,543 officer reservists and 35,000 enlisted reservists.¹⁹ As the Army expanded for World War I, so did the Army Reserve. For example, approximately 89,500 officers from the Officers Reserve Corps served and one-third were medical doctors, while 80,000 members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps served and 15,000 were in medical units. They served in every division of the American Expeditionary Force, Warrior Citizens answering their Nation's call, when needed.²⁰ As the Army Reserve continued its development and responded to the uncertainties and chaos inevitable of that time period, the Army Reserve culture began to possess a set of common understandings for organizational action as it would be used part-time to fill in the gaps of a struggling active component Army.

As World War II neared, the Army Reserve was mobilized again to provide the junior officers needed to build the huge Army necessary to defeat Nazi Germany and

Imperial Japan. Almost one of every four Army officers -- more than 200,000 of the 900,000 Army officers during the war -- was an Army Reservist. Recognizing the importance of the Organized Reserve, as it was then called, to the war effort, Congress authorized retirement and drill pay for the first time in 1948.²¹ The culture of the Army Reserve had a traditional way of thinking and doing things at this point in time shared by its members related to war as a state on state event and long mobilization times to become ready.

Five years after victory in World War II, the Army Reserve was needed again. In 1950, Army Reserve men and women were called up to rebuild the dangerously weak U.S. Army during the Korean War. The Korean War saw more than 240,000 soldiers of the Organized Reserve called to active duty to serve in Korea. While the Korean War was still under way, Congress began making significant changes in the structure and role of the Reserve. These changes transformed the Organized Reserve Corps into the U. S. Army Reserve (USAR). This new organization was divided into a Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve. Reserve units were authorized 24 inactive duty training days a year and up to 17 days of active duty, which was called annual training. The president was given authority to order up to one million Reservists, of all services, to active duty when declaring a national emergency.²² Army Reserve culture hit its adulthood during this time period to reflect what is it today. This culture focused on the values, beliefs, and expectations that members came to share and the glue holding this organization together was its part-time nature that had become the pattern of meaning for the organization.²³

More than 69,000 Army Reservists were called to active duty in response to the Berlin Crisis of 1961. The call-up which lasted from September 1961 to August 1962, was hampered by a number of problems, including old equipment, lack of equipment, shortage of unit soldiers, and difficulty locating individual soldiers. A subsequent reorganization of the Army's Reserve Component occurred in 1967 and 1968. That reorganization resulted in an Army Reserve composed primarily of combat support and combat service support units, with combat arms units concentrated in the Army National Guard. The position of Chief, Army Reserve was established by federal statute, to be filled by a USAR general officer appointed by the president for a four-year term with advice and consent of the Senate.²⁴ This time period presented the Army Reserve with a power distance from the active component and the National Guard. The redistribution of forces created an unequal distribution of combat power and military prestige associated with combat power for the Army Reserve. The organizational culture of being "less than" the active component and not as relevant as the National Guard seeped into the bloodstream of the Army Reserve.

There was no large-scale mobilization for Vietnam; however, as President Johnson favored a minor role for the Army Reserve and other reserve forces. Ultimately, some 5,900 USAR soldiers comprising 42 units were ordered to active duty, and 3,500 soldiers in 35 units went overseas. The end of the draft coincided with announcement of the Total Force Policy in 1973. That policy called for the United States to maintain an active duty force capable of maintaining peace and deterring aggression. Those forces would be reinforced, when necessary, by a well-trained, well-equipped

Reserve Component. The effect of an all-volunteer active Army and the Total Force Policy was a shift of some responsibilities and resources to the Army Reserve.²⁵

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 led to the largest call-up of Reserve Component personnel since the Korean War. More than 84,000 Army Reservists provided combat support and combat service support to the Total Force in Southwest Asia and site support elsewhere. During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Army Reserve provided transportation, medical, civil affairs, postal, engineer, military police, and maintenance, linguistic and other types of support.²⁶

The Army Reserve's responsibility for major installation management expanded, when in October 1997 the USAR took on Fort Dix, N.J., one of the Army's 15 designated power-projection platforms, and additionally managed Fort McCoy, Wis. This change in component management of the Army's power-projection platforms can be a tipping point for Army Reserve leadership culture as responsibility for major installation management is now a full time vice part time responsibility with leadership consequences. A shift in military strategy from full spectrum to counter insurgency and partial mobilization prompted a reorganization of USAR training divisions into divisions (institutional training) and divisions (exercise) that enhanced peacetime and operational readiness. On the personnel end, improved computerization and implementation of the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act provided a better managed more professional force.²⁷

As a strategic reserve, citizen Soldiers served one weekend a month and two weeks a year every summer unless called to active duty when needed. General William Westmoreland in 1990 said: "Most of the units called up in the reserves are in a kind of

support role and not necessarily on the front line.”²⁸ Today General Westmoreland statement is no longer the reality for the Army Reserve. As outlined by former Chief, Army Reserve Lt. Gen Thomas J. Plewes in 1999, the Army Reserve contains the preponderance of many key Army capabilities:

Today, the Army cannot go to war without the Army Reserve. It provides 45 percent of the Army’s combat service support units and 26 percent of the Army’s combat support units. Further the Army Reserve provides: 100 percent of the Army’s training and exercise divisions, 100 percent of its railway units and enemy prisoner of war brigades, 97 percent of civil affairs units, 84 percent of psychological operations forces, 72 percent of the movement control structure, 63 percent of the Army’s chemical decontamination and detection capability, 59 percent of the medical capability, and 50 percent of the Army’s watercraft.²⁹

The Army Reserve is transforming from a strategic to an operational, expeditionary force at an unprecedented pace. More than 20,000 out of the 205,000 authorized Army Reserve Soldiers are forward deployed in Afghanistan, Iraq and 18 other countries. Due to disaster relief efforts, homeland defense initiatives, and the global war on terror in a persistent conflict environment, Army Reserve Soldiers are now in an almost continuous state of mobilization and deployment. No longer the exception, deployment is now the rule, and the Army Reserve finds itself in the process of profound, fundamental change.³⁰

The Army Reserve’s transformation is focused on providing needed capabilities to combatant commanders during persistent conflict.³¹ Restructuring of the Army Reserve includes the inactivation of 10 Regional Readiness Commands (RRCs), one Army Reserve command and the creation of four Regional Readiness Sustainment Commands. Additionally, throughout 2008 the Army Reserve will activate deployable functional commands to command and control Army Reserve forces including five Expeditionary Sustainment Commands, three Combat Support Brigades, an Aviation

Command, one Military Police Command, and eight Sustainment Brigades. The intent of these commands is to increase the size of the Army Reserve deployable force, streamline structure and enhance fiscal efficiencies.³²

Without a doubt the Army Reserve is committed to reinventing itself to meet the deployment mission change associated with the needs of the 21st Century Army. History tells the story of an organizational culture born to support a traditional active duty military based on a broad range of civilian required skills to compliment the traditional military, serving the Nation when called on an infrequent basis. That makes the Army Reserve “nontraditional” in its very cultural nature. As the Army Reserve transforms into a more lethal, modular, agile force, this requires deep and lasting cultural change that must seep into the very bloodstream of the organization.³³ For this transformation to “stick,” the Army Reserve must take steps to first understand its current organizational culture and leadership culture and resolve to change how they lead its people. It is this understanding that will now be examined.

Examination of Army Reserve Culture

There is to date virtually no documented research on Army Reserve culture and Army Reserve leadership culture.³⁴ This void in and of itself speaks volumes as to the priority and importance of the topic in general and the challenges in understanding and anchoring transformational change. Schein defines culture as “the basic tacit assumptions about how the world is and ought to be that a group of people are sharing and that determines their perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and, their overt behavior.” Military institutions have generally devoted little attention to studying culture, yet it may be the most important factor not only in military effectiveness on the battlefield, but in

the processes of innovation during times of peace.³⁵ Without truly understanding one's organizational and leadership culture, how can transformation take root and anchor itself?

“Changes in leadership, professional military education, doctrinal preference, and technology all result in the evolution, for better or worse, of the culture of military institutions. The effects on culture, however, may not be evident for years or even decades...”³⁶ Given the time it takes to change culture, special emphasis must be given to the importance of understanding the culture you are attempting to change. Change is not an engineering, right sizing, or restructuring problem. Change involves people that can generate uncertainties, emotions, and inconsistencies. Therefore, simply managing change is insufficient. Successful transformational change for the Army Reserve requires a better understanding of their organizational and leadership culture.

According to noted cultural author Edgar Schein, you can not understand organizational change without considering culture as the primary source of resistance to change. He divides organizational culture into three levels: artifacts, espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions as illustrated in figure one below.³⁷ It is through these three levels that certain aspects of Army Reserve culture will be examined.

Levels of Culture




Figure 1.

The first and most visible level is *artifacts*. This is the most observable level of culture and consists of behavior patterns and outward manifestations of culture such as dress codes, technology use, physical layout of work spaces, and written and spoken language. All may be visible indicators of culture, but they are difficult to fully interpret correctly. For example, artifacts and behavior also may tell us what a group is doing, but not why. The next level of culture is *values*. Values underlie and to a large extent determine behavior, but they are not directly observable as behaviors. There may also be a difference between stated and operating values. To really understand culture, one needs to get to the deepest level, which is the level of *assumptions and beliefs*. Schein contends that underlying assumptions grow out of values, until they become taken for granted and drop out of awareness. People may be unaware of or unable to articulate the beliefs and assumptions that form their deepest level of culture.³⁸

While there is no academic or scientific data on Army Reserve culture, yet personally having 20 years of experience from being part of this organization and also

researching the academic literature about culture, I can make some broad inferences about this culture. By examining the Army Reserve's artifacts, values, assumptions and beliefs one can see an organizational culture and a leadership culture gap that exists between the strategic reserve legacy Army Reserve force and the Army Reserve force that is in the mist of a fundamental change to be more operational and expeditionary. Three Army Reserve artifacts that are a huge barrier to transformational success are illustrated by the following three statements: (1) One weekend a month and two weeks a year, (2) leadership focus on maintaining unit strength, and (3) overall resourcing based on a peacetime strategic reserve."³⁹

The Army Reserve artifact of "one weekend a month and two weeks a year" is illustrated in the photo below. This statement artifact continues to be sold at Army



Figure 2.

Recruiting Stations and is indoctrinated into new Army Reserve recruits from day one of their military experience. It continues to be reality for many Army Reserve leaders and Soldiers that are not currently forward deployed. Army Reserve training calendars continue to be driven by a one weekend a month schedule and a two week block of annual training. Additionally this artifact leads to the second artifact; a leadership focus on maintaining unit strength. Where the active Army is focused on mission accomplishment, a prevailing culture in many Army Reserve units today continues to be on maintaining unit strength. This in turn leads to a misguided notion that instilling discipline and enforcing standards will cause Soldiers to leave the unit, hence adversely impacting unit strength. The third artifact, an overall resource allocation, is related to the congressional budget request based on a peacetime strategic reserve. This last strategic leader artifact continues to be a huge risk for the Army Reserve for it can result in units that are not prepared to meet the National Security Strategy and must be resolved as Army Reserve operational demands continue.

The second cultural level is focused on values, which define what the members of an organization care about and constitute the basis for making judgments about what is right and wrong.⁴⁰ Three Army Reserve values that are barriers to transformational success are: bureaucracy, risk avoidance and familiarity.⁴¹ The Army Reserve has over time become a frustrating bastion of accepting mediocrity due to the value placed on bureaucracy. The organizational reality for the basic Army Reserve Troop Program Unit (TPU) is a reality that often rewards below average performance and where many decisions and decision makers are over-rationalized. Generally bureaucracies are not set up to accommodate constant changes, since change requires great flexibility and

imagination. Army Reserve Troop Program Units are each their own bureaucracy and are coming into conflict with a new professionalism and more flexible ways of doing things required by transformation. The second value associated with risk avoidance is born from the first Army Reserve value of bureaucracy. Risk avoidance means making a decision not to enter into a new way of working because of the inherent risks this would introduce.⁴² While risk avoidance as a component of risk management can be positive, to value risk avoidance as internal to bureaucracy leads to a lack of “out of the box” creative and strategic thinking. The third Army Reserve value is familiarity. We have all heard the saying that “familiarity breeds contempt,” and that the better we know people, the more likely we are to find fault with them. This is the exact opposite in the reality of the Army Reserve that I experienced. Soldiers and leaders who have been in the same unit for years are often blind to the unit’s most obvious deficiencies. Long standing personal relationships become the norm for the selection of positions versus who is best qualified. These three values continue to breed a culture of contentment, comfort and conflict avoidance that can obstruct unit readiness, which can lead to the environment described in General Taguba’s statement to Congress on the leadership failure associated with the Abu Ghraib prison fiasco.

Assumptions represent what members of the organization believe to be reality, they exist outside ordinary awareness.⁴³ Three Army Reserve assumptions and beliefs that are barriers to transformational success are best illustrated by the following sentences: “we are less than our active duty counterparts,” “the Office of the Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) is the enemy,” and “we can fix it at the mob site.”⁴⁴ The assumption “we are less than our active duty counterpart” is born from the historical

development of the Army Reserve and resonates throughout the entire U.S. Army. This creates a cultural divide between the Active Army and the Reserve Components. To be less than, less professional, or not as good as the active Army is an assumption that runs deep and at times is unrecognizable, yet always there. “OCAR is the enemy” is an assumption born from the historical development of the Army Reserve as a bureaucratic organization. Given the geographical structure of the Army Reserve, the separateness of the Troop Program Unit (TPU), the drilling Army Reserve structure, and the distance that is felt by units from the flagpole, change and transformation coming from higher headquarters OCAR is often looked at as invasive, something that will pass, and something that is not lasting. The third assumption “we can fix it at the mobsite” was born during the strategic time period and still lives today. Given the part-time nontraditional nature of the Army Reserve, the time needed to conduct training and complete all mandatory tasks and missions is limited. The assumption that it can be fixed at the mobsite is inherent in the Army Reserve thought process. Consequently, it is OK to not be ready for deployment due to the fact that they won’t let us go out the door at the mobsite until we are fully trained. These assumptions and beliefs come from the legacy Army Reserve Command and Regional Readiness Command geographical structure, the one weekend a month artifact and poor strategic communication.

Examination of Army Reserve Leadership Culture and Senior Leadership Development

To overcome those cultural barriers to successful transformation just described requires a focus on leadership. In 2004 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, then Chief Reserve designated 2004 as the “Year of the Leader in the Army Reserve” and initiated the Army Reserve Leadership Campaign Plan which was a strategy to energize

Army Reserve leadership culture. Personally speaking with 15 Army Reserve officers the past three months, they do not remember this campaign plan nor do they remember the significance of that year.⁴⁵ An analysis of Army Reserve Posture Statements reveals the following: the 2005 statement mentions the word “leadership” 10 times; the 2006 statement mentions the word “leadership” 8 times; and the 2007 mentions the word “leadership” 14 times. The current “Six Imperatives of Army Reserve Transformation” mentions “leader” twice, although no one imperative focuses specifically on leadership.⁴⁶ As illustrated above, the Army Reserve has recognized leadership’s importance in its recent formal statements. Yet anchoring change requires sufficient time be taken to ensure the next generation of leadership personifies the new transformation.⁴⁷

The Army Reserve Senior Leader Development Office (SLDO) mission is to develop the path to increase the primary warfighting skills through direct management, development and utilization of our Senior Army Reserve Leadership consisting of Active Guard and Reserve (AGR), Troop Program Unit (TPU) and Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Senior Leaders.⁴⁸ In a volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous transformational environment in which leadership is required to anchor and drive this change, senior leader development for the Army Reserve becomes the glue that will ultimately hold the transformation together. Leaders must be skilled change managers who must first learn and understand what the present state of culture is, unfreeze it, redefine and change it, and then refreeze the new assumptions.⁴⁹ The Army Reserve SLDO program is based on putting the right leaders in the right place at the right time. The three main criteria according to SLDO that make a best qualified senior leader are:

successful command, deployment experience, and professional education. The August 2007, colonel command board results shows that out of 19 selected for command, only 6 officers met all three criteria.⁵⁰ Additionally an examination of the Army Reserve strategic fill numbers for the next several years identifies a critical officer shortage in the grades of captain, major, and lieutenant colonel. Within the next six years there will be a 9,500 projected mid grade officer shortage.⁵¹ This shortage has huge future strategic implications as a tipping point occurs, and the Army Reserve can no longer sustain the new operational, expeditionary mission without the mid grade officer leadership to lead TPU units and Soldiers, while simultaneously needing time to develop these leaders through training and education.

Professional development keys to success for SLDO are centered on performance, command, career focus and education. For performance, one must do their best at every job and receive some top block Officer Evaluation Reports. For command, one must seek command or command equivalent positions as the experience of command is second to none in leadership development. For a career path, one must go for 28-30 years and even expect more. Finally for education, one must never stop learning to include earning a Master Degree and other related military education opportunities as soon as your career path allows. In achieving all of the above one must deploy and take care of yourself, your family & your mental health.⁵²

To better appreciate Reserve Officer views on leadership an informal questioner was sent to Senior Army Reserve officers attending the Army War College that asked their response to the following statement: "The Army Reserve has the proper priority focus on leadership development. Of the 18 responses, 7 *agreed or strongly agreed* with

the statement, while 9 *disagreed or strongly disagreed* with the statement and 2 were neutral.⁵³

Personal comments from those that disagreed that the Army Reserve had the right emphasis showed passion for this disagreement, and they used phrases such as: the “Army Reserve has failed to adjust training...”; There is a variation in leadership development...”; Promotion and acceleration seldom based on operational experience and capabilities.” The best overall comment that describes their views was:

There is variation in leadership development among the different commands and units. Often a function of OPTEMPO, Soldiers get leadership training but quality varies. About the only place where there may be standardization occurs in the institutional training base wherever it is taught. But that in and of itself is insufficient, much has to occur where Soldiers will be serving and leading others.

Conversely, there were no personal comments from those that agreed the Army Reserve had the right emphasis on leadership development. These numbers and comments, although not quantitatively representative of all senior Reserve Officers, yet attest to the belief in many that the Army Reserve fails to place proper emphasis on senior leadership development.

Recommendations

Secretary Rumsfeld in 2003, when discussing the challenge of cultural transformation, stated that the men and women of the Armed Forces “remain the most critical asset to the Armed Forces. We must ensure they have the resources, capabilities and innovative culture they need to assure our allies, as well as dissuade, deter and if necessary, defeat the aggressors we will face in the dangerous century ahead.”⁵⁴ From this research on the transformation’s cultural element within the Army

Reserve, this paper has three broad recommendations to fully anchor Reserve Transformation.

The first recommendation is that the Army Reserve must enable transformation by seriously studying its organizational culture and its leadership culture. This study should focus on helping the Army Reserve answer the following four critical cultural questions: What is the current culture? What not to change? What must be changed to transform? How to change? This paper submits that the reason the Army Reserve has failed to study its organizational culture is that organizational culture is the most difficult of all organizational concepts to define and to study.⁵⁵ Cultural understanding and context must be considered when transforming the Army Reserve to ensure that the current transformation is not the next fad and that change is anchored for enduring long term success.

The second recommendation is that the Army Reserve examine officer professional development in the environment of persistent conflict. In line with this recommendation is that leadership needs to be its own separate Army Reserve imperative to give professional development the proper focus and emphasis required to help anchor transformational change. This recommendation is based on the realization that we must know what are the emerging leadership competencies the next generation of leaders must develop that are perhaps unique for leading Soldiers in the Army Reserve. Due to the “part-time” cultural artifact that this author believes will never go away, the leadership competencies required to lead Soldiers from a distance need to be explicitly defined by this study as they may be different than active duty fulltime and require unique leadership development.

Finally, based on the first two recommendations, a roadmap must be developed to change the organizational and leadership culture to anchor transformation in a time of persistent conflict. This roadmap will define the long and short term milestones to emphasize the commitment and help gain acceptance from Army Reserve Soldiers.

Conclusion

As the United States Army Reserve continues to undergo “the deepest, most profound change it has pursued in more than 50 years,” our top priority must focus on understanding, changing and shaping Army Reserve culture and leadership culture.⁵⁶ To do this, we must first truly understand that which we are changing. In essence this paper identified three recommendations that will enable leaders in the Army Reserve to have a better grasp of their organizational culture, a more mature understanding of today’s Reserve officer leadership development challenges, and finally a roadmap to enable long term transformation to meet today’s global challenges dominated by persistent conflict. To achieve the needed cultural element of Army Reserve transformation, we must first study and understand the culture of the Army Reserve that was born during the strategic reserve time period and is now trying to morph at an unprecedented pace into something that it doesn’t recognize, therefore forming a culture gap rather than a culture bridge. After that understanding we must enhance our leader development to build the culture bridge. To anchor transformational change the Army Reserve must destroy the culture gap. Strategic Army Reserve leaders are the architects for the bridge and the leadership within the Army Reserve must be the builders that anchor this historic transformation. During persistent conflict and incredible change the Army Reserve can not afford a “fade” or the “next” great idea.

Endnotes

¹ Jack C. Stultz, Jr., "Sustain, Prepare, Reset, Transform," *The Officer* 83 (December 2007): 28-32. Army Reserve transformation information in the opening paragraphs are from this article.

² Jack C. Stultz, Jr., "Army Reserve: 'Integral Component of the World's Best Army'," *Association of the United States Army* (October 2006); available from ProQuest; Internet; accessed 19 December 2007.

³ Jack C. Stultz, Jr., "The Army Reserve: No Longer a Strategic Reserve," *Army* 57 (October 2007): 139-43 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 10 December 2007.

⁴ Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985), 327.

⁵ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*, (Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 14.

⁶ James R. Helmly, "Profound Change While Fighting the War," *Army* 54 (October 2004): 103.

⁷ George W. Casey, Jr. In his keynote address at the Association of the United States Army Annual Meeting's Eisenhower Luncheon said he foresees decades of persistent conflict.

⁸ Jack C. Stultz, Jr., *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Reserve 2007*, Posture Statement presented to the 110th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2007), 3.

⁹ Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Introduction," in U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), v; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf>; Internet; accessed 29 December 2007.

¹⁰ Schein, 326.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² "Transcript : Taguba, Cambone on Abu Ghraib Report," *Washington Post*, 11 May 2004 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17812-2004May11.html>; Internet; accessed 28 December 2007.

¹³ Schein, 313.

¹⁴ Ibid., 326.

¹⁵ George R. Mastroianni, "Occupations, Cultures, and Leadership in the Army and the Air Force," *Parameters* 35 (Winter 2005-2006): 90.

¹⁶ Mary Jo. Hatch, *Organizational Theory* (New York:Oxford University Press, 1997), 233.

¹⁷ *Historic News Network Home Page*, available from <http://hnn.us/articles/1328.html>; Internet; accessed 29 December 2007.

¹⁸ "U.S. Army Reserve – History," linked from Global Security Homepage at "Military," available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/usar-history.htm>; Internet; accessed; 28 December 2007.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Hatch, 205.

²⁴ "U.S. Army Reserve-History"

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Stultz, Jr., "The Army Reserve: No Longer a Strategic Reserve"

²⁹ MAJ GEN Thomas J. Plewes, *Force Modernization and Integration: Statement before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Sub-Committee on Air-Land Forces*, 105 Cong., 2d sess., 24 March 1999; available from <http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/1999/990324tp.pdf>; Internet; accessed 29 December 2007.

³⁰ Stultz, Jr., "Army Reserve; 'Integral Component of the World's Best Army' "

³¹ Stultz, Jr., *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Reserve 2007*, 10.

³² Stultz, Jr., "Army Reserve; 'Integral Component of the World's Best Army',"

³³ Kotter, 8.

³⁴ No current Army Reserve culture specific research found using Army War College research resources as of 10 December 2007.

³⁵ Murray Williamson, "Military Culture Does Matter," *Orbis*, 7(January 1999):15.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Schein, 13-20. Explanation of levels of culture.

³⁸ National Defense University, "Organizational Culture," in *Strategic Leadership and Decision Making: Preparing Senior Executives for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC : National Defense University Press, 1997); available from <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/stratldr-dm/pt4ch16.html>; Internet; accessed 29 December 2007.

³⁹ Due to the lack of existing Army Reserve culture studies, these culture level examples are the opinion of the author based on 20 years of experience in the Army Reserve.

⁴⁰ Hatch, 214.

⁴¹ Due to the lack of existing Army Reserve culture studies, these culture level examples are the opinion of the author based on 20 years of experience in the Army Reserve.

⁴² *BusinessLink.gov Homepage*, available from <http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/detail?type=RESOURCES&itemId=1075386209>; Internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

⁴³ Hatch, 210.

⁴⁴ Due to the lack of existing Army Reserve culture studies, these culture level examples are the opinion of the author based on 20 years of experience in the Army Reserve.

⁴⁵ Informal survey conducted from September thru November 2007 by author.

⁴⁶ *United States Army Reserve Home Page*, available from <http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/ARWEB/NEWS/20060915.htm>; Internet; accessed 29 December 2007

⁴⁷ Kotter, 14.

⁴⁸ Lawrence W. Meder, "Army Reserve Senior Leader Development," briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 10 December 2007.

⁴⁹ Schein, 322.

⁵⁰ Meder, slide 5.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, slide 6.

⁵² *Ibid.*, slide 8.

⁵³ Zapsurvey conducted by author, January 2008. Seventeen Senior Army Officers responded to survey.

⁵⁴ Edgar M. Johnson, "Introducing Innovation and Risk: Implications of Transforming the Culture of DoD," briefing slides, Washington, D.C., Institute for Defense Analysis, August 2003, slide 7.

⁵⁵ Hatch, 202.

⁵⁶ Helmly, 103.

