

ARMY TRANSFORMATION: A CULTURAL CHANGE

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USAWC CLASS OF 2008

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

Report Documentation Page

*Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 15 MAR 2008		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2008	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Army Transformation A Cultural Change				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Rick King				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College ,122 Forbes Ave.,Carlisle,PA,17013-5220				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Rick T. King
TITLE: Army Transformation: A Cultural Change
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 01 March 2008 WORD COUNT: 5,167 PAGES: 27
KEY TERMS: Transformation, Modularity
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Over the past seven years the Army has undergone one of the most aggressive periods of change in its long history. While almost completely engaged with the Global War on Terrorism, the Army has simultaneously modernized its legacy fleet, developed and deployed an interim force, spent billions of dollars on the research and development of the Objective Force and the Future Combat System (FCS), and began the immense transition to the Modular Force. This research paper will explore the Army's Transformation envisioned by the last two Chiefs of Staff of the Army during this period, General Eric Shinseki and General Peter Schoomaker, through a lens of cultural change. This paper will also explain why cultural change is important from a strategic perspective, and examine the significant changes made by General Shinseki and General Schoomaker through the lens of the Culture-Embedding Mechanisms. Understanding the effective approaches of organizational cultural change will benefit current and future Army leaders and provide insights for the future on maintaining irreversible momentum towards Transformation despite the complex and expensive global conflicts.

ARMY TRANSFORMATION: A CULTURAL CHANGE

If you don't like change, you will like irrelevance even less.¹

—General Eric Shinseki
Former Army Chief of Staff

Over the past seven years the Army has undergone one of the most aggressive periods of change in its long history. While almost completely engaged with the Global War on Terrorism, the Army has simultaneously modernized its legacy fleet, developed and deployed an interim force, spent billions of dollars on the research and development of the Objective Force and the Future Combat System (FCS), and began the immense transition to the Modular Force. In short, the Army is Transforming while at war. This research paper will explore the Army's Transformation envisioned by the last two Chiefs of Staff of the Army during this period, General Eric Shinseki and General Peter Schoomaker, through a lens of cultural change. This paper will also explain why cultural change is important from a strategic perspective, and examine the significant changes made by General Shinseki and General Schoomaker through the lens of the Culture-Embedding Mechanisms. Understanding the effective approaches of organizational cultural change will benefit current and future Army leaders and provide insights for the future on maintaining irreversible momentum towards Transformation despite the complex and expensive global conflicts.

Why Strategic Cultural Change

The US Army War College's *Strategic Leadership Primer* defines organizational culture as "the set of institutional, stated, and operating values, beliefs, and assumptions that people have about their organization that are validated by experiences

over time.”² At the time General Shinseki gave his now famous speech embracing transformation at the 45th annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army on 12 October 1999, most realized that America’s Army was bifurcated; an organization consisting of heavy forces with excellent combat power but poor strategic responsiveness and light forces with excellent responsiveness but little combat power. Culturally though, the Army was still resting on its laurels from its performance during Operation Desert Storm and the end of the Cold War. In addition, in 1993, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin released the Bottom-Up Review of the Armed Forces with the slight strategy change from “win two Major Theaters of War simultaneously” to “maintain sufficient military power to be able to win two Major Regional Conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously.”³ This left wide flexibility for interpretation. Arguably the Army was slipping into a cultural malaise generated from the previous success of the Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, tested warfighting doctrine, and improved professional leadership development. General Shinseki believed the Army was becoming irrelevant.

There is significant interdependence between the current culture and the desired culture that is necessary for future unit effectiveness and continued relevancy. The engine for this cultural change is the strategic leader’s vision.⁴ General Shinseki’s vision for preventing this irrelevancy was articulated immediately when he became the 34th Chief of Staff of the Army. General Shinseki’s vision was that the Army must transform itself into a force capable of dominating at every point on the operational spectrum. It must become more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than the present force. These organizational characteristics stretched

across all of the Army's core competencies, including prompt response, forcible entry operations, and sustained land dominance. The Army intended to be able to deploy a combat capable brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff, a warfighting division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions into theater in 30 days, operating as integral components of the Joint Task Force.⁵ The Army's specific roadmap was captured in the trident chart that became familiar after General Shinseki launched the Army Transformation in October 1999 (Figure 1). The three prongs on the chart represented the Legacy Force, the Interim Force, and the Objective Force. This roadmap articulated the need to sustain and recapitalize the Legacy Force, develop and field Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) or the Interim Force and, central to the roadmap and the Army Transformation, invest in the research and development of the Objective Force.




Figure 1. General Shinseki's Transformation Roadmap

The IBCT, now called the Stryker Brigades, provided an interim capability so that the Army staff could focus on the future. In short, this interim capability gave General Shinseki his irreversible momentum to change the culture of the Army. As evidence of its significance, the *Strategic Leadership Primer* lists the transformation from heavy vehicles to Stryker Brigades as one of the six significant cultural changes in the Army since World War II.⁶

Like his predecessor, General Schoomaker not only embraced the Army's Transformation, but developed his specific vision to accelerate portions of Transformation into what he called the Current Force. The 2004 Army Posture Statement, his first, defined Army Transformation as "moving from the Current Force to the Future Force" and the new goals are "to provide relevant and ready forces that are organized, trained, and equipped for full-spectrum joint, interagency, and multi-national operations and to support Future Force development."⁷ His vision was to improve near-term capabilities by a complete reorganization of the Army's combat forces from division-centric into brigade-centric formations. The brigades would be designed as modules, or self-sufficient and standardized Brigade Combat Teams, that can be more readily deployed and combined with other Army and joint forces to better meet the needs of the Combatant Commanders. Spinning off the success of the Stryker Brigades, Modularity would provide a more self-contained, sustainable, lethal force package organized with capabilities for a full range of missions. This cultural shift to a brigade-centric Army would also provide an expeditionary force more capable of supporting deployment on a rotational basis and solve the bifurcation problem sooner

rather than later. Modularity is also listed in the *Strategic Leadership Primer* as another one of the six significant cultural changes in the Army since World War II.

Based on the need to both transform and execute the land force-intense Global War on Terrorism, General Schoomaker merged the three paths on General Shinseki's trident chart into what he described merely as the Current Force and the Future Force. Through Modularity, increasing available combat brigades from 48 to 76, and the spiraling of advanced technology from FCS into the Current Force, he aligned efforts for the Future Force to complement the ongoing missions of the Current Force and depicted this simply as one arrow pointing toward the future (Figure 2).




Figure 2. General Schoomaker's Vision and Strategy⁸

In his testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee in 2004, General Schoomaker revealed the urgency of his vision:

We see this as an extraordinary window of opportunity, to take advantage of not only of the great resources that this Congress and the committee has provided to our Army, but also take advantage of the motion that the

Army is in. It is a narrow window of opportunity and perhaps one of my greatest fears is that we do not take full opportunity here of this window and allow ourselves to come to rest and not complete the transformation that we feel is so necessary.⁹

Edgar Schein's Model

In *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, Edgar Schein describes how leaders embed the assumptions that they hold and thereby change an organization's culture through a leader's ability to get the organization to share the same assumptions through Culture-Embedding Mechanisms. These Culture-Embedding Mechanisms consist of primary embedding mechanisms, which create or change the culture of the organization, and secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms, which are needed to ensure the embedding lasts.¹⁰ General Shinseki and General Schoomaker's cultural change of the Army will now be explored through examining three primary embedding mechanisms and three secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms.

Primary Embedding Mechanisms

The first primary embedding mechanism, which is one of the most powerful, is what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis. What leaders consistently pay attention to communicates most clearly what their own priorities, goals, and assumptions are.¹¹ General Shinseki came into office in 1999 with a clear vision of transformation and ardently embarked on his endeavor to change the Army. He never veered off point, despite a tumultuous relationship with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the ensuing Global War on Terrorism. General Shinseki inculcated the Army with his vision when he announced that the Third Brigade of the Second Infantry

Division would become the first IBCT. He systematically and strategically communicated the Army Transformation with both the Army Staff and Soldiers in the field. It encompassed everything from the Army Posture Statement, the Army Vision, the Army Transformation Campaign Plan, and the Army Transformation Roadmap to the Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM). General Shinseki sent emails to Soldiers and leaders in the field announcing most of the previously mentioned documents. Under his signature, he endorsed the *United States Army White Paper, Concepts of the Objective Force*, which was purposely widely distributed to leaders within the U.S. Government, the defense establishment, industry, and the academic communities.¹² His commitment to Transformation only grew stronger after September 11, 2001, and the ensuing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As the 35th Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker embraced Transformation. He significantly contributed to the irreversible momentum by leveraging the ongoing engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan to change the organizational structure of the Army to the Modular Force. To improve near-term capabilities, he implemented modularity to the returning formations from the Global War on Terrorism, incorporated the experience gained from the current fight, and maintained focus on what he now called the Future Force.

Because we were a nation at war, General Schoomaker matured Transformation into two main components that were irreversibly linked, the Modular Force and the Future Force consisting of FCS. The urgency of the current fight caused him to focus on the potential capabilities of future organizations and pulling future capabilities into the Current Force. Instead of siphoning funding from FCS, which was becoming the

Pentagon's second largest program in terms of programmed dollars, he successfully appealed to Congress for the continuance of supplementals to help pay for the war and modularity. The 2005 Army Posture Statement not only highlighted the need for the supplementals but also articulated the maturation of Transformation. "These funds will also enable the force to recover from the stress placed on equipment and Soldiers during combat and continually "reset" itself for future deployments. Moreover, these resources are required to continue to transform the Army into a larger, more powerful force built on self-sufficient brigade-based modules."¹³ Transformation was now defined by four goals.

The first goal of Transformation was to build an operational Army that was larger and more combat powerful, flexible, and rapidly deployable through restructuring into modular Brigade Combat Teams. The active force would increase from 33 active brigades to 43 and potentially up to 48 with an increased adjustment to end strength. Combined with Transformation of the National Guard, this would increase the total number of available brigades to 76 and enable General Schoomaker to generate forces in a predictable rotational cycle and establish his expeditionary force.¹⁴ The second goal was to rebalance the active and reserve forces by shifting 100,000 individual specialties to increase the number of units with the skills in the highest demand, such as intelligence, military police, and civil affairs. The third goal was to stabilize Soldiers in their units for longer periods of time by transitioning from an individual replacement manning system to a unit focused system. The fourth goal was to improve the Army infrastructure to better enable the operational force. Installations are the platforms from which the Army projects military power and improvements were needed in training

facilities, rapid mobilization and deployment capabilities, and information reach-back capabilities. General Schoomaker made Transformation near-term and increased the focus on the Current Force.

The second primary embedding mechanism is how leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises. When an organization faces crisis, the manner in which leaders deal with it can change norms and values and reveals important underlying assumptions. In essence, crises increase the intensity of learning.¹⁵ The two crises helping General Shinseki embed a culture of Transformation were Kosovo and the aftermath of September 11, 2001, eventually leading to the Global War on Terrorism.

The crisis in Kosovo and the United States' reaction can arguably be traced back to the results of the crisis in Somalia in 1993. President Clinton was reluctant to commit ground forces in Kosovo. During the decade of the 1990's, the Army remained structurally organized to fight big wars. Army senior leaders were also averse to executing the perceived social experiments of the Clinton administration. Combined, this seemed to prevent the Army from offering the President a wide range of ground options in contingencies. When advising on possible ground options during the Kosovo conflict, the Army had only big ground force options requiring months to execute. Consequently, General Shinseki believed the Army was becoming inflexible and thus irrelevant by its inability to rapidly influence the outcome in Kosovo.

As previously discussed, the events of September 11th only strengthened his commitment to Transformation. In 2002, General Shinseki testified before the Senate Armed Service Committee:

Army Transformation is first and foremost about dealing with the volatility and uncertainty of the 21st Century strategic environment. It leverages the potential of emerging technologies, new concepts for warfighting, greater organizational versatility, and the inspired leadership that would generate a force that is more strategically responsive, more deployable, more agile, more versatile, more lethal, more survivable, and more sustainable than the forces we have fighting the Global War on Terrorism today. The events of September 11th and our operations since that day have validated the need for Army Transformation and the urgency to move even faster. In crafting our Vision, we believed that Army Transformation was essential if we were going to keep this great Army the best, most dominant ground force for good in the world.¹⁶

General Schoomaker's crisis was the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. By developing the four near-term goals, he linked Transformation to the current fight while maintaining the FCS program for the Future Force. He leveraged the momentum of the operational tempo created by the long war to force his vision to change the culture and organization of the Army to the Modular Force in the near-term, thereby creating the single arrow of Transformation to the Future Force. The two key enablers of the four goals of Transformation that he developed during his crisis were his Reset Program and the spiraling of advanced technology from FCS into the Current Force.

In order to reverse the effects that the combat and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were placing on equipment and Soldiers, General Schoomaker implemented the Reset Program. The program included the recapitalization of equipment, retraining essential tasks to incorporate lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, and more brilliantly, the reorganization of returning units into modular unit designs. "We use this opportunity to reset our units forward to the future – not to return them to their legacy designs."¹⁷

The second key enabler that specifically linked the FCS program to the current fight was the spiraling of advanced technology from FCS into the Current Force, or what

is now being referred to as “spin outs.” In 2004, the Army restructured the FCS program, the most critical investment program, “to accelerate the introduction of battle command, the Army network, and other crucial capabilities to the Current Force, while we continue to build the FCS-equipped Brigade Combat Team.”¹⁸ These spin outs capitalize on the investments already made in the research and development dollars invested in the FCS program and have provided body armor improvements, up-armored vehicles, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, and the Joint Network Node (JNN) to the current force. General Schoomaker believed that the technologies spiraled into the Current Force would also help to improve the decisions the Army made concerning the Future Force.

The third primary cultural embedding mechanism is the observed criteria by which leaders allocate scarce resources. By 2000, General Shinseki was already creating his irreversible momentum by committing funding to the Interim and Objective Forces. Many felt this was shortsighted and thought those funds were at risk to cuts from either the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Congress, or both. The Army’s POM 02-07, submitted in 2000, provided a significant shift in program funding to the IBCTs and FCS. Billions of dollars were allocated to the research and development of FCS and the procurement of four IBCTs. Congress not only supported, but added another \$3.2 billion due primarily to General Shinseki’s tenacity and repeated hearings on the Hill. The following year, the Army’s POM 03-07, marked the watershed for Transformation. Aside from earmarked sustainment and recapitalization programs, nearly all funding for programs had to be tied to one of the other two prongs of the trident chart to survive the

Army staff POM build. General Shinseki believed simply that the Army could not afford not to change.

General Schoomaker continued General Shinseki's repeated presentations to maintain Congressional support for both the Army's Transformation and funding for the Global War on Terrorism. By 2004, with the support of Congress, General Schoomaker had focused the Army's resources on wartime requirements. In POM 06-11, the Army further restructured or cancelled 126 acquisition programs to free resources for wartime requirements.¹⁹

Two of these programs had the most impact on resources, the restructuring of the FCS program as stated earlier, and the cancellation of the Comanche program. The Army cancelled the Comanche, designed to be the Army's new armed scout helicopter, and reinvested the \$14.6 billion in savings into new airframes, improved equipment shortfalls, enhanced survivability, and modernization of the aviation fleet.²⁰ Many felt the demise of the Comanche resulted from the battlefield success of the Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. In fact, part of the redirected funding from Comanche was spent on the acceleration of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles program.²¹ General Schoomaker was determined to sustain the Army's global commitments with the Current Force and maintain funding for Transformation.

In 2006, after realizing that the Army's requirements from the recently released Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) strategy, the National Military Strategy and its Title X responsibilities far exceeded its Fiscal Guidance, General Schoomaker withheld the Army POM from OSD. The Fiscal Guidance received from OSD for FY08 was \$116 billion, nearly \$23 billion short of what the Army needed to meet all its requirements.²²

This was an unprecedented move by General Schoomaker who believed that finding additional resources for the Army should not be a question of affordability but a matter of national priority. Officially, the Army's failure to submit the POM to OSD by the normal budget timeline was not a rebuke to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. General Schoomaker argued that the only way to maintain the current global commitments and execute the new requirements was by eliminating at least a division from the force. Secretary Rumsfeld agreed to set up a task force to study the Army's funding. General Schoomaker remained publicly vocal about Army budget shortfalls to Congress and the White House. Unofficially, these actions indicated a failure by the Secretary in his ability to reconcile the budget within the Departments of Defense. Due to General Schoomaker's perseverance, the Army eventually received a \$14 billion increase from OSD and the White House prior to submission to Congress.²³

Secondary Articulation and Reinforcement Mechanisms

Having identified the three primary cultural embedding mechanisms, this paper will now examine three secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms of Schein's model. These are the organizational design and structure, the organizational systems and procedures, and the formal statements of organizational philosophy, creeds, and charters. The secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms enable the leader to institutionalize cultural change.

The first secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanism is organizational design and structure. Schein articulates that reorganizing provides ample opportunities for the leader to embed their deeply held assumptions about the task, the means to accomplish it, the nature of people, and the right kinds of relationships to foster among

people.²⁴ Until December 2000, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS) was solely responsible to the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) for force management and force integration. Force management allocates resources according to determined force requirements in accordance with Army roles and missions. General Shinseki, as a part of Transformation and realizing the importance of senior staff oversight, established a new Army staff element, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (ODCSPRO) that took over all force management responsibilities. The new ODCSPRO, later renamed the G-8, emphasized the importance of fielding material solutions, namely IBCTs and FCS, to combat future adversarial threats. General Shinseki also hedged his bets by mandating that the new Army staff lead for programming Transformation be manned at 100% for all active officer positions. General Shinseki used this new G8 to provide the staff linkage between his vision, the Transformation Campaign Plan, and acquisition programs for Army requirements.

In contrast, General Schoomaker focused his organizational change primarily outside the Army Staff. As stated earlier, through the new Transformation goals, he changed the combat organization of the Current Force through modularity and oriented the Army to prioritize efforts that would provide more near-term change. This cultural shift to a brigade-centric Army would provide an expeditionary force more capable of supporting deployment on a rotational basis.

General Schoomaker also organizationally extended modularity beyond the brigade. As part of the Modular Force, the Army eliminated an entire echelon of command headquarters above the brigade level by combining the traditional Division and Corps Headquarters, as depicted in Figure 3, into one mobile Division/Corps level

capable of directing any mix of brigades in land operations. Moving from three levels to only two eliminated redundancies and freed personnel slots to redistribute across the force. The new higher headquarters became more capable, versatile, and focused on the tactical and operational level warfight. With Corps level attributes, it would have the ability to command and control any combination of capabilities: Army, Joint, or coalition.²⁵




Figure 3. Modular Force Command Headquarters²⁶

Realizing that the Army needed a single integrating center for all Future Force activities, General Schoomaker created the Futures Center, located at Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).²⁷ The Futures Center provided the Army with an “institutional” lead agent for change, oversaw the Transformation efforts, including modularity, and synchronized efficient and cost-effective ways to build the Army’s

Future Force. The Future Center became instrumental in interfacing with the Joint Staff's requirements process.

The second secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanism is organizational systems and procedures. The routine procedures and reports can formalize the process of "paying attention" and thus reinforce the message that the leader really cares about certain things. As previously discussed, General Shinseki inculcated the Army with Transformation from his first day as the CSA. His personal strategic communications plan was so successful that his terms from the three prong trident chart, Legacy Force, Interim Force, and Objective Force, became the new lexicon for the Army and was well understood outside the Army in OSD, industry, and Congress. Transformation and the new Army Vision became fully integrated in the routine work done at the Pentagon in every Army staff component.

General Schoomaker not only adopted General Shinseki's inculcation, but by leveraging the operational tempo brought on by the war, began the near-term execution of Transformation and charged the Army Staff with maintaining oversight of that execution. He changed the Army Transformation Campaign Plan to simply the Army Campaign Plan. The "new" plan was a comprehensive transformation strategy with an overarching theme of an Army at war. The plan's premise was threefold: a more relevant and ready Army, a more capable and modular force, and a more stable and predictable lifestyle.²⁸ This new lexicon became the template by which the Army measured success both within the Army's Current Force formations and outside the Army, especially in Congress. The message was that the Army's culture was changing to a more Joint, Continental United States (CONUS)-based expeditionary Army that

remained focused on the core competencies of warfighting while becoming more agile and responsive in all missions and processes.²⁹

In order to synchronize the execution of resources and optimize unit rotations globally, the Army developed the Army Forces Generation Model (ARFORGEN). ARFORGEN is a force management process, using modular unit designs and operational cycles, to provide a sustained deployment posture of operationally ready units in predictable patterns while retaining the capability to surge combat power for major combat operations.³⁰ ARFORGEN uses resources (personnel, equipment, and training) to generate combat ready forces. Operational forces progress through three force “pools” (reset/train, ready, and available) with their resource priorities based on their rotation sequence.³¹ This process changed the Army’s readiness from tiered metric to cyclical metric and thereby for the first time allowed the Army to collate extensive data on unit readiness and combat effectiveness by individual Brigade Combat Teams at any time. In turn, this succinctly allowed the Army to describe the level of investment needed to maintain a force of a given size for a given period, especially to Congress, finally matching a capability the Navy and Air Force had been practicing for years. ARFORGEN also established a metric to measure the Army’s execution of the Modularity phase of Transformation.

The final secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanism is formal statements of organizational philosophy, creeds, and charters. Schein further states “such public statements may have a value for the leader as a way of emphasizing special things to be attended to in the organization, as values around which to rally the troops, and as reminders of fundamental assumptions not to be forgotten.”³² In one of

his first testimonies before Congress, General Shinseki articulated his new vision, “The Army Vision is Soldiers on point for the Nation...Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War. The centerpiece to this vision is People, Readiness, and Transformation.”³³ He never changed that message during his tenure as the Chief of Staff of the Army. General Shinseki repeatedly used this vision to rally the troops internal to the organization and to inform and gain support from others external to the organization. General Shinseki emphasized this vision to ensure that the Army fulfilled its Title X responsibilities by transforming itself into a full spectrum force capable of dominating at every point on the spectrum of operations.

Like his predecessor, General Schoomaker’s vision was about Transformation, but it was also about the Nation at war. Hence, the Army’s vision transcended into “Relevant and Ready Landpower in Service to the Nation.”³⁴ General Schoomaker’s message was that the Army must remain the preeminent land power on earth and the ultimate instrument of national resolve. He saw Transformation not as an end to itself, but in terms of how it could contribute to accomplishing the mission today. Through Modularity, increasing available combat brigades from 48 to 76, and the transferring of advanced technology from FCS into the Current Force he aligned efforts for the Future Force to complement the ongoing missions of the Current Force. For the individual Soldier, General Schoomaker instilled a return to the Warrior’s ethos. He increased the requirements for marksmanship training, hand-to-hand combat instruction, live-fire convoy training, and an increased emphasis on physical fitness for both initial entry level Soldiers and across the force. He believed that mental and physical toughness

underpinned the beliefs embraced in the Soldier's Creed and had to be developed within all Soldiers regardless of their specialty.³⁵

General Schoomaker invigorated the Army Strategic Communications Plan and urged each Soldier to become an ambassador to the American people for the Army. He believed that it was extremely important, especially while at war, for the Army to tell its story about what was going on in the Army in a way that the American people could understand. As part of that Strategic Communications Plan, he developed The Way Ahead, which was an overview of The Army Strategic Planning Guidance in terms the Soldier could understand, but also intertwined the Army Campaign Plan and the annual Army Posture Statements. As such, the intended audience for The Way Ahead was multifaceted. He intended to not only have the Army message reach the Soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers in the Army, but also to the rest of the Department of Defense, Congress, and the American people.

Conclusion

In Lieutenant Colonel James J. Galvin's research project, "Communicating Army Transformation to Congress: 1989-2005," he examined the abilities of the last five Army Chiefs of Staff since the end of the Cold War to communicate their respective visions and organizational change to a key stakeholder – Congress. For his comparisons, Galvin used specific attributes useful for leaders to communicate a vision of organizational transformation recommended by organizational change experts.³⁶ He found that the three Chief's visions prior to Generals Shinseki and Schoomaker were not tangible and lacked a compelling image to drive change. Although they recognized the potential for information technology, their efforts to utilize it remained experimental

and they remained focused on maintaining the nucleus of the Army during the military drawdown of the post Cold War era. Subsequently, their messages to Congress were not compelling or tangible enough to elicit budgetary support for large-scale change.³⁷

In contrast, according to Galvin, the last two Chiefs developed compelling visions to transform that captured the attention of Congress. General Shinseki's success can be attributed to his tangible description of the Legacy, Interim and Objective Forces, and his utilization of a peacetime window of opportunity to initiate change. General Schoomaker leveraged the momentum of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to propel his vision to physically change the Army by creating the Modular Force. In both cases, stakeholders could better understand how the Army would change.³⁸

Today the Army maintains an irreversible momentum towards Transformation despite the complex and expensive global conflicts in which it is currently engaged as a result of the way General Shinseki and General Schoomaker changed the Army's culture through primary embedding mechanisms and secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms. Experiences gained by the Army's leaders and Soldiers over the last six years of combat, both conventional and unconventional, will continue to shape the cultural transformation of the Current Force and the Objective Force. Because of this culture change initiated at the turn of the century, the Army is poised to remain relevant for the future.

Insights from this examination will benefit current and future Army leaders who will continue to transform the force. The view through the lens of culture-embedding mechanisms is relevant because a change in culture is indeed at the heart of

Transformation and billions of dollars and the Army's ability to remain relevant and the preeminent land power on earth are at stake.

Had it not been for General Shinseki and General Schoomaker, it is very possible that the Army would not be on a path to Transformation, but still only modernizing. General Shinseki created the irreversible momentum for change that provided the next Chief of Staff of the Army the ability to transform to a more expeditionary force while engaged in the Global War on Terrorism.

Endnotes

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