

LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL:  
THE DEMOCRACY PROJECT AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON  
TERRORISM

by

B. CHANCE SALTZMAN, Major, USAF

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the  
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies  
For Completion of the Graduation Requirements

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES

AIR UNIVERSITY

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

May 2005

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

# Report Documentation Page

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE <b>MAY 2005</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-2005 to 00-00-2005</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Liberty and Justice For All: The Democracy Project and the Global War on Terrorism</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Air University, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, AL, 36112</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <b>see report</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

## APPROVAL

The undersigned certify that this thesis meets masters-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

---

Colonel James W. Forsyth, PhD (Date)

---

Colonel Michael L. Grumelli, PhD (Date)

## **Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

## *About the Author*

Major B. Chance “Salty” Saltzman is currently a student at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell AFB, AL. Major Saltzman entered the Air Force through Boston University’s Air Force ROTC program in 1991. After earning distinguished graduate honors from missile operational readiness training, Maj Saltzman held numerous missile crew, instructor, and evaluator positions at Malmstrom AFB culminating in his selection as the Senior Evaluator Crew Commander. While assigned to the 341<sup>st</sup> Missile Wing, Major Saltzman competed in the inaugural Guardian Challenge Space Competition and led the team to the 1995 Blanchard Trophy for the best missile operations squadron.

In 1996, Major Saltzman was selected for the Air Force Intern Program where he was assigned to AF/XOI and the Air Staff History Office. While on the Air Staff, Major Saltzman worked planning, programming and budgeting issues for the Information Warfare Panel, wrote HHQ classification guidance for Information Operations and provided historical research for the Air Force Chief of Staff.

In 1998, Major Saltzman was assigned to the National Reconnaissance Office, Operating Division Four. In OD-4, Major Saltzman served as Flight Commander, Senior Flight Commander and Mission Planning Flight Commander responsible for planning and command and control of three NRO reconnaissance satellite constellations. He also served as the on-console launch officer and led early-orbit engineering checkout for a \$1 billion NRO satellite. In 2000, Major Saltzman was selected to attend the U.S. Air Force Weapons School.

After graduating from the Air Force Weapons School in 2001, Major Saltzman was selected to remain at the Weapons School as an instructor. While at the Weapons School, Major Saltzman served as Academics Flight Commander and an Assistant Director of Operations. In March 2003, he was deployed to Vandenberg AFB to serve in 14AF’s Strategy Division as the Chief of Operational Assessment during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

After earning distinguished graduate honors at Air Command and Staff College in 2003, Major Saltzman was selected to attend the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell AFB.

### ***Acknowledgements***

This paper would not have been possible without the thought-provoking discussions and forthright reviewing of Colonel Jim Forsyth. Equally as important were the many discussions about this topic with Dr. Rick Andres, Dr. Jim Kiras, Dr. Lew Griffith, and my SAASS classmates. All of these men served as my sounding boards and helped me immensely to frame my arguments. I would also like to thank Dr. John Petersen, my father-in-law, whose keen and balanced understanding of the issues helped me shape a more objective argument. Finally and most importantly, I must thank my wife, Jennifer, for giving me the time I needed to put all these thoughts together. Without her attending to the myriad of daily details that keep our house running smoothly, I never could have accomplished this project. Thanks so much.

## *Abstract*

The Bush administration has declared that the spread of democracy with its habits of freedom is the best way to protect America from international terrorism. This conclusion is based on a presumption that political freedom is a strong determinant of terrorism. This paper contends that not all democratic forms are equally able to eliminate the conditions that are exploited by terrorist organizations. Furthermore, the U.S. must understand the manner in which political freedom, economic conditions and religion is related to affiliation with terrorist organizations. Assessing the convergence of these factors revealed several key findings. First, states that exhibit both political and religious repression are extremely prone to terrorist exploitation. Second, states with growing economic conditions and high relative deprivation are more prone to terrorist exploitation than states without these conditions. Finally, the convergence of political repression and growing economies in Islamic states is extremely prone to terrorist exploitation. In the end, understanding these conditions can help GWOT planners identify high risk states that are not currently affiliated with terrorist organizations. If the internal conditions of these states can be improved, terrorists dislocated from current states by GWOT efforts will not have new sanctuaries in which to fall back. In summary, by assessing these relationships and factors, this thesis can help decision-makers frame the next stages and ultimate objectives of the Global War on Terrorism.

## *Contents*

Chapter	Page
DISCLAIMER .....	ii
ABOUT THE AUTHOR .....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	iv
ABSTRACT .....	v
INTRODUCTION .....	1
1 FROM DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY TO DEMOCRATIZATION .....	6
2 THE FREEDOM FACTOR .....	15
3 THE ECONOMIC FACTOR .....	30
4 THE RELIGION FACTOR .....	45
5 THE CONVERGENCE OF FACTORS .....	55
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS .....	76
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	87

## *Illustrations*

Figure	Page
1 Terrorist Affiliation relative to Political Freedom .....	17
2 Terrorist Affiliation relative to Form of Government .....	22
3 States with Terrorist Activity relative to Political Stability .....	24
4 Terrorist Affiliation relative to Political Stability .....	25
5 Political Freedom (1972 - 1983) .....	26
6 Political Freedom (1994 – 2003) .....	27
7 Terrorist Affiliation relative to Economic Freedom .....	32
8 GNI Comparison with Terrorist Affiliations .....	33
9 Terror Affiliation relative to Economic Category .....	35
10 Terrorist Affiliation relative to Income Distribution .....	37
11 Income Distribution .....	39
12 Terrorist Affiliation relative to GNI Growth .....	40
13 Terrorist Affiliation relative to Dominant Religion of State .....	46
14 Terrorist Affiliation relative to Religious Freedom .....	49
15 Terrorist Affiliation relative to Religious Homogeneity .....	50



## *Tables*

Table	Page
1 Terrorist Affiliation relative to Deprivation and Economic Growth .....	42
2 Political and Religious Freedom Convergence and Affiliation Rates .....	56
3 Affiliation relative to Religious Homogeneity and Political Freedom .....	57
4 Affiliation relative to Political Freedom and Dominant Religion .....	58
5 Affiliation relative to Political Freedom and Economic Conditions .....	61
6 Affiliation relative to Religious Freedom and Economic Conditions .....	62
7 Convergence of Political & Religious Freedom with Relative Deprivation.....	64
8 Convergence of Political & Religious Freedom with Increasing GNI .....	65
9 Affiliation relative to Political Freedom, Dominant Religion and Increasing GNI .....	66
10 Affiliation relative to Political Repression, Income Level and Religion.....	68
11 High Risk States .....	70
12 High Transitional States .....	72

## *Appendices*

Appendix	Page
A States Affiliated with Terrorist Organizations	85

## Introduction

*It was widely believed that terrorism was a response to injustice and that terrorists were people driven to desperate actions by intolerable conditions, be it poverty, hopelessness, or political or social oppression.*

*Terrorism, like revolutions, occurs not when the situation is disastrously bad but when various political, economic and social trends coincide.*

Walter Laqueur, terrorism expert, Center  
for Strategic and International Studies

In March of 2003, the United States initiated preemptive combat operations in Iraq to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein which “posed a grave and growing danger that the U.S. and [its] allies could not afford to ignore.”<sup>1</sup> This operation was the embodiment of the neoconservative Democracy Project which asserts that the U.S. should use preemptive military force to spread democratic values in the pursuit of its national interests.<sup>2</sup> In his address to the U.N. in September 2002, President Bush implied that the U.S. would expend significant blood and treasure to meet the demands of peace and security. As of 11 January 2005, 1,352 Americans have lost their lives during operations in Iraq.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that OIF cost \$3.9 billion per month during 2004.<sup>4</sup> With this tremendous investment of resources, the Bush administration has demonstrated its commitment to the idea that spreading democracy around the world is the solution to the international terrorism problem. The extent to which this idea will work in practice is dependent on the answers to several key questions. First, is the spread of democracy

---

<sup>1</sup> Congressman Ron Lewis, “Renewing Our Purpose in Iraq,” 21 July 2003.

<sup>2</sup> The Democracy Project are the words used to describe the neoconservative-led initiative which argues that it is in America’s compelling interest to promote democratic regimes wherever possible. As Charles Krauthammer described it in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute in February 2004, the initiative is based on the belief that non-democratic regimes incubate anti-Western extremism, making their aggrieved populations vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist groups.

<sup>3</sup> Boston Globe, 12 January 2005. Online Internet, available at [https://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2005/01/12/american\\_deaths\\_in\\_iraq/](https://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2005/01/12/american_deaths_in_iraq/)

<sup>4</sup> US Senate, *Testimony on Iraq: Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee*. 9 July 2003.

sufficient to win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)? If so, will any form of democracy be equally effective? If not, are there other factors that must be considered?

Democratization's basic logic is that "democratic institutions and procedures, by enabling the peaceful reconciliation of grievances and providing channels for participation in policymaking, can help to address those underlying conditions that have fueled the recent rise of Islamist extremism.<sup>5</sup> If this is true, one would expect to see terrorism decrease as the world becomes more democratic. However, despite an increase in the number of democracies in the last thirty years, the rise of terrorist activity around the world in the last few years appears to show the contrary. To explain this requires an assessment of the root causes of terrorism.

Terrorism is a complex phenomenon that can be assessed from numerous vantage points. One way to address terrorism is to examine the conditions that are exploited by terrorist organizations. Specifically, states with an absence of freedom, economic opportunity and religious tolerance may be ripe for terrorist organizations to exploit. If all of these are true, the neoconservative Democracy Project must offer states more than democracy; it must completely change the cultures that are prone to terrorist exploitation. Without considering these factors comprehensively, democratization may be a hollow strategy in the GWOT.

After three decades of studying political violence, Walter Laqueur concluded that there is a connection between terrorism and economic, social, and political state of affairs.<sup>6</sup> Despite the fact that there is not likely to be a set of objective conditions that always generates terrorism, there is reason to believe that certain conditions are more likely to be exploited by terrorist organizations. Along these lines, the key findings in this study are:

- (1) States characterized by political freedom are less prone to terrorist organization affiliation than states characterized by political repression.

---

<sup>5</sup> Jennifer L. Windsor, "Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism," (The Washington Quarterly 26:3, Summer 2003), 43.

<sup>6</sup> Laqueur, *No End To War*, 22.

- (2) States characterized by economies with growing incomes and high relative deprivation are more prone to terrorist affiliation than states without these economic characteristics.
- (3) States characterized by religious repression are more religiously homogeneous and significantly more prone to terrorist affiliation than states without these religious characteristics.
- (4) The convergence of these political, religious and economic factors creates internal conditions in states that are more prone to terrorist exploitation than they would be if the factors existed individually.

The neoconservatives have placed tremendous emphasis on democratization and economic growth as the way to undermine terrorism. But as the findings above indicate, the conditions that lead to terrorist organization affiliation are more complicated. To assess the viability of the neoconservative plan, this paper will establish and describe the conditions of states that are most susceptible to terrorist exploitation. The main premise is that to be a legitimate threat to U.S. national security terrorist organizations must be affiliated with states whose conditions they can exploit. In as much, one element in the democratization initiatives of GWOT should focus on identifying high risk states and changing the internal conditions which make them candidates for terrorist exploitation.

### **What is Terrorism?**

Defining terrorism is not an easy matter because there is a lack of consensus regarding such notions as “political,” “power,” “aggression,” and “force.”<sup>7</sup> For this analysis, terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”<sup>8</sup> Terrorist organizations in this study include those identified by the U.S. State Department’s list of Foreign Terror Organizations and other

---

<sup>7</sup> William A. Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, “On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr., 1990), 239.

<sup>8</sup> This is the U.S. State Department’s definition derived from Section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 documented in the 2004 Foreign Terrorist Organizations List, 16 Feb 2005.

organizations with prominence due to recent terrorist activity.<sup>9</sup> States are considered affiliated with terrorist organizations if the organization exploits the internal conditions to operate within the borders on more than a temporary basis. The term *affiliated* is specifically chosen to bound terrorism for analytical purposes. Because this study, like the Bush administration, is examining geopolitical and socioeconomic factors of states to determine the underlying causes of terrorism, the perpetrators' bases of operation and activity become the most appropriate entities to evaluate. In other words, which states' conditions are being exploited by terrorist organizations or with which states are they affiliated?

The word *affiliated* best describes the relationship between terrorist organizations and the states in which they are based (See Appendix A for a list). Across the globe, this relationship ranges from direct government support of terrorist organizations to passive tolerance to open animosity to their presence. Therefore, the term *affiliated* is not intended to categorize the degree to which the state supports the terrorist organization but rather to capture the reality that terrorist organizations must physically reside in states. Terrorist organizations choose the states in which they reside for a number of reasons including the inability of domestic government to counter their activity, political contestation of a domestic issue or simply for its sanctuary qualities.<sup>10</sup> The Democracy Project is an attempt to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorist organizations seek to exploit. The presumption being the freer the state, the less susceptible it is to terrorist organization exploitation and the less likely the state will affiliate with terrorist organizations. Therefore, if democratization works, terrorist organizations and the terrorism they spawn will dry up.

## Outline

This paper begins by describing the Democracy Project's evolution from democratic peace theory to neoconservative foreign policy. With the strategy defined, the paper will turn to analyzing the correlations between terrorism and the factors of political freedom, economic conditions and religion to assess their influence on terrorist

---

<sup>9</sup> MIPT Terrorism Database, Online Internet, available at <http://www.tkb.org>. 10 February 2005.

<sup>10</sup> National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 2003), 17.

affiliation in a state. Finally, conclusions will be drawn regarding the key determinants of terrorist affiliation, high risk states and the key actions to reverse the conditions that terrorists exploit. Although some recommendations will be made, the overarching goal of this paper is simply to present data that clarifies which state conditions create opportunities for terrorist organizations and the full scope of what the Democracy Project must accomplish in order to eliminate international terrorism. If this goal is met, the reader should have a clearer picture of the high risk states, the complexity of the GWOT, and the limits of using military force as the sole instrument to eliminate the underlying causes of terrorism.

The difficulty in characterizing terrorism makes it easy to criticize conclusions about the nature of the phenomenon. However, policy makers cannot allow these difficulties to paralyze their decision-making. If these critiques prevent the development of methods to systematically reduce the strength of terrorist organizations, the U.S. will continue to be bogged down in extremely costly and inefficient hunts for terrorists. This paper assumes away the need to understand many of the psychological causes that lead to an increase in terrorist activity. Instead, it will focus on terrorist organizations' need for state affiliation in order to project political violence in an internationally significant way. The Democracy Project emphasizes the lack of political freedoms as making a state vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. This paper will make the case that in addition to this, the changes in economic conditions, relative poverty, and religious intolerance must also be addressed. If these key conditions and the high risk states they create can be identified, the foundation of terrorist organizations' strengths can be undermined.



## Chapter 1

### From Democratic Peace Theory to Democratization

*The triumph of democracy and tolerance in Iraq, in Afghanistan and beyond would be a grave setback for international terrorism. The terrorists thrive on the support of tyrants and the resentments of oppressed peoples. When tyrants fall, and resentment gives way to hope, men and women in every culture reject the ideologies of terror, and turn to the pursuits of peace. Everywhere that freedom takes hold, terror will retreat.*

—President George W. Bush  
National Address, 7 September 2003

In order to fully understand the Democracy Project, one must understand its foundational principles in democratic peace theory.<sup>11</sup> The decision to invade Iraq encapsulated all the key elements of the Bush administration's view of the world. The internal logic of this foreign policy was simple. Terrorism was the United States' principle national security threat. To address this threat and reshape the security environment one has to transform the politics and culture of the Middle East through the process of democratization.<sup>12</sup> This incredibly ambitious project to build peace and security through democratization is a plan with theoretical underpinnings grounded in democratic peace theory. To fully understand the foreign policy of democratization, one must grasp the logic that extrapolates the democratic peace's ability to prevent war into a solution for international terrorism.

---

<sup>11</sup> Democratic peace theory is a political theory attributed to Kant's work *Perpetual Peace* in 1795. The theory is based on the proposition that democracies do not go to war with one another. In a 1998 article titled "What is the Democratic Peace?" R.J. Rummel outlined the basic tenets of the theory as 1) Democracies do not make war on each other. 2) The more two nations are democratic, the less their mutual violence. 3) Democracies have the least foreign violence and 4) Democracies have, by far, the least internal violence.

<sup>12</sup> James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, (New York, N.Y.: Viking Penguin, 2004), 363.



The origins of the democratic peace trace back to the publication of Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace* in 1795. In this book, Kant argues that once the aggressive interests of absolute monarchs are tamed and the habit of respect for individual rights is engrained by democracy, wars would be seen as a disaster to the people's welfare and would vanish.<sup>13</sup> As Kant saw it, citizens of a democracy would be very cautious in declaring war because they would be decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war including "having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, [and] having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind." On the other hand, in a non-democratic state, "a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the sacrifices of the pleasures of his table."<sup>14</sup> As democracies are formed and as liberal cultures progress, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and other democracies emerges. It follows that democracies, which derive their power from public consent, presume other democracies to be consensual as well and therefore deserving of accommodation.<sup>15</sup> This forms the basis for the notion that liberal democracies do not go to war with each other and instead experience greater degrees of cooperation which further liberalizes the state.

As a foundation for this analysis, Russett and O'Neal provide a useful definition of democracy. They define democracy as a country where most citizens can vote, the government comes to power in a free and fair election contested by more than one party and the executive is either popularly elected or responsible to an elected legislature.<sup>16</sup> Defined this way, Russett and O'Neal concluded that pairs of democracies are much less likely than other pairs of states to fight each other. Furthermore, they assert that the emerging view is that democracies are more peaceful overall, especially if one considers which states initiate militarized disputes.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," in *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York, N.Y.: Addison Wesley Publishers, Inc., 2003), 100.

<sup>14</sup> Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Part 1," in *Philosophy of Public Affairs*, (Vol 12), 229.

<sup>15</sup> Doyle, in *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, 101.

<sup>16</sup> Bruce Russett and John O'Neal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations*, (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton and Co., 2001), 44.

<sup>17</sup> Russett and O'Neal, 50.

Explanations of the democratic peace are generally grouped as either cultural or structural. Cultural explanations center on the idea that democracies share governing principles, perceptions and expectations of behavior. This group contends that democratic people are conditioned to solve their domestic and international disputes without resorting to violence. Structural explanations stress the importance of institutional constraints imposed on the decision makers of a democracy. In this outlook, a separation of powers and institutions hold democratic leaders accountable for bad decisions making democracies reluctant to use violence to resolve disputes. Clearly, these two theoretical perspectives are complementary in that a democratic culture drives the creation of political institutions which in turn emphasize the democratic culture. In 1795, Kant saw this symbiosis when he wrote that a good constitution for representative government would, over time, generate a good moral culture.<sup>18</sup>

### **Brief History of Democratic Peace in U.S. Foreign Policy**

Throughout its history, the ideals of democratic peace have underscored U.S. political principles and therefore have been prominently expressed in American foreign policy. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine made the first declarations regarding U.S. intentions to protect “free and independent conditions” outside its borders for the purpose of ensuring its national security.<sup>19</sup> President Woodrow Wilson expanded the position of active interventionism by adding that it was morally imperative to aid in the political regeneration of other states. Wilson expressed this principle in the Fourteen Points he laid out as a basis for peace after World War I. Although he stopped short of invoking a need for universal democracy, he declared a need for open covenants of peace in the public view, removal of economic barriers and a pacific union of nations.<sup>20</sup> As a precursor to the philosophy of the Bush administration, Wilson believed that political regeneration would be based on national self-determination and modern democracy. By this reasoning, if, and only if, all states reform in this way will world peace result.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> Russett and O’Neal, 53.

<sup>19</sup> James Monroe, President of the U.S., *7<sup>th</sup> Annual Message to Congress*, Washington, D.C., 2 December 1823, Online Internet, available at <http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/monrodoc.html>.

<sup>20</sup> Russett and O’Neal, 30.

<sup>21</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis*, (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1959), 84.

The idea of a democratic peace matured in the aftermath of World War II. In 1947, the Truman Doctrine articulated “one of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion.”<sup>22</sup> For Truman, this life free from coercion was democratic in nature as he described it in terms of free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. To this end, Truman stated it “must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”<sup>23</sup>

After World War II, the global political environment was dominated by the ideological battles waged by Americans and Soviets in the Cold War. In this context, democratic peace theory was more broadly advanced in the famous NSC-68. In this document, the overall national security policy was described as one “designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish.”<sup>24</sup> With remarkable insight, NSC-68 declared that policies striving to develop a healthy international community, like vigorous sponsorship of the United Nations and international economic activities, were more necessary than ever to U.S. strength.<sup>25</sup> U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War exhorted the ideals of democratic peace theory but only to the extent that it worked as a counter to Soviet expansion.

By the 1970s, the Carter administration was recasting foreign policy as a “doctrine of modernization” designed to view international problems as human issues rather than political confrontations.<sup>26</sup> In the wake of the Vietnam failure, Carter wanted to establish foreign policy based on moral ends and shift away from the strategic focus of the Soviet threat. To this end, the administration pledged that the U.S. best serves its interests by “supporting the efforts of developing nations to advance their economic well-being and preserve their political independence.”<sup>27</sup> However, in this role, Carter believed

---

<sup>22</sup> Harry Truman, President of the U.S., *Address to Joint Session of Congress*, Washington, D.C., 12 March 1947, Online Internet, available at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm>.

<sup>23</sup> IBID.

<sup>24</sup> NSC-68, *United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*, 14 April 1950, Online Internet, available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-69.htm>.

<sup>25</sup> IBID.

<sup>26</sup> Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” *Commentary Magazine* (November 1979), 39.

<sup>27</sup> Kirkpatrick, 41.

there was no room for military intervention because the lesson of Vietnam was that military force offered only superficial solutions.<sup>28</sup>

Ronald Reagan refocused U.S. foreign policy on the Soviet Union and reconnected military force to the promotion of democracy around the world. Reagan's policy was based on the "Roll-Back" strategy of the 1950s but leaned heavily on supporting anti-Communist insurgents to reverse Soviet expansionism. Throughout his two terms, Reagan incessantly promoted the expansion of freedom as an independent policy of the United States. In his 1982 speech to the British Parliament, Reagan declared the U.S. objective in his campaign for democracy.

The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.<sup>29</sup>

The beginnings of the contemporary neoconservative Democracy Project are evident in this speech. Reagan, like the neoconservatives who would follow, genuinely saw democracy as a self-evident superior form of government. As Reagan observed, "It would be cultural condescension, or worse, to say that any people prefer dictatorship to democracy."<sup>30</sup> It follows then that people would always prefer the right to vote and independent newspapers and would never prefer government repression of religious liberty, a single political party, or a rigid cultural orthodoxy instead of democratic tolerance. Through the first Bush administration, these ideas began to grow and were eventually captured in draft Defense Planning Guidance.

In 1992, Paul Wolfowitz, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, circulated draft guidance that articulated the need to safeguard U.S. interests by promoting American values. He said the U.S. should be prepared to use military force unilaterally and preemptively

To address sources of regional conflict and instability in such a way as to promote increasing respect for international law, limit international

---

<sup>28</sup> IBID, 41.

<sup>29</sup> Ronald W. Reagan, President of the U.S., Speech to British Parliament, London, England, 8 June 1982.

<sup>30</sup> IBID.

violence, and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems.<sup>31</sup>

The draft guidance was rewritten because it proved to be too politically inflammatory for the first Bush administration during an election year. Wolfowitz' vision for U.S. foreign policy would have to wait out the Clinton administration.

The Clinton administration declared the “enlargement” of the democratic sphere to be an important interest for the United States.<sup>32</sup> For the Clinton administration, enhancing worldwide economic conditions was seen as the critical precondition to the advancement of democracy. In as much, although the rhetoric of democratic conditions was often complemented by action, it increasingly came to be viewed as a secondary interest often subject to barter for economic and commercial benefits.<sup>33</sup> On one hand, the administration supported a free election in Nicaragua and blocked a military coup in Paraguay. While on the other hand, it shied away from pushing for democratic reforms in Nigeria and remained silent about authoritarian shifts in Kazakhstan.<sup>34</sup> In keeping with democratic peace theory, President Clinton declared “the best way to ensure our security and build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy everywhere.”<sup>35</sup> However, in practice it was more accurate to describe his policy as applying “only in a few, rare circumstances and to a limited number of fortunate peoples.”<sup>36</sup> In the relative security and economic boom of the mid 1990s, the U.S. was not overly dedicated to the expansion of democracy.

### **The Emergence of the Democracy Project**

Shortly after President George W. Bush took office, the events of September 11, 2001 changed the security equation for the United States. International terrorism became the prime threat to national security overnight. Previous terrorist activity, despite the loss of American lives, was a distant threat, disconnected from the average American's

---

<sup>31</sup> Patrick E. Tyler, “Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics,” *New York Times*, 8 March 1992.

<sup>32</sup> Robert Kagan, “Democracies and Double Standards,” *Commentary Magazine* (August 1997), 23.

<sup>33</sup> Kagan, 23.

<sup>34</sup> Kagan, 24.

<sup>35</sup> William J. Clinton, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address, Washington, D.C., 25 January 1994.

<sup>36</sup> Kagan, 26.

routine. In the four years prior to the 9/11 attacks, 47 U.S. citizens were killed in terrorist attacks but only 7 of those were in North America.<sup>37</sup> With over 3,000 killed on a single day, 1440 of which were U.S. citizens, the 9/11 attacks evoked a tremendous emotional response by Americans creating an opportunity for the administration to conduct a grand military response. After 9/11, the Bush administration convinced Americans that terrorism was not just a crime against humanity but also an act of war. The combination of the U.S. position as sole superpower and the threat of terrorism created a convergence of international and domestic conditions that allowed the reemergence of the neoconservative foreign policy drafted a decade earlier.

The inauguration of the Bush administration and the events of 9/11 brought neoconservative thinking back into decision-making circles. The key premise of this thinking was that promoting democratization in the closed societies of the Middle East, and presumably elsewhere, provides values and ideas that offer a powerful alternative to the appeal of the extremism seen in terrorist activity.<sup>38</sup> This line of reasoning defines national interests not as power but as values, specifically the success of liberty.<sup>39</sup> As President Bush stated it, “The United States and Britain share a mission in the world beyond the balance of power or the simple pursuit of interest. We seek the advance of freedom and the peace that freedom brings.”<sup>40</sup> The neoconservatives who crafted this strategy believe the U.S. should not be ashamed to use its unrivaled power, forcefully if necessary, to promote American values globally. Because modern threats to U.S. national security, such as terrorists, are not subject to classic theories of deterrence, the neoconservatives also believe the U.S. must be willing to use military force preemptively. Simply put, how does one deter a terrorist willing to die for his ideological cause? The only options are developing an impenetrable defense or preemptive attack.<sup>41</sup> Finally,

---

<sup>37</sup> US State Department. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002*. Report from Counter Terrorism Office. April 2003, Appendix H.

<sup>38</sup> Windsor, 43.

<sup>39</sup> George W. Bush, as quoted by Charles Krauthammer, speech to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 10 February 2004.

<sup>40</sup> George W. Bush, as quoted by Charles Krauthammer, speech to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 10 February 2004.

<sup>41</sup> Dr. Lewis Griffith, “The Littoral Enforcer: The Bush Doctrine in Historical and Present Context.” Address, Air and Space Power Conference, Maxwell AFB, AL, 11 March 2004.

many neoconservatives believe that multilateral institutions unnecessarily constrain U.S. efforts to ensure global security and therefore the U.S. must be willing to act unilaterally.

The Democracy Project retains the core ideas of democratic peace theory. Most importantly is the belief that the spread of democracy is indispensable to securing American interests because democracies are “inherently more friendly to the U.S., less belligerent to their neighbors, and generally more inclined to peace.”<sup>42</sup> More controversial is that the Democracy Project also carries with it a universal, open-ended commitment to human freedom. The National Security Strategy declares that the U.S. will “extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”<sup>43</sup> These core elements connect the Democracy Project soundly to democratic peace theory but there are significant differences.

The Democracy Project deviates from classic democratic peace theory by its contempt for the tenets of liberal institutionalism. Liberal institutionalists believe the democratic peace should be pursued through increased legalism, multilateralism and humanitarianism. Legalism represents the construction of “a web of treaties and agreements that will bind the international community to normative [behavior].”<sup>44</sup> This idea leads to the primacy of multilateral considerations to maintain international legitimacy. Finally, according to the neoconservatives, the guilt that drives humanitarian justifications belies the deep suspicion of national interest as a rationale for projecting power.<sup>45</sup> In short, liberal institutionalists want to model the international community after a domestic society based on law, treaties, and norms that abolish power politics. The Democracy Project differs from this liberal view because neoconservatives are unwilling to relinquish America’s hegemonic power to an international legal structure that waters down its agenda. Furthermore, neoconservatives do not feel a need to disguise their efforts in the form of humanitarianism. They see the spread of democracy as “the last line of defense and [the] first line of attack.”<sup>46</sup> Neoconservatives believe

---

<sup>42</sup> Charles Krauthammer, speech to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 10 February 2004.

<sup>43</sup> National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 2002), 1.

<sup>44</sup> Charles Krauthammer, “In Defense of Democratic Realism,” *The National Interest* (Fall 2004), 16.

<sup>45</sup> Krauthammer, 16.

<sup>46</sup> Charles Krauthammer, speech to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 10 February 2004.

democracies have a responsibility to press their advantage lest they “confer on succeeding generations a more terribly violent and tumultuous world.”<sup>47</sup>

The evolution of democratic peace theory into the Democracy Project turned a theoretical political debate into aggressive foreign policy. In essence, neoconservatives have such faith in the democratic peace that they feel a responsibility to preempt terrorists by using military force to install democracies and accelerate the resulting peace process. Unfortunately, creating practice from theory is proving a far more complex proposition. The situation in Iraq is not progressing the way the Bush administration or the neoconservatives believed it would. As the policy-makers continue to assess the strategy, what are the key questions that must be considered? First, will establishing democracies solve the international terrorism problem? Second, are factors like economic opportunity and religion more important to stopping terrorism than the form of government? Finally, are there indicators that point to a combination of factors in states that can be more effectively targeted in the next phase of the GWOT?

It appears that while military force may be necessary to remove repressive regimes and provide initial security, the U.S. must take a more comprehensive approach to democratization. By combining regime change and military security with economic and secular incentives, the U.S. may be able to set conditions for domestic control. However, if the U.S. does not extract its military forces and allow “soft” power to influence the democratic, economic, and social processes, the resentment created by U.S. presence may overwhelm the strategy. The vision provided by the Democracy Project is inspiring but the operational success of it requires policy makers to understand the correlations between the factors they are addressing and the outcomes they desire.

---

<sup>47</sup> Adrian Karatnycky, “The Democratic Imperative,” *The National Interest* (Summer 2004), 116.





## Chapter 2

### The Freedom Factor

*Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe—because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export.*

—President George W. Bush  
Speech to U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 6 November 2003

The Bush administration believes the Democracy Project will, by spreading freedom around the world, eliminate the underlying causes of terrorism. The GWOT is a multi-faceted approach that includes attacking terrorist organizations and denying terrorists sanctuary and support, but the key element is the democratization of areas where terrorism festers.<sup>48</sup> In June of 2004, President Bush declared that as the Middle East “sees the promise of freedom in its midst, the terrorist ideology will become more and more irrelevant, until that day when it is viewed with contempt or ignored altogether.”<sup>49</sup> In word and deed, President Bush has committed the U.S. to eradicating terrorism by promoting democratic principles around the world.

In order to test the Bush hypothesis that the spread of democratic freedom will solve the terrorism problem, one must define and evaluate the term *freedom*. Once it is clear what is being evaluated, this paper leverages the Freedom House ratings to categorize the states of the world based on their degree of freedom. Secondly, the degree

---

<sup>48</sup> National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., February 2003), 15-28.

<sup>49</sup> George W. Bush, President of the U.S., speech at U.S. Air Force Academy Graduation, Colorado Springs, C.O., 2 June 2004.

of freedom around the world will be compared to terrorist affiliation to determine the meaningful nature of the relationship. If the neoconservatives are correct, states with higher degrees of political freedom should have fewer affiliations with terrorist organizations. Also, as individual states become freer, their affiliations with terrorist activity should diminish.

For the purposes of this analysis, freedom is defined as the degree to which rule of law prevails, basic human rights are protected and there is free political competition.<sup>50</sup> This definition of freedom squares with the democratic values espoused by the Bush administration. In a speech to the United Nations, the President described the dignity of democracy as being “honored by the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, protection of private property, free speech, equal justice and religious tolerance.”<sup>51</sup> To the neoconservatives who champion the Democracy Project, the justice and dignity which inherently characterize freedom are synonymous with the principles of democracy.

In order to compare degrees of freedom of states around the world, this paper will use the Country Ratings established by Freedom House.<sup>52</sup> Since 1972, Freedom House has published an annual assessment of the state of freedom in all countries. Individual countries are evaluated based on a list of questions on political rights and civil liberties that are derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>53</sup> Each country is assigned a rating for political rights and a rating for civil liberties based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest level of freedom.<sup>54</sup> For this analysis, countries scoring from 1 to 2.49 are considered Free, those scoring between 2.5 and 3.9 are considered Partly Free, those scoring from 4 to 5.49 are considered Partly Repressive, and those countries scoring higher than 5.5 are considered

---

<sup>50</sup> Adrian Karatnycky, “Gains for Freedom Amid Terror and Uncertainty,” *Freedom in the World* (2004), 3.

<sup>51</sup> George W. Bush, President of the U.S., speech to the UN General Assembly, New York, N.Y., 21 September 2004.

<sup>52</sup> Freedom House is a non-profit, nonpartisan organization that conducts an array of U.S. and overseas research, advocacy, education, and training initiatives that promote human rights, the rule of law, and other democratic principles.


<sup>53</sup> On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

<sup>54</sup> Freedom House, *Freedom In The World* Country Ratings, Online Internet, available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>, 25 January 2005.

Repressive. If the democratization hypothesis is true, the higher a country scores on the freedom ratings, the more likely it is to be affiliated with terrorism.

### The Linkages between Political Freedom and Terrorism

A comparison of political freedom and terrorist organization affiliation highlights two important points. First, a much greater percentage of repressive states are affiliated with terrorist organizations than free states. Second, not all forms of democracy are equal with regards to freedom and terrorist affiliation. The inference is that as liberal democracies replace less free governments, terrorist organizations will erode and eventually disappear. Of course, critics of the Bush administration’s democratic initiatives believe this process creates instability in societies that, because of their openness, are particularly vulnerable to terrorism.<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, critics contend that parts of the world are not ready for the freedom and responsibility associated with democracy.<sup>56</sup> As a consequence, they believe many states, despite costly efforts to establish democratic freedoms, are likely to slip back into their repressive habits. In order to validate the Democracy Project each of these key points must be assessed.



**Figure 1: Terrorist Affiliation Relative to Political Freedom**

SOURCE: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World* Report, 2004.

<sup>55</sup> Stephan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, Op Ed Reply, *American Spectator*, Vol. 37, No. 5 (June 2004), 34.

<sup>56</sup> Tom Bethell, “The Rival Fanaticisms of Our Day,” *American Spectator*, Vol. 37, No. 6 (July/August 2004), 54.

In 2003, the Freedom House report characterized 42 states around the world as repressive of which 18 are affiliated with known terrorist organizations. In contrast, the report identifies 75 states as free of which only 4 are affiliated with terrorist organizations. Furthermore, as one examines the categories of states' degrees of freedom it is clear that the freer the state the less likely it is to be affiliated with terrorist organizations. As shown in Figure 1, nearly 43% of repressive states are affiliated with terrorist organizations compared to 34% of partly repressive, 24% of partly free and only 5% of free states.<sup>57</sup>

This simple statistical comparison shows repressive states are 8 times more likely to be affiliated with terrorist organizations than free states. On the surface, it appears that the hypothesis is true—democratization may indeed eliminate the terrorist problem. However, before singling out democracy as the reason free states are less likely to be affiliated with terrorist organizations, it is necessary to distinguish democracy from political freedom. For instance, Freedom House declared 75 states to be politically free, however, Freedom House also declared 121 states to be electoral democracies.<sup>58</sup> Thus, the difference between electoral democracy and political freedom must be addressed.

Not all forms of democracy are equal with regards to the degree of freedom that their population enjoys. This is a critical point that must not be abstracted away in the political rhetoric of democratization. This distinction is important because although the goal of this foreign policy is promoting liberal democracies, it must be remembered that they are complex societies that will take time to build. The 75 states defined by Freedom House as free can all be described as liberal democracies. Forty-six additional states are technically electoral democracies but are better described as procedural democracies.<sup>59</sup> The difference between liberal and procedural democracies can be explained by examining the three functional criteria which lie at the heart of any definition of democracy. First, the ultimate locus of power is an elected body. Second, legitimacy

---

<sup>57</sup> Data compiled from multiple sources including State Department terrorist organization profiles, the CIA World Fact book, and Freedom House reports. Compiled Data is listed in Appendix.

<sup>58</sup> Freedom House, "Electoral Democracies Worldwide," Report on World Freedom (2004)

<sup>59</sup> Freedom House, "Survey Methodology," Report on World Freedom (2004) defines the basic criteria for designating a country as an electoral democracy. First, voters can choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals not designated by the government. Second, voters have access to information about candidates and their platforms. Third, voters can vote without undue pressure from the authorities. Last, candidates can campaign free from intimidation.

must be granted to the opposition to government. Third, there must be acceptable processes for a smooth transition of power.<sup>60</sup> Liberal and procedural democracies can be differentiated by examining these aspects of electoral democracies and the degree to which they are embraced.

Many countries who can currently claim to be democratic do not adhere to these fundamental democratic criteria. Instead they are characterized by a head of state that retains supreme authority of government and uses an elected body as a mere rubber stamp. When governmental opposition in these countries becomes too critical, it is often suppressed. Furthermore, power in these countries is usually unopposed and extended for life-long terms. On the contrary, liberal democracies not only adhere to rules, institutions and practices where voters regularly modify leadership, they also actively promote free debates and competition in the media, civil society and political parties.<sup>61</sup> In a liberal democracy opposition to the government has an important role with actual power that is exercised through free expression, assembly and association. These differences between electoral democracies are important to understanding which states are most likely to be affiliated with terrorist organizations.

Differences between liberal and non-liberal governments characterize the nature of affiliations that terror organizations have with states. The inescapable fact for democratization efforts is that both procedural and liberal democracies are affiliated with terrorist organizations. However, most of the democracies affiliated with terrorist organizations are procedural democracies and rarely free. The analysis shows that the characteristics of the democracy alter not only the likelihood of affiliation but also the effectiveness of the terrorist organization. For example, only four liberal democracies are affiliated with terrorist organizations. The Palestinian terrorist organizations in Israel have been well documented. Ireland's Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Spain's Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) organization are recognized by the U.S. State Department as official Foreign Terrorist Organizations.<sup>62</sup> Italy is affiliated with the Italian Red

---

<sup>60</sup> Raphael Israeli, "Western Democracies and Islamic Fundamental Violence," in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, (Autumn/ Winter 2000, Vol 12, Issue 3/4), 160.

<sup>61</sup> Daniel Brumberg, "Beyond Liberalization?," *Wilson Quarterly*, Vol 28 No. 2 (Spring 2004), 47.

<sup>62</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Terrorist Organization list," (Washington, D.C., 29 December 2004).

Brigade which is not recognized by the U.S. State Department; however, in the name of completeness the organization is included in the study.

These terrorist organizations, affiliated with liberal democracies, have either found non-violent ways to express themselves politically or are small enough to be dealt with by domestic police. Recent Palestinian and Israeli talks are leveraging political discourse to design a cease fire agreement once again and the IRA has a legitimate political arm, the Sinn Fein, which has worked within the government to create settlements that have eliminated violent activity. Since the Belfast Agreement went into effect in 1998, the IRA has not conducted a single terrorist attack.<sup>63</sup> In Spain and Italy, the terrorist organizations are fringe criminals numbering in the hundreds that do not represent a significant political movement or have popular appeal. In Spain, the ETA has an estimated strength of less than 100 and from 1996 to 2003 successfully conducted only 3 terrorist attacks, none of which resulted in deaths. In Italy, the Italian Red Brigade is considered stronger, with strength estimated at about 1500, however, they have not successfully conducted a terrorist attack since 1996.<sup>64</sup> In these three states, the practices of the liberal democracy have limited the effectiveness of the terror organizations. These groups may be able to conduct isolated acts of terrorism but they cannot exploit the conditions of the state to the extent necessary to increase their effectiveness.

Terrorist organizations have more trouble operating effectively in liberal democracies because of the legitimacy and practices of this type of government. The legitimacy of the government in liberal democracies is a popularly held notion that discourages fringe elements from enlisting support for violent anti-government responses. Also, the non-violent practices and habits for resolving differences in a liberal democracy are more prominent than in other forms of government. As a result, it is unacceptable to address grievances and frustrations in a violent manner in a liberal democracy. The net result is that terrorist organizations have trouble building support and evading law enforcement in liberal democracies.

In contrast, procedural democracies that are not liberal suffer from more robust and dangerous terrorist organization affiliation. Turkey, Indonesia, and Sierra Leone are

---


<sup>63</sup> Data correlated from State Department's "Patterns of Global Terrorism" reports 1998-2003.

<sup>64</sup> Department of State, "Chronology of Significant International Terrorist Incidents," *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C., 1996-2003), Appendix A.

all technically electoral democracies. However, because of varying degrees of political and social repression none of these states can be called a liberal democracy. In fact, Freedom House categorizes each of them as partly repressive (scoring 4.36, 4.95 and 5.0 respectively). Furthermore, they are all affiliated with terrorist organizations on the State Department's FTO list.

Turkey, as an example, is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Turkish Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary People's Liberation Front (DHKP-C), and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLK-P). These organizations are more active and considerably stronger than those in Italy and Spain, the PKK has an estimated strength of 15,000. Members of these terrorist groups have claimed responsibility for seven deadly terrorist acts and are suspected in an additional 14 terrorist acts from 1996 to 2003.<sup>65</sup> Indonesia is affiliated with at least two terrorist organizations, the Free Papua Movement and the Free Aceh Movement, who have conducted significant terrorist activity in the last eight years.<sup>66</sup> Sierra Leone is also affiliated with at least two terrorist organizations, the Revolutionary United Front and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, responsible for 19 terrorist acts since 1996.<sup>67</sup>

The numbers in Figure 2 indicate several key facts regarding the relationship between governmental form and terrorist affiliation. First, only about 14% of democracies are affiliated with terrorist organizations. This is far below the 38% of non-democratic states that are affiliated with terrorist groups. Second, if democracies are disaggregated for comparison, procedural democracies are nearly six times as likely to be affiliated with terrorist organizations when compared to liberal democracies. Of the 46 procedural democracies, thirteen are affiliated with known terrorist organizations.<sup>68</sup> Finally, the chart shows that 40 of 44 states affiliated with terror organizations have non-liberal governments. The bottom line is that terrorist organizations do not affiliate significantly with liberal democracies.





## **Figure 2: Terrorist Affiliation relative to Form of Government**

SOURCE: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World* Report, 2004

### **The Linkage between Political Instability and Terrorism**

Despite these statistics, critics assert that democratization will not reduce terrorism. Amy Chua, Yale law professor, wrote that the global spread of democracy is “a principal, aggravating cause of group hatred and ethnic violence throughout the non-Western world.”<sup>69</sup> Additionally, they charge that the instability of governmental change, especially a change to a more open democratic society, increases the vulnerability of the state and therefore the amount of terrorism. One author asserts that unrestricted travel, a free press to publicize events and surprisingly low risks of harsh punishment make terrorism more likely in democracies.<sup>70</sup> This notion is not unlike criticism of democratic peace theory which states that the process of democratization can increase the likelihood of war. In 2001, Russett and O’Neal published their study of democracy which included an examination of whether the instability which can arise from democratization leads to military conflict. They concluded that there was no statistical evidence which indicated

---


<sup>69</sup> Joshua Muravchik, “The New Gloomers,” *Commentary Magazine*, (June 2003), 26.

<sup>70</sup> Lawrence C. Hamilton, “Dynamics of Terrorism,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March 1983), 40.

that democratization, or any political shift for that matter, increased the likelihood of interstate conflict.<sup>71</sup>

Similarly, the openness of democracies, as the U.S. is painfully aware, makes them particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks, but they do not experience them more often than repressive forms of government. In fact, a survey of all significant terrorist acts from 1996 to 2003 shows that free states are slightly more immune to terrorist activity than states in other freedom categories. Nineteen of seventy-five, or 25.3% of, free states experienced significant terrorist events from 1996 to 2003. This compares to 35%, 47% and 50% for partly free, partly repressive and repressive states respectively. Furthermore, during this time frame, free states suffered 140 separate terrorist attacks compared to 463, 244 and 178 for partly free, partly repressive and repressive states respectively.<sup>72</sup> If the partly free India is removed as an outlier, the numbers support the conclusion even more dramatically (140, 190, 244, and 178).<sup>73</sup> These numbers indicate that the freedom associated with democracies cannot be historically linked to an increase in terrorism anymore so than lesser degrees of freedom or governmental form.

Without evidence to support that notion, the question becomes whether or not the path to democracy increases terrorism due to the instability created by changes in political freedom. In this respect, the eight-year survey of terrorist activity indicates that there is a significant statistical correlation between instability and terrorist activity but not terrorist affiliation. For analysis purposes, stability of a state is defined by the change in political freedom rating from year to year. A state was described as stable if its average change was less than half a rating point per year. States with political freedom ratings that averaged a change of more than half a rating point were deemed unstable.<sup>74</sup> Given these definitions, thirty-two percent of stable states experienced terrorist acts compared with forty-three percent of unstable states.



<sup>71</sup> Bruce Russett and John O'Neal, *Triangling Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2000).

<sup>72</sup> Compiled from U.S. State Department, "Patterns of Terrorism," (Washington, D.C.: 1996-2004).


<sup>73</sup> From 1996-2003, India experienced 27 terrorist acts. This is 19 times the amount seen in other states. Trends across the spectrum of states are clearly identified, but the statistical skewing caused by this significant anomaly is omitted.

<sup>74</sup> To categorize states based on stability, average change in Freedom House freedom ratings between 1996 and 2003 is established using a standard deviation of 0.5.

### Figure 3: States with Terrorist Activity relative to Political Stability

SOURCE: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World Report*, 2004 and State Department, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, 1998-2003

Figure 3 shows that nearly 11% more states in the unstable category experienced terrorist acts from 1996 to 2003. The fact that unstable states are more likely to experience terrorism than stable states is statistically significant.<sup>75</sup> However, further statistical analysis on the number of terrorist acts that occur in the year of and the year after a change in a state's political freedom rating does not yield a statistically significant correlation. In other words, a change in a state's stability from year to year does not necessarily increase the amount of terrorism that occurs with any degree of statistical significance.<sup>76</sup> Yet, if the number of terrorist acts is broken down by stability category and outliers are removed for statistical trending, unstable states account for 64 percent of terrorist events and stable states account for 36 percent.<sup>77</sup>



<sup>75</sup> A regression analysis was performed on the yearly freedom rating change and the corresponding number of terrorist acts. The correlation was 1.8 with a statistical significance of .000.

<sup>76</sup> A regression analysis was performed on the yearly freedom rating change and the corresponding change in number of terrorist acts from the year of change to the following year. The correlation was -.047 with a statistical significance of .749, indicating no significant statistical correlation.

<sup>77</sup> Again the stable India's 273 events badly skews the data and obscures more appropriate trend analysis


#### **Figure 4: Terrorist Affiliation relative to Political Stability**

SOURCE: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World Report*, 2004 and State Department, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, 1998-2003

Figure 4 shows twenty percent of unstable states were affiliated with terror organizations while eighteen percent of stable states were affiliated with terror organizations. For all intents and purposes, this is essentially the same percentage. Therefore, it may be concluded that the instability which inevitably follows the process of democratization will increase the likelihood of terrorist activity in a state but it does not mean that the state is more likely to be affiliated with terrorist organizations.

#### **The Viability of Democracy**

The final counter argument to democratization is that parts of the world are not ready for the freedom associated with democracy and will readily slip back into the comfort of an autocratic government. This argument must be countered in two steps, the first geographical, the second temporal. First, democracy has proven to be a viable form of government in all corners of the globe. Obviously, North America and Europe have enjoyed the fruits of long lasting democracies but it is also true in Asia and the Pacific where Mongolia and East Timor have proven that democracy is not exclusively for the rich, Western states. In Africa, countries like Benin and South Africa have built remarkably sturdy democracies and in South America, Uruguay and Chile stand out as examples. With Israel leading the way and the remarkable elections in Iraq and Palestine, even the Middle East seems to be fertile ground for democracy.




### **Figure 5: Political Freedom (1972 to 1983)**

SOURCE: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World* Report, 2004

The lack of durability, or staying power, of democracies is the second half of this critique. Do emerging democracies last or do they convert back to more repressive forms of government when things get tough? By tracking the changes in freedom ratings over time, the likelihood that a free state will transition to a less free state can be determined. Averaging states' Freedom House country ratings from 1972 to 1982 reveals 51 states that fall into the category of free state. Of those 51, only 10 have less free rating for the period 1993-2003 and 9 of those still remained in the free or partly free categories. Only The Gambia became categorized as partly repressive with an overall freedom rating average of 5.36. The story of Gambia may turn out to be the exception that proves the rule.

From 1972 to 1994, The Gambia was a free or partly free electoral democracy consistently rated 2.0 by Freedom House. In 1994, a military coup ousted the government and quickly imposed draconian measures curtailing civil liberties, political rights and the free media. From 1994 to 2000, Freedom House issued The Gambia a 7.0 freedom rating. However, by 2001, mounting domestic pressures forced the dictator to reconstitute legislative elections, repeal the prohibition on former ministers participating in politics, award political opposition with free airtime on state-controlled radio and

television and recognize political party opposition.<sup>78</sup> In 2003, The Gambia was given a freedom rating of 4.0 and while this is still not a free state, it should be seen as evidence for the tenacity of democratic freedom. Once people experience democratic freedom, the facts seem to indicate that they do not surrender it often.



**Figure 6: Political Freedom (1994 to 2003)**

SOURCE: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World* Report, 2004

To round out the argument, the average freedom ratings from 1972 to 1982 also reveal 56 states described as repressive. Comparing these 56 to their 1993-2003 averages, twenty-two remained the same or became more repressive while thirty-four moved positively toward freer ratings. Eight repressive states actually became states categorized as free with six more categorized as partly free. In fact, about half of the states were able to maintain their status as a repressive state. Although there are still states like North Korea and Saudi Arabia holding on to repressive forms of government,

<sup>78</sup> Freedom House, “The Gambia Country Study,” *Freedom in the World*, 2004.

cases like Chile and Mongolia seem to indicate repressed people can turn to freedom anywhere and anytime.

The breakup of the Soviet Union led to many states transitioning to freer forms of government including Mongolia. As a Soviet satellite state and single-party Communist government, Mongolia rated 7.0 on the freedom scale. In 1990, without Soviet oversight, the Mongolian government responded to anti-government protests by legalizing opposition parties and holding the country's first multi-party elections. Despite acute poverty, Mongolia has adopted market reforms to create a private sector and encouraged small business entrepreneurs to replace the collectivized programs of Soviet legacy. Mongolia's routine elections, independent judiciary, free press, and active human rights and social welfare groups have kept Mongolia free for over 10 years.

Chile is another example of a state that transitioned from repression to freedom in a short time span. From 1973 to 1989, the state lived under the repressive dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. However, small changes along the way led to democratic reforms. First, constitutional amendments were slowly added to reduce Pinochet's power until public pressure forced the dictator to abide by a constitutional provision that mandated a referendum pass before he could extend his military rule. In 1988, 55% of the voters voted to hold competitive national elections. By 1990 political competition and governmental accountability led to enough democratic change that Freedom House declared Chile to be a free state.<sup>79</sup>

## Summary

Comparing the degree of freedom in states with terrorist affiliation reveals several important facts. First, a much smaller percentage of free states are affiliated with terror organizations when compared to states in all other freedom categories, especially repressive states. Second, the types of democracies are important for determining the quality and quantity of terrorist affiliation. Specifically, procedural democracies, without the freedoms of liberal democracies, are much more likely to be affiliated with terror organizations. Furthermore, compared to those affiliated with liberal democracies, terrorist organizations affiliated with procedural democracies are stronger and more

---

<sup>79</sup> Freedom House, "Chile Country Study," *Freedom in the World*, 2004.

effective. Third, democracies, due to their openness, may in theory be more vulnerable to terrorist attack, but, free democracies have suffered fewer terrorist attacks than others. However, the instability which results from democratization does positively correlate to the number of terrorist attacks. Finally, democracies exist all over the world and where democratic freedoms have been experienced they are not replaced by repression very often.

In conclusion, it is worth restating the initial question. Will establishing democracies solve the international terrorism problem? The answer of course cannot be a simple yes or no. The analysis here does indicate that if the world continues to replace repressive governments with liberal democracies, less and less states will be affiliated with terrorist organizations. However, the instability created by this process is likely to increase terrorist activity in the short run. If the recent experiences with terrorist organizations in liberal democracies are any indication, the significance of terrorism will continue to be reduced as states become freer and freer.

This review concludes that promoting democracy as a means to undermine the roots of terrorism is necessary but may not be sufficient. Effective democratization must emphasize building liberal democracies and mitigating the effects of instability. Democratization alone is probably not sufficient because many other socioeconomic conditions can affect a state's stability. In order to fully understand how internal conditions can promote terrorist affiliation, it is necessary to examine other socioeconomic factors and determine their relationship to terrorism. The next chapter will assess the relationship between economic conditions and terrorist organization affiliation.





## Chapter 3

### The Economic Factor

*There is also a need to acknowledge the root causes of terrorism, including extreme poverty, despair and injustice and to strongly advocate concerted efforts and collective commitment throughout the world to eradicate poverty and under-development.*

--Ambassador Claude Morel  
United Nations Delegate

Debates in the United Nations often describe poverty as a root cause of terrorism. The Benin ambassador to the UN declared, "Terrorists cannot be silenced without eliminating the conditions they can use to justify their actions...those include poverty, injustice, marginalization and exclusion."<sup>80</sup> There is ample evidence that poverty caused by a lack of economic viability generates resentment, desperation and hopelessness that terrorist organizations exploit. However, some terrorism observers think that the connection between poverty and terrorism is weak. At an international meeting in Oslo, Norway, experts made this point by concluding that at the individual level, terrorists are not drawn from the poorest segments of society and that terrorism is not particularly high in the poorest countries of the world.<sup>81</sup> This assessment is difficult to deny but the spectrum of ambiguity regarding the relationship between poverty and terrorism clouds the usefulness of the linkage. Without a clear understanding of this relationship,

---

<sup>80</sup> Kolawole Idji, Minister of Foreign Affairs and African Integration of Benin, United Nations General Assembly Debate, 10-16 November 2001.

<sup>81</sup> Tore Bjorgo, "Root Causes of Terrorism," The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (Oslo, Norway, 9-11 June 2003).

applications of soft power to address terrorism may be fruitless or worse aggravate rather than help the situation.

The U.S. National Security Strategy states that “poverty, weak institutions and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks.”<sup>82</sup> It is this connection between terrorist organizations and a state’s internal conditions that can be exploited to increase the effectiveness of terrorism and must be examined. The hypothesis is that poor states with weak economic conditions are more prone to exploitation by terrorist organizations. As with political freedom, exploiting the poor economic conditions of a state would make a terrorist organization stronger and more effective. Therefore, as economic conditions improve, states would be less likely to affiliate with terrorist organizations.

To examine the relevant aspects of a state’s economy, this study assessed terrorism as it relates to a state’s economic freedom, Gross National Income (GNI), income distribution and change in GNI. By analyzing the relationship of these factors to terrorist affiliation and activity, a more useful linkage between poverty and terrorism can be established. The goal of this effort is to identify the economic conditions that characterize states that are exploited by terrorist organizations. Ideally, this would help GWOT planners to focus their efforts against high risk states.

To measure a state’s economic freedom, this study uses the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom to establish ratings for each state’s economy. For evaluation purposes, this Index defines economic freedom as “the absence of government coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself.”<sup>83</sup> The Index establishes a rating for each state on a scale of one to five with one being the most free and five being the most repressive. Free economic states are those who score 1.99 or less, partly free states score between 2.0 and 2.99, partly repressive states score between 3.0 and 3.99, and repressive economic states score higher than 4.0.<sup>84</sup> By comparing the economic freedom rating of each state with terrorist activities, one should be able to

---

<sup>82</sup> NSS, Introduction.


<sup>83</sup> William W. Beach and Marc A. Miles, “Explaining the Factors of the Index of Economic Freedom,” *2005 Index of Economic Freedom*, (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones and Co., Inc., 2005), 58.

<sup>84</sup> Beach and Miles, 59.

describe a relationship between poverty and terrorism. If the hypothesis is true, the higher a state's economic freedom rating, the more likely the state is to be affiliated with terrorist organizations.

### The Linkage between Economic Freedom and Terrorism

A comparison of economic freedom and terrorist organization affiliation shows a remarkable similarity to the relationship between terrorist affiliation and political freedom. As with political freedom, a much lower percentage of economically free states are affiliated with terrorist organizations relative to economically repressive states. As Figure 7 shows, only 11% of economically free states are affiliated with terrorist organizations compared to 40% of those repressed economically.<sup>85</sup>



**Figure 7: Terrorist Affiliation relative to Economic Freedom**


SOURCE: The Heritage Foundation, *Index of Economic Freedom*, 2005

Like political freedom, less economic freedom means a higher percentage of states in a particular category will be affiliated with terrorist organizations. Specifically, repressive states are nearly 4 times as likely to be affiliated as free states and even twice as likely to be affiliated when compared to partly repressive economies. It should be

<sup>85</sup> 2005 *Index of Economic Freedom*, (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones and Co., Inc., 2005). Terrorist affiliations compiled from multiple sources.

noted that the Heritage Foundation holds an extremely strict view of economic freedom and therefore very few states actually qualify as free. However, even if the three non-repressive categories of economies are combined, only 17% of them are affiliated with terrorist organizations. As other economic details are analyzed, the clarity of this linkage between economic freedom and terrorist organization affiliation changes.

In freer economic categories, the states affiliated with terrorist organizations have a lower average GNI per capita than the average of other states in the category. As Figure 8 shows, the more repressive categories do not continue this trend. In fact, in the economically repressive categories, the states affiliated with terror organizations have a higher GNI per capita than the overall GNI average of the category.



**Figure 8: GNI Comparison with Terrorist Affiliations**

SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Indicators Report, 2001

In the freer categories, states affiliated with terrorism have a GNI per capita 9% and 35% less than their category average. In the more repressive categories, the GNI per capita of the states affiliated with terror organizations is higher than the category average by 13% and 28%.<sup>86</sup> This data shows that the relationship between economic freedom,

<sup>86</sup> World Bank, “Size of the Economy,” *2001 World Development Indicators Report*, Online, internet, available at <http://worldbank.org/data>. 10 September 2004, Appendix 1.1, 12.

GNI and terrorist affiliation is complex. Therefore, it would be premature to use this information to conclude that simply promoting economic freedoms would reduce terror organization affiliation.

Because of the strict standards set by the Heritage Foundation, economic freedom ratings are not intended to describe the economic strength of a state. Although economic freedom is strongly correlated to Gross National Income, there are cases of partly free economies being impoverished. For example, in 2003 Bolivia was economically freer than Japan (2.59 to 2.73) but its GNI of 890, only slightly above the United Nation's international poverty line, was significantly below Japan's GNI of \$34,510.<sup>87</sup> As a result, a more accurate analysis of the relationship between poverty and terrorism must include economic data which more directly describes poverty.

### **The Linkage between Gross National Income and Terrorism**

The Gross National Income of states is more directly related to poverty. The World Bank uses this data to categorize states into four sizes of economy and as a basis for determining populations living below the international poverty line. States with GNI less than \$755 are described as Low Income, those between \$756 and \$2995 are describes as Lower Middle Income, those between \$2996 and \$9265 are Upper Middle Income and those higher than \$9266 are High Income Economies.<sup>88</sup> Comparing terrorist activities across these categories yields conclusions that are more directly tied to poverty.


As with economic freedom, Figure 9 indicates that there is a correlation between the occurrence of terrorist affiliation and gross national income. In total numbers, there is nearly 2.5 times as many low income states affiliated with terror organizations as there are high income states. Equally as telling, a greater percentage of lower income states are affiliated with terrorist organizations by nearly two to one. However, if the comparison is made purely based on states' positions relative to the international poverty line, the results are less conclusive. In the Low Income category, which represents the states below the World Bank's international poverty line, 33.3% of states are affiliated with

---

<sup>87</sup> The UN and World Bank define the international poverty line at \$2/ day or about \$730 GNI per capita.

<sup>88</sup> World Bank, "Classification of Economies by Income and Region," *Global Economic Prospects*, July 2000, Table 1.

terrorist organizations while in categories above the poverty line, 18.3% are affiliated with terror organizations.



**Figure 9: Terrorist Affiliation relative to Economic Category**

SOURCE: World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects*, 2000

Furthermore, if the number of terrorist acts is assessed for each of these categories, the results are similar. There are more terrorist acts in the lower income states; however, more than two-thirds of the terrorist acts between 1996 and 2003 occurred in states above the international poverty line. In as much, it may be more accurate to assess the linkage between poverty and terrorism in relative terms rather than in absolute terms. Relative poverty may prove to be more directly linked to terror affiliation than the absolute poverty that is assessed by looking at states' positions relative to the international poverty line.

### **The Linkage between Relative Deprivation and Terrorism**

Relative deprivation is the term used to describe the tension between the conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled and those that they are capable of getting and keeping.<sup>89</sup> Relative deprivation provides an effective theoretical tool for analyzing relative poverty and how it relates to terrorist affiliation. For example, the average GNI of states affiliated with terrorist organizations is \$4,992

<sup>89</sup> Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 24.

whereas the average GNI of states not affiliated with terrorist organizations is \$7,292.<sup>90</sup> Does this poverty gap indicate that states affiliated with terrorist organizations are acting on the frustration of not having what others have? Before the effects of relative deprivation can be properly characterized, a more detailed assessment of the economic conditions inside the various states is required.

Ted Robert Gurr's theory of relative deprivation posits that people are driven to violent political behavior because of the frustration that comes from relative deprivation.<sup>91</sup> In other words, it is not poverty which should be correlated to terrorist affiliation but economic frustrations. According to Gurr, the sense of frustration may result from quite rational analysis of the social universe and leaders can put their followers' anger to rationalized uses.<sup>92</sup> In this situation, frustration is the result of interference with goal-directed responses and results from a real or perceived discrepancy between legitimate expectation and actuality. Therefore, the sense of deprivation can arise either from "interference with goal-seeking behavior or from interference with continued enjoyment of an attained condition."<sup>93</sup>

One way to describe this relative deprivation is to compare states' Gini index. The Gini index is an economic coefficient between 0 and 1 which measures distribution of income. In theory, a state with a Gini index of 0 would have perfect distribution with everyone receiving the exact same income. In a state with a Gini index of 1, all the income would be earned by one person with the remainder of the population earning nothing. In reality, of course, states exist in between these extremes and their Gini index is stated as a percentage. The median Gini index for the world is 38.5 with half the states below and half the states above this value.

By examining the inequality of income distribution and its relationship to terrorism, several important distinctions regarding relative deprivation can be connected to terrorism. As Figure 10 shows, the highest percentage of terrorist affiliation occurs in those states that rank in the middle third of Gini indexes. In the bottom third of Gini

---

<sup>90</sup> World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 2004.

<sup>91</sup> Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (January 1968), 252.


<sup>92</sup> Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (January 1968), 250.

<sup>93</sup> Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (January 1968), 256.



indexes, where the income distribution is most equal, 17.4% of states are affiliated with terrorist organizations. This is roughly equivalent to the 19.6% of states that are affiliated in the top third of Gini indexes. With 40% of states in the middle third being affiliated with terrorist organizations, the notion that as income becomes less equally distributed terrorist activity increases seems to be untrue. The details in this breakdown of income yields even more interesting data.

The bottom third states averaged a much higher gross national income per capita than the other thirds. The most equal states had a GNI of \$12,552 for 2003 while the middle and top thirds had \$6,537 and \$1,662 respectively.<sup>94</sup> This confirms that actual income is less an indicator of terrorist affiliation than relative income distribution. Examining the fact that states with extreme inequity of income distribution and those with more equal distribution have roughly the same percentage of terrorist affiliation makes this argument counterintuitive.



**Figure 10: Terrorist Affiliation relative to Income Distribution**


SOURCE: World Bank, *Human Development Indicators*, 2004

The middle third of Gini indexes has a much higher percentage of states affiliated with terrorist organizations as a result of more acute relative deprivation. Nearly 38% of these high relative deprivation states are affiliated with terror organizations compared to only 20% of the combined low relative deprivation states. Obviously, the relative

<sup>94</sup> World Bank, *Human Development Indicators*, 2004.

deprivation that exists in the upper third of Gini indexes is the most exaggerated, however, the perception of deprivation is less obvious to the majority of the population. In other words, in the upper third states a few people possess the majority of the wealth which means that most of the population is equally poor. The average citizen does not see the wealth or expect any of it. Therefore, from their vantage point their actual economic condition matches their expectations. Likewise in the bottom third of Gini indexes, there is little frustration because in general the average citizen expects and receives about the same income as everyone else. In contrast, the middle third states' variances in income are quite visible within the ranks of the majority economic class. This high state of deprivation awareness creates very visible disconnects between expectation and reality which leads to frustration which can be exploited by terrorist organizations.

Within the Gini divisions of states, different internal conditions are exploited by terrorists. In some instances poverty is the critical factor in others the frustration of inequality is more important. For example, in the bottom third of Gini indexes, the states affiliated with terrorist organizations had an average GNI of \$6,806 or 54.2% of the group's average GNI. In the middle third, states affiliated with terrorist organizations average \$5,862 or 89.7% of the group's average GNI. Finally, in the group with the most unequally distributed economies, states affiliated with terror organizations averaged \$1,651 or 99.3% of the group's average. From this one can conclude that in the category of states with more equal income distribution, terrorist organizations are more likely to exploit the poorer states while poverty becomes less connected to terrorist affiliation in states with unequal income distribution. In other words, where everyone is generally making the same income, terrorists exploit relative poverty. Where everyone is generally poor and income is distributed unequally, terrorists exploit the frustration created by income distribution inequality. The category of states in between is where the real friction and associated terrorism exists.



### **Figure 7: Income Distribution**

SOURCE: World Bank, *Human Development Indicators*, 2004

Examining the high relative deprivation states within the middle range of Gini indexes, they cannot be categorized in global terms as either impoverished in terms of GNI or unequal in terms of income distribution. As a result, the individuals in the state will collectively experience the relative deprivation of both factors. Some sub-groups within these states are likely to be relatively deprived of the average income while others will be aware and frustrated by the inequity of income distribution. In these friction states, terrorist organizations can exploit both factors to increase their capacities and therefore a higher percentage of states in the middle third are affiliated with terror organizations.


Turkey, with a Gini Index rating of 40, is an example of a state where these economic conditions come together in a way that facilitates terrorist organization exploitation. Turkey's economy is relatively small with a GNI per capita of \$2790 in 2003 placing it in the lower middle income category. The poorest 20% of the population share only 5.8% of the income creating deprivation that can be exploited by terrorist organizations. Also, the wealthiest 20% share nearly 48% of the income while the next wealthiest 20% share less than 22% of the income.<sup>95</sup> This relative deprivation is likely to create frustration because these groups will not be separated sufficiently in social context

---

<sup>95</sup> World Bank, "Distribution of Income or Consumption," *World Development Indicators*, 2004.

and the disparate incomes will be a perceived barrier to success. This provides a second avenue for terrorist organizations to exploit.

The final aspect of poverty to examine is the relative deprivation that may occur inside states that experience changes in their GNI. If the economics that create poverty are directly related to terrorist affiliation, then changes in the economy should drive changes in terrorist affiliation. By examining terrorist affiliation relative to the changes in GNI, an important counterintuitive point becomes clear. Terrorist organizations are affiliated with a higher percentage of states who's GNI grows positively as to those that grow negatively. This relationship does not square with the idea that spreading economic prosperity will reduce terrorism and therefore must be examined thoroughly.



**Figure 12: Terrorist Affiliation relative to GNI Growth**

SOURCE: World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects*, 2000

The right half of Figure 12 shows the 126 states that experienced a positive growth in their GNI between 1999 and 2003. These states were divided into thirds in order to assess whether the size of the economy was related to terrorist affiliation. As the figure shows, the 42 wealthiest states only had 5 states affiliated with terrorist organizations, or 11.9%. In contrast, the 42 poorest states that experienced positive GNI

growth included 14 states, or 33.3%, affiliated with terrorist organizations. The poorer states also experienced far more terrorist acts than the wealthier states which would seem to indicate once again that poverty is directly related to both terrorist organization affiliation and terrorist activity. However, these economies were all growing during the period. When the states with shrinking economies were assessed, the results did not support the linkage between poverty and terrorism.

The left half of Figure 12 graphically depicts the 34 states whose economies experienced negative GNI growth from 1999 to 2003. Unlike the states with positive growth, here the wealthier states have a higher number of terrorist organization affiliations. Furthermore, the number of terrorist acts in the poorer states is negligible relative to the number of incidents in the other two-thirds of the states. Across the spectrum of GNI changes, it is clear that absolute wealth is not as important as how the economy is changing. In other words, on a percentage basis terrorist affiliation occurs less at the extremes of wealth (poor states declining and wealthy states increasing) when it comes to changing economics. As economies change, wealthier states with falling incomes and poorer states with rising incomes have higher percentages of terrorist affiliation.

With the attention that the National Security Strategy gives to weak and failing states, it may be counterintuitive that terrorist affiliation is most prominent in growing economies. Assessing these graphics along a spectrum from negative GNI growth to positive, it is the middle third that are the friction states where relative deprivation creates the conditions most exploited by terrorist organizations. In these states the tension between the conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled and those that they are capable of getting and keeping are the starkest. People recognize gains and losses in economic opportunity and as their aspirations go unsatisfied they are more likely to be frustrated by the changes. This frustration makes the states ripe for terrorist organization exploitation.<sup>96</sup>

In light of these economic relationships to terrorist affiliation, it is necessary to determine if combining deprivation and income changes in a state makes the state particularly prone to terrorist exploitation. To provide a clearer assessment of changing

---

<sup>96</sup> Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 33.

GNI and relative poverty, several conventions must be established. First, the lower two income categories, as well as the upper two income groups, are grouped into one to create a relatively poor group of states and a relatively wealthy group of states. Second, general categories of states must be defined to capture the size of the economy and the way it is changing. Growing states are defined as relatively poor states (GNI per capita below \$2995) whose GNI has grown since 1999. Failing states are poor states with a falling GNI per capita. Declining states are defined as wealthy states (GNI per capita greater than \$2995) with a falling GNI per capita. Finally, wealthy states with a rising GNI per capita are referred to as enriching states. Based on these conventions, analyzing the convergence of relative deprivation and GNI factors reveals two important characteristics that effect terrorist affiliation. First, growing economies are more prone to terrorist affiliation than other combinations of changing economies. The second economic characteristic is that high relative deprivation states (states in the middle third of Gini indexes) are more prone in nearly all types of changing economies to be affiliated with terror organizations than low deprivation states (states in the bottom and upper third of Gini indexes).

Change in GNI	High Deprivation			Low Deprivation		
	Total	Affils	%	Total	Affils	%
Failing States	4	1	<b>25%</b>	15	4	<b>27%</b>
Growing States	22	10	<b>46%</b>	37	10	<b>27%</b>
Declining States	2	2	<b>100%</b>	8	1	<b>13%</b>
Enriching States	10	2	<b>20%</b>	24	2	<b>8%</b>

Sources: World Bank, 2004 *Human Development Indicators* and 2001 *Global Economic Prospects* e

highest number of states affiliated with terrorist organizations. Although Declining States also experience a high percentage of terrorist affiliates, the relatively small sample size reduces the significance. Table 1 also shows that conditions of high relative

deprivation have higher affiliation percentages than nearly all of their economic counterparts with conditions of low deprivation. Based solely on economics, Growing and Declining states exhibit the conditions that are most susceptible to terrorist exploitation and that high deprivation exaggerates the affiliation percentage.

To clarify this complex economic linkage, several examples can show how this convergence manifests itself. Iran and Indonesia are examples of growing states with relatively low GNIs of \$1810 and \$600 respectively and growth rates exceeding 20%. In both instances, the Gini indexes of these states, 43 and 34.3 respectively, place them in the high relative deprivation category. Under these circumstances, individuals will justifiably raise their expectations with regard to their economic capabilities. According to Gurr, these expectations are a manifestation of the norms set by the immediate environment.<sup>97</sup> In Iran and Indonesia, people witness growing incomes generally and disparate distribution of that income amongst the social groups with which they interact. This disconnect between economic potential and economic reality creates more intense economic frustration and renders the state vulnerable to terrorist exploitation.

In contrast, Belarus, a state with no affiliation to terrorist organizations, is similar to Iran and Indonesia in all other factors considered in this study except deprivation. Belarus is in the lower middle income category (relatively poor) with a growing GNI per capita but its Gini index is 30.4 placing it in the low deprivation category. Without this relatively low deprivation condition, the economic circumstances in Belarus would make it a likely candidate for terrorist affiliation. However, the desire for increased economic status is not as intense here because individuals are less likely to interact with people who have significantly more income. Largely, the economic expectations of social classes in Belarus are met relative to the economic reality of interacting groups. In other words, the lower Gini index means that as the economy grows, individuals' incomes grow more consistently with their peer group reducing relative deprivation frustration. As a result, the psychological satisfactions that members of a society value in non-authoritative interactions, like economics, are achieved creating less economic frustration to be exploited by terrorist organizations.<sup>98</sup>

---

<sup>97</sup> Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 27.

<sup>98</sup> Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 27.

## Summary

In conclusion, this chapter shows that there is a relationship between poverty and terrorism. Yet, it is not the simple relationship that many might believe it is. In fact, the relationship is complex and nuanced across the spectrum of global economies and terrorist affiliations. However some basic conclusions can be stated. First, terrorist organizations are most likely to affiliate with states whose economy creates the conditions for exploitation. These conditions are not characterized by abject poverty but rather by relative deprivation. Gurr's original deprivation premise was intended to demonstrate the connection between relative deprivation and the origins of political revolts. But his conclusions can also be applied to the relationship between relative deprivation and the internal conditions of a state that make it exploitable by terrorist organizations. Although economic freedom and GNI establish many of these conditions, they do not do so absolutely but relatively.

Finally, changes in a state's economy, both positive and negative, create opportunities for terrorist organizations to highlight relative poverty and inequality of income distribution. The target is not those who are poor but those who are most frustrated by their changing economic condition. As will ultimately become more obvious in this study, economics and poverty become another set of factors that creates a web of conditions that make certain states more exploitable for terrorist organizations.





## Chapter 4

### The Religion Factor

*The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.*

--President George W. Bush  
Address to Congress, 20 September 2001

The connection between religion and terrorism seems so direct that the President of the United States must specifically and repeatedly remind the world that the Global War on Terrorism is not a war against Islam. But when the prominent terrorist groups of the day are issuing fatwa's and declaring jihads, the religious aspect of the phenomenon cannot be ignored. President Bush has asserted that terrorists hijacked religion but it may be that certain religious conditions in a state are more exploitable by terrorists.


Of the factors considered in this paper, religion is the most problematic for policy-makers to address. The United States has a long tradition of defending political and economic freedom and encouraging religious tolerance. However, unlike political and economic freedom, if religion is determined to be a key factor in terrorist affiliation, the United States is in a far weaker position to influence the condition. How could the United States declare that the religious practices or beliefs of a state must change in the name of fighting terrorism? One paradox of supporting freedom is that the United States must be willing to accept anti-Western ideology but work to undermine the conditions that allow this anti-Western ideology to turn to political violence. If this effort is to have

any effect, the relationship between religion and terrorism must be assessed as accurately as possible.

Like the factors previously addressed, religion can be analyzed from a number of different perspectives. In this analysis, states will be characterized by their most dominant religion, their degree of religious freedom, and the percentage of the population that practice the dominant religion. These conditions will be compared to terrorist organization affiliation to determine if there is a significant correlation that may help explain the relationship between the religious conditions of a state and terrorism.

### The Linkage between Dominant Religion and Terrorism

Comparing the dominant religions of states with terrorist affiliation yields some complex results. First, more Islamic states are affiliated with terrorist organizations than any other religion and over 41% of Islamic states are affiliated. As Figure 13 shows, however, this is not the highest percentage of state affiliation.<sup>99</sup>



**Figure 13: Terrorist Affiliation relative to Dominant Religion of State**

SOURCE: Central Intelligence Agency, *World Fact Book*, 2000

The small sample size of only 3 Hindu states (India, Nepal and Mauritius) skews the percentage of terrorist affiliation for this religion. Further complicating the analysis is

<sup>99</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook 2000*, (2000).

the presence of minority religious terrorism. For example, over 85% of the 273 terrorist acts in India between 1996 and 2003 centered on the Islamic separatist movement in Islam dominated Kashmir.<sup>100</sup> This notwithstanding, if one considers the religions that dominate the vast majority of states, there are conclusions that can be drawn.

The religions of Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism are the most popular religion in 163 of the world's 192 states, or 85% of them. With this in mind, the percentage of Islamic states that are affiliated with terrorist organizations relative to Catholic and Protestant states is significant. In raw numbers, there are twice as many Islamic states affiliated with terror organizations as there are Catholic and Protestant affiliates combined. With only 9.3% of the combined Catholic and Protestant states affiliated with terror organizations, the percentage of Islamic states that are affiliated is more than 4 times as great. Therefore, of the major religions of the world, it would seem that Islam is currently the most exploited religion by terrorist organizations.

With a seemingly direct correlation between Islam and terrorist organization affiliation, it must be acknowledged that terrorists have not just hijacked a religion but are also actively exploiting the Islamic states to further their causes. Writing in late 2000, Raphael Israeli prophetically described the situation. He wrote that militant groups are "cultivated by Islamic fundamentalist countries."<sup>101</sup> At the time, Iran was sustaining the Hamas, the Hizbullah and Bosnian Muslims; Sudan was providing training grounds and basing for activities against Egypt and other African regimes; and Afghanistan was tacitly supporting Islamists in Central Asia. According to Mr. Israeli, "these militant Islamic regimes provide an umbrella and hinterland for rainy days."<sup>102</sup> After the events of 9/11, the relationship between Islamic radicals and the states they exploit seemed to be one of the central linkages between religion and terrorism.

When President Bush stated that terrorists had hijacked the Islamic religion, the notion that he captured was that the principles of a religion had been bastardized to support anti-Western political violence. But examination of the attributes of radical Islamism shows something a bit different. The key attributes of Islamism are an

---

<sup>100</sup> U.S. State Department, "Chronology of Significant Terrorist Activity," *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, compiled for 1996-2003.

<sup>101</sup> Raphael Israeli, "Western Democracies and Islamic Fundamentalist Violence," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 12, Issue ¾ (Autumn/Winter 2000), 169.

<sup>102</sup> Israeli, 169.

appreciation of death, the glorification of armed force, the worship of martyrdom, and faith in the propaganda of deed.<sup>103</sup> Political theorists, Fukuyama and Samin, contend that these attributes have “little precedent in Islam but have been defining features of modern totalitarianism.”<sup>104</sup> Because terrorists are manipulating the religion’s doctrine, it is less productive to explore the religious beliefs of Islam as a driver of terrorist affiliation and more productive to focus on the general religious conditions inside the states that are being exploited. Potentially, there are specific religious conditions inside Islamic states, and perhaps others, that make them simpler to exploit.

### **The Linkages between Internal Religious Conditions and Terrorism**

One important religious condition inside states is the degree of religious freedom. In order to assess the religious conditions in every state, studies from Freedom House, the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Christian Solidarity International (CSI) were compiled.<sup>105</sup> The degree of religious freedom in states is primarily based on CSI’s comprehensive assessment. CSI assigned a rating for each state from 1 to 7 with 1 being the most free and 7 being the most repressive. CSI defines religious repression as obstruction to religious belief and worship including discriminating on religious grounds and preventing private and public religious services.<sup>106</sup> Level 1 states have no or minor violations of basic religious liberties whereas level 7 states have continuous and very serious violations.

Comparing religious freedom to terrorist organization affiliation reveals once again that a lack of freedom generally means a higher percentage of terrorist affiliation. As Figure 14 indicates, although only a small number of states rate higher than level 6 by CSI, a high percentage (66.7%) of them are affiliated with terrorist organizations. In contrast, only 5.7% of the 88 religiously free states are affiliated with terrorist

---


<sup>103</sup> Francis Fukuyama and Nadav Samin, “Can Any Good Come of Radical Islam?” *Commentary Magazine* (September 2002), 35.

<sup>104</sup> Fukuyama and Samin, 35.

<sup>105</sup> For purposes of comparison and to collect data for all 192 states, information was obtained from the State Department’s 2003 International Religious Freedom Report (18 December 2003), the 2003 CIA World Fact Book and from Christian Solidarity International (CSI). CSI is a non-profit, independent human rights watch group recognized as a non-government organization by the United Nations.

<sup>106</sup> Christian Solidarity International, *Religious Freedom Ratings*, On-line Internet, 10 May 2005. Available from <http://www.csi-int.org>.

organizations.<sup>107</sup> In fact, with each succeeding, and more repressive, religious grouping, the percentage of states affiliated with terrorist groups increases. This information shows a strong relationship between religious repression and terrorist organization affiliation.



**Figure 14: Terrorist Affiliation relative to Religious Freedom**

SOURCES: State Department, 2003 *International Religious Freedom Report*, Central Intelligence Agency, 2003 *World Fact Book* and Christian Solidarity International (CSI)


From these statistics it is clear; states which are not religiously free are significantly more affiliated with terrorist organizations. If compiled together, 40 of the 104, or 38.5% of the non-free states (those above level 1), are affiliated with terrorist organizations. By percentage, this is 7 times higher than the 5.7% that are affiliated in the 88 religiously free states. The obvious conclusion is that religious repression is certainly a condition being exploited by terrorist organizations. Actually, it appears that lack of religious freedom is more strongly correlated to terrorist affiliation than Islam or any other specific religion. Any reduction in religious repression appears to decrease the percentage of states being exploited by terrorists. However, this comparison does not show all the religious information that must be considered before any specific

<sup>107</sup> Center for Religious Freedom, *Religious Freedom in the World: A Global Survey of Freedom and Persecution*, a Division of Freedom House, (2000).

conclusions can be drawn. In as much, the next step must be to determine which religious conditions increase the probability of religious repression.

A more detailed look inside the CSI religious freedom categories reveals that 7 of the 9 states in the highest two levels of religious repression are Islamic. This implies that Islamic states are more religiously repressive than states dominated by other religions. Are terrorists exploiting Islam or the states' religious repression or does it matter? This "chicken and egg" scenario must be explained in more precise terms to properly evaluate the relationship.

One possible explanation for the linkage between Islam and religious repression is the religious homogeneity of Islamic states. The connection between religious homogeneity and religious repression rests on the notion that societies with extremely small religious minorities are more likely to repress that minority. In contrast, states with several different religions practiced by relatively large segments of the population would be more likely to institutionalize religious freedom. As Figure 15 shows, in general this assertion has merit.



**Figure 15: Terrorist Affiliation relative to Religious Homogeneity**

SOURCES: State Department, 2003 *International Religious Freedom Report*, Central Intelligence Agency, 2003 *World Fact Book* and Christian Solidarity International (CSI)

The average religious freedom rating for the groupings in Figure 15 tends to increase (meaning it becomes less free) as the religious conditions in the state become more homogeneous. In states where the dominant religion is observed by less than 40% of the population, the average freedom rating is 1.53 compared to 3.06 where more than 90% observe the same religion. However, every category in Figure 15 except the highest has a religious freedom rating below the world's average of 2.28. In effect, this means that only the most homogenous religious societies are extremely prone to religious repression and its corresponding terrorist affiliation.

Of the 53 states where more than 90% of the population observes the same religion, 19 are affiliated with terrorist organizations, or 35.8%. This is significantly higher than the 5.9% affiliation in states where the dominant religion is observed by less than 40% of the population. Although these extremes seem to indicate that religious homogeneity drives terrorist affiliation, it must be noted that the bottom five categories are relatively consistent with the 71%-80% group being the second least affiliated group. Because of the high number of states in the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile and the presence of so many of the terrorist affiliations, it is necessary to examine these states more closely to determine the precise linkage between terrorism and religion.

If the dominate religions are considered within the categories of religious homogeneity there seems to be less correlation to terrorist organization affiliation. Only Islamic states have affiliates with greater homogeneity than non-affiliates. In Catholic, Protestant and Buddhist states, those that are affiliated with terrorist organizations are on average more religiously diverse than the states that are not affiliated with terrorists. Here again, the next level of detail provides additional and significant information concerning religion's relationship to terrorist affiliation.

There are 53 states where more than 90% of the population observes the same religion. Of these, Buddhism, Protestantism and Orthodox religions account for 15 states with 3 states affiliated with terrorist organizations. There are 15 Catholic states of which three, or 20%, are affiliated with terrorist organizations. The remainders in this category are the 23 Islamic states of which 13, or 56.5%, are affiliated with terrorist organizations. Excluding the Islamic states from this category, terrorist affiliation drops to 20% and the religious freedom rating drops from 3.06 to 1.9. In fact, removing Islamic states from



each category in Figure 15 improved the religious freedom average without exception. Compared to averages for the world as a whole, only the Islamic states' numbers stand out with regard to terrorist affiliation.<sup>108</sup>

The linkage between terrorist affiliation and religious homogeneity must also account for the substantial differences across the various religions. A direct comparison shows that only 2.2% of Protestant states (1 out of 45) are affiliated with terrorist organizations. This compares to 17.7% and 42.9% for Catholicism and Islam respectively. This is notable because Protestant states are significantly less homogenous on average than either Catholic or Islamic states. On average, 61.4% of the population practices the dominant religion in Protestant states compared to 75.9% and 76.7% in Catholic and Islamic states respectively. This observation is consistent in the other religions of the world as well. Combining the 29 Buddhist, Hindu, Orthodox and Jewish states, 31% are affiliated with terrorist organizations with an average of 79.5% of the population practicing the dominant religion.

One problem with these figures is that the statistics seem to show that a world without Islamic states would be one in which terrorist organizations had far fewer states to exploit. The important thing to remember is that this analysis is specifically focusing on state affiliation with terrorist organization. This is not the same as state sponsorship of terrorism. States with certain conditions are being exploited by terrorist organizations and while some states may actively encourage the relationship, far more are simply subjected to it. The religions that are being exploited cannot be blamed any more so than any victim of exploitation can be blamed for the acts of the exploiter. The key is to accurately describe the relationship so that those that practice the religion can work to eradicate the specific conditions that allow terrorist exploitation.

One such condition that must be clearly understood is the degree to which religious tolerance persists in the state. Islamists cite their tolerance of minorities relative to the Christian West as justification for their style of human rights. However, in the West, tolerance is seen as equality where differences are set aside and not value-judged. In contrast, an Islamist sees tolerance as accepting the minority in spite of its

---

<sup>108</sup> In Chapter 5, the Islamic practice of Shari'a will be discussed as a particularly dangerous convergence of conditions within Muslim society which may help explain terrorist affiliation.

inferiority.<sup>109</sup> One resultant from this view is that minority positions will not be assimilated into political, economic or social discourse because they will by definition be inferior to the majority position. This leads to underdeveloped bargaining skills and a warped sense of justice and liberty. One might conclude that this unchecked “group think” creates conditions where large portions of a populace could be susceptible to fundamental extremists. The Gurr theory of relative deprivation may be extrapolated to show that individuals in this society adopt fundamentalist positions as a way of achieving relative separation from the homogenous majority. In a society which operates uniformly with regards to ideology, individuals can be deprived of self-actualization and must seek more extreme ways to achieve relative increases in power and status.<sup>110</sup>

## Summary

The conclusions regarding the relationship between religion and terrorism are complex. Because religion is a cultural phenomenon and because there are often many religions present in a state, conclusions as to its linkage to terrorism are tenuous at best. However, with a broad enough perspective, some conclusions can be drawn. First, Islamic states are affiliated with terrorist organizations more so than other religions. Over half of the states affiliated with terrorist organizations are Islamic and over 41% of all Islamic states are affiliated with these organizations. But if terrorists have really hijacked the religion, what is it about the religion that makes it more exploitable? Does the religious repression common in Islamic states make them more exploitable? The answer to this question leads to the second general conclusion.

As with the previous categories of freedom, religious freedom is directly linked to terrorist organization affiliation. Only 5.7% of the 88 states which rated as religiously free (level 1) were affiliated with terrorist organizations. Across the spectrum of religious freedom, as states became more repressive, a larger percentage of them are affiliated with terrorist organizations. With the average religious freedom rating over twice as repressive as the other two major religions, the religious repression prevalent in

---

<sup>109</sup> Raphael Israeli, “Western Democracies and Islamic Fundamental Violence,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 12, No. ¾ (Autumn/ Winter, 2000), 171.

<sup>110</sup> Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 26.

Islamic states makes them more exploitable by terrorist organizations. Islamic religious repression may result from the religious homogeneity in Islamic states.

In general, states which are religiously homogenous are affiliated with terrorist organizations in greater numbers and percentages than more varied religious societies. In the 53 states where the same religion is practiced by more than 90% of the population, nearly 36% of the states are affiliated with terrorism. More generally, as states become less religiously diverse, religious repression increases. In other words, smaller religious minorities are more likely to be repressed. However, the influence of the Islamic religion on these statistics is considerable. For example, in the most homogenous category, 13 of the 16 states that are affiliated with terror organizations are Islamic. In the most homogenous category, the religious freedom rating goes from 3.06 with Islamic states to 1.9 without them. In sum, there currently seems to be no doubt that terrorist organizations are exploiting the religious conditions of Islamic states.



## Chapter 5

### The Convergence of Factors

*At the base, underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife create opportunities for terrorists to exploit. Terrorists use these conditions to justify their actions and expand their support.*

— National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

This study has analyzed terrorism's linkages to political, economic and religious factors. Specifically, it has explored the relationship between various political and socioeconomic conditions in a state and the corresponding likelihood of exploitation by terrorist organizations. Individually assessed, each factor has given some indication of the conditions that terrorist organizations are more likely to exploit. However, because these conditions never exist in isolation, the factors must be assessed in combination in order to provide a meaningful description. In other words, if terrorist organizations exploit conditions of repression, then states where repressive political, economic and religious conditions converge should be higher risk for exploitation than in freer states. The findings are actually more complex.

The key to this analysis is selecting the precise political, economic and religious factor or circumstance which provides the most meaningful relationship with regards to the other factors. Based on the preceding analysis, political freedom ratings provide the best way to aggregate political circumstances for terrorist affiliation. Religion must be assessed not only in terms of freedom but also by dominant practice and homogeneity. As for economics, the linkages become even more complex. For that reason it is necessary to compare the convergence of political freedom and religious circumstances to

conditions of economic deprivation as well as changing GNI conditions. The convergence analysis yielded several key findings.

- (1) The convergence of political and religious repression creates states that are prone to terrorist affiliation.
- (2) The convergence of repression, either political or religious, with high relative deprivation or growing economies creates states that are prone to terrorist affiliation.
- (3) Any degree of political and religious freedom converging is more prone to terrorist affiliation if the convergence is also characterized by a condition of high relative deprivation.
- (4) The convergence of both political and religious repression with an increasing economy creates states that are prone to terrorist affiliation.
- (5) Politically repressive Islamic states with growing economies are prone to terrorist affiliation.

### **The Convergence of Politics and Religion**

**Key Finding #1.** The convergence of political and religious repression creates states that are prone to terrorist affiliation. As seen in Table 2, the progression from politically and religiously free states to politically and religiously repressive states corresponds to increases in terrorist affiliation percentages.

**Table 2**

Political and Religious Freedom Convergence and Affiliation Rates

	Political Freedom			
Religious Freedom	Free	Partly Free	Partly Repressive	Repressive
Free	9.1%	0%	33.3%	N/A
Partly Free	14.3%	40%	23.8%	41.2%
Partly Repressive	0%	100%	54.5%	37.5%
Repressive	N/A	N/A	N/A	66.6%

SOURCES: Freedom House, State Department, CIA and CSI sources previously documented

Although this table clearly shows a trend, it is more helpful to examine religious freedom in terms of the contributing religious factors. Therefore, it serves the GWOT better to examine this convergence by considering the factors of religious homogeneity

and dominant religion. Analyzing the convergence of these religious details and political repression reveals important corollaries to the key finding.

**Table 3**

Affiliation Relative to Religious Homogeneity and Political Freedom

Religious Homogeneity	Political Freedom			
	Free	Partly Free	Partly Repressive	Repressive
Less than 40%	0%	0%	0%	66.7%
40% – 60%	0%	0%	45.5%	66.7%
60% - 80%	0%	16.7%	25%	44.4%
More than 80%	12.1%	33.3%	42.3%	40.7%

SOURCES: Freedom House, State Department, CIA and CSI sources previously documented

Table 3 quantifies the corollary that terrorist affiliation in states with less than 40% homogeneity only occurs in politically repressive states. Furthermore, terrorist affiliation in politically free states only occurs where religious homogeneity exceeds 80%. These extremes show the importance of religious homogeneity to the political and religious convergence leading to terrorist affiliation. They also show that as freer political categories become more homogenous they become more prone to terrorist affiliation. In contrast, politically repressive states have greater percentages of terror affiliation in less homogenous categories. From this it can be concluded that in repressive states, terror organizations exploit the frustrations of larger religious minorities whereas in free states they exploit the “group think” of extremely homogenous societies. One explanation for this is that terrorist organizations have less influence with minorities in free states because the minorities are protected, assimilated and have a voice in the government.

Because of its centrality in the public debate, the second religious condition to consider with political freedom is the dominant religion of the state. With more Islamic states affiliated with terrorist organizations than any other religion, the public may believe that this is the only relevant convergence but other religions converging with political repression are also prone to affiliation. In fact, Catholicism and Protestantism are equally prone to affiliation when they are practiced in repressive states. As Table 4

shows, fifty percent of repressive Catholic and Protestant states are affiliated with terror organizations. Taken in aggregate, the other, non-major, religions of the world (Buddhism, Hinduism, Orthodox and Judaism) are less prone to terror affiliation in repressive states but become far more prone to affiliation in freer states.

**Table 4**

Affiliation Relative to Political Freedom and Dominant Religion

<b>Political Freedom</b>	Islamic	Catholic	Protestant	Other
Free	0%	8.1%	0%	12.5%
Partly Free	16.7%	23.5%	0%	50%
Partly Repressive	40.9%	50%	0%	60%
Repressive	54%	50%	50%	12.5%

SOURCES: Freedom House, State Department, CIA and CSI sources previously documented

In partly repressive and partly free states only Protestantism has no occurrences of terrorist affiliation. Islamic and Catholic states show only modest decreases in terrorist affiliation as states become freer. In contrast, significant increases in terrorist affiliation percentages occur in the non-major religions of the world with more than half (7 of 13) of these “other” states in both political freedom categories are affiliated. It must be noted however that these percentages only jump significantly in the aggregate. With this category summarizing four different religions of small sample sizes, the conclusion that they show a specific linkage between religion and political freedom should be taken with caution.<sup>111</sup>

The number of free states of any religious denomination that are affiliated with terrorist organizations is small. With one notable exception, free states that are affiliated with terror organizations are Catholic but only 8% of free Catholic states (3 of 37) are affiliated. The exception and arguably the most prominent relationship between religion and political freedom is the Jewish state of Israel. For decades this state has been a battleground at the nexus of religion and politics. Terrorist affiliation with this state

<sup>111</sup> The “Other” category in Table 4 includes 13 Buddhist, 12 Orthodox, 3 Hindu and 1 Jewish state.



clearly demonstrates that religion and politics can provide extremely exploitable conditions in the right combination.

One particularly exploited convergence of repressive religion and politics is the Islamic practice of shari'a, or political governance by strict adherence to an Islamic code based on the Koran. The shari'a states are characterized by extreme religious repression with an average rating of 5.56 compared to the world average of 2.28. In the 9 states that practice shari'a, terrorist affiliation occurs in 7 of the states. The shari'a terrorist affiliated states have an average religious freedom rating of 5.71. This level of religious repression, as Table 2 showed, exclusively resides in politically repressive states that maintain some sense of legitimacy by leveraging extremely homogenous religious societies. Of these shari'a states, 5 of the 7 affiliated states are at least 97% Muslim and the other two are above 70%.<sup>112</sup> With nearly 78% of shari'a states being affiliated with terrorist organizations, one can easily conclude that this particular convergence of religion and politics creates domestic conditions that are extremely exploitable by terrorist organizations.

Islamic states that do not practice shari'a are considerably less likely to be affiliated with terrorist organizations. Of the 47 Islamic states which do not practice shari'a, 17 are affiliated with terrorist organizations. While this 36.3% affiliation is still relatively high by global comparison, it is considerably smaller than the 78% of shari'a states that are affiliated with terror groups. The conclusion is that not all Islamic states are the same internally. The nature of the Islamic conditions within the state will affect the state's proneness to being exploited by terrorist organizations. Islamic states which practice secular government and observe religious freedom are far less exploitable.

One excellent example of an Islamic state that has embraced religious freedom within its political framework is Senegal. Although 94% of Senegal's nearly 10 million people practice Islam, there is an active Christian community with Roman Catholics and various Protestant denominations accounting for 4% of the population.<sup>113</sup> There is significant geographic integration of all groups with some concentration of Christians in

---

<sup>112</sup> The two states that are not affiliated are Maldives and Nigeria. Nigeria is a state where only about 50% of the population is Muslim and is only experimenting with shari'a in a few areas. Maldives is a tiny state about twice the size of the District of Columbia with a population of only 280,000.

<sup>113</sup> U.S. State Department, "Senegal Country Report," *International Religious Freedom Report* (2003).

the southern and western regions of the country. The constitution provides for freedom of religion and specifically defines the country as secular. Religious organizations are independent of the government and operate without governmental interference. In 2002, in an effort to increase school enrollment, the government introduced two hours of religious education (Islamic or Christian, according to school demand) in the state elementary school curriculum. The government encourages and assists Muslim participation in the Hajj every year and provides similar assistance for an annual Catholic pilgrimage to the Vatican.<sup>114</sup> The long standing amicable relationship between religions is facilitated by leaders maintaining a public dialog with one another. Senegal's example of religious tolerance, integration and peaceful communication, and lack of terrorist activity for that matter, is proof that Islam itself is not necessarily a precipitant of religious repression.

### **The Convergence of Repression and Economics**

**Key Finding #2.** The convergence of repression, either political or religious, with high relative deprivation or growing economies creates states that are prone to terrorist affiliation. As chapter 3 indicated there is a degree of complexity in the relationship between economics and terrorist affiliation. Therefore, in order to describe these linkages more clearly, the economic conditions must be assessed individually against the political and religious factors.

The first analysis of economic and religious convergence addresses how the deprivation created by income distribution affects terrorist affiliation when combined with different degrees of political freedom. Table 5 illustrates that regardless of the degree of deprivation, affiliation generally increases as the degree of political repression increases.<sup>115</sup> However, the analysis points out that high deprivation states have higher affiliation rates than low deprivation states in the same political freedom category. For instance, in the politically repressive states, high deprivation triples the affiliation

---

<sup>114</sup> U.S. State Department, "Senegal Country Report," *International Religious Freedom Report* (2003).

<sup>115</sup> In many of the politically repressive states, the economic data could not be ascertained by the World Bank. For example, Afghanistan, Somalia, Brunei, Eritrea and others do not have published Gini indexes or GNIs. Because many of these countries are affiliated with terrorist organizations, the percentages presented in the tables are more conservative (lower) than they otherwise would be.

percentage compared to repressive states with conditions of low deprivation. Perhaps more significant, conditions of high deprivation may best explain terrorist affiliation in politically free states. In the politically free category, terrorist affiliation increases by a factor of 7 for high deprivation states relative to low deprivation states. Three of the four free states affiliated with terrorist organizations have conditions of high deprivation. Only Spain has an income distribution which places it in the bottom third of Gini indexes. However, with an index value of 32.5, Spain's income distribution is on the borderline of being a high deprivation state.

**Table 5**

Affiliation Relative to Political Freedom and Economic Conditions

Economic Factors	Political Freedom			
	Free	Partly Free	Partly Repressive	Repressive
High Deprivation	21.4%	40%	55.6%	50%
Low Deprivation	3.1%	25%	44.4%	16.7%
Failing States	0%	16.7%	33.3%	16.7%
Growing States	0%	30.4%	34.8%	45%
Declining States	14.3%	33.3%	100%	N/A
Enriching States	8.1%	0%	33.3%	60%

SOURCES: Freedom House and World Bank sources previously documented

The bottom portion of Table 5 shows the convergence of political freedom and the various types of states relative to their economic class and changing GNI per capita. First, it must be generally noted that for all but failing states, as repression increases the percentage of states affiliated with terrorist organizations also increases. More importantly, the number of states affiliated with terrorist organizations is significantly higher in the Growing States category. Of the 39 states affiliated with terrorist groups, 24 of them are Growing States of which two-thirds are in the partly repressive and repressive states. Interestingly, all of the repressive Growing States that are affiliated with terrorist groups also have conditions of high relative deprivation. On a smaller scale, Enriching repressive states are also extremely prone to terrorist affiliation. Again, Growing States

are defined as those states which are poorer relative to the rest of the world and have an increasing GNI per capita and Enriching States are relatively wealthy states with growing GNIs. The bottom line is that growing economies and political repression create conditions that terrorist organizations exploit.

**Table 6**

Affiliation Relative to Religious Freedom and Economic Conditions

Economic Factors	Religious Freedom			
	Free	Partly Free	Partly Repressive	Repressive
High Deprivation	20%	45.5%	33.3%	100%
Low Deprivation	4.9%	28.6%	41.7%	N/A
Failing States	0%	25%	66.7%	0%
Growing States	5.9%	33.3%	42.1%	100%
Declining States	14.3%	50%	N/A	N/A
Enriching States	8.6%	25%	33.3%	100%

SOURCES: Freedom House and World Bank sources previously documented

As with political repression, terrorist affiliations generally increase as states become more religiously repressive. With regards to deprivation, again conditions of high deprivation generally increase the incidence of affiliation for a given religious freedom category. However, in contrast to politically repressive states, religiously repressive states with high relative deprivation are significantly more prone to affiliation. Although only two of the religiously repressive states had published income distribution data, both of the states have conditions of high deprivation and are affiliated with terrorist organizations.

Several interesting relationships exist as religious repression converges with changing incomes. First, for those states where GNI and income distribution data is available, there is only one instance of a religiously repressive state that is not affiliated with terrorist groups.<sup>116</sup> Second, compared to political freedom, the linkage between

<sup>116</sup> The exception is North Korea which is rated as repressive in both political and religious terms but has not been connected to any terrorist organization.

terrorist affiliation and religious freedom is more linear as the affiliation percentages increase in all economic categories. Finally, comparing the convergence of growing economies and religion to the convergence of growing economies and politics reveals the impact of religious repression. There are 24 Growing States that are affiliated with terrorist groups. These affiliated states are evenly distributed across the partly free, partly repressive and repressive political categories. However, when assessed against religious repression, half of the affiliated states are in the partly free religious category. Although the percentages of affiliation do increase as religious repression increases, it is significant that religious freedom seems to be more of an all or nothing proposition. In other words, unlike political freedom, any state outside the religiously free category is significantly vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist groups in terms of both raw numbers and percentages.

### **The Convergence of Political, Economic and Religious Factors**

**Key Finding #3.** Any degree of political and religious freedom converging is more prone to terrorist affiliation if the convergence is also characterized by a conditions of high relative deprivation. This is the first key finding that results from the convergence of all three factors addressed in this study. Although this finding may seem like a worst case of the second key finding, it proves how different the results are when all three factors converge.

The upper half of Table 7 highlights several conclusions with regards to the convergence of political and religious freedom and conditions of high relative deprivation. First, nearly half of the high deprivation states in the repressive areas of Table 8 (outlined in red) are affiliated with terrorist groups. There is even significant terrorist affiliation in states with high deprivation despite the states being categorized as partly free politically and religiously. Significantly, in the category where complete political and religious repression converges with conditions of high relative deprivation, 100% of the states are affiliated with terrorist organizations. Finally, as indicated in the yellow shaded areas, political freedom and religious freedom do not provide complete immunity for states with high relative deprivation.

**Table 7**

## Convergence of Political &amp; Religious Freedom with Relative Deprivation

<b>High Deprivation</b>		<b>Political Freedom</b>			
<b>Religious Freedom</b>	Free	Partly Free	Partly Repressive	Repressive	
Free	16.7%	0%	100%	N/A	
Partly Free	50%	50%	40%	50%	
Partly Repressive	N/A	100%	66.7%	25%	
Repressive	N/A	N/A	N/A	100%	
<b>Low Deprivation</b>		<b>Political Freedom</b>			
<b>Religious Freedom</b>	Free	Partly Free	Partly Repressive	Repressive	
Free	3.6%	0%	50%	N/A	
Partly Free	0%	36.8%	30%	0%	
Partly Repressive	N/A	N/A	66.7%	33.3%	
Repressive	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	

SOURCES: Freedom House, State Department, World Bank, CIA and CSI sources previously documented

The lower half of Table 7 details the convergence of political and religious freedom with conditions of low deprivation. First, in the 85 states characterized by low deprivation there are no instances of religious repression and very few cases of political repression. Furthermore, of the 7 cases of political repression only 1 of these states is affiliated with terrorist organizations.<sup>117</sup> In fact, in nearly every category of political and religious convergence states with conditions of high relative deprivation provide less immunity against terrorist exploitation than in states with conditions of low deprivation. Where states are rated as being both politically and religiously free, the percentage of states affiliated with terrorist organizations is 5 times greater for those with high deprivation. From this it can be concluded that even if states become relatively free with regards to political and religious freedom they will be more vulnerable to terrorist exploitation if their income distribution creates conditions of high deprivation. If the lower half of Table 7 is compared to Table 2, the significance of relative deprivation as a contributing factor to terrorist affiliation is apparent. In every combination of political

<sup>117</sup> To some degree the significance of this is mitigated by the fact that many repressive states do not make economic data (particularly income distribution data) available.

and religious freedom, terrorist affiliation is lower when the high deprivation states are removed from the analysis.

**Key Finding #4.** The convergence of both political and religious repression with an increasing economy creates states that are prone to terrorist affiliation. Referring back to the definitions for states income categories, Growing States account for 24 terrorist affiliations while Enriching States account for 7 affiliations. The 2 categories of states with decreasing incomes are less significant because of their smaller numbers. There are only 23 Failing States and only 5 of them are affiliated with terrorist organizations. Even smaller are the 11 Declining States of which only 3 are affiliated with terrorist groups. In as much, this study concludes that the convergence of politics and religious repression with economies that have increasing incomes is particularly prone to terrorist affiliation.

**Table 8**

Convergence of Political & Religious Freedom with Increasing GNI

<b>Growing States</b>	<b>Political Freedom</b>			
<b>Religious Freedom</b>	Free	Partly Free	Partly Repressive	Repressive
Free	0%	0%	50%	N/A
Partly Free	0%	46.2%	21.4%	50%
Partly Repressive	N/A	100%	57.1%	27.3%
Repressive	N/A	N/A	N/A	100%
<b>Enriching States</b>	<b>Political Freedom</b>			
<b>Religious Freedom</b>	Free	Partly Free	Partly Repressive	Repressive
Free	8.6%	N/A	N/A	N/A
Partly Free	0%	0%	0%	50%
Partly Repressive	0%	N/A	50%	N/A
Repressive	N/A	N/A	N/A	100%

SOURCES: Freedom House, State Department, World Bank, CIA and CSI sources previously documented

Unlike previous individual analysis of changing economies, the convergence of all three factors creates conditions where absolute wealth has more impact on terrorist

affiliation. As Table 8 shows, the number of categories that contain sizeable percentages of terrorist affiliation is greater in the poorer (upper) half of the table. In other words, in relatively poorer economies, partly free political and religious conditions do not provide as much immunity to terrorist exploitation as they do in wealthy economies.

However, generally speaking the convergence of increasing economies (regardless of size) in states marked by political and religious repression causes the incidence of terrorist affiliation to be extremely high. In the Growing States, 13 of 27 states, or 48.1%, in the more repressive categories of Table 8 (indicated by the bold red numbers) are affiliated with terrorist organizations. In the Enriching States, 4 of the 7 states, or 57.1%, in these repressive convergence categories are affiliated. As mentioned, these numbers are substantially higher than in Failing and Declining States. However, because of the prominence of Islam in current terrorist campaigns, this analysis must account for dominant religions converging with the political economic and conditions.

**Key Finding #5.** Politically repressive Islamic states with growing economies are prone to terrorist affiliation. The convergence of increasing incomes with political repression and various religions yields interesting trends for terrorist affiliation.

**Table 9**

Affiliation Relative to Political Freedom, Dominant Religion and Increasing GNI

<b>Growing States</b>	<b>Political Freedom</b>			
<b>Dominant Religion</b>	Free	Partly Free	Partly Repressive	Repressive
Protestant	0%	0%	0%	N/A
Catholic	0%	25%	N/A	<b>50%</b>
Islam	0%	25%	<b>42.9%</b>	<b>54.5%</b>
Other	0%	<b>50%</b>	<b>50%</b>	0%
<b>Enriching States</b>	<b>Political Freedom</b>			
<b>Dominant Religion</b>	Free	Partly Free	Partly Repressive	Repressive
Protestant	0%	N/A	0%	N/A
Catholic	15.8%	0%	N/A	N/A
Islam	N/A	N/A	<b>50%</b>	<b>60%</b>
Other	0%	N/A	N/A	N/A

SOURCES: Freedom House, State Department, World Bank, CIA and CSI



There are only 7 Enriching States that are affiliated with terrorist organizations of which 4 (57%) are Islamic. The other 3 are politically free Catholic states. There are 23 Growing States that are affiliated with terrorist groups of which 13 (56.5%) are Islamic. These high percentages of Islamic states affiliated with terrorist groups could lead to the conclusion that Islam is the most significant contributing factor to terrorist affiliation. However, before reaching this conclusion, the convergence of contributing political and economic data must be considered to determine if there are more pertinent internal conditions contributing to the terrorist affiliations.

The size of the economy does have some impact as it converges with political repression and various religions. Poor, repressive states regardless of dominant religion are extremely prone to terrorist organization affiliation. Specifically, over 45% of Islamic countries who rate as repressive on the Freedom House scale and have a GNI less than \$765 per year are affiliated with terrorist organizations. Non-Islamic countries that are categorized as poor and repressive are fewer in number but significantly more prone to terrorist affiliation. Three of the four Catholic countries and the lone Protestant country are affiliated with terrorist organizations. This may lead one to conclude that poverty and political freedom have more to do with terrorist affiliation than religion. However, additional information shows the significance of Islam to terrorist organizations.

**Table 10**

Affiliation Relative to Political Repression, Income Level and Religion

<b>REPRESSIVE</b>	Islamic	Catholic	Protestant	Other
Low Income	45.5%	75.0%	100%	20%
Lower Mid Income	71.4%	0%	0%	0%
Upper Mid Income	80.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a
High Income	0%	n/a	n/a	n/a

SOURCES: World Bank, State Department, CIA and CSI sources previously documented

The combination of repression and Islam in states significantly increases the likelihood of them being affiliated with terrorist organizations. Except for the four in the

highest income category, repressive Islamic states have significant levels of terrorist affiliation regardless of income level. Importantly, as GNI increases in repressive Islamic states, the likelihood of terrorist affiliation also increases with the upper middle income class reaching 80%.

The fact that wealthy repressive Islamic states are more prone to terrorist affiliation than poor repressive Islamic states stands in direct contrast to states dominated by other religions. In non-Islamic repressive states, every instance of terrorist affiliation occurs in the low GNI economic category. In the repressive or partly repressive categories with a GNI above \$765, there is not a single Catholic or Protestant state affiliated with terrorist organizations. As these economies grow, the influence of Islam is again at the forefront of consideration.

Islamic states account for 16 of the 25 states (64%) that are politically repressive and have growing economies. However, Islamic states account for 9 of the 12 states (75%) affiliated with terrorist organizations in this category. This disproportionate representation of terrorist affiliations indicates that the religion of Islam is a contributing factor to terrorist affiliation where political repression converges with growing economies. In contrast, Catholic states account for only 16% of the states in this group and account for 16.6% of the states affiliated with terrorist organizations. The remaining state affiliated with terrorist in this convergence is a Buddhist state. Buddhist states account for 16% of the states in the group and only 8.3% of the terrorist affiliations. Having assessed the internal details of this convergence of political, economic and religious conditions, it can be concluded that politically repressive Islamic states with growing economies are prone to terrorist affiliation.

Thus far, the analysis has focused on detailing the internal conditions of states that are currently affiliated with terrorist organizations. Understanding these conditions now enables the study to shift to assess the internal conditions of non-affiliated states to determine which ones are most likely to be exploited by terrorist organizations. As the GWOT continues to reduce terrorist sanctuaries and bases of operation, the terrorist organizations will begin to look for new operating areas. The next section outlines some of the states that are primed for exploitation.

## Levels of Risk of Terrorist Affiliation

Understanding the combination of factors and how political, economic and religious changes can affect terrorist affiliation provides some indications about what type of states are in a high risk category for terrorist exploitation. In general, it is possible based on the preceding analysis to group states into four broad categories of terrorist affiliation risk: High Risk, High Transitional, Low Transitional, and Resistant. The first category is the High Risk states which currently share the internal conditions of states that are affiliated with terrorist organizations. Obviously, these states are of considerable interest to the United States and its GWOT because as terrorist organizations are forced to move from their current bases of operation, these states would provide the most likely options for relocation.

### High Risk States

High risk states are denoted by political and religious repression, growing economies, conditions of high relative deprivation and often extremely homogenous Islamic populations. This study identifies 16 high risk states. However, these states should not all be considered with the same level of priority for the GWOT. Because terrorist organizations have shown a propensity to center their operations in states with some degree of access to their areas of concern, the proximity of these high risk states affect their priority. Furthermore, historical ties and previous foreign policy efforts will no doubt preclude action in others. Nevertheless, the high risk states identified here represent the convergence of the most highly exploited internal conditions of a state.

**Table 11**  
High Risk States

Tunisia	Morocco	Turkmenistan	Georgia
Vietnam	Laos	Tajikistan	North Korea
Burma	China	Maldives	Cuba
Bhutan	Comoros	Nigeria	Mauritania

It is beyond the scope of this study to describe the specific internal conditions of all of these states; however, several, because of their importance to the GWOT, are worth outlining. For example, Tunisia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are high risk states because politically, all three states are rated as repressive and have very homogenous Islamic populations characterized by slight religious repression. For example, international watch organizations have documented that Turkmenistan has committed serious violations of religious freedom to include jailing of religious minorities as penalty for unauthorized religious activity.<sup>118</sup> Economically, all three states have income distributions creating high relative deprivation and all experienced economic growth. From 1999 to 2003, Turkmenistan led the way with a GNI per capita that increased from \$610 to \$1120, or 45.5%.<sup>119</sup> This increase has taken Turkmenistan from the lowest income category to the lower middle category. Nearly 72% of states that share Turkmenistan's and Tunisia's description of factor convergence are affiliated with terrorist organizations with Tajikistan in a 46% affiliation category.

Nigeria is a high risk state because it is currently exploring policies that would institute conditions in the most repressive convergence category. In addition to being a partly repressive Islamic state with an economy whose GNI has grown nearly 20% in the last five years, Nigeria is moving toward a shari'a government. Nigeria's northern states have adopted shari'a law and national debates are discussing whether shari'a punishments like amputation and stoning are appropriate for the entire country. Many states have prohibited open-air religious services to avoid religious violence and Christians are claiming that Islam has been declared the *de facto* state religion.<sup>120</sup> It should not go unnoticed that 100% of states that share Nigeria's economic, religious and political conditions are affiliated with terrorist organizations.

There are also converging conditions outside of the Islamic world that create high risk states. A convergence of repression with poverty and relative deprivation cause several states to stand out. For example, Laos, Vietnam, and Georgia lean toward repressive politics and are categorized as lower income states with growing economies.

---

<sup>118</sup> U.S. Department of State, "International Religious Freedom Report," (Washington, D.C., 2004), 12.

<sup>119</sup> World Bank, "Size of the Economy," *2004 World Development Indicators Report*, Online, internet, available at <http://worldbank.org/data>. 10 September 2004, Appendix 1.1, 12.

<sup>120</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Nigeria Country Study," *International Religious Freedom Report* (Washington, D.C., 2004).

Recalling that repressive non-Islamic countries were prone to terrorist affiliation when they were also in the lower income categories is important to understanding these states as high risk.

Laos and Vietnam are the most repressive high risk non-Islamic states which makes them highly attractive to terrorist groups. In 2003, Laos and Vietnam had GNIs per capita of \$290 and \$370 respectively but both were growing substantially with Laos experiencing a five year increase of nearly 10% and Vietnam over 30%. Poor and repressive Buddhist states, Laos and Vietnam both have conditions of high deprivation and slight religious repression. The convergence of these factors with a growing economy and political repression places them in a category of states where a large percentage is affiliated with terrorist organizations.

Georgia is not as politically repressive as Vietnam and Laos, but it is dominated by an Orthodox majority with a past reputation for violating religious freedoms. Technically Georgia is a democracy, but past practices and history have prevented true liberal democracy from taking hold.<sup>121</sup> Additionally, Georgia is a state with economic conditions of high relative deprivation putting it in a category of states where 50% are affiliated with terrorist organizations. Georgia, like the others states mentioned, is just an example of the high risk states offered to illustrate the convergence of internal conditions that are currently available for terrorist organizations to exploit.

### **High Transitional States**

The second category of terrorist affiliation risk is the High Transitional states. These are states that share many of the characteristics of High Risk states but not enough of them or not to a sufficient degree to warrant placing them in the High Risk Category. This study identified twice as many High Transitional states as High Risk states and again will only highlight the internal conditions of a few to represent the larger category.

### **Table 12**

#### High Transitional States

---

<sup>121</sup> U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Country Studies," *World Fact Book* (Washington, D.C., 2004).

Guinea	The Gambia	Tanzania	Senegal
Uzbekistan	Eq. Guinea	Kuwait	Rwanda
Qatar	Bosnia-Her.	Cameroon	Belarus
UAE	Kenya	Djibouti	Bahrain
Brunei	Serbia-Mont.	Swaziland	Chad
Kazakhstan	Togo	Ivory Coast	Guatemala
East Timor	Congo	Albania	Kyrgyzstan
Niger	Gabon	Zimbabwe	

Senegal is an example of a High Transitional state because it has many elements of a High Risk state with a few notable exceptions. For example, Senegal is an extremely homogenous Islamic state with growing economy characterized by conditions of high relative deprivation. This convergence would generally make Senegal a High Risk state except that Senegal is also religiously free with a partly free political system. These freedoms are tenuous but nevertheless present and therefore Senegal is a High Transitional state. However, if political power were to transfer to someone who took advantage of the homogenous Islamic population and began to repress the other religions, Senegal could easily lapse into High Risk status.

Other states are categorized as High Transitional instead of High Risk due to some degree of religious freedom and conditions of low deprivation. Kazakhstan, Kenya and Belarus are examples of states which practice religious tolerance and have relatively equal income distributions. These conditions minimize frustrations that might otherwise occur in the population of these rather poor countries which also exhibit some political repression. In these states, if the economies continue to grow but the repressive governments do not adequately manage the growth to maintain the conditions of low relative deprivation, economic frustrations may arise. In the wake of these frustrations, resentment between religious groups may lead to violence. Under these circumstances, repressive governments often behave too aggressively and evoke responses that provide opportunities for terrorist exploitation.

Rwanda and Uzbekistan are High Transitional states because they are high risk in every respect except they have failing economies. Poor countries getting poorer are generally not ideal for sophisticated terrorist networks to exploit. However, it should be

noted that tremendous efforts are ongoing by the World Bank and other like organizations to improve these impoverished conditions. As this occurs, GWOT planners must be mindful that these particular High Transitional states will quickly become High Risk states if their economies begin to show signs of growth. This growth must be managed by a representative government with a mind toward income distributions that set conditions of low relative deprivation.

### **Low Transitional and Resistant States**

The third category of risk is the Low Transitional States. Logically, these states have only one or two conditions that are generally exploited by terrorist organizations. As such, they are less immune to terrorist affiliation than other states but clearly are not states which require tremendous effort from a GWOT standpoint. It may be surprising to learn that this category includes states like the United States because of its conditions of high relative deprivation. Other states include the Central African Republic and Ukraine because of their less than free political practices and Argentina and Brazil because of their declining economic conditions and homogenous populations.

The final category of risk is the Resistant States. Not surprisingly, these states do not exhibit conditions that are being exploited by terrorist organizations. They are politically and religiously free states and with very few exceptions have prosperous and growing economies with conditions of low relative deprivation. States that exemplify this category include Canada, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. All three of these states have the freest political and religious ratings and have extremely prosperous economies with very equal distributions of income. In addition to this very low relative deprivation, these countries are characterized by a very diverse religious makeup. While these conditions do not guarantee immunity from terrorist affiliation, the internal conditions of these states would make it extremely difficult for terrorist organizations to conduct effective operations inside their borders.

### **Summary**

In conclusion, the convergence of political, economic and religious factors in states is complex with regards to terrorist affiliation. However, certain conditions do

emerge as ideal for exploitation by terrorist organizations. The first finding is that the convergence of political and religious repression is prone to terrorist exploitation. The most dangerous example of this convergence is the Islamic practice of shari'a governance where 78% of the practitioners are affiliated with terrorist organizations.

The second finding is that the convergence of repression and economic conditions of high relative deprivation or relatively poor states with growing income levels is prone to terrorist affiliation. High deprivation states have greater percentages of affiliates than low deprivation states regardless of the level of political or religious freedom. Also, Growing States account for the highest number of terrorist affiliates and where increasing incomes meet political repression there is an extremely high percentage of terrorist affiliation. Of note is the fact that only states categorized as religiously free are substantially immune to terrorist affiliation. In religious categories characterized by even sparse religious repression, terrorist affiliation increases precipitously.

When all three factors converge there are several significant findings. The third convergence finding states that any degree of political and religious freedom converging is more prone to terrorist affiliation if the convergence is also characterized by a condition of high relative deprivation. For example, where states are politically and religiously free, the percentage of terrorist affiliation is 5 times greater for states with high deprivation compared to those with low deprivation. Also of note, states characterized by low deprivation do not have occurrences of religious repression and very few cases of political repression. Finding number four expands this idea to growing economies. This finding states that the convergence of political and religious repression with growing economies creates states that are extremely prone to terrorist exploitation. The final finding further explores this convergence by specifying that politically repressive and growing *Islamic* states are extremely prone to terrorist affiliation.

The results of this study conclude that the convergence of factors highlights certain states as high risk for becoming affiliated with terrorist organizations. In the Islamic world, states like Turkmenistan, Tunisia and Nigeria are ripe for exploitation. The combination of Islamic repressive governments and growing economies mark them as ideal states for terrorist organizations to grow and flourish. As for non-Islamic states, Laos, Vietnam, and Georgia are all characterized by internal conditions that are



repressive enough that their weak economies drive them into categories that terrorist organizations are exploiting in large numbers.

In addition to these High Risk states, states in the High Transitional category lack only small changes in their internal conditions before they could be categorized as High Risk states. States like Kazakhstan, Kenya, Belarus and Uzbekistan have many of the elements of high risk states and with minor changes in terms of relative deprivation or a turn around in their economy, these states could easily transition to the High Risk category.

Finally, states may also be categorized as Low Transitional and Resistant states. Low Transitional states like the Central African Republic, Argentina and Brazil are at the lower end of exhibiting conditions suitable for terrorist organization exploitation. In as much, they should not be given priority by GWOT planners. However, monitoring these states could be worthwhile as it will be easier to improve the internal conditions before they become problematic. Resistant states are simply those states which do not possess internal conditions which mark them for terrorist affiliation. States like Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland are free politically and religiously and with low relative deprivation they are not characterized by a frustrated populous that terrorists can exploit.

This analysis begins to shed light on how the U.S. should proceed in the Global War on Terrorism. As the neoconservatives have postulated, this study shows that political freedom is clearly linked to nearly every combination of affiliation causes. However, political freedom cannot be pursued without paying attention to the critical economic and religious factors that also affect the internal conditions of these states. Therefore, what actions should the U.S. initiate to undermine the conditions that terrorist groups exploit without inadvertently creating counterproductive conditions? Is political freedom a prerequisite to substantial economic growth? Are secular states better equipped to precipitate economic growth and religious freedom? In the next chapter, the study will draw some broad conclusions about the path to addressing these issues.

## Conclusions and Implications

*The more ambitious the project the wider its scope, the more sweeping the hypotheses, the more reckless the quantification of data, the more disappointing the results. But this is not to say that the study of terrorist movements is a priori unfeasible and that it should not be undertaken. There is an accidental element in the emergence of terrorism and for this reason a truly scientific, predictive study is indeed impossible. But it is also true that terrorism is more likely to occur in certain social and political conditions than in others.*

—Walter Laqueur

Interpretations of Terrorism: Fact, Fiction or Political Science

Laqueur's statement, although published in the *Journal of Contemporary History* in 1977, still holds true. This thesis has gone the extra step of declaring that terrorist organizations affiliate with and exploit states characterized by certain conditions in order to improve the effectiveness of their terror campaigns. Identifying and clarifying the specifics of these exploitable conditions is an important first step into undermining the effectiveness of terrorist organizations.

The significance of this study is its assessment of the linkage between neoconservative beliefs about democratic peace and the initiatives of the Global War on Terrorism. The neoconservatives that underpinned the Bush administration's Global War on Terrorism believe the key factor is the political freedom of a state and that instituting democracy will eliminate the exploitable conditions of a state. There is little question that the GWOT and the Bush administration's National Security Strategy have attempted to seize the strategic initiative from terrorist organizations. However, in order to capitalize on this initiative, it is imperative that military efforts to spread democracy are focused in a way that eliminates the underlying conditions of terrorism without inadvertently creating counterproductive conditions relative to other factors. To do this, it helps to have a comprehensive understanding of the political, economic and religious

conditions that are exploited by terrorist organizations and the combinations of these conditions that create high risk states.

## **The Role of Political Freedom**

In the years following the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks, there has been a growing conviction in the member states of the United Nations about the centrality of democratic governance in achieving both sustainable peace and development.<sup>122</sup> Certainly, the neoconservatives have placed a premium on democratization in “weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks.”<sup>123</sup> The conclusions that these groups have arrived at appear to be grounded in solid evidence.

The relationship between political freedom and states’ affiliations with terrorist organizations is substantial. The percentage of repressive states that are affiliated with terrorist organizations is 8 times greater than the percentage of free states that are affiliated. Furthermore, each progressively freer category of states has a smaller percentage of states affiliated with terror organizations. The four free states that are affiliated with terrorist organizations are also worth discussing because of the nature of the terror campaigns in their countries. Ireland, Italy, and Spain are all free democratic states who leverage their democratic institutions, habits and legal foundations to control the terrorist activity and even in some cases fold those organizations into the realm of legitimate political discourse. As a result, the terrorist organizations operating in these free states are not conducting terrorism with the same degree of ferocity as in other states. Even Israel, the fourth free state affiliated with terrorist organizations, is working through newly legitimized political relationships and democratic processes to suppress the terrorist campaign within its borders. The bottom line is that states characterized by political freedom are less prone to terrorist organization affiliation than states characterized by political repression.

---

<sup>122</sup> Mark M. Brown, “Democratic Governance: Toward a Framework of Sustainable Peace,” *Global Governance*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April-June 2003).

<sup>123</sup> National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 2002), 2.

## **The Role of Economics**

Economically, this study examined three perspectives that could affect terrorist affiliation: economic freedom, income, and income distribution. First, an analysis of economic freedom showed a nearly identical relationship to terrorist affiliation as that of political freedom. Assessing the economic categories of states, the more repressive the category, the greater the percentage of states affiliated with terrorist organizations. Forty percent of economically repressive states were affiliated with terrorist organizations compared to only eleven percent of economically free states. In this regard, a relative absence of both political and economic freedoms was consistently related to terrorist affiliation.

Second, the percentage of states in the lowest category of Gross National Income (<\$755) that were affiliated with terrorist organizations was twice as high as the percentage of affiliated states in the highest GNI category. Although it is generally true that higher income states were less prone to terrorist affiliation than lower income states, the relationship was not as consistent as with the lack of political and economic freedoms. This leads to the conclusion that absolute poverty is not as significant with regards to terrorist affiliation as is relative deprivation.

Third, the economic analysis revealed that relative deprivation is a critical component of terrorist affiliation. Income distribution data shows that states at the extremes of income distribution have similar terrorist affiliation rates. In other words, the third of the world with the most evenly distributed wealth has the same affiliation percentage as the third of the world where wealth is least evenly distributed. In the middle third of states where populations are routinely exposed to greater degrees of relative deprivation there is a considerably higher percentage of terrorist affiliation. At the equitable extreme, there is little relative deprivation because expectations are met due to everyone having basically the same income. At the opposite extreme, populations are content because the vast majority of the population has relatively the same income and is socially distant from the extremely small group who make significantly more. The middle third experiences conditions of high deprivation and its associated frustration because their expectation of income is distorted by the variances they see in the economic

class with whom they are socially connected. In other words, the average citizen in this group is routinely exposed to individuals with very different income levels. The resultant relative deprivation creates frustration over unrealized expectations of income level.

The recognition that frustration lies at the heart of the economic conditions that terrorists exploit is not a completely new finding. In other studies, the frustration created by conditions of economic deprivation has been attributed to corruption. Transparency International produced a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) that ranks the states of the world based on corruption.<sup>124</sup> Its findings are consistent with the conclusions of this study. For example, nearly 50% of the 40 most corrupt states according to the CPI are affiliated with terrorism. Furthermore, with only one exception, the High Risk states identified by this study were all listed among the 25 most corrupt states in the world.<sup>125</sup> The bottom line of this complex argument is that states characterized by economies with growing incomes and high relative deprivation are more prone to terrorist organization affiliation than states without these economic characteristics.

### **The Role of Religion**

The religious component of terrorist affiliation is at once the most visible and the most problematic for U.S. policy makers. With the high visibility of terrorism originating in the Middle East and with GWOT initiatives centered on Islamic states, it is hard not to associate terrorism with religion. The number of Islamic states affiliated with terror organizations only heightens the concern that the terrorism problem is one of religion. With this in mind, there are several important conclusions to draw from this study. First, religious freedom can be correlated to terrorist affiliation in much the same way as political and economic freedom. The percentage of states affiliated with terror organizations in the most repressive religious category is thirteen times higher than the percentage of those in the freest religious category. Second, as the percentage of a population that practices the dominant religion goes over 90%, the terrorist affiliation increases significantly. The percentage of affiliated states whose religious homogeneity

---

<sup>124</sup> Transparency International has produced an annual index for the last ten years which ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. Corruption is defined by the index as the abuse of public office for private gain.

<sup>125</sup> Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index*, (University of Passau, Germany, 2004).

is greater than 91% is about 7 times greater than affiliation percentages of states where less than 40% of the population practice the dominant religion. Finally, of the three major religions of the world, the percentage of Islamic states that are affiliated with terrorist organizations is significantly higher than either Catholicism or Protestantism. Assessed individually, this study concludes that states characterized by religious repression are more religiously homogenous and significantly more prone to terrorist organization affiliation than states without these religious characteristics. However, critics can argue that the practice of Islam in states characterized by other exploitable conditions brings into question which factor is the precondition for terrorist exploitation. Islamic states are often poor and repressive creating ambiguity as to the root cause of the terrorist affiliation. The answer of course requires an understanding of terrorist affiliation in light of the convergence of these all factors.

### **The Impact of Converging Factors**

When political, economic and religious factors are taken into consideration together in a state, several important conclusions can be drawn. First, the convergence of political and religious repression creates states that are prone to terrorist affiliation. Second, the convergence of repression, either political or religious, with high relative deprivation or growing economies creates states that are prone to terrorist affiliation. Third, any degree of political and religious freedom converging is more prone to terrorist affiliation if the convergence is also characterized by a condition of high relative deprivation. Fourth, the convergence of both political and religious repression with an increasing economy creates states that are prone to terrorist affiliation.

In addition to these conclusions, the significance of Islam as a contributing factor must also be addressed. This study concludes that there is evidence that politically repressive Islamic states with growing economies are very prone to terrorist affiliation. In addition to a large percentage of politically repressive Islamic states being affiliated with terrorist organizations, the practice of shari'a governance is particularly significant. Seventy-eight percent of shari'a governments are affiliated with terrorist organizations making this convergence of factors one of the most affiliation prone of any category.

By examining how these exploitable conditions converge, states can be categorized according to their relative risk of terrorist affiliation. High Risk states are those that currently share the same internal conditions to states that are affiliated with terrorist organizations. As discussed earlier, in the Islamic world, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Morocco and Nigeria are considered High Risk states. The combination of Islamic repressive governments and growing economies mark them as ideal candidate states for terrorist organizations to grow and flourish. As for non-Islamic states, Laos, Vietnam, and Georgia are characterized by internal conditions that are exploited by terrorist organizations in many other states.

The second category of affiliation risk is High Transitional states. These states are marked by many of the High Risk characteristics but lack a key ingredient or sufficient degree of an exploitable condition. It is important that states like Senegal, Rwanda and Uzbekistan be monitored closely in order to take actions to prevent a slide towards the High Risk category.

The remainder of the states can be divided into either Low Transitional states or Resistant states. As the names imply, these states are lower in priority because they either do not have sufficiently exploitable internal conditions or in the case of the Resistant states have no exploitable conditions. Again, states in these categories are certainly not immune to terrorist affiliation, however, their internal conditions would not be ideal for terrorist exploitation. The bottom line with regards to the convergence of factors is that combining the political, economic and religious factors that were outlined in this study creates internal conditions in states that are more prone to terrorist exploitation than they would be if the factors existed individually.

### **Implications for Policy Makers**

There are three main implications for policy makers in this analysis of individual factors and combinations with regard to terrorist affiliation. First, political freedom is the key to staving off the conditions that lead to terrorist affiliation. With very few exceptions, political freedom characterized by liberal democratic practices severely curtails the ability of terrorist organizations to exploit a state. Secondly, political freedom leads to religious freedom whereas the opposite is not as true. As evidenced by

the fact that there are no instances of religious repression coexisting with political freedom. However, there are instance like Senegal, Tanzania and Swaziland where religious freedom exists in spite of political repression. Third, economics is an engine of stability. Where economic conditions provide opportunity for the population, the population has incentive to continue maintaining that environment's stability. Where there is little economic opportunity, there is little incentive to support the status quo.

Having drawn these conclusions, the following recommendations are made to policy makers designing and implementing the GWOT strategy. First, the primary focus of GWOT should be initiatives to promote and build liberal democracies as the key to removing the conditions that terrorist organizations exploit. Furthermore, an immediate emphasis should be placed on addressing high risk states and those states whose political conditions can be influenced without military intervention. In these states, the U.S. should bring pressure to bear to establish legitimate, institutionalized liberal democracies through building effective administration, legislative, judicial and law enforcement mechanisms. Secondly, these states must receive the support needed to build a functioning legal economy with market incentives to develop the state into a viable participant in the international economic community. Although growing economies have high affiliation rates, as they continue to grow beyond impoverished conditions, the affiliation rates decrease. The United States must protect these growing states until they are in less vulnerable circumstances. Finally, the U.S. must support initiatives to build social environments with a spirit of tolerance that balance religious considerations with the requirements of modern society.

With regard to states affiliated with terrorist groups and those states less susceptible to U.S. soft power, the U.S. must continue to monitor the internal conditions of states and be ready to explore opportunities to deconstruct repressive regimes and undermine the conditions that create High Risk states. Military intervention may be necessary to remove repressive regimes before political freedom can take hold. As the successes in the Middle East begin to expand, the U.S. must be ready to respond to continue to capitalize on these strategic opportunities and consolidate its strategic gains.

At the outset, this thesis endeavored to answer certain fundamental questions about the Global War on Terrorism. First, is the spread of democracy alone sufficient to



win the GWOT? This answer to this question is complex because it was intentionally nuanced by the terms democracy, sufficient and win. However, without oversimplifying it is sufficient to say that this study shows that the spread of democracy does reduce the conditions that terrorist organizations generally exploit. If, as this study argues, terrorist organizations need to exploit states in order to conduct effective terror campaigns, then spreading democracy would significantly contribute to the U.S. “winning” the GWOT. The term “sufficient” forces the analysis to address the other questions asked at the beginning of this thesis.

Will any form of democracy be equally effective in winning the GWOT? In other words, are all forms of democracy sufficient to undermine the conditions exploited by terrorist organizations? The answer to this question is a qualified yes. While democracies of any form are less prone to terrorist affiliation, there is a significant difference between the likelihood of terrorist affiliation in liberal democracies from that in procedural democracies. The GWOT must avoid ambiguous democratic rhetoric and endeavor to build and promote full-fledged liberal democracies as the best answer to undermining the conditions that are exploited by terrorist organizations.

Finally, are there other factors beyond governmental form that must be considered in fighting the GWOT? Here the answer is an unequivocal yes. Economics and religion do have substantial roles in establishing or aggravating internal conditions that make a state more prone to terrorist affiliation. Regarding these factors, the details concerning the precise relationship must be understood to ensure that efforts to undermine exploitable conditions do not become counterproductive. In general, it can be said that religious intolerance can establish preconditions for terrorist affiliation while economic conditions can aggravate the internal stability of a state. In both instances, promoting liberal democracies can create environments of economic and religious freedom that are critical to undermining the conditions that lead to terrorist affiliation.

It would be an error to state that the data from which these judgments have been based is comprehensive with regards to states’ political, economic and religious conditions. However, the data does allow a number of summary observations which should not be ignored as a result of questions over data sets. The study of terrorism is a complex undertaking making its conclusions easy to dismiss as overly simplistic. This

should not be used as an excuse to ignore general trends that can provide important guideposts for the prosecution of an aggressive, necessary foreign policy. The findings in this study are no different. While there are important cautions to heed as the United States pursues the Democracy Project, it must be said that liberty and justice for all is a path to winning the Global War on Terrorism.

## Appendix A – States Affiliated with Terrorist Organizations

States Affiliated with Terrorist Organizations	Terrorist Organizations
Afghanistan	al Qaeda
Algeria	Armed Islamic Group, Salafist Group for Call and Combat
Angola	UNITA, FLEC-FAC
Armenia	Kongra Gel (Formerly Kurdistan Workers' party)
Azerbaijan	Kongra Gel (Formerly Kurdistan Workers' party)
Bangladesh	Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP)
Burkina Faso	Revolutionary United Front
Burundi	Forces for Defense of Democracy
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge
Colombia	National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
Congo	Forces for Defense of Democracy
Egypt	Gama'a al-Islamiyya, al Jihad
Eritrea	Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
India	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Indonesia	Free Papua Movement, Free Aceh Movement
Iran	Mujahedin-e Khalq Org, Kongra Gel
Iraq	al Qaeda, Abu Nidal, Ansar al-Islam, Tawhid and Jihad, Ansar al-Sunnah
Ireland	IRA, Real IRA, Continuity IRA
Israel	Al -Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, HAMAS, Kahane Chai, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Liberation Front, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP-GC, al-Fatah, Dem. Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Italy	Italian Red Brigades
Jordan	Al -Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, HAMAS, Kahane Chai, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Lib. Front, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP-GC
Lebanon	Asbat al-Ansar, Hizballah
Liberia	Revolutionary United Front
Libya	Harakat al-Shuhada'a al-Islamiyah
Malaysia	Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
Nepal	Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M)

## Appendix A (continued) – States Affiliated with Terrorist Organizations

States Affiliated with Terrorist Organizations	Terrorist Organizations
Pakistan	Harakat ul-Mujahadin, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Lashkar I Jhangvi
Peru	Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
Phillipines	Abu Sayyaf Group, New Peoples' Army, Jemaah Islamiya Org, MILF
Russia	Dagestan Liberation Army, Movsar Baryayev gang, Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade
Saudi Arabia	al Qaeda
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
Singapore	Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
Somalia	al-Ittihd al-Islami, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
Spain	Basque Fatherland and Liberty
Sri Lanka	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Sudan	al Qaeda, Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army
Syria	Kongra Gel (Formerly Kurdistan Workers' party)
Thailand	Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)
Turkey	Kongra Gel (Formerly Kurdistan Workers' party), Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Army, MLK-P
Uganda	Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army, Allied Democratic Forces
Venezuela	United Self-Defense Forces of Venezuela
Yemen	al Qaeda

This Table is based on the author's compilation of data from the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency and MIPT (National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) Database. The affiliation between these states and the terrorist organizations ranges from direct government support to passive tolerance and even open animosity. The term affiliated states is not intended to categorize the degree to which the organizations are exploiting or being supported by the states.

## ***Bibliography***

- “American Deaths in Iraq.” *Boston Globe*, 12 January 2005. n.p. On-line Internet, 12 January 2005. Available from [https://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2005/01/12/american\\_deaths\\_in\\_iraq/](https://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2005/01/12/american_deaths_in_iraq/)
- Beach, William W. and Marc A. Miles. “Explaining the Factors of the Index of Economic Freedom.” *2005 Index of Economic Freedom*. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones and Co., Inc., 2005.
- Bethell, Tom. “The Rival Fanaticisms of Our Day.” *American Spectator* 37, No. 6 (July/August 2004), 54.
- Bjorgo, Tore. “Root Causes of Terrorism.” *The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*. Oslo, Norway, 9-11 June 2003.
- Brown, Mark M. “Democratic Governance: Toward a Framework of Sustainable Peace.” *Global Governance* 9, no. 2 (April-June 2003), 141-147.
- Brumberg, Daniel. “Beyond Liberalization?” *Wilson Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (Spring 2004), 47-55.
- Bush, George W. President of the United States. State of the Union address. Washington, D.C., 2 February 2005.
- Bush, George W. President of the United States. Address to a Joint Session of Congress. United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20 September 2001.
- Bush, George W. President of the United States. Address. U.S. Air Force Academy Graduation, Colorado Springs, C.O., 2 June 2004.
- Bush, George W. President of the United States. Address. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 6 November 2003.
- Bush, George W. President of the United States. Address. UN General Assembly, New York, N.Y., 21 September 2004.
- Bush, George W. President of the United States. Address. Washington, D.C., 7 September 2003.

- Center for Religious Freedom. *Religious Freedom in the World: A Global Survey of Freedom and Persecution*. Division of Freedom House, (2000).
- Christian Solidarity International (CSI), *Religious Freedom Ratings*, On-line Internet. Available from <http://www.csi-int.org>. 10 May 2005.
- Clinton, William J. President of the United States. State of the Union Address. Washington, D.C., 25 January 1994.
- Crenshaw, Martha. "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (June 1981), 379-399.
- Douglass, William A. and Joseba Zulaika. "On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32, no. 2 (April 1990), 238-257.
- Doyle, Michael W. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." In *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis. New York, N.Y.: Addison Wesley Publishers, Inc., 2003.
- Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1988. US Statutes at Large (1989): Section 140(d)(2).
- Freedom House, "Electoral Democracies Worldwide," *Report on World Freedom* (2004). On-line Internet. Available from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>, 25 January 2005.
- Freedom House, *Freedom In The World* Country Ratings, Online Internet, available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>, 25 January 2005.
- Freedom House. "Chile Country Study." *Freedom in the World*, 2004.
- Freedom House. "Survey Methodology." *Report on World Freedom* (2004). On-line Internet. Available from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>, 25 January 2005.
- Freedom House. "The Gambia Country Study." *Freedom in the World*, 2004.
- Fukuyama, Francis and Nadav Samin. "Can Any Good Come of Radical Islam?" *Commentary Magazine* (September 2002), 34-38.
- Fukuyama, Francis and Nadav Samin. "Modernizing Islam." *Commentary Magazine* (December 2002), 17-21.

- Fukuyama, Francis. "The Neoconservative Moment." *The National Interest* (Summer 2004), 57-68.
- Fuller, Graham E. "The Future of Political Islam." *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 2 (March-April 2002), 48-60.
- Griffith, Dr. Lewis. "The Littoral Enforcer: The Bush Doctrine in Historical and Present Context." Address, Air and Space Power Conference, Maxwell AFB, AL, 11 March 2004.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence." *World Politics* 20, no. 2, (January 1968), 245-278.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Halper, Stephan and Jonathan Clarke. *American Spectator* 37, No. 5 (June 2004), 34.
- Hamilton, Lawrence C. "Dynamics of Terrorism." *International Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (March 1983), 39-54.
- Heritage Foundation. *2005 Index of Economic Freedom*. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones and Co., Inc., 2005.
- Idji, Kolawole. Minister of Foreign Affairs and African Integration of Benin. "General Debate of the 56<sup>th</sup> Session of the U.N. General Assembly." New York, N.Y., 10-16 November 2001.
- Israeli, Raphael. "Western Democracies and Islamic Fundamental Violence." In *Terrorism and Political Violence* 12, no. 3/4 (Autumn/Winter 2000), 160-173.
- Kagan, Robert. "Democracies and Double Standards." *Commentary Magazine*. August 1997, 19-26.
- Karatnycky, Adrian. "Gains for Freedom Amid Terror and Uncertainty." *Freedom in the World*, 2004, 3-13.
- Karatnycky, Adrian. "The Democratic Imperative." *The National Interest*. Summer 2004, 107-116.
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane. "Dictatorships and Double Standards." *Commentary Magazine*, November 1979, 34-45.
- Kramer, Martin. "Islam vs. Democracy." *Commentary Magazine* (January 1993), 35-42.
- Krauthammer, Charles. "In Defense of Democratic Realism." *The National Interest*. Fall 2004, 15-25.

- Krauthammer, Charles. Address. American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 10 February 2004.
- Laqueur, Walter. "Interpretations of Terrorism: Fact, Fiction and Political Science." *Journal of Contemporary History* 12, no. 1 (January 1977), 1-42.
- Laqueur, Walter. *No End To War*. New York, N.Y.: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2003.
- Lewis, Representative Ron. "Renewing Our Purpose in Iraq," 21 July 2003.
- Mann, James. *Rise of the Vulcans*. New York, N.Y.: Viking Penguin, 2004.
- MIPT (National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) Terrorism Database, Online Internet, available at <http://www.tkb.org>. 10 February 2005.
- Monroe, James. President of the United States. *7<sup>th</sup> Annual Message to Congress*, Washington, D.C., 2 December 1823. On-line Internet. Available from <http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/monrodoc.html>.
- Morel, Claude. Seychelles Ambassador to the United Nations. "General Debate of the 56<sup>th</sup> Session of the U.N. General Assembly." New York, N.Y., 16 November 2001.
- Muravchik, Joshua. "The New Gloomers." *Commentary Magazine*, June 2003, 24-29.
- National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 2003.
- National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 2003.
- Niva, Steve. "Between Clash and Co-optation: US Foreign Policy and the Specter of Islam." *Middle East Report* no. 208 (Autumn 1998), 26-29.
- Reagan, Ronald W. President of the United States. Address to British Parliament. London, England, 8 June 1982.
- Rummel, Dr. R.J. "What is the Democratic Peace?" Honolulu, H.I.: University of Hawaii (1998).
- Russett, Bruce and John O'Neal. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations*. New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton and Co., 2001.



- Saikal, Amin. "Struggle for the Global Soul." *World Today* 60, no. 8/9 (August-September 2004), 7-11.
- Transparency International. *Corruption Perceptions Index*. University of Passau, Germany, On-line, Internet. Available from <http://www.ti.org/cpi>. 7 March 2004.
- Truman, Harry S. President of the United States., *Address to Joint Session of Congress*, Washington, D.C., 12 March 1947. On-line Internet. Available from <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm>.
- Tyler, Patrick E. "Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics." *New York Times*, 8 March 1992.
- US Central Intelligence Agency, "Country Studies," *World Fact Book*. Washington, D.C., 2004.
- US Department of State. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002*. Report from Counter Terrorism Office. April 2003.
- US Department of State. "Chronology of Significant International Terrorist Incidents," *Patterns of Global Terrorism*. Washington, D.C., 1996-2003.
- US Department of State. "Foreign Terrorist Organization List." Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 29 December 2004.
- US Department of State. "Kazakhstan Country Study." *International Religious Freedom Report*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 18 December 2003.
- US Department of State. "Nigeria Country Study." *International Religious Freedom Report*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 18 December 2003.
- US Department of State. "Senegal Country Report." *International Religious Freedom Report*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 18 December 2003.
- US Department of State. *2003 International Religious Freedom Report*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 18 December 2003.
- US Department of State. *2004 Foreign Terrorist Organizations List*. Washington, D.C., February 2005.
- US National Security Council. *NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*. 14 April 1950. On-line Internet. Available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-69.htm>.
- US Senate, Testimony on Iraq: Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 9 July 2003.

Waltz, Kenneth N. *Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis*. New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1959.

Windsor, Jennifer L. "Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism." *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003), 43-58.

Wirajuda, N. Hassan. "The Democratic Response." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9, no. 1 (Spring 2002), 15-21.

World Bank. "Classification of Economies by Income and Region." *Global Economic Prospects*. July 2000.

World Bank. "Distribution of Income or Consumption." *World Development Indicators Report*. On-line, Internet. Available from <http://worldbank.org/data>. 10 September 2004.

World Bank. "Size of the Economy." *2001 World Development Indicators Report*. On-line, Internet. Available from <http://worldbank.org/data>. 10 September 2004.

World Bank. "Size of the Economy." *2004 World Development Indicators Report*. On-line, Internet. Available from <http://worldbank.org/data>. 10 September 2004.