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**HOW TO WIN AND KNOW IT: AN EFFECTS-BASED
APPROACH TO IRREGULAR WARFARE**

by

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December 2007

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**HOW TO WIN AND KNOW IT: AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO
IRREGULAR WARFARE**

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ABSTRACT

The United States is entering its seventh year of the Global War on Terror and continues to struggle with irregular war. As the Department of Defense's lead for Irregular Warfare (IW), U.S. Special Operations Command co-authored the *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0* with the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command in order to "outline a holistic U.S. Government and partner nation approach to IW." The concept establishes the need to integrate all instruments of national power in order to enable a joint force commander to successfully conduct a protracted IW campaign against state and non-state actors. The end state is a joint force with enhanced capability for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting. To succeed in IW the commander and staff need a campaign planning system that answers two primary questions: "How do you effectively focus on controlling or influencing populations?" and, "How do you measure your efforts in IW?" The answer may be a "marriage" of an effects-based thinking with the concepts outlined in the new *IW JOC*. This thesis will analyze the potential of such a concept, utilizing a case study of Special Operations Command Pacific's own effects-based approach to the War on Terror.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AQN	Al Qaeda Network
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
AWC	Army War College
BG	Brigadier General
C2	Command and Control
CC	Critical Capabilities
CCIR	Commanders Critical Information Requirement
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIE	Collaborative Information Environment
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
CJSOTF-P	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CNT	Counter Narco Terrorism
COA	Course of Action
COG	Center of Gravity
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COL	Colonel
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CR	Critical Requirements
CT	Counterterrorism
CTF	Combined Task Force
CV	Critical Vulnerabilities
DIME	Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, And Facilities
EAC	Effects Assessment Cell
EBA	Effects-Based Approach
EBAO	Effects-Based Approach to Operations
EBASS	Effects-Based Assessment Support System

EBO	Effects-Based Operations
EBP	Effects-Based Planning
ECOORD	Effects Coordinator
E-EWG	Executive Effects Working Group
ETO	Effects Tasking Order
EWG	Effects Working Group
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field Manual
GPF	General Purpose Forces
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HN	Host Nation
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IA	Interagency
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IPE	Intelligence Preparation of the Environment
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JACD	Joint and Army Concepts Division
JCA	Joint Capability Area
JCET	Joint Combined Exchange Training
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JI	Jemaah Islamiah
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force
JIPB	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
JIPOE	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment
JMD	Joint Manning Document
JOC	Joint Operating Concept
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPP	Joint Operations Planning Process
JP	Joint Publication
JSOTF-P	Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines
JTF	Joint Task Force
JWFC	Joint Warfighting Center
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LTG	Lieutenant General (United States Army)
LtGen	Lieutenant General (United States Marine Corp)
MAJ	Major

MC02	Millennium Challenge 2002
MCO	Major Combat Operations
MDMP	Military Decision-Making Process
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MG	Major General
MILGRP	Military Group
MN	Multinational
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MOP	Measure of Performance
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTFRIC	Military, Terrorism, Finance, Recruitment, Information, Communication
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OE	Operational Environment
OEF-A	Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan
OEF-P	Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
ONA	Operational Net Assessment
ONAWG	Operational Net Assessment Working Group
OOTW	Operation Other Than War
OPE	Operational Preparation of the Environment
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operation Order
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OGA	Other Government Agency
PASOC	Pacific Area Special Operations Conference
PEL	Priority Effects List
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RP	Republic of the Philippines
SIBR	Security, Institution Building and Reform
SJFHQ	(CE) Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (Core Element)
SOCAPAC	Special Operations Command Pacific
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SoSA	System-of-Systems Analysis
SSTRO	Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

TSCP	Theater Security Cooperation Program
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
UQ	Unified Quest
U.S.	United States
USG	United States government
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSF	United States Special Forces
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WOT	War on Terror
WWII	World War II

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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States is entering its seventh year of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and continues to struggle with understanding both “how to win,” and “if it is winning” an irregular¹ warfare engagement. As the Department of Defense’s (DoD) lead for Irregular Warfare (IW), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) co-authored the *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0* with the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command in order to “outline a holistic U.S. Government (USG) and partner nation approach to IW.”² The concept establishes the need to integrate all instruments of national power (diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic)³ in order to enable a joint force commander (JFC) to successfully conduct a protracted⁴ IW campaign against state and non-state actors. “The overall desired end state is a joint force with enhanced capability for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting that allows the joint force to be as compelling in IW as it is in conventional warfare.”⁵ However, the current joint command and staff construct for planning and executing conventional warfare does not suit the *IW JOC*. To succeed in IW the joint command and staff needs a campaign planning system that answers two primary questions: “How do you effectively focus on controlling or influencing populations?” and, “How do you measure your efforts in IW?” The answer is a “marriage” of an effects-based approach to operations with the concepts outlined in the new *IW JOC*.

¹ Department of Defense (DoD), *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0*. (Washington D.C., 11 September 2007), B-3. NOTE: This thesis will use the *IW JOC*’s proposed definition of “irregular” – “activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., in which significant numbers of combatants engage in insurgency and other nonconventional military and paramilitary operations without being members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces of any country.”

² *Ibid.*, 1.

³ Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Military and Associated Terms* (Washington D.C., 12 April 2001, as amended 14 September 2007), 266. NOTE: This thesis will use the *JP 1-02* definition of “instruments of national power” – “all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military.”

⁴ DoD, *IW JOC*, 5. NOTE: This thesis will use the *IW JOC*’s definition of “protracted” – “an operation, campaign, or war of such long duration that it requires multiple unit rotations for an indefinite period of time.

⁵ *Ibid.*

This thesis analyzes the potential application of an effects-based approach to IW operations serving as a review of the concepts and critiques of effects-based operations (EBO), and EBO's evolution to an effects-based approach (EBA). Concepts of irregular warfare, IW's present evolution in the *IW JOC*, and IW's relationship to effects-based thinking are analyzed. This approach provides a framework for understanding why conventional warfare has survived the past century without an effects-based approach, and why IW cannot survive the future without adopting an effects-based approach. Utilizing the Special Operations Command Pacific's (SOCPAC) use of an effects-based approach to the War on Terror (WOT) as a comparative case study, this thesis investigates the development, application, and compatibility of an effects-based approach with SOCPAC's conduct of IW in the Pacific theater. In doing so, potential benefits and shortcomings are identified. Lastly, this thesis analyzes those benefits and shortfalls in implementing an effects-based approach to IW and provides recommendations for the broader application of an effects-based approach to the *IW JOC*.

The *IW JOC* states, "The future security environment includes a mix of military and non-military challenges by state and non-state actors to U.S. national security, with IW as the favored form of warfare of those who would be our adversaries."⁶ An effects-based approach allowed the SOCPAC commander and his staff to focus efforts and measure success in this new irregular environment. When used properly an effects-based approach is a tool that enables the commander to score his return on investment, and not simply count the number of activities executed in theater. This allows future joint force commanders to prioritize resources while measuring USG and partner nation effectiveness in achieving operational and strategic GWOT objectives.⁷

The U.S. military faces the challenges of continuing the GWOT into the next decade. In order to be successful it must adapt its methodology of targeting friendly and enemy systems in a protracted irregular campaign. The use of an effects-based approach merged with the concepts of the new *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept*

⁶ DoD, *IW JOC*, 11.

⁷ David P. Fridovich & Fred T. Krawchuck, "Winning in the Pacific, The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 44, 1st Quarter 2007) 27.

achieves this. The challenge is the adaptation of a military process that is currently compatible in conventional warfare. The U.S. military doctrine writers will have to shift their efforts towards a better understanding of irregular warfare. The publishing of the *IW JOC* is only the first step. The next step is combining a practical staff methodology for fighting a more irregular threat. The SOCPAC model provides a concept for consideration. By using an effects-based approach to planning and executing an IW campaign, the future joint force commanders will have the necessary framework to achieve success against an adversary who continues to wage a protracted irregular fight.

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II. EFFECTS-BASED THINKING

A. INTRODUCTION

The concept of effects-based operations (EBO) is nothing new. Throughout military history the notion of understanding an adversary and exploiting his weakness has always been the foundation of a sound military strategy. The ability of the military commander to identify his target, execute his operation, and assess his actions constituted his own “strategic intuition.” Military theorist Karl von Clausewitz understood and wrote of the importance of a commander’s intuition. In the military classic *On War*, Clausewitz explains the military genius of Napoleon Bonaparte. He attributes Napoleon’s success to his ability to make flash judgments and cut through the “fog of war.”⁸ Clausewitz refers to the French phrase “*coup d’oeil*,” or “to glance.”⁹ For Clausewitz, *coup d’oeil* was “the rapid discovery of a truth which to the ordinary mind is either not visible at all or only becomes so after long examination and reflection.”¹⁰ What Clausewitz describes as a “rapid discovery of truth” is what made Napoleon a great military commander and leader of the French Empire. It not only allowed Napoleon to strike decisively at his adversary’s weakest points, but allowed him the foresight to see beyond the battlefield and into the political, economic, and social arenas. This left Napoleon with an informal methodology that provided him with the best course of action (COA) to achieve his national objectives.

The Eastern military philosopher Sun Tzu also wrote of the concepts behind EBO. He articulated a distinct understanding of the links between military might and diplomatic objectives. In the *Art of War*, he states, “*Seek to take an enemy’s country intact rather than destroy it. Seek to capture an enemy’s armies rather than destroy them. To fight and conquer is not excellent strategy. Excellent strategy is to achieve victory without*

⁸ William Duggan, *Coup D’oeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning*, Monograph online. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2005); available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub631.pdf> ; Internet; cited 15 October 2007.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

violence.”¹¹ The second and third order effects of eliminating a conquered foe’s male population create an obvious economic burden in the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Sun Tzu understood the importance of influencing the population as well as targeting an adversary’s military weaknesses. Today these concepts are no different. However, the evolution of warfare and the growing separation between the instruments of national power have eliminated this sort of strategic intuition, leaving a gap in current military operations. An effects-based approach to operations attempts to fill this gap for the modern joint force commander.

B. CONTEMPORARY GENESIS OF EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS

The term “effects-based operation” was first used by the USAF Center for Campaign Planning (affectionately named the “Black Hole”) during the first night of OPERATION Desert Storm.¹² The “Black Hole” planners focused not only on the execution of the target list, rather they hoped to predict the second and third order effects beyond simple target destruction. This methodology pulled from a history of predicting second and third order effects used in air power thinking by the U.S. Army’s Air Corp’s Tactical School before World War II. This thought process was later revived as the primary approach to air campaign planning during the Cold War.¹³ The result was a systems analysis to target planning, and it resulted in the destruction of Iraq’s integrated air defense system in the first few hours of the Gulf War.¹⁴

The modern concept of effects-based operations was refined in the early 1990s by US Air Force Colonel John Warden. Col Warden laid the intellectual foundation for

¹¹ William Lidwell, trans. and ed., *The Art of War*, by Sun Tzu (WOWIO Books, 2006) <http://www.wowio.com/users/product.asp?BookId=11>, (accessed 3 July 2007), 36.

¹² Williamson Murray, “Transformation: Volume II,” in *Transformation Concepts for National Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Williamson Murray (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002), 3.

¹³ Murray, 3-4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

EBO with his depiction of the enemy as a system¹⁵ and future war as “parallel warfare.”¹⁶ “Parallel Warfare” is defined by the principles of both annihilation and attrition happening simultaneously rather than sequentially. USAF Brigadier General David A. Deptula asserts in his monograph, *Effects Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare*, that the Gulf War demonstrated the application of “parallel warfare” allowing control of enemy forces without the requirement for massing surface forces.¹⁷ Col Warder “argued that technology would allow the United States to attack multiple, vital targets simultaneously at the strategic level, and thus collapse an adversary’s system, leaving him with no means to respond.”¹⁸ He stated that this “makes very real what Clausewitz called the ideal form of war.”¹⁹ By identifying the key interconnecting nodes in an adversary's systems, one could effectively target multiple systems with a single shot.

Despite the apparent success of the Gulf War air campaign, EBO remained USAF centric until 2000 when the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) began to explore a broader application of the concept. USJFCOM focused on expanding the concept beyond a tool for analyzing second and third order effects of strategic bombing campaigns. The USAF found EBO to be a very useful staff thinking tool when it came to the integration of stealth and precision weaponry. USJFCOM sought to expand EBO’s potential by applying it to the challenge of integrating the instruments of national power for strategic campaign planning. USJFCOM hoped to broaden the systems based approach in order to potentially analyze the effects needed to achieve a strategic objective that included the linkage of military power to another instrument of national power. A systems based approach would account for the links or nodes between the political, military, economic,

¹⁵ Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Military and Associated Terms*, 527. NOTE: this thesis will use the JP 1-02 definition of “system” – “A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent instruments; that group of instruments forming a unified whole.”

¹⁶ Gary H. Cheek, “Effects-Based Operations: The End of Dominant Maneuver?” in *Transformation Concepts for National Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Williamson Murray (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002), 74-75.

¹⁷ Ibid., 74-75.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) networks that comprise the nation-state system. This systems based approach potentially offered the best way to achieve those strategic objectives assigned a USJFCOM by the Department of Defense (DoD). USJFCOM understood EBO as an analytical form of warfare. It allowed for the anticipation of enemy actions and reactions, and then executed tasks, assessed effects, and reassigned or re-executed tasks again based on the measurement of effects.²⁰

The events of 9/11 ushered in a new threat to U.S. national security and global stability. With this new threat came the need for the U.S. military to identify a new way to fight an irregular adversary. USJFCOM seized on this new requirement to adapt EBO to planning and executing operations against this threat. From the end of 2001 to early 2004, USJFCOM refined the effect-based operations process and in November of 2004 published the Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 7, *Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO)* to explain the process and joint application. USJFCOM also identified potential doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements for the execution of EBO. Next, USJFCOM's Doctrine Integration Branch hosted a two-day conference from 31 January to 1 February 2005.²¹ The conference established a common understanding of EBO. The consensus of the conference members not to adopt EBO as a fundamentally new method of warfighting, rather the members believed doctrine should codify the effects-based approach (EBA) as fundamental to operational art and design.²²

C. MOVING TOWARD AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH

In 2005, USJFCOM shifted away from the effects-based operations (EBO) as “the way to conduct operations”, and instead focused on the practical application of an effects-

²⁰ Cheek, 92.

²¹ Joint Warfighting Center, “A Common Perspective,” *U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center Doctrine and Education Group's Newsletter*, Vol 13, No. 1, (May 2005); available at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/comm_per/acp13_1.pdf; Internet; accessed 01 Jun 2007.

²² Ibid.

based approach (EBA) as “a way of conducting operations.”²³ EBA is not defined in and of itself. Rather, USJFCOM focused on the joint force commander’s understanding of the adversary, the operational environment (OE), and the best way to employ the instruments of national power.²⁴

An effects-based approach views the OE through a systems perspective with the objective of focusing the staff on the relevant links and nodes. The PMESII networks comprise the OE at the nation-state level. Each network or system is interconnected via nodes²⁵ (person, place, or thing) and links (behavioral, physical, or functional relationships).²⁶ Some nodes are identified as potential “key nodes.” “These are nodes related to a strategic or operational effect or center of gravity (COG).”²⁷ Key nodes are likely to be linked to, or identified in, multiple systems. Since each adversary’s OE is composed of systems, nodes, and links, the capabilities of the U.S. instruments of power can be focused against selected key nodes to attain operational and strategic effects.²⁸ The result is a staff thinking process or system that analyzes the independent systems and corresponding links and nodes of an adversary’s OE. This is labeled a “system of systems analysis” (SoSA) and it gives the joint force commander (JFC) and his staff a holistic understanding of the OE and the required conditions to achieve assigned operational and strategic objectives.²⁹ Each of those operational and strategic objectives is then further divided into the tasks needed to achieve the desired effects.³⁰ Each effect

²³ Joint Warfighting Center, U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations* (Suffolk: U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, 24 February 2006), i.

²⁴ Ibid., I-6.

²⁵ Joint Publication 1-02, 375. NOTE this thesis will use the JP 1-02 definition of “node” – “3. An element of a system that represents a person, place, or physical thing.”

²⁶ Joint Warfighting Center, 1-3.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., II-1.

³⁰ Joint Publication 1-02, 176. NOTE this thesis will use the JP 1-02 definition of “effect” – “1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.”

provides the link between national strategic objectives and tactical actions.³¹ The result is a “systems perceptive” of the OE (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment³²

Each instrument of national power can achieve different effects, and those effects can be achieved directly or indirectly. Some effects are created as a result of direct actions against nodes, while other effects are achieved by the indirect effect on other interconnected nodes linked to the primary targeted node.³³ These effects are then assigned to subordinate and supporting command echelons as objectives and tasks with the effect as the link between the two (Figure 2).

³¹ Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations*, I-1.

³² Ibid., II-2.

³³ Ibid., II-11.




Figure 2. Effects and Command Echelons³⁴

This echelon approach of linking objective to effects and tasks helps to create a depth and breadth throughout the OE. As Figure 3 indicates the actions against nodes at the tactical and operational levels can affect nodes, links, and systems at the strategic level, and vice versa. The “benefit of graphically portraying these node-link relationships (in as much detail as time permits) is that the potential impact of actions against certain nodes can become more evident.”³⁵ This graphic representation also exposes the number and strength of links to a node or nodes, which indicate potential COGs.

³⁴ Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations*, I-5.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, II-4.




Figure 3. The Breadth and Depth of a Systems Perspective.

D. THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK FOR AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO JOINT OPERATIONS

USJFCOM outlined this new way of thinking in the *Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations*, published by the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) in February 2006. The systems analysis process is the foundation of an effects-based approach to operations and provides the joint community with a common baseline that would fill the void between earlier transformational concepts and emerging

joint doctrine.³⁶ The handbook outlines how an effects-based approach can be applied at the theater strategic and operational levels, specifically during the planning, execution, and assessment of an operation.³⁷

1. Planning

“Planning for the employment of military forces occurs at every echelon of command and across the range of military operations. An effects-based approach to planning complements the traditional planning process.”³⁸ The current joint operations planning blend the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) and the process of operational design. The JOPP is a methodical process that is initiated by the receipt of a mission and the joint force commander’s guidance and then proceeds through mission analysis, COA determination, ending with joint orders production (see Figure 4).




Figure 4. The Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP)³⁹

³⁶ Joint Warfighting Center, “An Effects-Based Approach, Refining How We Think About Joint Operations,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 44, 1st Quarter 2007), 2.

³⁷ Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations*, i.

³⁸ Joint Warfighting Center, “An Effects-Based Approach, Refining How We Think About Joint Operations,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 3.

³⁹ Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations*, III-2.

The current JOPP does not force the commander or staff to think in terms of effects or a systems perspective. Designated COAs and corresponding tasks may or may not match desired or achievable effects, nor does the JOPP seek to promote “unified action”⁴⁰ with interagency partners and/or partner nations. An effects-based approach is cyclic in nature and allows the staff to assess its progress and refocus effort as part of the normal JOPP process through integration in the mission analysis and COA determination cycles.

“The mission analysis process is iterative and collaborative, but not always sequential. It is, however, always centered on and driven by the JFC's and staff's systems perspective: data, information, knowledge, and understanding of the OE in which the friendly and adversary systems interact.”⁴¹ Figure 5 (EBA and the JOPP Mission Analysis Process) depicts how an effects-based approach is integrated in the staff mission analysis process. This combined process enables the commander and staff to determine the effects that will “bridge the gap” between objective and task. The effects allow the staff to describe the conditions needed to be established or avoided within the OE to achieve the commander's end state.⁴² As Figure 5 depicts the two additions to the mission analysis process are; (1) “define the operational environment as a system of systems,” and (2) “identify effects/measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and potential COGs.” Upon completion of mission analysis the staff integrates a continued effects-based approach into the traditional JOPP COA determination cycle as depicted in Figure 6. As Figure 6 depicts there are six additions to the COA determination process and they are; (1) Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (JIPB) portray the OE as systems, nodes, and links, (2) identify critical capacity (CCs), critical requirements (CRs), critical vulnerabilities (CVs), and key nodes, (3) couple friendly desired effects and COAs, (4)

⁴⁰ Joint Publication 1-02, 565. NOTE this thesis will use the JP 1-02 definition of “unified action” – “The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.”

⁴¹ Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations*,. III-3.

⁴² Ibid., III-5.

couple enemy desired effects and COAs, (5) compare friendly and adversary attainment of desired effects, and (6) determine friendly COA risks of undesired effects.



Figure 5. EBA and the JOPP Mission Analysis Process⁴³




Figure 6. EBA and the JOPP Course of Action Determination Process⁴⁴

⁴³ Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations*, III-3.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Once each COA is wargamed and vetted it is analyzed, compared, and validated prior to recommendation to the JFC. The result is the selection of a COA that is more readily adaptable during execution. “In planning, the commander’s intent and early identification of desired effects steer both the mission and analysis and COA determination process.”⁴⁵ The integration of an effects-based approach to the JOPP enhances the probability of objective to task translation and success.

2. Execution

"Execution can be best characterized as monitoring, assessing, planning, and directing actions in the battlespace to create desired effects. Like planning, execution is a cyclical, iterative and multi-echelon collaborative process" (see Figure 7, Execution).⁴⁶




Figure 7. Execution of an Effects-Based Approach.

The execution process puts into action the JFC’s plan to integrate DIME to create his desired effects.⁴⁷ By incorporating a cyclic tasking and re-tasking process the

⁴⁵ Ibid., III-23.

⁴⁶ Ibid., IV-1.

commander and his staff can monitor, assess, plan, and direct the necessary actions needed to achieve desired tactical effects, while creating desired effects and preventing undesired effects in achieving operational and strategic objectives.⁴⁸

3. Assessment

Assessment measures the effectiveness of joint planning and execution. Assessment is the primary tool that the JFC has to determine his commands and subordinates progress toward "accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective."⁴⁹ Once effects are assigned, the staff then determines those indicators (effects measures) that show if the desired system behaviors are achieved. These indicators then become part of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).⁵⁰ The process helps the JFC to identify any gaps in task accomplishment and effects achieved at each echelon. The assessment seeks to identify the "delta" within the OE and then refine planning and execution to "bridge the gap."⁵¹ This is vital in an irregular warfare environment where battle damage-assessment (BDA) cannot be measured by vehicles destroyed or territory gained. It requires a more holistic assessment of all instruments of DIME, often with greater assessment of the non-military aspects of the OE.

E. CRITICISM OF USJFCOM'S EFFECTS BASED APPROACH

USJFCOM first suggested the benefits of an EBO concept in 2001 to then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. EBO was pitched to Secretary Rumsfeld, as "a continuously updated operational support tool that provides a JTF commander visibility of effects-to-task linkages based on a 'system-of-systems' analysis of a potential

⁴⁷ Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations*, IV-1.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., IV-6.

⁵⁰ Ibid., III-3.

⁵¹ Ibid., IV-7.

adversary's PMESII war-making capabilities.”⁵² Secretary Rumsfeld liked the idea that through the use of evolving computer technology and analysis of intelligence and open source data, his commander's could know almost everything about potential adversary's capabilities, potential actions and reactions, and take the most cost effective means to victory.⁵³ Secretary Rumsfeld sought immediate implementation and validation of the concept.⁵⁴

In the second half of 2002, USJFCOM conducted *Millennium Challenge 2002*. *Millennium Challenge 2002* was an elaborate war game designed to validate emerging transformation concepts within the DoD. The theories of EBO were put to practice against a rouge military commander in a fictitious Persian Gulf nation-state.⁵⁵ Retired USMC LtGen Paul Van Riper, a known opponent of the DoD's transformation strategy, was called to command the enemy forces. Van Riper subverted the war game early by “going off script” and launching a pre-emptive missile strike on the U.S. Fleet in the Persian Gulf. Despite the script's call for Van Riper to piece meal his missile forces, he launched the bulk of everything he had at the fleet and overwhelmed the Aegis defense systems. This attack resulted in 16 ships destroyed and over 20,000 dead sailors and marines. The wargame was over before it could start. The blue force's effects-based planners' assertions that such a missile attack was completely improbable had been disproved by Van Riper's actions. However, the game was reset and this time Van Riper was told to keep to the script. Van Riper resigned as enemy commander and this time USJFCOM won.⁵⁶

What LtGen(R) Van Riper had hoped to point out (and later would reiterate in an email to GEN Peter Pace, in December of 2005) is that effects-based operations take away from and degrade the tradition and value of a commander's intuitive decision

⁵² Andrew Cockburn, “How Rumsfeld was Suckered by the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs,’” *Counterpunch*, 19 May 2007 [newsletter online]; available from <http://www.counterpunch.org/andrew05192007.html>; Internet; accessed 1 Jun 2007.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

making process. Van Riper is not the first to point out that an all encompassing operational net assessment (ONA) driven by computer analysis software cannot account for all contingencies or eliminate the “fog of war.” His actions during the *Millennium* wargame directly challenge that assertion. However, by deviating from the script he knew before hand that he could undermine a system that played to a rationally acting adversary.

Other opponents of effects-based thinking argue that it works contrary to the proven strategy of attrition warfare. The concept is that “attrition warfare leads to the assured destruction of enemy military forces in the field, while effects-based operations, by bypassing certain enemy forces, can permit those forces to blend back into the population at large and prepare for a post-war insurgency campaign that U.S. forces might find more difficult and costly to counter.”⁵⁷ Van Riper and other opponents of an effects-based approach base their analysis on a revisionist view of the early events of Operation Iraqi Freedom. They actually criticize the efficiency of the process. They argue that EBA can quickly bring about the collapse of an enemy government, with so little effect on the population, that it will only embolden an “undefeated” population to more willingly support the deposed regime or other insurgent activities.⁵⁸ If this is the case, then it begs the question, “Why an effects-based approach to irregular warfare, if it is EBA that causes it in the first place?”

F. AN EFFECTS BASED APPROACH FOR IW

An effects-based approach system perspective shows promise when applied to IW. It is EBA’s system analysis tools that allow the commander and staff to consider a full spectrum of actions, integration of whole-of-nation concept of power, recognition of interconnected actors, and measurement of effort that makes it a very adaptable staff

⁵⁷ Ronald O’Rourke, “Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress,” *CRS Report for Congress*, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 9 November 2006), 27.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

process.⁵⁹ DoD must find a better way to leverage its forces and the other instruments of national power in the conduct of IW. The central tenet of EBA is that it can purposefully shape the interactions of the actors in a complex security environment.⁶⁰ It can also be predictive when used to plan a full spectrum campaign, from conventional to IW, thus allowing the commander and staff to better prepare for an “undefeated” population.

While an effects-based approach can focus on utilizing all instruments of national power to kill or capture terrorists, deny safe haven, and cut off sources of support, it attempts to synchronize the efforts of the other instruments of national power besides the military. Military operations cannot achieve success unilaterally, nor are they isolated to only having an effect on the belligerent’s military, especially when the opponent does not have a formal military force structure. An effects-based approach provides the most effective way to focus, plan, and synchronize efforts in an irregular approach to the GWOT by focusing the other instruments of national power and integrate those into a harmonized effort.

⁵⁹ Edward A. Smith, *Complexity, Networking, & Effects-Based Approaches to Operations*, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, July 2006), ix.

⁶⁰ Smith, x.

III. IRREGULAR WARFARE

A. INTRODUCTION

The events following the end of the Cold War and more specifically the terrorist attacks of “9/11”⁶¹ ushered in a new era of understanding and efforts to define irregular warfare. The U.S. military operations in the last six years have set a backdrop for the emergence of a renewed interest in the theory and practice of irregular warfare (IW). Like USJFCOM’s efforts to develop a new approach with effects-based operations, USSOCOM found itself tasked with redefining the U.S. Department of Defense understanding of IW. The U.S. military’s growing strategic level security interest within failing and/or failed states took center stage in the violent struggle for legitimacy among state and non-state actors. Revolutionary or insurgent violence, criminal activities, and terrorism that occur within “traditional” inter-state boundaries are nothing new. However, the challenge is to understand first, “How will current and future adversaries of the USG use these activities to undermine and erode the will and influence of the U.S. and our strategic partners?” and then “How will the USG achieve the level of unified action necessary to integrate all available instruments of national power to address irregular threats?”⁶²

B. THE U.S. IRREGULAR WARFARE FOCUS POST WORLD WAR II

The concept of Irregular Warfare (IW) is arguably in its third round of policy, doctrinal, and academic engagement in the post World War II (WW II) era.⁶³ IW theory was first codified in the 1950s and 1960s in terms of the “small wars” and internal conflicts centered on Southeast Asia and Latin America. Early U.S. military IW doctrine

⁶¹ NOTE: For this thesis “9/11” will be defined as the terrorist attacks executed by the Al Qaeda Network (AQN) against the United States on 11 September 2001.

⁶² Department of Defense (DoD), *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0*. (Washington D.C., 11 September 2007), B-3.

⁶³ Mark T. Berger, Kenneth Burgess, James Mauldin and Michael P. Sullivan, “Déjà Vu All Over Again’: Counterinsurgency and the ‘American Way of War’ ” *Intelligence and National Security: An Inter-Disciplinary Journal* vol, 22. no, 4. (forthcoming).

at the time of the Vietnam War was limited. The primary USMC doctrine found in the *Small Wars Manual*, first produced in 1940, was based primarily upon pre-WWII USMC operations in the Latin America “Banana Wars”.⁶⁴ At the same time, the U.S. Army had produced a number of brief Field Manuals that regarded IW as primarily the purview of the U.S. Army Special Forces.⁶⁵

The second iteration of academic debate appeared to reach its height in the 1980s.⁶⁶ The post-Vietnam literature focused on resolving the U.S. military failures outside of a conventional warfare construct. Despite this and the ongoing protracted irregular conflicts in Afghanistan and El Salvador, the U.S. military produced nothing new in the way of formal IW doctrine during this period. Rather, the U.S. military shifted Cold War efforts to maximizing conventional warfare models. This was the antithesis of IW. “It reflected the U.S. military’s commitment to avoiding another Vietnam and only engaging in more or less conventional warfare with clearly defined objectives. Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm—the First Gulf War—were classic examples of this approach.”⁶⁷

The final and current wave of IW theory revolves around the post-Cold War and the current conflicts that followed the attacks of 9/11. “Of particular importance, however, [is] the growing awareness by 2004 that post-OEF and post-OIF stabilization and/or nation-building efforts [are] in trouble.”⁶⁸ Many still believed IW to be the

⁶⁴ United States Marine Corps (Department of the Navy), *Small Wars Manual* (NAVMC 2890), (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1940).

⁶⁵ See Department of the Army, *Operations Against Guerilla Forces*, FM 31-20 (February 1951). Department of the Army, *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*, FM 31-21 (October 1951); Department of the Army, *Guerrilla Warfare*, FM 31-21 (March 1955); Department of the Army, *Counter guerrilla Operations*, FM 31-16 (February 1963).

⁶⁶ See Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present* (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Larry E. Cable, *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York University Press, 1986); Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

⁶⁷ Mark T. Berger et. Al.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

purview of special operations. The U.S. military as a whole did not become interested in IW until after the end of major combat operations (MCO) in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, and the declaration of a “win” by President George W. Bush. The focus within the DoD became a push to meet the challenges of combating the current and future adversaries that pursue “irregular, disruptive, traditional, and catastrophic” capabilities to threaten U.S. interests.⁶⁹

In October 2004 the U.S. Army and USMC co-produced an “interim” field manual on counterinsurgency (COIN). This displayed an effort by the U.S. military to come to grips with COIN, which is one of the range of activities conducted as part of IW.⁷⁰ Next, the DoD published its 2005 *National Defense Strategy* and in it stated:

Increasingly sophisticated irregular methods – e.g., terrorism and insurgency – challenge U.S. security interests. Adversaries employing opponents often take a long-term approach, attempting to impose prohibitive human, material, financial, and political costs on the United States to compel strategic retreat from a key region or course of action. ... Our experiences in the war on terrorism points to the need to reorient our military forces contend with such irregular challenges more effectively.⁷¹

These sentiments were further amplified by the release of the DoD’s 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (QDR). According to the Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon R. England, the 2006 QDR represented a “shift in the strategic direction of the U.S. armed forces to help the United States win the long war against terrorism.”⁷² The 2006 QDR laid out a “roadmap” for the development of Irregular Warfare capabilities, and emphasized the need to prepare for wider asymmetric challenges in order to effectively

⁶⁹ Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, March 2005), 2.

⁷⁰ Douglas Jehl and Thom Shanker, “For the First Time Since Vietnam, The Army Prints a Guide to Fighting Insurgents,” *The New York Times*, 13 November 2004 [online]; available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/13/politics/13army.html>; Internet; accessed 31 October 2007.

⁷¹ DoD, *The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America*, 3.

⁷² Steven Donald Smith, “QDR Will Help the Military Make Changes, England Says,” *DefenseLink News Articles*, 2 February 2006 [article online]; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=14967>; Internet; accessed 2 November 2007.

support the USG's strategic direction.⁷³ By the end of 2006, the U.S. Army and USMC made another leap forward by superseding all previous COIN manuals with the new Field Manual 3-34, *Counterinsurgency*. Most recently, USSOCOM and the USMC took the first step down the IW "roadmap" by producing the *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept* in order to address the future approach to IW.⁷⁴

C. IRREGULAR WARFARE JOINT OPERATING CONCEPT VERSION 1.0

1. Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the *IW JOC* "is to describe how future joint force commanders (JFCs) could conduct protracted IW to accomplish national strategic objectives in the 2014-2026 timeframe."⁷⁵ Not only is it designed to guide the development and integration of DoD concepts on the conduct of IW, but it provides a baseline for further debate and discussion, and development of new doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) changes.⁷⁶ The *IW JOC* was created in conjunction with the *Major Combat Operations* (MCO) and *Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations* (SSTRO) Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs). "The IW JOC is integral to the conduct of MCO and Military Support to SSTRO. It complements the conduct of Deterrence Operations and Shaping Operations."⁷⁷ It enhances existing JOCs, and offers both complementary and competing ideas for ways and means to address strategic and operational challenges. The *IW JOC* addresses the following aspects that are not covered in current JOCs:

- Theater strategy for IW.
- IW campaign design, planning, and execution.
- Global scale of IW operations.

⁷³ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 1.

⁷⁴ DoD, *IW JOC*, 12.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 5.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 14.

- Protracted timeframe of IW.
- Offensive applications of IW, particularly against hostile armed groups operating in non-belligerent states.

The Venn diagram shown in Figure 8 depicts the overlapping relationship each JOC has with the others.




Figure 8. Joint Operating Concepts Relationships

The scope of the *IW JOC* remains at the operational-level solutions. “It does not provide a tactical description of how to conduct IW operations but instead introduces new conditions and capability needs for IW.”⁷⁸ This is essential to current and future understanding in “how” IW is defined.

2. Defining Irregular Warfare

Definitions provide a common understanding of doctrinal terms and emerging concepts in the conduct of warfare. The following definitions of IW and conventional warfare establish the baseline for understanding the fundamental differences in the application of IW versus conventional warfare.

⁷⁸ DoD, *IW JOC*, 14.

a. *IW JOC Working Definition*

The *IW JOC* defines Irregular Warfare as: “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”⁷⁹ But the *IW JOC* also states, “IW is complex, ‘messy,’ and ambiguous,” therefore, making it necessary to address some basic definitional issues before continuing.⁸⁰

b. *Irregular versus Conventional*

Without becoming collared in a debate about the precise definition and division between “irregular warfare” and “conventional warfare”, there is a need to clarify how both of these terms are used by the U.S. military. “Irregular warfare” (IW) follows the definition above, and is in line with the concepts put forth in the 2006 QDR. “Put succinctly, irregular warfare involves indirect forms of military operations, while relying on any and all relevant force capacities to gain ‘asymmetric advantages’ and weaken or destroy the capability and power of the adversary concerned.”⁸¹ This is in contrast with “conventional warfare” that is not defined in any U.S. military doctrinal publications. However, for the purposes of this thesis, “conventional warfare” is defined as warfare between states that employs direct engagement, aimed at undermining or destroying each other’s capacity to make war. This may include efforts to capture and/or hold territory in order to influence an adversary’s government or policies.⁸² Thus conventional warfare is grounded in the proven doctrines of attack, defend, and withdrawal. At the same time, following the successes of the First Gulf War and the initial stages of OIF, conventional warfare is increasingly being viewed as “short wars,”

⁷⁹ DoD, *IW JOC*, 6.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Mark T. Berger et. Al.

⁸² Jeffrey L. Hasler, “Defining War: New Doctrinal Definitions of Irregular, Conventional and Unconventional Warfare”, *Special Warfare*, vol, 20, no, 2, (March-April 2007), 19-21. Also see Department of Defense (DoD), *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0*. (11 SEP 2007), 7-8.

in contrast to protracted deployment of massive and sustained force, which characterized the traditional “American Way of War”.⁸³ Linked to this, and of considerable relevance, is the fact that conventional warfare is understood to take place between legitimate sovereign states. By contrast, at least within the scope of military doctrine, IW is understood to be a form of military operations aimed at removing a legitimate or sovereign government, in a far more indirect and discrete fashion of influencing the population, as opposed to conventional warfare’s focus on removing a legitimate or sovereign government through direct military defeat (see Figure 9).




Figure 9. Contrasting Conventional and Irregular Warfare.⁸⁴

c. *Operations and Activities that Comprise IW*

IW is comprised of a variety of operational and tactical level operations and activities that historically occurred on the periphery of conventional warfare. This is important in further refining the theory of IW as an approach to warfighting and not just

⁸³ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977; first published, 1973); Max Boot, “The New American Way of War” *Foreign Affairs*, vol 82, no 4 (July-August, 2003).

⁸⁴ DoD, *IW JOC*, 8. NOTE: The *IW JOC* Figure 9 is primarily attributed to Dr. Gordon McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” Model, and his work on understanding insurgencies and the fundamental differences of the direct and indirect approaches to warfare.

an operational theme. Although, the following activities could easily be applied to the context of a conventional warfare, these represent the specific range of operations conducted as part of IW:⁸⁵

- Insurgency
- Counterinsurgency (COIN)
- Unconventional Warfare (UW)
- Terrorism
- Counterterrorism (CT)
- Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
- Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO)
- Strategic Communications
- Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
- Information Operations (IO)
- Civil Military Operations (CMO)
- Intelligence and counterintelligence activities
- Transnational criminal activities
- Law enforcement activities focused on irregular threats

“In practice, most wars and campaigns are hybrids of conventional and IW operations. The balance or primary focus of [these activities and] operations gives a war, campaign, or major operation its predominant character.” The next step analyzes how the instruments of national power are leveraged in the conduct of IW.

3. diMe versus DIImE in the IW Environment

The unique challenge in the conduct of IW is the need to take a balanced or potentially imbalanced approach to the effective use of the instruments of national power. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (March 2006) states that success in the GWOT “involves using military force and other instruments [elements] of national power to kill or capture the terrorists, deny them safe haven or control of any

⁸⁵ Hasler, 20.

nation; prevent them from gaining access to WMD; and cut off their sources of support.”⁸⁶ This concept is not new to the history of warfare. However, due to the inherent political nature of IW the military component of DIME (diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economics) should be a supporting rather than supported effort. This is compounded by the paradox that direct military action by the USG frequently detracts from the long-term legitimacy of a failing state.⁸⁷ This is contrary to the short-term benefits of U.S. provided security and stability. Unlike conventional warfare where the military element is the focus of all national efforts and supported by the other three, in IW the military finds itself in a balanced effort, or more often than not in a “supporting effort” to the other USG and partner nation elements. Therefore, IW campaign planning and execution considerations cannot focus solely on the military. This is in contrast to traditional conventional warfare, where the U.S. military is the “supported effort” (Figure 10).




Figure 10. Conventional versus Irregular War Planning and Execution

Therefore, in IW planning and execution an inherent need arises for establishing a process that affords the JFC and his staff the ability to address this paradox. The joint planning and execution process must include a more indirect approach that is prepared for a protracted timeline, and unifies the interagency and partner nation components in a manner that all can be measured and assessed.

⁸⁶ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: The White House, March 2006), 9.

⁸⁷ DoD, *IW JOC*, 18.

4. “Winning the Will”: Indirect, Protracted, and Unified Action

The *IW JOC* provides a solution for securing the legitimacy of the USG host nation partners, while denying the control, influence, and support of mutual adversaries. The “central ideal” of the concept is:

The joint force will conduct protracted regional and global campaigns against state and non-state adversaries to subvert, coerce, attrite, and exhaust adversaries rather than defeating them through direct conventional military confrontation. IW emphasizes winning the support of the relevant populations, promoting friendly political authority, and eroding adversary control, influence, and support. Unified action by the USG and its strategic partners is essential to winning an irregular war or campaign. While the direct application of military power may not be the primary means of winning IW, joint forces will often be required to support non-military instruments of power and set the conditions for strategic success.⁸⁸

The key IW elements that can be draw out from this “central idea” are an “indirect approach”; that is “protracted” in nature; and combines the “unified action” of all USG and HN elements of national power. The relative complexity of bringing these elements together under a holistic approach to warfare requires a more agile joint force planning, execution, and assessment capabilities.⁸⁹

5. Needed Capabilities

What the 2005 *National Defense Strategy*, the 2006 *IW JOC* and the 2006 QDR all have in a common is a message calling for irregular warfare capabilities.⁹⁰ The current and future joint force needs to have the critical inherent skill set for campaign design, planning and force preparation, as well as, an operational mission set for the

⁸⁸ DoD, *IW JOC*, 19.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 33. also see Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, March 2005); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006); and The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: The White House, March 2006).

⁹⁰ NOTE: The 2006 QDR analyzed the current state of transformation in the U.S. Military and identified an imbalance between conventional and irregular capabilities. In order to better prepare the current force for ongoing efforts to defeat the United State’s adversaries in its GWOT that imbalance must be addressed.

irregular operational environment.⁹¹ As the 2006 QDR points out, in order for this to happen a shift will have to occur away from “traditional” capabilities. This shift will better address future irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges.⁹² USSOCOM sought to validate this capability “shift” in U.S. Army’s *United Quest 2007* (UQ 07) Wargame series.

D. UNIFIED QUEST 07: SHORTFALLS AND STRENGTHS OF THE IW JOC

The U.S. Army executes the “U.S. Army’s Future Warfare Study Plan” under the title of *Unified Quest*.⁹³ It is comprised of a series of seminars, workshops, and wargames used to explore current operational problems. “UQ 07 employed [a] ‘bottom-up’ approach to examine the operational challenges of conducting UW and Stability, Support, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations as part of Full Spectrum Operations.”⁹⁴ UQ 07 provided USSOCOM an opportunity to test the operational theories developed in the *IW JOC* and the application of IW in the larger context of the GWOT. The findings of UQ 07 addressed potential impacts to USSOCOM’s organizational, personnel, training and operational capabilities. The major finding’s of the USSOCOM UQ 07 analytical team not only validated the key ideas of the *IW JOC*, but identified the new and unique challenges conducting IW, and the requirement for a very different approach.⁹⁵ The team’s report states, “While the deliberate planning associated with traditional warfare has proven successful in direct inter-state engagements, players recognized the need for a different type of planning, assessment and preparation for IW.”⁹⁶

⁹¹ see Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, March 2005); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006); and The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: The White House, March 2006).

⁹² DoD, *QDR Report*, 19.

⁹³ *Unified Quest 2007: U.S. Special Operations Command Analytical Report*, (USSOCOM, 4 June 2007), 1.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 5-17.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

E. SUMMARY

The current round of policy, doctrinal, and academic engagement on the conduct of IW continues. This new era is attempting to establish IW as an approach to warfare and not just an “operational theme,” despite the fact that the *IW JOC* falls short in providing the critical staff thinking process to execute prescribed “holistic” approach to IW. If the findings of UQ 07 are presumed to be correct, then the next step is the development of a critical staff thinking process that complements these new prevailing concepts. Fortunately, Special Operations Command Pacific in late 2004 made a similar paradigm shift to a more indirect approach to its own WOT efforts in the Pacific theater. SOCPAC’s efforts serve as a logical case study for analyzing the “coupling” of irregular warfare with an effects-based approach.

IV. SOCPAC CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION:

In January 2005, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) began a process of reevaluating the WOT operational level strategy it designed for the Pacific Theater. SOCPAC conducted an internal strategic estimate to develop a baseline for where SOCPAC's efforts were focused and how they aligned with the strategic picture of the Pacific Theater at the time. This estimate served as a framework to initially refocus the unique capabilities of special operations forces (SOF) to the WOT in the Pacific.⁹⁷ The estimate identified an existing gap in the SOCPAC staff process that failed to effectively insure resources were balanced against WOT objectives to combat terrorism in the Pacific Theater. In order to fill this gap, SOCPAC expanded on the evolving USJFCOM EBA process. This new command philosophy emphasized an indirect approach to the WOT. It sought to leverage the maturity and expertise, trust, and confidence of special operations forces through a more indirect approach in theater.⁹⁸ The command believed that an effects-based approach coupled with a more indirect focus provided the framework to successfully achieve U.S. Pacific Command's (USPACOM) WOT objectives.

B. OVERVIEW OF SOCPAC MISSION:

SOCPAC serves as a subordinate unified command to USPACOM. SOCPAC and its component units deploy throughout the Pacific Theater in support of USPACOM's deliberate plans, contingencies, the Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP), and the WOT. Through the routine conduct of bilateral exchanges, joint and combined training events, and operational deployments, SOCPAC elements foster interoperability with host partner nations and interagency partners within the Pacific

⁹⁷ Jeff McKaughan, "Pacific Warrior, Building Capacity and Partnerships Throughout the Region." *Special Operations Technology*, Issue 5, Volume 2 (2007): 26.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 29.

Theater. The command is also tasked to maintain the capability to operate as a rapidly deployable Joint Task Force (JTF).⁹⁹ “Today, SOCPAC forces are operating throughout the Pacific Theater in close concert with U.S. Embassies to increase partner nation capabilities to defeat terrorism and insurgencies, and address underlying conditions that support terrorism.”¹⁰⁰

SOCPAC executes its WOT requirements not only as a sub-unified command of USPACOM, but also as the regional theater special operations command (TSOC) for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). It is the mission of USSOCOM to lead, plan, synchronize, and as directed, execute global operations against terrorist networks. USSOCOM also trains, organizes, equips and deploys combat ready special operations forces to combatant commands.¹⁰¹ SOCPAC is required to synchronize the regional WOT efforts in the Pacific with USSOCOM’s national level GWOT planning. SOCPAC serves as the vital conduit linking the efforts of USSOCOM as the GWOT Command with USPACOM the Pacific Theaters Regional Combatant Command.

C. SOCPAC IN THE GWOT 2002 TO 2005 PUT TABS IN ALL HEADINGS

1. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines 2002-2004

In January of 2002, SOCPAC deployed JTF 510, comprised of 1,300 U.S. troops, to the southern Philippines.¹⁰² JTF 510 conducted counterterrorist operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)¹⁰³ working by, through, and with the Armed Forces of the

⁹⁹ "What is SOCPAC?" *Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC)*; available from <http://www.socpac.socom.mil/>; Internet; accessed 2 October 2007.

¹⁰⁰ McKaughan, 26.

¹⁰¹ "United States Special Operations Command Mission" *Headquarters, United States Special Operations Command (USSCOM)*; available from http://www.socom.mil/Docs/Command_Mission-060214.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 October 2007.

¹⁰² Gregory Wilson, "Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation." *Military Review* VOL LXXXVI, NO. 06 (November-December 2006): 6.

¹⁰³ NOTE: the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is a Muslim terrorist group operating in the southern Philippines. It conducted numerous kidnappings for profit prior to 9/11. The ASG's most notable kidnapping was Martin and Gracie Burnham, two American missionaries on 27 May 2001. ASG moved to Basilan Island. Since 9/11 it has conducted several small bombings. The most notable is the February 2004 Super Ferry 14 bombing in Manila Bay, killing 132.

Philippines (AFP) under the moniker of the bilateral exercise series BALIKATAN (roughly translates to “shoulder to shoulder” or “shouldering the load together”).¹⁰⁴ The U.S. air component was stationed in Mactan, Cebu with logistics and the JTF Headquarters stationed in Zamboanga, Mindanao comprised the bulk of the more than 1,300 man force. Only 160 United States Special Forces and 340 Navy Construction Team (Seabees¹⁰⁵ and USMC Security) personnel located on Basilan Island comprised the tip of the spear (see Figure11).



Figure 11. Map of Balikatan 02-1.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ "Exercise Balikatan." *GlobalSecurity.org*; available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/balikatan.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2007.

¹⁰⁵ NOTE: Seabee is not an acronym. It comes from the pronunciation of the abbreviation for Construction Battalion or CB. It has become the nick name of the Naval Construction Teams. It dates back to World War II.

¹⁰⁶ NOTE: Original map from: "Philippines." *CIA – The World Factbook*, (1 November 2007); available from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2007.

On 1 September 2002, JTF 510 redeployed to Camp Smith, Hawaii leaving behind elements to form Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).¹⁰⁷ JSOTF-P continued operations along with the AFP for over 2 years on Basilan Island. Today, the environment on Basilan no longer fosters terrorist activity.¹⁰⁸ Within the first year, the ASG ranks “shrank from 800 to 80 on Basilan Island and several of their senior leaders were arrested or killed.”¹⁰⁹

It is important to understand how this success on Basilan impacted the development of SOCPAC’s EBA system. When *Special Operations Technology* asked LTG David P. Fridovich (then SOCPAC Commander and the initial Special Forces Group Commander on Basilan Island) how he measured success with JSOTF-P operations he answered:

After two years on Basilan Island . . . the environment no longer fostered terrorist activities and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) left the island. The AFP [sic Armed Forces of the Philippines] effectively drained the swamp of underlying conditions with our assistance. The Basilan people now live in a safe and secure environment. As a result, the AFP downsized their presence from 15 infantry battalions down to 2 battalions on Basilan Island. By guaranteeing security, the AFP made it safe for teachers and doctors to return to Basilan. Private business and non-governmental organizations also operate in an area they once shunned. The AFP won back the support of the local population and the Philippine government, producing a long-lasting effect . . . The Basilan people chose to support government and not the ASG.¹¹⁰

The success on Basilan became the foundation of SOCPAC’s model for conduct of IW in support of WOT operations in the Southern Philippines, and the greater Pacific Theater. The formula employed by then COL Fridovich comprised of: preparing the environment through early population surveys and assessment; determining what objectives and

¹⁰⁷ "What is SOCPAC?" *Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC)*; available from <http://www.socpac.socom.mil/>; Internet; accessed 2 October 2007.

¹⁰⁸ David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, "Winning in the Pacific, The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 44 (1st Quarter 2007): 26.

¹⁰⁹ ADM Thomas Fargo, "PASOC 2003." *USPACOM Speeches and Transcripts*, 10 February 2003. available from <http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2003/030210pasoc.shtml>; Internet: accessed 2 October 2007.

¹¹⁰ McKaughan, 26.

associated tasks were needed to achieve success; and continued assessment throughout the operation in order to ensure focus and maximize flexibility of his limited resources (160 USSF and 340 Navy Seabees and USMC security). This basic formula developed by then COL Fridovich and his staff had all the makings of an effects-based approach. They were able to maximize their payoff and it resulted in measurable military, economic, social, and political success on Basilan Island.

2. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines 2004-2005

However, SOCPAC did not fully recognize the payoff of the early Basilan efforts immediately. In early January 2004, JSOTF-P was completely reorganized. The focus of the effort placed on USSF advisor teams paired with those AFP Brigades nearest to known ASG sanctuaries. Advising the AFP in direct action capture/kill missions became the primary mission of the command.¹¹¹ SOCPAC looked for a way to show the "success" of a more direct approach to operations working through and by the AFP in the Philippines. The only metric SOCPAC used at this time was a kill/capture count tracked weekly on a command briefing slide.¹¹² The accuracy of that slide was a priority, and it became the primary means for measuring SOCPAC and JSOTF-Ps success in the Southern Philippines.¹¹³ Regardless of the debate over the effectiveness of the direct approach strategy, this is the first time SOCPAC attempted to apply a metric of success to its WOT efforts.

3. TSCP and the Pacific Special Operations Conference

From 2002 to 2005 SOCPAC continued to execute its portion of USPACOM's TSCP events and the annual Pacific Special Operations Conference (PASOC) in order to maintain its long established engagement requirements. The focus of these events had obviously shifted towards a WOT focus. However, the planning and execution of the traditional Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Counter-Narcotics Training

¹¹¹ SOCPAC Staff Officer, "RE: Strategic Estimate and timelines," E-mail to Michael P. Sullivan (author), 4 October 2007.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

(CNT), Counter-Terrorism Training (CT), and annual Bilateral/Multinational Exercise events changed very little from pre-9/11 standards.¹¹⁴

With both conventional and special operations resources being pulled to support the continuing efforts in both Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-AFGHANISTAN (OEF-A), the command needed to find a process to focus its reduced resources that provided maximum flexibility and payoff. SOCPAC found itself in a situation not unlike those early Gulf War air targeting planners that had to find the most effective means of targeting Iraq Defenses in Kuwait with a limited number of available sorties. What resulted is a process that SOCPAC hopes will provide focus for the unified effort of U.S. military component, interagency, and partner nation contributions to IW in the Pacific that can be measured and assessed.

D. EVOLUTION OF EBA AT SOCPAC:

In January of 2005 SOCPAC began to refocus its effort in the WOT. SOCPAC viewed fighting the WOT “not as a series of discrete functional events but rather as an integrated effort to achieve objectives and end states.”¹¹⁵ SOCPAC started out by asking four primary questions:

- (1) How do we plan, guide and synchronize the WOT: through, with and by, host nations?
- (2) Does the current synchronization process for the WOT prioritize and focus our efforts?
- (3) As the Inter-Agency National Implementation Plan (NIP) supporting activity process develops for the WOT, how do we nominate activities?
- (4) How do we measure our progress in achieving WOT objectives and end-states?¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Michael P. Sullivan, unpublished professional journal, September-November 2004.

¹¹⁵ David P. Fridovich, "SOCPAC Effects-Based Approach Command Brief (Unclassified)" (Special Operations Command Pacific, Camp Smith, HI, copy of slide obtained via E-mail, 2 February 2007), 2.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

A common theme emerged. The planning and execution of the future WOT operational level strategy could not simple focus on unilateral and purely military solutions.¹¹⁷ SOCPAC needed to find a more indirect approach of working through, by, and with partner nations and incorporate the other instruments of national power to be more effective with its and USPACOM's efforts.

1. Strategic Estimate

From December 2004 to early spring 2005 SOCPAC took a comprehensive look at the entire Pacific Theater. The estimate sought to identify where SOCPAC needed to continue or change its focus for the WOT, TSCP, conventional war plans, and other existing programs.¹¹⁸ The SOCPAC Special Operations Joint Plans office or SOJ5 was assigned the task to develop the strategic estimate. The document divided the theater into several sub-regional categories. This estimate identified several key areas of emphasis for the command. By adapting a regional approach to theater level operations, the estimate laid the framework for the adoption of a more systems based analysis throughout the command. Also, the estimate helped to synchronize SOCPAC's campaign planning with USSOCOM and USPACOM efforts.

2. CARVER Matrix SOCPAC's First Systems Approach

In late 2004 early 2005, just prior to the SOJ5s development of the strategic estimate, the SOCPAC SOJ3 (Operations) developed a small targeting cell to analyze weaknesses in the terrorist organizations operating in the southern Philippines. This small group began what would be the first "systems analysis" of the terrorist networks in the Pacific Theater.¹¹⁹ This early targeting effort looked for critical nodes to kinetically attack in order to produce the desired effect of bringing down the ASG and Jemaah

¹¹⁷ Fridovich, "SOCPAC Effects-Based Approach Command Brief (Unclassified)" 3.

¹¹⁸ McKaughan, 26.

¹¹⁹ Eric Walker, E-mail to Michael P. Sullivan (author), 9 October 2007.

Islamiah (JI)¹²⁰, terrorist network in Southeast Asia. The cell used the CARVER targeting analysis technique developed by U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOFF). This technique is used during mission planning to assess mission, validity, and requirements, and technical appreciation of a designated target.¹²¹

CARVER is an acronym made up of the following factors that encompass a designated target: criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability factors. These factors assist the planners in selecting the best targets or components of a given target to attack. Each factor is considered and assigned a numerical value. These values are then placed in a decision matrix and the sum of the values generates the desirability to attack a given target or component.¹²² At the strategic or operational level of analysis, the CARVER process can provide a list of the enemy's systems or subsystems. At the tactical level it can list component of subsystems ideal for attack based on the component that receives the highest score (for example Figure 12 displays a sample matrix for a Bulk Power Supply Facility.)¹²³

¹²⁰ NOTE: Jemaah Islamiah (JI) is militant Islamic organization created in Indonesia that promotes the establishment of an Islamic state that includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Southern Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei. JI is known for the 2002 car bombing of a Bali nightclub, killing 202; the 2003 car bombing of the J.W. Marriot Hotel in Jakarta, killing 12; and the 2004 car bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, killing 8. JI is known for its ties to both the Al Qaeda Network and Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southern Philippines.

¹²¹ Field Manual (FM) 34-36 *Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 September 1991); available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/DoDdir/army/fm34-36/appd.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2007.

¹²² FM 34-36.

¹²³ Ibid.

BULK ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY							
POTENTIAL TARGETS	C	A	R	V	E	R	TOTAL
FUEL TANKS	8	9	3	6	5	6	41
FUEL PUMPS	8	6	2	10	5	3	34
BOILERS	6	2	10	4	5	4	31
TURBINES	8	6	10	7	5	9	45
GENERATORS	4	6	10	7	5	9	41
CONDENSERS	8	8	5	2	5	4	34
FEED PUMPS	3	8	5	6	5	6	33
CIRCULATION WATER PUMPS	3	8	5	6	5	4	33
GENERATOR STEP UP TRANSFORMER	10	10	10	5	5	9	53

Figure 12. Sample Matrix for Bulk Power Supply Facility

The SOCPAC targeting cell attempted to apply this same basic CARVER process to targeting the terrorist network in the southern Philippines. The first step was defining those specific subcomponents that made up the terrorist network. Terrorist networks do not operate in the exact same manner as a traditional nation-state. The operational environment (OE) that makes up the total terrorist system is not comprised of the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational (PMESII) subsystems. After evaluating historical data and current intelligence the SOCPAC targeting cell defined the terrorist subsystems into the marketing, training, finance, recruiting, infrastructure, and communication (MTFRIC) subsystems. By redefining the adversary's subsystems the SOCPAC targeting cell believed it could reveal more effective options to engage and influence the enemy and relevant population. It is important to note that the MTFRIC subsystems overlap and interact through the same "node and link" relationship described earlier. Furthermore, the nodes in the terrorist MTFRIC subsystems may have links to the nation-state PMESII subsystems. In theory this gave the SOCPAC targeting cell multiple centers of gravity (COGs) to target. The multiple subsystem concept also validated the potential benefits of indirectly affecting the terrorist networks by removing identified COGs (see Figure 13.)




Figure 13. Centers of Gravity Across MTFRIC and PMESII Subsystems

Conceptually, CARVER was used to prioritize hundreds of nodes that make up these various categories. This effort was beneficial in forcing SOCPAC to contemplate the complexity of conducting IW. The work also validated the need for an interagency approach especially when targeting non-military subsystems and nodes. However, the CARVER model was eventually dropped because it was too conceptual and did not deal with "actual" nodes. It provided an expanded framework for planning using a systems approach to understanding the operational environment as an interdependent system of systems. This led the targeting cell to explore the evolving USJFCOM concepts of EBO and EBA as a more concrete targeting tool for the WOT.

E. SOCPAC'S EBA MODEL:

By August 2005, SOCPAC expanded and formalized the efforts of the early targeting cell by adopting USJFCOM's evolving concepts of an effects-based approach to operations. By adopting an effects-based approach, SOCPAC attempted to successfully incorporate a more indirect approach to the WOT, executing through, by, and with

partner nations.¹²⁴ It was believed that an effects-based methodology would enhance the already existing Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) and the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Thus, EBA would enhance the command's ability to more efficiently utilize limited resources and synchronize SOCPAC component, USPACOM component, and interagency actions in the WOT. "Rather than focusing campaign planning and execution solely on component task accomplishment, an effects-based approach seeks to influence or change behavior through integrated application of select instruments of national power to support the U.S. Government's (USG's) GWOT objectives."¹²⁵ The first step was the development of a dedicated effects cell within the SOCPAC staff.

1. Effects Cell

The SOCPAC Effects Cell (EC) is aligned under the commander's immediate administrative staff or SOJ00 and coded SOJ00EC. The EC stands alone as a unique staff element in order to serve all of the SOCPAC staff in the accomplishment of both deliberate and crisis action planning, execution, and assessment by leveraging all elements of an effects-based approach.¹²⁶ The EC serves as the base of the Joint Effects Cell and includes separate planners, analysts, and a fires element. It functions as the core effects-based approach experts within the command and is organized as depicted in Figure 14. The EC is manned with 11 Military Joint Theater Distribution positions and one SOJ2 intelligence analyst.

¹²⁴ *Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) Effect Cell (EC) Charter* (Camp Smith, HI: Special Operations Command Pacific, 6 September 2007) 3.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ *SOCPAC EC Charter*, 5.




Figure 14. Effects Cell Organization.¹²⁷

The Effects Cell's primary purpose is to enhance the current planning process by incorporating a system of systems analysis (SoSA) of both the OE and the enemy. It does this by utilizing a deliberate planning database tool that methodically and fully integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power. The cell accomplishes this through the SOCPAC Effects Cell Process and its management of four major functions (Knowledge Base Development, Effects-Based Planning, Effects-Based Execution, and Effects-Based Assessment).

2. SOCPAC Effects Cell Process:

a. Knowledge Base Development

"Knowledge Base Development" is a continuous process that provides the foundation for the implementation of an effects-based approach. It provides SOCPAC with a full understanding of the OE, available resources, and flexibility to use those resources effectively. The knowledge base development is managed through a combination of an Operational Net Assessment (ONA) database, and routine

¹²⁷ SOCPAC EC Charter, 5.

“wargaming” of Red (enemy), Green/Grey (ally/host-nation) objectives and potential responses to Blue (U.S./Coalition) actions, intentions, or perceptions. The command uses a web-based Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) to enhance coordination and collaboration of primary staff elements.¹²⁸

The ONA database for the SOCPAC WOT focus areas is populated with data on enemy and friendly systems, organizations, characteristics, and relationships. The EC and its corresponding working groups use SoSA to “identify, analyze, and relate the goals and objectives, organizations, dependencies and inter-dependencies, external influences, and other aspects of the various systems of sub-systems.”¹²⁹ This is accomplished by using PMESII and MTFRIC filters for each friendly and enemy system. The ONA Analyst then uses known intelligence and open source information to conduct a nodal analysis identifying linkages between PMESII and MTFRIC subsystems. This allows effects planners to then identify key nodes to target resources or actions against in order to achieve desired effects. This analysis is further validated by the Red/Green/Blue wargaming. The effort produces an effect-node-action-resource linkage and planners use this to refine their thinking during the mission analysis and COA determination processes.¹³⁰

b. Effects Based Planning

As stated, effect-based planning (EBP) attempts to integrate all aspects of national power (DIME) within the OE in order to create a desired effect necessary to achieve the commander’s objectives. SOCPAC uses EBP to recommend potential COAs for the commander’s decision in order to achieve WOT objectives. “EBP emphasizes connecting theater objectives to tactical tasks through the attainment of desired effects within the operational environment.”¹³¹ The tasks are assessed separately from the desired effect through the use of a Measure of Performance (MOP). MOPs are only

¹²⁸ *SOCPAC EC Charter*, 9.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *SOCPAC EC Charter*, 10.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

focused on task accomplishment, and it is primarily the responsibility of the SOJ5. This is because MOPs answer the question, “Are we doing things right?”¹³² The SOJ5 planner can then take that assessment and adjust plans for future action based on the cost benefit analysis provided by SOCPAC's effects-based assessment process.

c. Effects-Based Assessment

"What is the return on the investment?" This was one of the recurring themes for former USPACOM Commander Admiral William J. Fallon when briefed on OEF-P operations and SOCPAC's WOT efforts in the Pacific Theater.¹³³ ADM Fallon knew he had very few resources at his disposal in executing the WOT in his AOR, and he wanted reassurance that objectives were being met. The SOCPAC's effects-based assessment process is an integral part to identifying the operational progress achieved or not achieved. The primary criteria to perform this assessment are Measures of Effectiveness (MOE). Each command objective is further refined by the effects needed to achieve that objective. MOE are tied to the assessment of individual desired effects. Each MOE measures changes in PMESII and MTRIC systems and essentially aid the analyst to answer, “Are we doing the right things?”¹³⁴ SOCPAC uses the online collaborative Effects Based Assessment Support System (EBASS) as the command's assessment management tool. EBASS attempts to provide a “near-objective, metric-based evaluation of environmental conditions that represent an overall effect.”¹³⁵

d. Effects Based Cycle and Process

SOCPAC executes its effects-based approach through a baseline 16 week cycle, with a six-week cycle sustainment cycle. There are three cross-functional elements that are part of the SOCPAC matrix-like staff organization. These are: the Operational Net Assessment Working Group (ONAWG); the Effects Assessment Cell (EAC); and the

¹³² Fridovich, "SOCPAC Effects-Based Approach Command Brief (Unclassified)," 7.

¹³³ Michael Weathers, SOCPAC Commanding General's Aide 2004-2006, Interviewed by author, 30 September 2007.

¹³⁴ Fridovich, "SOCPAC Effects-Based Approach Command Brief (Unclassified)," 7.

¹³⁵ SOCPAC EC Charter, 11.

Effects Working Group (EWG). Additionally, the Executive Effects Working Group (E-EWG) provides the final guidance and decisions to focus the primary cells and groups across the command. The Process is outline in Figure 15 (SOCPAC EBA Battle Planning, Execution, and Assessment Cycle). It starts with the initial commander's guidance and his list of primary objectives, which in turn define the focus of the EBA planning effort. Next the ONAWG conducts a Blue/Red/Green wargame in order to develop the initial SoSA; identify key nodes; conduct a comparative analysis of each player's actions; and establishes expected baseline effects that link to critical nodes. The commander's objectives are now effectively linked to associated effects. The E-EWG then conducts a baseline assessment to determine progress towards GWOT objectives. For example an effect could be a change in behavior of terrorist and/or host nation. Metrics are used to measure this effect based on a green, amber, or red system. This assessment then feeds the EWG that determines the appropriate action/effort utilizing the correct DIME option. This becomes the focused activity or tactical tasks to be completed (e.g., train host nation CT Unit). Finally a post activity assessment is conducted to determine if desired effects were achieved. These results are a cost-benefit analysis of each effort directed at GWOT objectives.




Figure 15. SOCPAC EBA Battle Planning, Execution, and Assessment Cycle.

The cycle when utilized correctly complemented SOCPAC's shift to an indirect approach to operations in the WOT. The cycle in theory established a process and criteria to measure success and the overall return on investment. In order to understand "why" SOCPAC choose EBA it is important understanding "how" SOCPAC framed its indirect approach to the WOT.

F. SOCPAC'S INDIRECT APPROACH AND EFFECTS-BASED THINKING

In early 2005 SOCPAC began to shift its operational focus in the WOT to a more indirect approach. The command began to focus more on the underlying conditions that foster terrorism in the Pacific theater, rather than purely conducting direct action "capture or kill" operations through, by and with partner nations. The command's first priority was to develop security and stability in the Philippines by shaping the environment through the use of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and civil-military operations. The goal was a "method [that] promotes economic development and shapes

conditions for good governance and rule of law.”¹³⁶ The method is protracted in nature and only works if the host nation’s leadership, military, law enforcement, U.S. interagency “Country Team” and USPACOM military forces (SOF and conventional) work in concert to build capacity and leverage each others’ strengths in a synchronized effort.¹³⁷ SOCPAC drew on the success and lessons learned of earlier efforts during the earliest stage of OEF-P on Basilan Island. By respecting the relevant population on Basilan, the legitimacy of host nation and American image improved. This approach leads to a secure and stable environment that enables significant commerce and quality life improvements.¹³⁸ SOCPAC focused on this lesson learned, and developed a three pronged approach to the conduct of IW in support of WOT objectives.

1. Indirect Approach Elements:

“Three elements constitute SOCPAC’s indirect approach in the Pacific region: institution-building, capacity-building and outside factors.”¹³⁹ Each element serves to concentrate the instruments of national power in a holistic approach to warfare in the Pacific theater. Each of these elements plug directly into SOCPAC’s effects-based thinking.

a. Institution-building

“Finding out how to get there [to the relevant population] first to give the people a leg up without creating resentment is an important aspect of institution-building.” SOCPAC’s role in this element was to support the construction of legitimate institutions of security, governance, rule of law, infrastructure, and economic stability.

¹³⁶ Fridovich and Krawchuk, "Winning in the Pacific The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach," 24.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 24-25.

¹³⁸ McKaughan, 27.

¹³⁹ Fridovich and Krawchuk, 25.

b. Capacity-building

SOC PAC used tools like the strategic estimate process and EBA to identify the capacity-building programs needed to build more professional and modern military forces within partner nations. The direct effect is a more professional and proficient host nation force that respects and upholds the rule of law. The indirect effect is the relevant population that now supports the now legitimate host nation government. This is accomplished through a protracted training plan coupled with interagency recommendation and buy-in. The former SOCPAC commander stated, “We closely plan and coordinate our activities with our partner nations and U.S. embassies to ensure we are working with the right partners in the right areas at the right time.”¹⁴⁰ However, SOCPAC was challenged with accomplishing these two objectives by tackling multiple outside factors.

c. Outside Factors

By early 2005, SOCPAC was left with a resource dilemma as operations in the Iraq and Afghanistan continue to require the majority of SOF resources worldwide. SOCPAC had to figure out “how to do more with less” due to the burden of increased SOF deployment and rotation schedules in support of OIF and OEF-A.¹⁴¹ In addition, SOCPAC was challenged with finding a way to impact the external network, resources, and ideology of its adversaries through more indirect means as the lead for USSOCOM GWOT efforts in the Pacific.

2. Effects-base Measurement of an Indirect Approach

SOC PAC incorporated an effects-based approach in order to have meaningful criteria for judging success and failure. The effects-based thinking gives the command a method to mitigate outside factors while prioritizing tasks in conducting an irregular campaign focused on institution and capacity building efforts. The command laid out a

¹⁴⁰ McKaughan, 27.

¹⁴¹ Fridovich and Krawchuck, 25.

framework for a protracted 5-10 year campaign plan to shape conditions in the Pacific theater that promote commerce, rule of law, and education. SOCPAC thought that these objectives could be accomplished by directly impacting the conditions that promote despair and violence. Indirectly, terrorist networks would then be isolated from the relevant population now that a legitimate alternative was provided by SOCPAC's efforts in the Pacific theater.¹⁴²

G. SUMMARY:

“In the end, the only meaningful criteria for judging SOF strategy and operations in the war on terror in Southeast Asia are the results and changes that ensue.”¹⁴³ SOCPAC's adopted an effects-based approach in order to enable a more consistent and accurate assessment of their success in conducting IW in USPACOM's WOT efforts. SOCPAC's EBA looks beyond military centric indicators, providing the commander with the means to improve effectiveness during current operations and in planning future IW efforts. SOCPAC's indirect approach to the WOT managed by an EBA aims to methodically assesses those conditions that create instability, improve the socioeconomic and security situation at hand by enhancing the legitimacy of local government, and severing ties with terrorist networks.¹⁴⁴ Whether this is the best approach and applicable beyond the Pacific theater is the focus of the next chapter.

¹⁴² Fridovich and Krawchuk, 26-27.

¹⁴³ McKaughan, 27.

¹⁴⁴ Fridovich and Krawchuk, 27.

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V. ANALYSIS OF THE SOCPAC MODEL: APPLYING AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO IRREGULAR WARFARE

A. INTRODUCTION

SOCPAC developed an irregular warfare model that has the potential of achieving security, stability, and peace in the protracted environment of the WOT. SOCPAC recognized in early 2005 that a unilateral direct approach campaign strategy was not the answer. Success in the WOT would need to rely on targeting the ideology and conditions that contribute to terrorism by working “by, through, and with” host nation partners throughout the Pacific theater. SOCPAC understood that a traditional direct approach strategy did not necessary apply to an operational environment where the primary strategic and operational objective is control of over the relevant population rather than terrain. In order to control or influence the population SOCPAC believed the full range of military resources along with the application of the other instruments of national power were required to succeed. However, just like the participants of *Unified Quest 07* would later find out, SOCPAC identified a gap in the existing Joint Operations Planning Process and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) doctrine and the need for a unique planning and assessment capabilities needed to conduct an IW campaign. To fill this gap SOCPAC turned to target planning tools like CARVER and early EBO theory before finally choosing an effects-based approach (EBA) as the solution. An analysis of SOCPAC’s model provides a starting point in understanding how EBA has the potential to fill the critical planning and execution gap that exists in the current *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept*.

B. SOCPAC’S MODEL: INDIRECT AND EFFECTS-BASED

SOCPAC effects-based approach to the conduct of IW helps the command prioritize efforts, shift resources and ensure that the indirect approach remains focused and balanced.¹⁴⁵ The strength in SOCPAC’s model is two-fold. First by conducting

¹⁴⁵ Fridovich and Krawchuk, "Winning in the Pacific, The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach," 27.

irregular warfare through an indirect approach SOCPAC overcomes the shortcomings of a pure attrition-based strategy. The conventional wisdom of finding, fixing, and eliminating the enemy has proven difficult in the GWOT. SOCPAC cannot simply plan and execute a strategy based on unilateral direct-action missions into sovereign countries in the Pacific theater. To succeed, it must blend host nation capacity-building and long-term efforts that address root causes of terrorism and instability as well as eliminate the existing threat in theater.¹⁴⁶ The consequence of a purely conventional attrition-based strategy is politically, economically, and socially untenable, and no attrition-style campaign could be so successful as to eliminate all potential terrorists. SOCPAC turned to an indirect strategy governed by an effects-based approach to operations because it provides a framework to purposefully shape the interactions of the actors in a complex irregular environment.¹⁴⁷

Second, SOCPAC's model works within the current U.S. military construct by simply attaching to and amplifying current joint command and staff operation doctrine. The model complements and enhances the commander's ability to intuitively balance his military actions with the other instruments of national power. It does not replace the commander's years of experience or limit his courses of action (COAs). On the contrary, the process better informs his staff and him on how to best shape the operating environment to achieve success in an asymmetric fight. The result is a staff thinking process that complements the commander's own *coup d'œil* (strategic vision) in identifying those military operations that best complement unified action in a protracted WOT campaign. The use of an effects-based approach has provided the command with the advantages being able to conduct a cost benefit analysis, focuses the "logical lines of operation"¹⁴⁸ and its ease of integration and adaptation of the existing joint doctrine to a more holistic application of all the instruments of national power.

¹⁴⁶ Fridovich and Krawchuk, "Winning in the Pacific, The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach," 27.

¹⁴⁷ Smith, x.

¹⁴⁸ NOTE: "logical lines of operation" is a term derived from Joint Publication 3-0. Joint Publication 1-02 defines "lines of operations" as: "1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s). 2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). Also called LOO. (JP 3-0)"

1. Advantages

a. Provides Cost Benefit Analysis

Application of an effects-based approach to irregular warfare improved clarity in tactical employment in the Philippines, particularly when conditions change and assigned tasks are no longer viable. SOCPAC allowed itself the ability to be more consistent and accurate in assessing its success in the Philippines by looking beyond military centric indicators. This is achieved by measuring effects at all levels through the use of pre-defined measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) to determine changes in the environment (see Figure 16). As the example in Figure 16 displays the MOEs and MOPs when used in concert enable the SOCPAC staff to assess effects of a joint/combined Department of State (DOS), Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) and Republic of the Philippines (RP) Humanitarian Military Assistance project and the resulting impact on the local population's response to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The resulting assessment gives SOCPAC a metric on its investment. This then leads to validation of current engagement or the need for an alternate approach.




Figure 16. MOE and MOP Assessment of Tasks and Effects Example

b. Focused on Logical Lines of Operation

SOC PAC's planners are better able to communicate their objectives to lower echelons for execution. The use of PMESII and MTFRIC lines of operation provide a useful construct for the design of SOC PAC indirect campaign efforts in the Philippines and greater Southeast Asia. Both PMESII and MTFRIC systems analysis enable the commander and staff to frame the problem and identify desired objectives and effects necessary for success. This has provided a common operating context for integration of the operations and activities of non-military organizations and agencies. SOC PAC built an assessment schema for operations in the Philippines, and it has become directly nested within the way SOC PAC and USPACOM look at all countries in the AOR. This has allowed the "effects to task" assessment to be integrated into the various echelons (strategic, operational, and tactical) in the Pacific theater. JSOTF-P is now able to assess itself and the effects it is having on increasing the capacity of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or in coordinating interagency efforts with the U.S. Embassy Country Team.¹⁴⁹ By integrating a common operating context along logical lines of operation at both the JSOTF-P and USPACOM levels, SOC PAC established a baseline for long range investment in the effects-based process.

c. Integrates into Current Joint Operations Planning and Execution System

SOC PAC's planning efforts guide joint operation planning at the operational level. This effort links the operational and tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives.¹⁵⁰ Effects are now a key element of operational design according to SOC PAC's effects-based model. Integration of EBA within the JOPP and JOPES seeks to clarify the relationship between objectives and tasks and help the SOC PAC staff determine conditions for achieving WOT objectives in theater.¹⁵¹ As such, the EBA is

¹⁴⁹ Michael A. Albaneze, COL SOC PAC, SOJ00EC, "RE: Doctrine update 1 v6[1].doc (UNCLASSIFIED)" Email to author, 6 March 2007.

¹⁵⁰ Joint Publication 5-0, "Joint Operation Planning," 26 Dec 06, Ch.I, para. 10.a. p. I-9.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, Ch.III, para. 8.b, p. III-12.

oriented at the operational and strategic levels of conflict and not the tactical.¹⁵² More specifically, “Thinking in terms of a direct or indirect approach and desired or undesired effects can help amplify the meaning of strategic and operational objectives, determine appropriate tasks and the best sequence of actions to accomplish them, develop more precise assessment measures, and use other elements of operational design more effectively”.¹⁵³

However, SOCPAC is still working to fully implement this new way of staff thinking throughout the command. Several shortfalls have limited the full application of the effects-based process. First and foremost SOCPAC has not achieved the level of interagency “buy-in” necessary to fully implement its IW efforts. Second, the existing bureaucracy is currently at odds with acceptance of the new way of thinking, more so now given the high operations tempo. This is manifested in SOCPAC staff resistance, which has resulted in the failure of the Special Operations Joint Intelligence section to fully incorporate a systems based analysis into the intelligence cycle.

2. Shortfalls

a. Full Interagency Collaboration

The *IW JOC* goes into detail about the importance of unified action in an IW campaign. “The JFC and military and IA planners must acknowledge and maintain balance across the campaign by continuously asking, ‘What will be the effect of this action or effort on the other lines of operation, the overall political-military campaign, and the strategic objectives?’”¹⁵⁴ Unfortunately, SOCPAC has only succeed in getting the separate military echelons (USSOCOM, USPACOM, and JSOTF-P) to routinely ask this question. Integration of the Country Team and other interagency (IA) partners was only accomplished at the tactical level. The Republic of the Philippines U.S. Country

¹⁵² Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Operation Planning,” see Figure III-1 “Effects and Command Echelons, p.III-13.

¹⁵³ Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Operation Planning,” see Figure III-1 “Effects and Command Echelons, Ch. IV, para 5.d, p.IV-8.

¹⁵⁴ DoD, *IW JOC*, 29.

Team is not part of the effects-based process except when queried for assessment information. The result is a “disconnect” in the unified effort needed for a holistic application of the all instruments of national power. SOCPAC alone cannot overcome this shortfall. Without a national effort within the USG to evolve IA capabilities, SOCPAC will have to maintain its piecemealed approach to a unified effort.

b. SOCPAC Bureaucracy and Effects-based Thinking

SOCPAC is a hybrid of the “procedural”, “craft”, and “coping” organizations described by James Q. Wilson in his book, *Bureaucracy What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It*.¹⁵⁵ The result is an organization that is near impossible to manage. SOCPAC multiple mission requirements has caught it in a situation where the command can at times easily observe the activities and outcomes (exercise execution) and at other times are left with outputs and activities (Information Operations (IO)) that cannot be observed and are difficult to measure. The bipolar nature of the command has left the staff with the difficult decision of defining core tasks that match the dynamic nature of the organization. In a perfect world the commander and staff would understand the importance of carefully defining core tasks of the organization and to find both pecuniary and no pecuniary incentives that will induce operators to perform those tasks as defined.¹⁵⁶ Prior to implementing an EBA, SOCPAC’s management system was primarily a “coping” organization using a “procedural” approach. Now the command is becoming more “craft-like” organization as it tailors its approach to each unique task.

SOCPAC adopted this new staff thinking process in order to balance its approach to the GWOT. One of the primary issues with SOCPAC’s EBA staff thinking process is that it has evolved faster than the current organizational design. This resulted in forcing the staff into compliance through the implementation of “matrix-like” planning

¹⁵⁵ NOTE: In *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It*, James Q. Wilson defines procedural, craft, and coping organizations as: **procedural**: “When managers can observe what their subordinates are doing but not the outcome (if any) the result from those efforts;” **craft**: consists of operators whose activities are hard to observe but whose outcomes are relatively easy to evaluate;” **coping**: “can observe neither the outputs nor the outcomes of their key operators.” 165-168.

¹⁵⁶ James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It* (United States: Basic Books, 1989), 174.

cells and boards. A secondary result has been staff resistance to “owning” the process. This is compounded by the administrative “turn-over” common to most joint commands. The result is the required longevity and experience needed to manage an EBA.

c. Staff Resistance

One former SOCPAC operations officer stated, “Unfortunately, SOCPAC staff still struggles with ownership of this process and investing time into the development of long-range solutions. This process pushes you to think long-range but that requires time and people which is challenging in a joint environment.”¹⁵⁷ Another officer described the relevance of the new system simply as “a way of articulating what was being accomplished in a more formalized way in the RP [Republic of the Philippines].”¹⁵⁸ Initially the general consensus was that attempting to create an Operational Net Assessment (ONA) that provided near perfect data on effects (that included the enemy and non-combatants and links social and physical infrastructure) at any given time was a bridge to far. Setting up an effects cell within the command was one thing, reliance on an EBA process would only result in a slowing of the decision-making process while a commander and staff awaited the ONA output.¹⁵⁹ As James Wilson points out bureaucracies, like SOCPAC, work against an EBA process because it redefines the tasks required. It was incredibly difficult to force staff members outside their comfort zones and take ownership of the process.

Despite the initial resistance, the SOCPAC staff did slowly take ownership. This was largely accomplished by the SOCPAC commander’s personal desires. However, without an increase in knowledge and quantifiable benefits to learning this new way of thinking remains a piece meal process. The model has yet to prove that SOCPAC can effectively integrate this system into a larger interagency approach. This has left many staff officers on their own to access effects beyond what is directly

¹⁵⁷ Eric Walker, “RE: What’s Up--Need Some Info,” Email to author, 7 October 2007.

¹⁵⁸ Michael Weathers, SOCPAC Commanding General's Aide 2004-2006, Interviewed by author, 30 September 2007.

¹⁵⁹ Author’s Notes, SOCPAC (Summer 2005)

impacted by U.S. or host nation militaries. Thus the system relies on subjective assessment of effects, often times not supported by any evidence from interagency partners.¹⁶⁰ Without a common lexicon, training, and inclusion of other governmental agencies and host nation partners, it is only through the loose professional and personal relationships that they assessment piece truly works.

d. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)

The Effects Cell and ONA cell are providing framework for which the command could expand its efforts, however the Special Operations Joint Intelligence section (SOJ2) has not incorporated a deliberate SoSA into its everyday JIPOE. One of SOCPAC's senior ONA analyst stated, "that the SOJ2s JIPOE staff process has not fully incorporated the work of the ONA and Effects Cells."¹⁶¹ This shortcoming is indicative of the greater problems SOCPAC is having with the entire staff taking ownership of the process. The "matrix-like" cells and commander's directives have served as a quick fix. However, full indoctrination of the EBA process in daily staff activities has not been accomplished. The shortcomings of in JIPOE to blend EBA full time point to the problems that the process has evolved faster than the bureaucracy.

C. SUMMARY

Despite the shortcomings of SOCPAC's effects-based approach to a more indirect campaign, it has proven itself as example of how to operationalize the central concept of the *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept*. Over two years prior to the *IW JOC* publication, SOCPAC was employing a more indirect approach in order to influence relevant populations in the Pacific theater's war on terror. SOCPAC identified early on in its own paradigm shift that the current staff construct and doctrinal processes did not fit the irregular operational environment that dominates the WOT. SOCPAC needed a way to move beyond the linear thinking of traditional major combat operations and find a

¹⁶⁰ Deputy SOCPAC Effects-Cell, SOJ00EC, interviewed by author, Camp Smith, HI, 11-12 June 2007.

¹⁶¹ SOCPAC ONA Analysis, interviewed by author, Camp Smith, HI, 11-12 June 2007.

way to define the complexity of an OE that include all instruments of national power working in concert to positively effect integrated subsystems of the nation-state system, while at the same time negatively effecting the centers of gravity of the terrorists networks in the Pacific theater. By adopting an effect-based approach to operations SOCPAC enabled the staff to identify those key COGs and leverage its limited resources effectively to achieve the SOCPAC commander's operational objectives.

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VI. CONCLUSION

A. FILLING THE GAP WITH EBA

As the SOCPAC model has shown, an effects-based approach facilitates the use of a top down systems approach to defining the current irregular warfare environment in the Pacific theater. SOCPAC's model has also moved towards developing the holistic solution for balancing both direct and indirect approaches to warfighting. What SOCPAC has shown in the past two years is the potential for an effects-based approach to cover the needs for critical campaign planning, preparation, execution, assessment, force development, and force management capabilities in the greater GWOT. An effects-based approach to irregular warfare supported by the evolving technology that speed and amplify a systems based analysis of the operational environment could be the future of campaign planning. The rise and popularity of "small wars" in a more irregular environment, where the end game is population control rather than control of territory, has brought the military and political leader back together. No longer can the joint force commander simply ignore the other instruments of national power when security, stability, and peace do not equate to annihilation of an adversary's forces. Adding an effects-based approach to the current JOPES is necessary at the theater strategic and operational levels, specifically during the planning, execution, and assessment of an operation.¹⁶² It provides the JFC and his staff with the potential tools to "operationalize" the concepts presented in the *IW JOC*, in order to achieve strategic and operational effects in the GWOT.

However, the shortfalls identified in the analysis of the SOCPAC model expose the need for additional changes beyond the adoption of just an effect-based approach. The lack of interagency inclusion and staff resistance may require greater fundamental changes to how the Department of Defense (DoD) and the United States government (USG) as a whole are approaching the GWOT. Further study is required that goes

¹⁶² Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations*, i.

beyond the understanding of “jointness” and builds on how the concepts of irregular warfare and effects-based thinking can be applied to broader unified action. Throughout the research and development of this thesis it has become clear that an effects-based approach can potentially fill the planning, execution, and assessment gap in the *IW JOC*. However, the process is not enough in and of itself. What is needed is further research on the organizational structure required to execute a holistic DIME strategy in an irregular warfare campaign. SOCPAC’s is an example of the potential of implementing an effects-based approach as starting point for development of that doctrine.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

If SOCPAC’s model is to become more broadly applied several institutional issues must be addressed within DoD prior to application to the GWOT. The U.S. military must work to evolve its organizational design to support the successful conduct of irregular warfare at the same level achieved in the conventional realm. EBA as a staff thinking tool needs to be incorporated doctrinally, just like the existing joint planning and execution systems. USSOCOM as the lead in implementation of the *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept*, needs to further analyze the SOCPAC model and push the other TSOCs to develop their own Effects Coordination Cells that are tailored to each theaters WOT requirements. USSOCOM can leverage its role as the lead for the USG in the GWOT to modify the staff bureaucracies in order to incorporate these doctrinal changes. However, in order to prevent the same shortfalls that SOCPAC has encountered additional doctrinal and training requirements must be addressed.

First, the process and products used in an effects-based approach must be incorporated into service staff operating doctrine. The current JOPES must be updated to include effects-based planning products. This will expose the joint force commander and his staff to the various processes and products outlined in the *Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Operations*. Furthermore it will inform the staff where an EBA fits within the current joint doctrine.

Second, effects-based thinking needs to be incorporated earlier in the training and development cycles of the U.S. military’s junior officer and non-commissioned officer

corps. Each service must reflect the changes needed in the development of those officers and non-commissioned officers that will be the future of the joint force. The concepts behind irregular warfare and effects-based thinking must be ingrained into the future joint force and become second like the current military decision making process (MDMP).

Third, the Department of Defense and the U.S. Government must develop a common interagency lexicon to guide current and future *IW JOC*. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explored correcting this problem with a “Goldwater-Nicholas II” concept. This was an effort to initiate the same type of revolutionary change that occurred in the Department of Defense under the original Goldwater-Nichols Act, only on a broader scale. Secretary Rumsfeld hoped to change the concept and understanding of the inner workings of the U.S. governmental interagency system, much like Goldwater-Nicholas changed the way DoD understood the “joint” operations.

Fourth, the Joint Manning Document (JMD) authorizations need to be updated to reflect the specialized skills needed to establish effects coordination cells and irregular warfare specialist. The bureaucracy survives on the authorizations and money that support current manning requirements. Without, these changes USSOCOM and the COCOMs will have to pull positions in an “ad hoc” manner and that only works counter to building the needed skills and longevity to be effective in the protracted nature of the GWOT.

Fifth, as the lead planner, USSOCOM should not dictate a “playbook” for conduct of IW. The very complex nature of IW does not lend itself to set plays. Rather USSOCOM needs to further research the development of an adaptive system that provides predictive and measurable assessment. An effects-based approach will potentially allow each JFC and his staff to determine the most appropriate ways and means to execute an IW campaign in their theater or area of responsibility.

Finally, further research is required to analyze the capability of the DoD and the current USG to effectively accomplish national security priorities in the GWOT. There is

not a single person, agency, or department within the USG charged with the responsible for planning, coordinating, resourcing, executing, and controlling all elements of national power within the National Security Apparatus for IW.

C. FINAL THOUGHT

Napoleon Bonaparte's second maxim of war states,

In planning a campaign, it is necessary to anticipate the enemy's actions, and then to prepare the means to thwart them. Plans of a campaign may be modified, *ad infinitum*, according to circumstances – the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the terrain of the theater of action.¹⁶³

This maxim will always hold true despite a conventional or irregular “theater of action.” However, understanding how to plan a campaign that “anticipates”, “thwarts”, and is still flexible enough to be “modified, *ad infinitum*, according to circumstance” has change over the centuries. No longer can the general simply rely on his staff to translate his strategic vision into the tactical destruction of a belligerent's forces. Today the staff needs a tool that goes beyond the current joint operating systems in be effective in winning in the irregular environment. By coupling an effects-based approach with the current joint staff process, USSOCOM can start the process of operationalizing the *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept* and give current and future joint force commander's the way and means to complement their strategic vision in prosecuting an irregular fight.

¹⁶³ D'Aguilar, G.C., trans. and William Lidwell, ed., *Napoleon's Military Maxims* (WOWIO Books, 2006) <http://www.wowio.com/users/product.asp?BookId=11>, (accessed 3 July 2007), 1.

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