SATAN VS. SATAN: THE USE OF BLACK PSYOP TO REGAIN THE TACTICAL INITIATIVE IN THE COUNTERINSURGENCY FIGHT

by

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**REPORT TITLE**: Satan vs. Satan: The Use of Black PSYOP to Regain the Tactical Initiative in the Counterinsurgency Fight

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**ABSTRACT**

In the counterinsurgency fight, the insurgent has the tactical initiative because he is able to pick the time, place, and intensity of his own engagements. The insurgent’s environment, however, is very difficult one despite his initiative. The insurgent must balance the mutually exclusive requirements of hiding (operational security) and fighting (operational effectiveness) in order to gain/maintain legitimacy without being prematurely destroyed by the state. What if the state could influence this balance? What if there was a way for the state to directly target the insurgent’s resource allocation between these competing requirements? Typically, states attempt this through influencing the population to support the state and reject the insurgent. But what if the state could use the insurgent’s own propaganda machine against itself? Through mathematical modeling, I will show that Black PSYOP enables the state to make strategic moves on behalf of the insurgent that are so detrimental to his cause that he must act in order to counter “his own” moves. In this way, the state is able to turn “Satan” against himself. “How shall then his kingdom stand?” ---Matthew 12:26

**SUBJECT TERMS**

Black PSYOP, Black Propaganda, Deception, Counterinsurgency, Reflexive Control, Tactical Initiative, Guerrilla Warfare
SATAN VS. SATAN: THE USE OF BLACK PSYOP TO REGAIN THE TACTICAL INITIATIVE IN THE COUNTERINSURGENCY FIGHT

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I. BACKGROUND

“And if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself; how shall then his kingdom stand?” 1 ---Matthew 12:26

In the unconventional (insurgency/counterinsurgency) fight, the insurgent has the natural tactical initiative. He gets to choose the time, place, and intensity of his own engagements. If he feels that he is not ready to conduct operations, he can withdraw and regroup. He can prioritize his targets and focus his resources and efforts accordingly. He can also choose to what extent he will resource operations based on how much he can afford to risk losing if the operation fails. The state attempting to counter him must react to the insurgent’s choices. Because of the reactive nature of this scenario, the state must constantly wait for an insurgent mistake in order to be able to gain the upper hand. The potentially protracted nature of this strategy necessitates a strategy where the state can capitalize on insurgent vulnerabilities to cause some of these insurgent errors.

We should not romanticize the insurgent’s strengths while overlooking his weaknesses. J. Bowyer Bell recognized that the life of an illegitimate organization (such as an insurgency) is far from pleasant on most days. He brings up the fact that the insurgent is always on the run, always being hunted, unable to avail himself of the amenities provided by the state, and eventually cut off from both the world at large and many of his own constituents. Bell concludes that the insurgent operates within a dynamic where operational security and operational effectiveness (tempo) are inversely proportional.2 We see this tradeoff in the extreme in that on one end of the spectrum, the insurgent could hole up in an underground bunker and do nothing where the state could not locate him. The drawback to this position is that the insurgent would also fail to accomplish anything meaningful, thereby degrading what little legitimacy that he has. On the other end of the spectrum, the insurgent could engage in open operations, thereby

increasing his operational tempo and efficiency, but then he exposes himself to the
detection and presumed retribution of the state. From this we conclude that in order to
remain viable, the insurgent must dedicate resources to both his operational security in
order to remain undetected and his operational tempo and efficiency in order to retain
whatever legitimacy he wishes to project. Since the two are inversely proportional to
each other, the resources dedicated to the one are not available for the other. Since the
insurgent has finite resources, he must constantly maintain this delicate balance to
survive. The insurgent’s need to maintain this balance presents a significant vulnerability
that the state can exploit in the counterinsurgency campaign.

The insurgent derives many of his resources and most of his security from the
population in which he operates. This has caused much theorizing about how best to
affect this population. The state typically focuses on avoiding operations that will
alienate the population from the state, and in trying to convince the population that the
insurgent is bad for them. While the first consideration is certainly essential to waging a
successful counterinsurgency, the second often encounters very difficult credibility
issues. It is difficult for the state to convince a sympathetic population of the insurgent’s
malevolence. These propaganda campaigns often have limited effectiveness because of
the credibility issues involved combined with the fact that the state will find it very
difficult to completely avoid unsavory operations while dealing with an opponent such as an insurgent.

We seldom consider courses of action that the insurgent could take that would
actually degrade his own support within the population. The reasons for this general lack
of consideration are relatively simple. The state assumes a rational insurgent opponent
that will not intentionally torpedo his own cause, and the state does not feel that it has any
control over the strategic moves of the insurgent, making the consideration of such moves
in planning appear little more than wishful thinking. But what if the state could make
moves of its own choosing on behalf of the insurgent? Could it then upset the insurgent’s
delicate balance discussed above? I will discuss ways to design Black Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) to do precisely that.
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

A. GENERAL DEFINITION

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) is the use of audio, visual, or audiovisual media to convey a message that influences foreign target audience behavior toward target behavior that is beneficial to United States interests. This target behavior is what is referred to as the “PSYOP objective.” The target audience is the person or group of people that are expected to engage in the target behavior. Since the modern media environment makes it very difficult to narrow message dissemination, there can be multiple target audiences for particular objectives. The message given in the medium is the “PSYOP product.” When planning a PSYOP campaign, there will be a “PSYOP program” assigned to every PSYOP objective. Under each program there will be a “series” for each target audience. These terms become essential as we get more into the model outlined below. I will focus on analyzing the programs throughout this paper.

Because of its focus on human behavior, PSYOP remains a very experimental endeavor, and its results are very difficult, at times, to predict or measure. This fact also cannot be ignored in considering some other aspects of the proposed model.

B. THREE CATEGORIES OF PSYOP

PSYOP is divided into three categories based on knowledge of the source: white, gray, and black. White PSYOP has a known and attributed source. The vast majority of all United States PSYOP products are White PSYOP because they overtly originate with the U.S. government and function as an articulation of policy. As such, the U.S. government has seen fit to maintain close monitoring of messages conveyed, since all such messages are attributable to the government. The advantage to White PSYOP is that its overt nature reduces its need for secrecy. The disadvantage is that because the source is readily identifiable, source credibility may dictate message credibility.

3 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-05.30: Psychological Operations, (April, 2005): 1.2.
4 FM 3-05.30: Psychological Operations, 1.8.
Gray PSYOP means that the source is unknown. Anonymous op/ed pieces in newspapers and magazines, and advertisements that do not reveal their source would all qualify as a form of Gray PSYOP when they target foreign audiences. The advantage of Gray PSYOP is that by concealing its source, credibility can become less of an issue allowing ideas to be judged more on internal merit. Conversely, some audiences might call into question the content of any message “afraid” to reveal its origin.

Black PSYOP deliberately misrepresents the source. This would involve messages that seem to be from someone other than the true source. The relevance to counterinsurgency operations is that the state can potentially use this method to send messages in the name of the insurgent. The drawback to this type of PSYOP is its difficulty in execution. If a Black PSYOP campaign gets exposed, the U.S. government gets caught lying, which would damage U.S. credibility. The other reason is that when engaging enemy states, the governments of those states have the ability to publicly correct the misrepresentations of their intentions, thereby further undermining that credibility. I will address these disadvantages later, but one of the major advantages is that a state utilizing Black PSYOP against an insurgent enable it to “make strategic moves” on behalf of the insurgent that might be detrimental to his cause. This would force the insurgent to act to mitigate the effects of “his own” actions, which would occupy precious resources and manpower, thereby potentially upsetting the delicate balance that the insurgent must maintain for his survival. Another reason why Black PSYOP against an insurgent potentially avoids some of the pitfalls of its more general use against states is that many of the countermeasures available to the states are not available to insurgents. The insurgent cannot call a press conference to correct the “misconceptions.”

C. WHY BLACK PSYOP AND NOT WHITE PSYOP?

This question is a very important one, for as we will see in the discussions below, performing Black PSYOP can be very risky, and performing it well can be very costly. If

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there is a way to accomplish the same objective through White PSYOP, why would we want to use Black PSYOP? The simple answer is that we would not. Because of White PSYOP’s overt nature, it is much easier to develop and disseminate, and there is much less danger of blowback from the population discovering that they have been deceived. So what conditions would make Black PSYOP a better alternative than White?

Several answers to this question present themselves based on the nature of the environment that the PSYOP is attempting to influence. The most obvious case for using White PSYOP is that there is little danger of blowback as long as the content of the PSYOP is true. So what is the disadvantage of using White? One answer is rather simple: source credibility. If the population has lost faith in the state as a reliable source of information, then White PSYOP will have little to no effect in influencing the population. This analysis can be segmented as well based on the subgroups within the population. If certain segments of the population do not place any faith in the state as a source of information (such as the insurgent’s supporting population,) then trying to influence their behavior with products that overtly claim what the population believes is a tainted source is not a very effective plan. Black PSYOP, if executed properly, has the ability to sidestep this credibility issue. Black PSYOP gives the potential for the state to address a population that has already dismissed the state as a credible source of information. It does this by claiming to be from a source other than the state. For the purposes of this paper, the Black PSYOP will claim to be from the insurgent.

White PSYOP’s ease of dissemination relative to Black PSYOP suggests another limiting circumstance for the use of Black PSYOP: incompetence. If the state does not have the competence, which I will discuss a little later, to effectively develop Black PSYOP products and successfully disseminate them to the target audience, then using Black PSYOP is not only useless, it is hugely counterproductive. Incompetently executed Black PSYOP will effectively destroy the last vestiges of the state’s abovementioned credibility, thereby invalidating other attempts to communicate with the population.

There is a third limiting factor for the use of Black PSYOP: duration. Since no deception campaign can expect to last forever without being discovered, the plans to use
Black PSYOP should always be focused in time and limited in objective. The state should do this in the hope that the program will be complete before it is discovered, and that whatever the objective was had sufficient importance to justify the risk. For the purposes of this paper, the objective of the Black PSYOP is nothing more than to compel the insurgent to act, thus gaining the state the tactical initiative. The programs that I describe in this paper are designed to do absolutely nothing more than that. However, they are also designed to do nothing less.

There is one more contributing factor that would dictate that Black PSYOP should not be used: availability of countermeasures. If the target of the Black PSYOP has the means to expose the deception in such a way as to make the blowback too painful for the deceivers to bear, then Black PSYOP should not be employed. In the modern information environment, the use of Black PSYOP against another state actor or a legitimate non-state actor, such as a profession (the press) or a religious group, does not make much sense. The reason for this is that if the Black PSYOP is discovered, then the leadership of the targeted group can call a press conference and tell the world about the deceptions attempted by the perpetrators. The programs proposed in this paper are all aimed at deceiving the population in order to compel the insurgent to act. Since the insurgent does not have a means, that does not involve exposing himself to targeting and surveillance, of exposing the state’s Black PSYOP, then the state must largely concern itself with the population’s ability to counter the deception. If this is deemed unacceptably high, for any number of possible reasons, then the state should seek an alternative to Black PSYOP.

In summary, if White PSYOP will accomplish the intent, Black PSYOP is a foolish alternative. If the state lacks the competence to make the Black PSYOP indistinguishable (discussed below), then Black PSYOP can be catastrophic. Black PSYOP should never be conducted beyond the duration that the deception can be maintained. And Black PSYOP should only be conducted in cases where the risk of exposure through the countermeasures available to the target has been properly weighed and found to be acceptable. This said, there are some times when White PSYOP simply will not accomplish the mission. If the credibility of the state is compromised, then
Black PSYOP may provide the only means of getting around the stigma by coming from “another source.” If the state is trying to influence members of the insurgent’s supporting population, then Black PSYOP may be the only way to get in under their guard. In dealing with an insurgent, Black PSYOP can also provide a situation, if executed properly, where the insurgent is left with only two choices: accept the claims of the Black PSYOP as his “party line,” or take action to correct the misconceptions that the Black PSYOP is now his “party line.” Because it directly pollutes his communication channel to the population, it has a much different effect than White PSYOP, which can normally only challenge his communications. Through the use of Black PSYOP, the state can make the insurgent choose to either clean up “his own mess” or accept the fact that the state has made the insurgent’s bed, and now the insurgent must lie in it. When faced with White PSYOP, the insurgent is able to argue with the state. Because of this, the insurgent may generally ignore the state’s argument (PSYOP) if he feels that the population will also do so. When faced with competent Black PSYOP, the insurgent looks like he is arguing with himself. Yet, for the reasons discussed above, it is an argument in which he must engage. It is unclear who will win such an argument, but it is almost certain that there is some sense in which the insurgent will lose.

While I will discuss some aspects of the need for competence and capability to perform Black PSYOP, I am really not trying to prove whether or not the state has the capability. I am trying to show that the potential for utility of a properly executed Black PSYOP campaign justifies the cost associated with developing the capability and the risk (in certain circumstances) associated with its use. The majority of this paper will discuss the potential utility of competent Black PSYOP, but before I can do that, I must set some baselines for what I mean by competence. There must be no illusions about the deceptive nature of Black PSYOP, and as such, the factors involved in competently planning deception operations must apply to Black PSYOP campaigns as well.
D. BLACK PSYOP AS DECEPTION

If we are to discuss the utility of Black PSYOP, we must view it in the larger realm of deception operations, since without deception, there is no Black PSYOP. The deception proposed by this paper through Black PSYOP is more a Chinese method of deception than a western one. The western concept of deception involves changing the opponent’s perception of reality to cause him to decide to take a course of action detrimental to himself. The Chinese are more focused on manipulating the opponent’s environment in such a way that his utility function is altered and he makes a decision detrimental to himself. This concept, referred to as reflexive control, is central to the model that follows. In order to achieve reflexive control over an enemy, the deceiver must create conditions that will compel his opponent to act in a particular way. This concept is central to the use of Black PSYOP against an insurgent in order to regain the tactical initiative for the state. If the state can achieve reflexive control over the insurgent, then the state can determine the time, place, and intensity of the insurgent’s engagements, thereby removing the insurgent’s control over his delicate survival balance described above. The indirect nature of Black PSYOP makes it difficult to plan, however, because it does not follow common PSYOP planning thought processes. Normally, it is the primary target audience that is expected to engage in the target behavior. In these cases of Black PSYOP, the primary target audience will be the insurgent, since the target behavior would be his response to his environment (the population) that Black PSYOP has just altered. Planning difficulties arise because the targeting for the deception operation is just the opposite. Deceiving the insurgent is both unnecessary and extremely difficult. The target of the deception is the population (the insurgent’s environment.) So while we are trying to elicit insurgent behavior, we are deceiving the population. The benefit of this approach is that without the need to deceive the insurgent, the state need not penetrate the counter-deception mechanisms of a necessarily paranoid organization like an insurgency. The state need only deceive the population into believing that the propaganda comes from the insurgent. It does not even

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have to be true or verifiable propaganda, which effective deception would normally require. It need only be indistinguishable from propaganda perpetrated by the insurgent. At that point, the state must determine whether or not the population has sufficient mechanisms to detect the deception in spite of a general lack of need to do so. If there is an unacceptable risk of population discovery, then, as mentioned before, the state should not engage in Black PSYOP. Yet true indistinguishability from insurgent propaganda can help to actually deflect some of the potential blowback onto the insurgent, as I will show in the discussion of the programs in this paper.

The indirect approach’s most profound difficulty is the potential unpredictability of the insurgent’s responses to his environment and environmental change. This unpredictability necessitates a realistic expectation of the PSYOP objectives. The state must not expect Black PSYOP to accomplish more than it is capable of. What I plan to show is that Black PSYOP can compel the insurgent to act, spending valuable resources, making himself potentially targetable, and most of all, making himself visible to the state. Black PSYOP is not, and truly cannot be, expected to contain or pacify the insurgent. In other words, Black PSYOP is not designed to get the insurgent to stop acting. It is not designed to get the insurgent to stop acting so violently. It is not trying to “win the hearts and minds” of the population. It is designed (in the context of this model) merely to make him act. It is important to note that if Black PSYOP can create environmental changes that would compel an insurgent to act when he otherwise might not feel it in his best interests, then Black PSYOP has been effective at reflexive control, for it has given the state the ability to manage the insurgent’s resource expenditures, thereby gaining the tactical initiative.
III. THE NEED FOR COMPETENT DECEPTION

A. FOWLER AND NESBITT'S RULES FOR TACTICAL DECEPTION

While the state is merely trying to deceive a population into believing that the propaganda that they are seeing originates with the insurgent, it is essential that the population never doubt this truth. In order to accomplish this, the state must engage in a highly competent deception campaign. The majority of the programs that I will discuss in this paper focus on the local manifestations of the insurgency and their local propaganda. As a result, the majority of the operations that I propose for Black PSYOP are going to be tactical in nature. Fowler and Nesbitt outline some principles for conducting tactical deception, and their principles provide some good instruction on how to ensure the quality of our Black PSYOP campaign. The entire reason that I include these rules here is to set a baseline for what I mean when I refer to a “competent Black PSYOP campaign.” If the state is unable to achieve competence in these principles, it should not attempt Black PSYOP because of the limitations discussed earlier. Conversely, the programs discussed in this paper start with a presupposition that the state is able to execute them according to the standards laid out in the below principles from Fowler and Nesbitt. As a result, the discussion of utility that dominates the model of the various programs presupposes realism as described here.

1. Rule 1: Expectancy

Fowler and Nesbitt’s first rule is that “to be effective, a deception must be one that causes the enemy to believe what he expects.”9 Since we seek to deceive the population in order to achieve reflexive control through environmental manipulation, we would replace “enemy,” with “population.” Black PSYOP campaigns rely heavily on this rule. The campaign’s effectiveness rests on the deceiver’s ability to generate products indistinguishable from normal insurgent propaganda in every respect except for the deceiver’s intentional modifications. This applies to the product itself as well as the

dissemination mechanism. If the population is used to receiving insurgent propaganda in the form of a “night letter” on their front porch in the morning, then Black PSYOP arriving in the mailbox would fail the expectancy test, and would potentially alert the population that something was different. This requirement presents some significant intelligence challenges for the state. In order to make the Black PSYOP meet the expectancy of the population, the state must understand both how to make the products look just like insurgent propaganda, but also how to properly disseminate them to the population without alerting the population’s “radars” that there is something different about the Black PSYOP. When the populace picks up the flyer or hears the radio broadcast, it has to look or sound just like the other insurgent propaganda, thus meeting their expectations that they are looking at insurgent propaganda.

2. **Rule 2: Feedback**

The second rule says, “timely feedback is an essential element of all major deception operations”\(^\text{10}\) This is particularly true of a Black PSYOP campaign. While PSYOP of any sort has a much slower feedback loop, there are also indicators of the deception’s credibility with the population. Populace reaction and insurgent response will guide the deceiver in painting the picture designed to degrade insurgent legitimacy and compel insurgent action. From a practical and resource standpoint, the state must allocate the necessary intelligence assets to collect the feedback essential to the deception operations.

3. **Rule 3: Integration**

The third rule addresses the integration of deception with operations\(^\text{11}\) As discussed above, even mild deception success will necessitate enemy action. We should analyze and target these actions to exploit such success. Essentially, we should plan operations based on enemy responses to our reflexive control.

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\(^{10}\) Fowler and Nesbitt, “Tactical Deception,” 44.

\(^{11}\) Fowler and Nesbitt, “Tactical Deception,” 44.
4. **Rule 4: Denial**

The fourth rule addresses what happens if the plan does not go just right. It asserts the necessity of denial of information on the real activity and countermeasures are required.\(^\text{12}\) The vulnerability in the denial aspect of the operation is often during the delivery phase. Propaganda is of a public nature, so it should not be too hard to place some fake propaganda mixed with the real ones using HUMINT sources. Even a source being compromised need not end operations. Convincing products should still resist population detection, leaving the possibility of desensitizing the population, and forcing the insurgent to act. Fowler and Nesbitt’s warning of the importance of denial should not be ignored, however, because performing Black PSYOP on a supposedly neutral population can have political blowback.

5. **Rule 5: Realism**

The fifth rule deals with the need to resist detection. It states that the realism required of a deception operation is a function of the enemy’s sensor and analysis capabilities as well as the amount of time that he has to make a decision.\(^\text{13}\) Deceivers trying to perform Black PSYOP who cannot produce propaganda products that look indistinguishable from the insurgent propaganda will have no success. Reflexive control of the insurgents through Black PSYOP relies entirely on the population attributing the statements made in the fake propaganda to the real insurgents. This attribution will only occur if the population cannot distinguish between the two sets of propaganda. If the population can tell the difference, then the insurgents can safely ignore the Black PSYOP products, denying the state reflexive control. The fifth rule benefits the state also, in that it also states that the realism only needs to match the level of the enemy’s detection capability. In this case, we are only concerned about the population detecting the deception. Since many of them have no vested interest in determining the authenticity of a piece of random propaganda, they will be more likely to (as the first rule says) “believe

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\(^{12}\) Fowler and Nesbitt, “Tactical Deception,” 44.

\(^{13}\) Fowler and Nesbitt, “Tactical Deception,” 44.
what they expect.” This principle removes some of the pressure from the deceiver because he does not have to overcome quite as high a degree of skepticism as would come from the actual enemy.

6. **Rule 6: Creativity**

The last rule states, “The most effective deception will be imaginative and creative. It cannot be legislated or ordered, and it must not be stereotyped or bureaucratized.”\(^\text{14}\) The six categories of Black PSYOP objectives that I outline below are not an exhaustive list, or an attempt to “stereotype and bureaucratize.” Many variations also exist within each of these categories, leaving plenty of room for flexibility in establishing a Black PSYOP campaign. The key to using Black PSYOP for reflexive control is to plan how to exploit any possible outcome.

\(^{14}\) Fowler and Nesbitt, “Tactical Deception,” 76.
IV. MODELING METHOD FOR BLACK PSYOP PROGRAMS

In order to design a Black PSYOP campaign that will exert reflexive control over the insurgent, it is necessary to design a model to predict insurgent behavior under given conditions. We would then be able to manipulate those conditions to elicit the desired response. To do this, I have used the six step modeling process described below. The six steps are identify the problem, make assumptions, solve the model, verify the model, implement the model, and maintain the model.15

A. IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM

In this phase of the modeling process, we must look at the question or problem that the model will answer or solve. In the most general sense, the problem is how to take advantage of the insurgent’s disadvantages in order to create a set of conditions that would compel him to act. Each of the Black PSYOP programs described below has their own problem statement, but they all serve to support this overarching question.

B. MAKE ASSUMPTIONS

This step is necessary because, by definition, a model is a simplified version of reality. Simplification means that there are factors that we must ignore for the purpose of analysis, and in narrowing down the variables to be analyzed, we must make assumptions about variables not under scrutiny. We must also make assumptions about the interactions between different variables. Two critical activities occur at this stage in the modeling process. The first is identifying and classifying the variables. The second is determining the interrelationships that exist between the variables and any sub-models within the overall model. I will expand on the different variables specific to each type of Black PSYOP program in the discussions below, but several categories of variables are common to all of the programs. The following four categories of variables will appear in each of the program models: initial support conditions, population responses, insurgent

responses, and resultant support conditions. I will define each briefly below in addition to describing some of the interrelationships that they have to the rest of the model.

1. **Initial Support Conditions**

   This category refers to the attitude and posture of the population toward the insurgency prior to the start of the program in question. There are three possibilities in this category: active support, passive support, and non-support. Active support involves the population actually providing support in the form of manpower, logistics, or information to the insurgent. Because of the additive power of this type of support, I have assigned a numerical value of (+1) to the condition of active support, meaning that active supporters within the population enhance the insurgent’s utility by one unit. Passive support means that the population does not provide actual assistance, but does nothing to turn the insurgent in to the authorities. This most often takes the form of the population turning a blind eye to the insurgent’s activities in the area. Because of the lack of any real effect on the insurgent because of this type of support (either positive or negative), I have assigned a numerical value of (0) to the condition of passive support. The insurgent could not survive if there were only passive supporters because he still needs overt assistance, but he relies pretty heavily on the presence of this non-negative support from the population within which he must function. Non-support means that the population is actively against the insurgent and will take action in the form of armed uprisings (rare) or turning the insurgents in to the state. Non-supporters within the population make it difficult for the insurgent to maintain his operations. As a result of this detraction from the insurgent’s cause, I have assigned non-support with a numerical utility value of (-1).

2. **Population Responses**

   This category of variable refers to how the population will respond to each Black PSYOP program being modeled. The assumption necessary to this portion of the model is basic competence on the part of the deception practitioners in implementing Fowler and Nesbitt’s six principles of tactical deception described above. The figures displaying the response rules do take into account that even a well-executed deception operation will
have some skeptics in the midst, and I have tried to capture the categories of possibilities ensuing from that portion of the population that did not believe that the propaganda was from the insurgent. I discuss the specifics of these variables within their respective Black PSYOP program sections. Lack of a currently implemented model makes it difficult to ensure that all possibilities are covered, but there is plenty of flexibility built into the model to add more population response possibilities later. It is important to remember that these are not what the model is trying to produce. Instead these responses are what the model is trying to use to compel insurgent response to the various forms of Black PSYOP programs. Because of this fact, there are no numerical values associated with the population responses to the various programs.

3. Insurgent Response

This category of variable describes how the insurgent can attempt to counteract the effects of the Black PSYOP program contained in the model. The insurgent directs his responses at the population in order to try to maintain his support level or increase it. They are almost always intended to reverse the effects of the Black PSYOP campaign described in the “Population Response” section. The insurgent responses generally fall into three categories, although some exceptions will be discussed in some detail later. The first category of insurgent response is to “correct by contact.” This normally involves the insurgent making direct, personal contact with the target audience to correct the misconceptions that the Black PSYOP propaganda is from him. This can occur through meetings or other forms of direct communication such as phone calls, emails, personal letters, etc. Because all of these forms of communication can be targeted for surveillance, there is an operational security cost to any of these types of insurgent response. Because of this cost, I have assessed a numerical cost of (-.5) to any use of “correct by contact” by the insurgent. It should be noted that even if he is successful in reversing the effect of the Black PSYOP program, the program was still effective in this case because it forced him to take action that the state is able to target, thereby establishing a form of reflexive control.
The second common category of insurgent response is to “correct by counterpropaganda.” This response involves the insurgent putting out some real propaganda that tells the population that the Black PSYOP is fake propaganda. There are some potential inherent credibility problems with this insurgent response, since the Black PSYOP propaganda looks like the insurgent propaganda, and the new “correct” propaganda looks like insurgent propaganda. Yet he may try to use this channel of communication with the population in order to correct the misconceptions. After all, he recognizes the risks associated with correcting by contact, so if he can reverse the effects of the PSYOP campaign from a lower profile, that would make more sense. The problem is that there are several steps to putting out propaganda, and each one leaves some form of signature, especially when the state has narrowed down the insurgent’s necessary target audience through the state’s chosen targets for Black PSYOP. Some of the particulars of this narrowing process will be discussed in the individual programs to which they apply. This specificity on the part of the state can make insurgent dissemination without detection somewhat more difficult. It is, however, not as hard as trying to make physical, personal contact, so even though there is a cost in terms of both resources and exposure to putting out propaganda, I have assessed a cost of (-.25) to the “correct by counterpropaganda” response. As with the “correct by contact” response, the “correct by counterpropaganda” response constitutes a small victory for the state in achieving reflexive control. Ideally, the state will be able to use the counterpropaganda campaign to tailor future messaging or even penetrate the insurgent’s dissemination mechanisms, but even if these aims prove too ambitious, the state has shown that it has the ability to compel the insurgent to act based on Black PSYOP, and it can use this information to better tailor future Black PSYOP campaigns.

The third general category of insurgent response is to “not correct.” This essentially means that the insurgent determines that the damage is not sufficient to warrant a response, or that a response at this time would be either ineffectual or overly costly, so he takes no action in response to the Black PSYOP program. Because he uses no resources while doing nothing, there is no cost associated with the “not correct” response. The cost of this insurgent course of action is the reaction of the population to
the Black PSYOP campaign. The state has not achieved reflexive control when the insurgent opts for this response, so the state must attempt to use the insurgent’s failure to act in order to punish him in terms of population support. The model reflects this result for each of the Black PSYOP program types.

There are a few other types of insurgent response that are addressed in the individual programs where they apply, but most of the programs incorporate the above three categories in some form or another.

4. Resultant Support Conditions

This variable type refers to the final population support (described in the “Initial Support Conditions” section) that results from the combination of the initial support conditions, the Black PSYOP program, and the insurgent responses to the Black PSYOP. As with the “Population Response” section, there is some room for uncertainty here. I give a narrative defense for each of the projected resulting support conditions predicted by the model, but until the model is actually implemented, there is certainly room for some disagreement. Once the model begins implementation, there will be considerable room for refinement as real world data comes in. As with the Initial Conditions, the resultant conditions fall into the three categories of “active,” “passive,” and “non-support.” The resultant conditions maintain the numerical associations of the initial conditions’ variable descriptions (+1, 0, -1 respectively.)

5. Some General Comments About the Probabilities of the Conditions

The model recognizes that there will be varying responses to the various forms of Black PSYOP program. It reflects these nuances with probabilities of the occurrence of some of the types of variables. There are probabilities for the initial support conditions, the population responses, and the insurgent responses. The values for the model shown here use a complete uniform distribution at every “decision point.” In other words, it uses 1/3 for each of the three initial support conditions present in the population, even though this number is probably unrealistic. If there are four options on a particular “branch” of the decision tree, then a probability of ¼ is used for all options, and so on. The reason for the initial uniformity is that it helps to initially reduce some of the inherent
subjectivity of the model. This uniformity is useful to compare the various programs to one another in terms of their net effect on the insurgent utility. Subsequent iterations can tailor these probabilities in order to refine the predictive power of the model.

6. Some Additional Relationships Between Variables

Some of the relevant equations for the various programs are described below.

The raw net utility change that the insurgent receives as a result of a given Black PSYOP program is calculated by taking into account population support change and insurgent action cost. The equation looks like this:

Net Utility Change (N) = (Resultant Population Support (R) – Initial Population Support (I)) + Insurgent Cost (C)

or:

N = (R - I) + C

There is also a weighted value of the net utility change (W) that becomes useful in considering the effects of various Black PSYOP programs on the insurgent. This value takes into account the probabilities that each set of conditions will occur. (W) takes into account the probability of the initial support conditions (P(i)), the probability of the population response (P(pr), and the probability of the insurgent response (P(ir)). I have also added an additional feature to the value of (W) and multiplied it by 1000 in order to show the effect that the Black PSYOP program would have in terms of insurgent utility on a population of 1000 people. Thus the equation for (W) is as follows:

W = P(i) x P(pr) x P(ir) x N x 1000
It is important to note that it is possible to find values for both N and W given a set of previous conditions. In other words, as we look at the decision trees for the various Black PSYOP programs, we could start at any point that we wanted to moving from left to right, and determine the N or W values for a particular condition. For instance, if we wanted to determine the weighted utility change within the percentage of the population that initially actively supported the insurgent, the W would be the sum of all of the W values that ended on “branches” of the “active support” initial condition for that program. This will be discussed in more detail in the analysis and conclusion section, but it is useful for determining the relative merits of different types of Black PSYOP programs.

Another important piece of information about the W value is that although it is weighted across a population of 1000, it does not translate directly into people changing support. The reason for this is that it incorporates the insurgent resource cost through the N value, which has no direct corollary to individual personnel. The one exception to this is when we calculate the W for insurgent inaction. The reason that, in this case, it directly translates into individual support changes is that there is no insurgent cost associated with inaction, which means that the W value in this case is not skewed by the value of C present in N.

C. SOLVE THE MODEL

The third step in the six step modeling process is to solve the model. This means that we apply whatever equations describe the interrelationships between the variables, and we draw our conclusions as to what the model tells us. In the case of this model, I will use the equations to show that each of the six different Black PSYOP program categories affects the insurgent’s utility function differently. As a result, each of them will have a different effect on his compulsion to act. The “Solve” step will allow me to demonstrate what the numbers tell us about the various Black PSYOP programs.
D. VERIFY THE MODEL

The fourth step in the modeling process is to evaluate what the numbers generated by the solve step tell us. Verification should answer essentially three questions. First, “Does the model address the problem?” Second, “Do the model’s predictions make common sense?” And third, “Do the model’s predictions match real world data?” A negative answer to any of these questions means that we must determine where the model went wrong in its attempt to describe reality. It should be fairly obvious whether or not the model addresses the problem. In each program verification section, I will address the common sense issue. I have already brought up the difficulty with answering the question of real world data, so much of that question will have to wait until after implementation, which is the step to which I now turn.

E. IMPLEMENT THE MODEL

The fifth step of the modeling process seems like it would be obvious, since the whole reason for model construction is to try to solve a real world problem, but for a variety of reasons, many models never get implemented. I will discuss several objections and obstacles to implementing this model after discussing each of the program models. The important thing to note is that without implementation, the last step of the modeling process is unnecessary and irrelevant.

F. MAINTAIN THE MODEL

In the last step of the modeling process, we constantly evaluate the predictive value of the model based on data collected during implementation because conditions may change. Variables that the model initially ignored or assumed values for may prove to be more important or more volatile, or assumed relationships between variables may not occur according to the model’s predictions. We must refine the model so that it better approximates reality (recognizing that an approximation is all that a model is designed to achieve in the first place.)

The important thing about the maintenance of this model is that there are inherent assumptions made during the course of the model’s development. This said, there is a
profound difference between maintaining the model and discarding it. Even if some of the initial assumptions prove inadequate, unless it can be shown that there will be no resultant effect on the insurgent’s support if he fails to respond to a properly executed Black PSYOP campaign, then the model needs refinement and maintenance, not disposal.
V. SIX TYPES OF BLACK PSYOP PROGRAM

I am proposing six different types of Black PSYOP programs for consideration. Recalling Fowler and Nesbitt’s sixth principle, these six are by no means an exhaustive list of possibilities. These six should give an idea of the potential for Black PSYOP to exert reflexive control over an insurgent, thus gaining for the state the tactical initiative in the counterinsurgency. The six program types that I will discuss below are as follows: dilute, distract, divide, deluge, desensitize, and domesticate. I will discuss each in some detail, explaining how the various steps of the modeling process apply to each individually. After that, I will draw some conclusions from looking at all six that can be useful in planning for the implementation of this model.

A. DILUTE

1. Description

The Dilute Black PSYOP program involves taking existing insurgent propaganda and redistributing it with aspects of the message garbled. The garbling could come in the form of either changing key portions of the message to seemingly conflict or just not match, or it could involve changing portions of the propaganda message to be virtually unintelligible. The choice of how to execute this program depends largely on what the state is trying to accomplish through it. Changing key aspects of the message, such as specific instructions (e.g. “Gather for a protest at 12:00 noon at the monument in the center of town”), will get some immediate feedback about the portion of the population that is actively supporting, and also how believable the deception actually is. If the actual propaganda gave instructions to meet at the monument at 12 noon, and the Dilute propaganda said to meet at the soccer field at 9:00 AM, then you will know by who shows up at the soccer field what portion of the active supporters of the insurgency believed the deception. It is important to note that the goal is not simply to turn the population into Pavlov’s dogs. Even if the people do not show up, if the Dilute propaganda meets Fowler and Nesbitt’s realism test, then the population will have a hard
time getting its instructions from insurgent propaganda. The insurgent would then have to use channels other than propaganda to instruct the population.

2. Identify the Problem

The Dilute program model seeks to determine whether or not state garbling of insurgent propaganda can force the insurgent to act.

3. Make Assumptions

The four basic population response categories for the Dilute Black PSYOP program need definition in this section. They are disillusionment, confusion, ignore, or provide delayed or unsynchronized support. Disillusionment describes a population reaction that determines that the insurgent cannot get his act together to put out a coherent message, so how can he be trusted? It would seem that this is a rather rare phenomenon, but if coordinated with other operations and propaganda campaigns, Dilute could conceivably have this effect on the population. The significance to the insurgent is that if the population gets disillusioned with him, they are far less likely to support his cause or fear his threats. The second category of population response is that the population simply become confused. This seems that it would be a rather common response, as it entails the population not knowing what it is that the insurgent is trying to convey through the propaganda. When this happens, the population will attempt to resolve the insurgent’s message through internal debate, which can provide opportunity for Human Intelligence (HUMINT) resources to insert themselves into this process, allowing the state to do even more damage to the insurgent’s organization. The third category of population response would be for the population to simply ignore the propaganda. The population could simply believe that since they cannot make sense of the seeming contradictions, that the message was not intended for them. They could simply feel that the content of the message does not directly concern them, so there is no real need to reconcile the “different” messages. The effect of this response on the insurgent would be that the population is no longer responding to propaganda that looks like it is from him. This effectively closes that form of propaganda as a communication channel between the insurgent and the population. Most of his alternative channels of
communication are much less secure or much less efficient. The fourth category of population response is delayed or unsynchronized support. This mostly applies to those that are already providing active support to the insurgent. This reaction describes those that showed up at the soccer field in the earlier example. They mean well, but they have the wrong set of instructions. Below I have included figures that propose the response rules for a Dilute program. There is a separate one for each of the initial population support conditions. The figures do not take into account the probabilities for any of the responses, but as discussed before, I assume uniform distribution at each “branch point.” Since delayed or unsynchronized support does not really apply to those that are initial non-supporters of the insurgency, I have left that option off of that decision tree. The “believe/not believe” distinction on the decision trees is an attempt to show that the responses have the potential to vary if the population either believes the deception or does not believe the deception. The distinction between these two responses is not part of the model, but is merely designed to show the thought process in determining response rules. Because of the external nature of the believe/not believe distinction, there are no probabilities associated with them. It is important to note that “believe/not believe” refers not to the content of the message, but to its source misattribution. The reason that no probabilities have been attached to this category is that the distinctions between the population’s response are not hard and fast. In other words, there may very well be people who believe the deception, but still ignore the message. The figures below tell the story. A more detailed narrative defense of the response rules appears in Appendix A.
Figure 1. Response rules for Dilute Program with initial active support

Figure 2. Response Rules for a Dilute Program with initial passive support
4. Solve the Model

Figures 1-3 show the Raw Net Utility Change for each of the possible outcomes of the Dilute model. From these we can examine the cumulative values for N and W.

\[ N = (R - I) + C \]

\[ W = P(i) \times P(pr) \times P(ir) \times N \times 1000 \]

When we look at the results of these equations for the overall program, we get

\[ N = -16.25 \]
\[ W = -459 \]
Figure 4 shows what the population support breakdown would be from the initial set of conditions following one iteration of a Dilute Black PSYOP program.

![Diagram of Dilute Iterations](image)

**Figure 4. Effects on population support after one iteration of a Dilute Program**

Figure 4 shows that with an initial uniform distribution of population support, one iteration of a Dilute program will cause the active support to go from 1/3 to 6/33, the passive support to rise from a third to almost one half, and the non-support to hold at around one third. If we were to run a second iteration of the model, we would use these as initial probabilities.

But the real question that must be answered by this model is whether or not a Dilute Black PSYOP program can compel an insurgent to act, thereby giving the tactical initiative back to the state. In order to answer this question, we must look at the most telling calculation of all: what happens to the N and W values when the insurgent takes no action? To determine this, I calculated N and W for all of the options that involved the insurgent choosing “not correct” as his response, and then I summed these values together to get the total effect. The results follow:
N(aphathy) = -6
W(aphathy) = -168

As mentioned in the modeling process description, the value of W only translates into actual people when the insurgent takes no action, and therefore incurs no resource cost. What this means is that a Dilute program not countered by the insurgent will cause 168 people out of 1000 to downgrade their level of support for the insurgent, either from active to passive, or from passive to non-support. The effects of N on the insurgent who makes no response to a Dilute program are best depicted by Figure 5, which shows the actual resultant population support conditions, given a non-responsive insurgent.

Figure 5. Effect of Dilute Program on popular support of an apathetic insurgent

Figure 5 shows that the insurgent taking no action against a Dilute program, while it might temporarily maintain his tactical initiative in that the state has not been able to elicit a response, will significantly degrade his popular support. His active supporters will go from one third to only one out of 11. His passive supporters will drop to just
under one third at 4/11. And the non-supporters in the population will rise to slightly over one half. This means that the insurgent will have to devote increasing amounts of his finite resources to provide for his declining security, which will eventually remove his ability to dedicate anything to his operational efficiency, providing the state with a de facto victory over the insurgent. Most importantly, a Dilute Black PSYOP program, executed correctly, allows the state to directly impact the insurgent’s environment, and consequently, indirectly alter his decisions, which is the definition of reflexive control.

5. Verify the Model

To verify the Dilute Black PSYOP program model, we must answer the three questions required of the verification process. The first question is whether or not the model addresses the problem. I have shown that there will be a negative effect on the insurgent from a Dilute program either through initiative cost if he responds, or through support cost if he does not. As a result, the state can use the Dilute Black PSYOP program in order to gain the tactical initiative over the insurgent. The second question for verification is whether or not the model matches with common sense. If propaganda is being put out in the insurgent’s name that contradicts itself, then he either has to correct it or face the credibility consequences that follow. As a result, it would seem natural that the insurgent would face the modeled results in general if confronted with a well-executed Dilute program. The third verification question is whether or not the model’s results match real world data. As I have already mentioned, getting real world data to check the model’s results beforehand is somewhat problematic. The verification with real world data for this model will have to wait until implementation.

6. Implement the Model

Implementing a Dilute Black PSYOP program model against an insurgency faces some challenges. The most obvious seems to be timeliness. It would be rather difficult to have the fake propaganda “hit the streets” soon enough after the real stuff in order to have them reasonably mistaken for each other. This is going to vary depending on medium as well. If the insurgent propaganda that the state is trying to “dilute” is video, then the state faces a much more time-sensitive issue than if the medium is a “whisper
campaign,” where time of origin can be much more ambiguous. This program, more than probably any of the others, requires timely access on the part of the state to the latest in insurgent propaganda. It should not be allowed to create a rushed operation that increases the state’s vulnerability to detection. In the end, the potential payoff suggests a need to mitigate the challenges of implementation.

7. Maintain the Model

Most of the maintenance of a Dilute program model involves the careful collection of the answers to the questions posed in the verification section. Using data gathered after implementation to better refine the response rules and probabilities is essential to incrementally increasing the predictive utility of this model. Getting the data to refine the model may be difficult. It may not be possible to take a public opinion poll that will tell if the percentages match the predictions. There will still be some subjectivity involved, but it should be possible to come up with more useful answers as long as the practitioners insist on asking useful questions.

B. DISTRACT BLACK PSYOP PROGRAM MODEL

1. Description

The Distract Black PSYOP program uses what has come to be known as “pseudo-gangs.” It attributes Black PSYOP products to rival insurgent groups that are trying to steal the thunder of the targeted insurgent group. If the targeted insurgent group is trying to gain legitimacy for his cause by claiming to have accomplished certain operations, then the use of a Distract program can be very useful to steal his credit while having him expend his resources for no net gain. It is important to note that while there exists the potential for some wonderful counterinsurgency results from the insurgents believing that there are rival insurgent pseudo-gangs out there, this is not a requirement for the proper implementation of this program. The insurgent need not believe that any such gangs exist. In fact, he can know for certain that they do not. The only requirement for the Distract Black PSYOP program to work is that the population believes that the propaganda that comes as a result of the program is coming from a pseudo-gang (rival insurgent group.) This distinction sets this particular program apart from most historical
attempts at using pseudo-gangs. Fooling the insurgent is risky, resource intensive, and extremely difficult. Having the population believe that a previously unknown insurgent group is “responsible” for the vehicle that exploded at the checkpoint yesterday is considerably less challenging.

2. Identify the Problem

The Distract Black PSYOP program model is trying to determine whether or not the population believing that another rival insurgency group is performing the actions of the actual insurgency will force the insurgent to act, thereby establishing reflexive control over him.

3. Make Assumptions

Four basic categories of population response need definition in this section. They are as follows: credit the pseudo-gang, counter the pseudo-gang, ignore, or confusion/doubt. Crediting the pseudo-gang involves the population giving the pseudo gang credit for the insurgent’s actions. Countering the pseudo gang, when done by active supporters, means that the population will try to help the insurgent root out his rivals. From the non-supporters, there will be a lot of “tips” about sightings of “pseudo-gang” members up to mischief. The third category of population response is to ignore the new insurgent group. There can be any number of reasons for this choice of response, but the idea is that the population does not want to get involved in the inner workings of insurrection. The fourth category of population response is confusion and doubt. This would probably most often occur if the population does not believe that there is a pseudo-gang out there, but cannot otherwise account for the propaganda that is appearing in the name of this “new” insurgent. This response is potentially dangerous to the state because this portion of the population is particularly susceptible to mobilization to the cause of the insurgent if they find that the gang is, in fact, pseudo. There is, however, a requirement for the insurgent to contact the population to get them to believe that they have been duped, and this contact, is precisely what the state is trying to elicit from the insurgent in the first place. The figures below propose some response rules for the Distract Black
PSYOP program. A more detailed narrative justification of the response rules can be found in Appendix A.

Figure 6. Response Rules for a Distract Program on initial active support

Figure 7. Response Rules for a Distract Program on initial passive support
Figure 8. Response Rules for a Distract Program on initial non-support
4. **Solve the Model**

The values for $N$ and $W$ that the Distract Black PSYOP program gives us are useful, and are calculated by the following equations:

\[ N = (R - I) + C \]

\[ W = P(i) \times P(pr) \times P(ir) \times N \times 1000 \]

With a uniform distribution of possibilities described above, the values for the overall $N$ and $W$ for the Distract Black PSYOP program are as follows:

$N = -10$

$W = -276$

As with the discussion on the Dilute program, these values merely demonstrate what happens to the overall support of the insurgent (both in popular support and action cost) as a result of the Distract program. The actual effect in terms of resultant population support can be better captured in Figure 9 below.
Figure 9. Effects on popular support after one iteration of a Distract Program

Figure 9 shows that the Distract Black PSYOP program moves the population more towards passive support. The active supporters drop from 12/36 to 10/36, and the non-supporters drop from 12/36 to 11/36, while the passive supporters rise slightly from 12/36 to 15/36. This means that in the long run, the Distract program will work only slowly (slightly greater drop in active support versus non-support) or it will need help if it is merely designed to degrade popular support. Fortunately, this is not the intent of the program.

The important question is what happens to the insurgent if he does nothing in the face of a Distract Black PSYOP program? To answer this we need to look at one more set of N and W values.

\[ N(\text{inaction}) = -2 \]
\[ W(\text{inaction}) = -56 \]
What this $W$ value tells us is that after an iteration of the Distract Black PSYOP program, 56 people out of 1000 will have downgraded their support for the insurgent. The significance of the $N$(inaction) term is better illustrated by Figure 10 below.

![Distract With Apathetic Insurgency](image)

**Figure 10.** Effect of a Distract Program on popular support for an apathetic insurgent

Figure 10 shows that if the insurgent does not respond to the Distract program, his active support will go from 4/12 to 2/12. His passive support will rise from 4/12 to 6/12, and his non-support will hold steady at 4/12. Thus the Distract Black PSYOP program is useful to degrade active support in the face of inaction, which can compel him to act, even if it does not induce the desperate state of affairs in the face of inaction that some of the other programs do.

5. **Verify the Model**

Does the model address the problem? If the insurgent fails to take any action in response to the Distract Black PSYOP program, then he loses some active support. He may gain some passive support, but over time, this degradation will leave him little choice but to try to counteract it. The Distract program will eventually compel the
insurgent to act, but it is a less efficient program than some of the others. Does the model make common sense? If the insurgent is trying to gain legitimacy through action, and another group is able to claim credit for the actions that he is spending his resources to perform, then he is definitely going to run into eventual problems. Does the model match real world data? As with the Dilute program, while there are examples of pseudo-gangs being used with varying degrees of success, they were most often used in an attempt to deceive the insurgent himself, so real world data is going to be hard to come by until implementation begins.

6. Implement the Model

The benefit of implementing this model over more “traditional” pseudo-gang operations is that there need be very little verification provided to the population for the authenticity of the pseudo-gang’s claims. This program initially involves little more than taking “credit” for operations. Even though this program has less than spectacular numbers in terms of degraded insurgent utility, there are some other intangible benefits to this approach. The first is that a credible pseudo-gang can potentially provide blowback insurance in the event of a lapse in competence in applying Fowler and Nesbitt’s principles properly. If the Black PSYOP deception is discovered, it may be possible to deny state involvement by blaming the pseudo-gang for the deception. Obviously, there would need to be a certain measure of subtlety in handling such a delicate matter, but it could be done. Another potential benefit to this approach is that if intelligence tells us that the insurgent is planning to perform a particular operation, and for whatever reason, it is in the state’s best interest to stop the operation instead of exploit it, then the pseudo-gang could announce its “intention” to do the operation, thereby robbing the insurgent of its propaganda value. As a general rule, I would not recommend this course of action, since the stated intent of these programs is to compel the insurgent to act instead of prevent action, but it would be a demonstration of reflexive control, which would give the state feedback on the effectiveness of its deception campaign. Another benefit of the Distract program is that it takes less ingenuity than some of the other programs. It is claiming actions that the population would know about, but cannot say for sure who the perpetrator was. It is not trying to mimic a particular brand of propaganda because it gets
to make up its own group. The language must seem to come from a local source, but other than that, all that the propaganda need do is get the facts straight enough to convince the population that the pseudo gang could have either executed or planned the operation. One of the big drawbacks of the Distract program is that there is a certain amount of self-deception that must be allowed to continue in order to maintain the realism factor. Namely, the local authorities must be allowed to believe in the pseudo gang’s existence when the overzealous locals who have chosen to counter the pseudo-gang (whatever their reasons) call in “tips” of their nefarious activities. Since this pseudo gang is a rival insurgent group, local law enforcement may necessarily dedicate resources to its “eradication,” which could detract from real counterinsurgency efforts on the local level. Even this cloud has a silver lining, however, for such actions would be excellent feedback that the population believed the deception.

7. Maintain the Model

The need for maintenance and refinement in the Distract program is no less than that of any of the other programs. We need to derive some real world data on the effectiveness of the program and more precisely determine the actual initial conditions or added response categories in order to increase the long-term utility of the model.

C. DIVIDE BLACK PSYOP PROGRAM

1. Description

The Divide Black PSYOP program issues threats and hurls insults at key figures in the population on behalf of the insurgent. There is no reason for an insurgent to threaten an active supporter, so when “the insurgent” does threaten an active supporter, there is going to be a crisis in that relationship. There are several versions of this program and there is great flexibility in choosing targets. The “insurgent” can threaten or insult other insurgent leaders in his own or rival organizations, or he can threaten or insult local respected leaders who had previously given him support. The possibilities are extensive. The advantage of this program is that it gives the state the ability to narrow its target list to people that the insurgent cannot afford to alienate allowing it to better focus
the deception operation. One of the disadvantages is that the intelligence requirements to get inside those communication loops can be substantial.

2. **Identify the Problem**

The Divide Black PSYOP program model is trying to determine whether or not insulting or threatening prominent members of the population on the insurgent’s behalf can compel the insurgent to act to counteract the effects of these insults and threats.

3. **Make Assumptions**

The initial conditions categories are the same, as are the insurgent response categories. There could possibly be a discussion of a fourth insurgent response category which would be for the insurgent to carry out the threats that the Divide program signed him up for, but this would be so damaging to the insurgent both in terms of exposure and loss of popular support, that its probability would probably be negligible. The main variables that need defining are the population responses. There are four potential responses to the Divide Black PSYOP program. They are to mock or attack the insurgent, to demand clarification, to give in to the threats, or to ignore. The mock/attack the insurgent response means that the targeted population or individuals decide that they are going to fight back against the threats or insults with some actions or insults of their own. This can range from counterpropaganda against the insurgent to preemptive assassinations. In those cases where this response would occur, the threatened or insulted population would be someone who clearly has the upper hand. The second category of population response to the Divide program is that of demanding clarification from the insurgent. This simply means that the population will insist on knowing if the threats or insults are serious before they are willing to go back to business as usual. The third category of population response is that of giving in to the threats. This means that the population believes that the threats are credible, and that they had better take the required action or they will suffer the consequences. In these cases, the state potentially loses some supporters, but if the Divide program is executed properly, this response can provide some excellent feedback as to the effectiveness of the deception operation. The fourth possibility for population response is the ever-possible ignore. The population
might just choose to ignore the threats or insults. This may be because they do not think that the insurgent will carry through on the threats, or maybe they do not care what the insurgent thinks of them, but for whatever reason, the threats or insults elicit no response from the population. In the face of a Divide program, the ignore seems less likely than in some of the other programs because there is an actual threat being made against the population, so they are less likely to remain resolute in their apathy.

We see from Figures 11-13 the response rules for the Divide Black PSYOP program. Narrative justifications for the response rules are contained in Appendix A.

Figure 11. Response Rules for a Divide Program on initial active support
Figure 12. Response Rules for a Divide Program on initial passive support

Figure 13. Response Rules for a Divide Program on initial non-support
4. Solve the Model

In assessing the effect of the Divide Black PSYOP program on insurgent utility, we must consider our values for N and W for the program with the following equations:

\[ N = (R - I) + C \]

\[ W = P(i) \times P(pr) \times P(ir) \times N \times 1000 \]

The values that we come up with are as follows:

\[ N = -15 \]

\[ W = -412 \]

These values show the loss of insurgent utility inflicted by the Divide Black PSYOP program, but Figure 14 shows the effect of one iteration of the program.

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**Divide Iterations**

First Iteration (starting with even distribution)  
Leads to second iteration with adjusted distribution as initial conditions

- Active (10)
- Passive (10)
- Non-Support (16)

- Active (10)  
- Passive (10)  
- NGO-Support (16)

Figure 14. Effect on popular support after one iteration of a Divide Program

45
We see from Figure 14 that from an initial distribution of one third each, active support and passive support both drop from 12/36 to 10/36, while non-support rises from 12/36 to 16/36. This marks a significant rise in non-support.

The most important question to answer is whether or not a Divide Black PSYOP program can compel the insurgent to act. In order to answer this question, we must consider the insurgent’s cost of inaction with the following values for N and W:

\[
N(\text{inaction}) = -4 \\
W(\text{inaction}) = -111
\]

The W(\text{inaction}) value tells us that when the insurgent fails to act to counter the effects of a Divide program, he loses support from 111 people out of 1000. This is 11% loss of popular support. Figure 15 itemizes this loss of support.

**Figure 15.** Effect of a Divide Program on popular support for an apathetic insurgent
Figure 15 shows a dramatic shift of the population toward non-support if the insurgent fails to act. Active support drops from 4/12 to 3/12. Passive support drops from 4/12 to 2/12, and non-support rises from 4/12 to 7/12. These changes would require the insurgent to shift considerable amounts of his finite resources to ensure his operational security, which would mean that his operational efficiency would decrease proportionately. This means that the insurgent has the choice to either act or become ineffective when faced with a Divide Black PSYOP program.

5. Verify the Model

Does the Divide Black PSYOP model address the problem? We see that even if the insurgent does not act, the state is able to exert reflexive control over the insurgent’s allocation of resources by creating an environment hostile to the insurgent. This prospect should compel the insurgent to act in order to avoid this outcome. Does the model match common sense? There is a reason that insurgents, left to their own devices, generally do not use threats and insults to inspire those that already support them. The reason is that it is counterproductive to do so. The model shows the extent of the counter-productivity of this approach by creating a mechanism for the state to make these threats on the insurgent’s behalf. Does the model match real world data? As with the other programs, there will not be significant real world data until implementation starts.

6. Implement the Model

The most important consideration in implementing the Divide Black PSYOP program model is target selection. The goal is to compel the insurgent to act in order to clean up “his” own mess. To that end, the state must select a target population or individual that the insurgent will feel compelled to pacify. In the absence of that knowledge, the state should target the insurgent’s strongest support base because the most dramatic drop in support came from the active supporters subjected to a Divide program. The payoff for the Divide program is substantial, but the deception should be planned meticulously because if the targeted population sees a state hand behind the threatening propaganda, there will probably be a fair amount of blowback. The mitigating factor there is that those that are most likely the targeted population are
already supporters of the insurgency anyway, so the fact that they will like the state less seems only a marginal loss. This never excuses sloppiness in the craft of deception, for without proper deception execution, no Black PSYOP program will ever work.

7. **Maintain the Model**

As with all of the programs, there is a constant need to monitor and maintain this model once implementation starts. There may be unforeseen and unaccounted for responses that need to be incorporated into the model. The probabilities will almost certainly need to be refined. The population responses should give some feedback as to the deception’s success, and since the targeted population will probably be fairly small to begin with, surveillance should be somewhat easier in order to detect insurgent contact with the targeted population to clarify or retract “his” threats or insults. The more that the model gets refined iteratively, the more effective it will be at predicting eventual results, thus giving the state more and more precise reflexive control over the insurgent.
D. DELUGE BLACK PSYOP PROGRAM

1. Description

The Deluge Black PSYOP program signs the insurgent up for more operations than he can handle in order to degrade his credibility. It is based heavily on the insurgent’s finite resources and his need to balance their use. Most insurgents, left to their own devices, would take the time to position the resources, plan, execute, and exploit each and every operation in an attempt to get the most leverage out of every expenditure and exposure. What the Deluge program does is have “the insurgent” claim to plan to conduct a variety of operations for which he does not have the time, and possibly not the resources. There are some potential drawbacks to this program. One is that the proposed targets should initially be targets that the insurgent would conceivably attack. Later on, there might be some useful outcomes of signing the insurgent up for targets that seem irrational, but that probably falls more in the realm of a Divide program discussed earlier. The reason that plausible targets might prove to be a drawback is that if the insurgent decides to make good on the “threats,” then there will probably be loss of life inspired by the program. Another potential drawback is that if the insurgent fulfills the promise, then the state may have just given him an avenue to enhance his credibility. The nastiness of the Deluge program is that if the insurgent performs an operation, sign him up immediately for another one. Eventually, he will either run out resources entirely, expose himself by upsetting the balance of security versus efficiency, or face the lost credibility of failing to perform “promised” operations. Either way, the Deluge Black PSYOP program puts the state in the driver’s seat as the insurgent decides his own fate.

2. Identify the Problem

The Deluge Black PSYOP program model is trying to determine whether or not an operational tempo that exceeds the comfortable limits of the insurgent can force him to act to try to “slow things down.”
3. Make Assumptions

Two categories of variables need discussion in this section: population responses and insurgent responses. The two categories of population response to the Deluge Black PSYOP program are expectancy and apathy (ignore.) The population either expects the insurgent to fulfill “his” promises to conduct the proposed operation, or they do not consider it worth their time. Expectancy can either bring hope or dread. Some of the population may be rooting for the insurgent to hit the promised target, while others will be rooting against him, but both reactions fall into the realm of an expectant response category. The reason that this category is significant is that failed expectations lead to frustration, which means that when the insurgent fails to deliver on the expectations of the population, there is a question of why. Most potential answers to this question provide useful fodder for future campaigns. If the insurgent says that he refrained because of benevolence, future White PSYOP campaigns can call into question his rationale for future missions that he actually conducts. If he says that he did not intend to hit the target in the first place, some of his more virulent supporters may ask the question, “Why not?” In either case, the population is left with unanswered questions, and the burden of proof is on the insurgent, which forces him to act or face the loss in credibility. As always, there is a portion of the population that will ignore the operational “promises” of the insurgent. There are many possible reasons for this reaction, and very few of them affect the model. The second category of variables that must be addressed in this section is insurgent response. The insurgent has his standard “correct by contact” and “correct by counterpropaganda” options available to him, but a Deluge program breaks the former “not correct” option down into two different categories: fulfill and fail to fulfill. The names mean just what they say. The Deluge program makes promises on behalf of the insurgent, and if the insurgent does not correct the “mistake,” then he either fulfills those promises (conducts the operation), or fails to fulfill those promises (does not conduct the operation.) Fulfilling the operation carries with it a utility cost of (-1) because of the predictability of the exposure (the state picked the target) and the resources necessary to conduct the operation. Failure to fulfill carries no direct utility cost because no action is
required, but there is a loss in credibility described above. Figures 16-18 show the response rules for the Deluge program. Appendix A provides a narrative defense.

Figure 16. Response Rules for a Deluge Program on initial active support
Figure 17. Response Rules for a Deluge Program on initial passive support

Figure 18. Response Rules for a Deluge Program on initial non-support
4. Solve the Model

Determining the effectiveness of a Deluge Black PSYOP program in eliciting insurgent action requires us to examine the program’s effect on insurgent utility. This is best expressed with the values of N and W shown below.

\[ N = -9.5 \]
\[ W = -424 \]

These numbers are substantial, but because of the inclusion of the cost of insurgent action (C), we need Figure 19 to give us a more complete picture.

![Deluge Iterations Diagram](image)

Figure 19. Effect on popular support after one iteration of a Deluge Program

Figure 19 shows that the active support has dropped from 7/21 initially to 5/21. Passive support has risen from 7/21 to 9/21, and non-support has held steady at 7/21.
Thus we see that the majority of the –9.5 value for N above comes from utility cost of insurgent action to maintain these support levels.

So what happens when the insurgent does not pay that cost? The N and W values for insurgent inaction show us the effect of the Deluge program on the insurgent cause when unanswered.

\[ N(\text{inaction}) = -2 \]
\[ W(\text{inaction}) = -83 \]

These values show that the insurgent loses two segments of popular support, and the actual number translates into 83 people per 1000. Figure 20 depicts this effect.

Figure 20. Effect of a Deluge Program on popular support for an apathetic insurgent

Figure 20 shows that the active support goes from one third to one sixth. Passive support holds steady at two thirds, and non-support rises from one third to one half.
These changes are significant because the active support is shrinking, and the non-support is growing. The insurgent can only let this happen for so long before he must either act or die. This shows that the Deluge Black PSYOP campaign has the ability to gain reflexive control over the insurgent by forcing him to expend the resources and risk the exposure or face an eventual hostile population.

5. Verify the Model

Does the Deluge Black PSYOP program model address the problem? Yes. It creates the situation described above where the insurgency must either act or wither. Does the model match common sense? If the insurgent is either unwilling or unable to conduct operations that he “promises” to conduct, then the population must wonder why. This is going to cause questioning among his supporters and ridicule from his detractors. He must address this change in mood or face the consequences shown in the calculations above. Does the model match real world data? As with the other programs, there will be limited real world data available for analysis until the implementation phase begins.

6. Implement the Model

The biggest struggle for the state in implementing this model is that they are deliberately engaging in a program, whose effectiveness can best be measured by attempted insurgent operations. If the program signs the insurgent up to blow up a police station, then if the program is effective, those dead police are testimonies to that effectiveness. It is in this program more than any of the others where we see the distinction between trying to contain the insurgent and trying to defeat him. The state is not trying to make the insurgent nice. They are trying to make him act. The simplest way to do this is to channel his energy into doing what insurgents do: very bad things. This continued nastiness is also necessary because if the proposed operations were pleasant, then the supporters would probably not put pressure on the insurgent to follow through with them. It is this potential for disillusionment in the minds of the active supporters that the Deluge Black PSYOP program is targeting and harnessing.
7. Maintain the Model

As with all of the other programs, there is plenty of room for refinement. Once the implementation process starts, and data becomes available based on the expected responses, there should be room to improve the resolution and specificity of the Deluge Black PSYOP program model. These improvements should provide a better means of choosing types of operations to sign the insurgent up for, and groups of people in whom to attempt to create expectancy.

E. DESENSITIZE BLACK PSYOP PROGRAM

1. Description

The Desensitize Black PSYOP program takes the concept of “ignore” to a whole new level. The goal of the Desensitize program is to flood the population with “insurgent” propaganda to such an extent that they are sick of it. The beauty of this approach is that it can be the real thing. It does not have to be fake propaganda, although it certainly can be. The state can simply mass produce such huge quantities of existing insurgent propaganda that the populace is infuriated by having their yards covered with paper or their airwaves clogged with the same message ad nauseam. The most important aspect of this program is that it is completely “over the top.” Any half measures potentially make the insurgent seem bigger than he is, ultimately bolstering his credibility. The main goal of the program is annoyance of the population, with a longer term effect that they stop caring about the content of the message, and fixate on ridding themselves of the residue. Another benefit to this program is that the insurgent really cannot fix it with counterpropaganda, for obvious reasons. The potential drawback is that the desensitization of the population cuts both ways. The state will find that its White PSYOP efforts will suffer some losses of effectiveness while the Desensitize program is underway. There is, however, an asymmetry of loss between the state and the insurgent in these cases. The state has many other channels through which it can address the population. The insurgent has just lost one of his few, and his alternatives can probably be targeted for surveillance or exploitation. Either way, the insurgent begins to be
viewed as a public annoyance, which is an image that he must correct if he is to maintain popular support. If he loses the communication channel of propaganda to address his audience, then his only options for conveying his message to his population are direct contact and ostentatious operations. Both of these alternatives involve targetable action, which is the goal of the Desensitize Black PSYOP program.

2. Identify the Problem

The Desensitize Black PSYOP program model tries to determine whether or not the annoyance of the population or the potential loss of propaganda as a communication channel by the insurgent is enough to compel him to act, thereby giving reflexive control to the state in the counterinsurgency fight.

3. Make Assumptions

Although there seems to be little point in the insurgent attempting to correct a Desensitize program using counterpropaganda, I am leaving it as an option for analysis purposes. Conceptually, this would involve potentially using different types of media in order to correct the idea that he was the source of the annoyance. If the Desensitize medium was handbills all over the yards and porches, perhaps the insurgent would attempt to get his message out through audio CD’s distributed throughout town. The main category of variables that needs defining in this section is the population response category. The three population response types are as follows: frustration, confusion, and apathy (ignore.) The population will probably be very frustrated if their sidewalks are cluttered with insurgent handbills, or if their storefronts have no windows that can see out because insurgent propaganda has been plastered all over everything. The second possible population reaction would be confusion. This reaction mostly appears as the population tries to discern the reason for the insurgent propaganda push. This response is not necessarily completely separate from frustration, but it does not reach the point of true anger, but rather seeks to find the meaning in the event. The third population response type would be that they ignore the propaganda. This is more than the mere ignoring of the propaganda in some of the other programs. The population begins to ignore any insurgent propaganda, and perhaps all propaganda. This response is the
The ultimate goal of the Desensitize program because it robs the insurgent of a vital communication channel with his supporting population and leaves him with only expensive and vulnerable alternative channels. Figures 21-23 depict the response rules for the Desensitize Black PSYOP program, and Appendix A gives a justification.

Figure 21. Response Rules for a Desensitize Program on initial active support
Figure 22. Response Rules for a Desensitize Program on initial passive support
4. Solve the Model

Determining the utility of the Desensitize Black PSYOP program at establishing reflexive control over an insurgent requires us to first determine the effects (depicted by the below values of N and W).

\[ N = -13.75 \]
\[ W = -506 \]

These are some pretty high losses due to the Desensitize program. In order to interpret the results, however, we must look at the actual effect on population support that results from one iteration of the program, depicted in Figure 24.
Figure 24 illustrates that the Desensitize program is devastating to the active support for the insurgency. Active support plummets from 9/27 to 4/27. Passive support rises from 9/27 to 12/27, but so does non-support from 9/27 to 11/27. Despite the rise in passive support, the sharp decline in active support makes the Desensitize program particularly costly to the insurgent.

The true test of whether or not the Desensitize program has the ability to elicit insurgent response is to look at the following values of N and W that result if the insurgent does nothing:

\[ N(\text{inaction}) = -5 \]
\[ W(\text{inaction}) = -186 \]
These numbers tell us that the insurgent will lose over 18% of his popular support if he does nothing to counteract the effects of the Desensitize Black PSYOP program. Figure 25 best depicts the effect of N(inaction.)

![Diagram of Desensitize With Apathetic Insurgency]

**Desensitize With Apathetic Insurgency**

Population support results if the insurgent takes no action in response to the Desensitize Program (starting with even distribution)

- **Active (0)**
- **Desensitize**
- **Passive (4)**
- **Non-Support (5)**

Figure 25. Effect of a Desensitize Program on popular support for an apathetic insurgent

The earlier numbers made the insurgent’s circumstances pretty difficult if he does act to counter the effects of the Desensitize program, but the results of his inaction are bleak indeed. The argument does not get any more compelling than Figure 25. If the insurgent takes no action in response to the Desensitize program, he will be left with no active supporters by the end of one iteration. This means that he will have no one from whom to recruit fighters, no active auxiliary, and no ability to grow his cause. The insurgent is faced with the stark reality that he must act or quit. This means that with the Desensitize program, the state can force the insurgent to act.
5. Verify the Model

Does the Desensitize program address the problem? The above calculations demonstrate the answer to be, “yes,” in the strongest possible way. Does the Desensitize program model match common sense? It stands to reason that the population will become annoyed with the over the top overabundance of insurgent propaganda. The fact that the insurgent really would have a hard time using any form of counterpropaganda greatly detracts from his ability to mitigate the damage, but mostly, the fact that the entire program is designed to elicit apathy from the population makes it a very potent weapon in the hand of the state. Does the model match with real world data? As with all of the other programs, there will be insufficient real world data until implementation starts.

6. Implement the Model

The main difficulty in implementing the Desensitize Black PSYOP program model is the volume of dissemination. It will be very difficult to keep such a large dissemination effort covert. The advantage that the state has is that the population has to sleep sometime, and even if the insurgent attempts to catch the disseminators in the act, who is he going to tell? How is he going to tell them? No one is listening to his propaganda anymore. The propaganda found on the disseminator is insurgent propaganda, so who is to say that the disseminator is not working for the insurgent? While it is possible to incorporate pieces of the other programs into the Desensitize program, it is not advisable, since the goal of Desensitizing the population is to make them immune from all propaganda, insurgent and others, and it is unwise to contaminate the results of the other programs. The volume dissemination needs to be solved, but once that is done, the Desensitize Black PSYOP program model is ready for implementation.

7. Maintain the Model

As with all of the programs, the fact that there is no previous real world data means that there is plenty of potential room for refinement. One of the big indicators of success is a general apathy toward propaganda in general. It might be possible to run a test case with White PSYOP where something offered in exchange for a particular
behavior (e.g. free lunch in exchange for taking a survey at the soccer field.) The level of participation in something like this might indicate whether the population is truly desensitized or not. Either way, once implementation begins, the ability to see the results will give the state the ability to better refine the Desensitize Black PSYOP program.

F. DOMESTICATE BLACK PSYOP PROGRAM

1. Description

The Domesticate Black PSYOP program is similar to the Deluge program in that it signs the insurgent up for operations for which he will eventually run out of resources, but in the case of Domesticate, the state signs the insurgent up for humanitarian projects. The benefit of this particular program is the insurgent’s difficulty in trying to counteract its effects. How does he explain to a thirsty population that he is not willing to help provide them with a well, and that the entire rumor is just one big mistake? How does he explain that he is not willing to pay reparations to the families of those that have perished in support of the cause, even if it was a false rumor from an unknown source? In this way, the Domesticate Black PSYOP program depletes the insurgent’s precious resources by compelling him to correct the rumors while simultaneously putting him in a whole series of awkward conversations with his supporting population. It is rare to find a means of exerting reflexive control over one’s enemy, but it is even more rare to be able to use the reflexive control to both make him act and punish him while he acts. This is the case with the Domesticate program.

2. Identify the Problem

The Domesticate Black PSYOP program is trying to determine whether or not raising the population’s expectations of the insurgent’s benevolence beyond the level to which he can deliver will compel the insurgent to act in order to reverse the effects of the program.

3. Make Assumptions

The two categories of variables that require definitions in this section are the population responses and the insurgent responses. The population has three basic
response types to the Domesticate Black PSYOP program: expectation, skepticism, and apathy (ignore). Expectation is where the population receives the propaganda in which “the insurgent” promises to do something good for the community, and the population believes that the insurgent is really going to help them. The insurgent is finally going to start fulfilling whatever promises he has been making all along of a great society! Skepticism is where the population believes that the insurgent is not going to really help even though he says he will. It is a direct challenge to the insurgent’s credibility. As with most of the other programs, the population may also ignore the promises. This may be because of skepticism, but it may also be because the proposed improvements do not directly affect the selected population. In response to these three, the insurgent maintains his standard response types of correcting by contact and correcting by counterpropaganda, but, as with Deluge, his previous “not correct” option breaks into two parts: fulfill and fail to fulfill. These two response types have to do with the promises that “he” has made in the Domesticate program. He can fulfill the expectations created in the minds of his population and follow through on the proposed project, or he can fail to follow through on the project and not fulfill the expectations of the population. Because of the resource cost incurred by performing the project as well as the exposure cost of trying to coordinate it, the insurgent incurs an action cost of (-1) for fulfilling the expectations and doing the project. Figures 26-28 depict the response rules for how this dynamic works between the insurgent and the population, and Appendix A gives a justification.
Figure 26. Response Rules for a Domesticate Program on initial active support

Figure 27. Response Rules for a Domesticate Program on initial passive support
4. Solve the Model

As with the other programs, the values of N and W will give us insight into the effect of a Domesticate Black PSYOP program on insurgent utility.

\[ N = -14.75 \]
\[ W = -473 \]

In order to factor out the insurgent’s action cost included in the value of N, we must look at the resultant population support conditions following an iteration of the Domesticate program. Figure 29 depicts these results.
We see from Figure 29 that active support takes a serious hit as a result of the Domesticate program, dropping from 10/30 to 5/30. Passive support actually rises from one third to one half, and non-support holds steady at one third. This means that the high negative N value overall seems to come largely from the actions that the insurgent takes to try to maintain the status quo.

What happens without those actions? The values for N and W below shed some light on the issue.

\[
N(\text{inaction}) = -3 \\
W(\text{inaction}) = -91
\]
As with the other programs the W(inaction) term gives an actual number of people out of 1000 that will change their support for the insurgency. In this case, the insurgent will suffer a 9% loss in support in terms of raw numbers. Figure 30 shows the distribution of this loss.

![Domesticate With Apathetic Insurgency](image)

Figure 30. Effect of a Domesticate Program on popular support for an apathetic insurgent

Figure 30 shows that the active supporters took the biggest hit, going from 3/9 to 1/9. Both passive support and non-support rise from 3/9 to 4/9. The degraded state of his active support will force the insurgent to take some form of action to remedy the situation before his active support is completely depleted. In this way, the state can use the Domesticate Black PSYOP program to exert reflexive control over the insurgent.

5. Verify the Model

Does the Domesticate program model address the problem? Yes. It shows that if the insurgent does nothing to respond to the program, his active support deteriorates rapidly. Because of this projected deterioration, the insurgency must either act or die.
Does the model match with common sense? If the state can raise the population’s expectations of the insurgent’s benevolence, the insurgent must either expose himself by fulfilling those expectations, or undermine the population’s trust that he is working for their good. This puts the insurgent into a Catch 22 situation. Does the model match with real world data? As with the other programs, there will not be any real world data until the implementation starts.

6. Implement the Model

The nice thing about implementing this model is that it places the insurgent into a bad situation whichever way he goes. If he manages to do one of the projects that the state signs him up for, there is a danger that the population may trust him even more, thus raising the insurgent’s support with the population. There are two important things to remember about this case. The first is that the Domesticate Black PSYOP program has forced him to act in this situation, thus exerting reflexive control and meeting its objective. The second is that if he does one humanitarian operation, sign him up for another one. If he continues to perform these operations that help the community, maybe he should be running things after all! One important consideration in picking the project that the state will sign the insurgent up to do is that it must be something that his group could theoretically accomplish. It would be foolish to have the insurgent group volunteer to set up a nuclear power plant to provide cheap, clean energy to the surrounding area. Signing the insurgent up for an operation that everyone knows that he cannot do gives him an out, and it is the disappointment that comes with failed expectations that the Domesticate Black PSYOP program is trying to harness.

7. Maintain the Model

As with the other programs, there is a need for maintenance on this model once the implementation starts. The measures of effectiveness would be that the population expects the insurgent to perform the humanitarian operation. It is highly unlikely that the insurgent is actually going to spearhead a school-building project in the neighborhood that he is trying to control, but if he does, that would be a big indication that the program is working. The main role of maintenance in the Domesticate program would be to best
determine which humanitarian projects would create the maximum amount of expectancy and resultant disappointment when not fulfilled. This way, the state is able to better target its reflexive control over the insurgent and thereby regain the tactical initiative.
VI. OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS

A. GENERAL

In this section, I will examine several potential problems that might plague the implementation of the model in general and some potential problems with the argument that I have made in support of using Black PSYOP as a means to regain the tactical initiative for the state in the counterinsurgency fight.

The most common concern about Black PSYOP as a method is the potential for political blowback. Black PSYOP is, by nature, deception, and the United States Government’s credibility suffers when it is shown to be perpetrating deception as a deliberate part of its foreign policy. Since the military is an usually an overt instrument of foreign policy, methods such as Black PSYOP should be associated with the military only with extreme caution, or there will be credibility issues for the rest of the military’s attempts to communicate with foreign audiences. There have been several attempts at Black PSYOP in the past, and when they were discovered, a complete loss of trust between the governments involved was often the result. The method that I am proposing is even more dangerous on these grounds because I am not advocating using Black PSYOP against a hostile government, but against a population that presumably is being victimized by a ruthless insurgency. How can the U.S. government, or any state for that matter, justify deliberately deceiving the neutral population for the purposes of defeating an insurgency? My answer to this is that the blowback need not be the sole consideration in using this method. Since the propaganda is indistinguishable from insurgent propaganda, the insurgent does not necessarily always gain even in the face of blowback. I am not arguing that blowback is irrelevant, only that there may be other factors that cause the state to determine that the potential rewards and expected competency of the state outweigh the risks of blowback. I am also arguing that the methods that I have laid out in this paper will only work as intended against an insurgency. One of the many reasons for this has to do with blowback. The insurgent does not have the same response options available to him that a hostile state would. If he tries to avail himself of the necessary communication channels to expose the deception, he is exposing himself to
targeting and surveillance. The intent of the Black PSYOP programs that I have shown here is not to win the hearts and minds of the people. The intent is to force the insurgent to act in a manner that will overly deplete his resources or expose him to the scrutiny and targeting by the state. It is to force him to act. This means that by definition, if the insurgent tries to expose the deception, he will be declaring it a success, for he must act to do so. Even if the population somehow discovers that the deception is occurring, and, for whatever reason, the state cannot “pass the buck” off on the insurgent (it is his propaganda after all), the propaganda is still indistinguishable from insurgent propaganda, so what is the population going to do? The most rational course of action is that they stop believing any propaganda because it might be a state deception operation. This has an asymmetric effect on the state versus the insurgent. The state has numerous other means to get information out to the population: the bureaucracy, press conferences, various other grievance-type meetings, social organizations, etc. If the insurgent tries to use any of these same mechanisms, he plays right into the hand of the state. If the insurgent loses propaganda as a communication channel, he is left only with face-to-face contact and flamboyant operations as a means of trying to communicate his story of legitimacy to his population. Both of these methods are very dangerous to the insurgent. The insurgent’s attempts to create blowback will only expose him to the state for targeting, and any blowback that the population would perform would hurt the insurgent worse than the state, and ultimately force the insurgent into the open anyway. Since regaining the tactical initiative is the sole purpose of the Black PSYOP campaign that I am proposing, this potential for benefit can outweigh the risks in certain circumstances (described earlier.) Once the insurgency is destroyed, then the credibility of state White PSYOP can be reestablished without the hindrance of an insurgency trying to destroy that credibility.

B. YOUR ASSUMPTIONS ARE NOT BASED ON ANY HARD DATA, AND WHERE DID YOU GET YOUR RESPONSE RULES?

This question does present a problem for the model that I propose. Most of the conclusions that I make depend on the legitimacy of the response rules that I have laid out. Individually, the response rules are outlined with their narrative defense in
Appendix A. More generally speaking, they may or may not be perfect. There may be response categories that I have not considered. Either one of these two conditions will affect the individual data that supports the conclusion. This possibility should not preclude the rationality of the overall result. To demonstrate what I mean, consider the following statements:

If the population receives propaganda that is indistinguishable from insurgent propaganda that gives conflicting messages, there will be confusion among the insurgent’s supporters and contempt from his detractors.

If the population receives propaganda that comes from a group claiming to be an insurgent group that is claiming “credit” for operations, the effects of which the population has observed first hand, the population as a whole has no reason not to believe the propaganda.

If the population receives propaganda that is indistinguishable from insurgent propaganda that threatens or insults his supporters or prominent local figures, they will expect some clarification from the insurgent, or will question the wisdom of a choice to become one of those supporters.

If the population receives propaganda that is indistinguishable from insurgent propaganda that says that the insurgent is planning on conducting an operation on a particular day, and it does not happen, the population is either going to doubt the insurgent’s propaganda mechanism, or they are going to question whether the insurgent can follow through on his threats or promises.

If the population repeatedly has their property plastered with insurgent propaganda such that it interferes with basic activities like getting to work and driving, they will become irritated with the insurgent, and will eventually stop caring what the individual pieces of propaganda actually say.

If the population receives propaganda that is indistinguishable from insurgent propaganda that says that the insurgent is finally going to bring in some aspects of the great society that he has been promising by rebuilding some of the population’s damaged
homes, and then he does not do anything about it, the population will be disappointed, and will want an explanation. If they receive none, they will be reluctant to trust insurgent propaganda again.

If any of the above six statements is irrational, then my argument does not make any sense. If any of the above seems reasonable, then while the particulars of the actual numbers may be off by varying amounts, the overall effect on insurgent utility of the Black PSYOP programs that I have outlined would be negative. If the insurgent does nothing to overcome this, then he will have to spend increasing percentages of his finite resources on securing himself from an increasingly unsympathetic population. These are resources that will be unavailable for operations. Any of the means at the insurgent’s disposal for overcoming the Black PSYOP programs require him to expend resources and/or make himself vulnerable to targeting and surveillance. This dynamic is the manner in which the state can use Black PSYOP to establish reflexive control over an insurgent, thus gaining the tactical initiative.

The model is also set up so that as maintenance is done after implementation, any response categories that need to be added can be added. Probabilities that need to be changed can be changed. Response rules that are exaggerated can be refined. Because of this, the individual response rules may or may not be exact, but that does not change the final conclusion.

C. WHAT ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING SUCCESS OR FAILURE? HOW CAN YOU TELL WHETHER THINGS ARE WORKING NATURALLY OR BECAUSE OF THE PROGRAM?

The short answer is that we cannot. There are a couple of reasons for this. There could just be other factors at work that we do not know how to account for. A failure reading can be deceptive for two major reasons. If we get different results than we hoped, it could be that we chose the wrong Black PSYOP program, or it could be that there was something wrong with the competence of our deception operation. If either one of these things happen, there will be a failure in the system, but that failure will not necessarily tell us anything. This will make maintenance somewhat of a challenge
because in order to determine what the reason for failure is, there must be some corroborating evidence outside of the final result.

D. MOST OF THE EXAMPLES SEEM TO BE PRINT MEDIA. WILL THIS WORK WITH AUDIO AND AUDIOVISUAL?

Black PSYOP in the context of this model is designed to pass for insurgent propaganda. Any medium that the insurgent uses is theoretically available to the state for Black PSYOP purposes. The main reason for illustrating with print is that print media is the easiest to conceptualize, and generally the simplest to disseminate by an insurgent. The important component is indistinguishability.

E. WHY DID YOU NOT USE CASE STUDIES TO DETERMINE VARIOUS TYPES OF BLACK PSYOP PROGRAMS?

According to Fowler and Nesbitt’s sixth principle, deception operations should be creative and imaginative, but I did not leave out case studies to thumb my nose at history. The main reason that I did not defer to case studies in this case is that most of the Black PSYOP campaigns that are available for study were waged between sovereign states, and they were designed to deceive the enemy directly (i.e. get him to surrender or lose the will to fight.) The program that I propose here can only be waged against an insurgency because of some of the constraints under which the insurgent operates, and it is always waged indirectly. I am not trying to get the insurgent to believe that the programs are insurgent propaganda. He will see through it immediately, but it will not help him at all. The programs proposed here focus on deceiving the insurgent’s supporting population upon which he depends entirely. Another reason that the programs that I have proposed do not match most of the case studies out there is that these programs have a very limited objective: make the insurgent act. Anything that they can do to elicit this action is fair game. The type of action may be significant, but not determinative of success. Simply causing the insurgent to act is achieving reflexive control and regaining the tactical initiative. Ultimately, the lack of similarity between the target, goals, and methodology steered me away from case studies as an analytical framework.
F. HOW DO YOU GET AROUND TRADITIONAL DIFFICULTIES OF DECEPTION OPERATIONS?

There is never anywhere in my analysis that says that any of these programs is going to be easy. I have outlined some of the difficulties in the “Implementation” sections of the individual programs. If Fowler and Nesbitt’s principles are not correctly applied, then there is no hope of a successful Black PSYOP campaign. There are, however, some truths about these programs that free them from some of the usual sticking points where deception operations often fail. The first and most important is the target of the deception. While the ultimate goal of the PSYOP is the insurgent’s action, he is not part of the deception operation. It is wildly unrealistic to hope that the insurgent would be deceived into thinking that it was he who had engaged in any of the programs that I outline here, nor is that the point. Realism is often a sticking point. An example of this is that the concept of pseudo gangs has been used in various deception operations in history. The difficulty in running the deception is that the target audience had to find real evidence for the existence of the pseudo gang. As a result, the deception planners had to plan elaborate ruses where the pseudo gang “performed operations” in order to add credibility to the deception. In the case of the Distract Black PSYOP program, there is no need for such ruses. The state does not have to convince the population that the pseudo gang exists. They just have to get the population to believe that the pseudo gang is claiming credit for the operation already performed. In the more general sense, traditional deception operations have to get past an elaborate enemy intelligence apparatus in order to induce an enemy response. Such is not the case here. With these Black PSYOP programs, the only level of deception that we must achieve is that the propaganda is coming from the insurgent, and there is no one that can safely rebut the deception claims! The population does not even need to believe the content of the propaganda; they must only believe in its source attribution in order for the program to be successful. All this said, there is no getting around the need for competent deceivers to wage a Black PSYOP campaign, but some of the traditional sticking points do not really apply. Still, if the propaganda is not indistinguishable from insurgent propaganda, then there is no point even trying to start the campaign.
G. SOME OF THE PROPOSED RESPONSES SEEM RELATIVELY UNLIKELY. WHY DID YOU USE UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS (EQUAL PROBABILITIES)?

The real reason that I used uniform distributions was for comparative analysis purposes. In order to be able to compare the effects of the different programs, I needed to maintain some sort of consistency across the campaign plan. The reason that this should not significantly taint the results is that the probabilities are built into the model. Because of this, we can refine the model during maintenance to better reflect the actual probabilities. These actual probabilities will affect the W values for each set of conditions since the W values are sensitive to the probabilities of the options. The other reason that it should not taint the results is that even if maintenance does not give exact probabilities, the “Iterations” figures contained in each of the program models give a projection of what the initial conditions probabilities might be for a second iteration. We can use these values as a planning figure until we can gather more exact data. We can also make some educated guesses as to the projected probabilities. For instance, a more legitimate initial distribution of support might be 10% active, 80% passive, and 10% non-support. Since each insurgency is going to differ, I kept the models generic in order to allow for the refinement during the “maintain the model” phase for each. While with better probabilities, the numbers may turn out differently, the ultimate conclusion, the effectiveness of Black PSYOP to gain reflexive control over an insurgent, will not likely change.
VII. ANALYSIS, SUMMARY, AND CONCLUSIONS

When we consider the table below, we find that we can compare the different Black PSYOP programs to one another based on their effectiveness as determined with uniform distributions of conditions.

Values of W and N For Each of the Programs

t=total  
a=active  
p=passive  
n=nonsupport  
in=inaction

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<td>-138</td>
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<td>-46</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-168</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-276</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-165</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-56</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-412</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-276</td>
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<td>-137</td>
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<td>-154</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-74</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-83</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 1. Summary of expected N and W values for each program and each initial support condition

The choice of which Black PSYOP program to implement can in part be determined by the comparison of the values in the above table. If the state knows little about the initial support conditions of the population, the two most relevant sets of N and W values are the total (t) and the inaction (in) values. These two values tell the state what the effect should be given the initial conditions if the insurgent tries to counter the program and if the insurgent fails to counter the program. Because the goal is to get the insurgent to act in order to try to counter the Black PSYOP program, showing what happens to him when he fails to act (inaction) will tell us the price he pays for not responding to our reflexive control. The total values will show that even when he does
attempt to counter the state’s programs, he pays a price, both in terms of lost support as well as in resources and exposure. If the state knows very little about the distribution of insurgent support within the population, the comparative values from this table suggest that the order of usefulness to the state of the six Black PSYOP programs (using the \( W(\text{in}) \) values) would be as follows:

Desensitize
Dilute
Divide
Domesticate
Deluge
Distract

The reason that we use the \( W(\text{in}) \) values is that these values provide us with the actual number of people per 1000 that will change their support for the insurgent if he fails to act. The theory is that the more pain that can be applied to the insurgent’s cause by his failure to respond, the more likely he is to respond to prevent this pain. But what if the state knows that the population has a much higher percentage of active supporters than passive or non-supporters? The state might want to have a more dramatic effect with its first Black PSYOP program, so it might choose to prioritize based on the damage done to the final support if active support was the initial condition. For this ranking, the state would use the \( N(\text{a}) \) values (raw change in utility for active support population) and would prioritize their campaign in the following order:

Dilute/Divide
Domesticate
Desensitize
Distract
Deluge

The above approach can prove highly effective because the loss of all of the insurgent’s active support population will effectively end the insurgency. Even if the population goes to completely passive support, if there is no one providing direct support to the insurgent (logistics, transportation, manpower, lodging, etc.), then the insurgent
cannot conduct operations or grow his capabilities. If this happens, the insurgency will end, so being able to engage in targeted degradation of the insurgent’s active support will gain his undivided attention.

As the program model(s) are implemented, the state should gain a greater understanding of the various probabilities that will refine the model. Once this happens, the state should probably rely more on the W values in order to rank order their priorities, since the W values are sensitive to probabilities of the various options, and will therefore give a more precise prediction of the amount of cost that can be inflicted on the insurgent by the various Black PSYOP programs.

It should be noted here that there is a factor that I am not considering in the rankings: state utility cost. Some of the programs may seem to be the best choice based on the damage that they can inflict on insurgent utility, but given the specific scenario of implementation being considered, the top program based on the above table may also be the most difficult for the state to execute effectively. Some of these potential difficulties have been discussed in the implementation discussions of the individual programs. The state must balance the amount of projected effectiveness with its own ability to execute the plan in order to effectively plan the Black PSYOP campaign that will be the most effective.

A bureaucratic impediment to an effective Black PSYOP campaign is that, for the programs outlined here to be effective, they must be integrated with operations in order to exploit the reflexive control generated by the Black PSYOP. CIA has the authority to execute Black PSYOP when authorized, but Department of Defense has the lead on most of the major operations where the U.S. is dealing with insurgencies. The bureaucratic barriers between these two organizations can create a difficult working relationship for trying to follow Fowler and Nesbitt’s insistence that tactical deception must be integrated with operations. It is difficult, but not necessarily impossible. The potential benefits of this approach provide what should be sufficient incentive to overcome the difficulties by facilitating cooperation between DOD and CIA in matters of counterinsurgency Black PSYOP. The integration must be real in order to be effective. It takes more than simple collocation of planners. DOD personnel are going to be planning operations
(surveillance and kinetic) in response to projected insurgent reactions to the various Black PSYOP programs. These planners cannot do their jobs unless they are well integrated into the Black PSYOP campaign. This may be a difficult mixture, but it is necessary to be effective, and in light of the potential benefits that we see from the models that I have proposed, such compromise is well worth the effort.

The common thinking about PSYOP is that it is designed to win the hearts and minds of the population, or that it is designed to break the enemy’s will to fight in order to achieve economy of force. In light of this concept of PSYOP, what I am proposing here may seem rather bizarre. I am not interested in the population’s hearts or minds. If the insurgent is able to make contact with them and completely reverse the effects of the Black PSYOP programs on their hearts and minds, the campaign will still have been a complete success because the insurgent had to make contact, thereby exposing himself. The goal is not to remove the enemy’s will to fight, but rather to drive him to action at a time and place of the state’s choosing in order to better target him for complete annihilation. This thought process of PSYOP makes it an integral part of preparation of the battlefield instead of relegating it to the position of perceptual janitor in which it often currently finds itself: sent to mitigate the effects of operations. If Black PSYOP can force the insurgent to respond, then it gives the state the ability to govern the insurgent’s allocation of resources between operational security and operational efficiency. This means that the state gets to determine the terms of the insurgent’s survival, which in turn, means that the state has the tactical initiative. The PSYOP thinking that says that PSYOP is about winning hearts and minds asserts that PSYOP is trying to achieve the strategic advantage (ultimate victory.) This method of using Black PSYOP is an attempt to regain the tactical initiative. Why should military decision makers care about the tactical initiative? Without the tactical initiative, there is no chance of consistently maintaining a tactical advantage. Without the tactical advantage, there is no hope of gaining the strategic initiative, and without the strategic initiative, there is zero probability of ever gaining the strategic advantage. As such, I have given Black PSYOP the task of accomplishing something for the state that it can be very difficult for the state to predictably achieve otherwise: tactical initiative over an insurgent, and I have shown that
there is a necessary relationship between the successful accomplishment of the objective of Black PSYOP and the possible accomplishment of the overall mission. In light of this relationship, the U.S. government should overcome whatever difficulties it must in order to make this capability a viable one if it hopes to achieve victory in the counterinsurgency fight.
APPENDIX A: NARRATIVE DEFENSE FOR RESPONSE RULES

A. GENERAL

Much of the logic for the actual calculations in solving the various Black PSYOP program models derives from the response rules contained in the figures throughout the description of the models. This Appendix is designed to give a rational defense for the choice of those response rules. I will go into each program and look at the response rules for each of the initial population support conditions within that program. There are, however, some general rules that somewhat streamline the process of articulating the full argument for each of the decision “branches.” These general rules I will outline here, and I will cover the exceptions within the individual sections.

B. CONTACT RESTORES STATUS QUO

As a general rule, if the insurgent opts to “correct by contact,” he is able to make his case in person, and therefore able to articulate his case to the satisfaction of the audience. He is also able to clear up that the Black PSYOP was a misunderstanding, and reassure the population that he “cares.” As such, he is able to restore the status quo level of support that existed for him prior to the Black PSYOP program’s implementation. There are a few exceptions to this rule, but I will discuss them in the individual sections.

C. PASSIVE SUPPORT IS STABLE

Because passive support requires so little effort (not turning the insurgent in to the state), it is fairly difficult to push people out of the passive support state in either direction. This means that many times, the response rules will have the population maintaining a passive support status where it looks like they should have moved to non-support.
D. NON-SUPPORTERS ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO SWAY THAN ACTIVE SUPPORTERS

Many times, the insurgency has a much closer control on the population, making non-support a very dangerous business. The insurgent is far more likely to know who the non-supporters are than the state is to know who the active supporters are. Because of this, in order to be a non-supporter, the population would have had to be ready to take considerable risk. An active supporter can still claim to be helping the cause by offering passive support. A non-supporter would have to abandon his position entirely by offering passive support. As a result, it is more difficult to move a non-supporter from his position of non-support than it is to move an active supporter to passive support. There are some exceptions, but they will be discussed on a case-by-case basis.

E. COUNTERPROPAGANDA IS A WEAKER METHOD OF CORRECTION THAN CONTACT

There are two reasons for this. One is the lack of personal touch given to the argument by counterpropaganda. The other is that the insurgent’s propaganda mechanism is what is being attacked and corrupted by the Black PSYOP program. While there are some cases where the counterpropaganda is able to reverse the effects of the Black PSYOP program on population support, often counterpropaganda proves insufficient to the task of dealing with the effects of the deception.

F. IGNORE DOES NOT AFFECT THE STATUS QUO

As a general rule, a population response of ignore has little effect on the status quo. If the population has opted not to pay attention to the message of the Black PSYOP program, then whatever the insurgent does will probably have little change on the population’s support status, and they will remain in the same state that they were in before. There are a few exceptions where the insurgent contacting those that were ignoring the message and revealing that they had been deceived would cause greater support for the insurgent out of backlash against the state. These cases will be dealt with as they come up.
G. THE INDIVIDUAL CASES

The individual cases will be addressed below by program type and initial support condition. Those cases that seem to fall outside of the general rules outlined above will be explained in more detail.

1. Dilute Active

Here we find that counterpropaganda is insufficient to overcome the disillusionment population response. This would be true because the disillusionment response is a representation of a loss of faith in the insurgent. Because of the stability of passive support, counterpropaganda is able to hold the population there; whereas, not correcting at all leads to a population perception of total incompetence or total apathy on the part of the insurgent. Counterpropaganda is also insufficient to overcome the confusion response, and both counterpropaganda and not correcting leave lingering doubts about the insurgent’s viability, causing a drop to passive support. Active support for an insurgency is very risky to the supporters if not synchronized, so the population will need greater reassurance than counterpropaganda and not correcting can provide. As a result, the population is far more likely to remain on the sidelines until the perception of synchronization returns, dropping them to passive support.

2. Dilute Passive

Counterpropaganda in the face of disillusionment still leaves lingering hurt and doubt, but the stability of passive support maintains the level here. Not correcting in the face of disillusionment leaves the population with a sense of abandonment, which coupled with the seeming incompetence shown by the Dilute program, will cause them to actually want to strike back. Counterpropaganda is good enough to maintain the stability of passive support in the face of confusion, but not correcting leaves the population feeling abandoned and with a sense of not knowing why they are protecting the insurgent in the first place. Since passive support needs no synchronization, there is no real effect within the portion of the population that experiences this response.
3. **Dilute Non-support**

Stability of non-support holds here except in the case of those that were ignoring the message, but the insurgent chooses to contact. While it would seem very rare for an insurgent to contact a non-supporter because of inherent risks, if he can clarify his position, the non-supporter would probably be pretty upset at being duped, which might be enough to push him to provide passive support until he is able to sort it all out.

4. **Distract Active**

For the portion of the population that chooses to credit the pseudo gang for the operations for which it takes credit, contacting the population is sufficient to clarify the situation, but counterpropaganda and not correcting leave the population wondering who is going to come out on top. Because those that are trying to help the insurgent against the pseudo gang have to take an active role to do so, they remain status quo (active.) Because the population in confusion/doubt are still watching a pseudo gang “perform operations” that support the insurgency, counterpropaganda is enough to clarify the issues for them, and they remain active supporters. Not correcting this confusion, however, leaves lingering doubt about who the players in the insurgency game are, and will cause the population to provide only passive support until the situation is clarified.

5. **Distract Passive**

The stability of passivity holds here except in the case of those that were confused and doubting because of the messages from the pseudo gang. When the insurgent opts to contact these people and clarify their confusion, there is likely to be a certain amount of anger over being duped, and they will start providing more active support. This is perhaps an exaggeration, but it is a possibility.

6. **Distract Non-support**

The stability of non-support holds here, except in the case as with Distract Passive above, where those with confusion are contacted directly. Their resultant bitterness about
being duped will give them a certain disillusionment concerning the state that they are supporting in the counterinsurgency fight.

7. Divide Active

For the population that decides to attack the insurgent in response to personal threats or insults, the embitterment is too extreme to be swayed by counterpropaganda, and not correcting just adds insult to insult. For this reason, those that have the response to attack the insurgent turn to non-support in all cases except where the insurgent’s direct contact is able to smooth things over. The population that demands clarification is slightly less stirred up, so counterpropaganda combined with the stability of passivity is enough to stop the decline at passive support. Failure to correct the threats to this group, however, results in non-support because of an unwillingness on the part of the insurgent to “fix his mess.” If the population gives in to the threats, then they will provide active support out of fear.

8. Divide Passive

As with Divide Active, those that decide to attack the insurgent in response to personal threats cannot be soothed by counterpropaganda or no correcting, and thus change to non-supporters as a backlash. Those who demand clarification find counterpropaganda an insufficient clarification because of the personal nature of the threats and the impersonal nature of the correction. As a result, their support drops to non-support, as do those to whom the insurgent fails to offer any form of correction. While those who give in to the threats engage in active support out of fear, ironically, counterpropaganda actually creates ambiguity about whether or not the threats were credible in the first place, causing the population to revert to status quo of passive support.

9. Divide Non-support

The stability of non-support holds here except in three cases. Non-supporters giving in to threats translates into silence (passive support.) Again, the irony of counterpropaganda in this case is that it creates ambiguity about the threat’s credibility,
causing a reversion to status quo of non-support. The other case where the non-supporter can be caused to provide passive support is the unlikely case where the insurgent contacts a non-supporter that was ignoring the threats. In this case, the disillusionment with the state over having been deceived would cause the non-supporter to potentially keep his mouth shut as a backlash against the state.

10. Deluge Active

Trying to correct expectations of insurgent operations through the use of counterpropaganda leaves questions in the minds of the active supporters about the reasons for refusing to engage in operations to help the cause. As a result, they may reduce their support level to passive until they are more confident that the insurgent is able to take power. Fulfilling the expectations meets the requirement, so active support remains in tact. Failure to fulfill has a more pronounced effect than the counterpropaganda approach, but a similar result: passive support.

11. Deluge Passive

The stability of passive support remains in effect here except in one case. If the insurgent fails to fulfill expectations, then the population may doubt his capability to perform operations. This can lead to frustration and loss of whatever is currently motivating them to provide passive support, thus leading them to a position of non-support.

12. Deluge Non-support

The stability of non-support maintains its hold here except in one case. If the insurgent fulfills the expectations created by the Black PSYOP program, his credibility will be established, and, assuming that the operation was not designed to alienate the non-supporters even further, may push them to keep silent in the face of renewed perceptions of insurgent viability.
13. **Desensitize Active**

Insurgent attempts to counter reactions of confusion and frustration with propaganda will backfire on him. Since the problem created by the Desensitize program is too much insurgent propaganda on the streets, more propaganda is only fuel to the fire. If the insurgent does nothing to correct the problem, then the frustration of the population will turn to irritation and non-support. If he fails to correct confusion, then there will be lingering doubts about the insurgent’s intentions and the population may go from active to passive support. This is a case where ignoring does not maintain the status quo in all cases. The over the top nature of the Desensitize program means that not correcting the ignoring population means that they will no longer be open to propaganda as a communication channel, and even if they wanted to provide active support, they would not be able to focus their efforts. This will drive them, either intentionally or otherwise, toward passive support.

14. **Desensitize Passive**

Attempts to correct through counterpropaganda will be lost in the shuffle against frustration and confusion. The stability of passive support in these cases will keep the population at passive support. Failing to make any effort to correct the frustration will allow the frustration to fester into irritation and non-support. Otherwise, the stability of passivity holds.

15. **Desensitize Non-support**

The stability of non-support holds in these cases.

16. **Domesticate Active**

Countering the Domesticate program using any method presents a problem for the insurgent: “Why would the insurgent not choose to conduct projects designed to improve the lot in life of his supporters?” Because of this difficulty, any attempt to correct or ignore either expectation or skepticism will degrade popular support from active to
passive. The status quo nature of the population ignoring the program will maintain the status quo of active support. Fulfilling the expectations will maintain an active support base for the insurgent.

17. **Domesticate Passive**

Failing to meet expectations in the face of a Domesticate program will create frustration. Contact and counterpropaganda will maintain the stability of passivity. Failure to fulfill or correct will allow frustration to fester into non-support. Because the skeptical population did not really expect the insurgent to fulfill expectations anyway, stability of passivity governs the resultant population support levels.

18. **Domesticate Non-support**

The stability of non-support controls the effects of the Domesticate program within this portion of the population. There is one exception. When the insurgent fulfills the expectations of the Domesticate program, he demonstrates benevolence toward the population. This benevolence has the potential to turn even non-support into passive support while the population tries to determine what the eventual intentions of the insurgent are.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 3-05.30: Psychological Operations. April 2005.
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