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14. ABSTRACT This paper takes the strategic concepts delineated in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and translates them into operational tasks. It discusses ways for the operational commander to integrate PSI and similar initiatives into the planning process and prepare to work with partners that may or may not be able to integrate into traditional U.S. command and control architecture. It provides a history of the PSI, as well as related policies that provide background for the implementation of PSI. It then discusses the importance of the PSI at the operational level, especially in the maritime arena, and ways to integrate the elements necessary to conduct operations under the PSI into the umbrella of normal operations. It also discusses obstacles to supporting PSI tasking and ways to overcome them.					
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OPERATIONALIZING THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of
the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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One of the most difficult challenges we face is to prevent, deter, and defend against the acquisition and use of WMD by terrorist groups. The current and potential future linkages between terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism are particularly dangerous and require priority attention. The full range of counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management measures must be brought to bear against the WMD terrorist threat, just as they are against states of greatest proliferation concern.

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
December 2002

Introduction

Globalization has radically changed how countries – and non-state actors – relate to each other. The foreign policy environment in the late 20th and early 21st centuries has been described by many as “new multilateralism.”¹ The United States, under President George W. Bush, has instituted a number of revolutionary strategic concepts aimed at adapting US policy to a globalized world. Coalitions supporting OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and programs such as the Container Security Initiative and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) have come to embody the spirit of “coalitions of the willing”. While this has made it easier to gain support for our desired actions, it has also muddied the waters of traditional alliances. Where once, US military units could expect standardized doctrine and procedures in working with NATO allies, new partners come with new procedures, limited capabilities and vastly different rules of engagement. While policy-makers and planners have to remember that the enemy gets a vote, so too must they remember that allies do too – and their vote may not always align with yours. This has created numerous problems at the operational level, trying to leverage both the capabilities and the limitations of partners, while realizing that they may choose to

¹ Treasa Dunworth discusses the evolution of the term “new multilateralism” and specifically how it is characterized today in the context of controlling WMD. See Treasa Dunworth, “The New Multilateralism?” (paper presented at the National Consultative Committee on Disarmament convention on Threats to Peace and Disarmament, Wellington, May 2006).

withdraw any or all elements of their support at any time. Such is the nature of multilateralism.

PSI is a case-in-point. It is not a treaty, nor is it doctrine. It has no commander, no building and no staff. In fact, it has no traditional linkage for an operational commander to refer to in order to develop concrete orders. It is a concept, not a capability. The only thing resembling a binding document is its Statement of Interdiction Principles, published by the initial eleven countries to support the initiative – four months after it was announced! In fact, it has been argued whether it can even be supported by international law.

This paper aims to take the strategic concepts delineated in the PSI and translate them into operational tasks. It will discuss ways for the operational commander to integrate PSI and similar initiatives into the planning process and prepare to work with partners that may or may not be able to integrate into traditional US command and control architecture. It will first provide a history of the PSI, as well as related policies that provide the background for the implementation of PSI. It will then discuss the importance of the PSI at the operational level, especially in the maritime arena, and ways to integrate the elements necessary to conduct operations under the PSI into the umbrella of normal operations. It will discuss obstacles to supporting PSI tasking and ways to overcome them.

History of PSI

The challenge is for individual nations to come together by determining where their national interests intersect and to determine what contribution they can make to this already-emerging network to meet those common interests.²

² John G. Morgan, Jr. and Charles W. Martoglio, “The 1,000-Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network,” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, 131, no. 11 (November 2005), 3.

The Bush administration has instituted a new form of foreign policy in the first decade of the 21st century. Coalitions of the willing have rapidly supplemented or supplanted existing and traditional alliances. The rapid pace of globalization has made countries less reluctant to enter into over-arching collective security agreements like those established at the end of World War II. Although the fruits of those post-war labors – the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – are still viable, their widespread participation and acceptance has created an environment where contentious issues can become mired in bureaucratic red tape and political posturing. Rather than sign treaties, President Bush has instead encouraged like-minded countries to join the US in narrower missions that are less binding than formal alliances. This has resulted in a larger number of coalition partners in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), with each partner contributing according to its conscience and interest. This led to the development of further policies, including the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Although clearly characterized as coalitions of the willing, the countries providing troops to OEF and OIF have primarily been traditional US allies, making it relatively easy for multinational troops to operate under a common command and control structure. There is still a problem, though, with countries deciding to reduce their presence or withdraw it completely, leaving the US or unready Afghani or Iraqi forces to fill the void.

Developed by the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency in 2002, the CSI “proposes a security regime to ensure all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the

United States.³ US Customs officers work with the partner country to establish security criteria to identify high-risk containers bound for the US, which are then inspected by the host-nation's customs agents before departing port. As a reciprocal program, partner nations are invited to send their customs officials to major US ports to identify high-risk cargo bound for their countries. Bilateral information sharing is also a key element to CSI.⁴

The So San Incident

In December 2002, the Spanish frigate, *Navarra*, was operating in a multi-national, coalition effort in support of OEF. She was assigned to Commander, Coalition Task Force (CTF) 150, operating in the Arabian Sea. At the time, CTF 150 was commanded by a Spanish Rear Admiral, and he was using *Navarra* as his flagship. US intelligence had identified what appeared to be WMD-related material being loaded onto a container vessel in North Korea. Over the next month of its journey, the US tracked the vessel until it arrived in the CTF 150 AOR. Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) – also multi-hatted as Commander, US FIFTH Fleet and Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander, and senior to CTF 150 in the chain of command – ordered CTF 150 to intercept and track the vessel. Visual contact with the vessel showed what appeared to be a freshly-painted name, *So San*, and the ship continually raised and lowered its flag, apparently in an attempt to avoid detection. Because of the suspicious behavior of the master raising and lowering the flag and no known registry for a vessel named *So San*, the *Navarra* was ordered to board the *So San* to inspect her paperwork and verify her flag and registration. The actions

³ Office of International Affairs, US Customs and Border Patrol, *CSI In Brief*, 15 February 2006, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_in_brief.xml (accessed 18 April 2007).

⁴ Ibid.

of the *So San* indicated her to be a stateless vessel, which allowed the boarding under international law without violating the rights of any flag state.

Once on board, the Spanish marines inspected the cargo, declared as cement, and found in addition, fifteen Scud missiles and several barrels of chemicals. The cargo was determined to be bound for Yemen. After several tense diplomatic discussions between the Yemeni president, US Vice President Cheney and US Secretary of State Powell, CTF 150 released the ship – although the boarding itself had been legal, there was no legal basis to seize the cargo.⁵

The *So San* incident, highly embarrassing to the US and its allies, highlighted the gaps that exist in today's global world. The ease with which countries and/or non-state actors can sell and transport WMD is staggering. Although technology has given us the ability to detect and track many of these shipments, international law prevents the interception of that cargo. The Proliferation Security Initiative was developed to help counter the threat, while still respecting national sovereignty and international law.

PSI, the Early Days

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was introduced by President Bush during a trip to Krakow, Poland in May 2003. From the State Department website:

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. Announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003, it stems from the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002. That strategy recognizes the need for more robust tools to defeat the proliferation of WMD around the world, and specifically identifies interdiction as an area where greater focus will be placed.

⁵ For discussion on the legalities of the So San incident, including arguments for and against seizing the discovered cargo, see Joel A. Doolin, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm," *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 29-31.

The goal of the PSI is to create a more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach to preventing proliferation to or from nation states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Actions will be taken in support of the PSI consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks. The PSI seeks to use existing authorities – national and international – to defeat proliferation.⁶

In fact, the PSI has been linked even farther back to the UN Security Council President's statement of 31 Jan 1992 that identified the proliferation of all WMD as a threat to international peace and security and highlighted the need for all UN members to fulfill obligations to prevent WMD proliferation in all aspects.⁷

Eleven core countries adopted a Statement of Interdiction Principles in September 2003, which is the first documentation of what PSI is or will do. It tasks participants to undertake measures to interdict transfer of WMD, delivery systems and related materials to and from “states and non-state actors of proliferation concern”; adopt procedures for rapid exchange of information, strengthen national legal authorities; and take specific action in support of interdiction efforts.⁸ All that is required to be considered a supporter of the PSI is to endorse the Statement of Interdiction Principles. As of November 2006, the State Department listed 81 countries that are supporters of PSI, including Russia, who added her support on the one-year anniversary of its announcement.

Since 2003, PSI has resulted in 25 bilateral and multilateral exercises and 19 operational experts meetings and workgroups aimed at increasing understanding and interoperability between partner nations. PSI has been credited with at least two interceptions of WMD-related material. The most well-known and significant event is the

⁶ Bureau of Nonproliferation, Washington, DC, *The Proliferation Security Initiative*, 28 July 2004, <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/34726.htm> (accessed 18 April 2007).

⁷ United Nations, Security Council, 3046th Meeting, “Statement of the President,” S/23500, 1992. http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/cbwars/cbw_research_doc/cbw_historical/cbw-unsc23500.html (accessed on 21 April 2007).

⁸ Bureau of Nonproliferation, Washington, DC, *PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles*, <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/23764.htm> (accessed on 21 April 2007).

September 2003 interdiction of the German-owned freighter, *BBC China*, bound for Libya with thousands of parts for gas centrifuges that could be used for uranium enrichment. US authorities contacted the German government, who asked the company to voluntarily divert the ship to an Italian port, where the ship was inspected and the contraband cargo – which had not been listed on the manifest – was seized. As a direct result of this interdiction, PSI was further credited by some with convincing Libya to abandon its nuclear weapons program in December 2003 and become a supporting nation.⁹ Participants are reluctant to discuss specific details of operational successes resulting from the PSI, in an effort to keep the methods employed protected and prevent compromising future operations.

Operationalizing PSI

*The strength of any network, including a global network of maritime nations, is in its simplicity, inclusiveness and adaptability.*¹⁰

PSI, as an example of multilateralism and globalization, is the template for future operations. Adaptable, ever-changing alliances will not only characterize US foreign policy, but will be reflected in military operations for the foreseeable future. Operational commanders must adapt traditional plans and command and control to be able to incorporate new, disparate partners in ways that maximize their strengths and contributions and to supplement them where their capability is less robust.

The true importance of PSI to the operational commander is not so much in preparing to conduct PSI-specific operations, but in rethinking all aspects of interoperability with coalition partners so that when a PSI-like mission occurs, integration of the coalition-of-the-

⁹ Jofi Joseph, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Proliferation?” *Arms Control Today*, 34, no. 5 (June 2004), 6.

¹⁰ Mike Mullen, “Principles for a Free and Secure Global Maritime Network,” *RUSI Journal*, 151, no. 1 (February 2006), 3, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed on 23 February 2007).

day will be more seamless and minimize shortcomings. Every event, whether a table-top exercise conducted by a ship during a foreign port visit or a multilateral exercise involving hundreds of soldiers and sailors, should be tailored to increase understanding and trust. Establishing common operating procedures, learning more about our current and potential allies, and teaching them about US capabilities will not only make those future alliances more plausible, but will make the interoperability during the operation itself more successful and increase chances for success. It must remain clear however, that the true benefits of these actions will be seen in the successful execution of PSI missions (or other similar operations), not in the number of exercises or conferences that precede it. Every event must be planned with as much consideration of real-world operations as feasible, given the political climate and relationship with the other country.

Relationships

In the same way that the President and the State Department work with their regional counterparts, it is essential for the operational commander to develop and maintain relationships with regional military commanders, whether they are currently a partner in ongoing operations or not. The nature of globalization means that we will not know who may or may not be a partner in the future. The better our relationships are, the more willing someone may be to agree to work with US forces. The better we understand others' capabilities and the better they understand our intentions and goals, the stronger our future partnerships will be. By leveraging a partner's skills, the operational commander can optimize all of the assets at his disposal. By understanding our intent and having demonstrated to our partners a willingness to fully utilize what they can bring to the fight, the

more amenable they will be to make the full potential of their capability available to the mission.

This idea cannot be limited to the commander. At every level of the operational command, relationships must be fostered. The commander needs to provide overarching guidance to the staff, so that when they deal with regional counterparts, the same message is conveyed. Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs) should contain a broad mission of cooperation and should not be limited to specific types of information sharing or missions. The ways in which TSCP actions are carried out should be conducive to translation into an array of other potential missions where a country may wish to partner with the US in the future. For example, NAVCENT, as part of its cooperation initiatives with Gulf Coalition Council (GCC) nations, develops bilateral standard operating procedures (SOPs) which could easily be adapted from information sharing in support of OEF to operations in support of a PSI mission, should the occasion arise.

Intelligence

Success in PSI operations will be heavily reliant on timely, accurate intelligence. This will require close coordination with intelligence agencies, both belonging to the operational commander and those at the national level. Intelligence relating to WMD shipments is, by its very nature, extremely time-sensitive and must be disseminated quickly so that it can be acted upon before it becomes obsolete.

Ever since 11 September 2001, there has been an impetus to expand information sharing across the board, both within our own intelligence community and with our international partners. The Director for National Intelligence released a *100-Day Plan for*

Integration and Collaboration across the entire national Intelligence Community (IC). One of the six focus areas identified is to “Accelerate Information Sharing.” Each of the specified initiatives under this focus area will directly impact the ability to not only share PMI information within our own government, but to enhance our ability to share that information quickly with international partners. The most important element of this focus area is a paradigm-shift from a “‘need to know’ model to a ‘responsibility to provide’ collaborative environment.”¹¹ Although still in the development phase, these initiatives are a positive step necessary to foster trust with our partners and accelerate intelligence dissemination to the operational commander.

Developing PSI Operations

As PSI is a concept, its real strength comes from related bilateral treaties and agreements. To date, the United States, for example, has entered into ship boarding agreements with Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands and Panama. With Liberia, Marshall Islands and Panama as key flag-of-convenience states, the State Department estimates that “more than 60 percent of the global commercial shipping fleet

¹¹ The initiatives introduced in the plan to accelerate information sharing are: 5.A Improve internal IC information sharing by revising standard policy guidance for defining, handling, and disseminating sensitive compartmented information; 5.B Move from a “need to know” model to a “responsibility to provide” collaborative environment by developing an implementation plan for an IC-wide identity structure with attribute-based access, such as clearance level, project affiliation, or other such attributes; 5.C Support PM-ISE, FBI, and DHS efforts to share with state, local, tribal, and private sector entities; 5.D Develop plans to move the IC collection and analytic communities from a “need to know” model to a “responsibility to provide” collaborative environment by developing an approach and implementation plans [sic] for an IC-wide impact; and 5.E Forge closer intelligence relationships with foreign partners. See the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *United States Intelligence Community (IC) 100 Day Plan for INTEGRATION and COLLABORATION*, 11 April 2007, <http://www.dni.gov/100-day-plan/100-day-plan.pdf> (accessed on 06 May 2007), 9-10.

dead weight tonnage [is] now subject to rapid action consent procedures for boarding, search, and seizure.”¹²

There is a great deal of debate in the international community on the legality and legitimacy of the PSI.¹³ Since “actions taken in support of the PSI will be consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks,”¹⁴ knowing the extent of each partner’s legal authority will be at the heart of every PSI operation. The need to strengthen legitimacy requires an even greater emphasis by planners to ensure that operations are carried out correctly, providing as few grounds for challenge as possible.

Maintaining a matrix of individual countries’ bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, as they relate to potential PSI missions, will be invaluable to operational commanders and their planners. This will enable rapid determination of appropriate responses to a PSI mission and ensure that those operations will be carried out without violating sovereign rights or international law. By knowing what each partner brings to the fight, planners can tailor operations to individual participants and their capability to respond to a particular scenario, thereby maximizing the contribution of each partner to the mission.

Operational commanders’ TSCPs are the key vehicle to ensuring success in developing relationships for PSI. Working with partners to strengthen their own capabilities

¹² Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, *The United States and Belize Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement*, 4 August 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/50787.htm> (accessed on 01 May 2007).

¹³ Two excellent legal reviews of PSI come to opposite conclusions on its legitimacy and legality, utilizing the same background and information. Jack Garvey argues that the bilateral boarding treaties with flag of convenience states is a thin veil of legality that will not stand up to political scrutiny, if exercised. See Jack I. Garvey, “The International Institutional Imperative for Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Proliferation Security Initiative,” *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 10, no. 2 (2005), 125-147, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 23 February 2007). Michael Byers argues that bilateral and multilateral agreements that allow boarding of fishing vessels and those suspected of smuggling persons provide the international legitimacy and are consistent with international law. See Michael Byers, “Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative,” *The American Journal of International Law*, 98, no. 3 (July 2004), 526-545, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 23 February 2007).

¹⁴ Bureau of Nonproliferation, Washington, DC, *The Proliferation Security Initiative*. 26 May 2005, <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/46858.htm> (accessed on 06 May 2007).

to detect and deter WMD proliferation violations will add directly to PSI, but also to the more over-arching goal of global security. The more countries take on responsibility to police their own territory and borders, the harder and more expensive it will be for proliferators to conduct business. Enhancing information sharing in both substance and speed will be a key component to ensuring success in PSI operations. Additionally, by understanding each potential ally's strengths, operational commanders can properly plan for operations that leverage each country's strengths and not only increase chances for mission success, but encourage others to participate in operations if they feel that their capabilities will be utilized and appreciated.

Practice Makes Perfect

Although not the final indicator of success in the PSI arena, practice, in the form of conferences and exercises will make eventual real-world PSI operations successful. Conferences allow experts from various backgrounds to collaborate, develop new ideas, and increase both cultural and practical understanding. Exercises expand on that theme and allow partners to put theories and practices to the test. They also encourage interoperability at the operational and tactical level, allowing issues in operating procedures and techniques to be resolved before they are needed for a real-world mission. At a cultural level, all participants get a glimpse at each other's culture – seeing how other nations interact with each other and how best to weave those differences into a cohesive whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.

Obstacles to PSI Operations

It is well and good for political leaders to decide on a PSI operation and gain partners willing to participate. However, success lies in the integration of culturally- and technologically-disparate nations into a cohesive unit, capable of leveraging each other's strengths and reducing the impact of weaknesses. Obstacles to success at the operational level fall largely into two areas – legal authority and interoperability. When possible, these obstacles need to be identified early and mitigated before a mission is even tasked.

Legal Authority

The legality of the PSI has been questioned since its inception. The United States has continued to argue that one of the great strengths of the PSI is that it will act in accordance with international laws and under national authorities. It creates no laws or policies, but encourages partner nations to strengthen their individual policies to identify and interdict WMD shipments. This was later echoed by the UN with the unanimous passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in 2004. It dictated

that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery... [and] call[ed] upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials.¹⁵

The problem this creates for the operational commander is that every time a PSI mission is tasked, the legal authorities of the participants will be different. PSI operations can be compared to a pick-up basketball game. You take any of the passers-by who want to play. However, with PSI, you are playing without a common set of rules. This affects every aspect

¹⁵ United Nations, Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1540, 2004. 28 April 2004, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf> (accessed on 06 May 2007).

of the operation, from amount and types of intelligence that can be shared and what units may participate to what their authorities will be in boarding a suspect ship and seizing the cargo if any WMD-related material is found. Some countries may only be able to conduct inspections on ships in one of their ports or only with consent of the owner or master, based on boarding agreements with either a flag state or an owner. There may be other legal issues that restrict a country's forces from seizing cargo, depending on the circumstances.

In addition, rules of engagement (ROE) are also different from country to country. The issues are different for both US and partner forces. US forces follow Commander, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Standing ROE until supplemental ROE are submitted and approved on a case-by-case basis. For ongoing, persistent operations like OEF and OIF, ROE has been fairly well-established and approved. For PSI missions, each one will be different and will likely not fall under the umbrella of an operation where appropriate interdiction ROE have already been vetted and approved. Once the mission is identified, the operational staff will have to evaluate what additional ROE may be required and get approval. This process can sometimes be quite lengthy, threatening the success of a given mission.

In dealing with US ROE, staffs must develop a laundry list of potential ROE that may be applicable for a PSI mission. They should be crafted and submitted to higher headquarters for conditional approval before a mission is identified, then the authority to implement those rules must lie with the operational commander once a mission is tasked. There is no time to begin writing ROE once a PSI mission is identified. The mission may be over before the Joint Staff ever sees the request. An interim solution is for planners to ensure that, when possible, operations can be carried out under the authorities of Standing ROE.

Dealing with partners can be even more difficult. Each country will have its own process for identifying and approving rules of engagement. Where possible, operational staff officers, when interacting with their regional counterparts, should identify what those rules of engagement and legal authorities are or are likely to be during a PSI mission so that when developing plans for those operations, the best estimate can be made about how that partner will be able to contribute to the mission. NAVCENT maintains a matrix of countries' ROE for a variety of anticipated actions in support of OEF and OIF. Understandably, each matrix is different, as countries have different legal authorities, depending on which operation they are supporting. This matrix is made available to every unit who deploys to the NAVCENT AOR in support of either operation and is updated whenever a participating country changes its ROE. This allows NAVCENT planners to apportion forces to individual missions, knowing what our allies will be able to do and NOT do, so that the right mix of capabilities is present to ensure mission success.

Interoperability

Not every nation the US works with will have the same technological capability that we do. As an example of one of our own issues, due to the rapid changes in technology, every Carrier Strike Group that deploys has slightly different communications systems in place. When it comes to technological interoperability, the more we work with other countries to develop their systems and skills, the better we will be able to operate with them in future engagements. Improved allied coalition interoperability was “highlighted as the

‘number one’ fleet communication system requirement.”¹⁶ US Fleet Forces Command is working to develop systems and methods for the US Navy to integrate with the rest of the nation’s agencies for maritime domain awareness. Those systems will also be designed for export to partner nations. However, for many developing nations, this will often mean the US footing the bill for technological capability to provide partners with the ability to communicate with coalition forces and enable streamlined information sharing. This is already evident in CTF 150, where NAVCENT routinely provides equipment and technical support to nations providing ships for operations with CTF 150. This requires early involvement between the ship/staff and NAVCENT, often before their deployment to the AOR begins. Once a ship is identified by their parent country, NAVCENT technicians begin working with the ship to ensure they either have procured the appropriate computer systems and architecture and communications suites to interact with other CTF 150 units, or identify shortfalls and arrange for those to be temporarily installed to ensure success.

Language and cultural differences also present a different interoperability challenge to the operational commander. With our NATO allies, a common language was established, in addition to accepted doctrine and procedures. And although NATO countries have their own, unique cultural heritage, the common European background and our previous interactions during WWI and WWII formed the core of NATO’s commonality. New partners come from vastly different cultural backgrounds and speak hundreds of different languages. Although English is spreading as a globalized language, it is not necessarily even a second language with new partners. This creates problems when trying to develop

¹⁶ US Second Fleet to US Fleet Forces Command, message 071908Z SEP 06, 07 September 2006, quoted in U.S. Fleet Forces Command, “The Concept of Operations for Fleet Maritime Domain Awareness.” Fleet MDA CONOPS (Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy, CFFC, 13 March 2007), 6.

procedures to operate together. The cultural barrier may be even harder to overcome. Issues ranging from standardized siestas to relationships between the sexes can create obstacles that will take time and understanding to mitigate.

Conclusion

The spread of WMD is the gravest threat to world security and will sometimes need to be met with force. The US needs all the help it can get, but the old global institutions aren't up to the job. The PSI is a herald of the new world order, multilateralism with teeth.¹⁷

PSI and similar strategic policies are the embodiment of an increasingly globalized world that will continue to blur the lines between states and interconnect people around the world. With connectivity comes abuse and vulnerability. There are those who would use global versatility to inflict harm anywhere from anywhere. And yet, no nation has the capability to provide security everywhere at once. It takes a network of partners, working towards a common goal, to achieve global security. Our current and future partners may not be the traditional ones of the past – the ones with which we have forged enduring relationships and common processes and procedures. This requires a change in operational thinking. We are now working with people who do not share the same culture, language or technology, but wish to achieve the same goals of increasing global security.

A review of my analysis shows that operational commanders can integrate PSI and similar initiatives into the planning process and integrate non-traditional partners into ad hoc operations. It all starts with relationships. By building understanding and trust, we can accurately assess a partner's capabilities and build a plan that optimizes those contributions. From there, practicing common procedures in a variety of forums – from conferences and

¹⁷ *The Wall Street Journal Online*, “The New Multilateralism,” 08 January 2004, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SP107351849173364800.html> (accessed 20 April 2007).

table-top exercises to large multi-national exercises – builds proficiency and allows issues to be identified and resolved before they become problems.

Unfortunately, understanding and a great plan are not everything. As each partner is unique in culture and language, their legal authorities will also vary widely. It is important for operational planners to understand exactly what each partner will be able to do and how far their authorities will allow them to go. By the same token, each partner will come with their own disparate technologies. For many developing countries where we are working to build capability, it will also mean being prepared to provide equipment and training to ensure that information and communications will flow as smoothly as possible.

The maritime domain is a great common, which is growing smaller and smaller each day with the spread of globalization. All maritime nations have an obligation to protect the maritime domain to ensure its freedom of use, while still protecting themselves along an open border. Operational commanders are perfectly poised to open doors and increase trust and understanding for our goals around the world. It just takes a little imagination and the willingness to listen to and work with others.

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