

The Secret of Future Defeat: the Evolution of US Joint and Army Doctrine 1993-2006 and the Flawed Conception of Stability Operations

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

THE SECRET OF FUTURE DEFEAT: the Evolution of US Joint and Army Doctrine 1993-2006 and the Flawed Conception of Stability Operations by Major Thomas V. Traczyk IV, US Army, 84 pages.

Throughout the past 15 years, both the Western allies and the Russians have entered into a series of military engagements that have in one way or another spectacularly failed to achieve the results intended, namely a decisive military victory which would in turn deliver a solution to the original political problem. The nature of US military operations in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has achieved dramatic military victories but has failed to deliver the political aims of the conflicts.

Many analysts attempt to explain the phenomenon by describing changes in the strategic environment that have rendered conventional interstate warfare ineffective or even irrelevant or obsolete. Many even claim that the age of conventional warfare is over, and that the world has transitioned to a new irregular paradigm of conflict. Other analysts point to organizational and cultural preferences for conventional warfare or for material-based or technological solutions that are inappropriate to the situation.

However, these concepts are merely symptoms, or at best precipitating causes and not the proximate cause of this seeming lack of military effectiveness in securing national policy objectives. Instead, the principal cause of the lack of efficacy in the modern military art is a flawed conceptual approach and design to current joint and Army doctrine.

Conceptually, the essential problem is that combat operations and stability operations are fundamentally different forms of operations, yet are tightly interconnected. To resolve this tension, a military doctrine must not only account for both combat and stability operations, but must also effectively integrate the two into a comprehensive and workable framework. Although current US joint doctrine and the Army's doctrine of Full Spectrum Operations both include stability operations, their flawed conceptual approaches intersect to produce an unworkable operational framework for the conduct of both stability operations and combat operations. These approaches produce a series of flawed conceptual models characterized by disintegration of stability and combat operations, conflation of stability and combat operations, and finally, the aggregation of dissimilar tasks associated with stability and combat operations.

This monograph will explore the development of doctrinal concepts and models since 1993, focusing on Joint and Army doctrine's treatment of combat and stability operations. It will then analyze these models in relation to history and theory of stability operations, isolating flaws in conceptual models such as the Range of Military Operations, the Deliberate Phasing Model, Full Spectrum Operations, and the Army tenet of versatility. These flaws will be linked to conceptual errors endemic to the Joint and Army organizations as a whole. The summary of these flaws will produce a hypothesis described as Integrated Army Operations, a framework for integrating both combat and stability operations into a single comprehensive framework. Finally, this paper will conduct a simple test of its findings using a simple comparative analysis.

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INTRODUCTION

In 1992, a year before the first publication of the Army's doctrine of Full Spectrum Operations, retired General Paul F. Gorman wrote that "Future victories depend on the Army's having both superb professional schools, and maneuver units trained and commanded well enough that battle seasoning surely outpaces battle losses."¹ While no one would argue against the merits of professional schools and well trained forces led by capable leaders, one might argue that the US Army has had all three of these enablers for the past three decades, and yet finds itself increasingly challenged to accomplish national policy objectives.

Throughout the past 15 years, both the Western allies and the Russians have entered into a series of military engagements that have in one way or another spectacularly failed to achieve the results intended, namely a decisive military victory which would in turn deliver a solution to the original political problem.² The nature of US military operations in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has achieved dramatic military victories but has failed to deliver the political aims of the conflicts.³

Most analysts agree that US and Western dominance in conventional, high-technology warfare has completely deterred state actors from strategies risking direct military confrontation, and has led to nonstate actors employing "asymmetric approaches" or complex terrain to render military power "functionally irrelevant."⁴ Because of these asymmetric methods, conventional war may have become much less important or decisive, since it no longer serves as the primary

¹ Paul F. Gorman, General, US Army, Retired, *The Secret of Future Victories* (Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1992. Reprinted by the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994), p. S-1.

² Rupert Smith, General, UK, Retired, *The Utility of Force: the Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 6.

³ Fredrick Kagan, "War and Aftermath: Beware Technology that Disconnects War from Politics," *Policy Review*, No. 120 (August and September 2003), 4.

⁴ International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance 2005-2006*. Ed. by Christopher Langton. (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), 411.

arena for military confrontation. These situations will deny the decisive conventional battle that western militaries are designed to prosecute.⁵

Several contemporary authors such as General Rupert Smith argue that large unit conventional combat operations are obsolete and that modern war has shifted to a new paradigm of “war amongst the people,” characterized largely by stability-type operations.⁶ Rather than requiring the destruction of large industrial age conventional armed forces, national policy and security objectives now demand the maintenance of order and functionality of states. French officer and counterinsurgency theorist Roger Trinquier goes so far as to state that traditional warfare is obsolete, replaced by “modern war” which he defines as “an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, psychological, military—that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.”⁷ Robert Kaplan agrees, describing the trend of conflict going from interstate conflict, to ideological conflict, and now emerging as cultural conflict.⁸ The Westphalian system of nation-states, which underpins theories of conventional warfare, is becoming irrelevant, replacing interstate war with other forms of violence involving local politics and organized crime.⁹

While these authors focus on changes in the strategic environment, others focus on military organizations and national culture for an explanation of why the superpower use of force fails so often. Fredrick Kagan, for example, argues that the American Way of War has become so infused with technology that it is incapable of effectively conducting stability operations required to translate military victory into political success.¹⁰

⁵ Ibid., 412.

⁶ Smith, 6.

⁷ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 1964), 5.

⁸ Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 26.

⁹ Ibid., 43-51.

¹⁰ Kagan, 4.

However, these concepts are merely symptoms, or at best precipitating causes and not the primary cause of this seeming lack of military effectiveness in securing national policy objectives. Instead, the principal cause of the lack of efficacy in the modern military art is a flawed conceptual approach and design to current Joint and Army doctrine.

In treating both of these forms or modes of operation, the essential problem is that combat operations and stability operations are fundamentally different forms of operations, yet are tightly interconnected. To resolve this tension, a military doctrine must not only account for both combat and stability operations, but must also effectively integrate the two into a comprehensive and workable framework. Although current US joint doctrine and the Army's doctrine of Full Spectrum Operations both include stability operations, their flawed conceptual approaches intersect to produce an unworkable operational framework for the conduct of both stability operations and combat operations. These approaches produce a series of flawed conceptual models characterized by disintegration of stability and combat operations, conflation of stability and combat operations, and finally, the aggregation of dissimilar tasks associated with stability and combat operations.

Army Field Manual (FM) 1 defines "stability and reconstruction operations" as military operations designed "to sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources."¹¹ For the purpose of simplification, this monograph will refer to these types of operations as stability operations, including all its forms, particularly counterinsurgencies or insurgency-driven stability operations that tend to be the most violent. As such, stability operations that involve combat tend to be "small wars," or conflicts between conventional armies

¹¹ US Department of the Army. *Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2005), p. 3-7.

and irregular forces that generally refuse decisive battle.¹² Similarly, this monograph defines combat operations as conventional warfare between the organized armed forces of states.

This monograph will also use organization theory to frame many of its points. Specifically, it will use Barry Posen's application of organization theory that organizations seek to minimize uncertainty by increasing their size, wealth, and autonomy, focusing on missions that emphasize control and predictability. Once the organization obtains these goals, they typically demonstrate institutional inertia or resistance to change. Applied to the US Army, this monograph will illustrate how the Army's preference for conventional warfare led to organizational resistance in addressing stability operations. This led to the addition of stability operations rather than its integration, through making incremental changes to AirLand Battle doctrine beginning in 1993.

¹² Charles Edward Callwell, Colonel, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 21.

DISINTEGRATION: THE DISINTEGRATION OF STABILITY AND COMBAT OPERATIONS IN DOCTRINE

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the US resounding victory during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the Department of Defense realized that it had achieved dominance in conventional war. Reevaluating its strategic environment as well as the impending downsizing of its forces, the military realized that the most likely form of employment of military forces would be in a stability or humanitarian role.

Realizing that its doctrine of AirLand Battle was ill-suited guide units in that role, the Army began the process of doctrinal revision. Yet, rather than begin a comprehensive and systemic analysis of the global environment and potential missions, the Army employed an incremental or additive approach, attempting to merely account for stability operations, and also frame them in the familiar framework of conventional warfare.

Although Joint and Army doctrine account for stability operations, organizational and cultural preferences for conventional warfare have led to the failure of the US military to integrate stability operations into a comprehensive doctrinal framework. This disintegration occurs because of the military's failure to recognize the significance of the threat posed by failing states, the interrelationship of stability and combat operations, and its own organizational and cultural preferences which distort its view of stability operations. These factors lead to flawed conceptual models, including the Range of Military Operations and the Deliberate Phasing Model, which artificially separate stability operations from combat operations.

FAILED STATES MATTER TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The shock of the September 11 attacks exposed the failure of US national security policy to recognize failed states as a potentially major national security threats, making stability operations a core competency of the military. The emergence of failed and collapsing states as national security threat is occurring because of the convergence of three phenomenon, including

the increase in modern technology and transportation networks, the increasing number of failed states, and the decreased commitment of resources by great powers such as the US.

It is a natural organizational tendency for states to focus on Great Power War, identifying the large armed forces of other nation states as the worst-case or primary threat against whom to plan in a form of mirror imaging. The attacks of September 11, however, illustrated that terror and technology have “collapsed the saving distances” that kept the US safe from harm.¹³ This makes the establishment of order in failed states an essential task in any the security strategy of a global power such as the US.¹⁴

As modern transportation systems bring disorder from failed states closer to home, the number of failed or collapsing states is dramatically increasing. Robert Kaplan writes that the “criminal anarchy” of failed or collapsing states is emerging as the “real strategic threat.”¹⁵ The traditional political maps which underpin the traditional state-based international security system are becoming irrelevant, often representing only a fictional political control.¹⁶ Crime, pollution or environmental damage, resource scarcity and poverty, and overpopulation have rendered regions ungovernable and governments dysfunctional.¹⁷ Kaplan concludes that this emerging environment of chaos and dysfunction is “*the national security issue of the early twenty-first century.*”¹⁸

One major reason for this increase in disorder is the decline of superpower sponsorship that characterized the Colonial and Cold War eras. The subsequent post-colonial movements of national liberation have now culminated and many have failed to meet their expectations of

¹³ Michael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan..* (Toronto, Canada: Penguin Group, Canada, 2003), 11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁵ Kaplan, 7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 19.

improving people's lives through effective governance.¹⁹ The collapse or failure of these governments combines with increased urbanization, lawlessness, and underemployment. States no longer provide basic services. Although many of the independence movements around the world were based on democratic principles and individual liberty, these ideals are completely unattainable in an environment of complete chaos and disorder. As one author points out that imperialism is a precondition for democracy.²⁰ He writes, "There are some humanitarian problems for which there are only imperial solutions."²¹

Despite this requirement for order, the traditional imperial commitment of the Great Powers is declining. The US traditions of noninterference and self-determination are at odds with the strategic requirements to maintain order around the globe. After 1991, the US believed that it could have hegemony through indirect rule, without installing the administrative apparatus abroad in the style of the colonial empires. It believed it could have "imperial domination on the cheap," ruling the world without putting in place any new imperial architecture for a post-colonial, post-Soviet world. The failure was hubris as well as a failure of the "historical imagination", making the US unable to grasp that the emerging crisis of state decay and collapse would ultimately translate into a direct threat against our national security.²²

After supporting the Afghan resistance during the Soviet-Afghan War, the US blundered by abandoning both Afghanistan and Pakistan following the defeat of the Soviets. Left to provide for its own security, Pakistan naturally attempted to retain a buffer against future Soviet aggression as well as gain strategic depth against India by controlling Afghanistan through empowerment of the Taliban. This set the conditions for a secure base of operations for Al Qaeda from which to plan its attack on the World Trade Center.²³

¹⁹ Ignatieff, 9.

²⁰ Ibid., 24.

²¹ Ibid., 19.

²² Ibid., 13.

²³ Ibid., 13.

By way of contrast, the US made an enormous commitment of resources to stability operations during its occupation of Japan following World War II. The US committed four years of dedicated interagency research, thought, and planning, seven years of occupation by 350,000 troops, and several billion dollars to Japan. MacArthur deployed 354,675 troops as an occupation force in Japan, despite the fact that Japan was a permissive country three-fourths the size of Iraq.²⁴ The institutional knowledge of this time was that a big investment in stability operations would lead to big political payoff.²⁵ The US knew this lesson during its occupations of Germany and Japan, but somehow forgot, or chose to forget by returning to its traditional preference for non-interference and self-determination, allowing its armed forces to return to their organizational preference for conventional warfare.

US strategy during the 1990s represented a strategic mismatch between the requirement to maintain order around the globe and the minimal resources committed. Technology and collapsing states have combined to produce a direct threat to the security of the international system, yet at a time when great power commitment abroad is declining.

MILITARY VICTORY: SUCCESSFUL WARFARE VERSUS SUCCESS IN WAR

While failed states may demand stability operations in and of themselves, conventional combat operations also require stability operations in order to achieve policy objectives, generating an interrelationship or linkage between the two operational forms. During situations involving conventional combat, militaries as well as nations tend to focus almost exclusively on military victory rather than on the ultimate, political objective. Conventional decisive warfare, however, invariably produces its own instability, requiring stability operations to preserve or even

²⁴ David P Cavaleri, *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between combat Operations and Stability Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 64.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 65-66.

fulfill the political objectives of the conflict. This failure to remember this lesson learned between the First and Second World Wars has produced a set of conditions in which the US military is at its most proficient in terms of conventional combat, yet consistently fails to achieve the policy objectives during employment.

Illustrating this failure as well as the limitations of its imperial authority is the failed US Middle East policy. The US may have unrivaled military and economic power, but it has not been able to build stability wherever it wants on its own terms.²⁶ The nature of US military operations in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has achieved dramatic military victories but has failed to deliver the political aims of the conflicts.²⁷ Achieving political objectives and returning to a state of improved peace depends upon the exact method of defeating enemy armed forces and the conditions of the targeted state and the end of conflict.²⁸ Although Kagan focuses on the technological rather than doctrinal aspects of US military operations, he points out that the US has produced a technological-centered method of warfare that is capable of producing spectacular military victories while at the same time spectacularly failing to achieve the political purpose for fighting the war in the first place.²⁹

Emerging doctrinal concepts, such as Network Centric Warfare, Shock and Awe, and Dominant battlespace awareness combine a target-set approach with near-perfect intelligence and networked sensors, weapon platforms, and C2 nodes, to rapidly destroy an enemy's conventional war-making capacity, with particular emphasis on the destruction of his ability to command and control that capability.³⁰ However, none of these concepts describes the translation of this destruction into attainment of the political objectives for the conflict.³¹ In fact, Kagan illustrates how the application of modern doctrinal concepts actually serve to undermine the achievement of

²⁶ Ignatieff, 10.

²⁷ Kagan, 4.

²⁸ Ibid., 4.

²⁹ Ibid., 4.

³⁰ Ibid., 6-9.

³¹ Ibid., 9.

policy objectives by undermining the preconditions for a smooth transition of power by destruction and insufficient emphasis on control of territory and civilian populations endemic to stability operations.³² The chaos, power vacuum and even humanitarian crisis in the wake of current US precision standoff strike emphasis serves to undermine the very political objectives a conflict is fought to achieve.

Thus, US forces often find themselves conducting stability operations that were either completely unanticipated or grossly underestimated. For example, during the US invasion of Panama in December 1989, a failure to integrate the planning for warfare and stability operations precluded the execution of effective stability operations.³³ Rampant disorder compelled US combat troops to commence stability operations and nation-building in the midst of combat operations, as forces had to react to refugees and looters. Several days of unrestricted looting severely damaged Panama's economy and hampered attempts to reestablish order and stability.

Similarly, in 1991, the US fought the Persian Gulf War, designed as a simple, limited, conventional conflict with absolutely no plans for stability operations. In the aftermath of the conflict, the uprisings of the Shia and Kurdish populations, and subsequent brutal repression by Saddam's regime, necessitated a belated stability operation named Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.³⁴ Since the Persian Gulf War was such an overwhelming military success, the larger lessons of handling the postconflict stability were largely forgotten or institutionally ignored, allowing normal military institutional preferences for combat operations to continue unabated.

The US military tends to view the combat operations will be the deciding factor in the achievement of policy goals, while assuming the stability operations will somehow occur and will be successful. The flaw of this view is that stability operations more frequently fail than succeed

³² Ibid., 13.

³³ Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 18.

³⁴ Ibid., 19.

and that their failure ultimately renders even the most magnificent military combat victory irrelevant.³⁵ While combat operations will be operationally decisive, the corresponding stability operations will be politically and strategically decisive since they will shape the ultimate peace that follows the conflict. “If you concentrate exclusively on victory,” warns Liddell Hart, “with no thought for the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one” ultimately leading to a continuation of war.³⁶

During World War II, defeating the Japanese militarily was only one aspect of winning the peace. MacArthur and his staff had to essentially reengineer Japanese society as a political, economic, and even social system. Seeking to eliminate all vestiges of military influence, MacArthur sought to demilitarize and democratize Japanese society, conduct economic and social reforms, including purges of military advisors and the break up of the *zaibatsu* family monopolies.³⁷

Postwar planning must emphasize economic recovery and competent administrations, otherwise military victory will “degenerate into desultory insurgency.”³⁸ Strong actor success in counterinsurgency, for example, is typified by “... preceding discriminate military attacks with meaningful political and economic reforms – reforms that effectively isolated guerrillas or terrorists from their base of social support.”³⁹

Several authors claim that to win the peace, the US must stop confusing military power for national power and utilize other forms of national power to resolve or prevent conflict.⁴⁰ Liddell Hart distinguishes between military strategy and grand strategy, or what we today label national strategy. He states that military strategy “is only concerned with the problem of winning

³⁵ Ibid., 23.

³⁶ Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Sir, *Strategy*, 2nd Revised Edition (New York: Meridian Printing, 1991), 353.

³⁷ Cavaleri, 40.

³⁸ Ivan Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 226.

³⁹ Ibid., 226.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 227.

military victory, grand strategy must take the longer view—for its problem is winning the peace.”⁴¹ Since the object of war is to obtain a better peace, he warns that too narrow a focus on military victory may lead to a flawed peace and ultimately a resumption of fighting.⁴²

Considering this interrelationship of stability operations with conventional conflict, a reappraisal of the legal obligations of the military under US Code Title X subsequently reveals the requirement to conduct effective stability operations. The previous analysis develops implicitly that stability operations are critical to US national security. This knowledge becomes explicit, however, when used as a lens to examine the specified legal roles of the Army.

US Code Title 10 specifies the following tasks for the Army:

- (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;
- (2) supporting the national policies;
- (3) implementing the national objectives; and
- (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.⁴³

Ostensibly, the first three tasks require a stability operations capability in addition to conventional warfare. Only the final task of “overcoming nations” relates directly to conventional operations alone.

Clausewitz would approve of this arrangement since he prudently subordinates the military as the means of policy.⁴⁴ A cognitive mechanism which may break this connection is “goal degeneration,” when an intermediate goal such as military victory, replaces the primary

⁴¹ Liddell Hart, 349-350.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 353.

⁴³ US Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, Subtitle B, *Army*, Chapter 307, *The Army*, Section 3062, *Policy; composition, organized peace establishment*.

⁴⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

goal, which in war is political.⁴⁵ Goal degeneration is particularly acute in “flow situations,” or situations that become almost addictive due to a succession of challenges, such as tactical battles.⁴⁶ Hence, militaries tend to narrowly focus on military victory, losing its context as an intermediate goal within a political framework. This implies that stability operations are not only critical in failed or collapsing states, they are normal, mandatory parts of conventional warfare as well.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND CULTURAL RESISTANCE TO STABILITY OPERATIONS

Despite the strategic and even legal requirement of stability operations, organizational and cultural preferences for conventional warfare have undermined efforts to integrate stability operations comprehensively, leading to the disintegration of military doctrine and policy. These preferences ignore the extensive US history of stability operations, and allow normal organizational dynamics and US cultural preferences to override any attempt to integrate stability operations into doctrine.

Cohen lists organizational resistance by the Defense Department as the greatest of the constraints on the US in the conduct of small wars.⁴⁷ Despite two hundred years of experience in stability operations around the globe, the Army has an institutional habit of forgetting the lessons learned about SO, returning to conventional warfare preparation. The Army maintains a mindset that stability operations are an anomaly, despite the fact that it has conducted far more stability operations than conventional combat operations.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Dietrich Dörner, (*The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 62.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 61-62.

⁴⁷ Eliot A. Cohen, “Constraints on America’s Conduct of Small Wars.” *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Fall 1984), 165.

⁴⁸ Yates, iii.

By Yates' count, the US Army has fought fewer than a dozen conventional conflicts, but several hundred stability operations. Its organizational bias considers stability operations as someone else's job.⁴⁹ Even at the height of the cold war, Eliot Cohen pointed out that actual direct conflict with the Soviet Union was the least likely contingency of the US military.⁵⁰ The majority of political debate and military preparation tends to be for the least probable type of engagement the military faces, conventional warfare.⁵¹

Colin Gray adds that US military strategy is ahistorical. Although the US Army has an extensive background in irregular warfare, the Army has never accepted it as a core competency, choosing rather to improvise and therefore relearn lessons. Stability operations are viewed as an unfortunate diversion from conventional or "real" war.⁵² This occurs because the Army has institutional bias for conventional warfare, characterized by the large-scale combat against the uniformed, regular armed forces of an enemy state. It is traditionally disinclined to prepare for stability operations.⁵³

The Army traditionally does not perceive stability operations as integral to war, and is subsequently unwilling to divert essential resources away from its core mission of conventional warfighting. Additionally, the Army typically assumes that disciplined soldiers trained solely on their warfighting tasks, could adjust and perform the myriad of menial tasks associated with stability operations.⁵⁴

Krepinevich also describes the Army's institutional resistance to counterinsurgency, even as its involvement in the counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam grew. He labels the Army's organizational preference for conventional war as "The Army Concept," defining it as "the

⁴⁹ Ibid., 2.

⁵⁰ Cohen, 153.

⁵¹ Ibid., 154.

⁵² Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 32.

⁵³ Yates, 1.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 3.

Army's perception of how wars ought to be fought, characterized by a mid-intensity or conventional focus and a reliance on firepower, or more broadly, the substitution of material costs for lives."⁵⁵ Even when the Commander in Chief, President Kennedy, demanded the development of an unconventional, counterinsurgency capability, the Army tended to frame all forms of conflict within its model of conventional conflict, with counterinsurgency as a lesser but included class.⁵⁶

These organizational dynamics conform to the predictions of organization theory. Organization theory predicts that organizations will naturally strive to reduce uncertainty, primarily by increasing their size, resources, and autonomy. When applied to military organizations, this implies that militaries will generally prefer offensive doctrines because they reduce uncertainty by attaining the initiative in combat over an opponent. Unlike defensive operations which attempt to exhaust the will of an attacker, offensives target an opponent's physical capacity which is more quantitatively measurable than will. Offensive doctrines also demand larger militaries, more resources, and more technical military knowledge, which further limit civilian interference and increasing autonomy.⁵⁷ Finally, offensive doctrines carry the battle into enemy territory, further reducing civilian interference.

The environment of offensive, conventional warfare sought by the Army is the polar opposite of stability operations, which represent an environment that is often dynamic, complex, and ambiguous. As a result, stability operations often emerge as unanticipated tasks conducted by unprepared troops, but tasks which forces usually discover are critical to accomplishing the political purposes for the intervention or conflict.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 5.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁵⁷ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), 47-49.

⁵⁸ Yates, 34.

Because of this desire to reduce uncertainty, they will naturally tend to produce doctrines that are offensive, non-innovative, and poorly integrated with political objectives and grand strategy.⁵⁹ Organization theory predicts that militaries will frequently behave in ways that run counter to the interests of the state, and therefore must be critically reviewed by civilian leaders frequently to ensure integration.⁶⁰ During periods of international calm, organizational dynamics take precedence. During periods of crisis, civilian intervention will override organization dynamics and allow balance of power theory to prevail.⁶¹

Yet often, this civilian intervention does not occur, precisely because US culture also prefers offensive, conventional warfare in the same way its militaries do. The historic material and technological superiority combine with the US geostrategic position to develop a cultural preference for offensive, aggressive warfare. Despite historically being a status quo power, because the US is geographically isolated, it has been compelled to project combat power abroad and conduct offensive operations in order to maintain that status quo.

The forward deployed forces of the Cold War were a historic anomaly. Because of the geographic isolation of the US, the norm has been to deploy forces overseas when required, leading to a cultural preference for decisive warfare, since the conflict had to be of sufficient importance to warrant the expenditure of such resources.⁶² To limit the cost of the war, decisive combat was required to rapidly conclude the conflict. In addition, the importance of the goal of the conflict also led to the cultural of fighting wars ideologically, as good versus evil. Fighting ideological wars reinforced the need for decisive operations, since limited war did not correspond to the ideological justification. This need for decisive operations, rapid conclusion, developed the culture of offensive operations.⁶³

⁵⁹ Posen, 58-59.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 241.

⁶¹ Ibid., 40.

⁶² Gray, 41.

⁶³ Ibid., 41.

While the US historic advantages in material, technology, and geostrategic position have shaped its military thinking directly, they have also shaped the development of US culture. American historic technological superiority has led to a cultural preference for technological solutions rather than innovative strategic approaches, despite the fact that there is no correlation between technological superiority and successful stability operations, particularly counterinsurgencies.⁶⁴ Since all nations prefer to fight to their advantage, historic US material superiority has led to a cultural preference to fight conventional war on a large scale in which material advantage readily translates into military and political advantage.⁶⁵ However, this typically leads to the error of treating stability operations as a “scaled-down version” of a conventional conflict when, in fact, irregular forces by definition employ organizations and methods which make material superiority irrelevant.⁶⁶ The very conception of the term “small war” illustrates this implicit recognition of less importance.

Both of these broad cultural trends intersect to form a third, which is the US overreliance on firepower. US culturally prioritizes the lives of its soldiers, leading to the dehumanization of its enemy and reduction into a target set for the application of firepower, even when not appropriate to the situation.⁶⁷ Advantages in technology, material, and firepower do not correspond to operational advantages in stability operations. The irregular enemy refuses to concentrate and openly engage the COIN forces, denying them the ability to maneuver or apply firepower. Furthermore, these advantages over-employed and the required large material presence in the targeted country are often counterproductive, causing collateral damage to the civilian population, undermining the legitimacy of the local government, and reinforcing the perception of the US presence as an occupation.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 35.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 39.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 39.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 37.

In addition to geostrategic factors, the US traditional value of self-determination generates a reluctance to interfere in the internal politics of other states, a reluctance that is contrary to the requirements of stability operations.⁶⁸ President Bush's presidential platform eschewed the use of troops for peacekeeping or nation building, a philosophy he carried even into the initial planning for the war in Afghanistan.⁶⁹ Even recently, President Bush's vision of transformation explicitly sought to avoid operations other than war and nation-building.⁷⁰

Even four years following the September 11 attacks, a security study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies delivered a skeptical assessment of US capability to shift from conventional, state-on-state conflict. Organizational inertia, the study predicted as well as the "sheer psychological difficulty of moving away from decades of strategic thought" will continue to combine and keep the US force structure and acquisition programs conventionally focused.⁷¹

While these tasks demand the ability to effectively execute stability operations to support or implement national policy, the doctrine of military organizations can frequently become disintegrated from policy. As the US entered the 1990s, it essentially accepted the Powell Doctrine which prescribed a clear set of preconditions for the use of the military, including last resort, clear objectives, short duration, and overwhelming force. This doctrine developed as a result of the failure of US involvement in Vietnam, generating the belief that the US people would not support the use of armed force unless it was against a direct threat to US national security, had clear objectives, and was of short duration.⁷² This doctrine hypothesizes that the US, as a superpower, should avoid engagement in stability operations or small wars.

However, as the 1990s progressed, this doctrine severely limited US options to shape its security environment. Max Boot states that if we revert to the Powell Doctrine and only enter

⁶⁸ Cohen, 169.

⁶⁹ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 192.

⁷⁰ Kagan, 5.

⁷¹ IISS, 412.

⁷² Yates, 17.

conflicts using a “narrow calculus” of immediate self-interest, we absolve the historic role of the “benevolent hegemon” underwriting the peace and order of the international system and the security of the global economy.⁷³ By purely avoiding stability operations, the US severely limits its own strategic freedom of action and reduces its own security.

More recently, the lack of a coherent doctrine has produced disintegration from Bush’s policy of regime change and preventive war. As Kagan points out, “The true center of gravity in a war of regime change lies not in the destruction of the old system, but in the creation of the new one.”⁷⁴ The destruction of the undesired regime is a much simpler task than the establishment of a stable new one.⁷⁵ “Combat is characterized by breaking things and killing people; war is about much more than that.”⁷⁶

In systems language, the desired end state and starting point for military planning represents a new and stable system. The intervention, possibly including military destruction, must be orchestrated in such a way to transition the system from the current but undesired state to the new desired state without causing the system to become unstable and unmanageable in the interim. The 200 year history of stability operations indicates the need for a professional acceptance of the interrelationship between war and peace.⁷⁷

Unfortunately, emerging military concepts underpinning the military’s transformation efforts do not offer any sign that military doctrine will be reintegrated with policy soon. Kagan traces a complex causal chain from the emerging doctrinal trends of information superiority coupled with precision long-range strike, to the increases emphasis and deployability, hence the need for lightness, the decrease in armor protection and hence survivability of individual

⁷³ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 350-351.

⁷⁴ Kagan, 10.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁷⁷ Yates, 21-22.

vehicles.⁷⁸ The decreased survivability then necessitates increased offensive and attritional warfare, since vehicles cannot allow enemy forces to take the first shot. The greater offensive mode is in complete contradiction to the requirements of stability operations, which require intermingling with the civilian population and therefore acceptance of risk to avoid collateral damage, possibly even allowing the enemy to take the first shot by having the confidence that units have a reasonable chance of survival and retaliation.

DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT AND DISINTEGRATION

These dynamics of the US culture and military organizations are evident in the development of its doctrine since 1993. These normal organizational preferences for conventional, offensive operations have led to flawed conceptual models such as the Range of Military Operations and the Deliberate Phasing Model, both of which artificially separate stability operations from combat operations.

The 1993 version of the Army's capstone doctrinal manual, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, introduced the Range of Military Operations, depicted graphically in Figure 1.⁷⁹ As a conceptual tool, this graphic illustrates the Army's

STATES OF THE ENVIRONMENT	GOAL	MILITARY OPERATIONS	EXAMPLES
WAR	Fight and Win	WAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large-scale combat operations . . . • Attack • Defend
CONFLICT	Deter War and Resolve Conflict	OTHER THAN WAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strikes and raids • Peace enforcement • Support to insurgency • Antiterrorism • Peacekeeping • NEO
PEACETIME	Promote Peace	OTHER THAN WAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Counterdrug • Disaster relief • Civil support • Peace building • Nation assistance
<p>The states of peacetime, conflict, and war could all exist at once in the theater commander's strategic environment. He can respond to requirements with a wide range of military operations. Noncombat operations might occur during war, just as some operations other than war might require combat.</p>			

Figure 1. The Army Range of Military Operations,

categorization of its military activities into war and operations other than war, represented respectively by the two dark vertical bars. The right bar, representing activities other than

⁷⁸ Kagan, 16.

⁷⁹ US Department of the Army. *Field Manual (FM) 100-5: Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), p. 2-0.

conventional warfare, is particularly revealing. Although this bar overlaps with combat operations in the environment of conflict, it is almost completely absent from the environmental state of war. This demonstrates the Army’s fundamental conception that stability operations have no place in “real” war. It also contradicts the US experience in two world wars in which large conventional warfare on a massive scale demanded the employment of stability operations to repair the damage to the belligerents and secure the political fruits of victory.




Figure 2. The Joint Range of Military Operations, 1995.

In the 1995 edition of Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, the Joint Staff

adopted this model of the Range of Military Operations from the Army almost exactly, as depicted in Figure 2.⁸⁰ However, the Joint model was even more extreme in its separation, with “noncombat” operations such as stability clearly delineated from war. The subsequent version of JP 3-0, published in 2001 just before the September 11 attacks, retained this model essentially unchanged.⁸¹

The 2001 version of *Operations* now designated FM 3-0, updated the range of military operations depicted in Figure 3 and introduced the spectrum of conflict. Despite the trend toward increasing complexity of the global environment in the 1990s, this doctrine further simplified that

⁸⁰ US Department of Defense. *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), p. I-2.

⁸¹ US Department of Defense. *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001), p. I-2.

environment by reducing it from three states to two, war and military operations other than war.⁸² Although this model now extended stability operation into the environment of war, once it enters the domain of war, it tapers off sharply reflecting its diminishing role.

Although combat and stability operations represent obviously different modes of operations, the failure of the military to see the interrelationship between them has led to the view that they will occur in sequential rather than overlapping phases, establishing an artificial and unrealistic temporal relationship between the two.⁸³ The higher priority afforded to combat




Figure 3. The Range of Army Operations, 2001.

operations combined with the logical view that winning a military victory was a precondition for effective stability operations serves to segregate planning efforts, which then one-sidedly seeks to maximize the efficiency of military victory in combat.

In reality, combat and stability occur simultaneously throughout a campaign.⁸⁴ Combat operations may even become necessary at some point after stability operations are well under way, such as Somalia 1992-1994, or may be recurring and intermittent, such as those following the American Civil War Reconstruction, or the US war in the Philippines from 1899 to 1902.⁸⁵

⁸² US Department of the Army. *Field Manual (FM) 3-0: Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2001), p. 1-15.

⁸³ Yates, 22.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 28.

Stability operations occur before, during, and after combat operations, demanding integrated rather than compartmentalized planning.⁸⁶ As General Rupert Smith points out,

Interstate industrial war carried a typical sequence of peace-crisis-war-resolution-peace, with military action being the deciding factor. But war amongst the people has not predefined sequence, it is a continuous crisscrossing between confrontation and conflict, with peace possibly not the starting or ending point, and conflicts resolving but not the confrontation.⁸⁷

Despite this interrelationship between stability and combat operations, doctrine attempts to separate or sequence the two in time. The 2001 edition of JP 3-0 introduced the deliberate phasing model, illustrated in Figure 4.⁸⁸ This model provided combatant commanders with a generic template for designing military campaigns. Although not prescriptive, the model nevertheless reflected the concept of stability




Figure 4. Joint Deliberate Phasing Model, 2001.

operations following decisive combat operations in time. The consequence of this belief is that military planning for major combat operations and stability operations has generally been compartmentalized, rather than integrated, generating segregated and hence disjointed preconflict planning.⁸⁹

Although the Army did not incorporate this model into its 2001 version of FM 3-0, it nevertheless followed its precedent, stating the following:

When conducting full spectrum operations, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations to accomplish the mission. The JFC and the Army component commander for a particular mission determine

⁸⁶ Ibid., 35.

⁸⁷ Smith, 19.

⁸⁸ JP 3-0, 2001, p. III-19.

⁸⁹ Yates, 22-23.

the emphasis Army forces place on each type of operation. Throughout the campaign, offensive, defensive, stability, and support missions occur simultaneously. As missions change from promoting peace to deterring war and from resolving conflict to war itself, the combinations of and transitions between these operations require skillful assessment, planning, preparation, and execution.⁹⁰

Although this text hedges its oversimplification, stability operations are still characterized as a “mission change” or a “transition.” During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US Central Command employed this phasing model, designating Phase IV as the postwar, stability phase. During the year prior to the war, however, the planning of the first three phases of the war and preparing of General Franks for his continuing meetings with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and President Bush consumed the planning staff’s time and energy.⁹¹ Planners had no remaining time or energy to analyze and plan Phase IV or even to draw on planning already conducted by the Joint Staff and the Department of State.⁹²

A US commander who recently returned from Iraq reflected that combat and stability operations occur sequentially, simultaneously, and most often in a “repeatedly iterative manner.” A deliberate phasing model does not adequately address the realities of the contemporary operational environment (COE).⁹³ Rather, a deliberate phasing approach segregated military activities and allowed the insurgents to exploit.⁹⁴ He recommended a balanced, objective-based approach rather than the deliberate phase approach.⁹⁵ “Our joint doctrine requires phased operations, which leads us to believe there is and always will be a distinct demarcation between major combat operations and stability operations.”⁹⁶

⁹⁰ FM 3-0, 2001, p. 1-16 thru 1-17.

⁹¹ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 139-140.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 140.

⁹³ Cavaleri, vi.

⁹⁴ Peter W. Chiarelli, Major General, “Winning the Peace: The Requirements for Full-Spectrum Operations,” *Military Review* (July-August 2005), 4.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 16.

Only in 2005, with the publication of FM 1, did the Army finally establish that stability operations can occur before, during, and after combat operations, or even separately.⁹⁷ However, this cognitive recognition has arrived too late to support the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Worse still, the segregation of combat and stability operations continues to gain acceptance in joint doctrine. The 2006 edition of JP 3-0, Joint Operations, updated this deliberate phasing model (Figure 5), stating,

“Although the JFC determines the number and actual phases used during a joint campaign or operation, use of the phases shown in [Figure 5] and described below provides a flexible model to arrange smaller, related operations.”⁹⁸ Stability operations are conducted [during the Dominate Phase] as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase and relieve suffering.⁹⁹

While admitting that stability operations will be conducted during the “dominate phase,” this model is clearly linear, ignores the potential of moving from stability operations to combat operations, or from Phase IV to Phase III. Additionally, it overlooks the reality that stability operations typically take far longer than the decisive “phase.” For example, decisive operations against Japan took three years and nine months, while the US occupation took six years and eight months, a full




Figure 5. Joint Doctrine Phasing Model, 2006.

⁹⁷ FM 1, 2005, p. 3-7.

⁹⁸ US Department of Defense. *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006), p. IV-26.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. IV-28.

83% longer, to finally reshape Japanese society and government into a form, which would facilitate a permanent peace.¹⁰⁰ The historic fact that stability operations normally take years runs counter to its depiction as a single phase of a single campaign.

These deliberate phasing models ignore the inherent interconnections between decisive combat operations and stability and establishes an artificial temporal relationship between them. Combined with the Range of Military Operations model, these two paradigms ignore the fundamental interconnection between stability and conventional combat operations, resulting in compartmentalized planning efforts which fail to achieve success.

SUMMARY

These flawed conceptual models of the Deliberate Phasing Model and the Range of Military Operations artificially separate stability operations from combat operations, producing disjointed military planning. Recognizing that stability operations represented the most likely employment of armed forces immediately following the Persian Gulf War, the military failed to overcome its own organizational and cultural preferences for conventional warfare. Other factors include the Army's failure before the September 11 attacks to recognize the significance of the threat posed by failed or collapsing states. Furthermore, the Army failed to recognize the interconnectedness of stability operations with conventional operations. These factors have led to the failure of the US military to integrate stability operations into a comprehensive doctrinal framework.

As Helmuth von Moltke wrote, "A mistake in the original assembly of the army can scarcely be rectified in the entire course of the campaign."¹⁰¹ If an operational design does not integrate stability operations from the start, its chances of achieving the purpose of the conflict are substantially degraded. Such a campaign plan will normally win an astounding military

¹⁰⁰ Cavaleri, 19.

¹⁰¹ Helmuth Graf von Moltke, *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1993), 45.

victory and then subsequently and spectacularly fail to achieve the political objectives of the conflict. The post-conflict situation will deteriorate, US combat troops will be expected to rapidly transition to stability tasks for which they are untrained, ill-equipped, and lacking the requisite organization. They will not be prepared or equipped for the tasks they are immediately demanded to perform and will quickly lose the initiative, not to any enemy, but to the unraveling situation, which will steadily move away from US policy objectives.

As stated earlier, many theorists believe that stability operations represent the contemporary form of warfare, and that conventional warfare is obsolete. These authors call for a small war army, suggesting that the “age of battles” is over. This view ignores the two hundred year history of US stability operations, a span of time that includes massive conventional conflicts as well. Even during the Cold War, Eliot Cohen criticized AirLand Battle doctrine in its exclusive focus on conventional warfare in Central Europe.¹⁰² What he fails to mention, however, is the possibility that war in Europe was averted due to the perceived readiness of NATO forces to meet it, even conventionally. Had the US reverted to an exclusively small wars army, it may have paradoxically increased the chances of a major conventional war in Europe due to the Soviets perception of an opportunity for conventional military victory.

Rather than focusing exclusively on conventional warfare or stability operations, the Army must systematically integrate both into a coherent doctrinal framework. To achieve US policy objectives during both peace and war, Army doctrine must provide a comprehensive theory for the conduct of both combat operations and stability operations. Although combat operations represent the unique contribution of the US military and therefore its core competency, the integration of Stability operations are a necessary and essential activity to achieve and secure national security objectives during conflict. While not the core competency of the military, stability operations must be integrated since they will be required before, during, and after combat

¹⁰² Cohen, 178.

operations. Effective stability operations are a concurrent shaping operations rather than the focus of a separate phase or sequel.

CONFLATION: ARMY DOCTRINE AND THE FLAWED USE OF ANALOGICAL REASONING

While organizational and cultural preferences lead to the disintegration of doctrine, they also encourage the additive or incremental approach to stability operations, vice a comprehensive and systemic reframing. Despite the importance of a coherent doctrinal framework describing the interrelationship of decisive combat and stability operations, the US Army's approach to stability operations has essentially been to adapt AirLand Battle to include stability operations, using a conventional warfare as a conceptual model to address stability operations through analogical reasoning. This flawed use of analogical reasoning generates a general conflation of terms and concepts. The resulting doctrine of Full Spectrum Operations subsequently fails to recognize that stability operations are a fundamentally different mode of operation, demanding different principles, organization, equipment, and training.

These organizational and cultural preferences for conventional warfare encourage the Army to frame unfamiliar concepts using the familiar terms of conventional warfare. This analogical reasoning has led to the conflation of stability operations and combat operations, masking important distinctions between the two forms of action. While organizational and cultural preferences artificially separate combat and stability operations, masking their interrelationship, flawed analogical reasoning conflates the two, masking critical differences.

The Army's flawed use of analogical reasoning produces conflation of stability with combat operations, masking important differences between the two disparate forms of operation. This flawed use of analogical reasoning produces a general conflation of many terms and concepts and contradicts the Army's own historical experience with stability operations as well as its treatment by the major military theorists.

ANALOGICAL REASONING AND THE CORRUPTION OF LANGUAGE

The Army's familiarity and organizational preference for conventional warfare causes it to apply the framework of conventional warfare to other domains of activity. This flawed use of analogical reasoning leads it to conflate several disparate terms and concepts, including information, effects, and stability operations. Chris Hedges observes that the "hijacking of language is fundamental to war."¹⁰³ However, the peacetime development of doctrine is also plagued by the corruption of language because of organizational dynamics. The Army's doctrinal approach has equated to "repair service behavior," or focusing exclusively on obvious deficiencies such as information and stability operations rather than addressing those problems in the context of a comprehensive doctrinal model or system.¹⁰⁴

Many officers criticize the Army's use of ambiguous language, continuous expanding and shifting lexicon and the bulletizing of points due to the technical mechanics of PowerPoint presentation software precludes the critical review or exchange of ideas.¹⁰⁵ Much of this confusion is generated by the use of analogical reasoning. An analogue is an item from the same or a related or similar domain, while a metaphor comes from a markedly different domain.¹⁰⁶ A metaphor uses a base or familiar domain to attempt to interpret and understand a new or unfamiliar domain.¹⁰⁷ Gary Klein identifies the risk of analogical reasoning as selecting an inappropriate analogue, or failing to identify the key differences between the analogue and the target domain, particularly differing dynamic factors such as causal mechanisms.¹⁰⁸ The selected

¹⁰³ Chris Hedges, *War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), 34.

¹⁰⁴ Dörner, 74.

¹⁰⁵ H. R. McMaster, Lieutenant Colonel. *Crack in the Foundation: Defense Transformation and the Underlying Assumption of Dominant Knowledge in Future War* (US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, Student Issue Paper, Vol. S03-03, (November 2003): 10.

¹⁰⁶ Gary Klein, *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), 197.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 199.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 199, 205.

analogy or metaphor must have a degree of similarity, but that similarity makes sense only in the light of the purpose, rationale, or context of the metaphorical construct.¹⁰⁹

In a recent doctoral monograph, one doctoral candidate conducted a more in depth analysis of analogical thought as well as its application to Army doctrine. She defines analogous thinking as thinking of one domain of experience in terms of another, helping people understand new ideas in relation to preexisting knowledge.¹¹⁰ People use their ability to think about relational patterns, to relate often disparate domains of their experience and knowledge in ways that allow them to understand new experiences or reinterpret old beliefs, understanding one domain of experience in terms of another.¹¹¹

Although a powerful and necessary cognitive tool, all analogies or metaphors are imperfect, since different domains of experience will have different characteristics while possibly sharing some similar characteristics. While the use of similar features to general the metaphor can have great utility, it also carries the risk of masking the disparate features if misused or if used out of context. While the disciplines and environment of stability operations and information operations may be radically different to conventional warfare, the Army's approach to them is not. Upon close examination, one finds that these concepts rely heavily on conceptual structures mapped from the Army's institutional knowledge of warfare by the use of analogical thought.

The result of this mapping is the distortion or loss of critical aspects of the domains of information or stability operations.¹¹² The human dynamic which encourages this error is "similarity matching," which describes people's tendency to respond to similarities more than

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 202.

¹¹⁰ Nannette Valencia Manalo Brenner, *Metaphors We Kill By: Rhetoric and Conceptual Structure in US Army Doctrine* (College Park, Maryland: Doctoral dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of Maryland, 2005), 5.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 8.

¹¹² Ibid., 2.

differences.¹¹³ Failing to carefully identify the key distinctions and presumptions inherent in a metaphor can even lead to “conceptual integration,” or the “verbal integration” of two incompatible concepts, which over time can even change the meaning of words.¹¹⁴

The other danger of analogical reasoning is the generation of concepts which are too conceptual, lacking the concrete elements necessary for any military doctrine. Analogous thinking is possible only through abstraction.¹¹⁵ What may begin as a necessary generalization may become overgeneralization.¹¹⁶

The Army uses heuristics such as the targeting process model and well as the elements of combat power as to simplify such complex concepts as warfare or information. Klein points out, however, that heuristics are never perfect since the potentially conceal important differences between the source and target domains.¹¹⁷ Conceptually, the Army is relying on its extreme proficiency in conventional warfare to give impetus to its approaches to cognition and communication. However, this type of analogical thought leaves the Army “trapped by the restraints of its own success” because it masks important differences between the two domains.¹¹⁸

The US Army uses analogical thought to conceptualize several target domains in terms of the familiar source domain of traditional warfare. The Army uses familiar experiences or frames such as physical movement through space, causation, warfare, and the hierarchical structure of the chain of command as the source domains for analogical thought about other subjects or target domains such as information and stability operations.¹¹⁹ While analogical reasoning is a powerful tool, it has severe limitations by potentially masking key differences. Gary Klein points out that this mode of thought is appropriate when the organization already has a base of

¹¹³ Dörner, 95.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 68.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 76.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 94.

¹¹⁷ Klein, 272.

¹¹⁸ Brenner, 5.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 16.

knowledge of the target domain.¹²⁰ When used to conceptualize an unfamiliar domain, serious flaws can develop due to the selection of an inappropriate metaphor with different causal dynamics.

Detecting the need to address the occurrence of stability operations and the impact of the information revolution, the Army erred by using analogical reasoning to analyze new and unfamiliar concepts. By using this mode of reasoning, the Army drew heavily upon its conventional warfare experience and targeting process and has conflated the terms and concepts used to describe information, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), effects, and stability operations.

INFORMATION AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

One of the first domains to experience this effect of flawed analogical reasoning is information. Changes in its fundamental mission and environment have forced the Army to formulate its own theory of information and even cognition, including the nature of thought and communication. It captures this theory in two key concepts, “relevant information” and the “cognitive hierarchy.” In

characterizing the nature of thought and information, the Army relies heavily on metaphors of causation derived from its own domain of experience of conventional warfare.¹²¹

In the 1993 Operations, the Army defined a key conceptual




Figure 6 The Elements of Combat Power, 2001.

¹²⁰ Klein, XX.

¹²¹ Brenner, 34.

model of the Dynamics of Combat Power. These elements included maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership.¹²² The 2001 version updated this model, relabeling it more accurately the “elements” of combat power and adding the additional element of information, depicted in Figure 6.¹²³

The ease with which this model maps the domain of information onto the target domain of combat power hides important disparities between the two¹²⁴. Unlike actions and physical objects, however, thoughts and ideas have no independent existence without a thinker.¹²⁵ This easy correspondence obscures an important disjunction between the two domains. Cognition, unlike movement, is not a linear sequence of steps.¹²⁶

The most critical element of information is the human beings who use information through thought and communication, however, information increasingly means recording media such as paper or electronic.¹²⁷ Information has little independent existence outline the process of thought, yet we refer to it as if it were a physical object. The entities we commonly refer to as information are actually just representations or records of thought. We associate thought with the media that records and transfers them.¹²⁸

The concept of relevant information attempts to give thought independent existence and hence the capacity for action in its own right, generating terms such as “actionable intelligence” which attempt to make a direct link between thought and action by making thought an actor.¹²⁹ The Army cognitive model presumes that effective action is automatic and uniform as long as the sequence of steps in the causal chain are followed, creating a direct link between thought and

¹²² FM 100-5, 1993, p. 2-10.

¹²³ FM 3-0, 2001, p. 4-3.

¹²⁴ Brenner, 38.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 43.

action.¹³⁰ The following passage from the 2001 version of FM 3-0 establishes a long causal chain that ultimately links information to action.

Relevant information results from assigning meaning to data to assist understanding. Processing changes raw data into information by assigning meaning to it. Analysis and evaluation transform information into knowledge, which is presented to commanders as relevant information. When commanders apply judgment to knowledge, it becomes understanding. Understanding enables making informed decisions with less-than-perfect data. Combined with will, understanding generates effective action.¹³¹

Beginning with data, Army units process and assign meaning, producing information. The force then analyzes and evaluates this information to transform it into knowledge, to which the commander applies judgment, producing understanding, and hence effective action. This casual chain produces a continuous linkage between information and action, despite the fact that information only exists in the cognitive world while action exists in the physical world.¹³²

This chain also oversimplifies information processing as simply categorizing, sorting, or filtering information, rather than substantively changing it. “Irrelevant information” is simply filtered out, reducing the background noise that blocks the commander’s cognition. This model presumes the public, objective nature of information, while ignoring the subjective and individual interpretation of information.¹³³ In actuality, thought, cognition, and communication are much more complex, adding to, combining, and shaping ideas and information, in some cases to reframe the entire problem.¹³⁴ The emergent structure of the Army’s cognitive blend is the transformation of information into an agent and the transformation of military causation from destruction to creation.¹³⁵ The Army’s practice of nominalizing cognitive functions that are

¹³⁰ Ibid., 45.

¹³¹ FM 3-0, 2001, p. 11-12.

¹³² Brenner, 46.

¹³³ Ibid., 48.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 66.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 55.

subjectively experienced by individuals removes the individual thinker from thought and defines information as separate entities with a public, objective existence.¹³⁶

The expansion of battlespace to include the information environment and the inclusion of information as an element of combat power signal a significant reframing and new doctrinal approach to warfare.¹³⁷ The inclusion of information has both increased the Army's responsibilities and decreased its freedom of action.¹³⁸ The elements of combat power represent a radial category, a set of concepts that share the common feature of being ways to apply and preserve its ability to apply or preserve its "physical destructive power" on the battlefield, yet each element represents a different method. This conceptual framework is tightly linked to the physical battlefield, defined by the maximum range of a unit's reconnaissance assets and most lethal weapon system. The original four elements represented a framework that was tangible or firmly linked to the physical world, based on a clear orientation to the application of destructive power, and were each distinct, yet tightly interconnected.¹³⁹ The most abstract or least quantifiable of the original four elements is leadership, yet this element is also embodied in the form of the Army leader, the officer and NCO corps. The addition of information blends the physical and cognitive worlds, expands a unit's scope of responsibility into noncombat roles, and diffuses the elements and their relationships.

Furthermore, the inclusion of information into combat power has undermined physical attack as the basis for the successful application of combat power.¹⁴⁰ While the original four elements of combat power were "firmly based in the physical frame," the Army's spends a great amount of time trying to establish that information has a tangible relationship with the other four elements. This carries an inherent contradiction. Information is an "enabler," augmenting the

¹³⁶ Ibid., 50.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 73.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 73.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 73.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 74.

capabilities of the other four elements, but an enabler is not itself a member.¹⁴¹ This represents a second linkage of information to action in terms of sharing the common characteristic of causation as well as being a contributing cause, ignoring the fact that cognition is markedly different and possibly opposite from the type of action central to warfare. While warfare entails action seeking destruction, cognition involves the opposite process, that of creation.¹⁴²

Combat is “kinetically based,” yet does require soldiers to think and communicate while they are fighting. Despite the fact that these cognitive functions are important or even essential, they remain in the background or context of physical action. Combat information is homogenous, driven and bounded by common concept of destroying the enemy’s combat potential while preserving one’s own.¹⁴³ By including the space of all information, the Army denies itself the ability to identify the relevance of information by its association with combat operations. Colonel HR McMaster disagrees with this generic view of information, arguing that information is only relevant if it can be translated into near-perfect military operations in the context of a sound strategy that supports policy goals.”¹⁴⁴

The addition of information creates a tension caused by the “disparity between the kinetic power of conventional warfare and the rhetorical power that charges the ‘information environment.’”¹⁴⁵ Information has caused the conceptual expansion of the other four elements of combat power, undermining the direct and concrete relationships between them.¹⁴⁶ Specifically, the Army if forced to expand protection and diminish the importance of leadership.¹⁴⁷

This impact on the elements of combat power is most clearly demonstrated by the changes in the conception of leadership. The 1993 version of Operations described the element

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 89.

¹⁴² Ibid., 54.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 84.

¹⁴⁴ McMaster, 50.

¹⁴⁵ Brenner, 86.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 88.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 75.

of leadership as “essential” and “decisive.”¹⁴⁸ This verbiage is lost in the 2001 version, replaced by terms such as “most dynamic” and “significant.”¹⁴⁹ As the last of five, information has replaced leadership as the decisive factor for victory.¹⁵⁰

The addition of information reframes the elements of combat power and dramatically increases the battlespace in time and space, conceptually expands all the elements to weaken the linkages between them, and severely diminishes leadership. The major focus is on the coordination of the force itself, as if the enemy is no longer a factor. The Army ignores the unpredictable, individual, subjective, and complex effects from the dissemination of information and oversimplifies it by emphasizing protection against the information environment and by metaphorically superimposing a targeting methodology on information operations (IO).¹⁵¹

With the development of information as an independent entity and even causal agent, the Army then establishes a type of operation centered exclusively on the control and protection of information. FM 3-0 defines information operations as “actions taken to affect adversary, and influence others’, decision making processes, information and information systems while protecting one’s own”¹⁵² The intended effect of influence, however, mirror images perception. This approach marks a distinct break with US historical experience, such as during the occupation of Japan when US forces implemented a deliberate censorship and information control program to reshape Japanese thought.¹⁵³ The occupation force did not assume that decades of militaristic culture would allow messages to be interpreted objectively according to their intended purpose.

By using analogical reasoning and employing the domain of conventional warfare as a source domain and metaphor, the army produces a flawed conceptualization of information and

¹⁴⁸ FM 100-5, 1993, p. 2-11 to 2-12.

¹⁴⁹ FM 3-0, 2001, p. 4-7 to 4-8.

¹⁵⁰ Brenner, 109.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 110.

¹⁵² FM 3-0, 2001, p. 11-16.

¹⁵³ Cavaleri, 46.

IO. The Army conceptualizes IO using the model of conventional warfare, specifically fire support, as a metaphorical source domain, metaphorically equating communication with delivering ordinance and a target audience for influence with a military target for destruction, consequently undermining its own ability to conduct IO effectively.¹⁵⁴ This oversimplification of thought processes carries the implicit assumption that target audiences will employ the identical, objective thought process. This contradicts the true nature of human thought and cognition, which are subjective, since emotion shapes thought, which then in turn, shapes emotion.¹⁵⁵

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

Similar to information, the Armies conception of intelligence is also shifting radically. Both Army and Joint doctrine contain a fundamental contradiction by describing the strategic environment as increasingly complex and yet delivering operational concepts based on the flawed assumption of near certainty.¹⁵⁶ Although technology is increasing the number, types, and capabilities of networked sensors to detect enemy positions, the factors which create uncertainty are also increasing, including the demand for better intelligence from precision weapons, decreased decision cycle resulting from increased tempo and lethality, as well as the increase in the amount of information to be processed.¹⁵⁷ First and foremost, though, is Clausewitz's point that the enemy is not inanimate, but reacts to his opponent.¹⁵⁸ This interaction makes even perfect knowledge of enemy locations prior to contact largely irrelevant, and makes "linear progression toward goals and objectives impossible."¹⁵⁹

This flawed assumption of near certainty has led to the grouping of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) into a single concept. The conflation of intelligence, a

¹⁵⁴ Brenner, 70-71.

¹⁵⁵ Dörner, 8.

¹⁵⁶ McMaster, 9.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 20-21.

¹⁵⁸ Clausewitz, 149.

¹⁵⁹ McMaster, 20.

combat function, with the actions or operations of surveillance and reconnaissance has masked a key distinction between the related but disparate concepts. The intelligence function contains the elements of collection of information and the analysis of that information to produce intelligence. Reconnaissance and surveillance, on the other hand, refer to the collection of information by any means available, including traditional reconnaissance and security operations, which are the employment of combat, combined-arms operations for the purpose of gaining information.

Kagan points out that modern doctrinal concepts have conflated situation development with target location, negating the traditional advantage of locating the enemy with ground reconnaissance forces, thereby not only locating the enemy precisely, but also testing his reactions, thereby enabling true anticipation.¹⁶⁰ Continuous and aggressive reconnaissance does more than collect information. It may also produce prompt enemy actions, or compel the enemy to reposition forces needed elsewhere to counter friendly reconnaissance efforts. Hostile forces may even mistake reconnaissance units for the decisive operation and prematurely expose their dispositions or commit their reserves.¹⁶¹

One passage from FM 3-0 states, “In the past, when forces made contact with the enemy, commanders developed the situation to gain information. Today, Army leaders use information collected by unmanned systems to increase their situational understanding before engaging the enemy.”¹⁶² McMaster identifies this as a major shift from traditional doctrine, which assumed the Army would have to make physical contact with the enemy and fight for information due to enemy concealment, dispersion, security forces, and deception.¹⁶³ Correspondingly, the Army organized reconnaissance forces with maneuverability, firepower, and heavy armor protection of all arms for semi-independent operations for flexibility.¹⁶⁴ Ironically, the Army’s reorganization,

¹⁶⁰ Kagan, 15.

¹⁶¹ FM 3-0, 2001, p. 11-10.

¹⁶² FM 3-0, 2001, p. 4-11.

¹⁶³ McMaster, 55.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

aimed at increasing flexibility through modularity, has produced more interdependent forces which rely on the intelligence provided by networked sensors out of contact.

Kagan, however, challenges this ability of sensors to assure near-perfect intelligence. Kagan points to a battle during Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 26, 2003, when elements of the Iraqi Republican Guard launched a counterattack which was not detected by US forces until it clashed with the advance guard of the 3rd Infantry Division.¹⁶⁵ This Iraqi counterattack was immediately defeated, but only by the superior weaponry and tactics of US ground forces, not from any decision superiority or dominant battlespace awareness.

The definitions of terms within FM 3-0 itself reveal this illogical grouping. This manual defines intelligence as “the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas; information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.”¹⁶⁶ This clearly establishes intelligence as a process, or function which continuously analyzes information about the environment and threat acquired by surveillance systems, unit collection, reconnaissance operations, and even combat operations themselves.

Unlike the function of intelligence, the definitions of surveillance and reconnaissance establish the two firmly in the domain of action. The manual defines surveillance as the “systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means,” can apply to either sensory platforms or reconnaissance.¹⁶⁷ Likewise, reconnaissance is “a mission undertaken to obtain by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or

¹⁶⁵ Kagan, 23.

¹⁶⁶ FM 3-0, 2001, p. 11-8.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 11-9.

geographic characteristics of a particular area.”¹⁶⁸ Rather than having the continuous characteristics, reconnaissance takes the form of combined arms operations for the purpose of gaining information. In some situations, the firepower, flexibility, survivability, and mobility of reconnaissance assets allow them to collect information where other assets cannot. Reconnaissance elements may have to fight for information. However, the purpose of reconnaissance is to gain information through stealth, not initiate combat.¹⁶⁹

This illogical grouping of the intelligence function with the actions of surveillance and reconnaissance, illustrate the growing tendency of the Army to map elements from the cognitive domain into the physical domain of action. It also indicates the inappropriate influence of joint doctrine, since the three terms may be more closely linked in the fluid domains of the air and sea rather than on land.

EFFECTS AND EFFECTS BASED APPROACH (EBA) TO OPERATIONS

In addition to the grouping of ISR, another source of conflation of terms is carried in the concept of effects. This concept developed primarily from the Air Force, began to take hold in the Army, and became joint doctrine in 2006. The JP 3-0 published that year defines an “effect” as “the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A set of desired effects contributes to the conditions necessary to achieve an associated military objective.”¹⁷⁰ It also establishes the types or categories of effects including desired, undesired, direct or proximate, and indirect.

During the theoretical development of effects, its authors began by identifying the “Conquest Paradigm” as the Cold War thinking of the military, claiming that the military continues to use it although it is now obsolete. This model resembles the Powell Doctrine in that the military is used as a last resort, and then used merely to destroy the armed forces of a targeted

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 11-9.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 11-10.

¹⁷⁰ JP 3-0, 2006, p. IV-8.

nation-state, afterward handing the situation back over to its civilian political masters.¹⁷¹ The proponents of EBA presume that the Conquest Paradigm no longer applies to the current strategic situation of the US. Instead, military operations should be governed by the planning of effects, including not only physical destruction, but a “wide spectrum of options” as well as understanding the second-order and potentially undesired effects of military activities.¹⁷²

Yet, from the theoretical literature underpinning the EBA concept, we see its conceptual roots clearly in the domain of air-delivered munitions effects and collateral damage estimates as part of the targeting and weaponeering process.¹⁷³ This use of conceptual blending, or analogical reasoning, attempts to map the familiar domain of weapons effects onto the domain of causality, or cause-and-effect, as well as the targeting process onto the cognitive processes of employing means other than military force.

However, causation in the real world is much more complex. There are many modes of causation, such as physical, emotional, and social, different means of causation, including contributing, precipitating immediate, remote, direct, and indirect. There can be multiple causes for a single phenomenon, with differing degrees and types of contribution.¹⁷⁴ In other words, we tend to think in isolated, linear, chains of causation rather than “nonlinear networks of causation.”¹⁷⁵ Time lags, uncertain feedback, and uncertainty of the complete set of causal variables and modes makes causation difficult to determine or prove.¹⁷⁶ Even simple cause-and-effect relationships in simple situations can frustrate military planning.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷¹ Edward C. Mann, , Col, Lt Col Gary Endersby, and Thomas R. Searle. *Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations*. CADRE Paper No. 15 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2002), 4.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 32. This page in Mann shows a diagram which is clearly taken from a targeting diagram, displaying concentric circles representing collateral damage estimates or probabilities.

¹⁷⁴ Brenner, 17.

¹⁷⁵ Dörner, 33.

¹⁷⁶ Klein, 281-282. Also see Dörner, 40, who discusses “intransparent” systems.

¹⁷⁷ Dörner, 4.

The importation of the air force concept of EBA highlights an important false assumption that air and naval concepts transfer readily to army operations on land. This fails to recognize the unique characteristics of land domain that distinguish in from the atmosphere and seas. Unlike the land domain, the air and sea are fluid media, with a limited target array, largely devoid of cover, concealment, or civilian populations.¹⁷⁸ These conditions of the air and sea domains more closely match the conditions of near certainty which underpin emerging theories, and enable heuristics such as the targeting process and EBA as well as the grouping of ISR.

Despite this inappropriateness to land warfare, the Army began to incorporate aspects of EBA into its organizations and process, conducting Effects Targeting Meetings and creating Fires and Effects Cells and Effects Coordinators. The author's branch of infantry is now grouped into the Maneuver, Fires, and Effects Division, including such diverse branches as engineers, military police, air defense, special forces, IO, civil affairs, psychological operations, and public affairs. In 2005, realizing the extent of the decentralized incorporation of EBA, the Deputy Training and Doctrine Commander distributed a memorandum stating the following:

“EBAO [Effects Based Approach to Operations], as an emerging concept, has created some confusion in the force. This concept, with new terms and ideas, was pushed to the field before properly vetted or validated. Although there are good points in the EBAO concept, it is premature to use this concept as a fore training tool. . . . The Army will not replace its established decision making process with an “unvalidated concept”¹⁷⁹

The following year, the Army published Field Manual Interim (FMI) 5-0.1, *The Operations Process*, which explicitly stated that the Army forces would not adopt “the joint systems analysis of the operational environment, an effects-based approach to planning, or effects

¹⁷⁸ McMaster, 37-39.

¹⁷⁹ John M Curran, Lieutenant General, *Effects Based Concepts and Doctrine in Army Education*. Memorandum (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Futures Center, 22 December 2005) 2.

assessment as described in JP 3-0.”¹⁸⁰ The manual stated that EBA was a tool appropriate to the joint staff, operating at the operational and strategic levels, but inappropriate for an army unit at the tactical or operational level. It went further to explain that all the Army’s activities and functions generate effects, implying that the term “effect” is so broad and general as to be devoid of meaning. “Since all [warfighting functions] create effects, no single staff officer is designated as the “effects coordinator” and no single staff section or command post (CP) cell is assigned responsibility for “effects.”¹⁸¹ Despite this ultimate rejection of effects and EBA, the infiltration of the invalidated concept of effects into the Army’s doctrine and organization clearly illustrate the corruption of its language by conflated, abstract terminology.

STABILITY OPERATIONS AND COMBAT OPERATIONS

Like effects, stability operations have also suffered conflation with combat operations, leading to a failure to recognize the distinctive features of each. As depicted in Figures 1 and 2 above, the 1993 version of FM 100-5 introduced the Range of Military Operations.

The Army classifies its activities during peacetime and conflict as *operations other than war*. During *peacetime*, the US attempts to influence world events through those actions that routinely occur between nations. *Conflict* is characterized by hostilities to secure strategic objectives. The last environment—that of *war*—involves the use of force in combat operations against an armed enemy. The prime focus of the Army is warfighting, yet the Army’s frequent role in operations other than war is critical. Use of Army forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of conflict.¹⁸²

This passage clearly associates stability operations with the strategic environments of peacetime and conflict. This paragraph masks the disparate requirements of stability operations as well as the fact that stability operations are a fundamentally different mode or form of

¹⁸⁰ US Department of the Army. *Field Manual Interim (FMI) 5-0.1: The Operations Process* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), p. 1-10.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1-11.

¹⁸² FM 100-5, 1993, p. 2-0.

operation. Rather than demanding any type of special principles, organization, equipment, or training, stability operation merely represent Army operations in the context of peace or conflict short of war. The conditions change, not the mode or design of Army operations.

This doctrine did attempt to hedge against its oversimplification, stating, “Often the Army will operate in all three environments at once. Whenever operations in these environments occur simultaneously, the Army integrates and coordinates their effects so they mutually support the attainment of strategic objectives.”¹⁸³ This statement assumes that Army units are capable of performing both forms of operation, so long as their effects are integrated and coordinated.

The 2001 version of FM 3-0 *Operations*, introduced Full Spectrum Operations model (Figure 7). While the Range of Military Operations simplified the operational environment down to the two states of war and military operations other than war, Full Spectrum Operations expanded the army fundamental mission set from essentially making




Figure 7. Full Spectrum Operations, 2001.

war and conducting OOTW, to the four missions of offense, defense, stability, and support, establishing these as Full Spectrum Operations.¹⁸⁴

This action continued the process of conflation between stability and combat operations. This organization of missions is logically flawed because it masks the fundamental difference between combat and stability operations. Offense and defense are combat missions, while stability and support fall in the realm of stability operations. By making the categorical break at

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 2-0.

¹⁸⁴ FM 3-0, 2001, p. 1-15.

this level, the Army groups the two combat missions of offense and defense with the two stability-type operations of stability and support. This categorization of two combat missions with two stability missions fails to account for the disparate requirements between the two.

This updated version of the Army’s doctrine described stability operations as

[Army operations to] promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. Regional security is supported by a balanced approach that enhances regional stability and economic prosperity simultaneously. Army force presence promotes a stable environment.¹⁸⁵

This description of stability operations reveals the complete underestimation of the mission. The emphasis on “peacetime” and “crisis” suggest again that stability operations have no part of “real” war. The last sentence implies that the mere presence of US combat forces produces stability. This is not only unrealistic, it also completely overlooks the enormous array of stability tasks, such as law and order, jurisprudence, economic, financial, elections, and governance.

In 2005, in the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army published Field Manual 1, *The Army*, which further refined Full Spectrum Operations and established landpower as the contribution of the Army to Joint operations. This updated model divides the spectrum into joint campaigns overseas and domestic, homeland overseas and domestic, homeland



Figure 8. Full Spectrum Operations, 2005.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 1-15 thru 1-16.

security operations (Figure 8). Overseas, stability operations expand to include reconstruction operations, while domestically, support operations changes to civil support operations.¹⁸⁶ The manual also redefines stability operations by stating, “*Stability and reconstruction* operations sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military capabilities to reconstruct or establish services and support civilian agencies.”¹⁸⁷

Significant is its description of landpower as “the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.”¹⁸⁸ These landpower tasks, particularly control over people and resources, directly relate to stability operations.

While this model requires Army units to establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for a lasting peace, it continues to merely reflect stability operation as simply a mission rather than a distinct form of operations. Under this construct, Army units change from combat to stability operations as a simple change of mission. This corresponds to Krepenivich’s description of the “Army Concept” during Vietnam, which tended to use the framework of conventional interstate conflict to conceptualize and discuss counterinsurgency operations.¹⁸⁹ This illustrates the Army’s tendency to conflate stability operations with conventional combat operations when, in fact, the two modes of operation call for dramatically different principles, organizations, equipment, training, and even mentality.

US HISTORIC EXPERIENCE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

By conflating stability operations and conventional operations, the Army ignores its own historical experience in the fundamentally different natures of the two operational forms. Army concepts developed for the familiar domain of conventional operations may not be appropriate for

¹⁸⁶ FM 1, 3-6.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 3-7.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 1-1.

¹⁸⁹ Krepinevich, 39.

other types of missions, such as information operations or stability operations.¹⁹⁰ By using analogical reasoning and employing the domain of conventional warfare as a source domain and metaphor, the army produces a flawed conceptualization of stability operations which overlooks its historical experience. In fact, the model of a successful stability operation contrasts sharply with the model for a successful attack, corresponding almost exactly to a failed attack, with decreasing combat power and transfer of control and authority.¹⁹¹

Many facets of the American Way of War, such as technology dependence, emphasis on firepower, casualty avoidance, and decisive offensive operations, fail to account for the distinctive conditions of irregular warfare or stability operations.¹⁹² The US preference for massed firepower, for example, may be unsuited or even counterproductive in stability operations which are politically constrained by their very nature.¹⁹³ Technological-based, firepower-centered warfare conducted at stand off ranges, is inappropriate for combating the irregular forces and even criminal elements which are the key opponent during any stability operation.¹⁹⁴

Strategically, both forms of warfare are indistinguishable, both representing the use or threat of force to achieve political objectives. At the operational and tactical levels, however, stability operations and irregular warfare are different from conventional warfare.¹⁹⁵

In fact, during a stability operation contested by irregular enemies, actual warfare is unlikely to be the dominant mode of effective engagement.¹⁹⁶ The irregular enemy is not usually the target. The battlefield is political and protection of the people is the overriding priority, so military plans conducting a stability operation should be radically different from those adopted

¹⁹⁰ Brenner, 10.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 70-71.

¹⁹² Gray, 54.

¹⁹³ Cohen, 170.

¹⁹⁴ Gray, 49.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 55.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 11.

for conventional, interstate warfare.¹⁹⁷ Victory will not be the product of engagements, although defeats can be damaging to the protection story. An irregular war can be lost militarily, but won only politically. The irregular enemy is more of a distraction than a focus.¹⁹⁸ Actual combat between regular and irregular forces has no strategic significance except for its perceptual effects with the people and its effects on their protection.¹⁹⁹

American culture emphasizes optimistic problem-solving, often leading to the error of mistaking conditions for problems. There is no utility in regarding terrorists or insurgents as problems to be solved. They will generally refuse conventional detection or engagement unless it will uncover the civilian population. Because the insurgent cannot be brought to battle, he is not a problem that the Army can solve tactically or operationally, but rather a condition that must be addressed indirectly.²⁰⁰

This phenomenon produces a dramatic tension between Army culture and political requirements. The Army has a “big war” mindset, seeking a well-defined mission achieved rapidly by decisive conventional battles. This model works well during conventional, interstate conflict when military and political objectives more closely coincide. Stability operations, however, normally bring ambiguous and shifting objectives, protracted committed, and intermittent, desultory skirmishes.²⁰¹

Traditional military tasks during a counterinsurgency, such as denial of sanctuaries and external support are important supporting or shaping operations, but not decisive. Although an important task, denying sanctuary and external support to insurgents will not produce success. Conversely, if a counterinsurgency is effective, the existence of an insurgent sanctuary and external support will matter little to the outcome. Although military operations to deny sanctuary

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 22.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 22.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 23.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 34.

²⁰¹ Boot, 332.

or external support are effective supporting efforts, there is a danger that the importance of that mission will become so inflated, that the truly decisive terrain of the population will be diminished.²⁰²

The irregular enemy precludes decisive military engagement by declining to concentrate and expose himself to the effects of firepower or maneuver. This phenomenon creates an environment which contrasts sharply with that of combat operations. Troops witness or are even targets of violence that cannot be neutralized militarily. The traditional concept of enemy may not even apply since an enemy may not exist as an organized entity or in the case of an insurgency, may exist but cannot be identified or distinguished from the civilian population.²⁰³ In counterinsurgency, for example, neither dead insurgents nor the absence of US casualties is proof of success.²⁰⁴ Rather than military action, the premium is on intelligence and police work. Military action should be narrowly focused on critical tasks such as protection of key functions such as logistic convoys, rather than massive combat “sweeps” searching for the elusive enemy.²⁰⁵ Irregular wars cannot be won by foreigners, but only by indigenous, persistent effort.²⁰⁶

The rules of engagement for counterinsurgencies are typically the reverse of those for convention warfare.²⁰⁷ Because military operations are only relevant by their political effects, they generally must take place amongst the civilian population. Single-minded pursuit of insurgents in broad sweeping operations often uncovers the civilian population, leading to political failure and defeat. Because of this, firepower often has a self-defeating effect by through collateral damage.²⁰⁸

²⁰² Gray, 26.

²⁰³ Yates, 34.

²⁰⁴ Gray, 49.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 24.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 45.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 37.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 38.

The US war in Vietnam provides a stark example of a model of conventional war inappropriately applied to a stability operation. The commander of US force, General Westmorland, attempted to employ large unit, search and destroy operations, particularly using the helicopter.²⁰⁹ To this he added firepower and the search for technological solutions.²¹⁰ The North Vietnamese Army employed tactics such as dispersion, concealment, and hugging to mitigate the effects of American firepower, while operationally, it exploited the US desire for big unit operations by offering battles as a diversion to uncover the South Vietnamese population.²¹¹

Even during the advisory years prior to ground intervention, the strategy in Vietnam represented a fundamental shift from previous stability efforts. The US constructed a South Vietnamese conventional army and employed it in large unit conventional operations, whereas previous stability operations employed a constabulary force, consisting of both army and police type forces employed in internal defense rather than external security.²¹²

This different mode of operations demands a different organization than conventional conflict. As Gray points out, “The counterinsurgent force must organize and direct a strict unity of civilian and military effort with a single chain of command, and with the civilian political authority unambiguously in supreme command.”²¹³ Small wars demand unified leadership under civilian control.²¹⁴

By the 1990s, the Cold War had produced an Army based on the divisional structure, well suited for conventional war in relatively open terrain, but poorly suited for stability operations.²¹⁵ Conventional warfare calls for large, division and corps-based units, with large fire support formation. Small wars, on the other hand, call for smaller, more rapidly deployable, and

²⁰⁹ Boot, 298.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 301.

²¹¹ Ibid., 303, 305.

²¹² Ibid., 288.

²¹³ Gray, 24.

²¹⁴ Cohen, 177.

²¹⁵ Boot, 331.

self-contained forces, low in fire support and technology and with large numbers of light infantry, civil affairs, psychological operations, military police, and intelligence soldiers.²¹⁶

During the successful occupation of Japan, McArthur organized his staff of 3500 US officers and civil servants into seven sections, roughly correlating to existing Japanese government bureaus.²¹⁷ This organization contrasts sharply with the standard military staff organization, yet was critical to enabling the occupation force to administer Japan through its indigenous administrative structures.

Cohen recognized that small wars are completely different from large conventional wars, requirement different conceptual models, doctrine, training, equipment, organization, and even personnel management policies.²¹⁸ By their very nature, stability operations are fought for limited political objectives and therefore limited resources and possibly limited public support.²¹⁹ This stands in stark contrast to the Weinberger and Powell doctrines which require the overwhelming use of force, public support, and a clearly defined objective.

Stability operations also differ from decisive combat in the dimension of time. Stability operations are inherently protracted. When they follow combat operations, they nearly always exceed the time required for military victory. While impatience is always a military vice, it is particularly fatal during stability operations. The only time a military victory is possible is when the irregular force makes an enormous error strategically by choosing to fight a conventional battle, or politically, alienating the population and isolating himself.²²⁰ Otherwise, a military victory is simply unattainable.

At the most basic level, stability operations greatly differ in the tasks which soldiers must perform. Following the Spanish American War, the US found itself conducting a stability

²¹⁶ Ibid., 331.

²¹⁷ Cavaleri, 25-26.

²¹⁸ Cohen, 167.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 168.

²²⁰ Gray, 45.

operation in Cuba. As Yates points out, the US Army found itself conducting many tasks not associated with conventional warfare, including the development of programs of public works, health, sanitation, education, the establishment of a legal system, civil administration, and even a constitution.²²¹ Despite these efforts, Spanish cultural influences eventually undermined US reforms, leading to renewed instability, and precipitating another US intervention in 1906.²²²

As US forces advance across Germany during World War II, combat forces on the scene initially performed the necessary security and humanitarian and administrative tasks. The units, however, were ill-prepared, improperly equipped, and untrained for these tasks.²²³ Additionally, the psychological aspects of soldiers transitioning from months of sustained high-intensity combat operations led to considerable animosity between the soldiers and the German civilians.²²⁴ These units were eventually relieved in 1946 by specially formed US constabulary force, with specialized training and even distinctive uniforms.²²⁵

Cohen states that the US cannot generate a capability for stability operations from an army exclusively focuses on conventional combat.²²⁶ US forces performing stability operations will perform many diverse and nonmilitary tasks. The historical trends are for combat troops to perform stability tasks rather than civilian experts or even military specialists. The reasons include the fact that these experts are normally limited in number, do not receive priority for deployment assets or readiness, and normally are incapable of conducting stability operations until a requisite level of security is established. Additionally, combat troops generally see stability tasks as undignified or “demeaning.” As a result, stability experts are not available on the scene when they are needed, compelling combat troops to conduct stability tasks either

²²¹ Yates, 8.

²²² Ibid., 8.

²²³ Ibid., 11.

²²⁴ Ibid., 11.

²²⁵ Ibid., 74.

²²⁶ Cohen, 179.

completely unanticipated or grossly underestimated, and these troops lack the requisite proficiency to perform these tasks effectively.²²⁷

The case for special purpose forces for stability operations ignores the strains on transportation resources during deployment. The US military is normally adept at tailoring or task organizing forces for the intended mission. Rather than organizational issues, a much more critical requirement is that forces are trained and prepared for the tasks they will perform.²²⁸

Yates concludes that the US military must prepare leaders for the nontraditional and diverse requirements of stability operations as well as the simultaneous conduct of stability and combat and rapid transition between emphasis on one or the other.²²⁹ This view, however, completely ignores skill set manageability and sustainability. The technical and tactical demands of combat and stability operations demand a division of labor. Demanding that a soldier be proficient in one skill set necessary for combat operations and a second skill set for stability operations is simply unrealistic and unsustainable.

Although a combat unit can and must conduct limited stability operations upon completion of its combat mission, a stability force organized, equipped, and trained to conduct a long-term stability operation should quickly relieve it in place to ensure effective execution of stability related tasks. Some skills will transcend both combat and stability operations, such as logistics and command and control functions. However, both combat operations and stability operation also demand an array of narrowly focused skill sets such as tank, artillery, and attack aviation gunnery on one hand, and economic, financial, and legal expertise on the other.

Rather than addressing these distinctions, the Army treats irregular warfare as treated as a “lesser but included class” of conventional warfare. The Army tends to assume that a unit trained and prepared near exclusively for conventional warfare, is capable of adjusting these strengths to

²²⁷ Yates, 26.

²²⁸ Ibid., 37.

²²⁹ Ibid., 38.

meet irregular enemies when necessary, while a unit prepared only for low intensity threats would be incapable of participating in a conventional conflict. This represents a flawed assumption, however, since stability operations are not simply a “scaled down” version of conventional war, but a completely different mode of operations “requir[ing] and entirely different mindset, doctrine, and training.”²³⁰

An interesting case study into the differences between stability operations and combat operations is the 1958 US intervention into Lebanon. Although instability in the Levant was an easily identified scenario, planning tended to completely ignore the political situation in the area of operations and the convoluted planning efforts tended to focus on military employment in combat mode rather than appreciation or development of the political objectives of the intervention.²³¹ All the plans made the assumption that deployment meant combat, and only in early 1958 did the specified commander, Admiral Holloway, begin directing his planners to begin contingency planning for limited contingencies, such as stability operations to affect the “restoration or maintenance of governments.”²³²

From the first day of the intervention, however, US forces realized the intervention would be an intensely atypical military operation. Lebanese government was essentially fragmented, with incoherent requests and responses coming from multiple sources and ranging from requests for assistance to outright hostility. Opposition meanwhile was mostly unconventional. Rather than the expected invasion by conventional Syrian forces, violence took the form of distributed “enclaves of lightly-armed, poorly organized” militants.²³³ By the end of the second day, the stability form of the intervention was becoming clearer, but its political objectives were still

²³⁰ Gray, 43.

²³¹ Roger J. Spiller, *“Not War But Like War”: The American Intervention in Lebanon*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1981), 13.

²³² *Ibid.*, 13.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 24.

largely undefined.²³⁴ The envisioned conventional operation to defeat an invasion by the Syrian conventional army never occurred.²³⁵

In terms of organization, one of the units included in the deployment was an Honest John rocket battery. Based on the dominant military doctrine of massive retaliation, the majority of this battery's munitions were nuclear, leading to a shortage of conventional rounds. Realizing this complete lack of utility of nuclear weapons, Admiral Halloway requested the unit be armed with conventional rounds, to which USAREUR objected that the effectiveness of conventional munitions did not warrant the expense of each rocket. This confusion was compounded by the political sensitivity of repositioning a nuclear force from Europe and led Admiral Halloway to cancel the landing of the battery, although it was already afloat.²³⁶

The general misunderstanding that the intervention into Lebanon was to be a "purely military operation" resulted in the prioritization of military over political intelligence, which ultimately became critical to the success of the mission.²³⁷ By contrast, during execution, the intervention became more political than military. The emerging objective became the "[de]militarization of Lebanese politics" and succession of power, meaning that while providing some security and stability, US forces were to be largely passive and apolitical.²³⁸ The intervention had been planned as a conventional military operation against conventional enemies invading Lebanon, but in execution it became a mostly political operation. No conventional enemy threatened Beirut.²³⁹

During the operation, the political subtleties and imperatives of a stability mode of operation were at odds with a military caught in the midst of transforming itself for nuclear combat in accordance with the adopted doctrine of massive retaliation. As a result, the military

²³⁴ Ibid., 25.

²³⁵ Ibid., 25.

²³⁶ Ibid., 27.

²³⁷ Ibid., 39.

²³⁸ Ibid., 39.

²³⁹ Ibid., 40.

had difficulty in defining the type of operation and detecting the largely political objectives to be achieved by it, objectives which “were beyond the power of nuclear weapons to solve.” The incident identified a major gap in defense strategy or doctrine created by the overreliance on nuclear technology.²⁴⁰

This overreliance on firepower and technology continues today in Iraq. One US commander described that unlike conventional operations, the employment of mass, or creating a decisive operation created a vulnerability for the irregular enemy to exploit. Rather, successful operations had a different template than conventional war, “the net effect of many microdecisive actions performed along all interconnected lines of operations.”²⁴¹ To perform these unique tasks, this commander organized unique, unconventional training of engineers with local cities prior to deployment.²⁴² These historic experiences of the US Army clearly reveal the differences between combat and stability operations, even when stability operations involve high levels of violence, such as during a counterinsurgency.

THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

In addition to the US Army’s historical experience, both classical and contemporary military theorists also recognize the disparate natures of stability operations and conventional warfare. Although focused primarily on conventional war between states under the Napoleonic model of the decisive battle of annihilation, classic military theorists such as Clausewitz and Jomini readily identified the existence of stability operations as distinct from conventional warfare.

In fact, the very manner in which these theorists frame war as conventional interstate conflict contrasts sharply with the requirements of a stability operation. Clausewitz defined the

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 44.

²⁴¹ Chiarelli, 16.

²⁴² Ibid., 10.

aim or objective in war is to “overcome the enemy, or disarm [the enemy].”²⁴³ Jomini shared this definition, writing, “battle is the one and only means that warfare can employ.”²⁴⁴

Defining the problem of war in this way generates models of conventional conflict that revolve primarily upon the concept of mass or concentration of force. Clausewitz defined the term “center of gravity” to describe the source of the enemy’s power, “the hub of all power and movements on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.”²⁴⁵ An enemy’s army or fighting force was typically his center of gravity, and when in doubt, “the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin.”²⁴⁶

Since mass is the aim of both conventional forces, the conflict takes on the form of a series of discrete military battles or engagements.

War, in its highest forms, is not an infinite as of minor events, analogous despite their diversities War consists rather of single, great decisive actions, each of which needs to be handled individually. War is not like a field of wheat, which, without regard to the individual stalk, may be mown more or less efficiently depending on the quality of the scythe; it is like a stand of mature trees in which the axe has to be used judiciously according to the characteristics and development of each individual trunk.²⁴⁷

Jomini also identified mass as the “one great principle underlying all the operations of war.”²⁴⁸ Jomini “to throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war,” emphasizing decisive points along the enemy’s lines of communication while protecting one’s own or on fractions of the enemy’s force with the bulk of one’s own.²⁴⁹ Jomini then identified the choice of the line of operations as the primary means of achieving the greatest possible mass at the decisive point.²⁵⁰ When facing an enemy of equal or

²⁴³ Clausewitz, 77.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 577.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 595-596.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 596.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 153.

²⁴⁸ Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War* (London: Greenhill Books, 1996), 70.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 70.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 114.

superior strength, Jomini called for relative superiority, “the skillful concentration of superior strength at the decisive point,” dependent upon judgment and “the resolution needed to sacrifice nonessentials for the sake of essentials.”²⁵¹ These models of conflict are clearly inapplicable to stability operations, which require dispersion rather than mass, and sustained effort rather than a series of discrete battles.

Contrasting this theoretical underpinning of conventional war, both Clausewitz and Jomini address warfare by irregular forces as a separate and distinct form, admitting that the assumptions or context underpinning their theories did not apply to the environment of stability operations. Clausewitz describes the use of “the people in arms” but merely addresses it as a supporting effort to conventional battle, or as an act of the desperate nation after a conventional defeat.²⁵² Additionally, he focuses on the employment of these irregular forces in the support of conventional forces. He recommends that these irregular forces should remain “nebulous and elusive” and “should never materialize as a concrete body” thereby risking decisive engagement with the enemy’s conventional force.²⁵³ Concentrating only at points of enemy weakness, the counterinsurgents only military response is escorts and guards at critical points and along supply routes.²⁵⁴

While Clausewitz defines war singularly, Jomini divides war into several categorizations, including wars of expediency, intervention, national wars, and wars of opinion, which involve the civilian population in addition to conventional armies.²⁵⁵ He writes that national wars call for the destruction of the enemy army and occupation of territory, while in wars of opinion , “it is of less importance to subjugate the country; her great efforts should be made to gain the end speedily, without delaying for details, care being constantly taken to avoid any tactics which might alarm

²⁵¹ Clausewitz, 197.

²⁵² Ibid., 483.

²⁵³ Ibid., 481.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 481.

²⁵⁵ Jomini, 18-29.

the nation”²⁵⁶ Jomini uses the Peninsular War in Spain in 1808 to provide a stark warning of warfare against “an exasperated people, ready for all sacrifices.”²⁵⁷ His prescription for such situations is to conclude the war rapidly, with extreme care not to engender the hostility of the population.²⁵⁸

Unlike stability operations, regular or convention warfare between states is “transcultural,” that is, it transcends culture into a common “grammar of war.”²⁵⁹ In a conventional war, it is possible to achieve a decisive military outcome, regardless of acute cultural differences between belligerents.²⁶⁰ Stability operations, on the other hand, are normally characterized by irregular warfare during which even subtle cultural differences can have a decisive outcome.²⁶¹ While different conventional operations will share this “grammar of war,” no two stability operations will ever be alike. Stability operations are very different from combat ops in complexity and form, during which violence and root causes of violence replace a symmetric conventional armed force as the primary threat.²⁶²

Even when started rationally or by “hostile intention,” the elements of danger and fear in war immediately cause “hostile feelings,” causing war in pure theory to tend toward the extreme.²⁶³ To Clausewitz, a theory of war must concede that real war may often stray from the absolute form, but still must always give absolute war the priority and establish it as the general frame of reference.²⁶⁴ Nation states going to war over powerful motivations produce war tending toward its absolute, pure theoretical form, with the objective of destroying the enemy’s armed forces becoming simultaneously the military and political objectives.²⁶⁵ In practice, limited

²⁵⁶ Jomini, 27.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 23.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 27.

²⁵⁹ Gray, 24.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 25.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 25.

²⁶² Cavaleri, 88.

²⁶³ Clausewitz, 76-77.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 581.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 87-88.

objectives cause war to deviate from its “natural course” and the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character.”²⁶⁶

Echoing this increasing political nature of unconventional conflict are many contemporary military theorists. French officer and counterinsurgency theorist, Roger Trinquier, goes so far as to state that traditional warfare is obsolete, replaced by “modern war” which he defines as “an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, psychological, military—that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.”²⁶⁷ Unlike traditional military conflicts, military force is not only indecisive but even unimportant, replace instead by the “unconditional support of [the] population.”²⁶⁸

Large unit operations and raids are generally too “brief and superficial” to harm the insurgents.²⁶⁹ Unlike conventional warfare, in which the defeat mechanism is the destruction of the enemy armed forces, modern war the destruction of the insurgent forces is simply not possible, nor is it even relevant. Rather, the defeat mechanism of stability operations is population control and administration.²⁷⁰

Callwell recognized that the singular feature of small wars is the strategic advantage enjoyed by the irregular force in terms of its complete freedom of action to disperse, concentrate, give or refuse battle while being unfettered by lines of communication or the necessity of protecting critical infrastructure or maintaining order.²⁷¹ He writes,

...the conditions of small wars are so diversified, the enemy’s mode of fighting is often so peculiar, and the theaters of operations present such singular features, that irregular warfare must generally be carried out on a method totally different from the stereotyped system [of conventional warfare]. The art of

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 88.

²⁶⁷ Trinquier, 5.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 63.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 28.

²⁷¹ Callwell, 85-88.

war, as generally understood, must be modified to suit the circumstances of each particular case. The conduct of small wars is in fact in certain respects an art by itself, diverging widely from what is adapted to the conditions of regular warfare, but not so widely that there are not in all its branches points which permit comparisons to be established.²⁷²

Guerrilla action reverses the normal practice of warfare, replacing mass with dispersion.²⁷³ As T. E. Lawrence described from his experience in the Arab Revolt, “Governments saw men only in mass; but our men, being irregulars, were not formations but individuals.”²⁷⁴ He crafted a strategy which declined to attack or defend positions, but employed superior cross-desert mobility and dispersion to win a “victory without battle.”²⁷⁵ Indeed, total military defeat of the enemy’s conventional force was not only infeasible, but also disadvantageous. “Our ideal was to keep his railway just working, but only just, with the maximum of loss and discomfort.”²⁷⁶ A decisive military defeat of the Turkish Army would have forced them to withdraw, rather than continuing to apply resources to protect its lines of communications, which accomplished Lawrence’s purpose.

Another counterinsurgent theorist, Galula, states that counterinsurgency or “subversive warfare” is a “special kind of war,” in which control of the population is the solution, but a solution which demands military operations “that differ from conventional warfare.”²⁷⁷ He points out that during conventional war, politics is still supreme, but once political objectives and directives are set, military means become predominate.²⁷⁸ In an insurgency or “revolutionary war, . . . politics becomes an active instrument of operation.”²⁷⁹ During the initial stages of an insurgency, many activities of the insurgents may be peaceful and even legal, clearly negating the

²⁷² Ibid., 23.

²⁷³ Liddell Hart, 365.

²⁷⁴ Thomas Edward Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 194.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 224.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 225.

²⁷⁷ David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2006), 278.

²⁷⁸ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers, 1964), 8.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 9.

utility of any military force.²⁸⁰ His model of counterinsurgency calls for organizing into conventional striking forces and static units, specially adapted and organized for a pacification mission.²⁸¹ Static unit “grid” deploys with the population, rather than militarily significant terrain.²⁸² This treatment of stability operations underscores its inherent difference from conventional combat operations between states.

SUMMARY

The recognition by both classical and contemporary military theorists highlights the distinction between combat and stability operations. This theoretical distinction has its roots in military history of irregular warfare, including the US historical experience in stability operations as well. Since 1993, however, the Army has increasingly ignored this distinction by adopting models such as Full Spectrum Operations. Full Spectrum Operations portrays stability operations as merely one mission among several, illogically categorizing it with the conventional combat operations of offense and defense.

This tendency to conflate disparate terms and concepts is part of a general trend due to the flawed use of analogical reasoning, masking critical differences between conventional combat operations and stability operations. The Army’s familiarity and organizational preference for conventional warfare causes it to apply the framework of conventional warfare to other domains of activity through analogical reasoning. A key danger of this type of reasoning is selecting an inappropriate model to use as the source domain. From the theoretical treatment as well as historical experience, stability and combat operations have very different causal forces at work, generating very different dynamics, and calling for very different methods in response. The use of conventional warfare as the source domain for approaching stability operations is a key factor in the difficulty US forces face today in conducting stability operations.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 6.

²⁸¹ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, 275-276.

²⁸² Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 110.

AGGREGATION: ARMY METHODISM AND THE TENET OF VERSATILITY

Based on this conflation of stability and combat operations, the Army subsequently demonstrates aggregation of the tasks associated with each mode of operations, failing to resolve the two disparate forms of operation within a single operational framework. This aggregation results from the Army's methodism in doctrine development, or its superficial attempt to repeat the doctrinal success of AirLand Battle, leading to a flawed definition of the tenet of versatility.

The differences between combat operations and stability operations lead many authors to conclude that each mode requires its own doctrine. However, in 1976, General William DePuy not only published Active Defense as the first post-Vietnam statement of doctrine, he transformed the purpose of doctrine. For the first time in the Army's history, doctrine became "a mechanism by which the institution could organize its thinking about future war."²⁸³ Thus, doctrine became the means of driving reform and focusing the organization rather than merely an incoherent collection of military preconceptions and traditions.

Sustaining this purpose requires that doctrine provide a comprehensive framework which enables the design of operational concepts to solve practical strategic problems. Because of the interrelationship of stability and combat operations, any doctrine must integrate stability operations rather than compartmentalize or sequence them separately from combat operations. At the same time, the two modes of operation call for dramatically different principles, organizations, and methods. The resolution of this cognitive tension between two antithetical but interrelated modes of operation is a fundamental requirement of Army doctrine.

The resolution of such cognitive tension through doctrinal innovation is given a prime example in the replacement of Active Defense by AirLand Battle between 1976 and 1986. This period of doctrinal innovation provides a case study in a successful development of doctrine

²⁸³ Roger J. Spiller, "In the Shadow of the Dragon: Doctrine and the US Army After Vietnam." *RUSI Journal*, (Dec 1997): 52.

involving a comprehensive, systemic approach and the resolution of disparate concepts. In fact, this success led to subsequent failure in 1993, as the Army attempted simplistically to repeat the formula of simply adding an additional tenet, while lacking the subtle but comprehensive systemic reframing of the problem.

FROM ACTIVE DEFENSE TO AIRLAND BATTLE

In developing its doctrine of Full Spectrum Operations, the Army drew heavily on its development of AirLand Battle from 1976 through 1986, which represented an enormous success on several levels, generating both operational cognition and institutional coherence. AirLand Battle not only served to counter the Soviet threat, but also served as the impetus to rebuild an Army shattered both morally and materially by its experience in Vietnam.

The situation in 1973 was a US Army defeated and demoralized from Vietnam, and the political and military leadership completely delegitimized and unable to produce a reformer.²⁸⁴ The Nixon Doctrine became policy, combining regional disengagement and the “demilitarization” of foreign policy, relying predominantly on the other elements of national power.²⁸⁵ In this absence of civilian intervention, the Army reverted to its institutional preference for conventional warfare, focusing on its perceived primary threat and scenario, conventional warfare against the Soviet Union in Central Europe.²⁸⁶

General DePuy began his reform of the Army through training rather than doctrine.²⁸⁷ Eventually, this emphasis on training began to evolve into doctrine prompted by General DePuy’s desire to provide a guiding framework to integrate the Army’s equipment acquisition process.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁴ Ibid., 43.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 43.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 43. This also agrees with Posen’s model of military doctrine in the absence of civilian intervention based on Organization Theory, see Posen, 54.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 45.

²⁸⁸ Paul H. Herbert, *Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations*, Leavenworth Papers, Number 16 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and Staff College, 1988), 28.

Initially, DePuy relied on his personal combat experiences during World War II to guide the development of doctrine. The lessons of the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, however, soon provided another model which expanded DePuy's thinking as well as sense of urgency.

The 1973 War provided an undeniable example of the complexity and lethality of modern armored warfare that began to tacitly organize information in the absence of any doctrine or theoretical model of warfare.²⁸⁹ DePuy's assessment that the Army was fundamentally unprepared for modern combat brought a sense of urgency to his desire to reform and retrain the Army.²⁹⁰ This urgency ultimately emphasized efficiency during the development of Active Defense, short-circuiting bureaucratic and institutional staffing processes and therefore limiting consensus-building or discourse.²⁹¹ He deliberately sought to impose his ideas, focusing on gaining the buy-in of the major Army headquarters in Europe, Seventh Army, while indoctrinating the officers and NCOs outbound to the Army units through his control of the Army's professional education system.²⁹² DePuy's doctrinal development model reflected his personal views, simplifying the problem of war into one of "weapon systems integration."²⁹³

At the same time, the political context of Germany's commitment to NATO made it imperative to reassure Germany that NATO intended to defend it and not merely use it as a battlefield, thereby demanding a military strategy of forward defense.²⁹⁴ Based on the Soviet superiority in numbers and emphasis on armor, the Germany's doctrine correspondingly emphasized anti-armor operations, obstacles, and flexibility or "rapid shifting."²⁹⁵ DePuy had a dual purpose in coordinating doctrine with the German Army. First, he attempted to integrate doctrines with a critical ally while addressing the common military problem they faced.

²⁸⁹ Spiller, "Shadow of the Dragon," 46.

²⁹⁰ Herbert, 36-37.

²⁹¹ Spiller, "Shadow of the Dragon," 48-49.

²⁹² Spiller, "Shadow of the Dragon," 49.

²⁹³ Herbert, 35.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 65.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 65.

Secondly, by gaining German support for Active Defense, DePuy guaranteed its acceptance by Seventh Army in Europe and therefore the support of the entire Army.²⁹⁶

DePuy used a systems analysis approach to the political requirement of forward defense and the strategic context of a numerically superior armor-centered enemy army to produce Active Defense.²⁹⁷ Active Defense represented a nontraditional form of the defense, emphasizing initial disruption of the enemy's attack through "successive attrition areas in preparation for a decisive counterattack."²⁹⁸ The problem of a politically-required forward defense against superior numbers resulted in the emphasis on massed, long range fires and lateral repositioning to defeat the enemy's main attack, followed by a counterattack.²⁹⁹

Once published, the 1976 version of FM 100-5 faced immediate criticism, but informed the discussion and enabled subsequent doctrine development. Criticisms of Active Defense included its narrow focus on the defense and on the European theater, as well as its systems analysis bias at the expense of the moral or human dimensions of combat.³⁰⁰ Ironically, one of the key individuals who would overturn Active Defense was also one of its key architects, General Starry.

After leading the production of Active Defense, General Starry took command of V Corps in Europe shortly after its publication. His command at the corps level forced him to realize that Active Defense addressed only the initial defensive battle, and failed completely to address the operational problem of Soviet follow-on forces or Operational Maneuver Groups.³⁰¹

During this time, the tension existed not between types of military operations, but between military operations themselves and politically motivated limitations, chiefly the political strategic requirement of forward defense rather than defense in depth. This political infeasibility of

²⁹⁶ Ibid., 68.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 79.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 79.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 84.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 96.

³⁰¹ Ibid., 97.

defense in depth contradicted the military infeasibility of linear, forward defense in responding to Soviet operational echelonment and the denial of the Soviet military objective of *udar*, or systemic operational shock. AirLand Battle effectively resolved this tension by the addition of the tenet of depth

Starry's first step in replacing active Defense was his development of Central Battle, which applied systems thinking to both the Soviet army and corps maneuver, and introduced operational perception in terms of arranging tactical actions on the battlefield.³⁰² Starry reached a second intermediate stage with his concept of the Integrated Battlefield, which integrated the close and deep battle into a single operational design.³⁰³ His next concept, the Extended Battlefield, then expanded the systems thinking and operational perception by expanding the tenet of depth from merely spatial to the dimensions of time and resources.³⁰⁴

In 1982, the Army published a new FM 100-5, officially establishing its doctrine of AirLand Battle, essentially the translation of the Extended Battlefield concept into a practical doctrinal framework.³⁰⁵ Updated in 1986, AirLand Battle proved to be an enormous success. It quickly reorganized, reoriented, and refocused the US Army, driving its organization, training, and acquisition process. It provided the essential conceptual framework or vision that allowed the Army to reform itself and prepare for conflict with its greatest adversary. This preparation enjoyed the ultimate success, deterring the Soviet Union from a conventional attack against Europe. Ironically, its test in combat came not in Europe, but in the Middle East during the Persian Gulf War. Also ironic was the fact that this overwhelmingly decisive victory of the war subsequently made conventional war the least likely contingency by deterring all states from

³⁰² Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory* (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), 288.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, 292.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 296.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 300.

challenging the US conventionally. Thus, AirLand Battle caused its own demise, as the new strategic environment it helped produce compelled the Army to replace it with a new doctrine.

FROM AIRLAND BATTLE TO FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS: THE DISINTEGRATION OF DOCTRINE AND LOSS OF OPERATIONAL COGNITION

Yet another irony in the effectiveness of AirLand Battle is that its success indirectly led to failure as the Army superficially and uncritically attempted to repeat the formula during its development of Full Spectrum Operations. This methodism led to the Army's flawed definition of its tenet of versatility to include tactical rather than purely operational versatility.

Dörner defines methodism as a logical flaw in which people limit their consideration of alternatives because of their "tendency to act in accordance with pre-established patterns."³⁰⁶ Although a simplification, the Army replaced its doctrine of Active defense with AirLand Battle essentially through the addition of the single tenet of depth. This simple addition or minor alteration, however, is deceptively simple, since it masks a systemic and comprehensive consideration of the strategic situation in Europe.

In developing Full Spectrum Operations, the Army attempted to fix a new problem by using the same method of adding an additional tenet. The 1993 version of FM 100-5 attempted to account for stability operations with the addition of the single tenet of versatility, defining it as "the ability of units to meet diverse mission requirements."³⁰⁷ Versatility is the appropriate tenet, but its lack of a systemic, theoretical underpinning causes the Army to misdefine it to include tactical rather than purely operational versatility. This flawed definition has contradicted the differing requirements of conventional warfare and stability operations and placed unrealistic demands on Army units.

³⁰⁶ Dörner, 45.

³⁰⁷ FM 100-5, 1993, p. 2-9.

When the authors of AirLand Battle added depth, they clearly meant for the Army to apply it at the operational level of war. No single tactical formation or force was expected or designed to fight in depth, but the operational force as a whole. Thus, depth implied operational echelonment, and was completely irrelevant to the tactical level of war.³⁰⁸

Unlike this definition of depth, the 1993 version of FM 100-5 intended versatility to apply at the tactical as well as operational level. Although ostensibly focused at the operational level of war, FM 100-5 clearly established versatility as applicable at the tactical level, stating, “Versatility is the ability of tactical units to adapt to different missions and tasks, some of which may not be on unit mission-essential tasks lists.”³⁰⁹ The manual went on to include the following passage:

Commanders must be able to shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently. Versatility implies a capacity to be multifunctional, to operate across the full range of military operations, and to perform at the tactical, operations, and strategic levels.³¹⁰

By not associating the “commander” with any particular level of war, this passage requires tactical level commanders to develop and maintain versatility, ignoring the challenges of company and battalion size combat units to reorganize, re-equip, or retrain themselves for stability operations, particularly once deployed and engaged in combat operations.

The very examples used to illustrate versatility cited in the manual belie its flawed conception. The first example of successful versatility given is Operation Just Cause. Yet as we saw from Yates’ account, this example completely ignores the fact that US forces had essentially not planned to conduct stability operations and only did so when the situation compelled them. Even then, units were completely unprepared to conduct stability tasks, having to divert from

³⁰⁸ Naveh, 301.

³⁰⁹ FM 100-5, 1993, p. 2-9.

³¹⁰ Ibid., p. 2-9.

combat operations, and doing so only with immense difficulty and limited success.³¹¹ The second example is Operation Desert Storm, and again contradicts Yates' account. Similar to Panama, Central Command designed Desert Storm as a limited conventional operation essentially without any stability operation. Only after the Shia and Kurdish uprising and subsequent repression did Central Command respond with a stability operation to protect those populations and provide humanitarian assistance.³¹²

The 2001 version of FM 3-0 did not correct this deficiency. It states the following:

Versatility is the ability of Army forces to meet the global, diverse mission requirements of full spectrum operations. Competence in a variety of missions and skills allows Army forces to quickly transition from one type of operation to another with minimal changes to the deployed force structure. Versatility depends on adaptive leaders, competent and dedicated soldiers, and well-equipped units. Effective training, high standards, and detailed planning also contribute. Time and resources limit the number of tasks any unit can perform well. Within these constraints, commanders maximize versatility by developing the multiple capabilities of units and soldiers.³¹³

This passage places the burden of training this unmanageable number of skill sets squarely on lower level commanders, without any feasibility assessment. The analogy the manual uses is of the decathlete, explaining that the decathlete trains for and competes in ten separate events, while the boxer merely one.³¹⁴ To expand this sports analogy, one could refer to high intensity conventional warfare, even if limited such as the Persian Gulf War, as a sport requiring mobility, power, and shock, like boxing or football. The decathlete may be a versatile athlete, but would not fare well if political objectives require that he enter the boxing ring and face a proficient heavy weight boxer.

FM 3-0 clearly overlooks the limitation of collective and individual skills for which a unit can effectively train, as well as the challenge of reorganizing and reequipping for a stability

³¹¹ Yates, 18.

³¹² Ibid., 19.

³¹³ FM 3-0, 2001, p. 4-17.

³¹⁴ Ibid., p. 2-9.

operation. To hedge against this weakness, the manual states, “Commanders at lower levels conduct battle focused training unless otherwise directed.”³¹⁵ This statement illustrates the phenomenon highlighted earlier, in which the Army tends to consider stability operations as a lesser included class of conventional operation. The assumption that units trained for high intensity combat can readily transfer those skills to stability operations is both false and dangerous.

The manual states that “engineers *with some reorganization and retraining* can transfer their skills from combat missions to other tasks such as rebuilding infrastructures or restoring water and power supplies.”³¹⁶ [italics mine]. Later, the manual states, “[Field artillery] or infantry units can be committed to fighting forest fires on *short notice with minimal training*.”³¹⁷ There is a significant danger of conflating a situation in which soldiers are used simply as unskilled manual labor, with the complex and sophisticated tasks required for true stability operations.

FROM FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS TO INTEGRATED ARMY OPERATIONS: RESOLVING THE COMPETING DEMANDS AND DYNAMICS OF COMBAT AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

Correcting the flawed definition of versatility in current doctrine requires its redefinition and restriction to the operational level of war. This will subsequently generate the requirement for operational echelonment of combat and stability forces, and transition from Full Spectrum Operations to Integrated Army Operations. The infeasibility of versatility at the tactical level suggests applying it at the operational level similar to depth. This implies operational echelonment of combat and stability during operational design. By applying versatility at the operational level, the Army will resolve the tension between the political and strategic

³¹⁵ Ibid., p. 1-17.

³¹⁶ Ibid., p. 2-9.

³¹⁷ Ibid., p. 2-9.

requirements for stability operations, and the military and tactical requirements of forces to organize, equip, and train for the mission they will perform once deployed. This method establishes versatility as the cognitive equivalent of depth to modern operations, but denoting depth in purpose or function rather than in space, time, or resources.

As demonstrated earlier, to be effective in conducting stability operations, the Army must organize, equip, and train a stability force for its specific operation. The two disparate missions of stability and combat operations demand two kinds of units.³¹⁸ This is demonstrated regularly today in Iraq as artillery units are transformed into transportation battalions, or as tank companies trade tanks for wheeled vehicles and employ armor soldiers in a dismounted infantry or military police role.

Forces, equipment, and training are all closely interrelated and are not fungible. Different strategic approaches call for different types of technology and types of forces³¹⁹. Doctrine, equipment, and training are all tightly interconnected, and changed only with difficulty and cost.³²⁰ The former commander of Central Command, General John Abizaid, understood this concept when prior to the invasion of Iraq, acting then as the Deputy Commander, recommended assigning stability operations to an Army corps not involved in the decisive combat operations.³²¹

Many authors argue that to respond to the demands of stability operations, the US must build two armies.³²² This argument is not realistic, however, since it fails to consider budget constraints. It also fails to account for the fact that we currently reorganize forces for stability operations such as the Multi-Nation Observer mission in the Sinai Peninsula or the counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most importantly, it fails to appreciate that stability and combat operations are interconnected, requiring the simultaneous commitment

³¹⁸ Arreguín-Toft, 226.

³¹⁹ Ibid., 37.

³²⁰ Ibid., 219.

³²¹ Gordon, 141.

³²² Arreguín-Toft, 227.

of both combat and stability forces. Building separate armies to handle these missions would increase rather than decrease the current disintegration between combat and stability operations. It would create more problems that it would solve, including problems in unity of effort as well as interoperability of equipment, techniques, and procedures.

The Army can use combat, combat support, and combat service support forces for stability operations, but this requires the Army to reorganize, reequip, and retrain them to conduct their stability role, preferably prior to deployment, but at a minimum, at a secure location prior to movement into their area of responsibility. While combat forces are capable of conducting limited stability operations as part of consolidation and reorganization, but must be relieved in place quickly by stability forces. Additionally, many supporting units, such as signal and logistic units, are dual use, performing essentially the same mission whether supporting a combat force or a stability force. These examples illustrate the implications of restricting the tenet of versatility as an operational vice tactical tenet.

SUMMARY

By defining versatility as a strictly operational tenet, the Army will set the conditions not only for the conduct of effective stability operations, but also for their integration into campaign design. It will also enable the Army institutionally to prepare for stability operations, organizing, manning, equipping, and training units for stability roles.

This change will also correct the methodism in doctrine development which led to Full Spectrum Operations. By superficially attempting to account for the likelihood of stability operations by adding an additional tenet, the Army failed to repeat the theoretical underpinning that marked AirLand Battle's addition of depth. By translating its doctrine from Full Spectrum Operations to Integrated Operations, the Army will provide the tenet of versatility with the intellectual rigor necessary to become actionable. It will enable the design of campaign plans that

effectively integrate both forms of operation, effectively resolving the fundamental tension or disparate requirements of each.

CONCLUSION

By defining versatility to include tactical versatility, the Army has aggregated the set of disparate tasks required by combat and stability operations. This unmanageable skill set represents an unrealistic expectation of units in the field, and relegated its responsibility to train and equip soldiers for the mission they will perform down to the lowest echelons of leadership in the Army. This flawed definition occurs because of the Army's methodism or superficial attempt to repeat its successful development of AirLand Battle by uncritically adding an additional tenet. It also occurs because of the Army's tendency during the 1990s to conflate terms and concepts involving combat and noncombat activities through the flawed use of analogical reasoning. This line of reasoning generates a general conflation of the Army's doctrinal terms and models, masking important distinctions which are critical for understanding.

This flawed analogical reasoning reflects the military's organizational preference for conventional war, a preference which leads to the military attempting to describe stability operations by mapping concepts from the familiar domain of conventional warfare. This organizational preference also generates disintegration of stability operations, contradicting their criticality to national security as well as their interrelationship with conventional combat operations. Although the US military attempts to conceptualize stability operations, these conceptual flaws have intersected to produce joint and Army doctrine which fails to provide a realistic and workable operational framework for the conduct of both stability and combat operations. As a result, both forms of operation are suboptimized rather than fully developed and integrated.

THE WAY AHEAD

The model of Integrated Army Operations essentially reverses the approach to stability operations taken by Full Spectrum Operations. Full Spectrum Operations treats stability operations as a distinctive phase, but one utilizing the same combat forces because of tactical

versatility. A new doctrine of Integrated Army Operations, on the other hand, conceptualizes stability operations are not a distinctive phase but are a distinctive force through operational echelonnement.

Because of the interrelationship of stability and combat operations, Army doctrine must integrate both combat and stability operations into a single coherent framework. Failure to do so will result in the continued inability of the US Army to achieve US policy objectives in peace and war.

Combat Operations		Stability Operations	
Offensive Operations	Defensive Operations	COIN Operations	Peace Operations

Figure 9. Integrated Army Operations.

However, since stability and combat operations are fundamentally different forms of operations, however, the Army must replace the models of the Range of Military Operations and Full Spectrum Operations with a new categorization which recognizes this difference. One example of Integrated Army Operations or the Integrated Battlefield, depicted in Figure 9,

illustrates the categorical break between combat and stability operations. After this distinction, the Army can then subdivide combat operations into offensive and defensive operations. Likewise,




Figure 10. Generic Phasing or Sequencing of Operations.

stability operations might also be subdivided, possibly into their most violent or nonpermissive form of counterinsurgencies, and into the more permissive form such as peace operations.

Likewise, the interrelationship of stability and combat operations means that any pre-established temporal relationship is artificial and unrealistic. Since stability operations must be

integrated rather than merely included, they should not be a distinct phase. Joint doctrine must therefore eliminate its Deliberate Phasing Model, replacing it with a figure such as Figure 10. This figure more accurately reflects the nature of stability operations as a normal, ongoing function of US forces before, during, and after conflict, or even separately, while conflict is typically temporary and possibly intermittent. The phases would be specific, based on the particular operational design. The last phase would typically involve a transition to the continuation of stability operations, which will normally be open-ended.

Army doctrine should retain versatility as a tenet, but redefine it, and probably all the tenets, as strictly a tenet at the operational level of war. Tactical combat units are incapable of versatility because of the unique requirements of stability operations. Although logistic, signal, psychological operations, and civil affairs units may continue to perform their respective roles in combat and stability, stability operations demand that combat forces be reorganized, reequipped, and retrained in order to maintain utility in a stability environment.

TESTING OF FINDINGS THROUGH COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

As an informal test of the findings above, a comparative analysis matrix can yield significant insight into the validity of the hypothesis concerning deliberate phasing and versatility of force. The table below in Figure 11 lists several conflicts, and then lists whether or not the

Conflict	Deliberate Phasing	Versatility of Force	Military Outcome	Political Outcome
US in WWII Europe, Occupation of Germany, 1942-1945(+)	No**	No	Victory	Success
US in WWII Pacific and the Occupation of Japan, 1941-1945	No**	No	Victory	Success
French in Vietnam, 1945-1954	Yes*	Yes*	Defeat	Failure
France and Algeria, 1954-1962	No	No	Victory	Failure
US in Vietnam, 1962-1972	Yes*	Yes	Victory	Failure
Soviets in Afghanistan, 1980-1988	Yes*	Yes	Defeat	Failure
US in Panama, 1989	Yes*	Yes	Victory	Success with difficulty
US Persian Gulf War and Aftermath 1991-1993	Yes*	No	Victory	Blemished Success
NATO in Bosnia 1998-1999	Yes	Yes	Victory	Success with difficulty
US in OEF, 2001-	Yes	Yes	Victory	Pending Success with Difficulty
US in OIF, 2003 -	Yes	No	Victory	Impending Failure

Figure 11. Comparative Analysis Matrix

operational design of these actions employed a deliberate phasing approach as well as employed

the tenet of versatility, using combat forces for both combat and stability operations. For cases in which a stability operation was not planned, the table counts this as deliberate phasing since stability operations were still separated from combat operations, arguably in the most extreme manner. The table identifies these cases with an asterisk after the “yes.” Finally, the table lists both the military, and more importantly, the political outcomes of the conflict.

For selection criteria, this comparative matrix uses contemporary conflicts starting from World War II, involving global powers in conflicts which demanded both combat and stability modes of action. Arreguín-Toft’s work provides the majority of the data, modified, however, to account for deliberate phasing and versatility rather than strategic interaction.³²³ Omitted, for example, is the US action in Somalia in 1993, since the lack of an initial coherent operational design precludes drawing conclusions on doctrine or operational design from the subsequent unfavorable outcome.

Two counterexamples appear from this table, including the Algerian War for Independence from France and the Persian Gulf War. The US executed the Persian Gulf War as a conventional, albeit limited conflict. However, the subsequent unrest and brutal repression within Iraq beginning in 1993 led to twelve years of stability operations, shows of force, and air operations to enforce the UN-mandated no-fly zones, ending arguable with the resumption of hostilities in 2003. Thus, stability operations were initially unplanned, but subsequently demanded by the unraveling situation. They were therefore separated in time, similar to the deliberate phasing model.

The strongest counterexample is the French War in Algeria, which on the surface meets the requirements of Integrated Army Operations, yet still to achieve its political objectives. Based on Galula’s description, the French did not employ deliberate phasing, and operationally

³²³ Arreguín-Toft, 231-232.

echeloned its forces into conventional strike forces and static units for pacification.³²⁴ Despite these actions, the French were military successful, but still failed politically, with Algeria gaining independence in 1962. While this may contradict the analysis of this monograph, there were several other casual factors at work, including the political vulnerability of France and the employment of brutal, repressive measures by France, including torture and murder. Arguably, the use of brutality combined with the extreme domestic political vulnerability of the French government undermined any type of military operation abroad.

After considering these counterexamples, the table clearly demonstrates that the use of deliberate phasing or omission of stability operations altogether, combined with the use of tactical versatility, shows near-perfect correlation with either political failure or at a minimum, with significant and unexpected difficulty in achieving the desired political outcome. Although this does not disprove the existence of other causal or contributing factors, it does clearly indicate the potential that the deliberate phasing model proffered by joint doctrine, combined with the Army's tenet of tactical versatility, represent significant factors in undermining the political, if not military, success of military operations. Future analysis might conduct a more detailed comparative analysis, including additional potential causal or contributing factors as well as additional cases.

IMPLICATIONS

While the conclusions of this monograph are principally doctrinal, one can readily generate implications using the remaining elements of the Army's DTLOM-PF model, referring to doctrine, training, leader development, material, personnel, and facilities. Specifically, it can impact the Army's organization of its deployment model or the Time Phased Force Deployment

³²⁴ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, 275.

List (TPFDL) development, its Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) model, and its training system with the Combat Training Centers (CTC)

Because of the artificial and flawed temporal relationship and sequential phasing of stability operations, the US military produces a second order effect during its deployment of forces. It traditionally deploys combat forces first. However, the fact that stability operations do not have a predetermined temporal relationship to combat suggests that the military might consider deploying stability forces first, except in cases requiring forced entry. The immediate advantages would be to position stability forces into theater, thereby releasing deployment resources for the subsequent, unrestricted movement of combat forces. Although it necessitates the lengthening of deployment windows for stability forces, it would also provide stability forces with the opportunity to gain greater familiarity with the region or even begin initial stability operations. This cultural familiarity, in particular, would dramatically improve the stability force's capability and chances for mission success.

Furthermore, the presence of stability forces would be less politically sensitive. It would not necessarily indicate or mandate our intent to conduct combat operations and therefore would not start the political "clock" in terms of the will of the American public, legislative branch, or international community. A more realistic deployment template is for stability forces to precede combat forces and then remain long after combat forces have departed. In fact, a unit might deploy for a short, conventional conflict, hand off to a stability force and redeploy, then return six months or a year later re-equipped, reorganized, and retrained as a stability force to relieve another stability force.

Even broader than the TPFDD or sequencing of force deployment, the developing ARFRORGEN model might also incorporate the results. This could take the form of the Division Ready Brigade (DRB) system of the 1990s, but this time with a parallel DRB structure, with a set of units prepared trained and ready to deploy for conventional warfare, while others are reorganized, re-equipped, and retrained for a stability mission.

This DRB system might also integrate into the Army's training system of Combat Training Centers (CTC). The National Training Center (NTC) might take the lead in training for conventional combat operations, while the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) takes the lead in stability operations. Another alternative might be to build a third CTC along the lines of JRTC but with a full-time stability focus, allowing both NTC and JRTC to return to a more conventional warfare focus.

All these implications are enabled by the reframing of stability operations. In 1992, General (Retired) Gorman wrote that "The secret of future victories is this: learn from the mistakes of the Twentieth Century how to fashion a force for the Twenty-first Century."³²⁵ Narrowly referring to the need for realistic training for military victory during conventional warfare, Gorman overlooked the broader need for appropriately conceptualizing stability operations in order to "fashion a force" which can demonstrate utility more broadly by translating military victory into political success. The US Army and joint community must correct their flawed doctrinal approaches to stability operations to remain effective instruments of national policy during the Twenty-first Century.

³²⁵ Gorman, p. IV-5.

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