

**Full Spectrum Operations - The Continuation of  
Major Combat Operations by Other Means:  
Making the Transition to Stability and  
Reconstruction Operations at the Division Level**

**A Monograph**

**by**

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## **Abstract**

FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS - THE CONTINUATION OF MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS BY OTHER MEANS: MAKING THE TRANSITION TO STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS AT THE DIVISION LEVEL by MAJ Andrew C. Hilmes, U.S. Army, 56 pages.

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the necessity of conventional military forces to adequately prepare for stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) in the aftermath of major combat operations (MCO). In the case of Iraq, there existed a narrow window of opportunity, perhaps ninety days long, following the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime. The window of opportunity presented the United States (U.S.) and coalition forces the possibility to immediately seize upon the goodwill of the newly emancipated Iraqi people, their democratic euphoria, and a generally permissive environment to set the conditions for successful SRO. The ability to rapidly transition from MCO to SRO is of vital importance, as it affords a unique opportunity for an occupying force to destroy an insurgency in its most vulnerable stage, its infancy. Unfortunately, the U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq were unable to exploit their initial success in MCO and now battle a full-scale insurgency, the outcome of which remains very much undecided. U.S. Army operations in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and the outset of the current century have almost always necessitated the need for the ability of the U.S. armed forces to rapidly conduct the transition from MCO to SRO. The current operational environment (COE) and future threat assessments prove that this requirement will not dissipate.

This monograph strives to determine the additional resources, training, and authority required by a U.S. Army division to successfully transition from MCO to SRO. The thesis investigates the experiences of three higher echelon headquarters, operating at the tactical level of war, required to make the transition. XVIII Airborne Corps during Operation Just Cause, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division during Operation Uphold Democracy, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The experiences of the three headquarters are contrasted with one another through an analysis of their actions with three of the principles of counterinsurgency: the establishment of security under the rule of law, the management of information and expectations, and support to the host nation.

Findings suggest that division-level headquarters transitioning from MCO to SRO must have the authority of occupational law, the means to conduct mass information operations with the people of the host nation, and the capability to coincide efforts with those of the host nation government. The recommendations include the modification of doctrine to provide more guidance on transitions and better discern between the operational environments encountered during SRO. Additionally, division headquarters must ensure that their staffs are functionally aligned to conduct specific SRO tasks in the aftermath of MCO, immediately liaising with and supporting the host nation government. This requires the revision of Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) and home-station training focuses, for both divisional staff and subordinate units, to ensure success. Finally, as a precursor to any organizational changes, the conclusion recommends the changing of Army culture to embrace SRO as a traditional mission set.

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## INTRODUCTION

The troops returning home are worried. 'We've lost the peace,' men tell you. 'We can't make it stick.' ...Friend and foe alike, look you accusingly in the face and tell you how bitterly they are disappointed in you as an American. ...Never has American prestige in Europe been lower. ...Instead of coming in with a bold plan of relief and reconstruction we came in full of evasions and apologies. ...A great many feel that the cure has been worse than the disease. The taste of victory had gone sour in the mouth of every thoughtful American I had met.<sup>1</sup>

John Dos Passos

At first glance this quote brings to mind any one of the plethora of stories pertaining to the ongoing conflict in Iraq readily found in any daily newspaper or nightly news broadcast. However, these concerns were expressed in the aftermath of World War II as the United States and its allies struggled to reconstruct a devastated Europe. That reconstruction was a massive effort which, after a Cold War lasting in excess of 40 years, ended quite successfully. For almost four years America has struggled, politically, socially, and militarily, with its ongoing occupation of Iraq. The outcome of the struggle, as well as that of the ongoing five year occupation of Afghanistan, remains very much in doubt. Meanwhile, the debate over the adequacy, or inadequacy, of post-war planning in both theaters of operation remains an extremely divisive and volatile topic with considerable implications for the future of the United States and, especially, its armed services.

Compared solely in terms of troop strength in Iraq at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US Army in Germany upon conclusion of World War II had ample strength to conduct post-combat/occupational duties. In May of 1945, US forces in country included 1,622,000 soldiers serving in 59 divisions, organized into two army groups, five army

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<sup>1</sup> John D. Passos, "Americans Are Losing the Victory in Europe" *Life Magazine*, 7 January 1946, 22-24.

headquarters, and 15 corps headquarters.<sup>2</sup> The American Zone of Occupation exceeded 40,000 square miles and included approximately 1,400 miles of international and regional boundaries. Residing within this territory, similar in size to Pennsylvania, were more than 16 million Germans and in excess of a half million displaced persons. The sector included many large cities, the largest of which were Frankfurt and Munich, as well as an extensive road and highway network.<sup>3</sup> Although US forces struggled from the outset to control their assigned borders, the ample number of forces available during the first months of occupation allowed for the safeguarding of what infrastructure, key facilities and resources remained in the aftermath of the war.

Unfortunately for the Americans, the ability to flood their sector with large numbers of troops and military equipment did not equate to instant success in stabilizing Germany. The summer of 1945 revealed a broken country rapidly spiraling into a dark chasm of despair. As US forces expanded their control into every township and village within Germany, they discovered a complete vacuum of civil government, and, subsequently, a dearth of law and order. State and municipal governments, to include their associated police forces, had ceased to exist. Much of the transportation infrastructure within Germany did not function, as highway and railroad bridges had been destroyed, and sunken ships clogged waterways and harbors. Further exacerbating the situation were large numbers of displaced persons, seeking food, shelter, and the ability to return home.<sup>4</sup> As a result of the public chaos and swelling refugee population, widespread crime and a corresponding black market flourished. Meanwhile, with the war in Europe won, the US Army began to conduct a massive redeployment and demobilization of forces from Germany itself. By July of 1945, 11 divisions were redeployed to the continental United States to prepare for the invasion of Japan or constitute the strategic reserve. The vast

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<sup>2</sup> John J. McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press, 2006), 16.

<sup>3</sup> Earl F. Ziemke, *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History (CMH), 1990), 321.

<sup>4</sup> Oliver F. Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953* (Heidelberg, GE: Headquarters, US Army Europe, 1984), 1-2.

majority of the remaining American forces in the European theater of operations were already earmarked for movement out of theater.<sup>5</sup> While there was much work to be done in post-war Germany, it would fall on the shoulders of a force significantly smaller than that which had defeated the Third Reich.

In order to successfully restore order to post-war Germany, US war planners concluded that a mission tailored unit would be required. As a result, prior to the German surrender, the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division (4AD) was selected to be the nucleus around which the soon-to-be-named United States Constabulary would be formed. Formally activated on 1 July 1946, the 38,000 soldier force absorbed the seven remaining cavalry groups in Europe, whose large number of mobile light tanks, trucks, and jeeps were deemed the ideal equipment for occupational duty. The all-volunteer Constabulary's mission consisted of maintaining security, accomplishing US governmental objectives, and controlling the borders of the US sector. Additionally, in conjunction with the expanding German police forces, the Constabulary would hunt for Nazi war criminals, prevent black market activities, enforce general law, and control traffic.<sup>6</sup>

Complementing the Constabulary in Germany were the conventional forces of the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division (IID). Retaining its organization as a combat force and training to fulfill that role, the IID was garrisoned in strategic locations and made available to reinforce the Constabulary when needed.<sup>7</sup> The designation of a purely conventional military force, free from occupational duties, served as a formidable deterrence to internal and external threats, and allowed the Constabulary to focus on its designated occupational missions.

In order to fulfill their mission charter, the 4AD required an eight month period to reorganize personnel and equipment, relocate units to the right places, and undergo extensive

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<sup>5</sup> Kendall D. Gott, *Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press, 2005), 9-10.

<sup>6</sup> European Command, Office of the Chief Historian, *Occupation Forces in Europe Part One* (series) (Frankfurt, GE: Historical Division, US Army Europe, 1945-1952), 123-24.

<sup>7</sup> Gott, 11.



training for its new mission. The subordinate units of the Constabulary (4AD) were assigned sectors designed to mirror existing German geopolitical lines and take advantage of municipal and law enforcement divisions.<sup>8</sup> Although the majority of the soldiers who would initially comprise the Constabulary were combat veterans, a formal program of instruction was required in order to properly train the division's soldiers for their new role. The result was the establishment of the US Constabulary School by the 4AD in the spring of 1946. The curriculum at the new school included study of German culture and geography, criminal investigation, the maintenance of police records, self-defense, and the apprehension of wanted persons. As the soldiers of the 4AD graduated from their training and Constabulary units assumed control of their assigned areas of operation (AO), a dedicated stability and reconstruction (SRO) force emerged on the post-war battlefield.

The method of employment of the Constabulary is perhaps the most remarkable aspect of its service. Executing operations at the lowest tactical levels, the Constabulary rotated troops between garrison and their assigned sectors on a fixed schedule. A typical schedule consisted of four weeks in garrison, followed by six in the field. This employment technique enabled the Constabulary to appear as being everywhere at once to the German populace, both reassuring them and deterring illegal activity.<sup>9</sup> This perception earned the troopers the nickname of *Blitzpolizei* or Lightning Police. Patrols also spent time conducting liaison with German mayors, police stations, other US governmental agencies, and neighboring US Army units. The close interaction with German police allowed the Constabulary to continuously monitor crime statistics and readjust their focus accordingly. Facilitating each patrol's interoperability with the German populace was an accompanying German policeman, who not only acted as an interpreter, but

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<sup>8</sup> European Command, 124-125.

<sup>9</sup> Brian A. Libby, *Policing Germany: the United States Constabulary, 1946-1952*, dissertation (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, 1977), 120.

made the actual arrest of any non-American suspect.<sup>10</sup> This tactic highlights the emphasis that the Constabulary placed on enhancing the prestige of the new German police force in order to promote German governance while simultaneously de-emphasizing their role as an army of occupation.

The end result of the Constabulary's actions was a drastic downturn in criminal activity and, correspondingly, a decrease in Constabulary search and seizure operations within just one year of operations. In 1947 the Constabulary began a gradual shift of focus from police operations back to tactical training. A year later, due to the increasing competence of the German police and governments and the growing threat of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, entire units of the Constabulary were reorganized as combat formations and assigned to other Army headquarters within Europe. Finally, the Constabulary headquarters itself was inactivated in 1950, followed by the last operational units in 1952.<sup>11</sup>

The Constabulary took almost a year to form, over the same period in which a German insurgency would most likely have formed. However, its formation and accomplishments deserve special consideration. The versatility of the troopers in adopting their police-like mission, although they were not initially trained as military policeman, demonstrates the ability of American soldiers to reorganize, retrain, and adapt to a new and foreign environment on short notice. The 4AD was successful in its new mission despite chronic personnel problems, severely dilapidated equipment, and its immersion in a socially, economically, and politically complex post-war environment. Furthermore, the Constabulary was able to attain the admiration and confidence of the German public by delicately balancing their appearance between no-nonsense law enforcer and that of sympathetic occupier. The Constabulary troopers understood the need to be visible enough to the German public in order to make them feel secure, yet put a German "face" on all missions to strengthen confidence in the fledgling new German government and

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<sup>10</sup> Gott, 18.

<sup>11</sup> Ziemke, 321.

foster its legitimacy. The final testimony to the adroitness of the troopers in adopting their new mission is the lasting peace enveloping Western Europe since the Second World War.

Analyzing the experiences of the 4AD in its role as the US Constabulary has relevance to US Army division headquarters preparing for the next conflict. It showcases a situation where a division headquarters was able to successfully reorganize itself to meet the requirements of a new mission. The headquarters changed from a conventional warfighting focus to a combined security, law enforcement, and border patrol agency capable of interacting with a host nation populace and non-military organizations to win the peace. Charged with securing a large area, but resourced with few troops, the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division was able properly train its soldiers for their new mission, resource them to the best of their ability, and then empower them with the necessary authority to accomplish their mission. The resulting secure environment enabled a new German government to form, gain legitimacy with its people, and eventually become self-sustaining. These accomplishments are similar to the United States government's desired endstate for its ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Given the difficulties faced by the US Army in stabilizing Iraq since the conclusion of successful major combat operations (MCO), it is pertinent to ask what could have been done better. Iraq has forced the US Army to relearn that while winning the conventional fight remains essential, winning the subsequent peace can last much longer and be far more complex. Future operations are likely to place US Army division headquarters in situations similar to those of both the 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division in Germany and the three Army division headquarters in Iraq during May of 2003. Those division headquarters must have the proper resources, training, and authority to successfully transition from MCO to SRO. More specifically, to make the transition from MCO to SRO, a US Army division headquarters must have the authority of occupational law, rapidly disseminate information to the host nation public, and coincide their operations with those of local governmental authorities.

## THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

For more than 50 years, America's military dominance has been on display. The United States has derived its current military superiority from a remarkable ability to translate technological innovation and industrial capacity into effective battlefield advantages. Yet, during that same 50 years, its military has been closely monitored and studied. Thus, history suggests that it is only a matter of time until an adaptive, creative opponent develops a method of war that will attempt to defeat America's established, generally predictable preoccupation with the science of war and the application of precision firepower.<sup>12</sup>

United States Joint Forces Command

This warning by the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) highlights the relevancy of analyzing the ability, or inability, of US Army division headquarters to transition from MCO to SRO. The JFCOM assessment of the Joint Operational Environment (JOE) discusses the rapidly evolving nature of international relations and the necessity of the United States and its allies to transform their use of the elements of national power accordingly. This document predicts the US will remain the global hegemon for at least the next quarter century, but forecasts "the continued distribution of power away from the nation-state, globalization of markets and information, the accelerated spread of technology, and the burgeoning information revolution" will transform the nature and conduct of international relations.<sup>13</sup> While other individual nation states are unlikely to achieve the status of peer competitor to the US over the next twenty-five years, the sum of these factors will challenge America's traditional means of wielding power. Future Army division headquarters, as major instruments of US foreign policy

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<sup>12</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, "The Joint Operational Environment: The World Through 2030 and Beyond," September 2006, iv.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 1.

implementation, will have to stay abreast of this dynamic environment as they prepare for the next conflict.

Division headquarters will be challenged with a fluid and primarily unconventional threat that generally seeks to avoid direct contact on future battlefields. Unable to match US military capability tactically or operationally, potential foes will seek to conduct strategic attacks on US national will, what many consider to be the US strategic center of gravity.<sup>14</sup> The proliferation of relatively inexpensive and advanced information technology throughout the world allows even the most modest of adversaries to exploit both US and world opinion through propaganda, sensationalistic attacks, or simply emphasizing the commission of US foreign policy or military mistakes. Examples include global television broadcasts of kidnapped American contractors in Iraq, the bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra with its resulting sectarian strife, and world-wide outrage over American abuse of Iraqi detainees at the Abu Gharib Prison. Unprecedented worldwide access to information has leveled the playing field of information operations. Correspondingly, the JFCOM analysis hypothesizes “Indeed, “knowledge war” may become “the preeminent form of future conflict in the twenty-first century.”<sup>15</sup> US Army divisions must not only master information operations to achieve “tactical victories” on future battlefields, but to avoid strategic failure of US foreign policy.

While the struggle for information dominance will change the nature of future conflicts, so too will the locations of those conflicts. An exploding population in developing and poorer regions of the world is resulting in a paucity of resources, especially food, water, and energy.<sup>16</sup> As competition for those resources increases, large scale migrations will occur, primarily to urban areas. Ethnic tensions, widespread crime, disease, poor health care, and a lack of education and

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 5, 10-11.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 5. A more detailed explanation of knowledge warfare can be found in Wayne Michael Hall’s *Stray Voltage: War in the Information Age* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 15. This document predicts that the world’s population will continue to increase to as much as 8.2 billion by 2030. Significant population growth, possibly as much as 90 percent, may occur in developing and poorer nations.

employments opportunities will challenge already limited governments and public service infrastructures.<sup>17</sup> The result will be a rise in failed or failing states, leaving large swaths of ungoverned territory and creating potential sanctuaries for transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. Potential missions for US Army divisions in these regions and failing/failed states could include humanitarian relief operations, peacekeeping/stability operations, protection of economic enclaves, large scale evacuation operations, and the elimination of safe havens for drug dealers, criminals, and terrorists.<sup>18</sup>

One aspect of the future operating environment that provides significant challenges for US military forces is the urbanization of the world. Specifically, over 60 percent of the world's population is predicted to live in urban environments by 2030. Typically featuring subterranean infrastructure, shantytowns, and high-rise buildings, urban environments mitigate many of the advantages of modern weapons, intelligence collection assets, and communication systems. Military operations are more likely to cause collateral damage and produce civilian casualties, while the close-quarters environment is more likely to generate increased friendly casualties and force protection requirements.<sup>19</sup> US soldiers will be unable to avoid interaction and requests for assistance from local nationals. The spectrum of military operations will be forced to proceed beyond solely kinetic conventional operations.

Unfortunately, the US Army has focused on technical solutions which do not appear optimal for future military commitments. This is a cultural issue within the military and the heart of a problem falling outside the scope of this monograph. Even during the 1990's, as the United States lacked a peer competitor and stability operations were increasing in frequency, the Army concentrated the bulk of its research, acquisition and development expenditures on high

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 14-21. See also Robert D. Kaplan's *The Coming Anarchy* (New York: Random House, 2000). Kaplan hypothesizes that events in the next half century are best explained by environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 23.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 17.

technology, big-ticket weapons systems like the \$14 billion Comanche Helicopter and \$11 billion Crusader Artillery System programs.<sup>20</sup> Although these weapon systems were eventually cancelled, the fiscal savings were then applied to the even more technological-savvy \$108 billion Future Combat System, upon which the Army has based its entire transformation plans.<sup>21</sup> This is despite the fact that ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have reaffirmed that combat and stability operations both involve up close and personal contact with both indigenous people and the enemy, and, subsequently, a necessary, sizeable commitment of boots on the ground. Current efforts to grow the manpower of the Army and Marine Corps, severely strained by ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, have only involved relatively modest increases. The Army is ignoring the hard reality of current and probable future operations while proceeding down an expensive, information technology paved, super highway to the future force, one which trades boots on the ground for technology

Although the US Army is reorganizing and preparing for future conflict with a high precision technology focus, its history also does not justify this decision. In fact, linear conventional warfare has been the exception for US military experience. In over two hundred years of existence the US military has only fought eleven wars primarily conventional in nature, as opposed to participating in several hundred stability missions.<sup>22</sup> However, these eleven wars reflect the primary purpose upon which the US military has traditionally organized, equipped, and trained its forces to fight and win the nation's wars.

FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, states "Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information

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<sup>20</sup> Vernon Loeb, "Rumsfeld Untracks 'Crusader'" The Washington Post, May 9, 2002 and Association of the United States Army, "Army Announces Cancellation of Comanche," February 24, 2004, Available from <<http://www.ausa.org>>, Accessed January 28, 2007.

<sup>21</sup> The \$108 billion is for the first increment of FCS only, enough to equip about one-third of the force. United States Government Accountability Office, *Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Airland, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate*, March 2005.

<sup>22</sup> Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press, 2006) 1.

dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to a crisis.” The manual also classifies the types of stability operations: peace operations, foreign internal defense (encompassing counterinsurgency), security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, support to insurgencies, support to counter-drug operations, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, and show of force.<sup>23</sup>

Taking this definition and its accompanying classifications into account, the US military has been “engaged in several hundred military undertakings that would today be characterized as stability operations.”<sup>24</sup> These undertakings encompass missions like the Reconstruction (1865-1877), the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) occupational period, and the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1913). While none of these experiences are completely similar, they all share one similarity in that they involve soldiers conducting tasks regarded as unorthodox and outside the purview of what the Army considers normal warfighting missions. History and present day operations both indicate that SRO will continue to dominate our future.

## CHAPTER TWO

### EXISTING DOCTRINE

Current Army doctrine says little about the transition from MCO to SRO, especially at the division level. FM 3-0, “the Army’s keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations,” establishes warfighting as the Army’s primary focus and proposes that success in warfighting allows the Army to succeed in operations other than war.<sup>25</sup> The manual describes full spectrum operations in detail, to include entire chapters devoted to stability and support operations, respectively. Despite considerable mention of transitions in the foreword of FM 3-0, written by

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<sup>23</sup> United States Department of the Army, *FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington D.C., 2002) 1-2.

<sup>24</sup> Yates, 2.

<sup>25</sup> United States Department of the Army, *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington D.C., 2001) vii.



Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki, only three paragraphs of the manual are dedicated to the subject. While warning that a transition “may be the most difficult follow-on operation to accomplish,” FM 3-0 only discusses command and control and force structure considerations for a transition.<sup>26</sup> A more detailed explanation of transitions must be found elsewhere.

FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, greatly expounds on the two chapters of FM 3-0 devoted to the same topic. While this manual does present a thorough guideline for the conduct of stability operations once the transition is complete, there is no discussion of the interim period itself. In fact, with only 8 pages devoted to foreign internal defense (FID) and counterinsurgency as a subset of FID, FM 3-07 implies that Army forces will operate in a relatively benign environment.<sup>27</sup> Written in 2002, the manual reflects the Army’s peacekeeping experience in the Balkans, Haiti, and Somalia during the preceding decade. Each of these operations, at its outset, involved robust and superior Army units conducting peace operations in a generally permissive environment. Major combat operations, with the exception of the October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia, were not conducted at any point during these operations. While capturing the Army’s experience in these contingency operations for future reference has obvious merit, it falls short of providing an adequate framework for operations in the aftermath of MCO or in an openly hostile environment. In other words, FM 3-07 is incomplete. It sufficiently captures the essence of SRO, yet fails to outline the implications of conducting SRO in a “most dangerous course of action” scenario.

The edition of FM 3-91, *Division Operations*, currently in circulation, follows the same themes established in FM 3-07, relying on the Army’s experiences of the 1990s to portray only one type of stability operation. FM 3-91 explicitly states “Except in rare situations, the only

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid. The revised DRAFT version of FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, does not contain any updated information pertaining to transitions. At the time of writing this monograph, FM 3-0 (DRAFT) has not yet been implemented in final copy.

<sup>27</sup> FM 3-07, pg. 3-1.

stability operation where the division is planning and executing stability as a division component is in peace operations.” Although FM 3-91 acknowledges “Divisions execute stability actions during...war to restore stability as tasked,” it fails to define this scenario at all, much less provide a blueprint for division operations. Two paragraphs of the Stability Operations Chapter are devoted to FID and counterinsurgency, yet the remaining twenty pages of the chapter focus almost solely on peace operations, primarily peacekeeping and peace enforcement.<sup>28</sup> FM 3-91 acknowledges that the potential for contested stability operations in the aftermath of MCO exists, but fails to address the issue.

Given the COE and the historic trend showing the necessity of the MCO-SRO transition, it seems prudent for doctrine not only to recognize the importance of a rapid and successful transition, but to elaborate what it entails. There is a large doctrinal gap here. The Army clearly understands that SRO is an important subset of Army operations and addresses it in its doctrine. However, it fails to consider the whole spectrum of SRO and assumes it will be conducted separate from conventional high intensity conflict, in a permissive environment. This logic contradicts the Army planning principle of planning backwards from a desired endstate. Additional assumptions made in Army doctrine are that the MCO-SRO transition will be heavily influenced through the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other governmental organizations (OGAs) who will operate alongside military forces from the outset. These assumptions apply to a best-case scenario only. This doctrinal void requires the Army to rethink what the decisive phase of any operation is.

Conducting operations in a permissive environment with heavy civilian agency involvement is perhaps one phase of a SRO campaign. However, the origin of the SRO campaign cannot be automatically assumed. The transition from the attack, or any other mission, to SRO must be addressed in detail. More importantly, the protracted and complex nature of SRO,

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<sup>28</sup> United States Department of the Army, *FM 3-91, Division Operations* (Washington D.C., 2002) 6-1.

especially when compared to MCO, strengthens the argument for its selection as the decisive operation many modern campaigns. US Army doctrine must show the way for its tactical division headquarters and their subordinate units to successfully transition to this critical mission.

## **DEFINING THE TRANSITION**

Accurately defining the successful transition between MCO and SRO is required before a division headquarters can execute this mission. While every situation is unique, the transitional environment promises to be complex and affected by a multitude of factors making it difficult for even the most astute division staff to discern fully beforehand. Ethnic and tribal differences, religious cleavages, retribution violence, infrastructure capacity, level of remaining governance, terrorism, and organized crime are likely to be a few of many factors defining the problem. Tactical units will struggle with the mental adjustment required to switch from purely kinetic combat operations and generally less restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE) to a peacekeeping mindset where force protection is begrudgingly compromised to interact with the local population and begin the campaign required to win the peace. Frequently, units may be required to conduct combat operations and stability operations simultaneously. As a result, difficult decisions must be made in order to prioritize and distribute combat power, logistical resources, and command and control (C2) nodes. The transition period also cannot be clearly delineated by time. What takes six months in one area of operations may take three years in another. However, the transition from MCO to SRO will result in the establishment of an environment where the division headquarters sets the conditions to shift its priority of efforts to SRO. The transition starts the organization on a path whose ultimate desired end includes the exit of US military combat forces as a result of the host nation's ability to sustain itself without their presence.

Barring a significant shift in Army transformation plans, it is probable that units organized and trained to conduct MCO as part of their Mission Essential Task List (METL) will also continue to be required to conduct SRO. More specifically, there will not be a separate

military follow-on force solely dedicated to conducting stability operations. Thomas Barnett is popular among many strategists who argue the need to split the existing military into two distinct forces: Barnett advocates a “Leviathan” force, comprising the military might of the US, capable of deterring adversaries and conducting preemptive attacks with “high-tech, big violence war.” This force is essentially similar to current US military structure. Barnett proposes the creation of a second force, which he calls the “System Administrator.” This new force is focused on “postwar security-generation” and “routine crisis response.”<sup>29</sup>

The Army, either unable or unwilling to implement Barnett’s proposal and others like it, has rejected them for now. The recently retired CSA, GEN Peter Schoomaker, envisions “an Army not trained for a single event like a track athlete, but talented across a broad spectrum like a decathlete.”<sup>30</sup> Division commanders must train their staffs and subordinate headquarters for full spectrum operations prior to deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Future missions will require units to now assume that “if they break it, they also own it.” The MCO-SRO transition will surface as staffs prepare for the next operation.

Another reality of the MCO-SRO transition is that civilian agencies and private charity organizations, including OGAs and NGOs, will not be readily available as combat organizations transition to SRO. These organizations will not begin to commit personnel and resources in substantial quantities until there is a guarantee of at least a semi-permissive environment for them to operate in. The mass exodus of these agencies following the suicide bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad during August of 2003 and upticks in violence against relief workers in Afghanistan, accentuates this point. In the absence of these combat multipliers for SRO, it will fall on the shoulders of conventional ground units to fulfill the role of OGAs and NGOs.

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<sup>29</sup> Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Berkley Books, 2004) 302-303.

<sup>30</sup> United States Department of the Army, *FM 1, The Army* (Washington D.C., June 2005) 4-6.

Division-level headquarters are an appropriate level headquarters on which to focus for the transition from MCO to SRO. The disposition of division headquarters at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 underscores this point. Each of the Army division headquarters was responsible for a large city or cities and their surrounding areas.<sup>31</sup> The division headquarters each focused their efforts on restoring stability to their designated sector, at the large city and/or provincial level. Their controlling headquarters, the US Army V Corps (subsequently called CJTF-7), focused its efforts on the whole of Iraq and worked alongside the civilian-led Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), later renamed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). While CJTF-7 and the CPA rebuilt the nation of Iraq, their subordinate division headquarters controlled the “fight” at the tactical level, working closely with Iraqi city and provincial governments to stabilize the situation. The division headquarters were required to have or develop “out of hide” the capabilities to synchronize their efforts with those of the local Iraqi governments. It is likely that future stability operations, involving a country or region as geographically large as Iraq, would require a similar military organizational structure.

The operations of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division in Baghdad during 2004 and early 2005 serve as a model for how a division headquarters could operate after transitioning from MCO. Recognizing the need for a changed approach to the mission at hand, the division commander theorized:

“Synchronization and coordination of the battlespace was not to win the war, but to win the peace. Penetration did not occur merely through synchronization of the kinetic battlefield functions, but that and more: local infrastructure improvement, training of security forces, understanding and educating the fundamentals of democracy, creating long-lasting jobs that would carry beyond

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<sup>31</sup> Upon conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq in May of 2003, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division controlled an area of operations (AO) which included Baghdad and its surrounding communities. Correspondingly, the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division assumed control of Mosul and its outlying areas, while the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division commenced operations in and around Tikrit. Later in 2003, the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division would control an AO including the cities of Falluja and Ramadi. These cities, with the addition of Kirkuk (the AO of the 173<sup>rd</sup> Airborne Brigade), were the major cities in the US Army’s sector in 2003.

short-term infrastructure improvement, and an information operations (IO) campaign that supported the cultural realities of the area of operations.”<sup>32</sup>

Focusing on an end state aimed at creating a legitimate, democratic, and self-sustaining Iraqi government, the division operated simultaneously along five interconnected lines of operations: combat operations, train and employ Iraqi security forces, create or restore essential services, promote governance, and foster economic pluralism. Each line of operation was tied to a robust IO capability, which equated to a sixth line of operation.<sup>33</sup> In short, the division metamorphosed from a purely kinetic, conventional warfighting focus to classical counterinsurgency practice, where finding and defeating the enemy was only one of several essential tasks and certainly not the most important to achieve their desired endstate.

1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division was able to operate along its specified lines of operation by “restructure[ing] the staffing functions and headquarters to achieve a capacity that equally weighted each line of operation against the other.”<sup>34</sup> Using this model, an economic or political engagement deemed more important to achieving the division’s desired endstate could eclipse a combat engagement in importance. Additionally, the division modified its pre-deployment training regimen and assigned the division staff and subordinate headquarters with tasks far different, at first glance, from the traditional foci of attack, movement to contact, and defend. Prior to deployment, the division prepared its engineers for their responsibilities by conducting training alongside the city engineers of both Killeen and Austin, Texas.<sup>35</sup> Once in country, the division’s chief engineer headed the governance support team (GST), serving as the “connective tissue” for the division’s city planning and contracting capabilities, subordinate headquarters, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local Iraqi governmental officials.

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<sup>32</sup> Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” *Military Review*, 85, No.4 (July-August 2005), 4.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, 11.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid*, 7.

Key projects for the division during its time in Iraq included establishing “economic incubators” in each city neighborhood, where it coordinated the allotment of physical space, conducted small business management training, and paired Iraqi businessmen with Iraqi bankers specializing in small business loans. Another economic stimulus of the division provided 2,000 tons of grain, fertilizer, and feed to Iraqi farmers, while simultaneously providing veterinary immunizations and constructing improvements to the local irrigation system. Recording of significant acts (SIGACTs) in specific areas of Baghdad revealed a correlation between the availability of funding to initiate these projects and a large decline in insurgent activity within the same area.<sup>36</sup> Reflecting on the division’s focus efforts in Iraq, and its disparity from conventional operations, the commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division surmised, “We should consider paraphrasing Clausewitz: full-spectrum operations are the continuation of major combat operations by other means.”<sup>37</sup> The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division had the benefit of preparing for their exact area of operation and its environment prior to deployment. However, the division’s approach to SRO, utilizing its six mutually supporting lines of operation, could serve as a framework for future division headquarters planning their transition from MCO to SRO.

## CHAPTER THREE

### **POST-MCO CASE STUDY EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS**

The primary research method this monograph follows is the case study method, as outlined by Stephen Van Evera in *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Using the process tracing technique, three distinct case studies analyze how a particular US Army division-level headquarters conducted the MCO-SRO transition during a military intervention abroad. The process tracing technique is a qualitative analysis method where the primary cause(s) for the outcome of a case study are identified through a backwards tracing of the causal process unique

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 9-11.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 13.

to that case. The investigator, at each stage, must infer from the context “what caused each cause.”<sup>38</sup> If done correctly, the investigator is able to isolate and identify the primary reason(s) a particular event unfolded in a particular manner. To achieve the purpose of this monograph, the process tracing technique will reveal the primary causes of both success and failure for three different US Army division-level units transitioning from MCO to SRO during Operations Just Cause, Uphold Democracy, and Iraqi Freedom.

While each case study clearly articulates the distinct environment and particular circumstances in which military operations were conducted, it requires a common “lens” through which to view those operations. In other words, because the case studies involve three different units conducting operations in three unique settings, a common set of evaluation criteria are used to accurately focus and compare the efforts employed by the unit involved in each case study. These criteria come from general academic (to include doctrinal) writings on the topic of SRO and are commonly held as areas requiring focus for the successful conduct of those missions.

In order to focus the “lens” of this monograph, it will utilize, as evaluation criteria, three of the principles of counterinsurgency listed in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. These principles are establishing security under the rule of law, managing information and expectations, and support to the host nation.<sup>39</sup> Each of these principles is well grounded in classical counterinsurgency treatises.<sup>40</sup> While the case studies center themselves on the conduct of these specified principles of counterinsurgency, they do not ignore outside events influencing the execution of operations and the prioritization of supporting tasks. However, the three stated evaluation criteria form the core of each case study and provide a framework upon which to

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<sup>38</sup> Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 70.

<sup>39</sup> United States Department of the Army, *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency* (Washington D.C., December 2006) 1-23-1-26.

<sup>40</sup> FM 3-24 relies heavily on classical works pertaining to counterinsurgency warfare. Examples include, but go well beyond, works such as David Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, T.E. Lawrence’s *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*, and Robert Thompson’s *Defeating Communist Insurgency*. Although not always clearly cited, FM 3-24 makes frequent use of these works to organize and describe the US Army’s approach to counterinsurgency warfare, including its basic principles.



organize the causal process deductions made through the process tracing analysis of each case study.

Security of the civilian population is the “cornerstone” of any stability operation.<sup>41</sup> Without it, general chaos and a complete breakdown of public order, both socially and physically, is almost certain to occur. The sheer destruction and unrestrained violence of MCO will cause the vast majority of noncombatants to seek safety and focus almost exclusively on survival. However, upon conclusion of MCO, it is only natural that surviving noncombatants will seek to return their lives to some semblance of normalcy. Essential to their ability to do this is a sense that somebody is in charge. In other words, the noncombatants of the host nation must feel their surrounding environment permits them to achieve some level of fulfillment without threat. There has to be a sense of order, where the law is enforced and its violators fear justice. Every society will respond to the aftermath of war differently, as a result of their homogeneity, expectations, patience, and level of hardship endured. Yet, without security under the rule of law, noncombatants will eventually be forced to take matters into their own hands to attain their goals. Competing interests, ethnic tensions, and retribution for past grievances are some of the many factors that will bubble to the surface in a SRO environment. Establishment of security under the rule of law will set the stage for both the occupying force and the host nation to begin movement forward and gain legitimacy.

The management of information and expectations is another essential task required to bridge the gap between MCO and SRO. Barring a radical revolution in military affairs, MCO will almost always degrade living conditions, governmental services, and communications networks from a prior condition. As MCO dissipate and SRO gain prominence, the ruling authorities (or occupiers) must conduct effective information operations (IO) to “create and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the populace, friendly military forces, and the

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 1-23.

international community.”<sup>42</sup> This is indicative of the mental shift required of combat troops to change from seeking to avoid noncombatants on the battlefield to proactively interacting with them in the SRO environment. The quicker an occupational force can conduct effective IO, the smoother the transition between MCO and SRO will be. As an example, host nation civil servants will want to know if they have still have a job and, if so, where they report for work. The sooner that information is conveyed, the more likely it is that essential services will be restored to the population at large. The population at large will benefit from effective IO as they gain situational awareness, understand where aid or resources are available, and learn of rules and curfews in effect. If the occupational force achieves information dominance, then they will be able to eliminate rumors detrimental to their authority and legitimacy while establishing credibility for what they are able to provide to the host nation.

It is never too early for an occupational force to begin supporting the host nation. The rapid incorporation of the host nation’s government and armed services into SRO encourages the host nation to take responsibility for determining its future and reduces the perception of US troops as occupiers. Ultimately, as the host nation’s government and armed services prove competent in their functions, it facilitates the ability of the US military to reduce its footprint and accomplish an exit strategy. FM 3-24 warns “While it may be easier for American military units to conduct operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and then assist them. Host governments have the final responsibility to solve their own problems.”<sup>43</sup> Eventually, the welcome mat for a foreign army, if ever laid out in the first place, will disappear. The quicker the host nation government can achieve self sufficiency, the better.

Each case study begins with a short introduction providing an overview of the military operation, to include a summary of host nation conditions upon its conclusion, or in the case of Iraqi Freedom, the end of the transition from MCO to SRO. The origin(s) of these stated

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 1-24.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 1-26.

conditions is the object of the analysis. In other words, the case studies determine how the operations of the involved unit impacted conditions in the host nation upon conclusion of MCO. This analysis is organized in accordance with the three previously described evaluation criteria and forms the “meat” of each case study. Finally, each case study concludes with a summary that highlights the identified linkages of unit actions, or inactions, that contributed to the overall success or failure of the mission.

## **OPERATION JUST CAUSE**

### **Background**

Operation Just Cause was the name given to the US military’s invasion of Panama in December of 1989, resulting from a standoff between the United States and Panamanian strongman, Manuel Noriega. The previous two years had seen a steady decay of a formerly positive relationship, as Noriega was indicted on drug charges in the US, threw out the results of democratic presidential elections, and used Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) to harass and attack US military personnel and their family members. A joint US force of conventional and special operations forces attacked over two dozen targets in Panama on December 20<sup>th</sup> and quickly overwhelmed the stunned PDF, who ceased all means of resistance within 14 days. Noriega managed to evade capture during the initial assaults, but surrendered to the U.S. within several days, after seeking refuge in the Vatican’s Nunciature. He was subsequently extradited, tried, convicted, and jailed in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges.<sup>44</sup>

While Operation Just Cause was a swift military victory, the ensuing SRO was dubbed Operation Promote Liberty and did not proceed nearly as smoothly. Primarily executed by a newly formed Military Support Group (MSG), much of Promote Liberty focused on public safety, health issues, population control measures, training of new police and paramilitary forces,

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<sup>44</sup> Yates, 92.

and the establishment of the newly appointed central government.<sup>45</sup> The primary invasion force headquarters at the tactical level, XVIII Airborne Corps, upon which this case study will focus, re-deployed to their home station less than a month after its initial entry into Panama and did little to set up the MSG for success in Panama.<sup>46</sup> The outbreak of massive looting, a new Panamanian government that was “hollow” and bankrupt, and a decaying societal infrastructure all impeded the ability of the MSG to conduct its mission.<sup>47</sup> Although Promote Liberty was not an outright failure, had XVIII Corps, serving as JTF South, effectively transitioned to SRO upon the conclusion of MCO, the ensuing operations of the MSG could have been initiated with far greater ease.<sup>48</sup>

### **Establishing Security Under the Rule of Law**

An inability to quickly restore public order and curtail lawlessness was the primary source of JTF South’s uneven transition to SRO. By the end of D+2 during Just Cause, XVIII Corps commanded in excess of 27,000 soldiers dispersed throughout Panama. Having already executed numerous missions and defeated the majority of PDF units, major combat operations were largely over throughout the country.<sup>49</sup> Follow-on forces, mainly from the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, continued to arrive on D+2, as they would over the next several days. XVIII Corps assigned each of its brigades, upon arrival, a geographical area of operations (AO) within Panama. Primary missions within each AO included neutralizing the PDF in the area, securing key sites and infrastructure, protecting U.S. lives and property, restoring law and order, and

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 92-93.

<sup>46</sup> Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., *Battle for Panama: Inside Operation Just Cause* (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s (US), Inc., 1993), 231.

<sup>47</sup> Richard H. Shultz, Jr., *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1993), xii.

<sup>48</sup> It is appropriate to study the operations of the XVIII Airborne Corps in Operation Just Cause, although the subject of this monograph is operations at the division level. The mission of the XVIII Airborne Corps in Panama, serving as a JTF, is similar to that of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division serving as a JTF in Haiti; both headquarters were responsible for conducting initial entry operations into a small country, followed by stability and reconstruction operations that including the installation of a new regime and proved far more cumbersome and of greater duration. Current Army doctrine (FM 3-91 (DRAFT)) requires all modular division headquarters, with proper augmentation, to be capable of serving as JTFs.

<sup>49</sup> Flanagan, 211.

showing support for the new Panamanian government.<sup>50</sup> Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) William Leszczynski, commander of 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry, described his soldiers' missions; "They guarded embassies/secured key facilities twenty-four hours a day; not very exciting, pretty boring. They ran patrols twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week through some of the poorest and most crime-ridden areas of Panama City."<sup>51</sup> While the arriving units did engage in some small-scale firefights and received sporadic sniper fire from holdover PDF soldiers during the first week of occupation of their AOs, the focus within Panama was clearly shifting to SRO.

While the U.S. forces struggled to establish control over their AOs and sought to secure key sites and infrastructure, they did little, initially, to stop a rampage of looting and destruction, mostly in the large city of Colon and the capitol of Panama City. The destruction of the PDF, which had also handled police functions, created a vacuum of law and order, resulting in losses calculated at \$1.2 billion.<sup>52</sup> Residents later reported groups of armed thugs wandering the streets, robbing, stealing, raping, and sometimes killing residents over a period of five days. Some concerned citizens attempted to establish order themselves, securing stores and their homes with privately owned weapons, while erecting barricades to their neighborhoods and establishing "neighborhood watch" style groups. "We had no choice. We were our own security," said one resident of Panama City.<sup>53</sup> US troops, who either did not or were not able to implement a curfew, were frustrated. "Have you ever seen a BMW going down the street on a forklift?" asked LTC Johnny Brooks, whose soldiers were unable to prevent the theft.<sup>54</sup> Eventually the US forces would establish control over the whole of Panama, but not before an avoidable amount of damage was done to the Panamanian infrastructure and economy.

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 198.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, 200.

<sup>52</sup> John Weeks and Phil Gunson, *Panama: Made in the USA* (London: Latin American Bureau, 1991), 10. This estimate coincides with that of Alfredo Maduro, president of the Panamanian Chamber of Commerce, who estimated losses by looting at \$50 million to \$1 billion (Flanagan, 210).

<sup>53</sup> Flanagan, 210.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

## Managing Information and Expectations

Although JTF-South clearly struggled to establish security under the rule of law in Panama, it executed a well resourced information operations (IO) campaign targeting the citizens of Panama. The campaign allowed XVIII Corps to connect to the Panamanian public very early in the operation, sustain the connection throughout MCO, and then build a useful two-way rapport for the conduct of SRO. The IO campaign began with the neutralization of television (TV) Channel 2, the Noriega regime's principal TV media, at H-hour on 20 December 1989. The Panamanian broadcasts on Channel 2 were initially replaced by prepared scripts and recordings in Spanish, delivered via an airborne broadcast center. Within hours, additional scripts were recorded and broadcast, in addition to up-to-date news items and popular music.<sup>55</sup> This effort was duplicated through the simultaneous establishment of a nation-wide AM radio station, broadcasting the same messages in an effort to gain a greater listening audience. The aim of the operation was to inform the Panamanian population of the U.S. intent, educate them on how to avoid becoming a casualty, and allow them to hear from their newly sworn in president, Guillermo Endara. Assessments conducted later showed that "The Panamanian population listened to, and complied with instructions and advisories from U.S. military PSYOP TV, AM radio, and loudspeaker broadcasts."<sup>56</sup> It is difficult to discern just how many lives these efforts saved and how many deadly confrontations they averted. However, the positive contribution of these proactive broadcasts to mission accomplishment is significant.

The ability to rapidly communicate with a large section of the Panamanian populace allowed JTF-South to enhance force protection and reduce violence by immediately announcing a "cash-for-weapons" program. The results were successful, as one brigade of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division located sixteen weapons caches and distributed more than \$105,000 to Panamanians, in

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<sup>55</sup> United States Special Operations Command Directorate of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, J9, *Psychological Operations in Panama During Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL, 1994), 11-12.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, 33.

return for weapons, by the end of the first week of January.<sup>57</sup> Ultimately, U.S. forces would recover in excess of fifty thousand firearms and hundreds of tons of ammunition during the first six weeks of the invasion.<sup>58</sup> In this instance, the infusion of reliable information to the Panamanian people, verified by U.S. ground forces enabled with large sums of cash to make good on a promise, helped rid Panamanian streets of a substantial amount of weapons and ordnance. This effort undoubtedly contributed to the establishment of security within Panama.

As the situation within Panama stabilized, the JTF quickly noticed how large of a demand existed among the Panamanian people for current news and information, given the disrupted broadcasting and publication of most commercial media outlets. PSYOP handbills, leaflets, and newspapers, explaining U.S. motives and providing information to establish a normal routine, were quickly consumed by eager Panamanians, some of whom promptly sold the products to their fellow citizens.<sup>59</sup> Within the first two days of the Operation, local media representatives began contacting U.S. bases in regards to getting their broadcast stations back on the air. They were willing to show their support for the U.S. operation and the new Panamanian government, but only if they were escorted and secured by U.S. troops at their stations. Initially, forces to support this mission could not be spared, but by December 24<sup>th</sup> the first two commercial television stations were secured and back on the air, much to the delight of many Panamanians.<sup>60</sup> Had JTF-South realized the significance of these facilities and their ability to reach out to the Panamanian people, they might have been added to the list of D-Day objectives. Quickly controlling these stations and bringing them back up on the air could have enhanced the ability of the U.S. to restore law and order, thereby reducing the amount of damage caused by looting and vandalism.

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<sup>57</sup> Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 357.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, 356.

<sup>59</sup> United States Special Operations Command J9, 19.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, 25.

## Support to the Host Nation

The long-term success of Just Cause was, ultimately, most jeopardized by the inability of the United States to provide robust and coherent support to the new Panamanian government. This failure became apparent on D-Day and continued to develop throughout the entire transition period. At approximately 2am on 20 December, Guillermo Endara, Ricardo Arias Calderon, and Guillermo Ford were sworn in as President, First and Second Vice-Presidents respectively, of the new Panamanian government. The ceremony, organized by US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) officials, was conducted clandestinely on a US military base, Fort Clayton, which would remain the seat of the new government for the next thirty hours.<sup>61</sup> Unfortunately, most other US initiatives to establish the Panamanian government and make it functional would not proceed so smoothly. Although the US invasion was initially very popular amongst Panamanians, whose public opinion polls still reflected a 92 percent approval rating in late January, the goodwill that the Endara regime enjoyed at its outset would quickly fade.<sup>62</sup> By September of 1990, public confidence in the government was waning, as polls showed an overwhelming lack of confidence in the new regime, in particular the new police force.<sup>63</sup> Although the Endara government faced an intimidating set of obstacles upon its formation, including near bankruptcy, the lack of a clear restoration plan by the US invasion force ensured that the new Panamanian government would face a turbulent infancy.

Essential to understanding the difficulties plaguing the post-conflict effort and its obvious linkage to legitimizing the new government is the fact that the operational plan (OPLAN) for SRO, eventually named Promote Liberty, was planned and eventually *executed* by SOUTHCOM's Directorate of Policy, Plans, and Strategy (SCJ-5). Concurrently, Just Cause, with its focus on high intensity conflict, was conceived by the SOUTHCOM Directorate of

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<sup>61</sup> Weeks, 13.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, 92.

<sup>63</sup> Donnelly, 388.



Operations (SCJ-3) and eventually revised and implemented by XVIII Airborne Corps, serving as the headquarters for all ground combat forces.<sup>64</sup> The bifurcation of these two inextricably intertwined missions had predictable results. With their focus on “winning the war” as they entered Panama on 20 December, XVIII Airborne Corps “did not recognize any specific taskings in Blind Logic (Promote Liberty’s former name) and knew that it had not been formally approved.”<sup>65</sup> The failure to either combine both plans for continuity of effort or at least require the executing headquarters to be familiar with *both* plans, however uncoupled they may have been, virtually guaranteed that ground forces would have difficulty identifying and then navigating the transition from MCO to SRO. More simply stated, XVIII Airborne Corps entered Panama without any plan to conduct SRO, nor did it understand or acknowledge that it might be required to conduct any SRO-related tasks.

Although XVIII Airborne Corps did not have a plan to conduct SRO, its subordinate units recognized the need to get the government of Panama back on its feet and made a difference in several areas of immediate concern. Most pressing were the needs of the people of Chorillo, whose neighborhood had been almost entirely razed by the fighting and ensuing anarchy. In Chorillo, the Corps had tasked its supporting 96<sup>th</sup> Civil Affairs Battalion to establish a displaced persons camp. Placing the Chorillo mayor in charge as the camp mayor and helping the camp residents establish their own administrative systems, the camp effectively and safely processed over 11,000 Panamanians with few problems.<sup>66</sup> Simultaneously, medical personnel within the invasion force moved to assist the decaying Panamanian health system. Panamanian hospitals, having been short-changed by Noriega in order to support the PDF, had almost no medical

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<sup>64</sup> Shultz, 16. Chapter 4 of this source gives a detailed and somewhat amusing account of how an undermanned staff section evolved into a commanding headquarters of a military operation responsible for the reconstruction of Panama in the wake of Operation Just Cause. GEN Max Thurman, the SOUTHCOM commander, vehemently opposed this arrangement as he assumed command in the Fall of 1989 and moved to change it just prior to the invasion. As events unfolded, however, unavailability of assets forced him to resort to using the SCJ-5 as a controlling headquarters.

<sup>65</sup> Center of Military History, *Operation Just Cause: The Incursion into Panama* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2004), 43.

<sup>66</sup> Flanagan, 212.

supplies with which to treat patients. US forces delivered over 615,920 pounds of medical supplies while treating over 15,000 Panamanian civilians at host-nation facilities they were seeking to improve.<sup>67</sup> Other units worked closely with local officials to distribute food, collect trash, clean facilities, manage local transportation, restore public services, and even restart the economy.<sup>68</sup> The quick response of the XVIII Airborne Corps to these crises not only alleviated potential human catastrophes, but also helped avert the complete breakdown of some Panamanian government functions in the aftermath of MCO.

### **Summary**

Evaluating the performance of XVIII Airborne Corps during Operation Just Cause with the stated evaluation criteria of this monograph illuminates the sources of both failure and success within the mission. Furthermore, the evaluation helps to understand the origin of some of the long-term problems plaguing the new Endara government. XVIII Corps and its subordinate units splendidly executed a complex combat operation and toppled a hostile regime within hours. However, units were slow and sometimes hesitant to transition to SRO. The result was the unnecessary reign of anarchy in some portions of the country for a period of several days, causing severe damage to the Panamanian economy and infrastructure.

The damage caused by looting and other criminal acts placed a large burden on the new Panamanian government, already struggling in part to an incoherent US military plan of support. Resulting from a bifurcation in planning between MCO and SRO, XVIII Corps, controlling all ground forces in country, did not recognize *any* tasks involving the reconstruction of Panama. Although some units clearly identified and ingenuously addressed mounting humanitarian crises, in addition to failing or failed government functions, the absence of a SRO plan by the controlling tactical headquarters left the Endara government without critical support during its infancy. Eventually, a failure to provide for the people caused the Endara government to lose most of the

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Center of Military History, 43.

overwhelming public support it enjoyed at the outset of its formation and jeopardized the long-term success of Operation Just Cause.

A major area of success for the XVIII Corps, in both the conduct of MCO and SRO, was a proactive and extensive IO campaign. The utilization of Panamanian civilian media outlets and PSYOP broadcast capabilities, in radio and television format, proved adept at informing the population at large. This ability proved crucial to legitimizing the invasion in the eyes of the people, minimizing their interference with military operations, and establishing programs to re-establish security under the rule of law. The IO campaign clearly kept the Panamanian public satisfied with information, managed their expectations, and facilitated the conduct of US military operations.

## **OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY**

### **Background**

Almost five years after deposing the Noriega regime in Panama, the US found itself enforcing regime change in another third-world country. A multinational force (MNF) of 21,000 soldiers and led by the US 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division began to enter the Caribbean nation of Haiti on September 19, 1994. Empowered by UN Security Council Resolution 940, the multinational forces were authorized to use any means necessary to remove the military junta which had seized power from the democratically elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide three years earlier. In addition to the removal of General Raoul Cedras and his two fellow junta members, the MNF was charged with restoring Aristide's regime to power. The military intervention came two days after an invasion force, led by the US 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, was turned around in mid-air as a result of successful negotiations between US envoys and the junta leaders.<sup>69</sup> As a result, the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division had to rapidly enter and conduct stability operations in a tense atmosphere which had come within hours of erupting into armed conflict.

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<sup>69</sup> Yates, 98.

The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain formed the nucleus around which Coalition Task Force (CTF) 190 would be formed. CTF 190 focused its efforts on restoring law, order, and normalcy through a combination of patrolling, retraining the Haitian police and army, providing humanitarian assistance, and demilitarizing paramilitary organizations. Successful in establishing a secure environment and having conducted a partial restoration of the Haitian infrastructure, the US handed over control of the mission to the UN in March of 1995 and withdrew the majority of its troops. The successes enjoyed by CTF 190 proved short-lived, as the situation in Haiti would later deteriorate and lead to another MNF, led by US Marines, entering the country in 2004 to restore order once again. However, it is the study of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain's initial entry into Haiti, and its subsequent transition to stability operations, on which this monograph will focus.

### **Establishing Security Under the Rule of Law**

The establishment of security was the cornerstone of 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain's mission in Haiti and its importance is reflected in the JTF's mission statement:

When directed, Combined JTF Haiti, conducts combined military operations in Haiti under the operational control of USACOM to protect and, if required, evacuate U.S. Citizens, designated Haitians, and third country nationals; to establish and maintain a stable and secure environment; to facilitate the return and proper functioning of the GOH; to provide logistical support to coalition forces; to professionalize the military component of Haitian public security forces; and, on order, to turn over responsibility for ongoing operations to the Government Of Haiti or designated international organizations.<sup>70</sup>

Although 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain clearly understood the role that the establishment of security would play in its ability to accomplish its assigned mission, the unit struggled early on to provide that security. Ultimately, it would achieve its objective through the application of creative techniques.

The division assessed the Haitian capital, Port-Au-Prince, to be the nation's center of gravity and deployed its headquarters, 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Combat Team, and the majority of its divisional assets there. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team, augmented with additional military police

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<sup>70</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, *Operations in Haiti: August 1994 thru January 1995*, CD-ROM Slide Presentation and After-Action Report, Chapter 1, Slide 4.

and aviation assets, deployed to Cap Haitien, a large coastal city deemed the center of gravity in the north, where it operated largely autonomously from the remainder of the JTF. Securing the remainder of the country, largely rural and assessed to be somewhat isolated from national affairs, was considered an economy of force mission and conducted almost entirely by Special Operations Forces under separate command.<sup>71</sup> By controlling Haiti's two largest population centers with the preponderance of its combat power and projecting at least a symbolic presence everywhere else in the country, the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain sought to stabilize and secure the country well enough for non-US military and civilian organizations to take the lead in rebuilding Haiti.

The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain was successful in its efforts to rapidly enter Haiti, secure forward operating bases, and establish its presence as the newest, most powerful authority within the country. Unfortunately, ambiguity over the charter of their mission resulted in the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain initially failing to capitalize on its occupational authority, dealing a blow to the prestige of their mission and causing skepticism toward the Americans on the part of some Haitians. LTG Henry Shelton, commander of JTF 180 (the headquarters immediately above JTF 190), relieved Haitian General Cedras of his ruling authority on September 19<sup>th</sup> and made it clear he was now in charge of the country until President Aristide was returned to power. However, the following day 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain soldiers stood by and watched as members of the Fad'H (armed forces of Haiti) lunged into a peaceful crowd of civilians and began to brutally beat them, killing one. Television crews filmed the entire event and it sparked immediate international outcry. The unwillingness of the US soldiers to intercede stemmed from initial guidance directing that US troops would not supplant the Fad'H in maintaining public order, nor get involved in "Haitian-on-Haitian violence."<sup>72</sup> Although the US would later refine its guidance to prevent another such incident from occurring, the damage had been done and JTF 190 had one more hurdle to overcome during

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid, Chapter 1, Slide 5.

<sup>72</sup> Walter E. Kretchick, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel. *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Press, 1998), 97-98.

the infancy of its mission. Although serving in the role of occupier, the JTF had failed to understand its position and, therefore, act like an occupier.

Another missed opportunity during the division's initial entry into Haiti came in the form of a restriction it placed upon itself. Concerned about force protection, the Commanding General of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain, Major General (MG) David Meade, had ordered that divisional units not patrol Port-au-Prince at night. This edict, lasting the first two weeks of the mission, allowed groups of armed thugs to terrorize the city by night, often conducting reprisal attacks against Haitians who had brought valuable information to the US soldiers during the preceding day.<sup>73</sup> Once the division corrected its methods and increased its presence to around the clock, a predictable decrease in violence and crime occurred. By November of 1994 almost all retribution violence by or against the FAd'H had been extinguished.<sup>74</sup> Mission success was eventually achieved through the assumption of risk by continuous day and night operations. Regrettably, this decision could and should have been made prior to the commitment of US forces.

When a spike of violent crime (robberies, car jackings, and murders) occurred in late November 1994 within the affluent Petionville section of Port-au-Prince, the division pursued an innovative solution to solve the problem. The result was the establishment of a MNF Haiti Crime Board which focused and then synchronized military police, counterintelligence, and infantry operations to deter crime. Military police and J2 staff plotted crime trends by time of day, location, and type in order to establish high crime areas and determine the best times for "saturation patrolling."<sup>75</sup> The result of this analysis was a surge of mounted MP and dismounted infantry patrols in the target area. Further aiding the effort was the joint investigation of serious crimes by MPs, counterintelligence teams, and the Haitian police. In the case of Petionville and

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<sup>73</sup> Kretchik, 107-108.

<sup>74</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division Slide Presentation, Chapter 1, Slide 40.

<sup>75</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division Written AAR, 70. This technique is very similar to the efforts of many units currently fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan who are seeking to discern the locations of terror cells through analysis of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) financing, construction, delivery, placement and locations of ambushes/attacks.

other targeted areas, crime fell by 90% after the commencement of saturation patrolling.<sup>76</sup> The creation of the MNF Haiti Crime Board from “out of hide” resources to solve an emerging problem quickly is indicative of the adaptability required for a unit to successfully operate in a SRO environment.

### **Managing Information and Expectations**

While the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division initially struggled to establish security under the rule of law in Haiti, it did not suffer from indecisiveness or faulty, self-imposed restraints in the realm of managing information and expectations. Operation Uphold Democracy benefited from proactive, creative, and effective use of information operations from its outset. Two months prior to the intervention, Radio Democracy was launched by the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) working closely with JTF 190, broadcasting information designed to facilitate the arrival of US troops and the return of President Aristide, in addition to news and popular music. Once US troops were ashore, local radio stations were hired to supplement this effort by D+7. Themes of programming were designed to ensure that the populace was aware of why the coalition was in their country and what effect it was having. Over 3,000 radios were distributed to Haitians by D+40 in order to facilitate this effort, supplementing the 10,000 radios air dropped prior to the US ground intervention.<sup>77</sup> By D+30, population assessments indicated that the majority of Haitians wanted the coalition presence in their country and were going out of their way to assist its efforts.<sup>78</sup> The preemptive information campaign conducted on a medium accessible by a large number of Haitians proved an invaluable combat multiplier and greatly enhanced the ability of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division to accomplish its endstate of a safe and secure environment.

Information operations were also effective in combating the rampant rumors which, if left unchecked, threatened the future of the mission. As the US began to conduct mounted joint

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions; Haiti: D-20 to D+40* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 1994), 177.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

patrols with the Haitian police, in early October, rumors began to surface amongst the populace that the US “liberators” had turned against them and were now firmly aligned with the remaining elements of the Cedras regime, their oppressive enemy. Concerned about potential damage to their mission, the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain increased the number of raids it conducted on the weapons caches and hideouts of pro-Cedras thugs. Although the missions did not always capture the intended targets or yield large numbers of weapons, the raiding parties were accompanied by Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) using loudspeakers to announce the intention of US forces to rid Haiti of the hardcore Cedras regime loyalists.<sup>79</sup> These raids were also supplemented by an intensive PSYOP campaign explaining the vetting of leaders for the “new” FAd’H by the returning Aristide government with close supervision from International Police Monitors (IPM).<sup>80</sup> The combined effect of the PSYOP campaign and its supporting raids preserved the ability of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain soldiers to use the FAd’H as a viable security instrument.

Although not technically under the control of 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain, the information operations conducted by the Special Operations Forces (SOF) units operating in the countryside deserve mention for their profound contribution to mission success throughout the country. In addition to their normal tasks associated with training the Haitian security forces and interfacing with participating foreign militaries, SOF conducted an extensive “grass-roots” campaign aimed at educating and influencing the populace to embrace their new government with enthusiasm.<sup>81</sup> They held town meetings to encourage the local nationals to organize and help themselves, while also explaining democracy, rights, and the Haitian constitution. The result of these engagements was a noticeable increase in the confidence and optimism of the people, their newfound willingness to express their personal opinions, and a reduction in violence. Eventually, this fostered a return of commerce to these areas, along with a flow of traffic, organized town

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<sup>79</sup> Kretchik, 128-129.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, 137.

<sup>81</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division Written AAR, 53.



meetings, and community projects.<sup>82</sup> The momentum of this effort not only directly contributed to the over-arching goal of a safe and secure environment in the targeted rural areas, but facilitated the ongoing main efforts in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien by allowing those forces to continue their mission with minimal distraction.

### **Support to the Host Nation**

Supporting the host nation was probably the most difficult aspect of Operation Uphold Democracy for 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain, producing mixed results. While JTF-190 ultimately succeeded in turning the Fad'H into a viable security and justice wing of the Haitian government, a failure to bolster the government in other areas contributed to the long-term failure of the mission. The coalition had to walk a fine line when it came to cooperation with the Haitian police and armed services. While the police and armed forces had a reputation for brutality, heavy-handedness, and were generally despised by the population, they also formed what was probably the only completely functioning arm of government.<sup>83</sup> If the soldiers of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain aligned their operations too closely with the Haitian security forces, they risked alienating the population and sacrificing the goodwill towards their mission in Haiti. On the other hand, disbanding the Haitian security forces and rebuilding them from the ground up would eliminate a useful asset for an extended period of time and simultaneously require American forces to almost completely administer the country. The latter option was considered infeasible by LTG Shelton and MG Meade, who believed a Haitian-led solution would be much more effective.<sup>84</sup> The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain's solution to this paradoxical dilemma would require a delicate balancing act.

Once new Fad'H leaders had been approved by the Aristide government in exile, the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain moved quickly to bring the organization under control and co-opt it for security

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid, 54.

<sup>83</sup> Kretchik, 96.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid. The reluctance of the US commanders to disband Haitian security forces is understandable. The Fad'H not only served as the nation's armed forces, but had far-reaching civil and judicial authority. Disbanding it would leave a large void in Haitian civil order and welfare.

purposes. Central to this mission was the 16<sup>th</sup> Military Police (MP) Brigade, attached to the division for the deployment. The commander of the brigade, Colonel (COL) Michael Sullivan, filled a unique role, serving as a self-described “coordinator, a relayer of information, and an enforcer of acceptable and unacceptable behavior by the Haitian police force.”<sup>85</sup> COL Sullivan was not only co-located with the Chief of Police for Port-au-Prince for the majority of the operation, but had placed two MP teams at each of the five police stations within the city. The MPs conducted joint patrols with the Haitian police, and were to “provide a visual example of what a professional police force should look and act like.”<sup>86</sup> The MPs enjoyed a good working relationship with the police and, by November, had helped significantly curb the level of police brutality, Haitian-on-Haitian violence, looting, and crowd demonstrations.<sup>87</sup> The integration of the MPs into the Haitian police force had proved beneficial, transforming them into a viable organization while forgoing the effort and time required for their complete disbandment and re-establishment.

While JTF-190 successfully navigated the potential minefield of using the existing Haitian security forces, it came up short of achieving its full potential to make a long-term difference in the daily quality of life for most Haitians. MG George Fisher, commander of the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division which relieved the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain in January 1995, observed “There was a conscious decision by the United States not to engage in nation building and the mission expansion and mission creep that accompanies nation building.”<sup>88</sup> Fear of taking on too much and not enabling the Haitians to eventually run their own nation resulted in the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain doing too little. The division was hamstrung by a noticeable lack of funds for development projects and even the “Title 10 authority from Congress to assume responsibility for providing a

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<sup>85</sup> Center for Army Lessons Learned, 154.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division Slide Presentaton, Chapter 1, Slide 40.

<sup>88</sup> Kretchik, 122.

broad array of support and relief.”<sup>89</sup> The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain did undertake some important civil works projects, most noticeably the restoration of electrical power in the country and the improvement of several major roads. However, a large number of officers, both inside and outside the civil affairs component of JTF 190, felt that they could and should have been doing more. This opinion was reflected by COL Jonathan Thompson, commander of the 20<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade, as he expressed frustration that more was not done in Haiti, “[the] safe and secure environment that we’re establishing here is dependent upon more than armed soldiers policing the streets.”<sup>90</sup> It is worthy of consideration if shortcomings in this facet of Operation Uphold Democracy contributed to the long-term failure of the mission.

### **Summary**

The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, serving as JTF-190 in Haiti, was successful in establishing security under the rule of law in addition to managing information and the expectations of the Haitian people. It’s achievements in these two areas enabled the headquarters to rightfully declare success as it conducted a transfer of authority with the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division in January 1995. As the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain departed Haiti, the nation was stable, the Aristide government had returned to power, American citizens and property had been safeguarded, and the Fad’H had become a more viable, respectable security force than prior to the intervention. These successes were all integral components of the JTF mission for Uphold Democracy. Nonetheless, shortcomings in the ability of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain to support the host nation led to the long-term failure of Operation Uphold Democracy.

Constraints placed on the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain, by the US government, resulted in the unraveling of the division’s many successes as JTF-190. A deliberate decision to avoid mission creep and take on too much of Haiti’s day-to-day administration resulted in the non-appropriation of funding and authority for 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain to undertake meaningful long-term infrastructure

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid, 124-125.

improvements. This decision resulted in JTF-190 executing fewer and less substantial projects than were necessary for a country as troubled as Haiti during this period. Ultimately, the decision had the predictable result of not making a noticeable improvement in the quality of life for the average Haitian, aggravating a restless population.

The long-term failure in Haiti should not obscure the many successes enjoyed by 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain, largely due to creative solutions to unique problems. The creation of a MNF Crime Board, serving as a fusion cell for counterintelligence, maneuver, and military police assets, was invaluable to the creation of a secure environment. Equally effective was the utilization of an MP brigade commander to serve in a multi-faceted role, simultaneously shadowing, translating and somewhat leading the Haitian security forces. Additionally, a robust IO campaign clearly made a positive contribution to Uphold Democracy. The utilization of radio broadcasts, military and commercial, prior to and throughout the mission, clearly helped shape and manage the Haitian peoples' expectation and fears. "Grass-roots" democracy and village government training, conducted mainly by SOF in remote areas, further increased the connectivity of the occupying forces to the people of the host nation. These creative arrangements and initiatives, lying far outside the realm of conventional warfighting, greatly facilitated the transition of 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain to SRO.

## **OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM**

### **Background**

The US intervention in Haiti was soon followed by large commitments of Army forces to peace enforcement missions in the emergent Balkan nations of Bosnia and Kosovo, starting in 1995 and 1999, respectively. The initiation of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in the aftermath of the spectacular terrorist strikes in America on September 11, 2001, marked the first large-scale conventional combat of the US Army since Operation Desert Storm. Nevertheless, the Army would discover that its SRO capabilities would still be required in this new conflict.

On March 19, 2003 a coalition consisting primarily of US and British military forces invaded the nation of Iraq with yet another regime change charter. Dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom by planners, the mission of the coalition was to topple the despotic Baathist regime led by Saddam Hussein and rid the country of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The conventional and special operations forces entering Iraq during the initial invasion numbered approximately 160,000.<sup>91</sup> Despite the daunting task of occupying a country similar in size to the state of California, with a population in excess of 24 million, and facing stiff resistance from an unexpected mixture of Iraqi conventional and paramilitary forces, the coalition achieved remarkable success. Effective Iraqi resistance ended April 13<sup>th</sup>, barely more than three weeks after commencement of the invasion, and coalition forces started reposturing for stability operations two days later.<sup>92</sup> Although Saddam Hussein would not ultimately be captured until December 14, 2003, his ability to control Iraq with any effectiveness had already been eliminated by April 9<sup>th</sup> of the same year.<sup>93</sup> However, despite scouring the country, the coalition never found convincing evidence of an Iraqi WMD program, subjecting the already unpopular military intervention to increased world and American domestic scrutiny.

Further complicating the situation in Iraq was the inability of coalition forces to stabilize and pacify Iraq in the aftermath of their successful offensive. By late June of 2003 attacks on coalition forces began to escalate and the following month General (GEN) John Abizaid, the Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, declared that US forces were being attacked through “guerrilla tactics.”<sup>94</sup> GEN Abizaid’s statement was the first acknowledgement by a

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<sup>91</sup> David L. Phillips, *Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco* (United States: Westview Press, 2005), 160-161.

<sup>92</sup> Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 554.

<sup>93</sup> Gregory Fontenot, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 432.

<sup>94</sup> Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, *The Iraq War* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2003), 252.

senior US official of a budding insurgency in Iraq. It is an insurgency that continues to battle coalition forces today, four years after the opening shots of OIF, and appears far from defeat.

Spearheading the attack, the US Army's 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division (3ID) entered Baghdad (approximately 500 kilometers from its line of departure at the Kuwait border) on April 5, 2003. Within three days the division completed its cordon around Baghdad and commenced eliminating remaining pockets of resistance within the city. With the arrival of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) on April 9<sup>th</sup>, the occupation of Baghdad was complete and effective Iraqi resistance eliminated.<sup>95</sup> Almost immediately and with little guidance from higher, the division began to provide security for several hundred "critical" sites within the city. These sites included hospitals, banks, government offices, palaces, oil refineries, museums, and areas suspected of containing WMD.<sup>96</sup> 3ID had distinguished itself during its attack to Baghdad but paid a stiff price, losing dozens of soldiers and numerous combat vehicles along the way.<sup>97</sup> However, there was little time to rest as the division strengthened its grip on the Iraqi capital.

The situation 3ID encountered in Baghdad upon conclusion of MCO was dire and quickly became worse. As conventional fighting had ended, the people of Baghdad began to leave their homes to secure provisions, account for family members, or just make sense of the situation. Anarchy quickly broke out throughout the city as many civil servants, to include the police, failed to resume their jobs with the arrival of the Americans. The looting of one Iraqi police station is endemic of what took place throughout the city: "electrical wires, phones, light fixtures, even some of the door jambs had been stolen."<sup>98</sup> Further exacerbating the situation, the city's power grid failed, leaving residents without power as the oppressive Iraqi summer heat approached. With forty percent of Baghdad's sewage flowing into the Tigris River untreated, garbage piling in the streets, and potable water nonexistent, the collective patience of the Iraqis

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid, 230.

<sup>96</sup> Gordon, 469.

<sup>97</sup> John Keegan, *The Iraq War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 204.

<sup>98</sup> Gordon, 465.

was immediately strained.<sup>99</sup> What once appeared as an astonishing example of rapid and decisive maneuver warfare at its finest was quickly transforming into a humanitarian crisis.

Although the situation in Baghdad was grave from the outset of 3ID's arrival, Army commanders on the ground collectively spoke of a missed window of opportunity once MCO generally ended. Then Lieutenant General (LTG) David McKiernan, commander of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) said "With few exceptions we were not being shot at. I could walk the streets anywhere in Baghdad. Most Iraqis there still viewed us as liberators, even if they did not particularly like us culturally."<sup>100</sup> MG Bufford Blount, commander of the 3ID agreed, "There was a time when the insurgency could have been headed off or greatly reduced and contained. For a period of time we were perceived as and acted like liberators."<sup>101</sup> This window of opportunity for US forces, lasting approximately two months and during which they faced minimal armed resistance, could have been used effectively to alleviate the growing list of inconveniences plaguing daily life in the Iraqi capital. It provided a point of penetration for US forces to exploit their successful ground offensive with robust SRO, demonstrating the ability of the United States to improve the lives of the Iraqi people and give them hope for their future.

### **Establishing Security Under the Rule of Law**

Unfortunately, the exploitation alluded to by MG Blount was never realized. The primary contributor to this outcome was the inability of 3ID, and other coalition forces, to establish security under the rule of law during the crucial, initial weeks of the occupation. By early June of 2003, Iraqi patience was beginning to wear thin. One Iraqi working for US forces in Baghdad observed "There was no security on the streets, just the law of the gun. The people felt cut off from the Americans and their own interim government. There were few jobs. For \$50 or

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid, 472.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, 493.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid, 494-495.

\$100, groups could hire local Iraqis to take a shot at the Americans. Corruption was rampant.”<sup>102</sup> By late June, attacks on coalition forces and acts of sabotage against Iraqi infrastructure increased markedly, further aggravating the plight of the Iraqi people.<sup>103</sup> An insurgency was being born.

Hamstringing the efforts of the 3ID and other units was the failure of the US government to empower them with the authority granted by occupational law. As part of the efforts to justify war in Iraq, US officials insisted that the invasion force would *liberate* the Iraqi people and avoided using the term *occupation*.<sup>104</sup> While this approach was designed to enhance public perception of the invasion, it deprived units like 3ID of considerable powers, including: the ability to repeal or suspend laws which threaten the occupying force (such as the bearing of arms), enact and enforce new criminal laws, restrict or forbid movement and require identification documents, seize news facilities and censor the press, use captured or seized enemy public property, including money, for operations of the war, and requisition labor for public works.<sup>105</sup> The effective use of these and other occupational powers could have been used to facilitate a secure environment in Baghdad and set the tone for a successful transition from MCO to SRO for the 3ID.

Although the US government eventually acknowledged its status as an occupying power in Iraq on May 10, 2003,<sup>106</sup> the decree was too late to affect the damage done to the security situation within Baghdad. After occupying the city for over a month, the US forces had yet to convey to the people of Baghdad who, exactly, was in charge of the city. One Iraqi proclaimed

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid, 492.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid, 488.

<sup>104</sup> U.S. State Department, “Powell Says U.S. Will Liberate Iraq, Give Hope to Iraqis,” 31 March 2003, available from <<http://telaviv.usembassy.gov/publish/press/2003/april/040102.html>>; accessed 28 January 2007.

<sup>105</sup> Lyle W. Cayce, “Liberation or Occupation? How Failure to Apply Occupational Law During Operation Iraqi Freedom Threatened U.S. Strategic Interests,” 3 May 2004, U.S. Army War College, 4-5. All of these occupational powers listed in this source are derived from the Hague Convention, Geneva Convention, and US Army Field Manual 27-10, *Law of Land Warfare*.

<sup>106</sup> Jeremy Greenstock and John D. Negroponte, “Letter from the Permanent Representatives of the UK and the US to the UN, addressed to the President of the Security Council,” 8 May 2003, available from <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0608usukletter.htm>>; accessed 28 January 2007.



himself Mayor of Baghdad and was eventually taken into custody by US forces, but only after he had managed to fire some municipal employees and replaced them with personal friends.<sup>107</sup> Some Shiite clergy established religious courts to replace the vacated governmental courts, while also organizing their own checkpoints to search cars within their neighborhoods.<sup>108</sup> The 3ID Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) believed that the issuance of an “immediate formal proclamation of occupation” would have helped to alleviate the situation by making it clear who was in charge and that order was demanded.<sup>109</sup> Subsequently, 3ID could have implemented new laws, such as implementing a curfew and banning the public possession of firearms. These security enhancing measures, not enacted until several weeks after the occupation of Baghdad, could have curbed violence and reassured Iraqis that an attempt at governance was being attempted. Debate continues today over whether the size of the invasion force was adequate for post-war efforts, but the delay of US forces in conveying their status and relationship to the Iraqi people substantially detracted from their ability to provide security.

### **Managing Information and Expectations**

Although the physical lacking of security in Baghdad hindered 3ID’s transition to SRO, it was exacerbated by the alarming inability of the coalition to maintain a two-way dialogue with the Iraqi people, both providing useful information and addressing concerns. From the outset of SRO, 3ID was unable to effectively communicate with the citizens of Baghdad in order to manage information and expectations. Lacking an organic media broadcast capability; the division “did not use or control the local radio stations, television, or newspapers to counter anti-coalition propaganda.”<sup>110</sup> The result was an immediate credibility problem for the US occupiers,

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<sup>107</sup> Saint Petersburg Times Wire, “Troops Arrest Baghdad ‘Mayor’,” 28 April 2003, available from <[http://www.sptimes.com/2003/04/28/Worldandnation/Troops\\_arrest\\_Baghdad.shtml](http://www.sptimes.com/2003/04/28/Worldandnation/Troops_arrest_Baghdad.shtml)>; accessed 28 January 2007.

<sup>108</sup> Center for Defense Information, “Eye on Iraq, War Update,” 22 April 2003, available from <<http://www.cdi.org/>>; accessed 28 January 2007.

<sup>109</sup> Cayce, 11.

<sup>110</sup> Paul Dicker, “Effectiveness of Stability Operations During the Initial Implementation of the Transition Phase for Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 3 May 2004, U.S. Army War College, 8.

who were besieged by rumors. Media images of divisional soldiers securing the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, while nearby schools and hospitals were being looted, started a rumor that the Americans had only come to Iraq to seize oil.<sup>111</sup> This rumor could have been easily and quickly countered had 3ID possessed the means to saturate Baghdad with public information. John Sawers, the top British official in Iraq during May of 2003, explained the dearth of information in Baghdad this way: “Baghdad has no TV, and no newspapers apart from party political rags. I was given two fliers yesterday by an Iraqi, one calling for the assassination of all Baathists, the other for the killing of all U.S. forces. That, and rumour, are the only information flowing.”<sup>112</sup> In the absence of coherent and timely information from the Americans, it is not hard to fathom the high degree of uncertainty and frustration felt by the people of Baghdad in the aftermath of the invasion.

While the ability to manage information and expectations has obvious merit for reactive purposes, it would also have been beneficial to 3ID for proactive intentions. 3ID could have used a broadcast capability to explain their authority (occupational or otherwise), the milestones to be achieved in reconstruction and establishment of an interim Iraqi government, informed the populace of new rules and curfews, issued a call for civil servants to return to work, and numerous other purposes.<sup>113</sup> These proactive announcements, at a minimum, could have drastically reduced confusion amongst Iraqis, averted casualties incurred from accidental confrontations with 3ID soldiers, and eliminated rumors before dissemination. More importantly, they could have been instrumental in filling the security void created by the removal of the previous city government while creating more realistic expectations for the Iraqi people.

### **Support to the Host Nation.**

While 3ID struggled to implement order in Baghdad, they did identify and undertake efforts to re-establish and then support the Iraqi-led governance functions of the city government.

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Gordon, 472.

<sup>113</sup> Cayce, 11-12.

The division began conducting joint patrols with Iraqi police, throughout the city, on April 14<sup>th</sup>. Although these patrols were limited by the small number of returning Iraqi police and a lack of detention facilities, they were a solid attempt to re-establish Iraqi governance.<sup>114</sup> This effort could have been advanced further. If the 3ID had been empowered with occupational authority, they could have immediately ordered Iraqi civil servants back to their jobs. Specifically, all policemen, prison guards, trash collectors, power plant operators, sanitation workers, and many other city officials could have returned to their jobs in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. Not only would their return have greatly facilitated the restoration of essential services to at least pre-war levels, the employees physical presence might have deterred some of the looters from dismantling the Iraqi infrastructure.<sup>115</sup> While, after closer scrutiny, some of the civil servants might have proven to be hardcore Baathists and required removal, their facilities could have been largely preserved. Iraqi-run essential services would have facilitated a return to normalcy and most likely enhanced the “liberating” image of US forces which US leaders had worked so hard to contrive.

Initially, city employees did not return to work in large numbers. It was only after 3ID offered a one-time \$20 payment that the employees began to return en masse. Unfortunately, this occurred after most of the city infrastructure had been looted.<sup>116</sup> Another problem with the return of Baghdad municipal workers arose from a delay in payment of their salaries, as 3ID did not have the funds required to pay them. It wasn’t until the second week of May that those funds were released, over a month after 3ID had consolidated its grip on the city.<sup>117</sup> Discretionary funds would not only have paid civil servants, but could also have been used to employ Iraqis to clean war damage, provide security, and conduct other tasks to keep them off the streets. 3ID

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid, 10.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, 12.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, 12.

<sup>117</sup> MAJ Adrian Bogart, Deputy C9, CFLCC, Operation Iraqi Freedom, interview by COL Ed Filiberti and Dr. Steven Metz, USAWC, 14 MAY 03, Baghdad, Iraq.

leaders, seeking to fund such ideas, proposed using over \$700 million in US currency the unit had captured from the regime. However, the request was denied by national level authorities as several agencies argued over responsibility of the funds.<sup>118</sup> Had 3ID been able to employ occupational law it would have been able to immediately order Baghdad municipal workers back to work and facilitated the re-establishment of the local government. Once those workers were back on the job, 3ID could have generated goodwill through the payment of their salaries and the hiring of unemployed Iraqis for reconstruction projects.

### **Summary**

While the long-term success or failure of the US in Iraq remains undecided and a daily news headline, it is possible to discern that the coalition, more specifically 3ID, did not successfully transition from MCO to SRO. The fatal blow to 3ID's success was the period of protracted anarchy in Baghdad following the toppling of the Baathist regime. This period completely unraveled the political, social, military, and infrastructural fabric of Iraqi society, causing grave, possibly insurmountable damage to the prospects of mission success for the US in Iraq.

The key ingredient missing to 3ID's transition was the authority of occupational law. Without occupational law authority, the division was severely crippled in its ability to correct the complete meltdown of Iraqi public order. Widespread looting systematically destroyed the majority of the city's commercial and governmental facilities, to include the infrastructure required to sustain key public works, like the already dilapidated electrical grid and sewer system. Without occupational authority the division was also unable to order Baghdad city workers back to their jobs, including the municipal police. Their absence at work encouraged looters to take advantage of the situation, resulting in a dearth of city services and further aggravating daily living conditions in the city. Once city workers were enticed back to work, the division, lacking

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<sup>118</sup> Cayce, 13.

discretionary funds, ran into problems paying them. Occupational authority could have been effectively leveraged in this situation, as the division was already holding \$700 million in Iraqi government reserves. Furthermore, access to the Iraqi reserves would have allowed the division to pursue immediate economic initiatives within the city, providing jobs, services, and keeping people off the street.

Although not the primary source of 3ID's failure to transition from MCO to SRO, the inability of the division to manage information and expectations greatly agitated the situation. Lacking a mass broadcast capability, in the form of a PSYOP or contracted Iraqi commercial media outlet, 3ID did not have the means to transmit mass public information in a useful manner. This inability almost immediately isolated 3ID from the people they were trying to help, who were unsure of where to go for help, what 3ID's intentions or mission charter was, how to get back their jobs, or even report suspicious activity. Finally, the information void left the Iraqi people vulnerable to rumors, which went largely unchecked by the US. The inability to manage information and rumors further complicated security vacuum in Baghdad and prevented 3ID from successfully transitioning from MCO to SRO.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

Operations in Panama, Haiti, and Iraq faced their biggest challenge by ambiguity and indecisiveness over what US forces were actually allowed or willing to do once SRO was underway. This dilemma is paradoxical, as each of these stability missions immediately followed a rapid, highly successful, and *decisive* offensive combat operation. That is, major combat operations eliminated, at least temporarily, all organized and armed resistance, to include that of host nation military forces. In Panama, XVIII Airborne Corps failed to acknowledge its need to act as an occupier and focused exclusively on MCO, only to be reluctantly drawn into SRO after the evaporation of the majority of the PDF within the first 24 hours. Operations in Haiti witnessed the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, although empowered by the UN to run Haiti until the

return of the Aristide regime, almost jeopardize mission accomplishment early on because of ambiguity over its authority to intercede in Haitian-on-Haitian violence. Finally, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division was hamstrung in Baghdad because the US intentionally stressed that its forces were purely liberators, not occupiers, while the city was clearly spiraling into anarchy around the division. By the time the US acknowledged it was an occupier, over a month later, considerable damage had been done to the city itself and the faith which local nationals had in US forces. In all three situations this dilemma could have been resolved by a clear issuance of occupational authority to the division-level commander *before* the commencement of the operation, even if only for a specified period.<sup>119</sup>

The three case studies of this monograph have demonstrated the effectiveness of units equipped with a mass broadcast system with which to both inform the local populace and dispel rumors. The wider the exposure of the host nation people to the broadcast programs the more aware they were of ongoing operations. In both Operations Just Cause and Uphold Democracy, local nationals benefited from an intensive effort by US forces to keep them informed. In general, they understood the reasons behind US involvement, what they could expect from US soldiers, where they could go for help, and how to avoid becoming a casualty.<sup>120</sup> The utilization of both PSYOP controlled radio and television broadcasts, as well as the purchase of host nation commercial broadcasts, proved effective methods of connecting to the masses and preventing rumors from jeopardizing mission success. In Iraq, where no such effort was made within 3ID's AO, there was a discernable disconnect between 3ID and the Iraqi people. Units transitioning

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<sup>119</sup> In fact, both the Geneva and Hague Conventions *require* certain actions by an occupying power once it achieves effective control of another sovereign territory, including the requirements to: restore and maintain public order, respect existing laws, facilitate the education of children, ensure the flow of relief supplies, and maintain hospitals, public health, and hygiene services.

<sup>120</sup> All of these measures go a long way towards building goodwill between the indigenous people and US forces, particularly the avoidance of civilian casualties. Taking these measures helps eliminate some of the many possible motivators for an insurgency or other forms of resistance to the occupation.

from MCO to SRO must have the capability to rapidly establish a dialogue with the majority of the indigenous people, if they haven't already made an effort to do so.

The correspondence of efforts between US forces and the host nation government presents a slippery but necessary slope to be navigated. Operations in Panama, Haiti, and Iraq all initially centered around regime replacement, but ultimately required co-opting host nation governmental leaders, employees, and services to stand the government back up to provide for its people. In each country this proved problematic, as the government, especially security forces, was viewed by the populace with fear and trepidation. However, in Panama and Haiti, the preservation of the security forces, their inclusion in combined operations with US forces, and their eventual vetting proved critical to restoring law and order. The decision to preserve or disband the host nation's security forces will not always be made at the tactical level, as demonstrated in Iraq, but its impact on mission performance is crucial. Other areas of governance, including public administration, sanitation, health, and others, are equally vital. Preserving those functions and the local nationals who operate them goes a long way in promoting self-sufficiency and hastening the ability of the military to turn the mission over to another agency or a new host nation regime all together. In the interim, reality and international law require the military to be prepared to fill the void when these systems fail or are damaged.

The new modular division headquarters organization affords some advantages to a division organization transitioning from MCO to SRO. One significant difference is the elimination of the division rear command post (CP) and the addition of a second division tactical CP (DTAC). "The two tactical CPs, designed to enhance the division commander's flexibility by providing nearly unlimited options for configuration and employment, are the center of gravity for division operations."<sup>121</sup> Both DTACs are one hundred percent deployable and mobile. These duplicate command and control nodes allow the division to control separate operations for limited

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<sup>121</sup> Telford E. Crisco, Jr., "The Modular Force: Division Operations," *Military Review* 86, No. 1 (January-February 2006), 97.

periods, control different types of operations simultaneously, cycle between operations (one plans while the other executes), and focus on different areas within the division area of operation.<sup>122</sup> Additionally, with two deputy commanding generals (DCGs) who are not functionally aligned as they were in the Army of Excellence (AOE) division, the division commander has more latitude where he can place and how he can utilize his DCGs for operations. This arrangement is well suited to allow a DCG, with one DTAC and its associated staff, to focus exclusively on SRO as the culmination of MCO nears. The DTAC can handle SRO until relieved of the mission by the division main CP or another headquarters altogether. These organizational modifications provide a division headquarters with increased flexibility and improved unity of effort as it seeks to transition from one difficult environment to another.

It has been over fifty years since the formation of the United States Constabulary and it is unlikely that another constabulary will be formed from the existing Army structure anytime soon. However, the lessons learned from the Constabulary remain extremely relevant today. A mission tailored unit, armed with occupational authority, the means and systems in place to conduct mass information operations with local nationals, and capable of coinciding its efforts with those of the host nation government can bridge the divide between conventional warfighting and the murkier environment of stability operations. A US Army division headquarters, empowered with these capabilities, is a logical and capable unit for the conduct of this transition.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

In order to improve the ability of division headquarters to transition from MCO to SRO, U.S. Army doctrine must be updated and refined from its current state. The draft version of a revised FM 3-91 does improve on the shortcomings of the current edition.<sup>123</sup> Reflecting the lessons learned from ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, this manual completely

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid, 98.

<sup>123</sup> Indications, at the time of writing this monograph, are that the new FM 3-91 will not be released for circulation prior to summer 2007.



discards its predecessor's focus on peace operations and focuses entirely on a fictitious scenario in which a division must conduct FID in the aftermath of offensive operations. The division in the scenario operates along five lines of operation: security and control, perceptions, governance and administration, infrastructure recovery, and humanitarian relief and assistance.<sup>124</sup> In order to accomplish its new mission, the division reorganizes itself by shedding unnecessary combat power, in the form of ground maneuver BCTs, and replacing them with units more applicable to the new mission, including a military police (MP) brigade and military intelligence (MI) assets. This scenario, highlighting a unit quickly transitioning itself from one type of major operation to another, is a step in the right direction for the modification of US Army doctrine.

Taking the approach of the fictitious division in FM 3-91 one step further, the division headquarters needs to identify and assign specific SRO tasks to its subordinate units prior to the onset of hostilities.<sup>125</sup> This is particularly useful for the application of units with a primary function that is no longer needed in the absence of MCO, for example, a field artillery battalion. This combat power, with proper training, coordination, and rehearsals, is immediately available for utilization by the maneuver brigade combat team commander or his controlling division headquarters. Using Baghdad as an example, it is conceivable that upon conclusion of MCO, 3ID could have created a city police assistance task force using the division provost marshal staff section and partitioning specific forces to liaison with police stations, monitor Iraqi emergency operations centers, and conduct joint patrolling with the Iraqi police themselves.<sup>126</sup> This

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<sup>124</sup> United States Department of the Army, *FM 3-91 (DRAG), Division Operations* (Washington, D.C., 2006) 7-1.

<sup>125</sup> The scenario in FM 3-91 (DRAG) utilizes a division organization that is optimally task-organized for SRO, as previously mentioned. However, it fails to show how the division got there. In other words, what did the division's ground maneuver BCTs do upon the conclusion of offensive combat operations? They cannot afford to sit and wait to be relieved by more optimally suited follow-on forces. The BCTs conducting MCO are the formations that transition the division to SRO and will at least establish the SRO environment in its crucial initial hours/days until the correct mix of units arrives in the AO and begins operations. FM 3-91 (DRAG) still needs to provide guidance on how a division headquarters can effectively address this crucial period of time.

<sup>126</sup> The modular U.S. Army division does not have an organic military police company assigned to it, unlike its predecessor.

arrangement will allow a division to have a centralized cooperative effort with the Baghdad police while freeing up maneuver units to conduct other stability operations. The ability to rapidly liaison with and support the host nation police forces also prevents their evaporation, through desertion and/or looting of equipment, until a possible follow-on military police unit or other designated unit/agency arrives to further the mission.

Other Army FMs must be modified to show improvements similar to those found in the new FM 3-91. FM 3-0 (DRAFT) *Full Spectrum Operations*, as a capstone manual, should add a new chapter before it is re-released to the force in the near future. The new chapter should be focused on the considerations for transitions between the different types of major military operations. Within its discussion of stability operations a wider range of mission types must be included, to reflect contested operations conducted in the aftermath of offensive operations. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, should be modified similarly, but also contain connective tissue that links it to the new FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. This allows FM 3-07 to be the connective link between FM 3-0 and FM 3-24. As a unit moves further away from conventional operations during the same military intervention, it can utilize this doctrine accordingly.

The division staff must be functionally aligned and trained for specific SRO tasks, to including their pairing with civilian counterparts. Pairings should include the provost marshal (PMO) with the chief of police, the division surgeon with the head of the city health department, the division engineer with city public works, and other similar functional arrangements.<sup>127</sup> To make these arrangements feasible, divisions should continue to build upon unique training arrangements that some units have already effected, such as the 1<sup>st</sup> CAV Division's training with the city governments of Austin and Killeen. Staff sections do not necessarily have to become subject matter experts on their specific areas, but familiar enough to understand the general

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<sup>127</sup> The 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division employed a similar method as it transitioned to stability operations in Mosul, Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

workings of their assigned areas and able to identify problem sources. This effort will be advanced further if subordinate BCTs for a mission are identified and assigned to the division with enough notice. Specific BCTs should be assigned, trained, and resourced to focus on specific SRO tasks as part of their Mission Essential Task List. As an example, a BCT should be assigned the role of ensuring the reopening of host nation public schools. Through home-station efforts involving adopt-a-school programs, meetings with school faculty and administrators, and site surveys, the tasked unit becomes familiar with the tasks involved and resources required to operate a school. Ultimately, these efforts should be aimed at allowing the host nation to gain self-sufficiency, but with the short-term benefit of allowing the nation to rapidly resume at least a sense of normalcy.

The authority of occupational law is one item a division headquarters must receive and readily utilize in this transitional environment. This is, of course, much easier said than done, as the National Command Authority (NCA) will tailor the decision of when and how to apply military force to different situations in the world within multiple different contexts. Ultimately, decisions made will be organized into guidance for tactically oriented headquarters and their units to execute. However, the reality of foreign interventions is that once operations conclude, US forces will own the ground they occupy and everything that goes with it, if even temporarily. By virtue of the fact that they are the most physically powerful organization in an area, the local nationals will at least initially turn to US forces for assistance and, possibly, governance. If they do not find what they are seeking, they will certainly turn elsewhere. The division commander, as the senior tactical commander of his AO, must not be hesitant or confused about what his soldiers can or cannot do. If his unit is empowered with temporary occupational law, if only for a specified, renewable time period, there will be less ambiguity for subordinate units confronted with issues like looting, local national crimes of retribution, and internal power struggles which threaten mission success.

The division sorely needs a mass broadcast system added to its inventory of organic equipment. Ideally, the system must be capable of replicating or replacing host nation television stations' ability to conduct public broadcasting. Minimally, the ability to operate a radio frequency in the host nation, similar to the Commando Solo aerial broadcasting platform utilized by PSYOP units, is required. Tactical units must have the ability to reach into the homes of indigenous people and explain why they are there, what the people can expect, where they can go for assistance, how to avoid becoming a casualty, and a wealth of other information. Division headquarters benefit from the possession of this technology as they can tailor their messages to the locales in which they operate. Ultimately, this effort can and should be duplicated by the purchasing of air time from host nation radio and television stations in the aftermath of MCO. These efforts will be used to establish an early, healthy dialogue of information between US forces and local nationals, eliminating barriers, confusion, rumors, and the waste of all too precious time.

Division headquarters, as well as their subordinate headquarters, must also be allocated a large discretionary cash fund with which to initiate stability operations. It requires this readily available money in order to take advantage of opportunities presented by the SRO environment; hiring interpreters, purchasing radio and television advertisement spot ads, implementing weapons for cash programs, or just hiring manual laborers to keep people busy and off the streets. Funds for this purpose have to be made available before the commencement of hostilities and not tied to specific strings or OPLANs, e.g., money marked only for operational purposes and not tasks considered part of reconstruction. Follow-on forces can receive more restrictive fiscal guidance, but the units conducting the transition must be granted more judicious leeway in its expenditure of this fund. This capability will help reinvigorate the local economy and also demonstrate that US forces are sincere in their efforts for local nationals to resume or attain a higher quality of life.

A precursor for any modifications to existing Army doctrine, organization or training is a shift in the Army's longstanding culture of focusing on conventional warfare. This is a formidable obstacle with many serious implications, including how the organization views itself, who it perceives as the proper executor of SRO tasks (*not* something best left to somebody else, preferably outside the Department of Defense), and how it decides to allocate and resource its precious training time. GEN Thurman, reflecting on Operation Just Cause, said "I did not spend five minutes on Blind Logic during my briefing as incoming CINC in August [1989]." Once in Panama, "the least of my problems at the time was Blind Logic."<sup>128</sup> Thirteen years later, similar statements were made by planners for Operation Iraqi Freedom. COL Kevin Benson, LTG McKiernan's Chief of Plans at CFLCC during the invasion of Iraq, when asked what he would have done differently: "I would have made a much stronger case to my CG that he should have been more involved with Phase IV planning during Phase III execution."<sup>129</sup> The identification of these mistakes is indicative of a reflective, learning organization seeking to learn from its experience. However, the amount of time elapsed between their occurrences shows that the Army, as an organization, still has a long way to go in eliminating its bias towards conventional warfare. A review of the current Army Campaign Plan finds little evidence to disprove this shortcoming.<sup>130</sup> While the Campaign Plan focuses on the topics of modularity, stabilization, rebalancing the force, and the warrior ethos, there is no consideration given to addressing the Army's culture and its perception of what its core missions must be. It is time for the Army to embrace what organizational history and current operations both indicate the future to hold.

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<sup>128</sup> Shultz, 68-69.

<sup>129</sup> Kevin Benson, "'Phase IV' CFLCC Stability Operations Planning," in De Toy, et al. *Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press, 2004), 196.

<sup>130</sup> *Army Campaign Plan: Worth Fighting For*. U.S. Army Campaign Plan, 2007. Available from <<http://www.army.mil/thewayahead/acp.html>>. Accessed 15 April 2007.

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