

Resurrecting NSC-68 for the Global War on Terror

A Monograph

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Abstract

Resurrecting NSC-68 for the Global War on Terror by LTC Richard M. Cabrey, U.S. Army, Field Artillery, 54 pages.

Can the United States wage a Global War on Terror with the current strategies in place? The U.S. waged a similar “long war” over four decades against communism. Although the threat to today’s U.S. national interests is a form of terrorism being waged by Radical Islam there are distinct similarities to the threat of communism posed after World War II. For the defeat of communism, one single document formed the foundation for the long term strategy to prosecute the Cold War. All instruments of national power were addressed in the recommended course of action and the entire process was centrally controlled by the newly formed National Security Council. The document, NSC-68, clearly identified the threat, U.S. national interests, and the methodology for applying instruments of national power to defeat communism. Today’s threat posed by Radical Islam has proved to be ideological and existential much like the communist threat, however, the strategies being developed within the U.S. Government for defeating the threat do not appear as effective as those during the cold war. The hypothesis this monograph proposes is that the organization of the National Security Council and the processes it used for advising the President on foreign policy are no longer working due to the bureaucratic growth in the U.S. Government. A proliferation of strategies by separate departments and agencies spurred by a “lead agency” approach of the current administration will prevent the U.S. from maintaining a long war focus on the threat facing our vital interests.

The components of the threats faced during the Cold War and the Global War on Terror are ideology and the existential nature of the threat. Writings by then Secretary of State George Kennan describe communism as defined by Lenin in 1916 as an ideological threat with not only the capability to harm the U.S. but also with the intended capacity to threaten our interests. For the discussion of the threat of Radical Islam, recent authors Mahmood Mamdani, “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim” Richard Mitchell’s, “Muslim Brotherhood” and Efraim Karsh’s “Imperial Islam” are used to define the nature of the current threat.

The strategy developed by the NSC under President Truman and the current National Security Strategy are examined with respect to: Unity of effort, feasibility and enduring nature. Unity of effort is the desired effect when unity of command cannot be achieved. The feasibility criterion focuses on allocating resources to the effort. For this monograph, the resource of information operations supporting both strategies is explored. The final criterion, enduring nature, examines how the Cold War strategy was maintained for almost fifty years while the current GWOT strategy is experiencing shifts of support by the populace, and our nation’s lawmakers.

Several recommendations for improving the potential success of the GWOT are presented in this monograph. Interaction of departments and agencies in the government must be more closely coordinated through a centralized body much like the NSC of Truman and Eisenhower’s presidency. Our foreign policy should also expand to engage more than militarily those regions or countries that can help facilitate containment and eventual defeat of terrorist organizations fueled by Radical Islam.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The attacks on the World Trade Center on 9-11 provided a tremendous potential catalyst for our national leadership to demonstrate the capacity of the American Government. Our president declared a “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) and with those words began the “Long War” that is still being waged after five plus years. Today, campaigns subordinate to the GWOT are being executed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Horn of Africa and within the borders of the United States of America. The conduct of these campaigns is and will continue to be instrumental in the overall success of the U.S. government in the “Long War.” Although each campaign plays an important role in the overall War on Terror, they will not be the focus of this monograph. Rather, the national strategy directing their objectives will be the focus. The GWOT is not the nation’s first long war. World War II arguably began for America as early as 1939 as we were involved diplomatically and economically with the U.K and Russia with the famous “Lend Lease Program.” The end of United States involvement in both Europe and Japan did not occur with the signing of an instrument of surrender, but included lengthy occupation duty by U.S. military forces in both countries. Post conflict reconstruction and posturing military forces for a potential threat from communist Russia kept the U.S. government engaged overseas for many more years. World War II, however, was not our longest conflict. The Cold War with its origins in the post World War II aftermath lasted over forty years and ended symbolically with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Cold War was waged on a global scale by the U.S. and its allies against a communist threat that prior to World War II appeared to be confined to the Soviet Union.

The conclusion of World War II saw the U.S. in an unfamiliar position in world politics. For the first time in its short history the United States was identified internally as well as externally as one of the two most powerful nations on earth. This power status stemmed not only

from a robust economic base, but also due to its demonstrated ability to wage nuclear war. In its new found role as a world leader, the U.S. was faced with leading a newly formed coalition to thwart the communist threat with its base of power residing in the Kremlin. Stalin, in a speech delivered in February of 1946, outwardly expressed the impossibility of cooperation between the warlike imperialists and the peace-loving socialists of the Soviet Union.¹ The speech by Stalin, although not identifying the U.S. directly as the warlike imperialist, propagated immediate activity in the U.S. State Department.

Within two months of the Stalin speech, the “Long Telegram” produced by George Kennan was cabled to the U.S. The Long Telegram was the first major attempt to codify the designs of a Stalinist Kremlin. Sent as a cable to Secretary of State Marshall in February of 1946, this document provided an initial assessment of the threat as well as foreign policy recommendations for the Truman administration.² With the challenge of Communism laid before the U.S., a way ahead or strategy would be necessary to guide the government and its elements of national power to execute foreign policy in what would become known as the Cold War. The strategy was ultimately a developmental process within the national security apparatus of the government resulting from multiple interactions between the president and his national security staff. NSC-68, published in 1950, as an example, was the product of the National Security staff in answering questions by President Truman on two specific issues. The actual document was a merging of two separate policy actions: based on Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb, an assessment and appraisal of U.S. military power and based on the direction of the president to go forward with a project for developing the hydrogen bomb.³ The overall communist threat

¹ Walter, McDougal, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776*. (New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), 159.

² Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall ["Long Telegram"], February 22, 1946, Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers. Available on line at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/index.php?pagenumber=18&documentdate=1946-02-22&documentid=6-6&studycollectionid=coldwar.

³ John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council From Truman to Bush*. (New York, William Morrow and Company, Inc), 36.

objectives presented in NSC-68 described an overarching design by the Kremlin which called for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin.⁴ NSC-68 went on to describe potential military, diplomatic, economic, and propaganda options available to the president. The paper was a significant milestone in strategy development and was actually a culmination of several NSC foreign policy memorandums produced during the Truman administration. The focus of this monograph is the long term strategy that evolved from contents of the NSC-68 paper, and how that strategy differs from our current National Security Strategy with its focus on the GWOT. Key elements to the successful strategy development in NSC-68 were a strong centralized National Security Council process and “long term” view of how communism would be defeated.

This monograph uses the development and implementation of NSC-68 as a base line in comparing the current Bush administration’s efforts in developing a comprehensive strategy for our long war on terrorism. Strategy is defined using the Department of Defense dictionary as: “The art and science of developing and using the diplomatic, economic, and informational powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war to secure national objectives.”⁵ To conduct a comparison of the two administrations’ strategies, this monograph will clarify the similarities of the foreign policy challenges faced by both administrations.

First, the current identified threat of Radical Islam must prove to be of a similar nature to that of Communism. The threat must be existential and ideologically based. For defining the concept of an ideological threat I will use the description provided by Lee Harris in his 2002

⁴ NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 14, 1950)

⁵ United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. (Washington, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2001. As Amended Through 16 October 2006).

essay titled “*Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology*”⁶. In his essay, Harris describes ideology as a culture or state of belief so strong that its goal is to change reality to meet the fantasy conditions envisioned by the actors. An example he gives is the 9-11 hijackers attacking the world trade centers, not to punish or act against America, but more importantly to show Radical Islam that America was vulnerable and could be overcome.

As for the threat being existential, it must simply be of a nature that is more than just perception but viable in terms of threatening the integrity and vitality of the American people and their society.⁷ The threat must be of significance to warrant an effort of our government to bring to bear all elements of national power. In a 1998 interview with an ABC reporter, Usama Bin Laden clearly stated the primary objective of al-Qaida. “They should all unite in the fight against polytheism and they should pool all their resources and their energy to fight the Americans and the Zionists and those with them.”⁸ Although the “they” he refers to is all Muslims, the real threat appears to be the radical Islamic element. The radical Islamic element will be more clearly defined in a later chapter. Bin Laden went on to further define the targets through an issued fatwa or holy law stating that he will not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as he is concerned, they are all targets.⁹ What the U.S. has witnessed since these statements by Bin Laden is the physical manifestation of these threats. Attacks in the gulf against the U.S. Navy, and the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia demonstrated the will and the capability for actions against our American military forces. The attacks of 9-11 demonstrated the leap in violence and the fruition of Bin Laden’s threat to attack civilian targets.

Coincidentally, the threat posed by Islam in general was compared to communism by one of the key members of Truman’s cabinet over fifty years ago. Dean Acheson stated, “The threat

⁶ Lee Harris, “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy” in *Policy Review Online*. Aug 2002. This article provides a very logical framework for describing an ideology. Central to his theme is that the leaders of an ideology must be as strong or even stronger believers in the goals.

⁷ NSC-68. Within the text of the memorandum, this definition is used as a paraphrase from the United States’ Constitution.

to Western Europe seemed to me singularly like that which Islam had posed centuries before, with its combination of ideological zeal and fighting power”.¹⁰ President Bush, in the September 2006 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* stated, “Today, we face a global terrorist movement and must confront the radical ideology that justifies the use of violence against innocents in the name of religion.”¹¹ The ideology that President Bush describes appears very similar to that espoused by Stalin in his call for the destruction and subversion of all governments opposed to Socialist Communism.

The second aspect that must be addressed is the target or focus of our instruments of national power. During the Cold War, the bipolar nature of the world left little doubt as to where the threat was and where the potential locations for the spread of communism would take place. Nation states fit neatly into categories of democratic capitalistic nations, Soviet satellites or those capable of going either way. The current alignment of nations is not so clear. No nation is willing to stand up in the international community and claim responsibility for terrorism. Rather, we see state sponsors that possibly harbor terrorist and act as terrorist facilitators. We also find super empowered individuals who can operate globally from no known address.¹² How will the U.S. government influence these terrorist targets without an address? Is it possible for the U.S. government to craft an integrated strategy relying on full interagency cooperation to contain or possibly defeat a terrorist threat?

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. executed foreign policy in specific countries and in general regions to stem the spread and eventually turn back communist encroachment on non-communist countries. In many cases, the U.S. design was not to establish a democratic country

⁸ Usama Bin Laden, Interview with ABC’s John Miller, May 1998.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*. (New York, W.W. Norton & Company Inc. 1969). 376.

¹¹ President Bush, United States. *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 1.

¹² Thomas L Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), 14. Friedman describes the U.S. response against Usama Bin Laden versus a nation state.

but to allow for good governance that may or may not be in the form of a democratic ruler. The “good governance” will be defined using elements stated in the current National Security Strategy. Although written in 2006, the components found in the goals of statecraft are similar to those spelled out in the NSC-68 paper. These components of good governance are: states that can meet the needs of their citizens, and conduct themselves responsibly in the international community.¹³

The last comparison that will be used is the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) itself. Although NSC-68 does not equate directly to the *National Security Strategy*, the comparison of the two documents is helpful. NSC-68 was, at the time of drafting, a classified document. As stated earlier it was the result of President Truman’s inquiries on capabilities of the Soviet Union and possible direction for the U.S. in relation to communism. The current National Security Strategy is a mandated document produced by the President and is an unclassified document meant to communicate a “way ahead” for the country. The important similarity in the two documents is the drafting agency of the government. A key component of the NSS is the organization responsible for drafting and maintaining oversight of the strategy. The National Security Council (NSC) is that key organization. As part of the legislation to unify the military in Jan of 1947, the National Security Council became a formal, Statute based organization.¹⁴ Formed under the executive branch, Truman was adamant that this new organization was formed purely as an advisory group. The NSC’s charter was to form papers on policy from the various departments and agencies for approval by the president. The one aspect that the NSC would be formally in charge of was general direction and coordination of intelligence operations.¹⁵

¹³ President Bush. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. p.1. NSC-68, Section IV, (Underlying Conflict in the Realm of Ideas and Values between the U.S. Purpose on the Kremlin Design) provides a more general definition which is more religion based in its definition. The focus is on individual rights and liberties, and a free market economy .

¹⁴ Prados, *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council From Truman to Bush*, 30

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 30.

Throughout subsequent administrations the Security Council remained as a body of policy advisors representing the numerous departments and agencies of the government. Even towards the end of Truman's presidency the NSC became plagued with the growing bureaucracy of all of the participating government departments and agencies. The result of the increasing capability of individual departments led to a migration of policy forming leadership away from the NSC and into each respective agency or department. Although policy recommendations were developed within one lead agency, the expectation was for collaboration between all involved agencies and departments. The NSC was still considered the final coordinating echelon prior to submission of any policy advice to the president. Although the bureaucratic evolution tended to dissolve the role of the NSC, the basic structure and process remained and was resurrected under President Eisenhower with NSC 166/2.

President Eisenhower requested a group to be formed to identify the links between Russia and Communist China and what actions the U.S. should take in terms of national security if the links proved threatening to U.S. interests. The result of the tasking was several iterations of study groups run at the National Defense University. Each study group presented facts, goals, costs and risks to each other. Eventually a compilation of the best of the options was presented to the National Security Council as well as to the department and agency leadership.¹⁶

The current Bush administration continues to adhere to a "lead agency" methodology for policy issues. This lead agency approach to policy formulation is intended to allow the most capable department to take the forefront in making recommendations to the president while coordinating with other concerned departments. With the GWOT, this lead agency approach has continued. The newly formed National Counter Terrorism Center is tasked as the lead agency

¹⁶ Michele A Flournoy, & Shawn W. Brimley. "A New Project Solarium: Strategic Planning for National Security". *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU Press), 80-86. The entire discussion of the Project Solarium is an excellent example of long term strategic thinking. One of Eisenhower's greatest concerns was the propensity for the senior decision maker

responsible for developing, implementing, and assessing the effectiveness of strategic and operational planning efforts to achieve counterterrorism objectives in support of the GWOT.¹⁷ In essence, the U.S. strategy development for prosecuting the GWOT resides with the NCTC. There are several higher level inputs to provide guidance to the NCTC in the development of the Counter Terrorism strategy. The *National Security Strategy* produced in March, 2006 is just one of these inputs. Accompanying the *Counter Terrorism Strategy* at a similar echelon is the *National Defense Strategy* and a National Military Strategy.¹⁸ A significant topic this monograph will address is the collaboration between echelons of the government and more specifically, how successful the NCTC is at leading the strategy development effort.

The analysis of the current strategy for countering terrorism as it compares with the strategy presented in NSC-68 will be conducted using three criteria, unity of effort, feasibility and the enduring nature of the strategy. Unity of effort is the first criterion for evaluation. Using “*Joint Publication 1-02*,” unity of effort is defined as “coordination through cooperation and common interests”.¹⁹ Unity of effort is the goal when unity of command is not possible. With respect to the current administration policy of lead agency approach, unity of command cannot be achieved, therefore, unity of effort is the objective. For the purpose of this discussion we will view unity of effort in terms of collaboration: horizontally among departments and agencies as well as vertically, from the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) down to the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) strategy as well as supporting strategies developed by parallel departments and agencies. As a key component in developing national strategy, the role and authority of the National Security Council will be reviewed. An important factor is whether the current administration’s NSC is being used in a similar manner to coordinate the GWOT as the

to focus on near term issues. The author suggests that President Eisenhower with his broad strategic background in WWII was one of the few senior leaders who understood strategic planning.

¹⁷ President Bush, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 20.

¹⁸ United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*. (Washington D.C.: 2006), 6.

NSCs during the Cold War. I do not intend to prove that the NSC under Truman was the “Gold Standard” for measuring effectiveness of an NSC, but rather the use and process of the NSC during the early stages of the Cold War allowed for a more coherent policy development and direction of U.S. instruments of national power.

A second criterion for evaluation is the feasibility of the strategy. Feasibility is defined as the determination as to whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources. More specifically, could the U.S. achieve the end state defined in NSC-68 and can it now achieve the end state as described in the current NSS? Determining the feasibility of the current strategy will be conducted in a subjective manner. Using NSC-68 as a base line, the ends and means described in our current strategies will be analyzed for potential feasibility. An example of the feasibility of a strategy can be taken from the Truman Doctrine speech of 1949. In his address to a joint session of Congress the president provided guidance on a specific amount of financial aid marked for Greece and Turkey. This aid was feasible based on the U.S. economy and budget. In a similar venue in January 2007, President Bush gave a state of the union address. Where Truman espoused a policy of economic and political aid to threatened countries, Bush described a new strategy for fighting the GWOT in Iraq and Afghanistan: a significant increase in forces deployed to these two countries as well as an increase in Army and Marine active duty strength. Additionally, the president requested one point two billion dollars for combating malaria in Africa.²⁰

The last criterion to be used in the comparison is the enduring nature of the strategy. Enduring nature will be defined as the ability to withstand changing administrations. The actual strategy may continue to evolve, but the objectives and purpose remain constant. In evaluating the current NSS, it will be more difficult to predict the enduring nature. The current administration changeover will not occur for two more years, although a recent change in the

¹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

composition of the congress from Republican to Democratic majority may have an impact on the overall GWOT strategy. In using NSC-68 as an example for comparison, the projection in time for the application of the instruments of national power and the identification of future interaction of the NSC with other governmental departments and agencies will be addressed. Contemporary sources like the *Beyond Goldwater – Nichols Phase II Report* released in July 2005 and specific GAO reports provide interesting insights into the challenges with and possible recommendations for increasing the capabilities of the NSC with respect to the disparate agencies and departments involved in the GWOT.

In *Keeper of the Keys*, John Prados details the role of the NSC throughout its inception up through President H.W. Bush. Through the administrations the role of the NSC was primarily as policy advisors on military and foreign policy. Depending on the strength of character of the key members the NSC would move between long term policy and short term operations as a focus. Under President Regan, the NSC saw seven National Security advisors and several changes in the NSC's role as policy advisors.²¹ Although each President ultimately defines the role for the NSC, the basic structure and capability exists by statute for it to be one of the most potent facilitators of interagency cooperation in the U.S. government. This is evidence of an enduring apparatus. Prados concludes his chronology of the NSC with a chapter titled, "The President's Lieutenants." In this chapter, Prados argues that the structure of the NSC is an enduring and functioning system. The change in its role from strategy and policy advice to a current operations focused committee is a result of the Johnson and Kennedy administrations development of a "situation room" and Oval Office Meetings to replace the formal NSC sessions of previous presidents.²² As the author of this monograph witnessed during a recent visit to Washington D.C. the bureaucracy levels

²⁰ President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 7 January 2007.

²¹ Prados. 458-459. Prados presents a chronological account of the role of the NSC, focusing mainly on the background and skills of the National Security Advisor as well as detailing the bureaucratic challenges faced by the policy advisors. Although it is clear that he was not impressed by Regan's use of

achieved in numerous governmental agencies has only led to further dissolving of the role of the NSC as a foreign policy advisory system focused on U.S. long term strategy.

As a conclusion, the final chapter of this monograph will identify the potential gaps and seams in the overall strategy for the GWOT as a result of the compartmented type approach that “lead agency” produces. Possible recommendations will be presented in terms of collaboration between echelons and unity of effort in the development of a strategy that is required for a long war. The GWOT will require continuous interaction by numerous government agencies to not only contain the spread of Radical Islam as a threat, but also for success in the campaigns currently being waged.

The Threat

The concept of describing the threat to the U.S. post WWII in the form of communism and more recently through Radical Islam is essential in terms of comparing the national security strategies of the two periods. In the introduction, the threat was defined by using the terms ideological and existential. These two aspects of both communism and Radical Islam will be further defined in order to establish the existence of a valid threat to U.S. national interests and the requisite need for a comprehensive strategy to defeat the threat.

Communism

Although primarily confined to Russia beginning in 1916, communism as a form of government was not completely alien to the U.S. The communists under Lenin conducted their revolution and established their government and proceeded to focus on their own security until threatened by the German Army invasion of WWII. Prior to the Cold War, America and its

the NSC, he brings to light the flexibility of the NSC and its ability to endure changes between administrations as well as changes during and administration.

²² Prados, 560.

leaders had experienced no direct threat from the inner workings of the Kremlin. The U.S. found itself allied with the Kremlin during World War II initially through the Lend Lease Program and eventually through the investment of U.S. combat power on the European continent to defeat Hitler and the German Army. Within one year of the signing of the Instrument of Surrender, true Soviet intentions with respect to the U.S. became clear as they were described in the famous “Long Telegram” sent by George Kennan, the attaché in the U.S. embassy in Moscow, to Secretary of State Marshall. According to Kennan’s interpretation of Soviet government, the very society and traditional way of life of America must be disrupted to ensure the security of Communist Russia. Although President Roosevelt as well as President Truman suspected anti-American intentions by the Soviet Union, they had yet to be as clearly expressed as Kennan had done. Kennan went on to describe the depth of the political and military capabilities that the Kremlin could rely on to ensure the defeat of a Democratic America.²³ The Kremlin, as a totalitarian led government, had no fears in lying to the people or making empty promises for a better life. This left the leadership in a position to exploit resources, prohibit free speech, destroy political opposition and maintain an incredible emphasis on building the military might of Russia. Kennan’s telegram not only offered a thorough analysis of the threat, but also the objectives and potential courses of action the U.S. might have with respect to engagement and containment of communism. America was faced with an ideological threat that controlled its own governmental process.

How does the communist threat fit the definition of an ideology? Again, going back to Lee Harris’ definition of an ideology, the communist regime in the Kremlin had to change the reality of a Cold War bi-polar world into the fantasy of a communist dominated world totally incapable of existing with a democratic and capitalistic competitor.²⁴ The first vestiges of the

²³George Kennan, "Long Telegram", February 22, 1946. Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers, 14.

²⁴ Lee Harris, “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy” in *Policy Review Online*. Aug 2002.

communists' desire to spread their own influence were seen in the overthrow of the Czechoslovakian government quickly followed by the intentions of subsuming Greece and Turkey. President Truman, in his address before a Joint Session of Congress in March of 1947, began to clarify and define the threat for the American people. His description of the Soviet designs on peaceful nations allowed the President to begin to craft a diplomatic and economic response to the Kremlin's actions.²⁵ The Truman Doctrine speech provided not only Congress, but the American people with a view of the magnitude with which Communism could effect the peace so recently won in Europe. Truman effectively described the militant threat in Greece and the effect a failed Greece would have on neighboring Turkey as clearly requiring U.S. assistance. The coercion of militant leaders trying to gain control of these two countries was compared to that of the leaders of Japan and Germany prior to WWII.²⁶

George Kennan, in a July 1947 essay written in *Foreign Affairs* summarizes how the ideology of communism manifested itself as a threat to the U.S. Describing communist ideology in 1916 under Lenin, Kennan gave a four step argument for the communist belief. First, a central factor in society is the system by which material goods are produced and exchanged. The second thought is that the capitalist system leads to the exploitation of the working class and is incapable of providing for or distributing fairly to the working class. The third point is that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction. The wealthy are unable to adjust to economic change resulting in a revolution by the working class. With the final point being that the imperialism resident in a capitalist society will lead directly to war and revolution.²⁷ In Kennan's essay, the conflict between Kremlin communism and U.S. democratic and capitalistic society was

²⁵ Harry S Truman. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947. Truman's speech not only gives justification for American support to Greece and Turkey, in it, he defines the limitations of our allies (UK) and the overall support we owe as a leading nation in the United Nations.

²⁶ Harry S. Truman, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947. The description of the militant minority threatening the existing government of Greece eluded to the communist designs on control of yet another satellite state for the Kremlin.

²⁷ George Kennan writing as "X".. The Sources of Soviet Conduct, *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, 50.

inevitable. It is also in this essay that Kennan began to craft an idea not just of containment but one of intervention to progress the decay of communist power in the Kremlin.²⁸ Kennan's suggestion of a long term approach to dealing with communism arose from his identification of the nature of the communist leadership. As an ideology, which he compared to "the church" the leadership was not under a timetable to appease the people of Russia. The oppression of human rights, work camps and government control of all aspects of Russian life gave Stalin the perception that he only had to wait out the downfall of capitalism. As long as the Kremlin could continue to co-opt satellite states, his power base would be secure.²⁹

The existential nature of the threat of communism is more difficult to identify. Communism itself as a form of government may not present a direct threat, but the actions of governments under communist rule provided several examples of threats to our integrity and vitality. Integrity of the U.S. is self explanatory, while vitality is a term that allows for some debate. As described earlier, the NSC-68 memorandum was written in response to President Truman's concerns about Soviet Nuclear capability. U.S. and Soviet nuclear conflict, possible but not probable, steeled both countries in the advancement of nuclear arms and the theories of mutual assured destruction. The capacity for the Kremlin to threaten U.S. integrity through nuclear proliferation was arguably proved by the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Although, the threat of nuclear conflict was possible throughout the cold war period, Prados, in *Keepers of the Keys*, describes that the threat of a nuclear showdown, even during the Cuban Missile Crisis was unlikely.³⁰

²⁸ Ibid, *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*, *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, .60. Kennan noted that although the Kremlin was experiencing internal decay, the ideals of communism resident in satellite states were firmly grounded.

²⁹ Ibid, This assessment of a secure power base is inferred by the author based on Kennan's article. Throughout the article Kennan draws a logical line from a corrupt government head that has only to accumulate resources and power from co-opted countries. The power of the Kremlin remains in tact through the occupation and control of countries by the military apparatus of the government.

³⁰ Prados, 109. Prados references documents written by Walt Rostow and Paul Nitche that identify President Kennedy and his advisors as placing too much emphasis on the possibility of nuclear war.

The more delicate aspect of the existential nature of the communist threat was the protection of our vitality. NSC-68 does not clearly define U.S. vitality. However, in NSC-68, the discussion of the fundamental design of the Kremlin focuses on the “machinery of government and structure of society” as the vital requirement for U.S. power and influence.³¹ In a later section of NSC-68, the structure of society that presents the threat to the Kremlin is the free and democratic system enjoyed by non-communist states. This idea of a free society as an enemy to the Kremlin was clarified during a Party Congress as capitalism.³² With the end of WWII, the U.S. emerged as the strongest economic force on the planet. President Truman used his speech before a joint session of Congress in 1947 to amplify the U.S. role in assisting with economic development in regions ravaged by the effects of WWII.³³ A stated U.S. objective in NSC-68 was for the U.S. to lead a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world.³⁴ It is in this stated objective that our national interests are viewed with the same importance as the actual integrity of the United States. The U.S. interests in “free societies” was challenged throughout the cold war period.

Engagements between U.S. backed governments with communist backed regimes occurred throughout the cold war without direct military action between the two super powers. These engagements took place in Korea, Vietnam, Central America the Middle East, North Africa and East Asia. The actual winner of these engagements is not up for debate in this monograph; the important point is that U.S. foreign policy was executed in direct support and in a regional manner to stop the spread of communist influence in areas that the U.S. saw as being vital to our national interest. As the Regan administration applied foreign policy in the form of military aid and economic assistance to Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Russian led communist influence in the

³¹ NSC-68, “Section III: Fundamental Design of the Kremlin”

³² NSC-68, “Section IV: The underlying Conflict in the Realm of ideas and Values between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin Design”.

³³ Harry S. Truman, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947.

³⁴ NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 14, 1950)

region experienced a major setback. Ironically, it is in this same region that we see the new threat to U.S. national interests begin to materialize.

Radical Islam

Although referred to by several different names, the threat as described in our National Security Strategy is called “radical Islam.” In his book *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim* Mahmood Mamdani provides a very refined description of the actual form of Islam that presents itself as a threat to our Western society. Mamdani describes it as political Islam. He traces the roots of this form of Islam to the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Cairo. In a period of history following closely behind the communist revolution in Russia, a group of Muslim political activists led by Hassan al-Banna created a movement whose intent was to reform the perceived political corruption in Egypt that was brought about by British/Western colonialism.³⁵ The society saw communism as a model of reform for the injustice and weakening of the ideology of Islam in their Islamic faith based country. According to the brotherhood, the virtues of the communist world, though only of outward appearance and largely theoretical, were, none the less noteworthy: concern for the poor, equality, mutuality of responsibility among classes, brotherhood, and humanitarianism without distinction between peoples. Irreligious and absolute, Russian socialism because of its emphasis on social justice, is the only alternative to an Islamic Socialism based on the foundation of monotheism and the brotherhood of man.³⁶ The brotherhood advanced its agenda from political welfare reform to armed politics with the end of World War II. In 1948 the U.N. decided to create the State of Israel in the Middle East. The creation of Israel in the midst of the Arab nations provided the impetus for the armed political

³⁵ Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*. (United States: Three Leaves Press, 2004), 48-49.

³⁶ Richard P Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood*.(New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 227.

movement. In 1952, the society, still growing in strength and popularity, lent its support to the young military officer Gamal Abdel Nasser who came to power in Egypt.³⁷ Shortly thereafter, Nasser saw the Society as a political threat and had most of the leadership, including Sayyid Qutub, arrested. The repression and imprisonment of the Brotherhood members only served to move the ideology from armed political activity to extremism. The recognized leader of this new extremism is attributed by both Mamdani and Richard Mitchell, author of the *Muslim Brotherhood*, as Sayyid Qutub.³⁸

Writing in prison prior to his execution in 1966, Qutub produced a manifesto of radical political Islam. In his manifesto, he recognized the failure of Marxism and identified an end to an era dominated by the resurgence of science. He saw an end to all modern theories of governance and pronounced that only Islam could provide mankind with the values it needed to survive.³⁹

Mamdani describes the efforts of Qutub and his followers as a form of Jihad, or struggle. He also refers to several other periods in Muslim history as Jihad events. The beginning of Wahhabism in the 1700's, and the Jihad which began in India and spread to the development of Pakistan as a state are two examples of Jihad waged by radical Islamic extremists.⁴⁰ These forms of jihad were characterized by armed and violent overthrow of existing political processes by a militant faction. Qutub referenced the prophet Muhammad when he reiterated, "The establishment of Allah's kingdom on earth, the elimination of the reign of man, the wresting of sovereignty from its usurpers and its restoration to Allah, and the abolition of human laws and implementation of the divine law [shari'a] cannot be only achieved through sermons and preaching."⁴¹ Qutub's use of

³⁷ Mahmood Mamdani, 56.

³⁸ Both Mitchell and Mamdani recognize that Marxism-Leninism provided the Egyptian Islamists with a theoretical influence. Although Mamdani describes the influence occurring post WWII, Mitchell introduces the link much earlier in the formation of the Brotherhood as early as 1928.

³⁹ Mamdani, 60.

⁴⁰ The introduction of the various Jihads in Mamdani's work is somewhat confusing. Although he links the creation of Pakistan to influencing the writing of Qutub, the author does not show direct correlation.

⁴¹ Efraim Karsh, *Islamic Imperialism, A History* (New York: Yale University Press, 2006), 212.

Muhammad's words proved to be an important catalyst for fueling the idea of Jihad that would later be perpetuated by Usama bin Laden.

The existential nature of the threat of Radical Islam is much easier to identify than the threat from communism. Again, using the terms integrity and vitality to describe those aspects of the U.S. that are threatened by radical Islamists will provide the framework for defining the threat more clearly. The integrity of the U.S. can be defined as within our sovereign boundaries and those areas of the world where the U.S. maintains a presence through diplomatic missions, economic interests or military occupations. In a 1997 interview with CNN's Peter Arnett, Usama bin Laden provided several examples of what he believed to be legitimate Jihad waged against both Western and Russian imperialists. Chechnya, Somalia, Bosnia and Tajikistan were all examples of Muslims being called upon to wage a holy war against the infidels. In this early interview, bin Laden was more limiting in his description of the targets of Jihad. The focus was primarily on the military and government leaders, with infidel civilians living in the Holy Land being at risk to frustrated Muslims. In the interview, bin Laden referenced the Khobar Towers bombing as a prime example of the authorized targeting of U.S. forces.⁴² Bin Laden's early thoughts of sparing the civilians obviously changed over the next four years with one of the primary target of the 9-11 attacks being the World Trade Center buildings.

As described in the existential nature of the communist threat, vitality becomes a much more encompassing term. Radical Islamic leaders have left no question of their intent to inflict suffering on the non believing people of the West. The attacks against not only the U.S. but more recently against the civilian populace of England and Spain demonstrate not only a clear intent, but more importantly a capacity or capability to inflict destruction not just on military forces but civilians outside of the Arab world.

⁴² Usama bin Laden Interview with CNN'S Peter Arnett. March 1997.

Thomas Friedman, in his book, “*The World is Flat*” dedicates a chapter to the discussion of the importance of a free trade world economy as it applies to the U.S. economy. He cites an English economist, David Ricardo, who theorized that any nations engaged in free trade agreements will ultimately benefit their own economies.⁴³ The U.S., in the current global economy, thrives on a free trade economy. U.S. economic interests exist in India, throughout the Middle East and South East Asia. All of these regions contain large Muslim populations. If Radical Islam can disrupt our economic opportunities in these areas the overall economic vitality of the U.S. could easily suffer.⁴⁴ As Friedman points out, in the long term, establishing barriers or erecting walls and assuming an isolationist policy could not fail to drive the U.S. economy into a down turn.⁴⁵

As with the Kremlin, Radical Islam proves to be a legitimate threat to U.S. interests and vitality. The ideology of Radical Islam will not allow a coexistence of free and democratic western societies with a fundamentalist Caliphate. Furthermore, where the Kremlin demonstrated capacity for threatening the U.S. with the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, Radical Islam has planned and executed devastating attacks against the U.S. on our homeland, against military targets overseas and against U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Applying our Instruments of National Power

Application of U.S. foreign policy is designed to bring about some change in behavior in a target nation or region. The instruments of national power are used to improve relations bilaterally or amongst a coalition, as a means of punishment against states who are in violation of international standards or for forcing some type of change within that nation’s governmental process.

⁴³ Thomas Friedman, *The World is Flat* (New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 225-226.

⁴⁴U.S. Trade Representative. 2006 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. Appendix. The 2006 report identifies India and Malaysia in the top twenty five of the nations receiving U.S. exports. Members of the Arab League combined accounted for 2.5% of total U.S. exports.

⁴⁵ Friedman, 227.

Traditionally, it has been relatively simple for the U.S. to target a specific nation state in the application of its own foreign policy. Recently, the target of foreign policy is less clear. Viewing the U.S. foreign policy with respect to NSC-68, the drafters defined the requirement for bringing to bear our instruments of national power and clearly identified more than just the Soviet Union as the target of our instruments of national power. As stated in the section titled The Role of Negotiation: “ultimately, it is our objective to negotiate a settlement with the Soviet Union (or a successor state or states) on which the world can place reliance as an enforceable instrument of peace”.⁴⁶ What actually allowed the Soviet Union to be considered a nation state, and therefore a viable target of our foreign policy? In simple terms, the Soviet Union existed as an internationally recognized sovereign nation and had a functioning government. In more specific terms, the Soviet Union existed as a totalitarian state as defined by Dr. Bruce D. Porter in “*War and the Rise of the State*”. Although Dr. Porter does not use sovereignty as one of his criteria, he does provide definitions for the governmental apparatus.⁴⁷ Dr. Henry Kissinger in his collection of essays *American Foreign Policy* also describes States as having the components of a government, though not necessarily democratic, and a geographical territory that is the statesman’s role to protect.⁴⁸ Published at the height of the Cold War in 1969, Dr. Kissinger’s essay, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” provides an in-depth look at relations between Communist Russia and the U.S.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 14, 1950). The following portion of the document begins the description of possible course of action and how the instruments of national power can be used in each case.

⁴⁷ Bruce D Porter, *War and the Rise of the State*, (New York, New York, The Free Press, 1994), 198.

⁴⁸ Henry Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy” in *American Foreign Policy*, (New York: WW Norton & Company Inc. 1969),

⁴⁹ Kissinger, 53-79. The entire essay provides an insightful view on the ideology of Communism and how it is at odds with capitalistic democratic societies. One of his main points concerns the balance of power. Where governments of previous eras looked at prosperity internal to their borders, current policies must reflect an interdependence of numerous nation states with a bi-polar umbrella directing overall interaction.

Identifying the Soviet Union as a viable target for our instruments of national power is only the beginning of the application of the U.S. foreign policy. U.S. foreign policy had to extend beyond the Soviet Union and encompass nation state actors who required our protection and those who were susceptible to Soviet influence and coercion. As described in NSC-68, the recommended course of action was for the U.S. to execute a rapid build up of political, economic and military strength in the free world.⁵⁰ In order to pursue this objective, the U.S. was forced to take a multilateral approach to its foreign policy. In essence, to achieve the end state of the containment of communism the target of U.S. policy must include more than the Kremlin. Dr. Kissinger describes the idea of expanding to an engagement of more than the target nation as the logical process stemming from the bipolar nature of the Cold War with two superpowers. Smaller countries vying for political and economic survival and acceptance at the end of WWII saw the superpowers as a yoke or an opportunity for relevance in the international community.⁵¹ Recognizing the need to expand and execute U.S. foreign policy to achieve national objectives in the fight against communism may not appear to be a monumental step. What made the process unique was the codification of this idea in NSC-68 by the National Security Council which allowed all involved governmental agencies to understand their role in developing their own strategies.

For purposes of understanding the direction U.S. foreign policy took with respect to defeating communism it is appropriate to summarize the recommended course of action presented in NSC-68. The three categories addressed by the course of action were: military, political and economics. Within the military instrument there was an identified need to protect our allies, maintain protection for mobilization bases, protection of lines of communication and a requirement for developing a greater offensive capability. Within the political instrument the

⁵⁰ NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 14, 1950).

⁵¹ Kissinger, 56. Dr. Kissinger describes this occurrence as political multi-polarity. The rigidity of the military basis for the bi polar world demanded that other nations have a stake in the process.

U.S. must strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations; and assist those nations that were willing to make an important contribution to U.S. security, to increase their economic and political stability and their military capability. It was believed that if we could politically engage and sway the states on the periphery of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin would be “off balance” politically and more susceptible to internal dissent. Within the economic instrument there was a desire to maximize our economic potential, including the strengthening of our peacetime economy and the establishment of essential reserves readily available in the event of war.⁵² Although not presented as a separate category, the informational instrument of national power was also addressed. The recommended course of action presented objectives for both internal and external application of the informational tool. Internal to the U.S. it was defined as, keeping the U.S. public fully informed and aware of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures that might need to be taken with respect to national security. Externally, (directed towards the Kremlin) the course of action directed “development of programs designed to build and maintain confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution, and to wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate the Kremlin design in other ways.”⁵³ With NSC-68 the U.S. began an era of foreign policy practice that targeted specific nation states for military, economic and political aid as well as targeting others for coercive action. In fact all instruments and actions would be focused on achieving a desired end state through influencing the decision making leadership of the Soviet Union seated in the Kremlin.

NSC-68 did provide several other options to President Truman: become isolationist, maintain the status quo and declare war on the USSR. All were feasible options, however, the disadvantages

⁵² In depth analysis included in NSC-68 describes percentage of GNP for military, foreign aid and investments. Reference was made to the U.S. capability to increase the economic production of the country such that we could increase defense spending to 50% of GNP.

⁵³ NSC-68 Section IX D. The remaining Course of Action-- A Rapid Build-up of Political, Economic and Military Strength in the Free World.

of these three options with respect to long term objectives rendered them less than optimal. An additional point to address is the composition of the staff that drafted the NSC-68 paper. There was a ten-member panel formed primarily from the Department of State and Department of Defense. The lead policy writer was Paul Nitze, former investment banker and member of several wartime economic management programs. Other members of the team for State and Defense included individuals with background in State Policy planning as well as retired military officers. A key piece of guidance President Truman gave to the team was to consider actual and potential U.S. resources in order to maintain a longer term view of the policy.⁵⁴

Move the calendar forward and the environment has changed. The instruments of national power remain the same, some of the countries remain the same, and a new ideology has replaced communism as the threat to U.S. sovereignty and vitality. The dilemma facing the current administration is a stated and actual threat to the U.S. in the form of radical Islam. Ideologically based, much like communism, there is no bi-polar superpower dictator sitting in a Kremlin of his own for the U.S. to target. The terrorist threat exists in numerous countries, many of whom are politically and economically engaged by the U.S. in a favorable manner. NATO, one of our longest standing alliances, includes countries from which the terrorists involved in the 9-11 attacks began their operation. With the declaration of the Global War on Terror, the U.S. found itself with the new challenge of applying the instruments of national power in the traditional role, vis a vis nation state to nation state, as well as applying the instruments in an effort to influence non-nation state actors. In the immediate aftermath of 9-11 there was resounding international support for the U.S. led operations into Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban and more specifically remove the individual thought to be responsible for the 9-11 as well as other attacks against the U.S. The target of our instruments of national power, Afghanistan, was just another nation state.

⁵⁴ Prados, 36-37. Nitche had also recently replaced George Kennan as director of the State's Policy Planning Staff. In addition to his background on Wall Street and Military economic programs,

The U.S. and its coalition executed military operations, brought in economic aid and helped establish a new democratic government. However, Usama bin Laden, the identified leader of al Qaida remained at large.

As Thomas Friedman pointed out, bin Laden personifies a new character in the international community. He is a super empowered individual.⁵⁵ He is globally connected through the internet, has access to finances from multiple sources and has shown an ability to influence politics on an international scale, yet he has no party headquarters. Although not the only leader of a radical Islamic movement, as the proclaimed leader of al Qaida bin Laden is arguably one of the most recognized leaders of what has become the number one threat to the U.S.. The current administration's strategies are filled with the term "combating terror" along with establishing democracy. The question that must be answered is how does the U.S. prosecute a war on terror if the leader of the terrorist organization is a super empowered individual like bin Laden acting unilaterally from within a sovereign state that does not profess hostility towards the U.S.? Is the U.S. justified in applying coercive and possibly military action against a sovereign state in order to defeat the terrorist leader or organization?

President Bush stated that we will make no distinction between terrorists and those who aid them.⁵⁶ This places the U.S. into a potential ethical dilemma on waging a "War on Terror" against a sovereign nation state who has not declared war on the U.S. In *Philosophy 9/11* there are a collection of essays that discuss the legitimacy of the GWOT. One particular author, Lorraine Besser-Jones, posits that our policy of prosecuting the GWOT against non-nation state actors is not legitimate.⁵⁷ Terrorist organizations like Al Qaida have no sovereign legitimacy and

Nitche studied economics at Harvard. This broad background in military, diplomatic and economics provided possibly the best candidate for the drafting of the NSC-68 paper.

⁵⁵ Thomas L Friedman. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. (New York: Anchor Books. 2000), 14.

⁵⁶ President Bush, National Security Strategy 2006, 12. This statement comes from one of the four short term steps, "Deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rouge states". The examples of the rouge states given in the NSS document are Syria and Iran.

⁵⁷ Lorraine Besser-Jones,. "Just War Theory, Legitimate Authority, and the War on Terror". Found in *Philosophy 9/11* ed. Shanahan Timothy. (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), 129-130. The author of

do not necessarily represent the government of the nation state from which they are operating from. Prosecuting war on a nation as a preemptive measure against a nation suspected of harboring terrorist or possibly facilitating terrorist activities is also counter to the theory of legitimate war. The theory of legitimate war as defined by Besser-Jones is predicated on two sovereign nations acting in their own best interest and the best interest of the international community. Violence emanating from a state in the form of terrorism is not grounds for attack, but at best should be considered criminal activity.⁵⁸ In other words, a nation should not be held accountable for the actions of a non political group residing within its boundaries. The current administration has made it clear that it will make no distinction between the terrorists and the identified state sponsors. The nation state that harbors knowingly or unknowingly terrorist activity and organizations can be held accountable⁵⁹. In the case of Iraq in March 2003, the U.S. acted in its perceived best interest, formed a small but powerful coalition and removed a regime by force. The administration either believed or perceived a link between the Saddam regime and terrorist networks. Since that action, the U.S. has come under great international scrutiny for its policy. The U.S. may be faced with the role of acting unilaterally in future anti-terrorist endeavors or using a comprehensive package of instruments of national power to influence the nation state in question.

The counter to Besser-Jones' argument, one should refer to the interview with Usama bin Laden from May of 1998. In the interview, bin Laden espouses the responsibility of all Muslims, regardless of their country of origin, to fight against the U.S., Zionist and those with them.⁶⁰

Besser-Jones does not account for the aspects of Radical Islam that expand its influence beyond internationally recognized boundaries. It is because the threat transcends national boundaries that

the essay speaks only in terms of waging "war". She implies the use of military forces and ignores that the GWOT as explained in our NSS and the National Strategy for combating terrorism is multi-faceted and entails more than the military instrument of national power.

⁵⁸ Besser-Jones, 135.

⁵⁹ President Bush, National Security Strategy 2006, 12.

the current administration in its policies seek to engage with all instruments of national power those countries with large Muslim populations.⁶¹

The U.S. has also set a precedent for attacking a super empowered individual. Using Afghanistan as an example, we see the U.S. engaged with Kharzi, the Afghanistan Prime Minister in trying to find and bring to justice Usama bin Laden. Five years ago the U.S. military played the major role in the defeat of the Taliban in this region with the ultimate objective of capturing or killing Usama bin Laden. In the aftermath the U.S. maintained a strong military instrument through the presence of combat forces in Afghanistan, but is now more fully engaged with economics and political processes to work toward the capture or defeat of Usama bin Laden. Through UN approved mandates and a coalition involving NATO and Afghanistan forces, the operations in Afghanistan reflect the type of intervention that Besser-Jones might approve.

Comparison of the Strategy

Our current NSS provides an ultimate goal of ending tyranny with a specified goal in statecraft of helping to create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly.⁶² In his foreword to the 2006 NSS, President Bush makes clear that the approach that the United States will take in terms of its foreign policy is similar to that of both Presidents Truman and Reagan.⁶³ It is in this context that we will view the current NSS and compare it with the strategy that evolved from the Truman Doctrine and ultimately became codified in NSC-68. It is also important to clarify the scope of the two documents being compared. NSC-68, in 1950 was classified “Top Secret”. A comprehensive document that would provide insight into America’s own vulnerabilities and the perceived

⁶⁰ Usama bin Laden interview, May, 1998.

⁶¹ President Bush, National Security Strategy 2006, 9.

⁶² United States. President. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, The White House, 2006. p.1.

vulnerabilities of the Kremlin. The National Security Strategy on the other hand is an unclassified document describing in broad terms the “way ahead” for the U.S. in terms of two main pillars: “the first pillar is promoting freedom, justice and human dignity – working to end tyranny...The second pillar is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies”.⁶⁴ In order to examine the U.S. strategy for the GWOT, the NSS cannot be taken as a stand alone document. Within the context of unclassified information, publications from DOD, DOS and the National Intelligence agency will be included in the comparison.

Unity of Effort

What NSC-68 delivered was a coherent unifying strategy that discussed all elements of national power and their role in the defeat of communism. NSC-68, as addressed earlier, provided several courses of action to President Truman, each referring to the elements of national power and each one having advantages and disadvantages. Most importantly, there was a comprehensive recommendation on which course of action should be implemented with respect to the long term best interests of the U.S. Unfortunately, there was no statute directing a NSS during the Truman administration so a direct comparison of like documents cannot be accomplished. However, both NSC-68 and the current NSS focus on a particular aspect of our national strategy; that being a defined threat; Communism for NSC-68 and radical Islamic terrorism for the 2006 NSS. In comparing the two documents, three aspects will be examined. Unity of effort, feasibility and the enduring nature of the strategy will all be considered.

⁶³ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. 2006. President Bush’s letter that provides the forward to the National Security Strategy.

⁶⁴ President Bush, NSS 2006, ii. Recently USSOCOM was tasked with developing an overarching plan for DOD that would include integrating all other departments and agencies in the U.S. Government. The National Counter Terrorism Center is also developing a classified plan to integrate all departments and agencies in their “lead agency” role.

The National Security Strategy is an overarching document that is designed as a foundation for subordinate strategies. With respect to the GWOT the NSS lists strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism as the second of seven key tasks.⁶⁵ Almost half of the entire document describes current successes and challenges with the GWOT to include the issue of weapons of mass destruction as they relate to threats from terrorist organizations. Additional chapters describe primarily political and economic desires. Overall, the NSS becomes the base source for development of other department or agency strategies, policies and objectives.

In theory, our national military strategy, produced by the Department of Defense (DOD), is developed as an amplification of the military element of national power as it relates to the objectives established in the NSS. Strategies from other departments or agencies should follow the same logical line of application. Five plus years into the GWOT, the defeat of terrorism remains a predominant theme within the NSS. This section of the monograph will look for how overarching guidance and intent in the NSS has been translated and expounded upon in subordinate agency or department strategies.

In military lexicon, the process of promulgating the commander's intent to lower levels ensures a nesting of plans and helps ensure a unity of effort. Each section of the 2006 NSS begins with a recap of the 2002 strategy, describes current success and then lists areas that are still considered a challenge. A majority of the verbiage is spent defining the threats to U.S. national interests as well as what constitutes democracy. In several instances, the strategy for success is defined by a goal or objective or more commonly known as an end without the ways and means being identified. It is only in the section titled "The Way Ahead" that the term strategy is even used in the context of providing direction to the U.S. government. The NSS identifies several regions and the challenges associated with them but falls short of providing a unifying plan of action or strategy to guide the foreign policy instruments. Within our government architecture there are

⁶⁵ President Bush, NSS 2006, 1.

too many agencies and departments to track collaboration in each. This section will limit the scope of comparison to the Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Justice (DOJ) and the National Center for Countering Terrorism (NCTC). These organizations by mission should have the greatest impact and represent the basis of our instruments of national power with respect to the GWOT.

The U.S. government relies heavily on the DOS to develop and expand our political interaction on a global scale. On its homepage, the DOS identifies itself as the lead foreign affairs agency.⁶⁶ In this role as the lead agency in foreign affairs one would expect DOS to lead all efforts on a strategic level in the engagement with any and all nations as the U.S. government applies instruments of national power. This would be the logical adaptation of the current administration's lead agency approach espoused in the National Security Strategy. In the DOS Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2004-2009 released in 2003 there is very little that demonstrates collaboration with the National Security Strategy from 2002. In unclassified research, the author was unable to find a more recent strategy to conclude if DOS has nested with the 2006 NSS. In describing interaction of the State department and USAID with countries in the Middle East there is a distinguishable unilateral wording. In all instances the DOS describes its own interaction and does not address working with other departments or agencies. The only reference found to interagency collaboration was a collection of side notes in a document titled "Strategic Plan". In the side notes DOS does recognize what is described as a "cross cutting" interagency relationship with DOD in addressing regional stability. The description of cross cutting is that DOD is there to apply military force and at times reconstruction⁶⁷. There is no discussion of the supported or supporting relationship between these two government agencies or any acknowledgement that DOD may have the lead role as was the case with OIF. The only other governmental agency

⁶⁶ Department of State home page found at www.state.gov

⁶⁷ Department of State. Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009. (Department of State / USAID Publication 11084 Released August 2003), 7.

referred to in the regional stability section of the strategy is the Intelligence agency. Even this reference only describes the role of the Intelligence agency as identifying possible areas of instability.⁶⁸ In the section titled “Counter Terrorism” the DOS acknowledges that it is charged with developing, coordinating, and implementing American counterterrorism policy. The list of agencies in a cross cutting role was expanded to include the Department of Treasury, Defense, and Homeland Defense in that all of these agencies “play an important role in combating terrorism.”⁶⁹ As a strategy this broad statement falls short in describing the interaction between agencies, identifying a lead agency or supporting requirements.

As an example of how poorly this cross cutting approach in the GWOT works, the DOS, tasked by the National Security Council was directed to work with the DOJ, Department of Treasury, Homeland Defense and DOD in efforts to identify and defeat terrorist financing. Based on the directive a Terrorist Financing Working Group (TFWG) was established which included the aforementioned departments and agencies. This is the same grouping of departments identified in the DOS Strategy and provides a vehicle to identify collaboration and interagency cooperation. In October 2005 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report that focused exclusively on the TFWG.⁷⁰ Although examples of some success were identified, a major issue brought out in the report showed a lack of coordination between agencies as well as disagreement on funding for lead agency action. From the title of the report, *Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate U.S. Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad*, it is obvious there was a lack of collaboration that development of a long term strategy requires. Statements on lack of acknowledgement between agencies on

⁶⁸ Ibid, 7.

⁶⁹ Department of State. Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009. The entire discussion of the DOS role and cross cutting agency relationship is found in the chapter “Achieving Peace and Stability.” Although the strategy was released in 2003, evidence of this same lack of collaboration exists even in more recent documents.

⁷⁰ GAO Report 06-19: *Terrorist Financing*. (United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C.. Oct 2005), 3.

who was the “lead”, the Treasury Department disagreeing with the TFWG on procedures and DOJ disagreeing on priority countries are all examples of a lack of successful collaboration. What is even more alarming is a specific statement in the report as to who was responsible for the overall coordination of this aspect of the GWOT. The report authors, Senators Grassley, Collins and Durbin stated, “Although we requested a meeting, we did not obtain access to the National Security Council (NSC), which is responsible for the overall coordination of the interagency framework for combating terrorism including the financing of terrorist operations.”⁷¹ At the time the GAO report was released the NCTC had not yet been established so the NSC remained the organization with oversight of DOS in executing the TFWG aspect of the GWOT. Another telling finding of the lack of coordination was the Department of Treasury’s failure to accept the Department of State’s leadership of the DOS-led Terrorist Financing Working Group’s (TFWG) procedures for the delivery of training and technical assistance abroad. While supportive of the Department of State’s role as coordinator of TFWG efforts, the Department of Justice officials confirmed that roles and procedures were a matter of disagreement. As a final point on the challenges facing the interagency effort with the TFWG, the study concluded that a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) should be drafted between the DOS and Treasury Department in order to facilitate their interaction.⁷² This one comment describes the lack of unity of effort more than any other point made in the GAO-report. A directive issued by the NSC should not require additional MOAs to facilitate collaboration between governmental departments. This lack of unity calls into question the authority of the NSC as an organization charged with overall responsibility for synchronizing foreign policy actions. Looking at more recent documents one would hope to see improvement in this area.

⁷¹ GAO Report 06-19, 2.

⁷² GAO Report 06-19, 4.

The 2006 NSS acknowledges that Iraq and Afghanistan play a vital role in the overall GWOT. “Winning the War on Terror requires winning the battles in Afghanistan and Iraq”.⁷³ This one statement summarizes a major theme of the NSS with respect to the GWOT. If the NSS is the document from which all others derive guidance and intent, this statement serves as an important objective in terms of prioritizing and focusing efforts of the other departments and agencies. Within Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. military has played a preeminent role in the U.S. efforts and therefore is the next department to investigate for unity of effort.

In February 2006, DOD issued its own version of a strategy specifically for the war on terrorism. Titled *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, or (NMSP-WOT), this document in the words of then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld would: reflect lessons learned in the last three years of war, provide guidance to planners and commanders on objectives and resource priorities, and finally guidance on cooperation with other departments, agencies and coalitions for planning and conducting military operations.⁷⁴ Figure 1 depicts DOD’s interpretation of the National Strategy. Depicted in the figure are three key U.S. government elements of the GWOT strategy (Protect the Homeland, Attack Terrorist and Support Mainstream Muslims). Also displayed are the “cross cutting” elements, those where cooperation with other nations and coalition partners is required.⁷⁵ This figure is a DOD interpretation of the overall GWOT strategy and is used to articulate the Ends, Ways and Means of our governmental GWOT strategy.

⁷³ President Bush, NSS 2006, 12.

⁷⁴ United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*. (Washington, D.C. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006), 1. Available online at www.jcs.mil

⁷⁵ Ibid, 19.

National Strategy for the GWOT




Figure 1

Figure 2 provides the Military Strategic approach to the GWOT and expounds upon the National Framework in figure 1 by identifying enemy elements as well as military strategic objectives under the category of “Ways”. Within the text of the document the six military strategic objectives will complement “other U.S. Government activities” and will help DOD achieve termination objectives that for reasons of classification cannot be included in this monograph. Although the two slides depict a “nesting of efforts” there is little in the text of the NMSP-WOT to demonstrate collaboration or unity of effort.

Military Strategic Framework for the GWOT




Figure 2

In the several pages that expound upon each military strategic objective, not one single reference is made to other governmental agencies. Although DOD recognizes that it is not a lead agency in several instances, there is no mention of which agency is in the lead or how the military would support an identified lead agency. Nor are there any references to prioritizing resources, tasks or focusing geographically the military actions required for the GWOT.⁷⁶ These specifics may be included in the classified version of the plan, however many in the interagency department who would be involved in the collaborative effort required in the GWOT would not have access to the classified version either. The NMSP-WOT fails to deliver any of the guidance suggested by the Secretary of Defense in his cover letter. Without even broad guidance, DOD subordinate agencies are left to interpret on their own the operational and tactical actions required

⁷⁶ NMSP-WOT, 23-27. It may appear unfair to characterize a lack of collaboration when the classified documents are not discussed, however it is my opinion that just as the GAO report described

to facilitate the “ways” described in Figure 2. Contrast this with NSC-68 which gave specific guidance to the military on force size increases, mobilization capability, military assistance to countries standing against communism and forward basing in the European Theater in order to stem the threat of communism.⁷⁷

Feasibility

In executing the Cold War many of the resources available to the nation were similar to those required for the GWOT. The Instruments of National Power provide the means or resources for the U.S. to achieve its desired end state. As important as the resources, are the ways in which those resources are applied. At a strategic level, many different resources can be looked at to determine the feasibility of the nation’s strategic direction. This monograph will not discuss in any detail how many forces are available to prosecute the GWOT compared to post WWII or how much money is or was allocated as a percentage of GNP to execute the two wars. These items are not directly comparable and do not provide an example of a resources that must be applied and managed by several different agencies. One of the more unique resources applied during the Cold War was “information.” The drafters of NSC-68 clearly saw a need to influence through information in order for the strategy to be successful. As a result, NSC-68 called for a psychological component in its recommended course of action in 1950.

“Having achieved a comprehension of the issues now confronting this Republic, it will then be possible for the American people and the American Government to arrive at a consensus. Out of this common view will develop a determination of the national will and a solid resolute expression of that will.”⁷⁸

In light of the NSC recommendation, the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was established by Presidential Directive on April 4, 1951 "to authorize and provide for the more effective planning, coordination, and conduct within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological

collaboration requirements among various departments for Terrorist Financing, the same should be done for DOD and other department interaction in the NMSP-WOT.

⁷⁷ NSC-68, 47.

operations."⁷⁹ According to Edward P. Lilly, the PSB's historian, the Board's basic function was to prevent interagency rivalries from developing among the agencies involved in psychological operations⁸⁰.

The objectives of the PSB and the Information Agency established under Truman were twofold. First, the American people had to be kept informed on the direction of the country with respect to communism. As stated in NSC-68, "Keep the U.S. public fully informed and cognizant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures which we must accordingly adopt."⁸¹ Those measures could include shifting production capabilities to support war efforts, possible implementation of a draft, rationing or preparation for a nuclear conflict. This list is not all inclusive but does provide an idea of the scope of information operations directed at the U.S. public.

The second objective was the leadership in the Kremlin. A continuous effort in the form of radio broadcasts in the vicinity of communist or "Iron Curtain" countries and diplomatic engagement with states bordering the USSR were designed to incite the Soviet populace to overthrow their own government. The PSB was eventually abolished and replaced with the Operations Coordinating Board which remained in effect until President Kennedy was elected.⁸² Currently, there is almost no effort being placed on an information campaign as part of the GWOT.

Enduring Nature

The last criteria to be used in evaluating the NSS with respect to the GWOT is the enduring nature of the strategy. Is the strategy capable of withstanding the transfer of administrations? The transfer can be viewed as a new president or a change in the composition of the congress.

⁷⁸ NSC-68, 16.

⁷⁹ Harry S. Truman Papers Staff Member and Office Files: Psychological Strategy Board Files
Dates: 1951-53 found on line at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpape/physc.htm>

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ NSC-68, 47.

NSC-68 and the process behind its development arguably remained in tact through the Regan administration and well into President Bush the first's presidency. Contributing to the longevity was a series of events centered on the communist threat. The Korean War, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan all presented ample opportunity for the U.S. to demonstrate its resolve to defeat communism. While Korea and Vietnam provide examples of all instruments of power being applied in regions countering communist incursion, Afghanistan was an example of less military intervention but significant assistance in terms of economic aid, political support and support through providing military equipment. Each of these events became an openly visible forum for the government to rally to the call of defeating communism. As administrations changed, the nature of the enemy remained the constant that allowed for an enduring quality of the strategy that lasted for almost fifty years. In contrast to NSC-68, the GWOT is only in its sixth year of formally declared existence.

As the current NSS states, the front lines of the GWOT are Iraq and Afghanistan. If we accept that these two regions provide a microcosm view of the overall GWOT then both operations provide a view into the enduring nature of the current administration's strategy. Afghanistan, or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began in October of 2001 with overwhelming international and internal U.S. public support the GWOT formally started with a major emphasis on the use of America's military power. Up through Jan 2006, the U.S. provided over fourteen point two billion dollars to Afghanistan. This money, a reflection of the U.S. economic and political instruments of national power, also supported the development of Afghanistan's internal security mechanisms.⁸³ Since the initial operations began, the U.S. experienced a presidential election and three congressional elections. Assuming that public support for the GWOT would be

⁸² Gordon Gray, Oral History Interview with Gordon Gray, by Richard Mckenzie, (Washington, D.C. 1973) Accessed on line on 13 March 2007 at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/gray.htm>

⁸³ Anne Gearn, Washington Post.com, "White House Seeks \$10.6B for Afghanistan" Associated Press Friday, January 26, 2007, Accessed on line 16 Feb 2007 at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/25/AR2007012500834.html>. This article goes on to describe additional funds

reflected in the elected congress an enduring pattern has developed. Not only did a Republican Party controlled congress continue to garner support for Afghanistan until the 2006 congressional elections, a recently elected Democratic Party controlled congress continues to argue for support for the efforts in that country. An example of this support is seen in a top congressional Democrat sharply criticizing NATO allies in February 2007 for refusing to join the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Tom Lantos, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said the United States should "re-think" its alliance with NATO partners unwilling to defend Afghanistan.⁸⁴ Is the same degree of support reflected in the other front line of the GWOT? Iraq, specifically the Saddam regime and its ties to terrorism will not be addressed in terms of justification for initiating military operations by the U.S. led coalition in March of 2003. A lengthy study on intelligence analysis would be necessary to derive whether the U.S. was justified in commencing military operations. Rather, assume that intelligence was correct and President Bush's stated policy of the right of preemptive military action; the U.S. was justified in initiating Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Will we find the same level of support, both internally and external to the U.S. for our operations in Iraq? The President and a Republican Party controlled congress survived the 2004 election. This is not an amazing feat given our history with presidents during war. As stated in a recent article in the *San Francisco Chronicle* "History reveals that Congress is loath to challenge a president no matter how unpopular a war. Major U.S. military involvement in Vietnam lasted 11 years -- including four years under Nixon."⁸⁵ The administration did not fare so well with the 2006 mid term elections. A democrat controlled

being earmarked for Afghanistan. Of the 10.6 billion being asked for from congress, all but 2 billion will be for security needs.

⁸⁴ Playfuls.Com News Service, by News Staff, "Congressman Rebukes US Allies For Lack Of Support In Afghanistan" (February 7th 2007) accessed on line 9 Feb 07 at: http://www.playfuls.com/news_10_12929-Congressman-Rebukes-US-Allies-For-Lack-Of-Support-In-Afghanistan.html

⁸⁵ Carolyn Lochhead, San Francisco Chronicle, Congress' Iraq move may yet constrain Bush , (Chronicle Washington Bureau 15 February, 2007) Accessed on line 16 February 2007 at <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/02/15/MNGOOU55AN1.DTL>.

congress has as its first major undertaking a non binding resolution of non-support for the administration's decision to increase troop strength in Iraq and invest in a new strategy. The outcome of this debate has not yet been decided as of this writing.⁸⁶ The success of the Democratic Party in getting a non binding resolution to pass is not as important as the fact that the drafting of a non binding resolution shows a lack of support for a current strategy within the government of the U.S. The enduring nature of the strategy for executing the GWOT as applied to Iraq is in question by our lawmakers. Why is there a difference in the amount of support shown towards Afghanistan and Iraq? Both areas are acknowledged as being on the front line of the War on Terror, yet the two operations are not exactly the same fight.

Afghanistan represented a definitive location for Usama bin Laden and his support base provided by the Taliban regime. In the immediate aftermath of 9-11 the nature of the enemy was clearly ingrained in the eyes of Americans, as well as our allies. Iraq, on the other hand, presented a threat of a different nature. Saddam Hussein had a history with the American people but up to 2003 had provided no direct threat to U.S. vitality or our National Interests since the first Persian Gulf War. The American military launched a successful attack, removing Saddam and his regime from power and then began the insurgency that was not anticipated in its intensity or scope. Since the end of "major combat operations in Iraq, Americans have listened to numerous reports on the causes of the insurgency and whether or not a civil war is taking place along sectarian lines. Are we involved in an insurgency and is the so called civil war something the United States should be involved with are two questions that are providing a great deal of debate in our government. Regardless of the answer to either of these two questions, the fact remains that the lawmakers do not show the same support for Operation Iraqi Freedom as they have for Operation

⁸⁶ As of late March 2007, the Democratic Party with some support from the Republicans in congress approved a bill that would cease funding the war effort in Iraq. President Bush has vowed to veto the bill, but is facing continually mounting pressure to set a timeline for withdrawing troops from Iraq.

Enduring freedom in Afghanistan. The nature of the threat seen in Iraq may not be as clearly defined for many Americans or the lawmakers in congress.

Usama bin Laden and the existential nature of the threat Al Qaeda poses to Americans may be the contributing factor for the continued support for our current strategy for operations in Afghanistan. NATO's involvement as a major player in a region that is not contiguous with the European continent reflects an international enduring nature and support for the GWOT strategy with respect to OEF that is much greater than support for the strategy with respect to OIF.

Conclusion

The U.S. is involved in a long war. Radical Islam poses a threat to the U.S. not unlike that of communism during the cold war. In both cases, with radical Islam and with communism, the threat is both ideological and existential. The ideological foundations of radical Islam are perpetuated by a totalitarian leader in Usama bin Laden much like Joseph Stalin drove the expansion of communism from the Kremlin after WWII. The United States has attempted to embark on a long term campaign to defeat the threat that has on several occasions inflicted physical damage on our interests and Americans at home. In our efforts against communism a succession of presidents and their staffs formulated and executed a long term strategy that arguably led to the defeat of communism as a threat to the United States. Communist regimes still exist around the world but do not currently pose a viable or existential threat to our vital interests. Fidel Castro, in Cuba is an example of a communist regime in close proximity to the U.S. but does not poses the capacity to threaten our existence. Radical Islam on the other hand is a globally based threat with almost limitless resources in terms of followers, funds and communications infrastructure. In the development of a strategy to defeat communism, President Truman assembled an organization with the cultural savvy, fundamental economic knowledge and political expertise to craft a long term course for America as a world leader in the advancement of democracy and defeat of communist authoritarian regimes.

The NSC, and their resultant memorandum for President Truman titled “NSC-68” was the bedrock foundation for a process and a plan that would endure eight presidents. Each administration maintained the NSC as an advisory organization, but not all used the NSC in a centralized role. In Prados’ “Keeper of the Keys” the legacy of the NSC is traced through each administration up through President George H. Bush. With the increased bureaucracy in the U.S. government it became increasingly difficult to centrally manage the cold war through the NSC, however, the plan presented in NSC-68 provided the unifying quality required for a long term strategy.

The U.S. is now involved with executing its current version of the Cold War in the form of the GWOT. The bureaucracy of the governmental departments and agencies has only grown since the end of the cold war. Furthermore, the current administration is relying on a “lead agency” approach to the GWOT. This approach has proved to be extremely difficult to bring about a unity of effort in the absence of unity of command. In spite of this perceived lack of unity of effort in the previous examples, the National Counterterrorism Center may possibly be a step in the right direction. “Beyond Gold Water-Nichols: Phase II Report” presents numerous recommendations for the restructuring and accountability of the departments and agencies executing their own pieces of the GWOT. Taken in total, the changes may lead to a more unified effort. In the executive summary, the report surmises that the NSC be formally tasked with an active role in ensuring Presidential intent is realized as opposed to its current traditional role of preparing decisions for the President.⁸⁷ A key observation of the need for this refocusing of the NSC relates to current statutes governing the military. Currently, Title 10 of the U.S. Code gives the Secretary of Defense “authority, direction and control” over the Defense apparatus subject to the direction of the President. The President, however, does not have authority by Congress to

⁸⁷ Clark A. Murdock and Michele Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.) 7

exercise the same type of control over U.S. Government agencies except in times of national emergencies. In effect, there are no national security command and control capabilities resident in the current structure.⁸⁸ The growth in the bureaucracy of our government agencies has overwhelmed the role of the NSC initially defined by President Truman. His small group of trusted agents and experts in foreign policy provided the necessary though informal command and control of the government. Today's NSC in keeping within the statutes is unable to exercise the same function for our President. The Goldwater-Nichols report provides numerous examples of the lack of interagency coordination and in many cases proposes sound restructuring advice. Of significance, is that most of these proposals would rely on empowering the NSC as an organization requiring revised statutes for authority to coordinate the activities of all U.S. government agencies as they execute missions related to foreign policy and the GWOT. The availability of resources and the actual employment of those resources are essential for executing any plan. One of the major strengths of NSC-68 was the identification and inclusion of an information management practice as a part of the overall strategy. President Truman established a board specifically for the purpose of presenting a consistent theme to the international community. Partners in our alliances as well as the Kremlin received a consistent message on the democratic goals of the United States and our desire to thwart communist expansion while building democratic capacity in terms of economic growth and diplomatic credibility in those countries willing to side with us. More importantly, the American people were a target audience for the themes and messages coming out of the administration. President Truman believed that the only way to call on the American people to make sacrifices, if necessary, was if they were kept informed of the progress and objectives of our foreign policy. Ironically, information is considered one of the four main components of our national power along with diplomacy, economics and the military, yet information as a resource is completely

⁸⁸ Ibid, 17.

under used and not even discussed in the current NSS. According to LTC David Kilcullen, of the Australian Army, the U.S. is losing the information war in the GWOT. Kilcullen, recognized by our senior civilian and military leaders as a counter-insurgency expert stated, “In the information war, America and its allies are barely competing. America’s information operations, far from being the primary strategy, simply support military actions, and often badly.”⁸⁹ This single statement also highlights a perception that America is not at war; only the military is fully engaged in the GWOT.

A presidential decree concerning the “Axis of Evil” is insufficient to send the proper message to would be terrorist organizations, government facilitators and super empowered individuals. Guidance to the American public has not been much beyond encouragement to enjoy economic success. In visiting several higher level headquarters, it is obvious that at least within the Department of Defense we lack the ability to communicate our successes in the GWOT.⁹⁰ In a personal example of this reluctance to communicate success, the U.S. is quick to insist on placing a local face on a great deal of the work and success we might enjoy in the GWOT.⁹¹ Tied to the application of a true information operations or Strategic Communications aspect in the GWOT may be a more widely accepted and long lived way ahead applicable to our own government agencies.

The enduring nature of our current strategy has yet to be fully identified. Limited success on the front lines of the GWOT in Afghanistan and a perception of losing in Iraq are already being

⁸⁹ George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy”, *The New Yorker*, December 18, 2006. 64.

⁹⁰ The author, as part of the AOASF curriculum conducted visits to most Geographic Combatant Commands and several U.S. embassies. Specifics on the content of the discussions concerning Information Operations and Strategic Communications can not be listed due to non-attribution policy of visits. This particular note refers to actions taken by the U.S. in response to the July 06 Israeli conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

⁹¹ This observation is from the author’s personal experience in Iraq from September 03 through September 04. Using money from the Commander’s Emergency Relief Program (CERP) units were asked by the Coalition Provisional Authority to credit all activities to the local government. In reality, the locals knew who provided the assistance and continually asked why the U.S. forces did not take credit. Local leaders tried to prevent rumors that insurgents and former Baath members were not responsible for progress made.

touted as the cause for a congressional turnover. Recommendations like those posited by the “Goldwater-Nichols Phase II report” may provide not only the unifying quality to our foreign policy, but also a holistic and hopefully bipartisan acceptance of a long term strategy required for the GWOT.

An additional aspect of the long term strategy that should be addressed is the engagement of nations and regions vice an isolation mentality towards countries who by location or regime present a threat. One of the strengths of NSC-68 was the discussion of building capacity in and maintaining engagements with other nations. NSC specifically identifies the role of the U.S. Government in building military and economic capability in Western Europe as well as assisting the U.K. with efforts in Asia and SE Asia.⁹² The current NSS however uses a tone of isolating potential threat countries. The NSS singles out Syria, Iran and North Korea as primary threats associated with terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁹³ In contrast to NSC-68, the current NSS does not provide a positive direction for our instruments of national power, but merely who the U.S. sees as a threat. Guidance for long term direction to our departments and agencies is not specified and could potentially inhibit a coherent enduring strategy.

Central to the enduring success will be an organization with the appropriate process and authorities to formulate and direct the President’s intent especially in the GWOT. This organization exists today as it has for over fifty years. The NSC will require the same transformation being experienced by the military today in order to make it as effective in the bureaucratic leviathan that is the U.S. government. The NSC must be resurrected, empowered and put to task if our GWOT is to be successful.

⁹² NSC-68, Section VI. U.S. Intentions and Capabilities. Throughout the document reference is made to NATO/Western Europe, Latin America, China and U.K. Commonwealths. In general terms, methods of engagement are addressed with respect to military assistance, economic development and diplomatic engagement.

⁹³ President Bush, National Security Strategy, 2006. 21.

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