

**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST**

July 2007

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FOREWORD

The purpose of the Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) is to give researchers, whether military professionals or civilian scholars, a ready reference of those issues of particular interest to the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense. The focus of the KSIL is strategic, rather than operational or tactical. Every year, the KSIL helps guide research efforts to the mutual benefit of the defense community and individual researchers.

This year, our nation faces several major challenges, ranging in type from the conflict in Iraq to changes in force size and structure. These challenges are perhaps more significant than any the United States has faced in more than a decade.

With the publication of the 2007 KSIL, the Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College invite all researchers to contribute their efforts to resolving these challenges.

Researchers are encouraged to contact any of the Strategic Studies Institute points of contact, or those found in the Expanded KSIL, for further information regarding their desired topics. These points of contact are not necessarily subject experts, but can recommend experts or additional sponsors.


DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES

GLOBAL AND FUNCTIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES

POC: Dr. Dallas Owens (717) 245-4126

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1. Global War on Terror

- a. Reconceptualizing the “war” on terror: Is it a war, and, if so, what is its nature and how should it be prosecuted?
- b. Revising U.S. global strategy for the war on terrorism; reassessing the ends, ways, and means
- c. Understanding challenges confronting the coalition in Afghanistan and developing appropriate responses
- d. What coalitions and alliances should the U.S. be building and supporting?
- e. What measures of effectiveness should be applied to the larger war on terror?
- f. Countering ideological support for terrorism through domestic and foreign means
- g. Recognizing progress in counterinsurgency operations, and reinforcing it
- h. What proportion of U.S. landpower should be focused on counterinsurgency operations and how should it be organized, trained, equipped, and deployed?
- i. Training international security forces (military, paramilitary, and police)
- j. Balancing political, economic, and military tools in counterinsurgency operations
- k. Challenges and opportunities of employing non-governmental militias in counterinsurgency efforts

- l. Should the war on drugs be integrated into the war on terror?
- m. What should be the military role in the collection of foreign intelligence in areas of interest and the linkage to, and collaboration with, nonmilitary collection?

2. Homeland Security/Homeland Defense/Civil Support

- a. Does the U.S. homeland have a center of gravity?
- b. Assessing, countering, and responding to WMD threats
- c. Identify intelligence collection requirements and restrictions in homeland security, and identify whether there are any likely and/or possible implications for information/intelligence sharing and warning
- d. Information sharing among intelligence, law enforcement, and other federal, state, and local agencies, and the likely and/or possible impacts on warning and our homeland defense/security effectiveness
- e. Strategic implications of missile defense as a component of homeland defense
- f. Active and reserve components' roles in homeland security
- g. Combining federal, state, and local resources for combating homeland threats
- h. Identifying and protecting DoD and/or non-DoD critical infrastructure
- i. Implications of the North American Defense Agreement (U.S., Canada, Mexico)
- j. Implications of dual Title 10 and Title 32 responsibilities for State Adjutant Generals given operational control of federal assets for local event support. Likewise: Implications of dual status (Title 10 and Title 32) responsibilities for active duty officers under USC Title 32 Section 315 given operational control of non-Federal National Guard soldiers to support domestic incidents
- k. Interagency planning for pandemics
- l. Strategic implications of intermediate range ballistic missiles in the Western Hemisphere

- m. What is the impact of under-equipped *active duty and* reserve units responding to WMD or natural disasters, or other *Civil Support* missions?
- n. How should U.S. Northern Command be organized and resourced, and how should it be composed (ratio of AC to RC and service composition) to better support its Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions?
- o. Should changes be made to either the Posse Comitatus or Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order Act to facilitate the use of National Guard or AC in support of Homeland Defense and Civil Support?
- p. What are the second- and third-order effects of mass evacuations?
- q. Establishing Operational Interagency information exchange environments: National directives call for the development of a domestic and international information sharing mechanism among Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and Civil Support entities
- r. Integration of the private sector in response to a public health emergency (e.g., information distribution, mental health counseling, goods, accountability for employees)
- s. Cyberspace Operations: Determine if the operational framework being pursued by the DoD for cyberspace operations is the most effective for all warfighters. Will it be sensitive to Geographic Combatant Commanders' needs or will they be required to standup their own cyberspace operations capability? Should there be a sub-unified command that consolidates all cyberspace capability? Should all Service and Agency capabilities be aligned to USSTRATCOM?
- t. Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Standardized Tracking. How can the DoD standardize a method for tracking critical infrastructure and what should the tool look like?
- u. Rules of Engagement in Cyberspace: What are they, and are they relevant and/or appropriate?

- v. National Guard: Operational or Strategic Reserve? Effects to Homeland Security and Civil Support
- w. Advantages and disadvantages of moving all U.S. territory (specifically Hawaii, U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico) under USNORTHCOM as the lead combatant command for expertise in Homeland Defense
- x. Interagency coordination and cooperation in Homeland Security/Homeland Defense
- y. Should DoD and non-Federal National Guard have dedicated Civil Support capabilities to respond to natural and manmade domestic disasters?

3. Military Change

- a. Understanding revolutionary change in warfare
- b. Analyzing developments in contemporary warfare
- c. Historical responses to unexpected technological breakthroughs
- d. Alternative paths for transforming the U.S. military
- e. Preparing for fog and friction on the future battlefield
- f. Land force requirements for full spectrum dominance
- g. Future force capacities for peacekeeping and stability operations
- h. Networks and Warfare:
 - (1) Leadership in a network environment
 - (2) Command and control (Battle Command) in a network environment
- i. Strategic implications of future operational concepts:
 - (1) The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and family of Joint concepts
 - (2) The Army in Joint Operations, and Army future force operational concepts
- j. Evaluating the themes in the Army's 2007 Strategic Planning Guidance:
 - (1) Assessing force proficiencies against irregular challenges
 - (2) Assessing force capabilities for stability operations
 - (3) Assessing force capabilities to dominate in complex terrain
 - (4) Assessing capabilities for strategic responsiveness
 - (5) Assessing the Army's Global Force Posture
 - (6) Assessing force capabilities for Battle Command
- k. Impact and fundamental requirements for interdependence
- l. Future force vulnerabilities to technological failures and surprises

- m. Information, misinformation, and disinformation. How can DoD manage these in an information-rich world?
- n. Inter- and intra-theater mobility requirements for a transformed military force
- o. Transforming logistical support for U.S. Army, allies and coalition partners
- p. Transforming OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Service staffs
- q. Transforming the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve
- r. Women in combat: laws and norms
- s. Modular force performance within existing and/or emerging Joint doctrine
- t. The mix of heavy, medium, and light elements in future forces, both AC and RC
- u. Savings and costs of the Future Force, both AC and RC
- v. Transformation in light of OIF and other ongoing operations
- w. The risk of technology maturation versus stable investment strategies
- x. Resource conflicts between operational and institutional transformation
- y. Advantages and disadvantages of transforming toward lean efficiency
- z. Does ARFORGEN meet the Army's needs for extended combat operations?
 - aa. Operating in cyberspace
 - bb. Streamlining the business of DoD's business: Is DoD's governance responsive enough in today's fast-changing world?
 - cc. Strategic implications of outer space as a theater of war

4. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy

- a. National Security Strategy (NSS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Defense Strategy (DS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), Unified Command Plan (UCP), and Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG):
 - (1) Assessing the NSS, DS, NMS, SPG, UCP, and CPG
 - (2) Alternatives to the NSS, DS, NMS, SPG, UCP, and CPG
 - (3) Determining acceptable strategic risk
- b. Alternative American grand strategies, their costs and benefits
- c. Scoping and determining strategic implications of irregular, traditional, and hybrid challenges
- d. Deterrence and dissuasion in U.S. national strategy
- e. Proliferation and counterproliferation in a globalized world
- f. Integrating military and nonmilitary tools to achieve strategic objectives and avoid or resolve potential conflict
- g. The utility of military force as an instrument of policy in the 21st century.
- h. Implications of U.S. missile defense for allies and potential adversaries
- i. Implications of preemptive and preventive war doctrines
- j. Responding to the collapse of strategically significant states
- k. Long-term stability, support, reconstruction and transition operations
- l. Post-Cold War security assistance and its utility
- m. Alternatives to the spectrum of conflict model and alternative strategic futures

- n. Is a full-spectrum force required for the future; is it possible to sustain?
- o. Strategic net and risk assessment in a unipolar system
- p. Examining the relationship between energy and security
- q. "Global warming" and U.S. national security

5. Landpower Employment

- a. The Army and irregular challenges:
 - (1) Given some success in defeating IED challenges, what other measures might insurgents or terrorists take?
 - (2) What steps should U.S. forces take to minimize the effectiveness of those measures?
- b. Requirements for counterinsurgency operations
- c. Requirements for military operations in complex terrain
- d. Assess the importance of information superiority in military operations
- e. Conducting combat operations, security operations, and stability operations concurrently: how to transition, where to focus?
- f. Changing landpower roles in stabilization, reconstruction, and humanitarian operations:
 - (1) Information and intelligence sharing between military and coalition partners
 - (2) Integrating military and civilian logistics
 - (3) Definitions and policies for establishing a “safe and secure” environment
- g. Improving joint, combined, interagency, NGO and IGO cooperation in humanitarian and counterinsurgency operations
- h. Evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy execution by combatant commanders and country teams
- i. The international criminal court and American military operations

6. Landpower Generation and Sustainment

- a. Changing requirements versus legal constraints for military and interagency mobilization
- b. Assessing the effectiveness of the War Reserve Materiel Program
- c. Impact of force protection requirements on power projection and force employment
- d. Globalization's impact on the military-industrial base
- e. Strategic implications of implementing base closures
- f. Overcoming anti-access and area-denial strategies
- g. Planning for operations in areas with primitive and austere infrastructures
- h. Tradeoffs with respect to power projection, prepositioning, and forward stationing
- i. Planning for protracted conflicts
- j. Logistics for dispersed/distributed combat operations
- k. Expanded roles of civilians in defense operations and the impact on force structure
- l. Adapting the reserve components to continuous mobilization
- m. Landpower's role in seabasing as a logistical and operational concept
- n. Sustaining a modular, capabilities-based Army
- o. Establishing a single Army logistics enterprise
- p. Managing support for joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) commodities

- q. Incorporating LOGCAP and other augmentation agreements into DoD and DoS strategies

- r. Implications for manning, equipping, and sustaining functions in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model:
 - (1) Generating force roles and missions: In a resource constrained environment, how do we balance the roles of the generating force and the operating force? Strategically is it more effective to give generating force tasks to the operational force or extend the capacity of the generating force? What are the relative risks involved?
 - (2) Title 10 and generating capabilities for the Joint Force Commander: What changes in Title 10 and other authorities are required to enable the Army to support operations that span the entire range of military operations in a battlespace which encompasses the whole world (including the U.S. homeland)?
 - (3) Exporting generating force capabilities: How will the evolution of the Army's generating force integrate with analogous changes in Joint, Interagency and Multinational partners to enable successful adaptation and generation of national capabilities?
 - (4) The generating force in the Modular Army: How should we address new generating force requirements in the context of Total Army Analysis, or its successor? Does the generating force become a modular force as well?
 - (5) The generating force in the long war: How will we attract and retain people of even higher quality than the current force under conditions of continuous conflict? How will they accumulate the full range of developmental experiences that includes increased education, frequent deployments and alternating operating force and generating force assignments?

7. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture

- a. Retention and readiness of active and reserve forces
- b. Developing forces and doctrine for expeditionary operations
- c. Developing forces and doctrine for security cooperation, assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence
- d. Developing soldiers and leaders for the future force
- e. Teaching strategy for 21st century conflict
- f. Changing the continuum of service
- g. Assessing the gap between civilian and military cultures
- h. The U.S. military and American society:
 - (1) Demographics: who is in it, and who fights?
 - (2) Civilian control over the military in the 21st century
- i. Identifying, managing, and sustaining the Army's intellectual and technological talent
- j. The status of the Army as a profession
- k. Sustaining public support for the U.S. armed forces
- l. How the Army develops and responds to "lessons learned"
- m. Obtaining Joint synergy despite different service cultures
- n. Establishing and maintaining a culture of innovation
- o. Implications of adopting commercial best business practices for the military
- p. Managing changes in temporary end strength
- q. Implications for the All-Volunteer Force fighting the "long" war

- r. Implications of DoD reorganization initiatives and military reform
- s. Managing deployed civilians and contractors
- t. Managing nondeployable soldiers
- u. Strategic purpose and effectiveness of the Individual Ready Reserve
- v. Examining the pre-commissioning program
- w. Revising the military decisionmaking process
- x. Determining the difference between dissent and disloyalty with civilian oversight
- y. Analyzing the impact of repeated deployments on families
- z. How will the fact that fewer members of Congress have served in the armed services affect future Defense policy?

REGIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES

POC: Dr. Steven Metz (717) 245-3822
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1. North Africa, the Middle East, and the Islamic World

- a. U.S. interests with respect to a sovereign Iraq
- b. Changing the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf
- c. Security issues created by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
- d. U.S. strategy toward Iran
- e. U.S. strategy toward Libya
- f. U.S. strategy toward Syria
- g. Implications of a nuclear Iran
- h. The impact of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) on U.S. national security
- i. Strategic implications of a changing Egypt
- j. The future of Saudi Arabia and Middle Eastern security
- k. Strategic implications of democratic, but anti-U.S. governments, in the Middle East
- l. Strategic implications of increasing Chinese demand for Middle East oil, and arms sales and economic aid in the Middle East and North Africa
- m. Future role of NATO in the Middle East
- n. Emerging and evolving military relationships among Middle Eastern states
- o. Strategies regional states have for dealing with the United States and its allies in the Middle East and North Africa

- p. Deterrence strategies in the Middle East and North Africa.
- q. The impact of government organizations and transnational organizations on Islamic militancy
- r. U.S. strategy toward Lebanon
- s. Efforts to contain and moderate violent ethnic and sectarian conflicts throughout the Middle East

2. Asia-Pacific Region

- a. Balancing U.S. security interests in China and Taiwan
- b. The future of the Japan-U.S. security relationship
- c. Implications of China's growing economic and military power in the region
- d. Security concerns in Southeast Asia and implications for the United States
- e. Strategic response to North Korea's intentions and capabilities
- f. Evolving Republic of Korea-U.S. security relations
- g. Evolving Japan-U.S. security relations
- h. Japan's relationships with Asian nations
- i. Future of ASEAN and U.S. strategic posture in the region
- j. The role of the U.S. military on the Korean Peninsula
- k. Future of the U.S. alliance with Australia and New Zealand
- l. Sources and dimensions of anti-Americanism in Asia: policy implications
- m. Chinese-North Korean relations
- n. Politics of history and memory in South-North Korean relations
- o. Role of nationalism in Asia and implications for U.S. policy
- p. Role of ideology in Asia and implications for U.S. policy
- q. China's regional and global grand strategy
- r. China's military transformation

- s. Russia's interests, policy and actions in Asia
- t. Transformation of U.S. forward deployment in Asia
- u. Toward U.S. energy security strategy for Asia and the Pacific
- v. The strategic implications of China's growing space capabilities

3. Sub-Saharan Africa

- a. The role of the African Union in African peacekeeping operations
- b. Army international activities programs in Africa
- c. Sub-Saharan Africa and the war on terrorism
- d. Implications of continent-wide failure due to AIDS and political strife
- e. Forming regional cooperative security arrangements
- f. Security effects of the exploitation of Africa's natural energy resources
- g. Professional development of African militaries
- h. Strategic implications of Chinese activity in Sub-Saharan Africa
- i. How should the U.S. respond to acts of genocide (e.g., Rwanda, Sudan)?
- j. The causes and dynamics of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa
- k. The constitution and role of the Africa Command (AFRICOM)
- l. Effective methods of conflict resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa
- m. Strategic implications of the establishment of narco-states by international drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and transnational criminal organizations (TNCOs) along the West Coast of Africa

4. Europe

- a. U.S. Army roles in future Balkan security
- b. A roadmap for future security in the west Balkans
- c. The revival of the Russian military
- d. Prospects for Russo-American security and/or defense cooperation
- e. Russia's future relationships with Europe and the United States
- f. Russia, the Middle East, and energy security in Europe
- g. Democratization and instability in Ukraine and Belarus
- h. Impact of growing Muslim populations on European security policy
- i. Strategic implications of reconfiguring the U.S. military presence in Europe
- j. Implications of a changing NATO
- k. U.S. leadership in NATO: Does the U.S. Army still play a role?
- l. NATO and EU defense capabilities: new or just repackaging the old?
- m. EU civil-military cell – a useful model for Joint/Interagency operations?
- n. Is the U.S.-Europe military capabilities gap still growing; are U.S. technology transfer rules helping or hindering?
- o. Implications of OIF for European cooperation in the war on terrorism
- p. EU expansion while excluding Turkey from membership

- q. Strategic implications of drawing down U.S. forces in Europe
- r. Will ISAF break NATO?

5. Southwest Asia

- a. Balancing U.S. security interests between India and Pakistan
- b. Role of India in world events and U.S.-Indian military-strategic relations
- c. Maintaining stability and security in Afghanistan
- d. Long-term implications of maintaining the OIF coalition
- e. Implications of major changes in Pakistan's domestic conditions

6. Central Asia

- a. Growing U.S. security interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia
- b. Russian-China-U.S. competition in Central Asia
- c. Implications of energy development in the Caucasus and Caspian regions
- d. Synchronizing security cooperation and political reform in Central Asia
- e. The role and structure of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia

7. Western Hemisphere

- a. U.S. interests in Caribbean security issues
- b. Hemispheric security forces (military and police) and new threats
- c. Improving security ties with Brazil
- d. Lessons from the Colombian insurgency
- e. Immigration and people smuggling as a security issue
- f. Ungoverned space and implications for territorial security
- g. Gangs and other transnational crime as a threat to the area
- h. Venezuela as an exporter of political instability
- i. Narco-funded terrorism networks
- j. Instability and disenfranchised indigenous and poor populations
- k. Implications of the rising threat of populism in the region; the difference between populists and the “responsible left”
- l. How to address the fundamental disconnect between the U.S. and Latin American visions of current threats to the region
- m. Long-term implications of Chinese engagement in Latin America
- n. Implications of economic integration such as the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
- o. Impact of the American Serviceman’s Protection Act of 2000 (ASPA) on hemispheric security relations
- p. Maintaining the viability of hemispheric security forces during a time of declining budgets

- q. Implications for U.S. security of a post-Castro Cuba
- r. Forming a North American Security Community
- s. How to engage the Mexican military
- t. Impact and desirability of forming sub-regional security organizations like the *Conferencia de Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas* (CFAC)

8. Other

- a. Revising the boundaries of the geographic Combatant Commands
- b. Integrating regional security cooperation plans and basing and presence policies
- c. Environmental issues as a basis for enhancing security cooperation

WAR AND SOCIETY

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1. American Society

- a. Balancing individual civil rights and national security requirements
- b. Debating America's place in the world
- c. America's changing perceptions of other nations
- d. The purpose of war: historical interpretation and debate
- e. The U.S. media and political and social mobilization
- f. American civil-military relations in wartime
- g. Changing notions of liberty and freedom
- h. Role of religion and faith in the American way of war
- i. Changing views of patriotism in America
- j. Strategic implications of public perceptions of who serves, and who dies
- k. The impact of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq on U.S. civil-military relations
- l. Civilian control of the military and the duty to provide military advice effectively
- m. Political boundaries for general and flag officers, active and retired

2. International Society

- a. Rethinking the “Clash of Cultures” debate
- b. Strategic implications of the “unipolar” moment
- c. Anti-Americanism and U.S. foreign policy
- d. International views of the United States
- e. Understanding centers of power in other societies, cultures
- f. International ramifications of American exceptionalism

**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
SUBJECT MATTER/REGIONAL EXPERTS**

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EXPANDED TOPIC LIST

Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1

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1. Investigate future trends (up to 2020) in American population (ages 17-42) that will impact recruiting for Army Components and recommend courses of actions that maintain recruiting success. (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-7693)
2. Review, investigate, and recommend an appropriate set of recruiting quality standards that predict operational mission success; are understandable and acceptable to the public and national leadership; and achievable within the projected 17-42-year-old American population. (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-7693)
3. Investigate performance of soldiers recruited from 2001 to 2007 who enlisted with high school diploma vs. those who did not; who enlisted with moral waiver vs. those who did not; those who enlisted with and without a medical waiver. (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-7693)
4. Analyze performance of non-U.S. citizens who enlisted in the Army from 2001 to 2007. Recommend legislative/recruiting policy changes based upon analysis. (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-7693)
5. What is the value of the high school diploma to military service? (Does possessing a high school diploma upon entry onto active duty equal a better soldier? Should the military, like most of society, view a GED [General Education Development] the same as it views high school diploma?) (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-7693)
6. Outsourcing for Combat Power: Is there an over reliance on contractors? (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-7693)
7. Mobilizing the Elements of National Power for the War on Terror (the long war). (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-7693)
8. What defines "quality" in the Army of the future (2010 and beyond)? (Mr. Spara, DMPM, 703-7693)

9. What are the effects of the DoD Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP)/Investment Review Board (IRB) certification process for Human Resources Management (HRM) Domain's information technology systems? Has the certification program provided any cost savings or cost avoidance to the domain or the Army? How can the HRM Domain make this certification process more efficient or effective? (LTC Barrington, CIO)
10. Identify the changes and efficacy of Army bonuses and incentive programs in maintaining an all volunteer force during wartime. How do current enlistment retention bonuses stack up historically with previous wars? What do results of such study imply for initiatives to grow Army end strength by 20-30K? (LTC McSherry, PR)
11. Identify the marginal cost and benefit curves for recruiting's main levers such as advertising, recruiter strength, and financial incentives. Can the lever's impact be captured in an equation? How strong is the correlation? Example: # additional recruiters = # additional recruits. What is the optimal mix? (LTC McSherry, PR)
12. Investigate and recommend ways for reducing the divorce rates of female enlisted soldiers in the Army (holding for no additional funding and no change to the Army's missions). Identify reasons for the increasing trend in female enlisted divorce rates and determine why this particular group has higher rates than male soldiers and female officers? What are the most effective services, according to soldiers, that the Army provides to reduce divorce rates for its officers and enlisted soldiers? (Dr. Betty Maxfield, HR, 703-696-5128)
13. What does "right" look like as it relates to Army workforce diversity for all components of the Army? (COL Tony Reyes, HR, 70-696-5114)
14. How effective is mentorship in today's Army? Is the current voluntary mentorship program sufficient to meet the needs of tomorrow's leaders or do we need to structure our program in the same manner as found in the corporate arena? (LTC Kathy Ensworth, HR, 703-695-5248)

15. Implementing and operating a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program (SAPR) in a deployed environment. What are the challenges of operating a SAPR Program in a deployed theater, and what are possible methods to overcome them? How should the hand-off of cases/victims after redeployment be managed? (Ms. Carolyn Collins, HR, 703-696-5139)
16. What is the relationship between soldier drug or alcohol abuse rates and other measures of indiscipline and the measured unit performance in externally-evaluated training exercises (i.e., NTC or JRTC rotations, BCTP-evaluated training exercises like Warfighters or Brigade/Battalion simulation exercises, etc.)? (Dr. Les McFarling, HR, 703-681-5577)
17. What is the relationship between unit cohesion and high risk behaviors, specifically drug and alcohol abuse, in the Army? Data from the Army risk reduction program (RRP) in conjunction with the reintegration of unit risk inventory (RURI) could be used to examine unit risk behavior, the high risk units can be identified from the RRP and RURI data (data are available from the Army Center for Substance Abuse Programs). The nature of the inter-relationship among cohesion and high risk and their developmental dynamics needs to be examined. Of particular importance will be the identification of the precise conditions under which social cohesion can become detrimental or beneficial for unit performance. Moreover, it will be interesting to see how deployment plays a role in unit cohesion (e.g., measuring cohesion before, during, and after deployment). (Dr. Harnam Singh, HR, 703-681-5580).
18. The soldier Life Cycle includes recruiting, training, and, ultimately, separation and retirement. How effectively does the Army communicate with the soldier and spouse and prepare them for retirement? To what degree are soldiers and spouses taking the initiative to begin planning for retirement years prior to their actual date of retirement? What can be done to enhance communications in this important life cycle process? (Mr. John Radke, HR, 703-325-2699)
19. The Secretary of Army has directed that the Army needs to incorporate continuum of service as part of the Human Capital Strategy. What are the most significant obstacles, in policies,

laws, regulations, etc. that must be addressed in order to achieve continuum of service? (LTC Jeff Sterling, DMPM)

20. Complete a review of the ROTC accession program (i.e., scholarship award process, PMS management, school selection, curriculum, etc.). How can the Army better recruit for Reserve Component officers? Review how scholarships are distributed. Review the commissioning rate of scholarship recipients and suggest improvements. Review the course curriculum to determine whether we are preparing future officers correctly. Is the intensity of training (e.g., PT, field exercise, etc.) affecting our ability to recruit cadets? Are there improvements required in the curriculum? (COL Patterson, DMPM)
21. What are the characteristics of organizations where pay for performance concepts work over time? Right now, pay for performance seems to work well in lab demonstration projects. What does the literature say about implementing such a system in a broad, heterogeneous environment like the total civilian Army? What kinds of interventions are called for and when should they take place in order to create an environment that fosters cooperation and trust, even within a concept that, on the surface, seems to reward competition within groups? (Ms. Jeannie Davis, CP)
22. Life Cycle Manning and the Global War on Terrorism: Will it work? Will the GWOT interfere with Life Cycle manning? (HRC-EP)
23. What are the implications of BRAC for the civilian work force (GS and contractor) during transition and at new location? How does BRAC organization ramp down as a result of the perceived dividends of consolidation and ramp up in the new environment to provide expected support? The implications of BRAC on the civilian workforce regarding mission requirements are not readily understood in the areas of (intellectual capital loss, current state to new state operating level upon BRAC execution, skill set revision, hiring practices to cover gaps, issues of management hierarchy when multiple organizations combine, workforce age impact on BRAC (i.e., metropolitan workforce versus lower priced area with younger/different/more mobile workforce); all of previous applies in some ways to contractors also and is particularly important to IT organizations and their support requirements. (HRC)

24. How will the ARFORGEN model impact soldier dwell time? (HRC-EP)
25. What are the capabilities and limitations of the Modular (plug and play) Army? (HRC-EP)
26. What are the disconnects between ARFORGEN and monthly accessions mission? (HRC-EP)
27. Assess current RC policy to determine if the numerous categories of soldiers are needed and how we can effectively track, monitor, and use the categories when needing the IRR soldiers? (HRC-TAGD)
28. Assess the Defense Business Board's recommendation to the SECDEF to outsource all military postal operations and outline a plan of how postal operations could be contracted throughout the Army to include during wartime. (HRC-TAGD)
29. Assess the effectiveness of the command and control relationships of the Human Resource Sustainment Centers with the Theater Support Commands and the HR companies. (HRC-TAGD)
30. Analyze the readiness reporting nonavailable and nondeployable criteria and make recommendations to reduce the number of soldiers nondeployable. Evaluate and make recommendations to the DoD policy and the Physical Disability Agency's practice that allows nondeployable soldiers to be found fit for duty and retained in the service. (HRC-TAGD)
31. Analyze alternatives for One DoD Postal Budget and recommend how to handle shortfalls if the budgeted amount is less than the bills. (HRC-TAGD)
32. Analyze alternatives for One DoD Postal Organization with organizational chart and positions for each level within the organization. (HRC-TAGD)
33. Analyze alternatives for postal planners to be integrated into the COCOMs from MPSA or stand-up a Joint Postal Cell for contingency operations. (HRC-TAGD)

Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2

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1. Global War on Terror:
 - a. What economic trends would indicate a long-term inability for the U.S. to continue prosecuting the war on terror?
 - b. To what extent should indigenous paramilitary and police forces be relied upon in the war on terror? What is the scope of the training and equipping responsibility of the U.S. military and how should such activities be internally coordinated?
 - c. Is combat information and intelligence integrated effectively down to the tactical level in the war on terror?
 - d. How can defense and counterterrorism intelligence integration be maximized in the war on terror?
 - e. Conventional deterrence theory states that a credible threat is essential to challenging enemy designs. Can nihilistic, nonstate actors be seriously deterred from committing mass casualty events with such techniques (e.g., holding at risk key geography [e.g., Mecca, Qom] or loved ones)?
 - f. As DoD intelligence and the FBI have to synchronize and integrate activities with respect to international and domestic terrorism, how or will the respective cultures adjust for information sharing purposes?
 - g. At what point should GWOT no longer be considered a “war,” but instead a series of law enforcement operations?
2. Homeland Security:
 - a. How have new Homeland Security policy, regulations, doctrine and executive orders affected U.S. military intelligence operations inside the U.S.?
 - b. What is the impact on homeland security of the growing influence of al Qaeda in Central and South America?
 - c. To what extent should the U.S. military be used inside the homeland for either natural disasters or attacks?
 - d. How should the American people, the U.S. Government, and the U.S. military balance domestic counterintelligence and rights to privacy?

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
 - a. Will the continued manipulation of the yuan-dollar relationship combined with increasing Chinese exports to Latin American countries have an effect on the security and stability of Latin American governments and their relations with the U.S.?
 - b. Will continued manipulation of the yuan-dollar relationship combined with increasing Chinese fossil fuel requirements have an effect on the relationships between Southwestern Asian countries and the U.S.?
 - c. Would a dramatically reduced Western reliance on fossil fuels lead to an altered set of security and stabilization norms in Southeast or Southwest Asia?
 - d. What effect would a power projection-capable China have on U.S. relations with U.S. allies and other states throughout southeast and southwest Asia?
 - e. Could the expansion of U.S. technology and telecommunications throughout southwest Asia assist in developing a U.S.-led or U.S.-participating regional security regime?
 - f. Is the current level of intelligence focus on Latin America sufficient for meeting policy maker needs in the region?
 - g. Looking to the time between 2015 and 2025, what estimates can be made about changes in the global political and military environment (to include threats and capabilities of likely adversaries)?
 - h. What regional security implications are developing due to the changing nature of the U.S.-Republic of Korea military relationship and reduced U.S. ground presence on the peninsula?

4. Military Change:
 - a. What techniques have produced the most efficient use of the military linguist in support of combat operations?
 - b. What techniques have proven successful in integrating civilian linguists into military operations at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels?
 - c. Has the new national intelligence architecture affected defense intelligence?
 - d. What techniques have proven successful in allowing tactical users to leverage strategic intelligence capabilities?

- e. Does the modern battlefield require a different intelligence construct from the traditional delineations of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence?
 - f. How will networked robotics across all warfighting functions shape future doctrine?
 - g. Are there any identifiable emerging technologies or technique trends in denial and deception campaigns targeting U.S. or allied forces?
 - h. How can the ELINT expertise of Army Military Intelligence be leveraged to build capabilities and strategies for protecting air defense and fire support radars against ground and air based EW threats?
 - i. Has the CENTCOM implementation of the JIACG concept proven successful in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how could this and other “fusion” concepts be combined to coordinate intelligence activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, host nation and third country intelligence services in combat zones?
5. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
- a. How has the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 or Patriot Act impacted Army intelligence activities?
 - b. Has the establishment of a cabinet-level Director of National Intelligence significantly changed the roles and interactions among members of the intelligence community?
6. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
- a. Could a specific operational deployment rate result in “breaking” the Global War on Terror’s requirement for low density, high demand linguists?
 - b. Recognizing the great potential for error, what techniques and procedures should be utilized in the selection, training, and employment of interrogators and interrogation units?
 - c. Which evolving missile technologies are most likely to mature and become disruptive against Army modernization and acquisition priorities?
7. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
- a. If the U.S. military, and specifically the U.S. Army, regressed to a conscripted force, what changes would be necessary in

leadership selection, education, and retention of the military intelligence corps?

- b. What should be the role of the Military Intelligence Branch and its officers in the development and operations of tactical, operational, and strategic electronic warfare forces?
 - c. Have past strategic and operational intelligence failures, especially recent instances such as the Iraq WMD NIE, created a demand by senior warfighters for evidence, rather than intelligence from the intelligence community; if so what are the implications of this in providing warning as well as intelligence support to operations?
 - d. Are there secondary effects to the consolidation of a full civilian intelligence force structure dedicated to strategic intelligence?
8. War and Society:
- a. What influences U.S. civil support for the war on terror, and how can this support be measured?

United States Army Intelligence and Security Command

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1. Analytical Considerations:
 - a. Using facts, assumptions, and data sets from previous combat planning processes, determine if using the Systemic Operational Design would have resulted in an improved assessment of the battlespace/environment versus that of MDMP.
 - b. Is Arab nationalism a spent force? How does nationalism affect the human terrain in the Middle East?
 - c. Has international cooperation truly increased as a result of the Global War on Terror? Is cooperation episodic or enduring? In what ways can we improve cooperation and collaboration in the military intelligence sharing arena? What level of support should we expect or depend on in the future?
 - d. Is there a struggle in the Islamic fundamentalist community for the title of "revolutionary" Islam? How does this affect the relationship among Sunnis, Shi'i and other regional/systemic actors?
 - e. What are the near-term (5-10 years) prospects of the Europe Union fielding an expeditionary military force and how will this affect U.S. foreign and military policy? What lessons have been learned in trying to overcome cultural, language, and operational obstacles to integration?
 - f. How will recently renewed Japanese nationalism affect stability in Asia?
 - g. Do recent trends in Central Asia and Eurasia threaten U.S. interests? Do recent efforts at military transformation, collaboration and cooperation between regional powers indicate a change in strategy or simply the pursuit of individual interests? Determine the relevancy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
 - h. What are the potential consequences of Russian withdrawal from its bi- and multilateral arms limitations treaties?
 - i. Over the past half-dozen years, much has been said about the technological revolution that has been transforming Army Intelligence. Has any real change occurred? Has it been revolutionary, as proponents suggest, or evolutionary? More importantly, what has been the pay off of any change for the Army?

2. Operational Considerations:
 - a. How should MI be postured and structured to exploit the human dimension of the Long War?
 - b. Does MI have the right capacity and balance across the Army (in the right component AC/RC) to support ARFORGEN?
 - c. Since Fusion Centers transcend the modular build, what should we as an Army/JTF plan for in the future?
 - d. What adjustments, if any, to the existing national, interagency, military, and coalition capabilities are needed to sufficiently address the requirements associated with complex environments?
 - e. How should the Army and INSCOM meet and get ahead of requirements for obscure or dialectical language requirements?
 - f. Is there enough nonmilitary (economic, political) policy training in MI schools to allow analysts to understand the goals, methods, and intent of nonmilitary U.S. policies?
 - g. How do we achieve global cultural awareness, and how do we fix this for the Long War view in our education process?
 - h. Are we training MI soldiers appropriately on political, social, economic, information, infrastructure issues, cultural awareness, and Red Teaming? How do we train CDRs and non-MI staffs?
 - i. How do we handle detainees who are suspected terrorists and what is their ultimate disposition?
 - j. For the Long War, do we have appropriate rules governing biometrics and cyber warfare?
 - k. Do our relevant policies allow us to retain the moral high ground, both in fact and in perception?
 - l. How do we keep the spirit of flexibility and adaptiveness alive and proactive? How do we incorporate nonenduring capabilities (e.g., site exploitation, certain ISR sensors, etc)?
 - m. Will the introduction of persistent surveillance require INSCOM to staff a larger analytical force to meet the demands of analytical resource management versus that of collection management? (i.e., focusing on analysts instead of collection assets) How will this affect operations and cooperation?
 - n. Are we out of balance in manning ISR systems, as compared to lethal systems?
 - o. How should military intelligence support the fight against terrorist financial networks and the proliferation of WMD?

Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3

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1. Global War on Terror:
 - a. What benefits and consequences result from technologically advanced forces training and transferring responsibilities to poorly equipped indigenous forces? What are important considerations in the organizing, training and equipping of units assigned training responsibilities?
 - b. Can emergent and improved space-based surveillance techniques be applied to monitor terrorist activity around the globe? What are the most promising technologies/techniques and how should they be applied?
 - c. Define the threat and the nature of the problem.
 - d. What defines a victory in the War on Terror? What are the measurable objectives and the metrics for success?
 - e. Conducting Personnel Recovery missions in an asymmetric environment.
 - (1) What is the role of DoD in support of Inter-Agency Personnel Recovery operations?
 - (2) U.S. Government justification for conducting unilateral operations in the recovery of isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) individuals in sovereign nations
 - f. Assess the military capability to conduct Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations in multiple theaters.
2. Homeland Security:
 - a. What space capabilities do Civil Support Teams need to have rapidly employed to support their operations?
 - b. Can space-based capabilities facilitate the interoperability and interaction of military and civil first responders? Which space-based capabilities offer the most benefit for doing so?
 - c. What is the potential for development and our associated susceptibility to home grown extremists similar to those increasingly seen in Europe?
 - d. What are the challenges in Domestic Consequence Management (DCM) efforts to support Homeland Defense/ Homeland Security?

- e. What are the C2 relationships between Title 32 and Title 10 forces providing homeland defense and consequence management under Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)?
 - f. Should DoD (and the Army) train, man, and equip units whose primary mission is consequence management, not warfighting?
 - g. Who should have Training Readiness Oversight (TRO) over Army and National Guard consequence management capable units?
 - h. What should DoD's DCM response be in the future? What can DoD do internally to make its response more effective and efficient? Should DoD have an increased or decreased role in DCM?
3. Regional Security Issues:
- a. Can cooperation on space-based programs with allied and coalition partners improve the net capabilities and the overall collaboration between U.S. military forces and their allies/ coalition partners?
 - b. Can integrated architectures comprised of complementary space systems/capabilities operated by several nations in a coalition improve partnership, data sharing and the overall persistence and availability of communications and surveillance in a given region of the world?
 - c. Assess the effectiveness of cultural-based human behavior representations, models and simulations, in preparing a combat-oriented force for SSTR operations.
4. Military Change:
- a. What responsibilities and overlap should exist between Military Intelligence, Signal Corps and Space Operations personnel within the U.S. Army? Where and how should the synergy between these three areas of expertise be developed to the benefit of the Future Force? Are there opportunities to exploit these synergies to improve the Army's overall engagement across and influence on the overall National Security Space community?
 - b. What is the way ahead for Irregular Warfare capabilities and capacities in the Army?
 - c. How should the Requirements Validation process integrate combat development recommendations with acquisition and

- programming considerations to ensure force modernization proposals are feasible and affordable?
- d. How should the Army's family of strategic guidance documents be structured to support Army force modernization within an increasingly prescriptive (top-down) DoD system that includes joint operational concepts, a joint capability lexicon, and joint investment portfolios?
 - e. DoD's emerging Capabilities-Based Planning (CBP) environment (Aldridge Study 2004/Institutional Reform & Governance Roadmap) drives integrated modernization investment decisions to the Department level. How should the Army organize and utilize organic analytic capacity to optimize Army participation in Joint validation and development of required capabilities?
 - f. Assess the military's capability to participate in long-term nation-building operations.
5. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
- a. How should tactical exploitation of the national capabilities program (TENCAP) evolve in a period of increasing synchronization of DoD and intelligence community support to deployed forces? What are the new opportunities for TENCAP to continue leading the way in the sharing of technology, capabilities and techniques between DoD and the intelligence community?
 - b. How should Title 10 and Title 50 change to improve space situational awareness and support rapid, effective employment of space control negation capabilities?
 - c. Should terrestrial-based offensive space control capabilities be given priority and focus instead of space-based offensive space control capabilities as the former are less provocative internationally than the latter? Are there advantages to U.S. National Security by assigning such a priority?
 - d. Should U.S. National Security Space Policy embrace the idea of an evolving set of "rules of the road" to establish space navigation "best practices" instead of pursuing a series of negotiated treaties to constrain activity in earth-orbital space?
6. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
- a. Human Resources Command and Managing Personnel: Is this the center of gravity?

- b. How many Senior Service College Fellowships should the Army have and why? Provide an analysis of the type of fellowships, including academic content and standards, required for tomorrow's Army.
 - c. Describe the application of leadership and decisionmaking to achieve mission success, in the absence of "a fully capable network." In an environment where net-centricity is the goal, consider the character of leadership and decisionmaking, given a catastrophic failure of the network.
 - d. With respect to the behavior of an adversary, post "operational or strategic event," compare the pre-event modeled outcome to the post-event ground truth. Considering the elements of PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure) effects modeling, describe the lessons learned for future cultural modeling initiatives.
7. Landpower Employment:
- a. How can space control be relevant to tactical units under current policy restrictions?
 - b. What level of assurance would the Global Information Grid require for delivering ISR and missile warning capabilities to deployed forces using CONUS-based processing?
 - c. Assess Army capability to manage the warfighter's airspace, given the current and future employment of myriad unmanned aerial systems and manned aviation systems.
8. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
- a. What are the design considerations for a comprehensive Force Modernization and Integration process that identifies, evaluates, prioritizes, resources and delivers capabilities to current and future Operational Commanders through the dynamic ARFORGEN planning model. How should the Army modernize a force in contact? (ACP Decision Point 82)
 - b. ARFORGEN – a process model that meets the force planning needs of the contemporary operating environment or a process that supports already known answers to force planning questions, such as: How many are available?; How many are needed?; Are the requirements supportable and sustainable?; How long are they sustainable?

9. Other Questions:

- a. The future strategic environment portends to be one of persistent conflict with increasingly technologically empowered nonstate actors and proxies challenging traditional military capabilities. Will this change the role of U.S. landpower in the next 10-20 years? If so, how and what implications does this have for our current strategic efforts in force modularity, design and basing?
- b. What are the roles and missions of GPF and SOF in the current and future (FCS) force? If tasks should migrate from one to the other, how should the force organize and train to effectively accomplish the mission?
- c. What is the historical record for successful SSTR operations, by DOTMLPF, in the 20th century?
- d. How will the Army evolve its processes to address comprehensive DOTMLPF net-centric capabilities at a pace that meets the needs of the warfighter?
- e. How can the Army align and synchronize its decision processes to address the evolving Joint needs and enablers?
- f. What activities are required to achieve fully integrated, synchronized net-centric capabilities and what is an appropriate model for resolving technical, architecture, interoperability, and technology shift challenges?
- g. How will the Army measure its improvement in warfighting under the construct of net-centricity?
- h. What changes will the Army need to undertake under the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model to develop and coordinate policy, programs, and initiatives that can keep pace and enable ARFORGEN?
- i. How does the Army move from an information culture to a knowledge culture?
- j. What is the strategic impact of linking the Global Information Grid to the unit level (battalion/ship/squadron and below)?
- k. What are the operational impacts, at the brigade level and below, of Joint integration of C⁴I through large-scale programs such as the Network Enabled Command Capability?
- l. How do evolving Biometric applications affect (a) maneuver warfare, (b) SSTR? What are the implications for Battle Command?
- m. What are the operational/strategic impacts of the LandWarNet concept on Battle Command?

- n. How will full implementation of Battle Command on the Move affect the Army strategically?
- o. A major impact of rapid fielding of new COTS and other capabilities to theater has been that material solutions have “outrun” doctrine, organization, training, leadership (education), personnel and facilities. Is this transformational? How can the Army best synchronize all elements of DOTMLPF to capitalize on these innovations?
- p. How should the Army posture itself to engage the National Security Space Community for the purpose of shaping and informing policy, strategy, and acquisition efforts? Where are the organizational and process centers of gravity?
- q. As the Army increasingly depends on space-based capabilities to support expeditionary warfare, how should the respective requirements and combat development effort best be executed within the Army?
- r. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has a plan for realization of capabilities to establish a global ballistic missile defense shield. What is the Army's associated vision for its integral support to this roadmap? What capabilities must or should be associated with the Army as lead service and why?
- s. Should the Army assert the position that it is the proper designee as the Lead Service for all land-based ballistic missile defense capabilities?
- t. Should a military service be designated as the Executive Agent or Lead Service for Global Ballistic Missile Defense?
- u. Should the Army be ready to consider its own acquisition of small satellite capabilities to mitigate land warfighting gaps?
- v. Should the Army view satellites as unmanned space vehicles (USVs) and be prepared not only to acquire but also operate its own USVs to meet the unique requirements of its forces just as it operates USVs optimized to meet the needs of tactical land warfighting forces?
- w. Should the Army have organic satellite control capabilities at the Brigade Combat Team level?
- x. As technology evolves, should the Army develop, field and operate high altitude unmanned aerial systems to provide Joint communications and ISR platforms, or should that capability be assigned to another service?
- y. Is there a “Battlefield” Consequence Management (BCM)?

- z. How is mission space defined for Army support to Foreign Consequence Management and Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HADR)?
- aa. Examine and develop methods to improve the use and rapid dissemination of biometric data and match results to the end user/warfighter.
- bb. Examine ways to enhance and optimize the implementation of biometric capabilities in counterinsurgency and intelligence operations.
- cc. Examine and develop methods for the use of biometric capabilities in stability and reconstruction activities.
- dd. Stability operations are now equal to offensive and defensive operations for MTOE development; what assets and/or force structure changes do maneuver platoons, companies, battalions, and brigades need to be successful in stability operations?
- ee. How should human intelligence assets be integrated into the modular force at brigade level and below to effectively manage, integrate, assess and act on intelligence collected by soldiers and junior leaders?
- ff. Can the establishment of a theocratic democracy be compatible with U.S. national security objectives?
- gg. What tools have been the most successful in conducting stability and/or counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
- hh. What approaches and tools should AFRICOM use in Africa? How can the military effectively meet expressed local needs while achieving its stated objectives?
- ii. Examine the current Civil Affairs force structure and roles and responsibilities as outlined in FM 3-05.40.
 - (1) Include the accession process, initial training, advanced training and professional development of Civil Affairs officers. Are they adequate? Will they meet future demand?
 - (2) Include current force structure as it relates to executing the "Full Spectrum Concept." Is it adequate? Will it meet future needs?
- jj. Examine effective uses of Phase 0 operations to shape destabilizing regions.
 - (1) Examine how stability operations executed in Phase 0 can preempt ideological (terrorist) strongholds.
 - (a) AFRICOM

- (b) CENTCOM
- (c) PACOM
- (2) Examine how stability operations can be most effectively executed in the initial six months of an operation to facilitate success and limit the duration and scope of the overall mission.
- (3) Examine the military's role in establishing local governance as a required first order effect during Phase 0 through Phase III and how best to integrate local traditions, legal and religious expectations.

Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4

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1. Global War on Terror:
 - a. What are the implications of the Global War on Terrorism on logistics/sustainment strategy for the U.S. Army and the Joint Force?
 - b. What are the issues related to coalition support (reliance and dependence) for the Joint Force? What are the logistics implications of a coalition force?
 - c. What are the issues related to logistics support for Special Operations Forces in their global commitment to the war on terrorism?
2. Homeland Security:
 - a. What should be our concept of logistics/sustainment support in defense of the homeland? What are the implications regarding the integration of local, state, federal, and commercial logistics capabilities?
 - b. What is NORTHCOM's relationship to the Army's logistics capabilities, and what is the concept to ensure effective command and control of logistics/sustainment operations?
3. Regional Security Issues:
 - a. Integrating Army logistics concepts with focused logistics
 - b. How can we leverage the commercial capabilities that are already in place across the globe to facilitate logistics/sustainment support for regional operations?
 - c. Are there opportunities to develop regional sustainment platforms that can support the Joint Force? What are the implications on Service logistics and Title X responsibilities?
4. Military Change:
 - a. How can we best leverage emerging technologies/capabilities to enhance the capability of the Joint sustainment process?
 - b. What does "modularity" mean to Army logisticians?
5. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
 - a. What are the sustainment implications of long-term commitments to SRO, PKO, and war on terrorism?

- b. How can the Joint Force leverage the concept of a sea base, and enable a more globally flexible sustainment capability?
6. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
 - a. What are the sustainment implications of the simultaneous deployment and employment of the Joint Force?
 - b. Examine the Army logistics enterprise, its role in LANDWARNET, and the challenges to its implementation.
 - c. Implications for sustainment in the current operational environment
 - d. Commander's intent – distribution planning and executing – developing unity of effort
7. Force Management and Leadership:
 - a. How can we know what it really costs to sustain a specific force in an operational environment? As part of this discussion, how can we know the resource requirements in near-real-time as force structure and operational needs change?
 - b. What are the force management and leadership implications of the expanding use of contractors?
8. Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational:
 - a. What are the implications for supporting JIIM and what can we learn from past operations?
 - b. How can we best leverage joint and strategic partners from the National Sustainment Base? Does this justify a Joint Logistics Command?
9. Distribution Process Owner: Define the role of the United States Transportation Command as the Distribution Process Owner.

Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6

POC: LTC Lary Chinowsky (703) 693-3069
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1. Global War on Terror:
 - a. Assess the opportunities and risks with interoperability of communities of interest (COI) networks to facilitate information sharing in support of the war on terrorism, e.g., Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN).
 - b. Balance information sharing between agencies' (JIIM) environment across the full spectrum of engagement – local, state, federal, and international – with protection of information.
 - c. Assess the role of technology in modern, net-centric warfare – is the “Network” a force multiplier or an Achilles heel?
 - d. What changes in acquisition policy will enable the rapid fielding of COTS solutions to the warfighter while still ensuring the products delivered are capable of operating in the intended environment? Specifically, what changes in test and evaluation requirements are needed?

2. Homeland Security:
 - a. Provide access to classified networks and information by nonfederal agencies (local and state emergency management employees, e.g., state governors and their staffs, local first responders).
 - b. Assess the current and future use of biometric technologies for identity management in support of the war on terrorism.
 - c. Communications support. In reference to the Active Army (Title X) providing national disaster support, what are the challenges of a Title X agency providing support in a Title XXXII environment, and what are some potential solutions to overcoming these legal barriers?

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
 - a. Western Hemisphere, specifically CONUS. Assess the roles and missions of NORTHCOM in light of the war on terrorism and recent regional natural disasters.
 - b. Are STEP/TELEPORT sites strategically located to provide the best global coverage?

4. Military Change:
 - a. Balance near-term information technology insertion within a long-range investment strategy.
 - b. Achieve DoD's netcentricity vision of ubiquitous access in light of the cultural biases among people and organizations to control information.
 - c. Data Strategy. What are upcoming (on the horizon) methods, protocols and techniques that will aid in achieving national data standards to accomplish true interoperability between inter- and intra-service, joint and coalition command and control systems?
 - d. How can the Army rapidly leverage the latest commercial wireless technology to expand the network down to the individual soldier – latest 802.11 series, 802.16, 802.20, and 802.21?

5. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
 - a. The implications of migrating everything to Internet Protocol (EoIP)
 - b. Soldier vs contractor operated and maintained tactical equipment. Are the new soldier systems so "high tech" that we cannot fight wars without contractors on the battlefield?
 - c. What are the scales of efficiency that we see once we extend the network down to the soldier?

6. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
 - a. What is the future of telecommuting in the Army and its implications on performance and productivity?
 - b. On Shore, off Shore. Where should the U.S. invest human capital in technology?
 - c. Every soldier is a shooter-sensor-communicator. Is the training and compensation commensurate with the requirements and expectations?

Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8

POC: LTC Kevin Lowe (703) 695-7406

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1. As we redefine the role of the reserve components, what are the developing requirements that make the reserves an operational reserve rather than a strategic reserve?
2. How do we determine an Army investment strategy, appropriately defined, that is most likely to succeed in a competitive market across the Services and on Capitol Hill?
3. How can the Army synchronize JCIDS and Army capabilities (either organizational or system specific) to analyze acquisition and programs of record that are feasible, affordable, and sustainable?
4. Are the current JCIDS products and decision points adequate to facilitate synchronization with acquisition and programming?
5. Are the structure and the content of the TAP still relevant or can the document be improved?
6. How could the JCAs be incorporated into the POM to better link the Army's organization into the Joint decisionmaking process?
7. How do we incorporate REF/RFI programs into the PPBE process to ensure sustainment of these rapid initiatives across the program and in the Force File?
8. What are the implications of a continuous resource process vice the current POM process?
9. How does defense transformation affect force management?
10. What is the role of the force management officer in stabilization, humanitarian, peacekeeping, and counterinsurgency missions?
11. What should be the force management doctrine for expeditionary operations or for the future force?

12. What is the changing role of force management functions within the RC?
13. How do FA50s (Force Management Officers) integrate combat capabilities?
14. What is the ideal mission, roles, functions and structure of the Force Management Division (FMD) in the ASCC?
15. How does ARFORGEN affect the duties of the Force Management Officer at the strategic level?
16. What adjustments or adaptations must the Army make to address the changes required in the force management processes as the role of the Generating Force becomes more operational?
17. What are the best modular packages for the Army, and how are we going to use them?

Joint Staff, Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5

POC: LTC Sewaphorn (Noy) Rovira (703) 695-6515
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1. By what metrics should progress in the war on terrorism be measured?
2. What are the policies and actions the U.S. Government needs to establish and support in order to shape conditions for regional security?
3. When regional security fails, what are the policies and actions the U.S. Government needs to establish (process and procedures) to achieve rapid building and sustaining of coalitions?
4. What should be the long-term strategy for Iraq?
5. What should be the long-term strategy for North Korea?
6. What should be the long-term strategy for India/Pakistan?
7. Would an interagency "Goldwater-Nichols-type" initiative enhance integration of all U.S. Government elements of power? What would such a program or process look like?
8. How can we better focus U.S. Government long-term security assistance efforts? Currently there is no coherent focused methodology for coordinating security assistance efforts and resources across the interagency arena based on U.S. Government priorities.
9. What should long-term U.S.-Russia strategic relations look like?
10. What should long-term U.S.-European Union relations look like?
11. Has the post-9/11 government reorganization been effective? Are we safer and more effective in countering threats to national security as a result of the establishment of DHS/NCTC/NC/HSC/ODNI, *et al.*?

12. How effective is interagency IA coordination in responding to the terrorist threat? Is there a need for Goldwater-Nichols type legislation to spur IA coordination?

United States Central Command

POC: LtCol David A. Dawson (813) 827-4389
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1. Global Strategy for the War on Terrorism:
 - a. The role of the nation-state in the war on terrorism
 - b. Balancing democratic reform and internal security: short- and long-term implications for the war on terror. Transition to democracy is a fragile and often unstable period – what level of instability is expected and/or tolerable when transitioning from an autocratic regime to a democratic form of government? General and specific [individual nation-state] case studies
 - c. Implications of expanding war on terrorism to state-sponsored terror groups: Iran and the Lebanese Hizballah
 - d. The role of the war of ideas, especially radical religious ideas, in the war on terrorism
 - e. The role of perception management as it relates to worldwide perceptions of U.S. power and actions
 - f. Lessons from the “War on Drugs” that apply to the war on terrorism
 - g. Evaluate U.S. SOCOM’s, USSTRATCOM’s, and USJFCOM’s roles in the war on terrorism.
 - h. Is there a need for a “strategic” counterinsurgency doctrine? Are there separate principles for “strategic” COIN?

2. Evolving Regional Security Arrangements:
 - a. Musharraf's Enlightened Moderation (EM). Is it the new national security strategy for Pakistan? Arguably, all major policy priorities are related to Musharraf's vision of enlightened moderation (economy, education, political reform, economic development, western influence, federalization of tribal areas in NWFP and Baluchistan). Is EM more than just a path to moderate Islam for Musharraf?
 - b. The strategy and future role of the PRC in Central and SW Asia
 - c. The strategy and future role of India in Central and SW Asia
 - d. The strategy and future role of Russia in Central and SW Asia
 - e. Analyze the interrelationships of the logistic train for narcotics trafficking, WMD, weapons, and people trafficking.

- f. Developing a democracy in the Middle East in the 21st century: What roles should the military play?
 - g. Viability and implications of an OSCE-like organization/process for the Gulf Region (to include Iran and Iraq)
 - h. Given limited U.S. resources, is a “pivotal states” strategy for the AOR feasible and acceptable?
 - i. Plans, programs, and policies to help Pakistan, KSA, and Egypt help themselves
 - (1) Military
 - (2) Economic
 - (3) Political
 - j. Nuclear Iran
 - (1) Ways to deter going nuclear
 - (2) What is Iranian strategy following the achievement of nuclear capability to do if/when Iran does go nuclear?
 - (3) How do Iran’s neighbors react in terms of capabilities?
 - (4) Strategy for deterring Iran following its achievement of nuclear capability
 - (5) What does a nuclear weapon capable Iran look like? How does the international community react/respond?
 - (6) If Iran does acquire a nuclear weapon, how does the international community ensure these weapons do not proliferate, either intentionally or unintentionally?
3. National Security Strategy:
- a. Interagency strategy for transnational insurgency
 - b. Improving the planning and execution of national strategy for the war on terrorism:
 - (1) Structure
 - (2) Process
 - c. An update of the National Security Act of 1947 and Goldwater-Nichols
 - d. Operationalizing the interagency process – converting policy decisions to interagency operations:
 - (1) Role of the Joint Staff and role of the Combatant Command staff in interagency integration and planning
 - (2) Integration of other Executive Branch Departments (DoS, DoJ, DoT, etc.) into security operations (planning phase and operational phase)
 - e. Role of strategic communications in prosecuting activities in USCENTCOM AOR

4. Landpower employment: Evaluation and recommendations for individual and collective cultural awareness training in support of COIN/stability mission deployments:
 - a. Precommissioning, especially language requirements and major/minor fields (area studies, history, international relations)
 - b. PME (especially ILE, SSC, JPME)
 - c. NCOES
 - d. Predeployment collective training
 - e. Feasibility/desirability of establishing advisor training similar to that used for personnel assigned to advisory duty in the RVN

United States European Command

POC: LTC James Cave, DSN 421-2906

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1. Global War on Terror:
 - a. What areas are appropriate to synergize the efforts to counter international terrorism with those efforts to counter international drug trafficking?
 - b. What sources of funding exist to support terrorism and what could/should the Army do to reduce them?
 - c. What should the Army be doing proactively to affect emergence of terrorist environments?
 - d. What service approaches, particularly Army approaches, would most effectively contribute to the War on Drugs?
 - e. Terrorism:
 - (1) The spread of Islamic fundamentalism within Europe
 - (2) How nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are used to provide funding to terrorist groups
 - (3) Iranian intelligence's use of NGOs to conduct intelligence activities
 - (4) Case study: Iranian intelligence double agent operations against other intelligence services
 - (5) How Iranian intelligence uses businesses to conduct intelligence activities
 - (6) How Iranian intelligence uses businesses to forward dual use technology to Iran
 - (7) Is Iran trying to build a nuclear bomb and how close is it?
 - (8) What level of cooperation is the IRGC/QF, MOIS and senior leadership of the Iranian theocracy giving to the terrorists in Iraq
 - (9) Case Study: How the Iranians quelled internal opposition since the 1979 revolution and ended with the disqualification of thousands of reformist parliamentary candidates in February 2004
 - (10) Iranian dissident operations (assassinations, intimidation, infiltration) around the world since 1979
 - (11) MOIS and IRGC/QF support to the Palestinian rejectionist groups and Hizballah

(12) Will Israel attack the Iranian nuclear facilities as they did with the Iraqi Osirak nuclear facility in the early 1980s?

2. Africa:

- a. Should AFRICOM be designed to conduct major combat operations?
- b. How should AFRICOM be constituted?
- c. Should AFRICOM have a special relationship with other departments in the Interagency?
- d. Security issues impacting oil producing countries
- e. Religious conflict and its implications for regional stability in Africa
- f. African contributions to peace-keeping operations
- g. Long-term regional security impact of African regional organizations such as the Maghreb Arab Union, COMESSA, ECOWAS, etc.
- h. Libya's future security role in the African Union
- i. Security interests by North African states in Sub-Saharan Africa
- j. Islamic and Islamist movements in the Sahel region of Africa, West Africa, and Central Africa
- k. Foreign sponsorship of Islamist movements in Africa
- l. Border control efforts by North African and Sahelian states
- m. Mediterranean security issues and North African states
- n. Impact of economic migration on North African security
- o. Chinese security and economic agendas in Africa
- p. Russian security and economic agendas in Africa
- q. Future changes in the Euro-Mediterranean (or Barcelona) process, and their impact on North Africa
- r. The future of Arab nationalism in North Africa
- s. Bilateral security cooperation between European and North African states (e.g., Italy and Libya)
- t. Security impact of improved LOCs (highways, air routes, etc.) between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa
- u. Evolution of professionalism in African militaries
- v. The future of force modernization in African military forces
- w. Impact of drought on Saharan and Sahelian security
- x. DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) programs around the continent: successes, failures, lessons learned
- y. Arms trafficking and ease of access across porous borders

- z. Inflaming ethnic animosities to instill fear and solicit support for unscrupulous leaders
- aa. Diamonds, gold, and coltan: Competition for access to Africa's mineral wealth and the use of that wealth to finance armed movements from the warlord to the state level
- bb. Oil and security outlook in the Gulf of Guinea
- cc. Equatorial Guinea: future stability and oil wealth
- dd. Sao Tome and Principe: considerations for U.S. basing
- ee. Nigeria: the future of international oil operations in the Delta
- ff. Nigeria: outlook for internal stability – a looming failed state?
- gg. Nigeria's political and military goals vis-à-vis its Gulf of Guinea neighbors
- hh. Gulf of Guinea: How two mini-states will cope with regional pressures
- ii. Nigeria-Cameroon: Outlook for Bakassi Resolution since the ICJ ruling
- jj. The role of Morocco's civilian security forces
- kk. The Moroccan monarchy and the structure of the Moroccan military
- ll. Morocco's military cooperation with Sub-Saharan African countries
- mm. Tunisia's security apparatus
- nn. North African naval modernization issues
- oo. Libya and COMESSA: Security role in Sub-Saharan Africa
- pp. Impact of succession to Qadhafi on Libyan allies and aid recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa
- qq. Prospects for Libyan-American security cooperation in the Mediterranean
- rr. Prospects for Libyan-American security cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa
- ss. Algerian Interior Ministry forces and their role in internal security
- tt. Algeria's Berbers and internal stability
- uu. Ethnic tensions in Mauritania and future stability
- vv. Role of France in North Africa
- ww. Role of France in the Sahel
- xx. Role of China in North Africa
- yy. Role of China in the Sahel
- zz. Role of Russia in the North Africa-Sahel region
- aaa. Regional security arrangements among North African and Sahelian states
- bbb. Relations of North African countries with Nigeria

- ccc. Relations of Morocco with Gulf of Guinea countries
- ddd. Relations of Mauritania with Senegal, Mali, and Algeria
- eee. The Palestinian expatriate community in North Africa and the Sahel
- fff. The North African expatriate community in Europe and the Middle East
- ggg. Life after Mugabe: Will Zimbabwe recover?
- hhh. The Future of the Mano River Union
- iii. Great Lakes regional stability
- jjj. Democracy: success or failure in Sub-Sahara Africa?
- kkk. South African military in the future
- lll. Equatorial Guinea: the last Kleptocracy in Africa?
- mmm. Interested in any topics addressing means of exposing and/or ending corruption in Africa
- nnn. The Swahili Coast and Mozambique – a strategic maritime corridor

3. Eurasia:

- a. Generational changes of attitude in the Caucasus
- b. Long-term Iranian interests and objectives in the Caucasus
- c. Crime networks in any or all: Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia
- d. Corruption networks in any or all: Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia
- e. Progress toward and prospects for European or NATO integration for: Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan
- f. Russia-Asia relations (especially China)
- g. Implications of Russian demographic changes

4. Balkans:

- a. Role of Serbia in regional stability
- b. Impact of Kosovo final status on Balkan stability
- c. Influence of Islamic extremism in Bosnia-Herzegovina
- d. Impact of Albanian nationalism on regional stability
- e. Influence of Islamic extremism in Kosovo and Macedonia
- f. Threat of Balkan organized crime on Europe
- g. Future stability of Kostunica minority government in Serbia
- h. Influence of organized crime on Balkan society
- i. Integration of Balkan States into EU and NATO structures
- j. Impact of Union of Serbia-Montenegro split on regional stability

- k. Influence of organized crime on Albanian governmental institutions
 - l. Role of clan demographics on Kosovo and Albanian democratic institutions
 - m. Future of Dayton implementation by EUFOR on Bosnia-Herzegovina
 - n. The role of Albanian transnational crime and drug trafficking organizations in regional stability
5. Kurds (Kongra Gel/PKK):
- a. Case study of the potential impact and implications, both to Turkey and to the Kongra Gel/PKK, of the transition of the Kongra Gel from an insurgency to a political movement supporting the Kurdish cause
 - b. Case study of factors enabling the Kongra Gel, as a Marxist insurgency made up primarily of Muslims, to mitigate pressures to adopt more of a radical Islamic agenda and maintain its focus on the basic Marxist (secular) tenets of the organization
 - c. Case study of Kongra Gel/PKK insurgency from the basis of its ability to avoid/prevent serious schisms or splintering, even after its leader's imprisonment, at least up to the current potential split. What are the potential implications of the apparent division of the Kongra Gel into "reformist" and "hardline" camps?
 - d. Case study of the effectiveness of Turkish Jandarma paramilitary police forces in combating the Kongra Gel/PKK
 - e. Case study of the effectiveness of Turkish military operations against the Kongra Gel/PKK inside northern Iraq from the 1990s to present. Were these operations successful in disrupting the KGK/PKK, for the long term, short term, or has there been little actual disruption to Kongra Gel operations?
6. NATO:
- a. Should NATO have a JIC-like organization?
 - b. In a peacetime environment, how can NATO best provide intelligence for out-of-area operations?
 - c. Role of U.S. intelligence support to EU and Eurocorps in and out of NATO operations
 - d. Future application of bilateral/multilateral intelligence systems in EUCOM AOR to support existing information sharing agreements as well as war on terrorism

- e. Cross-command intelligence security cooperation (engagement) in an increasingly complex allied/coalition environment
- f. The impact of NATO expansion on the intelligence/information sharing environment of old members
- g. Moving NATO intelligence beyond reliance on the member nations: NATO collection assets needed?
- h. Multinational coalition intelligence architectures and intelligence sharing: How do/should NATO, CENTCOM, ISAF, interact?
- i. NATO Intelligence: Does it function?
- j. Intelligence sharing with NATO partners in non-NATO and out-of-area operations
- k. Intelligence support to operations: How can NATO best do this?
- l. Develop a “dream” intelligence architecture and intelligence community structure for the NATO of tomorrow; where should it be in 10 years?
- m. Assess the impact of demographic changes on the long-term viability of NATO.

United States Army Europe (USAREUR) and 7th Army

COL James M. Waring DSN (314) 377-4151

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1. NATO

- a. What should the future NATO Command Structure look like? Should Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), report directly to SACEUR? What Joint Force and Component Commands are required?
- b. How could NATO best adopt a joint/common users logistics structure for expeditionary operations? Is overall common funding a desirable future approach, or is the current national responsibility approach best suited for expeditionary operations?
- c. Are the EU and NATO redundant or complementary?
- d. Are the proposed future anchor points for NATO from COMEUR's 2006 House/Senate testimony feasible? Appropriate?
- e. How does NATO avoid donor fatigue in Afghanistan? Is the concept of minimum military requirement (MMR) still useful in articulating capabilities requirements?

2. Army Service Component Commands

- a. Are ASCCs correctly structured and resourced to support GCCs' theater security cooperation requirements?
- b. Are our proposed ASCCs postured correctly to support the GCCs' overall requirements?

3. Information Operations

- a. How well does the Army at large understand and leverage the importance and impact of the media? What needs to change for the Army to get its story out?

- b. Are the resources the Army is investing in information operations yielding commensurate gains? Is the potential/ actual impact upon operations tangible and worth the cost?
 - c. What is the optimal structure/organization to develop strategic communications (STRATCOM) at the HQDA/ ASCC level (OCPA/PAO; CIG/CAG; combination)? What mechanisms are best suited for dissemination of STRATCOM?
4. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy
- a. Does the State Department command the requisite authority in forming U.S. foreign policy, or do the Geographic Combatant Commanders hold more influence than perhaps is appropriate?
 - b. Does the U.S. adequately address global economics and transnational crime in its NSS/NMS?
5. Landpower Generation and Sustainment
- a. Life cycle cost/total ownership cost versus commercial leasing for ground support equipment or other soldier support items: Is leasing a viable option?

United States Joint Forces Command (J-2)

POC: Gayn Borland, DSN 836-6155

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1. Homeland Security: Explore the need for an enterprise National Homeland Defense Plan (involving both interagency and DoD – something akin to a National Response Plan).
2. Leadership, Personnel Management and Culture: Examine the issue of understanding cultural intelligence (CQ) and its implications in conflict and the war on terrorism.
3. Heating Up: Global warming and its implications on U.S. national security and diplomacy
4. Pros and Cons of establishing an intelligence community lessons-learned data base

United States Army Forces Command

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1. Global War on Terror:
 - a. Identify and discuss the strategic, operational and/or tactical innovations employed by coalition ground forces to defeat an ever morphing enemy in today's operational environment. (CSG)
 - b. Has the industrial base been adequately mobilized to support the war in Iraq? If not, what can the Army/DoD do to improve priority over commercial interests and priority for scarce raw materials?(CSG)
 - c. Can success in an insurgency ever be adequately measured? If so, what type of metrics/approach should be used? (CSG)
 - d. How does the current demand for counter-insurgency operations impact the Army's ability to remain Full Spectrum capable? (CSG)

2. Homeland Security: Will changes implemented by the SECDEF in response to the recommendations of the Commission on the Guard and Reserves result in an improved requirements identification

process between DoD and the Department of Homeland Security or better visibility of force requirements to support Homeland Security for FORSCOM? Include potential impediments within discussions. (CSG)

3. Regional Strategic Issues:

- a. How can the Army better prepare soldiers and units for language and culture sensitivity requirements prior to deployment into theaters of operation? (CSG)
- b. Have Theater Security Cooperation activities taken a “back seat” as we execute the War on Terror? If yes, what issues are emerging in terms of future regional instability or U.S. ability to execute future combat operations within a specific AOR? If no, discuss the strategic impact of Theater Security Cooperation activities within specific AORs. (CSG)
- c. Where will the next war be, and how will it be fought? What should the Army be doing now to prepare?(CSG)

4. Military Change:

- a. Will the 19 Jan 07 SECDEF Utilization of the Total Force memorandum result in sustainable force rotation policies for the long term; spread the burden across the three components; result in predictability to service members, family members and employers; and/or help maintain the All-Volunteer force for the Long War? (CSG)
- b. Is there a requirement for a Joint Integrated Requirements Priority List (JIRPL) in which combatant commander force requirements are prioritized? If so, is such a list achievable? (CSG)
- c. In a brigade-centric Army, should the focus of the Corps – while in garrison or in support of the war fight – be changed? (CSG)
- d. How can Knowledge Management serve our global allies during all operational phases? (G6)
- e. In what ways can the military construction (MILCON) process be changed to increase flexibility and responsiveness to the combatant commander and component commanders? (CSG)
- f. Should combat operations be funded as part of the base budget or through the budget supplemental process? How can ARFORGEN facilitate the POM and Budget processes? (CSG)
- g. How can we improve the use of the military/civilian/contractor mix at the unit level? What tools, flexibilities,

controls might be needed to reduce costs or improve output by varying the mix currently generated through the cumbersome, somewhat disconnected, process? (G-8)

- h. How can Lean Six Sigma be applied to the POM build process? (G-8)
5. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
- a. Should other elements of the U.S. Government be required to partner with DoD to achieve victory post-conflict in emerging democracies? If so, then which elements and in what manner? (CSG)
 - b. How does technology influence our strategic decisionmaking process? (G6)
 - c. How can the Army both increase and improve interagency involvement in combat operations in theater and in the Army's planning and exercise programs? (CSG)
 - d. How do we tailor deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer competitors? (CSG)
 - e. How can the military better leverage other elements of DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) for the long war? (CSG)
 - f. What is the "right" end strength for the Army? Should increases in end strength be applied to both the Operational and Institutional Army or just the Operational Army?
6. Landpower Employment:
- a. Given the enhanced capabilities and the changing tactics and operations of all actors (combatants, institutes and instruments of civil government, and indigenous and non-indigenous personnel) in the current theater of war, how can this new complexity of warfare be better handled by U.S. forces? (CSG)
 - b. To what limits can the Army provide alternative mission resources to mitigate unit training/readiness in-activities while transitioning to war, i.e., providing a second set of MTOE equipment at intermediate training/readiness staging bases while the unit's operational set is in transit, etc? (G6)
 - c. What is the growth threshold of a network centric architecture spiraling/evolving while at war? (G6)
7. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
- a. How could "Communities of Practice," that use collaborative, distributive, continuous learning methodologies that are

- operationally based and Center of Excellence supported, best assist commanders as they ready forces for deployment? (CSG)
- b. In today's Modular Army, what support does the Senior Mission Commander – as the supported commander – need from the Installation Management Command and/or the Army Sustainment Command – as supporting commands? (CSG)
 - c. Should the military Transition Team mission remain with TRADOC, or move to the Special Warfare Center and School (SWC)? (CSG)
 - d. Is Total Army Analysis still a viable process for developing future force structure requirements? If yes, why; if no, then what additional changes should it undergo? (CSG)
 - e. Should ARFORGEN requirements determine force structure and end strength? (G1)
 - f. With Army Transformation, are we modular enough? Is there a need for greater modularity smaller than the Brigade Combat Team (BCT)? Is there a need for greater modularity within CS/CSS units? (G1)
 - g. Is Army end strength sufficient to support the life cycle management requirements of ARFORGEN? If not, how should an increase in end strength be applied within the Institutional and Operational Army? (CSG)
 - h. What does an "Operational Reserve" really mean? What does it mean to the Army in terms of resourcing and programmatic? (CSG)
 - i. How does the Army move from a system of unit-centric accountability and maintenance for equipment to a fleet-centric/Army-wide management system? (CSG)
 - j. Given ARFORGEN, should the Army training strategy be more prescriptive or descriptive? (CSG)
 - k. How do FORSCOM and AMC manage equipment training sets in and out of ARFORGEN? Do we need new business practices to better manage this process? (CSG)
 - l. Does the Army need to make changes in resourcing/ programmatic to better support the ARFORGEN process? (CSG)
 - m. Is the DoD Directive, *Equipping the Reserves*, compatible with ARFORGEN? If not, what must change to make it a viable policy for today's environment? (CSG)

- n. Assess Combat Support and Combat Service Support's ability to synchronously support the Army Force Generation battle rhythm. (G6)
- o. What is the optimum time period within the ARFORGEN cycle to conduct New Equipment Training to minimize the obsolescence/perishability of new technologies/associated cognitive skill sets? (G6)
- p. Does the Army have the technology/capability to achieve Total Asset Visibility today? (G-4)
- q. How can retrograde of equipment be accomplished more effectively? (G4)
- r. Can the Army meet the equipping goals given the high operations tempo (current operations, modularity equipment requirements, and future operations)? (G4)
- s. What are the implications of ARFORGEN on PPBES within the Army? (CSG)
- t. Can ARFORGEN be utilized to justify and obtain resources? (CSG)
- u. How do the USAR and ARNG utilize and manage their respective TTHS accounts? (CSG)
- v. What is the impact on Army logistics in supporting simultaneous stability and combat operations? (G-3 ACD)
- w. The Abrams Doctrine, adopted by the Army after Vietnam, resulted in a force structure that ensured the Active Army would never again be able to go to war without the Reserves and the commitment of the American people. Does the current rebalancing of capabilities between the Active and Reserve Components represent a shift away from the Abrams Doctrine? Whether yes or no, address whether or not this is the "right" answer for today's security environment. (CSG)
- x. What will Army installations look like in 30 years in terms of training facilities, soldier services and support, and quality of life? In light of initiatives such as the Virtual Installation Movement, could "virtual basing" be an option? (CSG)

8. Force Management and Leadership:

- a. What is required to facilitate OSD's pursuit of a Continuum of Service for AC and RC soldiers? Could an "operational RC" be the first step to Continuum of Service (CSG) ?
- b. Has Army transformation impacted Army traditions and culture? (CSG)

- c. Has the Army achieved AC/RC integration? (CSG)
 - d. Is the institutional Army structured to manage a contracted workforce? (CSG)
 - e. What can the Army do to better assist RC recruiting efforts and to alleviate RC mid-grade shortfalls? (CSG)
9. War and Society:
- a. Has the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided the policy or strategy required to successfully meet the demands of the 21st century? (CSG)
 - b. Has the Army adapted from Industrial-Age to Information-Age warfare? (CSG)
 - c. What are the impacts of the current level of Reserve mobilization on employer support to the Guard and Reserve? What incentives or other actions are required to ensure employer support, in particular the small business owner with less than 50 employees? (CSG)
 - d. Are Federal protections adequate for Reserve Component members whose businesses are suspended or closed because of voluntary or involuntary mobilization? If not, include proposed legislation required to protect these soldiers within your discussions. (CSG)
 - e. Does “Shock and Awe” affect our ability to “Win Hearts and Minds?” (CSG)
 - f. Can other instruments of national power be indirectly used in the GWOT (e.g., the Department of Education could sponsor college scholarships for the children of reenlisting soldiers to aid retention)? (SA)

North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command

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1. What is the threat posed to CONUS by the flow of special interest aliens across the borders and what can USNORTHCOM do to counter the threat?
2. What centers of gravity are associated with Homeland Security and Homeland Defense? Does the United States have a center of gravity? What should be done to protect it?
3. What nonlethal weapon capabilities does DoD require to conduct Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions?
4. How can we improve interoperability in command, control, communications, and computer systems to support the Canadian and U.S. transformation strategies and protect vulnerabilities to our economies, security, and environment?
5. What threats and challenges are associated with untracked air threats (general VFR aviation, low-altitude, low-observable vehicles), and what can NORAD do to address them?
6. Identify the potential value, issues and implications associated with the assignment of the bi-national maritime warning mission to NORAD by the governments of Canada and the United States.
7. What is a useful framework for understanding and evaluating the CBRNE threat from a red force perspective?
8. What metrics and/or measures of effectiveness can be used to measure USNORTHCOM's mission of deterring, preventing, and defeating clandestine attacks?
9. What psychological effects of a terrorist attack are likely?
10. How best can USNORTHCOM integrate into the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-mandated DHS National Bio-surveillance Integration System?

11. What levels of risk are acceptable in conducting CBRNE-remains recovery and processing?
12. What are the most effective techniques and protocols for protecting hospitals against introducing CBRN contaminants during post-attack operations?
13. How should NORAD/USNORTHCOM ensure continuity of operations in the event of catastrophic failures or loss of ability to operate?
14. How can USNORTHCOM effectively, efficiently, and legally develop and implement the comprehensive collection of Homeland Defense and Civil Support threat information consistent with U.S. privacy law?
15. What key theater security cooperation initiatives are required to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance the overall Homeland Defense posture of the United States.?
16. Considering catastrophic incidents/events such as 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina/Rita, is there a need for a fully integrated Homeland Security/Homeland Defense National Exercise Program?
17. How can we improve the interconnectivity of U.S. efforts to reduce the WMD/E threat with international efforts?
18. Operational Control of U.S. Borders: Is the Nation on the right track? Given the threat nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism highlighted in HSPD-25, the rapidly growing drug manufacture and trafficking presence in Mexico, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and terrorist interest in such weapons, what should be the USNORTHCOM role in ensuring operational control of U.S. borders in the land domain?
19. What relationships should DoD establish with Canada Command? The Canadian military recently formed a new command with similar responsibilities as U.S. Northern Command. As Canada Command matures, U.S. Northern Command should strengthen the partnership between the two commands. DoD needs to work out the relationships between U.S. Northern Command, NORAD, and

the new Canada Command. Some of the questions that need to be answered include: How do USNORTHCOM and Canada Command ensure coordination and integration of plans and operations? Should the United States and Canada enter into any new formal agreements or treaties with respect to North American security or civil support cooperation? Does NORAD need to transition into some other type of organization with new missions and responsibilities and possibly even a new structure?

20. How can the U.S. Government more effectively synchronize and create greater unity of effort between interagency, NGO and DoD on the war on terrorism, while maintaining a balance of freedom for U.S. citizens? There is a rightful tension between the freedoms that citizens of the United States enjoy and the need to provide security for the nation as a whole. There is a host of legal restraints (posse comitias, DoD surveillance restraints on U.S. citizens, etc.) that are intended to prevent infringement of individual freedoms. Terror organizations and transnational threats operate globally, and the United States has a long porous border allowing these threats access inside the United States. How can the DoD, with the largest share of the budget and capability, and other U.S. agencies be better integrated and synchronized to achieve national security yet maintain U.S. citizens' freedoms?
21. How can DoD effectively carry out its catastrophic response roles and responsibilities? Numerous entities criticized the Federal Government's response (including DoD's) to Hurricane Katrina. In the aftermath of the hurricane, several reports detailing lessons learned have been published. It is appropriate to review DoD's roles and responsibilities during truly catastrophic events where it is extremely likely that local and state authorities will quickly be overwhelmed. Some examples may include any CBRN event or severe natural disasters that meet certain criteria such as high magnitude earthquakes or hurricanes. This review should address the appropriate authorities that combatant commanders with domestic responsibilities have and what responses would require SecDef approval. It should also address appropriate trigger points for responding and what the appropriate combatant commander response would be once these triggers occur. Finally, it should address what resources should be made available to combatant commanders during the response (transportation, supplies, communications, etc.).

22. How can the U.S. Government effectively carry out information and intelligence sharing between DoD and non-DoD organizations and agencies? USNORTHCOM has been assigned Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities missions. USNORTHCOM mission preparation, planning and execution necessitate coordination and working with multiple organizations and agencies both within and outside DoD to include other government and civil agencies. Many current laws, regulations, policies and interpretations adversely impact the effective sharing of this data with these organizations to the detriment of mission accomplishment.
23. Is sufficient joint and interagency doctrine in place to support the Lead Federal Agency and Incident Commander to provide unity of effort under the National Incident Management System construct?
24. Since OPCON and TACON will not apply to all responders during incident management, and military responders will rarely be in the lead, are Mutual, General, Direct and Close Support relationships (as defined in Joint Doctrine) sufficient within the Incident Command System (ICS) in the USNORTHCOM AOR, or does military doctrine need to be modified to overcome the lack of unity of command?
25. In response to a sustained asymmetric attack on the Homeland, should SOF have a domestic role, and if so, what should that role be?

United States Pacific Command

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USG Tier 0 Issues

1. Interagency process. How can we synchronize the interagency process at the national level?
 - a. Efficiently provide clear, unified policy/guidance to regional leaders
 - b. Align/link the various interagency annual planning cycles
 - c. Align interagency members' (OSD, DoS, AID, JS, etc.) geographical subdivisions

2. Common understanding of our strategic and operational environments.
 - a. Common Terms of Reference. We need a common taxonomy to describe the characteristics of regional, national, and non-state entities. PMESII+ paradigm is one example. OSD uses another. This inefficiency will exacerbate challenges to globalizing analyses and estimates.
 - b. Globally shared estimates. How can we link COCOM regional estimates? How can we move from hard copy estimates to virtual, interactive, and constant updates?
 - c. COEs. How can we formalize and synchronize the myriad USG information and analysis reach-back sources, defining the scope of and designating "Centers of Excellence"

3. Shaping concept. How can we synchronize military support to interagency shaping at Tier 0 and I?
 - a. What are the strategic implications of shaping a joint operational concept?
 - b. How will we assess force proficiencies in "Phase 0"/shaping?
 - c. How should the IPL process address future force shaping requirements?
 - d. What means can we use to designate departments in the "lead" from supporting departments?

PACOM Tier I Issues

1. USG application of the DIMEFIL elements of national power in Asia (through approximately 2017). How will PACOM help synchronize with elements of DIME:
 - a. With partner nations, with governments?
 - b. To plan and achieve regional shaping?
 - c. To generate unified deliberate OPLAN planning, directing, monitoring, assessing?
 - d. To better plan and conduct U.S. and multilateral exercises?
 - e. To support post-conflict emerging democracies within the region?
 - f. Considering increasing regional economic interdependence?
 - g. To develop an energy strategy for the region?
2. How can we facilitate interoperability in shaping and humanitarian assistance activities with:
 - a. Coalitions and/or national forces?
 - b. International organizations and NGOs?
 - c. The State Partnership Program (SPP)?
3. How should PACOM assess its future region-wide military support to shaping operations/Phase 0:
 - a. Materiel requirements?
 - b. OPTEMPO / force posture needs?

Asia-Pacific Region Strategic Environment

In each of the categories below, the term “trends” is intentionally neutral, and refers to both opportunities and threats. We might want to leverage opportunities and avoid/mitigate threats. The focus of the impact of trends is on defense implications to PACOM, the Asia-Pacific region, or its subregions.

Political

1. Regional collective security trends:
 - a. The future, robustness, and membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum
 - b. The emergence of new security alliances among various Asian states

- c. The accession/growth of influence of major Asian states into regional security alliances
 - d. Sources and dimensions of anti-Americanism in Asian states
 - e. Role of nationalism
 - f. Potential emergence of a different ideology
2. Governmental trends:
- a. Collapse of a regionally strategic Asian state
 - b. Collapse of a subregionally important Asian state
 - e. Increased or decreased collective participation in regional/ subregional forums
 - f. Emergence of a democratic state (including balancing democratic reform and internal security)
3. Political stability trends:
- a. Transnational market instability impact on ability to govern
 - b. Politically disenfranchised indigenous populations
 - c. Nonparticipatory governance
 - d. Vulnerability to organized crime
 - e. Other political obstacles to democratization
 - f. Impact of resource nationalism on international business relations in Asia-Pacific states
4. Ethical trends:
- a. Willingness/ability of states to address human trafficking
 - b. Willingness/ability of states to address corruption
 - c. Erosion of public confidence in governments due to these
 - d. Ethics-related obstacles to democratization
5. Geopolitical trends:
- a. Russia's interests, policy and actions in Asia
 - b. China's interests, policy and actions in Asia

Military/Conflict

1. Conflict related trends:
- a. Emergence of democratic, but anti-U.S. governments
 - b. Emergence of rogue powers, terrorist networks
 - c. Emergence of low-tech threats to the region from non-state actors
 - d. Emergence of hi-tech threats to the region from non-state actors

- e. Potential confidence and security building measures (CSBMs)
- f. Success of border control/security efforts
- g. The role of and risks to international business in ethnic, sectarian and religious conflicts

2. Military related trends:

- a. Formation of an alliance and coalition that includes adversaries who oppose U.S. interests
- b. Evolving mil-to-mil relationships between states in the sub-regions
- c. Development of professionalism in Asian militaries

Economic

1. Economic trends:

- a. States' economic policies' effect on sustainable growth that addresses poverty and income equality
- b. Emergence or persistence of economic obstacles to democratization
- c. Transnational market instability/market crash
- d. States' fiscal discipline or lack thereof
- e. FTAs as a tool for sustainable economic development
- f. Instability from economically disenfranchised populations
- g. Uncontrolled intra- or transnational economic migration
- h. Market instability and impact on international business investment
- i. Persistence of corruption and impact on international business investment
- j. Competition for access to Africa's energy

2. Fiscal/budgetary trends:

- a. Defense/security spending vs. investment
- b. The "costs" of terrorism
- c. The "costs" of corruption
- d. The "costs" of illicit activities

Social/Cultural

1. Demographic trends:

- a. Rural-urban flight
- b. Growing gender imbalance

- c. Generational changes in attitudes toward leadership and governance
 - d. Demographic obstacles to democratization
2. Sociological trends:
 - a. Failure to curb human trafficking
 - b. Climatic warming
 - c. Income disparity
 - d. Educational obstacles to democratization
 3. Cultural trends:
 - a. Indigenous religious extremism/fundamentalism
 - b. Externally/foreign sponsored Islamist movements
 - c. Ethnic/tribal/clan animosities that instill fear/solicit support for unscrupulous leaders
 - d. Cultural obstacles to democratization
 4. How can PACOM partner with multinational firms WRT responsibilities concerning?
 - a. Operations in failed states
 - b. Human rights
 - c. Mitigating corruption

Informational

1. Infosphere trends:
 - a. Proliferation and distribution of info technology in poorer states
 - b. Ability to inform population
 - c. Impact on ability of governments to control information
 - d. Impact upon Strategic Communication and its effectiveness
 - e. Impact on democratization efforts
 - f. Vulnerability to hi-tech state and non-state actor threats

Infrastructural

1. Ground LOCs (highways, routes, etc.) trends:
 - a. Ease of movement within developing states
 - b. Ease of transnational migration/emigration
 - c. Logistics of/tracking of narco-trafficking
 - d. Proliferation of fossil fuel vehicles

- e. Border security
 - f. Arms trafficking
 - g. Democratic processes (such as elections)
2. ALOC and SLOC (air and sea routes, etc.) trends:
 - a. Ease of commerce/shipping
 - b. Maritime security
 - c. Ease of transnational migration/emigration
 3. Scientific and technological trends:
 - a. Emergence of alternative/bio fuels
 - b. Affordability of renewable energy
 - c. Stability through domestic and shared ISR
 - d. Developments to help prevent or mitigate effects of natural disasters
 - e. Developments to mitigate agricultural or water challenges

Environmental

1. Environmental trends:
 - a. Regional climatic change/warming
 - b. Droughts – agriculture
 - c. Potable water scarcity
 - d. Demand for and supply of energy

Northeast Asia-Pacific Region Strategic Environment

Political

1. Political trends (role and future relationships):
 - a. China
 - b. Russia
 - c. Japan
 - d. South Korea

Military

1. Military trends:
 - a. U.S.-Japanese alliance: Way ahead
 - b. NE Asia multilateral cooperation
 - c. U.S.-Philippine CT strategy

- d. China's military transformation
 - e. Successful Mongolia Defense Reform (What can we learn to use elsewhere?)
2. Conflict trends:
- a. Nepal
 - b. North Korea
 - c. China and Taiwan

Economic

1. Economic trends:
- a. Chinese economic agendas in Africa
 - b. China's rising appetite for energy
 - c. Russian economic agendas in Africa

Informational

1. Informational trends (telecommunications expansion):
- a. North Korean population's ability to be informed
 - b. Impact on North Korea's ability to control information

Southeast Asia-Pacific and Oceania Region Strategic Environment

Political

1. Political trends:
- a. Timor and Bangladesh
 - b. Burma
 - c. China in SE Asia

Military

1. Military trends:
- a. China's power projection capability to achieve greater influence
 - b. Maritime security capacity in the Strait of Malaca and tri-border region (Sulu/Celebes Sea)
2. Southeast Asia multilateral cooperation

South Asia-Pacific Region Strategic Environment

Political

1. Political trends:
India's role and future relationships
2. Southeast Asia multilateral cooperation

United States Southern Command

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1. Can the U.S. build and maintain positive relationships with existing as well as newly elected governments in the region which oppose U.S. policies? If so, how? (either broad, regional solutions or more pointed recommendations for single nations)
 - a. What specific role can regional mil-to-mil engagement play in engaging these governments?
2. Assess the types of threats the region will face circa 2015-2020.
3. Third Border Initiative: Successes and Shortcomings. Which Caribbean countries have made the most positive contributions to border security; which are lagging? Where do the greatest opportunities for regional mil-to-mil or mil-to-law enforcement reside? Where does USSOUTHCOM fit in?
4. Examine the eventual restoration of U.S.-Cuba mil-to-mil relationships (for example, survey applicable lessons from the restoration of mil-to-mil relationships with Eastern European states following the end of the Cold War).
5. Epidemiology and major health threats to the region and their impact on the regional, political and economic stability.
6. A study of the strategic culture in Venezuela: What historical, cultural, and demographic factors determine why Venezuela reacts the way it does and what can that tell us about reaction to future situations? Is the strategic culture changing? Why or why not?
7. Demographic study of the region: What are the trends 5/10/15 years out? What will be the effects of those trends in each of the subregions?
8. Analysis of the 2006 (and when it comes out, the 2007) Latinobarometer poll: What does it mean for the U.S. military and for U.S. policymakers?

9. A study of the strategic culture in Brazil: What historical, cultural, and demographic factors determine why Brazil reacts the way it does and what can that tell us about reaction to future situations?
10. Latin America: Is an arms race picking up steam? Who are the regional actors attempting to achieve superiority? Are competing regional military alliances being contemplated?
11. Examine the most successful instances of U.S.-Latin American engagement/cooperation (government-sponsored or not) of the 20th and 21st centuries.
12. Identify structure/composition of Cuban industries. Consider senior level individuals' and agencies' military and regime affiliations. This will aid in planning for HA/DR efforts. Provide updates by industry.
13. Analyze the history and impacts of extra-hemispheric actors (both state and non-state) in the region.
14. How can the U.S. negotiate basing rights in Partner Nations with governments that may not support our regional policies (for example, a Cooperative Security Location [CSL] in Manta, Ecuador)?
15. Colombia-Ecuador: What is the potential for border issues to lead to armed confrontation? Do Plan Colombia and Plan Ecuador complement each other, or are they a roadmap for border conflict?
16. Assess the deliberately transnational nature of contemporary Latin American populist movements and their impacts on regional governability and security.
17. Unified Command Plan (UCP) and its inherent seams: Is there a better way to organize combatant command theaters?
18. What is the future of democracy in Latin American nations with significant indigenous populations?
19. Identify strategies to eliminate or significantly reduce illicit trafficking throughout the Western Hemisphere.

20. Assess the impacts of the human trafficking problem in Latin America.
21. Examine and present frameworks that will serve to engage and/or defeat enemies that employ asymmetric warfare. (The study should encompass all types of actors: those from outside the region as well as those from within.)
22. Assess the relationships between transnational threats and those threats traditionally viewed as internal security challenges. Do threats traditionally viewed as internal security challenges possess a transnational component?
23. Examine successful models for reducing state corruption.
24. Should the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the mission responsibilities of the Unified Commanders be revised?
25. Assess present and future U.S. dependence on Latin American energy sources (including, but not exclusively, Venezuelan and Mexican petroleum).
26. Is there a discernible trend away from inter-regional relations? If such a trend can be established, does it have precedents and what have been the results?
27. Examine predictive models that forecast the migration of coca cultivation in response to eradication efforts. What are the implications for national policy formulation and strategic security planning?
28. Provide literature review (5-8 pages for each country) describing challenges to the judicial systems of listed priority countries (top four listed – Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Paraguay). What are requirements for effective judicial reform, specifically as it pertains to improving overall security? Overall security of each partner nation and the region rely on a solid cooperation between security forces and the judiciary. (E.g., Colombia is transforming its judicial system; it is over burdened and considered inefficient, and the demobilization process will create more challenges.)

29. Trace the evolution (changes and growth) of regional military professionalization since the mid-1960's. (changes and growth of civil military relationships)
30. Viability of ethanol production for achieving energy security in CENTAM and select Caribbean nations (Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Barbados). Use open source information to determine if sugar cane ethanol is a better economic use of land suitable for sugar production. Determine comparative rates of return by researching relative production costs, yields per hectare (lbs of sugar, gallons of ethanol), and market values of these commodities. Assume the price of ethanol is inflexible to a major expansion in the supply for ethanol. Research amount of available land for potential sugar cane ethanol production versus national consumption. Determine labor intensity (employment potential) from these two activities (sugar production vs ethanol production) on a per-hectare basis. Note: This research will produce preliminary data to indicate whether there are significant benefits to energy security from ethanol production. In the affirmative, follow-on research could be conducted to produce an array of inter-agency recommendations for promoting ethanol production in these subregions.
31. What are the future USAF contributions to theater security cooperation for emerging nations? How can the world's most advanced air and space team contribute to strategic alliances with our Western Hemisphere neighbors?
32. Examine the security implications of CAFTA-DR and Central American regional integration initiatives, such as those proposed by the Central American Integration System (SICA). (Example: border control/security issues)
33. Assess the "total costs" of terrorism and other illicit activities (governability, security, economics, etc.)—not only the obvious costs, but also the less tangible ones such as the erosion of public confidence in governments (at all levels) due to corruption, etc.
34. What reforms are necessary to make Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) beneficial to all sectors of society? How can nations seek ways to creatively benefit and create sustainable long-term growth using FTAs as a tool for economic development?

35. Assess the varying degrees to which most nations in the Western Hemisphere have paid a price in the GWOT.
36. Examine the range of economic policies and their results in key countries throughout the region. Assess these policies with respect to their ability to provide long-term sustainable growth that addresses poverty and income equality while maintaining fiscal discipline.
37. Analyze defense/security spending and social investment by country over the past 5 years (10 years if possible).

United States Special Operations Command

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1. Are we fighting one global insurgency or regional insurgencies along a common theme?
2. USSOCOM, DoD, and the interagency – collaboration in the war on terrorism
3. Clarifying the lines under the authorities of Title 10 and Title 50 with respect to intelligence activities and the implications in terms of prosecuting the war on terrorism outside designated combat areas
4. Global posturing of all Special Operations forces – specifically synchronizing integrated training prior to deploying components as an integrated SOF task force.

United States Army Special Operations Command

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1. Global War on Terror:
 - a. Networks: DoD lacks capacity for developing ethnographic information as a weapon against hostile networks. While formerly addressed to a minimal extent in the SOF community, the entire force needs this training and ability; how should it be done?
 - b. There is a great deal of discussion of Information Operations, but many real doctrinal and practical issues in its employment. How can we turn the discussion into practice?
 - c. Electronic Warfare is a serious deficiency in the Army, prompting the Vice Chief of Staff to issue instructions on building this capability. How can the Army's EW capability be increased, and synchronized with the other Joint players?
 - d. Military role in developing partnerships with allies in war on terrorism. The Army's role in developing these partnerships (USASOC G-2)
 - e. Military contributions to information operations in war on terrorism (USASOC G-2)
 - f. How can SOF better coordinate with and support other U.S. Government agencies in strategic communications and information operations? (USASFC)
 - g. Who within the U.S. Government should have the lead and proponentcy for information operations, and what should DoD's role be? (USACAPOC)
 - h. How do we prosecute the war on terrorism in the GCC and U.S. Government seams? What special command structures are required? Is the JIATF structure appropriate? (USASOC G-35)
 - i. Study the willingness to exploit surrogates to further U.S. foreign policy (USASOC G-3X)
 - j. Sustainment of the war on terrorism including:
 - (1) How the Army and Joint Forces will support and conduct a large-scale, long duration irregular warfare campaign spanning several countries or regions. (USASOC G-8)
 - (2) The full spectrum of operations in an irregular war to counter that opponent (counterinsurgency,

- counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, stability, security, transition and reconstruction civil-military operations, psychological operations, information operations, and intelligence operations) (USASOC G-8)
- (3) What the roles and missions for the Army and Special Operations are in an irregular war, recognizing the full spectrum of operation necessary to counter the asymmetrical opponent in an irregular war (USASOC G-8)
 - (4) Study the relationship between DoD and DoS as the war on terrorism expands beyond OEF and OIF. Who is the lead/focal point for the combined DoD and DoS operations? (USASOC G-8)
- k. What the influence of religious beliefs and religious radical groups is in the present development of the war on terrorism (Chaplain)
 - l. Examine the context of the war on terrorism and evaluate the associated risk of defining a strategy that potentially fights the “tool” and not the people, ideologies and movements that employ terrorism as a means of propaganda or a method to influence political change (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - m. Examine the roles of nonstate actors in challenging the authority and sovereignty of the established nation-states (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - n. The challenge of synchronizing the UN, NATO and other regional security forces in support of the war on terrorism (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - o. Prioritize the information war. The challenge of influencing or challenging Muslim fundamentalist ideology (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - p. How we can refine processes and approvals needed for the successful execution of clandestine operations (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - q. Evaluate the methods to improve SOF human intelligence capabilities to fight terrorism in restricted and denied countries (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - r. How current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq – and their potential outcomes – will affect regional security in the greater Middle East and East Asia (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - s. How to build and maintain coalitions in a manner that does not dilute the will of America to take decisive action in the

- international arena (in some cases, success will require the United States to have a low profile) (75th Ranger Regiment)
- t. Define U.S. policy with respect to preemptive, preventive and retaliatory measures in support of the war on terrorism. (75th Ranger Regiment)
2. Homeland Security:
 - a. Does DoD need to reexamine Posse Comitatis and traditional roles in response to 9/11 and future homeland security threats? (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - b. Enhancing situational awareness without becoming a police state. Evaluate measures required to preserve liberties and institutions central to American culture (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - c. Execution of war-gaming exercises at the national level to establish operational working relationships and identify critical vulnerabilities (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - d. Evaluate legislation required in support of the Office of Homeland Security. Consider Presidential empowerment of a Chief Executive (75th Ranger Regiment)
 3. Regional Strategic Issues:
 - a. Study the implications of strategic water control to the economic, political and military stability of critical regions. (USASOC ARNG Advisor)
 - b. North Africa and the Middle East. What is the U.S. long-term strategy towards Hamas as a legitimate governing body? (USASOC G-3X)
 - c. How do we – and who does this (i.e., the UN) – professionalize regional security forces in areas currently not identified as central battlefields in the war on terrorism? (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - d. Examine the role of the media in rebuilding failed states (venue for fair representation of information) (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - e. Examine the need for justice and reconciliation programs within the process of rebuilding governments of failed states. Examine impacts on continued coalition operations within this construct (75th Ranger Regiment)

4. Military Change:

- a. The probable impact of fog and friction of the future force and suggested lubricants (USASOC ARNG Advisor)
- b. Integration of traditional law enforcement tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) into military TTP. Such “cross-over” skills are needed to target terrorist rings and support networks (USASOC G-2)
- c. How do we streamline the POM process to make it more responsive to immediate needs as we continue to prosecute the war on terrorism? (75th Ranger Regiment)
- d. Determine the effects of technology on the Principles of War. Has technology truly enabled smaller combat formations, or is the individual soldier, and the ability to mass when required, still as important as ever? (75th Ranger Regiment)
- e. Considerations with respect to actions directed against enemy computers and networks (75th Ranger Regiment)
- f. Method to compress time associated with cultural change that fosters innovation and flexibility in a time of war (75th Ranger Regiment)

5. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:

- a. Revision of Foreign Assistance Program (circa 1961) in support of the National Security Strategy. Reduce from 30 objectives to a less cumbersome, more focused effort (75th Ranger Regiment)
- b. International recognition for emerging states (or nonstate actors) (75th Ranger Regiment)
- c. 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* and the Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap (USASFC)
 - (1) Implications of the document on Army Special Operations Forces and the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC)
 - (2) Analysis and study of what is required in mission sets, organizational structure, force structure, equipment, technology, and stationing to conduct “long-duration, low-visibility and multiple” irregular warfare campaigns (USASFC)
 - (3) Integration of a long-duration irregular warfare campaign with Joint, conventional, and multinational forces (USASFC)

6. Landpower Employment:

- a. What is the role of SOF in urban warfare? (USASOC G-8)
- b. What are the roles for and the implications of using surrogates in urban warfare? (USASOC G-8)
- c. What is the role of SOF in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations? (USASOC G-8)
- d. How are Future Force sustainment operations conducted across noncontiguous LOCs in separate nations? (USASOC G-8)
- e. Should unity of command or unity of effort be the governing paradigm for interagency operations? (USASOC G-3X)
- f. A measure to increase DoD influence or communicate with the State Department with respect to infrastructure improvements in failed states (i.e., improve utilities in cities and rural areas). (75th Ranger Regiment)

7. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:

- a. Expand planning for projected conflicts and logistics for dispersed/distributed combat operations to include protracted conflicts in multiple countries and regions simultaneously (USASOC G-8)
- b. Implications for logistical support to surrogate forces as they are employed by the U.S. during an irregular war (USASOC G-8)
- c. The role of the support Brigade Combat Team in irregular war as it is conducted in multiple regions and countries simultaneously (USASOC G-8)
- d. Identify unique force protection capabilities required to conduct sea-basing operations (75th Ranger Regiment)
- e. Role of industry in support of the "long war." Examine the relationship of the U.S. economy and extended military operations. Can industry increase efficiencies in this regard? (75th Ranger Regiment)

8. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:

- a. Maintaining the necessary cultural awareness and linguistic competence to deal with multiple active and potential conflicts within the wide-ranging Islamic world (USASOC G-2)
- b. Developing imaginative leaders who are able to produce creative solutions to complex problems (USASOC G-3X)
- c. Study the impact of service members not paying Federal taxes (USASOC G-3X)

- d. Evaluate the existing Joint Planning models with respect to both deliberate and crisis action planning (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - e. How can we develop more adaptive leaders? What is the feasibility of incorporating “social intelligence” into soldier and leader development and education? (75th Ranger Regiment)
9. War and Society:
- a. Assume there will be no major technological advancements in alternate fuels that would lower U.S. dependence on oil. How high will fuel costs have to be and/or how low will fuel supplies have to be before the low costs of foreign labor are offset and production of goods made in the United States (clothes and electronics, for example) becomes economically feasible again? In other words, when will the costs and availability of transportation begin to work against a global economy and for a regional economy, and push the United States toward an isolationist policy? (USASOC G-35)
 - b. Prioritize “Public Diplomacy” in the foreign policy process. Grant interviews to foreign media (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - c. Strengthening of public opinion research (including within foreign countries). (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - d. Development of rapid response capability to respond to misinformation (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - e. Expanding and empowering the roles of ambassadors and military liaison elements (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - f. Sustaining foreign exchange programs and providing visibility at the local and national levels (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - g. Development of message campaigns with support of the private sector (75th Ranger Regiment)
10. Other:
- a. Military working dogs (MWD). What is the DoD position on contract dogs in offensive operations? What agency sets the standards for contract dogs? Is the current inventory of MWDs sufficient to support all war on terrorism and Homeland Security requirements? (USASOC G-35)
 - b. Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat. Can technology defeat IEDs? Is counter-IED a force protection question or is it offensive operations? What agency is responsible for writing

- counter-IED doctrine? Is the MWD (Special Search Dog or Patrol Explosives Detector Dog) the appropriate tool to defeat IEDs for mechanized units? (USASOC G-35)
- c. Asymmetric Warfare. This is associated with IEDs, but of a greater scope. Is asymmetric warfare simply management, training and coordination of actions in response to threats? What is the offensive (vice reactive or defensive) posture of asymmetric warfare? Is irregular warfare simply the continually changing nature of warfare, the “revolution of military affairs,” or is it the future of war? Is the real problem one of semantics? Are U.S. forces trapped in a status quo mentality, or are they ready to redesign themselves to confront the current threat at the expense of confronting a peer foe in the future? (USASOC G-35)
 - d. Explore the second and third effects of the AC/RC Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations split (USASOC Futures Center)
 - e. Explore the advantages of moving RC SF units from the NGB to the USAR (USASOC G-35)
 - f. Can science develop robotics that protect or reduce our vulnerability? (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - g. Where can “lesser technologies” improve efficiency? (75th Ranger Regiment)
 - h. Who should control Civil Information Management (CIM) and have the lead for it in the different theaters? Study how to develop a Common Operating Picture for CIM (USACAPOC)
 - i. After nearly 20 years, is it time to reexamine Goldwater-Nichols in view of the following questions? (USASFC)
 - (1) Does Goldwater-Nichols maximize Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) and integration in the interagency and multinational spectrum? (USASFC)
 - (2) What are the relationships in ARSOF and other government agencies, while facing 21st century challenges and defeating enemies in the war on terrorism? (USASFC)
 - (3) What is the impact of command climate/human relations environment on retention and recruiting?
 - (4) How can equal opportunity (EO) programs be tailored and leveraged to create a positive human relations environment/command climate?
 - (5) Do deploying/deployed EO advisors have the appropriate training and are there enough per unit

in consideration of supporting reserve units and civilians on the battlefield? (Many reserve units have EO advisor positions as required, but not authorized. Therefore they never receive the 10-week qualification training).

United States Strategic Command

POC: Marilyn Bombac (402) 294-8543
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1. Global War On Terror:
 - a. National Implementation Plan and the way ahead for DoD/SOCOM
 - b. Counterproliferation initiatives
 - c. Interoperability with interagency
 - d. Deterrence and nonstate actors
 - e. Nation and rogue state sponsorship of terrorism
 - f. Countering ideological support to terrorism
 - g. Proliferation Security Initiative
2. Homeland Security:
 - a. Missile Defense – theater and global
 - b. QDR – global deterrence
 - c. What deters the United States and how does that impact security decisions?
3. Regional Strategic Issues:
 - a. Interdependence on allies and friends
 - b. Information sharing
4. Military Change:
 - a. Transforming from asset to requirements based capabilities
 - b. QDR force construct and sizing
 - c. Impact of BRAC
5. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
 - a. Integrating information operations – vertically and horizontally
 - b. Leveraging and integrating existing analytical capabilities
 - c. Operations in cyberspace/netwarfare/NETOPS
 - d. Way ahead for strategic communications/information operations
6. Leadership, Personnel Management, and Culture:
 - a. Leveraging government/agency expertise – birth of Joint Functional Component Commands at STRATCOM

- b. Using collaborative tools – changing culture from "need to know" to "need to share"
 - c. Establishing distributed collaborative, inter-dependent organizational environment
7. War and Society:
- a. Role of nuclear weapons in deterrence
 - b. Emerging powers

United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command/ Army Forces Strategic Command

POC: LTC Alex Robinson (256) 955-1182
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Missile Defense

1. Should we expand missile defense partnerships with friends and allies in the European and Pacific Regions, and what are the implications for our National Defense Strategy?
2. Are the geo-political and security implications regarding positioning Ballistic Missile Defense System elements in Poland and the Czech Republic worth the security and diplomatic risks?
3. What are the options and opportunities for funding strategies in the transference of responsibility of elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System from the Missile Defense Agency to the Services?

Space

1. How can America's military space capabilities contribute to the Nation's security alliances with friends and allies?
2. How will emerging and new technologies in space and near-space impact military land operations in the future?
3. What are the implications of Chinese engagement in space on America's ability to continue using this domain in support of its national interests?
4. What are the implications for America's dominance in space in a future with increased technological opportunities and peer/near-peer competitors?

Netops and Information Operations

1. What are the opportunities for meeting the operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) requirements in support of Combatant Commanders?

2. How do we more effectively fulfill information assurance requirements for a net-centric Army and future Joint Force?
3. What are the implications and opportunities of using commercial sources to augment military communications [or imagery] assets and how do we prevent our adversaries from doing the same?
4. What are the opportunities and operational challenges for effective employment of Information Operations in the current operating environment?

Technology Development

1. How do we more effectively use collaborative tools to change our culture from “need to know” to “need to share”?
2. What are the opportunities for integrating Blue Force Tracking and Global Positioning System capabilities with other allied nations?
3. Technology in the hands of our potential adversaries: What are our opportunities to exploit their vulnerabilities?
4. What opportunities exist to leverage effective enterprise technologies into military capabilities, and what are the implications of this relationship?
5. Technology in the hands of warfighters. How do we increase the capability without increasing the load?
6. How can technology support scalable and tailorable solutions to support commanders’ diverse and evolving requirements for common operating pictures?

Resources and Workforce Implications

1. Soldiers vs. contractor operated and maintained equipment. How do we reduce our requirement for contractors on the battlefield?
2. Technologically savvy soldiers and civilians: How do we recruit and retain them?

3. Optimizing the BRAC-Workforce relationship. How do we enable workforce stability during a BRAC reality?
4. Acquisition Reform: What are the Army's opportunities for greater benefits during a budget-constrained environment?

Joint Operational Environment and Doctrine Development

1. In support of our Nation's strategic interests on the Kwajalein Atoll, how do we enhance our relationship with the Republic of the Marshall Islands?
2. Soviet Union, al-Qai'da, [unknown] . . . How do we define and prepare for the next threat earlier?
3. Reserve Component soldiers operating our Nation's Ground-based Midcourse Defense System. What are the challenges and opportunities for additional dual Title 10 and Title 32 arrangements?
4. What scientific trends – global, regional, and domestic – are driving the future Joint Operational Environment?
5. How will future technological breakthroughs influence the future battlefield?
6. Which ongoing scientific efforts, if successful, would fundamentally alter the global environment – and what should we do about it?

The Defense Intelligence Agency

POC: Russell G. Swenson (202) 231-4775

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1. Global War on Terror:
 - a. The spread and role of radical Islam and international terrorist group capabilities
 - b. International counterterrorism (CT) capabilities and worldwide perception of U.S. power and CT actions

2. Homeland Defense:
 - a. Homeland defense and homeland security cooperation in assessing, countering, and responding to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats and consequences
 - b. Obstacles to information sharing among intelligence agencies, Federal, state and local law enforcement officials
 - c. Examining current laws and statutes that enhance or impede information sharing, coordination, and cooperation among homeland defense and homeland security agencies
 - d. The military's role in responding to natural disasters in the United States – lessons to be learned from the 2005 hurricane season

3. Regional Strategic Issues:
 - a. Responses (North Africa/Middle East, Asia-Pacific, Southwest Asia) to the presence of militant Islam, challenges to internal and regional stability and the U.S. global defense posture
 - b. Assessing national strategy, security policies, and decisionmaking in the Caucasus and Asia
 - c. Prospects for regional instability generated by politically and economically disenfranchised indigenous populations in Latin America
 - d. The regional strategic goals and ambitions of North Korea and China and their ability to achieve them through military and economic capabilities
 - e. Requirements for advanced infrastructure and network analyses that broadly examine command and control processes used by U.S. planners, policymakers, and warfighters
 - f. Role of Army/ground forces exercises in enhancing U.S.-Russian relations.

- g. The implications of the gradual merging of crime, government, and the intelligence services in Russia
 - h. The implications of the growth of the Muslim population within Russia (coupled with the decline in ethnic Russians) on the Russian military (manpower, training, roles and missions)
 - i. NATO-Russia relations - implications for the U.S.
 - j. U.S.-Russian cooperation in the war on terror – the way forward
 - k. Implications of U.S. Missile Defense programs on U.S.-Russian relations
 - l. Implications of U.S. Missile Defense programs on U.S.-NATO relations
 - m. Implications of U.S. Missile Defense programs on Russia-NATO relations
 - n. Implications of the (possible) Russian abrogation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
 - o. Assessment of (select) allies’/partners’ armies experienced in peacekeeping operations, now doing “warfighting” in Afghanistan and/or Iraq
4. National Security Strategy:
- a. Review in-theater intelligence organizations such as Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) and the Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DJIOC), and counterintelligence operations centers (CIOC) in order to determine if they are meeting the objectives of the National Intelligence and National Security strategies, combatant commanders’ operations plans, and other requirements
 - b. Strategic implications of DoD continuing to rely on commercial hard- and software despite endemic security vulnerabilities that are increasingly being exploited by sophisticated cyber and technical adversaries?
 - c. How does DoD ensure Supplier Assurance when the complexity and size of software programs have surpassed the ability to reach high or moderate assurance that malicious code has not been embedded?
 - d. Proliferation of sophisticated malicious cyber knowledge and the asymmetric vulnerability of the United States and its allies to its employment: Does it necessitate an international partnership for an export control regime?
 - e. At what point do U.S. efforts at legislating morality and U.S. values become counterproductive and a threat to U.S. security?

- f. What happens after GWOT is over? The U.S. has trained and increased the capabilities of numerous foreign security services who now may focus their skill sets on the U.S.
 - g. How has widespread U.S. support to foreign security services under the GWOT banner endangered future Defense HUMINT operators and operations?
 - h. How does the U.S. respond when it is no longer the center of technological innovation and what are the military implications? How can the U.S. retain and maintain its technological superiority?
 - i. How can the U.S. propagate synchronized strategic communications in cyberspace when we do not control cyberspace and our footprint in cyberspace is declining?
 - j. How does the U.S. recover its international reputation in the aftermath of the Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Iraq War?
 - k. How does the U.S. deal with multiple nuclear-capable rogue nations?
 - l. How does the U.S. deal with an evolving international situation where scores of nations may acquire the capability of creating fissile material that could be diverted for nuclear devices or weapons?
5. Leadership: Examine how DoD and service intelligence agencies are modifying training, education, management, and leadership principles to meet new Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Intelligence Reform Act requirements.
6. Underground Facilities as a National Security Challenge:
- a. The construction and employment of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs) facilities by potential adversarial nations and nonstate organizations is growing each year. Whether those nations and non-government organizations are classified as rogue, major, emerging powers or terrorist groups, they use underground facilities (UGFs) and HDBTs to protect and conceal WMD, ballistic missiles, leadership, and activities that constitute serious threats to U.S. national security. The growth and sophistication of UGFs and HDBTs is especially notable among nations with mature WMD programs. Denial and deception operations complicate detecting and characterizing of UGFs, and the facilities themselves commonly frustrate

assessment of the UGFs functions. Of grave concern is what these countries and non-state entities have learned from U.S. attack tactics and weapons used against underground targets over the last decade in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Their new and modified facilities incorporate features that make them more survivable against U.S. weapons. Moreover, these countries are exporting their underground construction techniques and construction equipment.

- b. U.S. adversaries and potential adversaries use UGFs to protect and conceal WMD, ballistic missiles, leadership, and activities that constitute serious threats to U.S. national security. Growth in UGF numbers is especially notable among nations with mature WMD programs. Denial and deception complicate detecting and characterizing UGFs. Also, those efforts and the facilities themselves commonly frustrate assessment of protected functions.
- c. Thousands of known and suspected UGFs exist worldwide. The number of countries and nonstate entities with UGF programs is growing, and the number of facilities is increasing every year. Installations deep inside mountains with extensive overburden are becoming facilities of choice. Left unchallenged and undeterred, adversaries will conclude they have sanctuary to coerce or attack the U.S., its allies, or its coalition partners.
- d. Detection and analysis of these facilities is the sole responsibility of the Underground Facility Analysis Center (UFAC). The UFAC integrates analysts, collection managers and strategists, R&D experts, and program managers from DIA, NGA, and NSA with engineers from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to meet its mission end-to-end. This intelligence and engineering integration is unique and has proved highly successful. It provides outstanding coordination and analysis. What more should be done?

United States Transportation Command

POC: Major James Groark DSN 779-1572

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1. How do the capabilities provided by USTRANSCOM's Joint Task Force -Port Opening (JTF-PO) Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) fit in the continuum of theater opening operations?
2. How do the capabilities provided by USTRANSCOM's Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) complement the Army's theater opening capability?
3. What is a recommended strategy for determining the optimum mix of transportation assets (air and surface) to support the National Military Strategy and Future Force?
4. How can a Joint Force Commander best decide when to use third party logistics providers versus Army organic capabilities?
5. Establishing, monitoring, and enforcing performance standards for intra-theater distribution
6. Consolidating Army and Defense Logistics Agency inventory to improve support to the warfighter
7. Potential improvements to redeployment processes for Army units
8. How could Universal Service Contract 05 be revised to improve performance by DoD shippers and commercial carriers and also contribute to Time-Definite Delivery (TDD) at a price we can afford?
9. Using commercial forecasting models and processes (e.g., collaborative planning forecasting replenishment [CPFR] model) to improve end-to-end joint distribution operations
10. Planning and modeling the theater distribution network during Adaptive Planning
11. Applying "game theory" to develop and improve Joint, interagency, and multinational supply chain collaboration and partnerships

12. Compare and contrast the challenges of implementing Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) across Wal-Mart and DoD supply chains, respectively
13. Using service-oriented architectures (SOAs) to improve interoperability across the logistics information domain
14. Mitigating the "friction" of joint distribution operations in theater
15. Recommendations for establishing a DoD global supply chain based on TDD
16. What information is required for logistics visibility to/at the "last tactical mile?" How should that information be provided (i.e., CONOPS with roles/responsibilities of COCOMS, Services, and National Partners [e.g., USTRANSCOM and DLA])? (Lt Col Mark Wyrosdick, DSN 779-3533, *mark.wyrosdick@ustranscom.mil*)
17. Aerial Ports and Supply Chain Management Theory (Dr. Kent Beck, DSN 779-4513, *kent.beck@ustranscom.mil*)
18. SOUTHCOM distribution hub operations: commercial versus Grey Tail CONOPS (Lt Col Rick George, DSN 576-6682, *richard.george.ctr@ustranscom.mil*)
19. A comparison of user-selected versus centralized selection of mode-of-lift. (Lt Col Jim Warnke, DSN 779-1796, *james.warnke@ustranscom.mil*)
20. Identify COCOM capability requirements for a real-time Common Operating Picture for Deployment and Distribution (COP D2)
21. Building and enforcing a single, multi-echelon distribution prioritization system
22. Achieving unity of effort across the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE)
23. How should the logistics planning process incorporate distribution network modeling and simulation?

24. Forecasting supply requirements for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
25. Logistics integration with multinational, interagency organizations, nongovernment organizations and civilian contractors. (Lance Carpenter, DSN 779-3740, *lance.carpenter@ustranscom.mil*)
26. How can cargo booking be improved in a way that focuses on buying service levels (2-3 days, 4-7 days) vs. buying modes (air, surface)?
27. Given the strategic lift available, how can we support the deployment of more than one Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to close in 30 days? (Mr. Jeffrey H. Blackwood, DSN 779-4839, *jeffrey.blackwood@ustranscom.mil*)
28. What railroad passenger system is necessary to provide for the common defense and promote the general welfare of the U.S.? (Mr. Jeffrey H. Blackwood, DSN 779-4839, *jeffrey.blackwood@ustranscom.mil*)
29. The role of logistics and distribution in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO). (Lance Carpenter, DSN 779-3740, *lance.carpenter@ustranscom.mil*)
30. The role of logistics and distribution in Security Cooperation. (Lance Carpenter, DSN 779-3740, *lance.carpenter@ustranscom.mil*)
31. The Non-linear Supply Chain, system-of-systems approach to modeling supply chain management. (Lance Carpenter, DSN 779-3740, *lance.carpenter@ustranscom.mil*)

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

POC: Mr. Larry Abercrombie (757) 788-5821

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1. Global War on Terror:
 - a. What lessons have future adversaries learned from OIF, OEF, and the 2006 Middle East Hezbollah conflict about how to use strategic communications and information operations against the future force?
 - b. How do we establish, resource and measure the relative effectiveness of nonkinetic effects versus lethal effects?
 - c. How will we preclude an adversary from manipulating national will through the media and internet? What proactive measures can we take?
2. Homeland Security:
 - a. What capabilities should the Army possess to execute Homeland Defense (HLD)/Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions?
 - b. What are the capabilities required to conduct WMD Elimination Operations?
 - c. What social, economic, ethnic, and religious impact will a continued open border with Mexico have on the U.S.? What should be the role of the U.S. military in controlling our borders? What are the larger issues in regards to immigration (both illegal and legal) as a form of asymmetric ethno-political warfare?
3. Regional Strategic Issues:
 - a. What existing or emerging states and non-state entities have the ability and the will to challenge U.S. strategic and national security objectives?
 - b. What are the political trends – global, regional, and domestic – driving the conditions of the future operational environment?
 - c. What are the economic trends – global, regional, and domestic – driving the future joint operational environment?
 - d. What are the social trends – global, regional, and domestic – driving the conditions of the future operational environment?

- e. What are the cultural trends—global, regional, and domestic—driving the conditions of the future operational environment? Trends in religion, information and PMESI?
 - f. What aspects of an adversary’s approach to irregular warfare will require an integrated DIME response?
 - g. What states/nonstates have the potential to emerge as a military peer or near-peer competitor?
 - h. What states/nonstates have the potential to emerge as an economic peer or near-peer competitor?
 - i. Where will competition for scarce resources lead to instability and/or violent confrontation? What will be the U.S. role in such a confrontation?
4. Military Change:
- a. What mix of capabilities best permits the Army to meet the Nation’s needs across the four primary security challenges of Irregular, Traditional, Catastrophic, and Disruptive challenges?
 - b. What design characteristics are required within strategic air and sea lift platforms that enable Army Future Forces to be designed with inherent protection, performance, and payload? What innovative means can be designed into both lift platforms and Future Force’s equipment that facilitate deployment without overly compromising needed capabilities?
 - c. What are the requirements or capabilities needed to create a unified airspace management effort across combined, joint, coalition, multinational, non-governmental agency and other governmental agency lines?
 - d. What are the capabilities that must be present within Joint Future Forces to deny enemy C2 based upon communications operating within the same portions of bandwidth of friendly forces? If based upon hardwired communications? If based upon cell phone communications? If based upon SATCOM? If based upon the Internet?
5. Landpower Employment:
- a. What concepts for equipping, organizational structure, and placement of equipment across the Army will permit it to have requisite rapid strategic and operational maneuver providing for rapid, decisive major combat operations against

conventional forces and the ability to reconfigure equipment within and across formations providing for force protection in counterinsurgency/Phase IV operations?

6. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
 - a. How will global resource assets, including those found in coalition, allied, national, joint, and DoD, be managed to support sustainment?
 - b. How will shared mobility assets, including air, sea, land, and precision airdrop, be parceled to meet sustainment requirements while engaged in Full Spectrum Operations?

7. Force Management and Leadership:
 - a. How should commanders be educated and trained to operate in a network enabled battle command? How do they gain experience?
 - b. How can the Future Army Modular Force be organized, trained, and equipped to execute the deploy = employ paradigm?
 - c. How does the new Army Learning Model compare to current methods of teaching in military and civilian institutions?
 - d. Compare and contrast the new Multifunctional NCO model with earlier Logistics NCO models.
 - e. Develop a model that minimizes cost for split based training operations during the BRAC transition from the losing installation to the gaining installation.
 - f. Is dL used effectively so that soldiers can continue to perform their jobs on tasks that used to be taught in residence?
 - g. What is the overall effectiveness of the dL education program to include cost, benefits, and usability; and which skill sets is dL most/least effective in teaching?

8. Science and Technology:
 - a. What future technologies show the greatest promise in providing a technological leap in the area of lethality during the 2015 time period?
 - b. What niche technologies are available to our adversaries and competitors that can be employed in a direct or asymmetric manner to defeat or deny success to U.S. operations?
 - c. What are the most likely breakthrough technologies that a future adversary may possess to apply as a disruptive challenge to the Future Force?

- d. What existing or emerging civilian/industrial use technologies can be adapted to challenge or deny U.S. networks and functional capabilities?
- e. What science and technology trends – global, regional, and domestic – are driving the future joint operational environment?

9. Other

- a. What ongoing efforts have the potential to significantly increase the ability to feed the growing world population?
- b. What ongoing efforts have the potential to reduce the global dependence on fossil fuels?
- c. Will globalization and continued growth of multinational corporations have a negative or positive impact on the U.S. economy?
- d. Will continued economic growth lead to a more balanced distribution of resources or will it exacerbate the existing disparity between developed, developing, and underdeveloped nations?
- e. Can/will the global economy sustain sufficient production of food?
- f. Will the global economy produce sufficient energy to sustain global growth?
- g. Will global competition for scarce resources be able to balance requirements with environmental concerns?
- h. What critical national resource shortfalls impact the JOE?
- i. What strategic national resources not resident in the U.S. place us at risk for future conflicts?
- j. What is the return on investment potential relative to the risk for Army investments in power and energy?
- k. What impact will unbridled population growth have on world health in regard to famine, plague, disease, etc.?

United States Army Materiel Command

POC: Paul Mui (703) 806-9110

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1. Homeland Security:
 - a. The viability of a ground centric (Army) Sustainment Support Command integrating U.S. Army Reserve assets
 - b. Opportunities for technology transfer from the military to the Department of Homeland Security and/or dual-use technologies
 - c. Army support for domestic disasters
 - d. Are the contracting vehicles responsive enough to determine when the government should step in and sustain a commercially procured weapons system with limited fielding? Example UH-72A LUH or ARH.

2. Realizing the Potential of Network Centric Warfare:
 - a. Evaluating new information assurance requirements in a network-centric army or analyzing effects of a transforming army at war on information assurance
 - b. Strategic implications for combat service support operations given planned mix of FCS systems and current systems that will equip the BCTs of the near future
 - c. Operational and cost benefit opportunities from leasing of Combat Support/Combat Service Support equipment to include: cost effectiveness, impact on national security/military operations, logistics management of leased equipment (safety implications, transportability implications, supportability considerations)
 - d. Implementation of sense and respond logistics concepts integrated with AIT technology, demonstrating improved warfighter support from supply chain management, fault isolation, and maintenance technical data access and rights of usage for logistics
 - e. Increasing and changing role of contractors in forward areas (interacting with military force)
 - f. Strategic and logistical planning for increasing numbers of contractors who will accompany the military force
 - g. Maintaining Army industrial support (organic/private) for transformation

- h. The role of the Army's organic manufacturing base in transformation
 - i. Evaluate the demands of increased bandwidth requirements and the ability of technological improvements to meet those demands
 - j. A DoD-wide data strategy enabling true interoperability
 - k. Extend the network to the soldier by using latest industry wireless technology
 - l. Test and implement Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) technology across the Army
 - m. Develop COOP strategies and capabilities across the Army
 - n. Going deeper into an information landscape involved in a very real cyber-war
 - o. Battlefield systems interoperable with other current systems and future systems
 - p. Provide comprehensive information assurance and information security in AMC Information Operations
 - q. Realize the full potential of information sharing through continued development and modernization of applications and service oriented architectures connecting to LandWarNet
 - r. Move logistics infrastructure toward digitization, miniaturization, virtualization, personalization, and wireless
 - s. Employ a secure, collaborative, web-enabled, and tailorable Enterprise Architecture intended to integrate and leverage AMC's mission planning and execution capabilities
 - t. Structure the AMC enterprise as a networked organization that features task focused, adaptive teams that facilitate efficient and parallel thinking behavior
 - u. Provide a Business Intelligence Center concept that would maximize the use and availability of command wide data, enabling real time data analysis and decisionmaking. Leverage information technology (IT) innovation and knowledge management (KM) to achieve decision superiority by transforming AMC processes, applications, and data into net-centric capabilities that accelerate information sharing
3. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:
- a. The impact of raw material for Class V production
 - b. Viability of a CONUS ground-centric sustain-ment/support structure
 - c. Risk of offshore production of tires, electronics, ball bearings, etc.

- d. LOGCAP/other augmentation agreements as a part of DoS and DoD strategies
 - e. The impact of certain strategic materials only being available from foreign sources
 - f. The impact of declining rotorcraft technology investment in the U.S. as compared with foreign governments and industries
 - g. The impact of multinational corporate teams and/or foreign-owned corporations providing military materials and/or expertise
 - h. Does the current acquisition model meet the war replacement requirements?
 - i. What is the potential impact of repeated rotations on acquisition, sustainment, replacement, and modernization of Army and USMC weapons systems and materiel despite announced increases over time?
4. Landpower Employment:
- a. LOGCAP and other similar instruments in stabilization and reconstruction operations
 - b. Sustaining a modular capabilities-based Army
 - c. Joint applicability of Army weapon systems
5. Landpower Generation and Sustainment:
- a. Implications of “sea-basing”
 - b. Impact of all civilians (government and contractors) on the battlefield
 - c. Implementing “sense and respond” logistics in an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) environment
 - d. The role of the Army’s ground systems industrial base (organic/private) in supporting landpower generation and sustainment
 - e. Joint Theater Logistics Management
 - f. Development of a national level Global Logistics Command
 - g. Establishment of a single Army Logistics Enterprise
 - h. The Army planning, budgeting and funding schema for new systems in light of the extended contractual periods associated with performance-based logistics
 - i. Logistics operations in dispersed/distributed combat operations against predominantly insurgent forces
 - j. Changing materiel requirements as operations transition from combat to stabilization to reconstruction/nation-building

- k. New requirements for the organic industrial base given the changing force structure and nature of conflict
- l. Implications for reliance on the commercial industrial base given changing force structure and nature of conflict
- m. Sustaining a modular capabilities-based Army
- n. Joint applicability of Army weapon systems
- o. Methods to reduce reliance on contractor support on the battlefield
- p. Implication of centralized/single fact to warfighter nontactical maintenance
- q. Implication of central control of all Reset
- r. Requirements for, and implications of, an Army logistics component of a Joint Logistics Command
- s. Desirability of single control of logistics systems from factory to foxhole – acquisition, fielding, maintenance, distribution, etc.
- t. Assess how the new active and reserve component force generation models will change the way the Army manages, maintains, and accounts for materiel. Consider both Title 10 and Title 32 requirements for the respective components
- u. The emerging growth of radio frequency identification technology and the required uses and security implications for DoD
- v. What are the role and impact of contractors on the battlefield?
- w. What are the role and impact of nongovernmental organizations on the battlefield?
- x. Will the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) enhance supply chain management?
- y. Assess how to implement BRAC decisions while not impacting readiness
- z. Consider the difficulties created within the prepositioned stock program by how quickly the equipment needs of the Army change
- aa. What is the military's role in controlling environmental impact on the modern battle-field?
- bb. Assess the implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS)
- cc. Assess whether indemnification is still a good strategy for GOCOs when using performance-based acquisition principles
- dd. Has the integration of Automated Identification Technology (AIT) into logistics tracking systems used for visibility and

- accountability of Class V, VII, and IX lived up to Army/DoD expectations during the most recent deployments into Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines? If not, what have been the shortcomings?
- ee. Transformation of the Army's Requirements Process focusing on Joint Warfighter readiness
 - ff. Logistics Transformation – Reduce Footprint
 - (1) Distribute supply nodes dynamically across the battlefield
 - (2) Robust and flexible transportation networks – leverage Joint capabilities to share
 - (3) Situational awareness of requirements, demand, and location of forces
 - (4) Net-centric environment where IT provides seamless connectivity
 - (5) “Wal-Mart” like efficiencies
 - (6) Develop, create, and put into use a tracking system – FedEx and UPS
 - (7) Actualize the Rapid Fielding Initiative and Rapid Equipping Force
 - (8) Adopt CBM+ across the Army – export successes from Army Aviation
 - (9) Predictive and ‘smart’ supply management
 - gg. Support the Army Structure Transformation – Think Expeditionary
 - (1) Supply and sustain an increased number of soldiers (Active force at least 547,400)
 - (2) Support expansion and modular conversion (FY 07 – 13) of AC and ARNG BCT and AC
 - (3) ARNG, USAR multifunctional and functional support brigades; include readiness and availability.
 - (4) Deploy and employ logistics forces simultaneously
 - (5) Evolve supply methods to enable modular conversion
 - (6) Develop modular logistics organizations complementing overall modular Army structure.
 - (7) RESET APS and ASF and convert into modular structures
 - (8) ARFORGEN – Review and properly equip units
 - (9) Role of security assistance and expanded use of U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC)
 - (10) Directly connect the warfighter to the logistics environment – flatten the logistics chain

- (11) Robust and flexible transportation networks
 - (12) Prepare for a possible increase in the use of sea basing for strategic logistics support
 - (13) Reduce or eliminate demand; shrink size of supplies
 - (14) Replacement for fossil fuels
 - (15) Super reliable, self-repairing machinery and electronics
 - (16) Replace food with pill or tablet
 - (17) Way to recycle and reuse body waste
 - (18) Predictive logistics through data/trend analysis for real-time support
- hh. Contractors on the Battlefield
- (1) Examine statutory and regulatory implications of contractors in the fight.
 - (2) Are the contractor tasks captured and translated into soldier-based maintenance in a timely matter?
 - (3) Examine contractor labor levels and applications in adjusting Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) for weapons system sustainment
 - (4) Are the transitions from PBL contractor to retail logistics (at the weapon system) addressed in automation initiatives?
 - (5) Examine LOGCAP current capabilities and enhancements that duplicate contractor missions.
- ii. Assess the impacts of DoD and DA regulations on GOCO facilities. Consider the effects of such requirements on the factors of production and the feasibility of carrying out all tasks on installations that are personnel and resource deprived.
6. Global War on Terror:
- a. Overarching, integrated analysis of terrorism funding, including narcoterrorism, sale of diamonds, etc.
 - b. Technological advances and/or dual-use technologies that can bolster border protection and homeland security
7. Military Change:
- a. Analysis of the issues associated with implementing the Army's data strategy and products to improve NETOPS functionality
 - b. Analysis of Multi-Level Security (MLS) issues for systems being developed for the Future Force

- c. Discussion of IPV6/IPV4 translation issues and implementation pilots/demos required
- d. Development of strategic options for providing an acceptable level of protection for information systems and networks using fewer resources. Problem is balancing the manpower, time and materiel costs of protecting U.S. information systems from enemy exploitation so we can provide an acceptable level of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the information in U.S. operational and tactical systems and networks with the requirement to conserve scarce resources
- e. The impact of the growing requirements to use wireless technology to communicate on and off the battlefield
- f. Weapons: Look closely at a new individual weapon (e.g., rifles and machine guns). To any soldier under fire, the ability to save his own life, and those of his colleagues, begins, and often ends, with the individual weapon (rifle, pistol or bayonet-knife) For the long term we must look at electronic, electro-magnetic and laser weapons. For the short term, replace the M16 rifle. The M16 rifle first appeared in 1957. It was a marginally effective weapon then, and its successors have not been much better. Increase use of the Mossberg 12ga military shotgun, the M240 machine gun (7.62 NATO), the M2 .50 cal heavy machine gun, a .45 cal pistol, the Barrett .50 cal sniper rifle and the M24 sniper rifle.
- g. Radios: Every soldier should be equipped with a personal communications device of the future. Just as every cop on the beat has a hand-held radio, every member of a squad should possess a communications device sophisticated enough to allow every soldier to remain connected to every other soldier in his squad, and if needed, beyond. If possible, the device should provide data as well as voice.
- h. Protection: Technology exists today to equip light infantry with an exoskeleton – essentially a robotic suit powered by a small gas engine that a soldier can strap on his arms and legs. Computers and sophisticated hydraulics sense and amplify muscular movements in his arms and legs. In the interim keep body armor relatively light and reliable.
- i. Mind and Body. Greater attention must be given to the selection, bonding, and psychological and physical preparation of close combat soldiers if they are to perform well in the dangerous, unfamiliar and horrifically desolate terrain

and weather in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Modern science offers some promising solutions.

- j. IEDs and Beyond: Adapt to protect against future threats. IEDs and other threats will change. The enemy will improve capabilities to disrupt soldiers. Look at protecting against the growing threat to helicopters
 - k. Night Vision: Do whatever it takes to keep the U.S. in the lead. Make sure we continue to “Own the Night.”
 - l. Lights: Weapon mounted and personal lights are essential in urban operations. Develop such items of use to soldiers with sufficient power to support long duration missions.
8. Force Management and Leadership:
- a. The Arming of Civilians: What are the implications from an international law perspective and what protections/safeguards exist for the individual?
 - b. Deployment Incentives: What compensation should be provided to deploying DACs, including necessary legislative changes (i.e., tax exemptions, recruitment bonuses, increased life insurance, etc.). What can be done to encourage more civilians to deploy in the face of an aging workforce? What recruitment and retention incentives should be considered for emergency-essential personnel?
 - c. Special Needs: What special needs exist for civilians and contractors who are deploying and/or on the battlefield? The CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) does not have enough uniforms in unusual (larger) sizes to allow everyone to deploy in a timely manner.
 - d. Disciplinary and Performance Issues: How should disciplinary and performance issues be handled for deployed DACs? AR 690-700, Chapter 751, states that the on-site chain of command has the authority and the discretion to initiate appropriate administrative action against a civilian employee for misconduct or disciplinary issues. Generally speaking, the easiest course of action is to send the employee back to the home station, many times with no documentation of the infraction or problem. This often results in no action being taken because the home station does not have the information necessary to take the disciplinary or performance action.
 - e. Post-deployment issues: What physical/psychological services should be available to DACs and contractor employees for

injuries suffered on the battlefield, including post traumatic stress syndrome, etc.?

- f. Attracting and developing senior civilian leadership

United States Military Academy

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1. Homeland Security, U.S. Army:
 - a. Securing the southern border of the United States from illegal immigration
 - b. Ramifications of the North American Defense Agreement
 - c. Budgetary politics: the problem of allocating funds for Homeland Security
 - d. Evolution of civil-military relations
 - e. Motivations for service in the U.S. armed forces
 - f. Growth of the gap between the U.S. military and American society
 - g. The level of civilian support for the war on terrorism: key determinants
 - h. The nature and quality of American patriotism and nationalism
 - i. The state of the military as a profession
 - j. Best practices for the U.S. Army in post-hostility operations
 - k. Best practices for the U.S. Army in the war on terrorism
 - l. Best practices for the U.S. Army in counterinsurgency strategy
 - m. The process of military reform: What are the components of a successful strategy?
 - n. Preemptive versus preventive war: evolution and legitimacy of concepts
 - o. The evolution of the Army Field Manual: key determinants
 - p. The reform of military education to better encompass language and culture training

2. International Issues:
 - a. The roots of anti-Americanism and regional variations
 - b. The utility of public diplomacy; best practices
 - c. Democratization as a response to terrorism: promise and limitations
 - d. The threat convergence of WMD proliferation and terrorism
 - e. The use of information warfare tactics by violent non-state actors
 - f. Internet-related challenges to U.S. grand strategy and national security

- g. Cooperation between the United States and the EU (also individual countries) in the war on terrorism
- h. The erosion of Latin American democracy over the past decade: undermining U.S. security interests in the region
- i. The anti-American message of Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. How strongly does it resonate in the region? What concrete measures by Venezuela undermine U.S. interests in the region?
- j. To what extent does Chavez control the political process in Venezuela? Develop metrics to gauge the strength of organized and diffuse opposition to Chavez. Evaluate the strength of civil and political society. What are the prospects for democratization after Chavez?
- k. The prospects for stability and democratization in Cuba over the next decade: the roles of the Cuban Army and foreign investment
- l. The growth of Islamic radicalism in Latin America: determinants
- m. The growth of Islamic radicalism in Africa: determinants
- n. Identification of the sources of liberalization in the Arab world: the role of intellectuals, the middle class, NGOs, and international pressure
- o. Sources of democratization in the Muslim world: case studies in Asia and Africa
- p. The interpretation of Muslim scripture as a support for political and cultural liberalization
- q. Hezbollah: estimating the growth of its influence in Lebanese politics over the next 5 years
- r. Palestinian and Israeli politics: prospects for an authentic 2-state solution
- s. Prospects for defeating insurgency in Afghanistan under NATO
- t. Prospects for democratization and state-building in Afghanistan
- u. Social, political, economic, and cultural obstacles to democratization in Iran
- v. Best practices for the U.S. Army in nation- and state-building in Iraq. The components of an American "Plan B" in Iraq: What does Iraq and the immediate region look like in terms of America's role if reconciliation and stabilization fail?
- w. Measuring the possibility of state failure in Pakistan: develop metrics

- x. Identify the relative political strengths in Pakistan of liberals and Islamists What are the political interests of the Pakistani military as a corporate body?
- y. Politics of oil in Africa. Threats to the free flow of oil to the United States
- z. The prospects for state- and nation-building in Nigeria under the new government
- aa. Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan: prospects for successful democratization
- bb. Ukraine and Georgia: prospects for membership in NATO
- cc. Russia's response to "regime change" on its borders. Assess the growth and durability of Russian political, military, economic, and cultural influence in the Near Abroad, particularly Central Asia.
- dd. Evaluating Russia's contributions as a partner in the war on terrorism
- ee. The growing estrangement of Russia from the West: the role of the Siloviki. Identify policies that might enable the West to influence Russian behavior.
- ff. Gauging the stability of Chechnya: have separatism and radical action been contained or have they metastasized to surrounding republics?
- gg. Politics of leadership succession in Russia
- hh. Politics of oil and gas pipelines in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and western China
- ii. The politics of succession in Kazakhstan: What institutional forces are likely to play a role after Nazarbayev's death or retirement?
- jj. Problems of human security as obstacles to building sound states and promoting democratization
- kk. Deescalation of tension between India and Pakistan: how durable? What are the prospects for a settlement in Kashmir?
- ll. Political instability and political radicalism in Indonesia

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

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1. Sustaining U.S. Contractor Support versus “Capacity Building”: Much of the engineering design and project management, and all of the construction work for USACE-managed programs is performed by contract. During the early stages of foreign contingency operations, the U.S. Government typically calls on major elements of the American engineering and construction industry to provide rapid support. Such firms often accept such work, with all its uncertainties, hoping to later qualify for long-term work in a given theater. Policy that mandates maximizing contract awards to local firms, and training them for greater capacity, provides disincentives for U.S. firms to gamble early on contingency contracts, either by declining to bid at all or to build in short-term profits by bidding for significantly higher payment. How can this contradiction be addressed to the benefit of U.S. national security?
2. Efficiency versus Effectiveness: Both the institutional and the operational Army have seen significant pressures for enhanced efficiencies, doing more with less. Carried to an extreme, efforts in this direction lead to an Army that is 100% efficient, with all of its personnel and other resources fully employed performing current tasks. This also leaves no surge capability to respond to unforeseen contingency requirements. How can we balance our requirements to provide adequate surge capacity to win our Nation’s wars (effectiveness) as a “not-for-profit” organization, with demands for business efficiency?
3. Geospatial Intelligence: The Army relies heavily on geospatial information and services (GI&S) for warfighting – from battle command, battlefield visualization, terrain reasoning and awareness, to focused logistics, assured mobility, and actionable intelligence. This intricate GI&S environment has rendered the Army’s current geospatial operations obsolete – ineffective, inefficient, and disjointed. For Army GI&S operations to be effective and efficient, Army GI&S policy, regulations and management oversight must be thoroughly examined and changed as appropriate. Should the “Topographer of the Army” be assigned

this responsibility and resources to accomplish this 21st century mission, or if not, whom?

4. Effectively Implementing the Army Role in Stability and Reconstruction: Since the 1990s operations in the Balkans, and more dramatically in operations since 2001, DoD OCONUS missions have included significant “stability, support, transition, and reconstruction operations” (SSTRO). Uniformed Army forces conduct stability operations in support of SSTRO, while the Corps of Engineers serves as DoD’s agent for reconstruction and related efforts. Planning is currently underway in the J5 for the possible creation of a Stabilization and Reconstruction Corps (S&R Corps) to plan and execute whole-of-government stabilization and reconstruction activities especially during Phase 0 and Post-conflict. Strategic objectives are 1) build the governance capacity of foreign partners to reduce terrorist space, capability, and influence; 2) build governance capacity to prevent failure of weak states to prevent humanitarian crisis and/or enhance regional stability; 3) conduct post-conflict S&R operations; and 4) support consequence management domestically when called upon to do so. The S&R Corps would be sized to meet future requirements (~20,000), predominately civilian but with a sizable military component, organized in 3 echelons (active, contract, reserve). What are the implications of such an organization for Army stability operations?
5. Implications of the Long War on the Generating/Institutional Army: Current projections are for sustained, significant OCONUS operations into the next decade. What changes does or will the Army have to make in order to support the repeated and continuous deployment of soldiers?

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve

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1. Stability Operations in support of full-spectrum operations:
 - a. Assess the effects of long-term stability operations on recruiting and retention rates in the Reserve Components
 - b. Define the skills required for stability operations and identify those which should reside within civilian agencies, rather than the military
 - c. Assess the limitations of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) in stability operations
 - d. Examine the effectiveness and benefit of the U.S. military in training foreign civilian police forces
 - e. Examine the relationship between Combatant Commanders and force providers to support stability operations on a long-term basis
 - f. Assess the relevance of the Geneva Convention to stability operations
 - g. Assess the value of civilian-acquired skills (CAS) in stability operations; specifically, CAS value in Civil Affairs units
 - h. Compare the skills required for successful execution of stability operations against the skill demographics of the Army (both AC and RC)

2. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA):
 - a. Examine the role of the Army Reserve in DSCA
 - b. Identify the impediments and recommended solutions to timely and effective Army Reserve execution of DSCA based on its role as a federal force under Title 10 USC
 - c. Assess the effectiveness of existing command relationships, roles, responsibilities and missions of NORTHCOM, PACOM, their ASCCs and other agencies involved in the planning and execution of DSCA (including WMD and CBRNE events)
 - d. Assess the effectiveness of the Army Reserve Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO) in the planning and execution of DSCA
 - e. Assess the impact of the ARFORGEN training and equipping strategies on effective Army Reserve support to DSCA

3. Assess the effectiveness of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act (ANGCRRA) – commonly referred to as Title XI – on the readiness of Army Reserve units relative Army Reserve manpower dedicated to National Guard unit training support and in relationship to officer accession trends. Was the Title XI initiative beneficial to the Army Reserve and should the program be expanded?
4. Examine the balance of Army forces in regard to the changing roles and missions of the National Guard. Specifically, is the force mix in each component optimum for its primary mission? Propose recommendations to correct any identified deficiencies
5. Examine the effect of contracting (contractors on the battlefield) on recruiting and retention in the Army and its Reserve Components. Recommended solution sets to mitigate possible negative impacts identified as part of the analysis
6. Assess the changing role of information operations, its relationship to PSYOP (psychological operations), and evaluate whether the Joint Role of USSTRATCOM is having a positive effect on the relationship
7. Examine the effect of increased training requirements (ARFORGEN, post-mob training reduction etc.) on Army Reserve recruiting and retention. Specifically, examine effects on civilian employer/soldier relationships and recommend appropriate solutions
8. Examine the existing force structure of the Army Reserve and assess whether or not this force structure is adequate to support a 5-year ARFORGEN cycle (1 year available to 4 years dwell). Develop force structure solutions to enhance ARFORGEN supportability
9. Examine and assess the potential long-term effects of utilizing the Army Reserve as an operational force and the impact of that use on recruiting and retention rates over the long term. Identify potential initiatives to reverse negative trends that might emerge as a result of operationalizing the RC.
10. Examine the change in paradigm from a strategic to an operational Reserve in an effort to identify and quantify the point at which

military responsibilities and duties become too demanding for part-time citizen-soldiers. At what DEPTempo point does the concept of an operational reserve begin to negatively impact readiness?

11. Examine the concept of a Continuum of Service which allows a service member – regardless of component – to move seamlessly between full-time active duty and part-time military service. Identify the current barriers to this construct and necessary enablers (policy, legislative changes, etc.), assessing the overall value of the Continuum of Service concept to the full realization of an Operational Reserve.

National Guard Bureau

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1. What are the appropriate roles and missions for the Army's components?
 - a. The ARNG as part of the operational force?
 - b. ARNG's state role in addition to federal role?

2. What is the future force structure of the Army National Guard? Considering only the needs of state governors in domestic operations, many critics have suggested that the ARNG should predominantly consist of CS/CSS force structure. However, the Constitutional basis for the National Guard is as armed militia for the governors, so "trigger pullers" were arguably intended by the Framers of the Constitution. This legacy of combat arms in the ARNG continues to this day. Are the ARNG's 28 BCTs, 8 Combat Aviation Brigades, and other structure enough? Role of ARNG's maneuver enhancement brigades and CS/CSS brigades in war and domestic operations

3. What is the future of the All Volunteer Force?
 - a. Although the ARNG has achieved personnel strength of 350,000 troops, will Army resource the ARNG with equipment to accomplish its missions?
 - b. How will continued deployments/mobilizations affect the ARNG's ability to remain a viable state and federal volunteer force?

4. How can the Army National Guard personnel system transform? Will the ARNG receive resources to further automate its personnel system with DIMHRS, iPERMS, etc.? How will new 12-Month Mobilization Policy affect the management of ARNG soldiers?

5. What is the future of training simulation in the Army National Guard?

Located in Indiana, the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center (MUTC) is a self-contained training environment. The 1,000

acre site was turned over to the Indiana National Guard in July 2005 and has been evolving into a full-immersion contemporary urban training center. ARNG Aviation forces regularly use a combination of individual and collective training equipment to keep aviation skills sharp. The BCTC at Fort Leavenworth also use simulation training to prepare combat brigades and battalions for the warfighting and other operations. How else could simulation be utilized to maximize training in the ARNG?

6. How should the mobilization and deployment processes be changed?

The new 1-year mobilization is an appropriate change. Coupled with this new 1-year mobilization are efforts to increase pre-mobilization training and reduce post-mobilization training. How will new 12-Month Mobilization Policy affect the management of ARNG forces?

7. How can the National Guard expand the State Partnership Program (SPP)? The National Guard's SPP links a particular state with a particular foreign nation to promote and enhance bilateral relations with that nation. It nurtures dependable collaborative partners for coalition operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. 51 countries are currently linked to 44 states, 2 territories (Puerto Rico and Guam), and Washington D.C. SPP seems to be a good way for a U.S. Governor to support overseas COCOM Theater Security Cooperation plans and overseas U.S. Embassy efforts without actually having to send Guard Forces out of state. Does SPP present an economical way for the United States to assist partner nations while simultaneously freeing more Active Component forces for warfighting and expeditionary missions?

8. How should the ARNG develop commission and warrant officers? Although the ARNG develops Warrant Officers in ways similar to the Active Component, the ARNG must allow Warrant Officers to maintain civilian jobs; what challenges does this present?

9. How should the ARNG implement the Army Force Generation Model?

In April 2007, the DARNG approved the latest array of ARNG forces in the ARFORGEN template. With ARNG forces already

plugged into the ARFORGEN model, the ARNG is already executing. How can the ARNG balance ARFORGEN execution with domestic operations, which are difficult to predict?

10. Future ARNG force structure: What can the ARNG sustain? With 350,000 personnel, the ARNG has sufficient personnel strength to sustain its current force structure; will the Army permit the ARNG to grow?
11. Impact of the Global War on Terrorism on officer and NCO career development?
Deployments have admittedly forced some individual officers, NCOs, and soldiers to defer their professional schooling. However, the schools can be rescheduled for these individuals. It is not a serious problem for the Guard. One must also keep in mind that for most Guardsmen and Guardswomen, their military careers are second careers. Guardsmen and Guardswomen have always had to schedule their military professional schooling around events in their civilian careers. Can the Army and the ARNG better accommodate ARNG Officers, NCOs, and soldiers in terms of professional development and schooling?
12. What levels and forces will the ARNG require to fight war on terrorism for 10 to 20 years?
The ARNG currently has sufficient forces to fight the Global War on Terrorism and perform its other missions during the decade ahead. However, the Guard could easily grow. One should remember that ARNG forces include unique units such as civil support teams (CSTs), which are ideal for protecting the homeland against acts of terrorism. How should the ARNG grow to best support the Global War on Terrorism and perform its other missions during the decade ahead?
13. Can the ARNG continue to provide its own replacements for extended periods under the current Partial Mobilization Authority? There is no policy requiring the ARNG to replace its deployed units with other ARNG units. ARNG forces are sourced as part of the "Total Army" forces. The needs of the Army and the availability of all the Army's forces will continue to determine what forces are provided by the ARNG. When the Army determines that an ARNG capability is required, the Partial Mobilization Authority serves

as authority to mobilize the ARNG forces. Should the Army try to replace ARNG units in theater with other ARNG units to best implement the new 12-Month Mobilization Policy?

14. What is the State Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ) role and interaction with NORTHCOM?

Each of the 50 States, Puerto Rico, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia has its own Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ). The JFHQ provides the Governor and the Adjutant General with planning and staffing capability for contingencies. In an emergency situation, the Governor and Adjutant General typically exercise command and control through the JFHQ and the JFHQ actively coordinates all the activities within the state or territory. Unless ARNG forces have been federalized, they are not subordinate to NORTHCOM. To the contrary, federal forces typically come in to augment National Guard and other first responders at the request of a state's governor. How can NORTHCOM best support a State's JFHQ during a domestic operation?

15. What is the impact of remobilizing ARNG soldiers for a second deployment?

Repeated deployments are admittedly stressful for Guard members, their families, and their employers. Nevertheless, the ARNG continues to meet missions, and the personnel strength of the ARNG is good. For the long term, it is important to provide as much predictability as possible for Guard members, their families, and their employers. For the individuals and units that endure extended deployments or suffer from insufficient dwell time between deployments, incentives should be provided. How can the Army and ARNG best provide predictability to ARNG soldiers, employers, and family members?

16. Define requirements and resourcing criteria for the ARNG in each ARFORGEN cycle.

For ARFORGEN to work properly, units must be resourced properly. Early in the ARFORGEN cycle, ARNG units need to have their equipment so that they can train with it. As a unit progresses into the later stages of the ARFORGEN cycle, additional training days have to be built into the schedule. In the final stages of the ARFORGEN cycle, personnel stabilization policies must be utilized

to keep trained personnel in the unit. Will the Army and the Nation resource the ARNG to meet the requirements of ARFORGEN?

17. What is the National Guard role in a post-Katrina Homeland Defense environment?
The ARNG forces in each state and territory are still the first responders. This will not change for at least two obvious reasons. First, while the Active Component forces are consolidated on relatively few federal installations, the ARNG is already “forward deployed” in each state and territory. Second, the ARNG is immediately responsive as it provides capabilities directly to the Governor on scene. How can the ARNG best support the Governors and first responders in a crisis? Will the Army and the Nation resource the ARNG to meet the requirements Homeland Defense missions?
18. Will the ARNG’s role in the operational force present so many training requirements and mobilizations that individuals will stop volunteering to serve in the ARNG?
19. NGB currently provides NORTHCOM with information and assists in planning for possible NORTHCOM support to first responders during domestic emergencies. What should be the relationship between the National Guard Bureau, ARNORTH, and NORTHCOM?