



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**The Anatomy of Terrorism and Political
Violence in South Asia, Proceedings
of the First Bi-Annual International
Symposium of the Center for Asian
Terrorism Research (CATR)
October 19-21, 2005
Denpensar, Bali, Indonesia**

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PREFACE

This paper presents the Proceedings of the First Bi-annual International Symposium of the Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) held in Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia on October 19-21, 2005. The Symposium, entitled “The Anatomy of Terrorism and Political Violence in Southeast Asia” was jointly organized by the Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN, or State Islamic University of Indonesia), the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (UIN), and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) under the auspices of the Executive Board of the CATR. The IDA research team wishes to express its gratitude to Dr. Azyumardi Azra, Chair of the CATR Executive Board for hosting the conference; Ms. Dina Afrianty and the staff of UIN, who labored tirelessly to make all the local arrangements on very short notice; Mr. Ranga Kalansooriya, who worked closely with the IDA team in designing the theme and program for the conference; and Aundra Campbell and Toni Crow of the IDA support staff without whom we could not have cleared all the administrative hurdles on the US side. We are also grateful for the patience and skilled efforts of the SFRD editorial team – Ms. Shelly Smith, Dr. Elisse Wright, and Ms. Barbara Varvaglione. Finally, we thank Dr. Victor Utgoff and Mr. Robert Zirkle for reviewing and commenting on the draft. Caroline Ziemke drafted the Introductions and Summaries presented in this report. The IDA team strove to accurately reflect the opinions expressed by the participants, and accepts sole responsibility for any misstatements, errors, or omissions. The Symposium and this collection of Proceedings were completed as part of an Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) project for the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) with the objective of providing analytical support to the Defense Policy Analysis Office (DPAO).

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SUMMARY

The First Bi-Annual International Symposium of the Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) was held at the Hotel Santika Beach, Bali on 19-21 October 2005. The theme for the meeting, “The Anatomy of Terrorism and Political Violence in South Asia,” complements a previous symposium on “The Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia” held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in April 2005. The CATR Board of Governors agreed to hold this meeting in Bali several weeks before the tragic suicide bombings attacks in Kuta, Bali on 1 October 2005. It was a sign of the shared commitment of all the members of CATR that there was no hesitation to proceed with the meeting as planned. It was the shared sentiment of all the participants that CATR should embrace the opportunity to show its support for the people of Bali during that difficult time, to send the clear message to those who use terrorism as a political tool that CATR members will not allow the threat of terrorist attacks to disrupt the rhythm of their lives, and to encourage others to take the same stand.

Several themes related to the anatomy of terrorism and political violence in South Asia provided the intellectual framework for the papers and discussions:

- The ongoing strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan often dominates discussions of terrorism in the South Asian region to the detriment of progress on other important issues. Nonetheless, it is important to consider how the geopolitical rivalry of those two states and, since 1998, their nuclearization of the balance of power in South Asia, effects the development of the terrorist threat in the region and the ability of all the states of the region to develop and implement cooperative counterterrorism approaches.
- The terrorist threat in South Asia is complex and multifaceted and has developed a transnational character that does not respect political boundaries. Terrorist groups have exploited porous frontiers and the lack of official cooperation between states in the region to their considerable advantage. Thus, it is important for CATR and its members to develop and illuminate approaches through which states in the region may transcend traditional geopolitical rivalries, ethnic divisions, and religious

differences and shift their collective focus toward their shared interest in defeating the common threat from terrorism.

- The political willingness of governments in the region to tackle the terrorist threat is neither clear nor consistent. National governments have sometimes taken advantage of terrorist organizations to promote their own geopolitical or domestic agendas, to the intentional or unintentional detriment of their neighbors. Clear cases need to be made to 1) convince governments and political parties that there is nothing to be gained and much to be lost by using such means, and 2) developing meaningful cooperative approaches to defeating the terrorist threat in the region?
- The links between the wars on poverty and terrorism in South Asia may be driven by unique regional factors. Western academics have increasingly dismissed poverty as a major contributing factor to the rise of terrorism. The studies that back up this conclusion, however, are most often based on data from the Arab world. South and Southeast Asian experts believe the link between terrorism and poverty is much stronger in their regions. In particular, they are concerned that such natural and man-made disasters as the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, the 2005 earthquakes in Pakistan, and ongoing war and civil unrest in Afghanistan and Nepal, are likely to lead to levels of human suffering that may lead to increased participation in terrorist and violent extremist groups.

Part I: Interregional Fertilization of Terrorism and Political Violence

The opening session of the First Bi-annual CATR International Symposium investigated the current state of understanding concerning the international connections between terrorist organizations and ideologies and, perhaps more importantly, to define what important questions remain to be investigated. The papers and discussions focused on four general topics:

1. The organizational links between terrorist organizations in South and Southeast Asia including finances, training, and transfer of weapons expertise and technology;

2. How international issues (such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and the Kashmir dispute) shape the ideological agendas of individual terrorist and insurgent groups within the South and Southeast Asian regions and the extent to which groups are linked by shared ideologies;
3. The most important agents of organizational, technical, and ideological cross-fertilization among terrorist groups; and
4. The mechanisms – both organizational and ideological – that might account for the recent escalation of the use of suicide bombing by terrorist and insurgent groups in South and Southeast Asia.

Part II: The Anatomy of Terrorism in South Asia

South Asia is one of the world's most vibrant and volatile regions. It is ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse and is home to ongoing resistance and separatist movements in virtually every country. Widespread poverty and a large and growing gap between rich and poor aggravate existing tensions and unrest, foster mistrust of governments, and create an environment that is at least tolerant of groups that advocate radical political change. Most such movements pursue their political and ideological goals by peaceful means, but a significant number are committed to the use of violence – whether terrorist or insurgent – to advance their ends. Virtually all of these movements – whether ideological, ethnic, or religious – also have important cross-border and international dimensions. Every state in the region – including peaceful Bhutan – has wittingly or unwittingly hosted one or more training camps or sanctuaries for terrorist and insurgent groups from outside their borders. Violent groups are able to move manpower, funds, and weapons across national borders, in part, because long-standing bilateral political disputes have prevented the governments of the region from forging effective cooperation on countering terrorism and political violence.

This double session could only begin to touch upon the complexity and scope of issues related to the anatomy of terrorism in South Asia. It did, however, identify a number of themes worthy of much deeper investigation and research by CATR members and other institutions. In particular, the discussions highlighted the degree to which many of the factors that have contributed, in the past, to division and conflict in the region –

religious, ethnic, and ideological pluralism; overlapping identities; religious diversity; complex civil societies with countless stakeholders; and large expatriate communities scattered all over the globe – can, in the future, be harnessed as forces for positive change. Progress, however, will require: imaginative approaches; genuine commitment to conflict resolution and reconciliation on the part of key elites and community leaders; patience; and a willingness to take risks.

Part III: Technology and Terrorism

Terrorist access to advanced technology poses significant challenges to national and international counterterrorism efforts. Modern information technology, especially the Internet, has dramatically accelerated the speed at which the extremist ideologies that underlie most terrorist movements can spread and evolve. It also offers terrorist organizations a virtually limitless and uncontrolled marketplace within which to propagate their agendas, raise funds, and recruit new operatives. For the most sophisticated groups, the cyber-marketplace also offers opportunities to exchange operational information, coordinate activities, and communicate using codes, encryption, and by embedding information in apparently innocuous websites. Perhaps the greatest concern for counterterrorism is the tendency of the new information environment – the Internet, satellite television, and 24-hour global news services – to increase the incentives for those who want to bring their agenda to the forefront of public attention to escalate the level and theatricality of their violence.

Terrorist acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction and other advanced offensive capabilities was another focus in this session. Papers in this section explore both terrorist access to WMD and efforts to acquire and employ aviation assets. In both areas, the message was similar. At present, much of the initiative toward acquiring such capabilities is focused in local groups rather than in international terrorist organizations like al-Qaida. In the case of aviation assets, local terrorist and separatist groups have had some success in acquiring basic aviation capabilities and training, although they are far from acquiring significant offensive “power projection” capabilities. Still, their ability to monitor and defend their own airspace, their increased ability to move people and materiel either for operational or logistical purposes, and the existence of terrorist cadres

trained in aviation technologies, all serve to increase the threat level and complicate the job of counterterrorist agencies and civilian aviation security.

In both cyber- and WMD- terrorism, a major challenge for counterterrorism is to respond to the ability of terrorist groups to adapt – both to new technologies and to defensive measures. The problem of deploying defensive measures against an adaptive terrorist threat applies equally to both information and kinetic weapons technologies. In the information realm, as counterterrorism efforts get better at tracing and identifying terrorist activities on the Internet and global communication networks, the terrorists get better at hiding their activities or driving them underground. Likewise, the evolution of the insurgency in Iraq shows that terrorist and insurgent groups learn quickly and have the expertise and flexibility necessary to develop technological and operational responses to new counterterrorism strategies and to do so very quickly.

Roundtable I: Does Terrorism Work

The refrain that civilized people must not give in to terrorism has become a truism in local, regional, and global struggles against terrorist movements. Political, religious, ideological, and social groups with grievances against their governments cannot, the reasoning goes, be allowed to believe that they can expect to achieve their objectives by committing shocking acts of violence against innocent non-combatants. Yet terrorism as a political tool is a phenomenon almost as old as politics itself, and the determination of political authorities to resist terrorist coercion is no doubt similarly ancient. So if it is true that terrorism is not an effective means of achieving strategic political ends, why does it continue and, in the contemporary world, spread? The goal of this roundtable was to answer the straightforward, but nonetheless complex question: “Does Terrorism Work?” Over the course of a broad-ranging discussion of these questions, a consensus emerged that three general factors account for the relative success or failure of terrorism in achieving political goals:

1. The Nature of the Terrorist Group: “corrigible” groups – those with limited and negotiable agendas – are more likely to achieve some political mitigation of their grievances than “incorrigible” ones – those whose violence is motivated primarily by anger or the desire for revenge.

2. The Nature of the Terrorist Group's Agenda: groups that see terrorism as a tool of war – a means to achieve clearly defined and publicly expressed political aims – are more likely to achieve some level of success than those who see terrorism as a tool of protest or revanchism.
3. The Nature of National and International Responses to Terrorist Activities: three factors are particularly important: 1) the tension between the need to provide national governments with the legal tools they need to arrest and prosecute those who participate in and support terrorist activity and the desire to protect the civil liberties and human rights of law-abiding citizens – especially those who stand in opposition to their government or its policies; 2) the role of national and ethnic diasporas in fomenting, financing, popularizing separatist and building international support for resistance groups that use or advocate terrorism as a tool of political struggle; and 3) the role of the national and international media in covering violent political activity.

Roundtable II: The Religious Dimension of Terrorism

Few issues have been more contentious in the effort to promote international cooperation in countering the spread of terrorism than the role of religion as a motivation for terrorism and political violence. Al-Qaida's overtly religious rhetoric makes it difficult to argue that religion is not a powerful motivator for individuals and groups engaged in political violence and terrorism. Still, as terrorism in Sri Lanka and Nepal clearly show, non-religious motivations can be just as powerful and durable. While most terrorist experts agree that religion is an important factor, the root causes that motivate terrorists and, more important, their supporters are essentially political. Western nations, in their counterterrorism strategies and policies, insist that they do not see Islam or any other particular faith as a "threat," yet their strategies frequently focus on "militant Islamist ideologies" and their immigration controls seem to single out citizens of predominantly Muslim nations. It is impossible to ignore the powerful role that religious ideology can play in sustaining terrorist movements and rallying popular support, yet the nature of that role is a source of debate and confusion among analysts, policymakers, and military and law-enforcement officials. The absence of common appreciation undermines

international cooperation. The purpose of this roundtable was three-fold: first, to discuss the role of religion as a dimension of terrorism; second, to identify strategies for countering the abuse of religious doctrine by terrorists; and finally, to discuss ways that religion and religious leaders can be mobilized as a force for stability and reconciliation to mitigate the root causes of terrorism.

The reality that most terrorist movements are motivated primarily by political rather than religious root causes clearly does not obviate the need for policymakers and strategists in every nation engaged in a struggle against terrorism to understand the religious dimension of the problem. In the Muslim world, in particular, the widespread popular perception that the West is at war with Islam is a major contributor to popular support, or at least tolerance, of violent religious extremists. In the eyes of many traditional religious elites, globalization has undermined faith, piety, and cultural cohesion by confronting young people with alien culture and values. Religious factors also combine with other sources of discontent – poverty, economic injustice, political corruption and repression – to trigger a deep and festering sense of frustration in individuals. This appears to be particularly true where globalization and economic modernization have left millions in South and Southeast Asia behind; apparently accelerating the growth of a community of the economically and politically dispossessed.

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INTRODUCTION

The First Bi-Annual International Symposium of the Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) was held at the Hotel Santika Beach in Denpasar, Bali on 19-21 October 2005. The theme for the meeting, “The Anatomy of Terrorism and Political Violence in South Asia,” was intended to complement a previous symposium on “The Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia” held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in April 2005.¹ The CATR is an outgrowth of the desire of participants in that earlier symposium to build on the foundation of information sharing and frank discussion from that meeting and to create a permanent organization that would meet on a regular basis. A Steering Committee met in Jakarta, Indonesia in July 2005 to draft a charter for a permanent council dedicated to promoting and sharing cooperative and comparative research on topics related to the causes and responses to terrorism and political violence in South and Southeast Asia. The CATR came into being later in the summer of 2005 and sponsored its first international symposium in Bali a few months later.

The Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) is a consortium of government, academic, and research institutions dedicated to providing systematic ways to promote and share regional research on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Its goal is to draw on the unique strengths and perspectives of each of its member institutions and countries to enhance both understanding of and responses to the rise of terrorism and political violence. The CATR is founded upon the principle that by promoting and sharing research, drawn from the diverse expertise and perspectives across the region it is possible to develop new approaches, enhance existing capabilities, and build integrated and cooperative efforts to counter terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region and other regions that directly affect its security. The Council fulfills a number of important functions:

¹ See John T. Hanley, Jr., Kongdan Oh Hassig, and Caroline F. Ziemke, *Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia Held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia*, IDA P-4026 (Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2005).

- It provides formal and informal mechanisms for promoting an open dialogue among scholars, officials, and law enforcement professionals;
- It encourages information sharing to improve the effectiveness of both national and international counter-terrorism activities;
- It promotes research on topics related to terrorism and counterterrorism for use in policymaking, planning, and training;
- It establishes links with institutions and organizations in other regions for the purpose of information exchange and scholarly dialogue.

The CATR Executive Board agreed to hold this meeting in Bali several weeks before the tragic suicide bombings attacks in Kufra, Bali on 1 October 2005. It is a strong sign of the shared commitment of all the members of CATR that there was no hesitation in proceeding with the meeting as planned. Instead all the CATR participants embraced the opportunity to show our support for the people of Bali during that difficult time, by sending a clear message to those who use terrorism as a political tool that CATR members will not allow the threat of terrorist attacks to disrupt the rhythm of their lives and work and encourage others to do the same.

In introductory remarks to the Symposium, one of its key organizers, Ranga Kalansooriya of Sri Lanka, laid out the following issues and questions related to the anatomy of terrorism in South Asia, which framed the discussions over the following three days:

- First, while CATR undertook this topic with the clear intention not to allow the focus to devolve into the usual India-Pakistan debates, it is important to consider how the geopolitical rivalry of those two states and, since 1998, their nuclearization of the balance of power in South Asia, effects the development of the terrorist threat in the region and the ability of all the states of the region to develop and implement cooperative counterterrorism approaches.
- Second, the terrorist threat in South Asia is complex and multifaceted, and it has developed a transnational character that does not respect political boundaries. In fact, terrorist groups have exploited the porous frontiers and lack of official cooperation between the states in the region to their considerable advantage. Thus, it is important for CATR and its members to propose new approaches that can transcend traditional geopolitical rivalries, ethnic divisions, and religious differences and shift the

collective focus of states in the region toward their shared interest in defeating the common threat from terrorism.

- Third, the willingness of governments in the region is to tackle the terrorist threats is neither clear nor consistent. Too often, national governments have used terrorist organizations to promote their own geopolitical or domestic agendas, to the intentional or unintentional detriment of their neighbors. What steps must be taken to 1) convince governments and political parties that there is nothing to be gained and much to be lost by such “playing with fire,” and 2) begin to develop meaningful cooperative approaches to defeating the terrorist threat in the region?
- Finally, the links between the war on poverty and the war on terrorism in South Asia may be driven by unique regional factors. Western academics have increasingly dismissed poverty as not a major contributing factor to the rise of terrorism. But these studies are most often based on data from the Arab world. Experts in South and Southeast Asia believe the links between poverty and terrorism are much stronger in their region. In particular, they are concerned that recent natural and man-made disasters – the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, the 2005 earthquakes in Pakistan, and ongoing war and civil unrest in Afghanistan and Nepal – may lead to increased participation in and support for terrorist groups.

This proceedings document includes three products: the formal papers presented at the Bali symposium, summaries of group discussions and Roundtable sessions, and Power Point presentations that were used in the roundtables to set the stage for and stimulate the exchange of ideas. With the exception of the formal papers, all the discussions at the symposium were conducted according to strict Chatham House rules of non-attribution. For this reason, no one is quoted directly in the summaries, although all the ideas expressed were advanced by one or more of the participants. While IDA drafted the summaries, they reflect as far as possible the opinions and observations of the experts in attendance. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editors, the Institute for Defense Analyses, the US Department of Defense, or any of the other participating organizations.

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PART I
INTERREGIONAL FERTILIZATION
OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

The opening session of the First Bi-annual CATR International Symposium had a dual goal: to investigate what experts in the region know about the international connections between terrorist organizations and ideologies and, perhaps more importantly, to define what important questions remain to be investigated. The papers and discussions focused on four general topics:

1. The organizational links between terrorist organizations in South and Southeast Asia including finances, training, and transfer of weapons expertise and technology;
2. How international issues (such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and the Kashmir dispute) shape the ideological agendas of individual terrorist and insurgent groups within the South and Southeast Asian regions and the extent to which groups are linked by shared ideologies;
3. The most important agents of organizational, technical, and ideological cross-fertilization among terrorist groups; and
4. The mechanisms – both organizational and ideological – that might account for the recent escalation of the use of suicide bombing by terrorist and insurgent groups in South and Southeast Asia.

ORGANIZATIONAL LINKS

While the participants agreed that ideology is a central feature motivating the actions of individual terrorist groups, they emphasized that some of the most important links between terrorist groups are non-ideological. In particular, it is clear that terrorist and insurgent organizations of quite different ideological stripes (secular and religious, Maoist and Islamist, local and regional) have forged cooperative arrangements for the transfer of arms and tactical expertise across national and regional boundaries. The LTTE in Sri Lanka, for example, is known to have used its sizeable business and shipping enterprises to support terrorist groups across South and Southeast Asia. There are few terrorist groups – no matter how ideologically pure they claim to be – that have not

forged such “alliances of convenience” with groups of other outlooks in the interest of expanding their technical capabilities and operational “reach.”

IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS ON RADICALIZATION

Discussants identified a number of international issues as potential factors shaping the ideological agendas of terrorist groups in the region: lingering post-colonial resentment and sensitivities, the imbalance of political and economic power between the West and the non-Western world, the uneven spread of democracy and its benefits and the failure of the US to support all democratic movements equally, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the failure of the Middle East peace process. None of these issues is new, however, leading some members of the group to suggest that one factor that has greatly intensified the ability of these long-standing issues to spark violent reactions across the world is the rise of global satellite news services and the internet. While decades ago, it might take days or weeks for news of episodes of violence or injustice to spread through societies, awareness of events in distant lands is now virtually instantaneous. Moreover, violent expressions of tension and disagreement are most likely to get the attention of TV news services – riots and terrorist bombings make for more exciting viewing (and higher ratings) than peaceful protests or painstaking (and boring) political negotiations. The unregulated public space of the Internet, at the same time, enables zealots to “spin” events in support of their own ideological agenda, free from the normal checks and balances that occur in broadcast and print media. In a sense, television and the internet have increased the public profile of violent political protest making it look like a faster-track to international and government attention for a grievance than more low-key, non-violent means.

The increased “religiosity” that has spread through many societies in recent decades is another international factor shaping the views of terrorist groups and their supporters in local and regional contexts. Over the course of the Afghan Civil War, for example, the Taliban managed to shift the strategic context of its salafist religious ideologies from a focus on local issues (regime corruption, Islamic law) to a global agenda – the establishment of a global Islamic “caliphate” and the strict quarantine of the Muslim world from Western influences. To cite another example, advocates of strict salafist ideologies in Southeast Asia have succeeded in transforming the Israel-Palestinian conflict into a powerful symbolic focus for popular anger despite the fact that

there are virtually no Jews in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian experts pointed out, however, that Israel and its powerful ally, the United States, are convenient symbolic scapegoats for whatever ills – poverty, political oppression, government corruption, ethnic and sectarian tensions – constitute the real root causes of discontent across the Muslim world. While “faith” has a different meaning for secular terrorist movements – such as the Maoists in Nepal, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, and the Communists in the Philippines – it seems clear that similar emotional/ideological processes are at work in spreading and intensifying the commitment of their members to escalating violence. The regional experts, however, stressed the importance of not allowing the appearance of religious or ideological zeal among terrorist groups and their supporters to distract governments from the underlying causes of discontent. In the cases of both avowedly religious and secular movements, it is essential to understand their strategic objectives and root causes in order to understand both how and why violent ideology spreads.

CROSS-FERTILIZATION OF RADICALISM

The discussion suggested several important sources of inter-regional cross-fertilization that demand further research and investigation:

1. *Afghanistan* has long been a known training ground for advocates of “jihad” against the West. The current Afghan insurgency has succeeded in capitalizing on that tradition to make its current resistance to the new Afghan democratic government a global cause for salafist radicals across the globe, including those in Southeast Asia. Interestingly, Southeast Asian Muslims are not going to Iraq to join in the insurgency; in this sense, Iraq may not play the same role in radicalizing the wider Muslim world as has Afghanistan.
2. *Ethnic “diasporas”* play an important role in bringing essentially local conflicts to international attention and attracting ideological patronage and all-important financial support. Expatriate Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Sikhs were instrumental not only in supporting local insurgent/terrorist movements, but also in initiating them. These diasporas have also, in some cases, used high-profile “spokesmen” to build international support for their causes by portraying themselves, and their co-ethnics in the homeland, as victims of discrimination, persecution, and other forms of systematic injustice.

3. On a more practical level, it is clear that ideologically-motivated terrorist and insurgent movements have found lucrative sources of income in the *international narcotics trade*, particularly between Afghanistan and Western Europe. Links between Muslim extremist groups and drug smuggling are emerging in South Asia and links between al-Qaida and South American narco-terrorist groups have been suggested.
4. Terrorist groups have forged expedient partnerships more broadly with *international organized crime* to facilitate money laundering, arms shipment, human trafficking, and other means of amassing funds and distributing resources. The LTTE is particularly advanced in this area; and al-Qaida is known to have used Osama bin Laden's construction companies and other businesses to augment its finances and support its operations.
5. A number of *traditional social institutions* in the Muslim world are being used to forge alliances, support the spread of extremist ideologies and advocate political violence. The importance of hawala and other traditional financial mechanisms are well documented – most can safely be conducted below the radar screen of international and national law enforcement. Terrorist groups have also used arranged marriages as a means to solidify ideological and operational alliances between regional and global extremist groups.
6. *Maritime terrorism and piracy* – conducted by the LTTE and criminal terrorist groups in the horn of Africa, for example – is emerging as another important source of financing and business cooperation among extremist groups. The LTTE is known for using its shipping assets to smuggle arms and humans throughout the Southeast Asian region for its own benefit as well as that of other terrorist and insurgent groups.

THE ESCALATION OF SUICIDE BOMBING

The issue that dominated this discussion of cross-fertilization of violent ideologies was how and why the phenomenon of suicide bombing has spread so rapidly into South and Southeast Asia in recent years. A number of recent studies attribute suicide bombing to a single factor or set of factors: individual psychology, resistance to military occupation, poverty, religious zealotry, and so forth. Over the course of this discussion,

however, it became apparent that terrorism in general, and suicide bombing in particular, are complex phenomena not attributable to a single, theoretical explanation. Much of the literature of suicide bombing has, to date, been based on data from the Arab world. Systematic analysis of the phenomenon in South and Southeast Asia is likely to reveal different patterns.

With the exception of the LTTE and a handful of assassinations by suicide bombers in India, suicide bombing is a very recent development in South and Southeast Asia. It was unknown among the mujahideen in Afghanistan during the war with the Soviet Union and the later civil war, probably because of the strict Islamic prohibition against suicide for any reason. The current suicide bombing campaign in Afghanistan has been carried out primarily by non-Afghans.

Southeast Asia experienced its first suicide bombings in 1998. Unlike their Arab counterparts—who have come largely from the educated, urban middle-class – Southeast Asian suicide bombers have come, overwhelmingly, from poor, rural regions of Indonesia, where economic privation and violence have been on the rise across society as a whole. In the Philippines, strict Roman Catholic prohibitions against self-destruction had, for centuries, kept the suicide rate there low, but the incidence of suicide has been on the rise throughout society in recent years. It remains to be seen whether this trend, coupled with a dramatic increase in the rate of conversions to radical Islam in the Philippines, might lead to an escalation of suicide bombing attacks. There is no clear profile of suicide bombers: some are well-educated, others are virtually illiterate; some are urban and economically well-off, others live in rural poverty. One universal feature has emerged, however: there has been no documented case in which the child of a Muslim extremist religious leader has become a suicide bomber. Those terrorist leaders who are willing to send other peoples' children to willingly die for their ideological cause are not, it seems, ready to put the lives of their own on the line.

This brought the discussion to another key question: what motivates terrorist leaders to use human beings as weapons of mass destruction? Terrorist ringleaders usually come from a different socio-economic class (wealthier and more educated) than suicide bombers themselves. Does this lead them to see the lives of their human “bombs” as of less moral value than those of their own children? Terrorist leaders, while ultimately guided by ideology, are immediately motivated by political strategy. Suicide bombers, in

contrast, seem much more likely to be driven by a religious zeal that accounts for the remarkably low rate of “second thoughts” among suicide bombers. Strategies of suicide bombing differ as well. The LTTE, one of the first groups to employ suicide bombing on a fairly regular basis, regards suicide as a tactic of last resort. In fact, with few exceptions, LTTE cases can be better characterized as “suicidal bombers.” That is, individuals accept operational assignments that are highly likely to result in their being killed or captured (which for the LTTE, which requires each of its members to carry a cyanide capsule around their neck in case of capture, is the same thing) but which do not require a conscious act of self-destruction. The JI in Indonesia, in contrast, has employed suicide bombing as a first move – often before it has made its goals clear – making suicide bombing more an outlet for the expression of rage and frustration than a tactic in a broader political strategy.

THE PAPERS

In “License to Kill: A Salafi Argument,” Fuad Jabali traces the geneology of Indonesian suicide terrorism back to its ideological roots in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The common features of known suicide bombers in Indonesia have been a declared hatred of America and a strong, literalist, salafist religious orientation. Jabali traces this evolution, in part, through the autobiographical writings of Imam Samudra – one of the 2002 Bali bombers. Samudra went to Afghanistan in 1989 and missed most of the “action” in the jihad there, but he returned home with the belief that the only legitimate defense of Islam must be carried out “on the battlefield.” Samudra, like many salafists, sees Israel and America as the ancestral enemies of Islam, dedicated to the destruction of Muslims and their faith. While few Indonesians engage in or approve of terrorism, Jabali warns that hatred and suspicion of the United States is much more widespread. Jabali also discusses the much-emphasized link between conservative, fundamentalist madrasas and pesantrens and the spread of violent extremism and terrorism; but he finds the link is a weak one. Jabali concludes with a discussion of the central role that civil society must play in countering the ideologies of hatred and the misuse of Islamic teaching that has created an environment that is at least tolerant of terrorists and their ideologies.

Narendra Paudel’s article, “The Price of Maoist Insurgency and Political Violence in Nepal,” traces the tragic consequences of political infighting in Nepal. The Nepalese political landscape is dominated by three powerful stakeholders: the King, the Maoists,

and the alliance of seven other political parties. Paudel argues that these three actors are more interested in their individual stakes in the outcome of their political power struggle than in the well-being of the Nepalese people, and that they have driven Nepal to the verge of becoming a failed state. Governance has broken down entirely; political violence has become endemic; and the three players in the political struggle seem not to be moving any closer to a workable political accommodation. In the meantime the Nepalese people pay the price in economic hardship, dislocation, and blood.

Jamhari Makruf's "Suicide Bombing: The Indonesian Case" attempts to answer the question that has haunted Indonesians since the 2002 Bali bombings: why were Indonesian Muslims willing to sacrifice themselves and kill innocent civilians in devastating suicide attacks? The spread of violent radicalism is, according to Jamhari, in large part a function of the increasing inability of the central government in Indonesia to maintain order and control radical groups. More deeply, however, Jamhari believes the emergence of suicide bombing can be attributed to three factors: 1) the genealogy of hatred, 2) legacies of colonialism and repressive government, and 3) personal religious and ideological motives. While these motivations are complicated, Jamhari concludes that suicide bombing in Indonesia may, ironically, be an unintended consequence of democratization. While democracy ensures individual freedom of expression and paves the way for the spread of new, more radical religious ideologies, it also loosens the traditional social and religious controls that provided social cohesion and constrained individual actions. As a result, individuals also feel more free to commit acts of violence without considering their broader effects on society.

In "Terrorists Sans Frontiers," Ranga Kalansooriya argues that the emergence of sophisticated, networked terrorist organizations across South Asia threatens to prevent the nations of that region from realizing their great human and economic potential in the 21st century. The war on terrorism, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, has transformed the landscape of terrorism in South Asia, but not always for the better. On the one hand, the nations of the region – including the perennial enemies, India and Pakistan -- have demonstrated a greater willingness to set aside their political and military differences to cooperate in combating terrorism. On the other hand, terrorists themselves have become more politically savvy and adaptable. Some have used politics to their advantage, either as players or as outsiders manipulating the system; others have diversified and linked their operations with other violent political movements inside and outside of the region.

The complexity of the ethnic and religious map of South Asia contributes to the emergence of what Kalansooriya calls the “spaghetti bowl” of terrorism: national boundaries are often arbitrary and divide ethnic, linguistic, religious, and tribal groups; weak governments cannot control their borders, facilitating transnational movement of terrorist finances, operatives, and arms; corrupt governments cannot meet the basic needs of the majority of their people; and globalization makes it much easier for violent political groups to do business on an international level. The situation is unlikely to improve until the governments of the region become at least as well-coordinated as the terrorists they are fighting. To date, the terrorists have shown the superior ability to overcome their ideological differences in pursuit of their common and individual interests.

LICENSE TO KILL: A Salafi Argument

By Fuad Jabali

(State Islamic University, Jakarta)

The important thing is that they were hit. I was happy. You know why? ... You know how many people they've killed in Central America. You know? ... Hundreds of thousands. Yes, really. They are still killing us. I am really happy they were hit. We have got our revenge. I feel sorry for the ones who died. That's more than they feel for us.

(A taxi driver in New York in October 2001)'

INTRODUCTION

Agung Hamid, an important figure behind the arrays of bombing-including the bombing of McDonald's restaurant December 2002-in Makasar, South Sulawesi, was caught in Yogyakarta in October 2004 and brought to Makasar. On the way from Yogyakarta to Makasar, and when he was being escorted to the Police station, he repeatedly said, "*Allahu Akbar; Allahu Akbar; lawan Amerika, hancurkan Amerika*" (God is Great, God is Great, fight against America, destroy America) (*Kompas*, October 6, 2004)¹. Saying that, he sent two combined messages: Islam is his orientation and he hates America.

Police investigation into the bombing of the Australian Embassy on September 9, 2004 found that the perpetrators shared similarly strong Islamic beliefs and an intense hatred of America. It was reported (*Kompas*, October 7, 2004) that those responsible for the attack were part of a religious study group whose members, like Agung Hamid, hold extreme views against the West including Australia, America and Britain.

¹ Tariq Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalism: Crusades, Jihad and Modernity* (London: Verso, 2003), 318.

Strong devotion to Islam and hatred of the West, particularly America, may seem to be two different issues, but the two are in fact interconnected: one influences the other. The connection between the two is evident when we observe two constant variables in all these terrorists' attacks: Strong Islamic beliefs held by those who carry out the attacks and predominantly Western targets. These western or western-associated targets have included Australian Embassy, McDonald's, homes belonging to American Embassy officials, and Bali, a tourist destination frequented by westerners. Hence, we turn to the question why do people with strong Islamic beliefs display a tendency to hate America so much?

Usually the perpetrators of terrorist attacks believe that bombing American people and interests is part of their being good Muslims. Thus, even though Hamid knew that he would likely receive the death penalty for his crime, he has remained composed throughout his detention, keeping a smile on his face at all times and believing that what he has done is condoned by his religion. Heri Golun, the suicide bomber of the Australian Embassy, consciously said good bye to his family saying that he was headed for martyrdom. To such people, the more they suffer the greater their reward from God. Imam Samudra, for example, has said repeatedly that he would never be remorseful for what he did, for his actions were sanctioned by Islam. For people like Imam Samudra, the death penalty is a welcome punishment.

Ancaman hukuman mati tidak menambah apa-apa kecuali semakin mantap keyakinan akan janji Allah, bahwa dalam transaksi untuk memperoleh surga Allah, akan diperoleh dengan berkorban di jalan Allah, dan otomatis ada proses 'membunuh dan dibunuh' (lihat al-Taubah:111) ... So? No chance for sad! Bergembiralah ... bergembiralah ... *Ahlan wa-sahlan* hukum mati, *welcome, welcome*. Dan itulah kemenangan yang besar.²

(The threat of the death penalty merely strengthens my belief in Allah's promise, to enter His paradise one has to engage in holy war in the way of Allah, and automatically there will be situation of 'killing or being killed' [see al-Taubah: 111] ... So? No chance to be sad. Be happy ... be happy ... Welcome the death

² (Kompas, October K, 2005) wonders, "What kind of teaching that obsessed those young men?"

penalty, welcome, welcome. That is the great victory).

These kinds of beliefs have now produced a number of suicide bombers in Indonesia, leading to a new phase of terrorism in the country.³ This is an alarming development, for suicide bombing is the most difficult terrorism to overcome. The Vice President Jusuf Kalla once asked, “What kind of teaching obsessed those young men?”

(As to the Bali Bomb Jihad, it was all done based on belief, and this belief is true and can be justified and based on the legitimate sources. It is not appropriate for the actor--or the accused actor--to ask for clemency from the president to reduce the punishment).

IMAM SAMUDRA: A CLOSE READING

Reading of autobiography of Imam Samudra, one of the Bali bombers, is useful in considering this question further. Throughout this book, it is evident that a particular understanding Islam can give rise to terrorism. Of course, one's understanding of Islam is not the only working factor. International politics and America's role in them are also important, but such factors are often misunderstood in a religious framework. Imam Samudra made a strong point that, for him, Islam is such an important factor in life that every thing he thinks or does is based on religious considerations.

Adapun peristiwa Jihad Born Bali, yang semua dilakukan atas dasar keyakinan, dimana keyakinan tersebut dapat dipertanggung jawabkan kebenarannya, clapat diuji keabsahan sumber-sumber hukurnnya, maka sangat tidak pantas bagi pelaku-atau yang dituduh pelaku-meminta pengampunan (grasi) kepada presiden, clemi mendapatkan keringanan hukuman.⁴

(As for the Jihad of the Bali bombings, it was all done based on belief, and this belief is true and can be justified and based on legitimate sources. It is not appropriate for the perpetrator – or the accused perpetrator – to ask for clemency from the president to reduce the punishment.)

Again:

³ See Trias Kunacahyono, “Babak Baru Terorisme di Indonesia,” *Kompas*, October 10, 2005.

⁴ Imam Samudra, *Aku Afelawan Teroris* (Np: Jazera, n.d)

Bagi saya-Alhamdulillah--, saya hanya melakukan suatu perbuatan meski dengan resiko apapun setelah saya rneyakini dengan sebenar-benar keyakinan, tanpa gamang, dan tanpa bimbang. Jihad bom Bali adalah suatu amalan Jihad yang berdiri di atas kristal keyakinan-keyakinan yang kukuh. Dan keyakinan itu, tak lain adalah karunia Allah swt.

(As for me -- Praise be to Allah -- I only do something -- with whatever risks that I must take -- after I truly believe in it without doubt and hesitation. Bali bomb jihad is an act of jihad based on a well-established belief. The belief is not other than the grace of Allah).

In Imam Samudra's mind, the West, (i.e. America), is the eternal enemy of the Muslims. He cites Qur'anic verses based on which he constructs his views on America. For example the Qur'an 2:120 says, "*Wa-lan tardy 'anka alyahud wa-la al-nasara hatta tattabi `a millatahum*" (And the Jews will not be pleased with thee, nor will the Christians, till you follow their creed)." These Jews and the Christians will not be pleased "because of the envy in their account" (2:109). The envy will be there forever and therefore "they will not cease from fighting against you till they have made you renegades from your religion, if they can" (2:217).⁶ Of course there is neither the word 'America' nor 'Britain' in the Qur'an, but there are words such as 'Jews', 'Christians', 'the People of the Book' and 'infidels'. Imam Samudra includes America in the Qur'anic discourse by characterizing them as the Qur'anic Jews and Christians. Belief in the truth and the eternity of the Qur'an, because it comes from the God who is true and eternal, leads Imam Samudra to see every statement in the Qur'an as literally true and eternal. This means that America will become the eternal enemy and the war between Muslims and Americans will be also eternal ?

What America has been doing in Islamic countries is viewed as an undebatable proof that what the Qur'an says is true: America (Jews and Christians) is indeed the enemy of Islam and they will never be pleased with Islam. Suffering and death in Gulf War, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine (where the third holiest place in Islam, Masjid al-Aqsa lies), Chechnya, Bosnia, Kosovo are repeatedly mentioned by Imam

Samudra, sometimes with graphic descriptions. Other than "Jews and Christians", some expressions are also used to identify America and their allies: Israel and America⁵, *Zionis* and *Salbis*⁵ *Salibis* and *Zionis*⁶ *Zionis Salibis*,¹ *1 Yahudi* and *Salibis*,⁷ *Salibis* and *Yahudi*⁸ *Salibiss* American army.⁹ As one can see, Samudra regularly mentions *Yahudi* (meaning a Jew) and *Salibi* (an Indonesian word of Arabic origin meaning one of the cross – Christian) together, as in the Qur'anic expression (2:120) mentioned above.

The graphic descriptions of the suffering of Muslims around the world, supplemented by graphic images of violence and death, are also included in his autobiography. In this way, Imam Samudra's conveys clearly his message to the readers that the Jews and the Christians are indeed allied against Islam. He cannot, and he does not try to, hide his anger toward them. He calls them 'vampire the son of monster',¹⁰ 'vampires monsters',¹¹ 'the cruel Zionists',¹² 'dirty *Salibis*',¹³ 'the colonial *Salibis*',¹⁴ 'the aggressor *Salibis*',¹⁵ 'monster America',¹⁶ 'terrorists America',¹⁷ 'the colonials America',¹⁸ 'the stupid director vampire the son of monster and his gang',¹⁹ 'vampires the sons of monsters Jews and Christians',²⁰ "'Planet of the Apes' alias Jews and the *Salibi* gang',²¹ 'the army of ape descents' (means Israel), 'the people of apes

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ As one of the leader of a 'hard line' pesantren in East Java also explains that, according to the Arabic grammar, the word "*lan*" in '*wa-lm tarclu*' of the Qur'an 2:120 is used for stating, an eternal negation (*U-ul-abet*). So, again, the conclusion is that the Jews and the Christians, i.e. the West, the Americans', will eternally be against Muslims (personal interview. 2005)

⁷ Imam Samudra, *Aku Melawan Terorist*

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

and pigs (Jews),²² 'the condemned Jews',²³ 'the colonial Israel'²⁴ and 'vampire Israel'.²⁵ It is of course psychologically tiring to mention a country or people whom he really hates. At one point, when he is really fed up, but still has to mention America, he leaves it blank and asks the readers help to mention them by themselves: "vampires with white robe called ... (you guess, because I am already nauseated to mention them)."²⁶

But hatred toward America is also shared by other people, internationally and domestically. What a taxi driver quoted in the beginning of this paper said in New York about one month after the September 11th attacks is an example. A national survey involving 1,177 respondents, conducted by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) at the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta reveals that a significant number of Muslims in Indonesia actually hate America.³³ When they were asked whether there is a state that they hate most, 31.6 per cent said yes, and America emerges at the top of the list with 17.7 per cent, followed by Israel 6.6 per cent and Australia 2.7 per cent. But when they were asked specifically about America, 60.2 per cent said that they do not like it, and 50.2 per cent of the respondent said that America see Islam as enemy.

If other people other than Indonesian Muslims also hate America, why they do not undertake suicide bombing missions as did Imam Satnudra? Two answers can be further proposed. It has a lot to do with (1) the way Islam is understood and (2) individual experience.

Imam Samudra makes a clear statement in the beginning of his book that he is a Salafi, whose interpretation of Islam is characterized as literal. He emphasizes three important views of the Salafis: (1) the view that the current generation is basically incapable of interpreting the Qur'an; (2) the exclusive right of the past generation, or *al-salafal-salih*, to interpret the Qur'an; and (3) the strong identification of Islam with Arabism. The second point is the logical consequences of the first. The current generation is inherently incapable of interpreting the text because the pious predecessors are proclaimed as being solely capable of interpreting the Qur'an.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

Samudra certainly does not negate the need to interpret the Qur'an and the Sunnah (the sayings and the deeds of the Prophet), the most two important sources in Islam. But who has the authority to do so? "Nowadays nobody has the right to claim that his/her interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunnah as the truth."²⁷ This statement, which sounds like a liberalist argument to promote plurality in Islamic interpretation, is unsurprisingly used by Imam Samudra to nullify the right of the current generation to develop a kind of Islam suitable for their context and to lead them to follow almost blindly the footsteps of the previous generation.

Who are those pious predecessors (*Al-salaf al-salih*)? Imam Samudra is not always consistent in this regard. First of all, based on the Qur'anic verses 10:10, he says that they are the Companions of the Prophet and the Followers (*al-tabi 'un*, i.e., the generation after the Companions of the Prophet). Then, based on the Prophetic Tradition "The best of the ages is my age and then those who come after me and then those who come after me," Imam Samudra adds another generation to the list of the "pious predecessors", that is the "followers" of the first generation (*tabiu al-tabi 'in*). To him an age (*qarn*) means a century, then three ages means 300 years. Therefore, to him, it is those who lived in the first 300 years who have the right to interpret the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Included in this rank are the founders of the schools of thought: Abu Hanifah (died in 767, the founder Hanafi school), Malik b. Anas (died in 796, the founder of Maliki school), al-Shafi'i (died in 820, the founder of the Syafi'i school), and Ahmad b. Hanbal (died in 855, the founder of the Hanbali school). "Their interpretation and understanding is pure, safe and true."²⁸

Up to this point there is no difference between a Salafi and a moderate Muslim. Like NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), the biggest mass Muslim organization with about 35 million members, Imam Samudra not only follows the four schools of thought but also criticizes the two extremists, one is the Kharajites and the other is the Murji'ites. He said that the Kharijites are so extreme in understanding Islam that those who commit big sins are considered as infidel and allowed to be killed. The Kharijites are often thought as the first terrorist group in Islam. They killed Ali (died in 660) the forth Caliph, and they launched continuous attacks and sabotages

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

throughout the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) and partly responsible for their fall. The Murji'ites, on the other hand, constitute another extreme. They are so permissive that, using Imam Samudra words, even those who worship stones and those who change the laws of God with other laws are considered "OK." If the two extremist groups are not right, the right one is the pious previous generation whose Islam is characterized by "just, moderate and not extreme.

If Imam Samudra is committed to the Salafi Islam, which he characterizes as just, moderate and far from extreme, why did he undertake bomb attacks? Is it because he was writing in the prison after he did what he did so that he had time to contemplate? Or is it simply because there is no relationship between what he writes and what he did? Or is it because his understanding of Islam is so complex that is full of contradictions'?

While finding an answer to this question may not be simple, one thing is All of this information was in fact written by a Ngruki alumni who still does not understand why his pesantren is still linked to terrorism important to take into account in considering it: Samudra's life experience. Like other bombers in Indonesia, Imam Samudra is quite young. He was 20 year old when he decided to fly to Afghanistan to fight. His final formal education was MA (Madrasah Aliyah, i.e. Religious Senior High School run under the Ministry of Religious Affairs the curriculum of which is almost similar to the public schools run by the Ministry of National Education). At 16, he recollects, he read Dr. Abdullah Azzam's work *Ayat al-Rahrnan f Jihad Afg/iani.titan* (The Signs of God in the Jihad in Afghanistan) many times, which left him dreaming of going to Afghanistan to fight. The Intifadah in Palestine and jihad in Afghanistan had made him really angry and unsettled. His dream came true when in 1990, the year of his graduation from MA, he met a man in the mosque of DDI (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah), who helped him find a way to Afghanistan. He was really excited. There in the same mosque he also met Jabir, who flew together to Afghanistan and later died in the Antapani bombs in Bandung

But if his aim was to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, he was actually too late. The Soviets had already withdrawn from Afghanistan in 1989, leaving Afghanistan with internal conflicts. Americans then saw the Freedom Fighters allies in a fight against the Soviets but as dangerous fanatics. As a result, all aid to them was cut. The complicated situation resulting from the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, led to the emergence of a body of international jihad veterans who, "being

outside control of any state, was suddenly available to serve radical Islamist causes anywhere in the world. ... They become the free electrons of jihad, professional Islamists trained to fight and to train others to do so likewise"²⁹ Imam Samudra, like Azahari, Dulmatin and Hanbali³⁰, came to join the ranks and learned a lot from them.

For Imam Samudra, Afghanistan was a door to the complexity of international realities. For a young man 20 years old, who grew up in small city with high school education, those realities must have been difficult to swallow. Being in the war zone, Afghanistan was an abnormal place with a lot of violence and stories about martyrdom and the brutality of non-Muslim aggressors in Muslim countries. His simple life and his 'young' Islam was likely incapable of accommodating such a difficult and complex realities. The outcome was frustration and anger. His encounters with other fighters from around the world like Chechnya and Palestine who also experienced death and sufferings-who in turn develop a kind of survival Islam, who thought that the straightforward and hard Salafi Islam was good for them-only made his Islam compressed in a small room and exploded.

Information technology only intensified his views as he used the internet regularly to monitor the death, suffering, and oppression of Muslims around the world. He owned a laptop computer and regularly visited *warnet* (network provider). This habit eventually led to his arrest. Of the internet, Samudra remarked:

I found the pictures of Afghanistan babies without heads and hands. They were brutally bombarded by America and their allies in Ramadhan 2001. Even this alone is enough to disrupt my activities. My Islam was touched. My iman was questioned. All of these have driven me to feel their suffering.

29 Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2002)

³⁰ Azahari is one of the two most wanted men in Indonesia. The other one is his student Noordin M Top. Both are the Malaysian citizens, who have been accused of being the master minds behind bombings in Indonesia. Azhari is reported that he learnt how to make remote control bombs in Afghanistan in 1999 (*Kompas*, October 3, 2005). Dulmatin, whose head is valued 10 million dollar by the US, was also reported to have this kind of training in Afghanistan (*Kompas*, October 5, 2005).

Imam Samudra never hid his feelings for the mainstream ulama whom he despised for sitting comfortably in their homes, talking about peace and Islam, while forgetting what happened in Afghanistan and Palestine. Those ulama, together with the majority of Muslims who suffered low self-esteem syndrome because of the jargon 'Muslims are terrorists' made by the "Vampire son of Monster," were all talk and no action. They enjoyed reading books and preaching to the masses, but rarely stood to defend their religion in a physical manner. "Where are they when the sons of Bayt al-Magdis were butchered by the cruel Zionists'? Where are those 'philosophers' when the Masjid al-Haram was colonized by the dirty Salibis?"⁴⁰ Imam Samudra clearly distrusts such ulama, as do other radical Muslims like him.

The only ulama whom he trusts are, of course, those who are involved in jihad on battlefields. In Samudra's view, those ulama, called *ahl al-tsughur* (the people of frontiers) – who have faced the enemy, guns and death – are more mindful of God than the ulama who are surrounded by their fans, facilities and praises. *Ahl al-tsughur*, being closer to death, try to make themselves pure, to prepare for the hereafter, and to withdraw themselves from worldly affairs. Their different way of life imbues them with different attitudes and, in turn, leads them to a different quality of fatwa. The fatwa of the frontier ulama are much superior than that of the sitting ulama. Imam Samudra then refers to Sufyan b. 'Uyayna, an authoritative figure of the Followers generation and the teacher of al-Shafi'i the founder of Shafi'i School, who said, "If you see people disagreed, then follow (the view of) Mujahidin and *ahl al-thughur* because God says 'I surely will guide them to my paths Based on this belief then Imam Samudra always refers to Syaikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, Usama b. Laden and the like, especially when it comes to issues on jihad.

Imam Samudra's Islam is an Islam that has developed as a result of his many sad experiences and negative views of a world full of death and sufferings. He knows that Islam means peace, but "[t]o let thousands of Muslim women were raped by infidels in all parts of the world is neither an act of loving peace nor an act of compassion to all the people (*rahmatan li-al-'alamin*).³² Then, in his view, jihad is not simply a choice, but a duty of all Muslims. Imam Samudra was actively involved in recruiting and training the new wave of radicals just like himself to carry on this duty. Iqbal, the suicide attacker of Paddy's Cafe Bali 2002, was one of Imam Samudra cadres (*Kompas*, October 9, 2005). Like Imam Samudra, Noordin M Top also recruits and trains

disciples to carry out his orders. According to a report (*Kompas*, October 8, 2005), in three days he “prepared” Heri Golun, the bomber of the Australian Embassy, to fully understand the necessity of sacrificing himself in the name of Islam.

PESANTREN AND TERRORISM

Following the arrest of Hanbali, the accused master mind behind the recent terror attacks in Southeast Asia and an important Jama'ah Islamiyyah representative in the region, *pesantrens*³¹, were repeatedly mentioned in a negative light by the media throughout the world. Quoting Tempo magazine, *Newsweek* (August 25/Sept. 1, 2003) mentioned that before migrating to Malaysia and then to Afghanistan, Hanbali attended a local pesantren in his village in West Java. On July 5, 2003, *New York Times*, indicated an increasing influence of Wahabism, a school of thought in Islam which promotes a strict interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunnah backed up by the Saudi Arabia, in pesantren.

Even more intriguing statements were made the the 6 August 2003 edition of *The Asian Wall Street Journal* in an its editorial article "The Pesantren Problem." Among other things, the Journal said that the Jama'ah Islamiyah, in spreading its terrorist ideologies, recruited foot soldiers from the pesantrens. "In many cases, poor kids do not have access to education, so the pesantrens may represent their only chance to learn and to write. Once there, they do not get a balanced curriculum, but rather learn only the Koran and the teachings of the local and visiting fundamentalist preachers. Sadly, youths who are looking for opportunity are being steered down a dead-end street toward violence and hatred."

If pesantrens are the breeding ground of terrorism, then, as the *The Asian Wall Street Journal* argues, combating terrorism must involve not only law enforcement but also education reform. The Journal refers to what Gen. Pervez Musliarraff has done as a model that the Indonesian government could follow: "bringing the local religious schools, or madrasah, under a central licensing regime, creating a new standard curriculum and monitoring their activities in order to prevent the production of a new generation of jihadis."

³¹ The Indonesian term refers to indigenous, traditional institutions of Islamic learning in Indonesia.

This is not to deny that there are some pesantrens and madrasah which, either directly or indirectly be it now or in the past, are linked to the actors of terrorist attacks. As *News Week* pointed out Hanbali is indeed a graduate of pesantren, Manarul Huda. This pesantren was established in the 1920s and one of the founders was Hanbali's great-grandfather. Hanbali finished his MI (Madrasah Ibtidaiyah, elementary school) and his MTs (Madrasah Tsanawiyah, Junior High School) in this pesantren. Imam Samudra, as mentioned above, was a madrasah graduate. Ali Ghufuran (alias Mukhlis) and Ali Ghufuran, two of the Bali bombers in 2002, were Ngruki Pesantren alumni, while Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (a figure linked to the Bali bombings 2002) was actually one of the founders of the Pesantren and currently its leader.

However, it is not so simple to make a link between the bombings and pesantrens. First of all, the number of pesantrens in Indonesia is quite large. Hanbali's pesantren and Ngruki are only two of many. In 1997/998 alone there were 9,388 pesantrens in Indonesia with their 1,770,768 santri (i.e. the students of pesantren). Are we saying that all of these pesantrens are breeding grounds for terrorism and all these santri are the potential future jihadis? Only a small number of pesantrens are actually linked to the radicalism. What is more, most of these pesantrens are linked to NU, whose Islam is considered as moderate, and most of them now have madrasah. Unlike pesantren, which was the oldest traditional Islamic learning, with no class, time limit and curriculum, madrasah is basically just like any other schools which use government curriculum.

The Ngruki pesantren also teaches the government curriculum. It is not a closed pesantren. Even if it was before, but now it is not. On 12 August 2004 Ngruki held a seminar on the Islamic Syari'ah and the challenge of globalization. Representatives of ten embassies were invited: German, Japan, America, Britain, French, South Korea, Thailand and Philippine. Only the first two embassies, however, sent their representatives. Also some months after the Bali bomb 2002, the pesantren held a prayer for peace program, involving the local Christian and Confucian organization.³²

Madrasahs are mainly private, and unlike secular schools, madrasahs are mainly run by community. While about 80 per cent of secular schools are run by the state and only

³² Muh. Khalid As, "Ponpes Ngruki Saran- Teroris". *hub Pos*, October 12, 2005

20 per cent by the community, only about 20 madrasah are run by the state and about 80 per cent by the community. Most of the students of madrasahs actually come from rural community whose economy is weak. What is more, unlike the students of secular school, the majority of the madrasah students are women. Thus, any proposal to abandon madrasahs or even to close them down because they are suspected of being under the influence of radicals is misleading. It will jeopardize the future of the rural community and women.

Three years after the Bali bombs 2002, people understand pesantrens and madrasahs much better. Some institutions, nationally and internationally, are now interested to work with these institutions of learning. However, some problems have emerged. Many institutions, especially international ones including USAID and AUSAID, are only intensively engaged in pesantren and madrasah development after the Bali bomb 2002. This has raised questions among targeted madrasah and pesantren: Why do they suddenly want to help pesantren and madrasah? Is this project developed because they think that pesantren and madrasah are terrorists? Is it a kind of brainwash? Reorient the pesantren and madrasah in line with the US or Australian interests? The refusal of some pesantren in West Java to accept reading materials sent by the US Embassy is an indication of how sensitive the project is. Developing programs to help madrasah and pesantren is not an easy task.

If working through Islam and its believers is strategic entry point in combating terrorism, and if there are suspicions on the part of pesantren and madrasah to the international institutions, and if there are misunderstandings on pesantren and madrasah, then working with intermediary institutions is a good alternative. These intermediary institutions must fulfill some requirements: *first*, they must be trusted by pesantren and madrasah; *second*, they must well understand pesantren and madrasah; *third*, they must have strong commitment to help pesantren and madrasah.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Hatred of America and religious misunderstanding are partly responsible for terrorism in Indonesia, and the solution to terrorism should be found in the two areas. That is, America and one's understanding of Islam. As for the Anti-America motive, Sidney

Jones believes that, although the locus of terror is national, the solution 'is global.³³ Indonesia merely the new battleground in a global war.³⁴ One may then think about a theory that "the American Empire has constructed a new enemy: Islamic terrorism,"³⁵ and hence, terrorism might be seen as "the use of violence by individuals and marginal groups"³⁶ But I am not going to discuss the complexity of global politics and how the anti-American motive can be dealt with. My aim is to see what we can do to solve terrorism in terms of Islamic context.

Vice-President Jusuf Kahn (*Kompas*, October 8, 2005) once made a strong point that, acknowledging the difficulty of combating terrorism and suicide bombings, "Only religious teachings can overcome this." In Indonesian context, religious teachings mean Islamic teachings. Imam Samudra's autobiography and other terrorist actors' statements scattered in mass media made it clear that Islam constitutes an important driving force behind these atrocities. Dealing with Islam is then a matter of strategic step to coping with terrorism, especially in countries where Islam is the religion of the majority.

The war against terrorism and radicalism has a military dimension, but it is mainly the battle to win the heart and the mind of the people. Democratization and education are two important weapons to combat terrorism. Military training is needed, but the emphasis must be put to the civil society.

While some may be inclined to ask "What the government has done to combat terrorism?", a more productive question may be "What the civil society has done?" Civil society plays a major role in combating terrorism. The population must be aware of the danger of radical groups, and must know how to handle it. It is likely that the target of the terror is not be military but a public or semi-public facility. Working through madrasah and pesantren with mass Muslim organization in this context seems to be the right choice.

³³ "Azahari dan Noordin Bentuk Kelompok Baru." *Kompas*, October 4, 2005

³⁴ Tb Ronny Rahman Nitibaskara, 'Boin Bali Jilid II.' *Kompas*, October 3, 2005

³⁵ Tariq Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalism*, xiii.

³⁶ Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* (Boston: South End Press, 1979), vol. 1, 6

Following the 2004 general election, Indonesia proudly has become a democratic country. If now there are 119 countries, or 62 percent of the all countries in the world, in which democracy is practiced (Farced Zakaria 2003), then Indonesia is an important democratic country for an obvious reason. Being the biggest Muslim country in the world--with a population of 238 million, of whom some 87 per cent are Muslims, Indonesia can be "a model for Islamic democracy", assuggested by *The Economist*. The success of Muslim Indonesia in establishing democracy is a fresh spirit to combat terrorism. Being the biggest Muslim country, Indonesia can play a significant role in combating terrorism done by their Muslim fellows. Terrorism, which endangers not only democracy but also humanity, must be seen as the enemy of every nation, every religion and every culture.

Although democracy is instrumental in combating terrorism, some problems need to be addressed. The Indonesian economic crisis followed by the political crisis in early 1998 obliterated much of the successful economic development that had been achieved by the New Order Regime (1967-1998). The current feature of social welfare is colored by high levels of poverty, unemployment, school dropout rates, and an increase in the number of children suffering from malnutrition. In 2004, about 30 to 40 million people are unemployed or underemployed. The latest report released by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics in December 2004, reveals that 37.4 per cent (37.4 million) of Indonesian population are living in extreme poverty (under poverty line). The report also mentions that another 20 her cent of the population are susceptible to fall under the poverty line (Indonesian poverty line is far below UN poverty line which is I US\$ per day. Indonesian poverty line is equivalent to 12 US\$ per month). The raise of the oil price has certainly made the condition worse.

The worst thing is that poverty and low education have become major factors that deteriorate the social condition of Indonesia. Child labor and trafficking, crimes, massive urbanization and the emergence of slum areas in cities are only some of the examples of how poverty and low education lead people to carry out things beyond their own wishes. Even radicalism and extremism can be linked to poverty and low education. Usama b. Laden is of course a rich man, but Amrozi, Imam Samudra and other actors behind the Bali bombing, for example, did not grew up in wealthy families. High commitment to Islam without adequate understanding on Islam due to the lack of education on Islam and if this is aggravated by difficult life, this commitment will finally

lead people to perform Such extremism.

THE PRICE OF MAOIST INSURGENCY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NEPAL

NARENDRA RAJ PAUDEL³⁷

BACKGROUND

Even though Nepal, the birth place of Lord Gautam Buddha (Light of Asia) is a peace loving country, she has been suffering from political violence and terrorism due to Maoist Insurgency since February 13, 1996. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) initiated an armed movement dedicated to abolishing the monarchy in Nepal and establishing People's Republic. Due to it, the situation of Nepal has been deteriorating day by day and people have been pushed into trouble, fear and uncertainty in their own country.

The Maoist insurgency has been interpreted from various perspectives. From the security perspective, it is a security threat. From political perspective, it is an ideologically-based political power struggle to control the state. From a sociological perspective, it is a violent form of social change and transformation which evolved to dismantle the centuries-old systems of poverty, discrimination and injustice. However, all agree that the current insurgency is a fundamental crisis in Nepal.

His Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMG/N) has already declared the Maoists to be terrorists and deployed a Unified Force against the Maoists to bring them into the mainstream of politics.³⁸ However, Maoists have been killing, disappearing, abducting people and destroying physical infrastructure. In this situation, a question "what would be the price of Maoist insurgency and political violence to Nepal while each of the stakeholders pursues their own interests" could be raised.

This paper specifically presents the governance situation in Nepal, Maoist politics and the price that Nepalese people have to bear in the face of the Maoist insurgency and political violence. Secondary data from research documents, periodicals, and other

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³⁸ Unified forces include Royal Nepal Army(RNA), Armed Police Force(APF) and Nepal Police(NP)

existing literature have been thoroughly reviewed to seek the answer to this question. Some 10 key informants were also approached for thematic discussion on the aforesaid issues.

GOVERNANCE SITUATION OF NEPAL

Nepal – a small Himalayan country situated between two Asian giants, India in the south, east and west, and China to the north – is fighting for its socio-economic transformation. Since the restoration of democracy in 1990, the hopes and expectations of the common citizen have risen highly. At the same time, however, the level of poverty, which had decreased to 38% by 2002, is soon expected again to reach as high as 49%³⁹. The overall value of Nepal's human development index (HDI) is 0.466 – which is the lowest among South Asian countries. If we look into these figures by regions, rural areas have an HDI of 0.446 while urban areas have HDIs of 0.616. The percentage of the population living in rural area is 85.8% compared to an urban population of 14.2%⁴⁰. What this shows is that the vast majority of the Nepalese people are living at a low level of HDI (see Table 1). Because of the low socio-politico-economic situation, the status of governance in Nepal is in crisis.

³⁹ NPC, HMG/N (2002): Tenth Plan (2002/07). Kathmandu: National Planning Commission, His Majesty's Government of Nepal

⁴⁰ UNDP (2002): Nepal Human Development Report 2001. Kathmandu: United Nations Development Program. P. 18

Table 1: Human development index

| <i>Indicators</i> | <i>In the middle of 2002</i> |
|---|------------------------------|
| Literacy (+15 yrs) | 49.2 |
| Actual enrollment at primary school (%) | 80.4 |
| Average life expectancy (year) | 61.9 |
| Child mortality rate (per 1000 at birth) | 64.2 |
| Maternity mortality rate (per 100,000 live birth) | 415 |
| Reproductive rate (%) | 4.1 |
| Population growth rate (%) | 2.25 |
| People access to the potable water (%) | 71.6 |
| Safe delivery service by the trained personnel (%)* | 13.0 |
| Human development index | 0.466 |

Source: NPC/HMG,N (2003): Tenth Plan (2002/07), p. 29

* The services delivered by the trained birth attendants were not included

CREATION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

In understanding governance, the nature of the political system is very important and is the lynchpin of the total governance system. It is important to understand the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced.⁴¹ Nepal has varied experience of political development. Multi-party democracy was restored through a people's movement in 1990, with the "Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990" establishing a parliamentary system of government based on representative politics⁴².

The modern democratic system was first introduced after the overthrow of the Rana regime in 1951⁴³. During the Rana period of autocratic family rule, except for maintaining regime-defined basic needs of the people and protecting the independence

⁴¹ <http://www.worldbank...>

⁴² C R Uprety and Tek Nath Dhakal (1992): Inculcation of Political Culture: Urgent Need for Nepal. A Conference paper presented at the First SAARC Political Science Conference on "Democracy in South Asia: Problems and Prospects" held on June 19-20, Kathmandu: Political Science Association Nepal.

⁴³ The Rana Family ruled over Nepal from 1846 to 1951 as de facto Kings in a feudal and autocratic manner. They were always suspicious of social institutions and educated people because they thought educated people could threaten the continuity of their family rule.

and sovereignty of the country, no other socio-economic development efforts were made. The country was little known in the international arena until this watershed period.

The post *Rana* era also witnessed a lack of good governance for several reasons. The social system remained feudal and political infrastructure was overwhelmed by the lack of democratic institutions, an inefficient bureaucratic system, conservatism in society, the various roles of political actors, over-ambitious power blocks, and other factors that contributed to the general mismanagement of state affairs in Nepal during the 1950s. The government resulting from the country's first general election in 1959 could not rule for more than one and half years due to the tussle between it and the monarchy over the exercise of power. The dispute pushed Nepal into the autocratic "Partyless Panchayat" system in 1960⁴⁴. The yawning gap between theory and practice, words and deeds, the leaders and the led made the Panchayat system autocratic and, again, feudalistic. The management of state affairs squandered the tax payer's money in activities designed to achieve self-serving political gains while more important developmental issues were given only lip service. More specifically, the system vitiated the moral base and ethical behavior necessary for the overall development of the society.

As a result, the 1990's political reform movement pulled down the 30 oldyear *Panchayat system*. The new constitution made provision for two Houses – the popularly elected the House of Representatives (HoR), and the National Council (also called Upper House) – as the supreme democratic institutions for making public laws and controlling the government. This system was expected to trigger changes on the political, administrative, economic and social fronts as people became increasingly aware of the miseries created by the misrule of the past. The hopes and expectations of the people for the restored democracy, and their trust in the freedom fighters and their parties, were naturally high. However, the Nepalese people have been compelled to bear further trouble, terror, and fear resulting from the Maoist insurgency. Political violence continues to frustrate of their democratic aspirations.

⁴⁴ Panchayat as a party-less political system was introduced in Nepal in 1960. The Panchayat system was based on the "Constitution of the Kingdom Nepal 1962," which did not allow the formation and operation of political organizations. However, the system was constituted as a three-tier system (village/town level, district level and national level) and claimed it was a democratic and popularly-based system where people can contest the election in an individual basis. The constitutional provision gave the king absolute power. For details see HMG/N (1962): The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1962.

ENHANCEMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE

Decentralization has been widely accepted as an effective tool for strengthening local governance. To achieve the objective of good governance, decentralization of central power and authority should transfer authority to the local level. Such reorganization can, in turn, be helpful for political stability, effective delivery of government services, poverty reduction, accelerated economic development, and the establishment and maintenance of equity. Efforts to strengthen local authority in Nepal started in the 1960s with the creation of Village/Town Panchayats, and District Panchayats. The Decentralization Act of 1984 tried to strengthen the local bodies; however, it could not solve local problems. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 in its Article 25 (4) states:

It shall be the chief responsibility of the State to maintain conditions suitable to the enjoyment of the fruits of democracy through wider participation of the people in the governance of the country and by way of decentralization, and to promote general welfare by making provisions for the protection and promotion of human rights, by maintaining tranquility and order in the society.⁴⁵

As envisaged in the constitution, acts governing local bodies were implemented in 1992, and accordingly, local elections were held in 1992 and 1997. Altogether 3,913 Village Development Committees (VDC), 58 Municipalities and 75 District Development Committees (DDC) were established. Enactment of the Local Self-Government Act of 1999 and Regulations of 2000 were additional attempts to strengthen local bodies for self-rule. After the expiration of the terms of the elected local bodies in July 2002, additional elections were not held and the tenure of the local representatives was not extended. Instead, employees working at VDC, Municipality, and the DDC were relied upon to function as the local self-government.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

The Nepalese modern administrative system has a relatively short history. Since 1956, four major high level Administrative Reform Commissions (ARC) have been

⁴⁵ Law books management Board (1990): The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990.

created, each with the intent of establishing a competitive administrative system nationwide⁴⁶. Traditionally, administrative set up was relied upon to protect the interests of the rulers during Rana period and, later, as a tool for stabilizing the Panchayat polity. Frequent changes in the Civil Acts and Regulations of 1956 were sold as reforms, but in practice they were mere window dressing. The logic behind the 1991 ARC, conducted under the then Prime Minister Girija P Koirala, included the following highlights:

- Contracting out some of the services to the private sector and the NGOs;
- Service delivery to the people
- Decrease in the number of departmental structures
- Introduction of a unified personnel system
- Downsizing the number of employees
- Simplification of governmental working procedures
- Training employees
- Decentralizing administrative power to the local level; and
- Controlling corruption.⁴⁷

Since October 2002, Nepal has not had elected representatives – except the ceremonial Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the HoR. The deadlock of the present political process continues. Since the royal takeover on October 2002, the king nominated three governments –under the Prime Ministership of Lokendra B Chand, and Surya B Thapa and Sher Bahadur Deuba – all of which were dissolved within 6 , 12 and 8 months respectively. Now the King himself stands as the chairperson of the Council of Ministers.

⁴⁶ The high level administrative reform commissions constituted so far were: (1) Administrative Reforms and Planning Commission under the chairmanship of the then Prime Minister Tanka P Acharya in 1956; (2) Administrative Reform Commission under the chairmanship of the then Home Minister Bedananda Jha in 1969; (3) Administrative Reform Commission under the chairmanship of the then Finance and General Administration Minister Bhes B Thapa in 1975; and (4) Administrative Reform Commission under the chairmanship of the then Prime Minister Girija P Koirala in 1991.

⁴⁷ Administrative Reform Commission Report, 1991

The present government has neither been able to bring the Maoist rebels in the peace talk process, nor is it willing to hold general elections.

All the three forces, Parliamentary parties, the King, and the Maoist rebels, are at a stand-off. The king is pressing for a greater role in the constitution at the encouragement of the absolutists. As the supreme commander of the military, the king also has the power to use force in advancement of his interest. The king, in a public meeting in Pokhara, proclaimed the intention of holding general elections in 2061 B.S (the year ending in April 2005). The present government has repeatedly been calling for general elections, with or without resolving the peace talks. The parliamentary forces⁴⁸ on the other hand, are in the street chanting slogans for the restoration of HoR which was dissolved in June 2002. The third force – the Maoist force living in the ‘jungle’ – has proclaimed a “new government,” and is fighting for establishment of an ‘autocratic republic government’. ⁴⁹ The Maoists neither support new elections nor the reestablishment of the HoR.

POLITICS OF MAOIST AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Since February 1996, Nepal has faced the Maoist insurgency -- a completely new brand of guerrilla warfare that Nepal has never experienced in her history. The previous global identity of Nepal as a poor but peaceful mountainous country has now been replaced by that of a war-torn, insecure and corrupt state in the eyes of the Western world.

A frequently asked question now is “Why are communists in general and Maoists in particular, so strongly expanding in Nepal in a contemporary world where communism is in global decline?”

Maoists became successful by isolating their target groups or political parties and by nearly shutting down the activities of other opponents in the Maoist affected areas. The Maoists launched coordinated attacks against the Nepal Police from 1996 to 2001.

⁴⁸ The Parliamentary force comprises Nepali Congress party, Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi), Nepal Labour and Peasant Party, and United Left Front which are in a movement for the reinstatement of the HoR

⁴⁹ The Maoists claim that they are “new government” and the authorized state government is “old government”.

During this period, Maoists hit many police posts, forcing Police to retreat to their district headquarters. They looted many weapons and killed many police personnel. By declaring during this period that they would not attack Royal Nepal Army (RNA), the Maoists successfully split the Nepal Police and RNA psychologically. High ranking personnel of RNA informally would say that they could defeat the Maoist within a week. But there was much evidence that RNA did not come out of its barracks to assist the Nepal Police despite being very close to incidents of fighting between the Maoists and the Police.

Similarly, the Maoists split Nepalese political parties by targeting those which were in government and leaving the opposition parties unharmed. Maoists killed many cadres belonging to the Nepali Congress (NC), which was in power. The opposition Nepal Communist Party (UML) remained silent and did not actively oppose Maoist activities. In this manner, Maoists were successful in creating a cleavage between and among the political parties of Nepal. Maoists were also successful in minimizing the role of political parties in the areas they influenced and weakening the strong cadres of each political party in the government. This process was regularly repeated until 2002. At that point, Maoists engaged in negotiations and a ceasefire with the government in an attempt to win recognition as a political party.

FIGHTING STRENGTH OF STATE AND MAOISTS

The main fighting base of State and Maoist strength are the Unified Security Forces⁵⁰ (USF) and People's Liberation Army (PLA), respectively. The current strength of USF is one hundred thirty thousand soldiers. It includes seventy thousand members of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), forty thousand Nepal Police and twenty thousand Nepal Armed Police (NAP). It is hard to estimate the actual number of Maoist militia. At the lower end, some analysts suggest that the Maoists have only a few thousand hardcore fighters. One military expert and retired RNA lieutenant general put their strength at 4,000 armed guerrillas, 5,000 militia that have received guerrilla training, and 20,000 armed militia. The Maoists themselves claim they have more than 10,000 armed guerrillas in their nine brigades, a figure that many close observers tend to accept. Indeed, the RNA has offered a similar estimate: some 9,500 guerrillas and 25,000 militia forces.

⁵⁰ Unified Security Force refers to the unified force of Royal Nepal Army (RNA), Nepal Armed Police (NAP) and Nepal Police.

Other experts are more cautious, suggesting a range of core fighters anywhere from 5,000 to 8,000.

MAOIST PROBLEM AND THE CONTEXT OF DIALOGUE

In 1997, in an attempt to solve the growing Maoist problem, His Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMG/N) called for dialogue with the Maoists. Likewise, the Political party CPN-UML formed a working team to resolve this problem through dialogue under the co-ordination of Jhala Nath Khanal and a similar effort was carried out by the government headed by the Nepali Congress (NC) and under the co-ordination of the then Member of Parliament Prem Singh Dhami. But the Maoists refused all such efforts until 2000, when they accepted to dialogue only with conditions.

In July 2001, the Prime Minister of Nepal, Sher Bahadur Deuba, suspended the security operations and requested that the Maoists announce a ceasefire. The Maoists accepted the government's request and agreed to negotiations.

FIRST DIALOGUE

| Table 2: Dialogue Team | | |
|------------------------|--|--|
| | State | Maoist |
| Dialogue Team | ❖Chiranjibi Wagle-coordinator ❖Mahesh Acharya ❖Bijaya Gacchedar ❖Narahari Acharya | ❖Kriashna Bahadur Mahara-coordinator ❖Top Bahadur Magar ❖Agni Prasad Sapkota |
| First talk date | 31 August, 2001 Place: Godavari | |
| Second talk date | 13 and 14 September, 2001 Place: Bardia | |
| Third talk date | 13 November, 2001, Place: Godavari | |
| Facilitators | ❖Mr. Daman Nath Dhungana ❖Mr. Padma Ratna Tuldhar | |
| Break Down | By attacking on Army Barrack by Maoists | |

Three successive rounds of negotiations took place between HMG/N and the Maoists in 2001. The first one was organized on 31 August 2001 in Godawari in the

Lalitpur district; the second was held on 13 and 14 September 2001 in Thakurdwar of Bardiya district; and the third took place on 13 November 2001 in Godavari of Lalitpur district. From the government's side the negotiating team consisted of Chiranjibi Wagle as the Coordinator, with Mahesh Acharya, Bijaya Gacchedar and Narhari Acharya as members. The Maoist team was coordinated by Krishna Bahadur Mahara with Top Bahadur Rayamajhi and Agni Prasad Sapkota as members. Padam Ratna Tuladhar and Daman Nath Dhungana acted as the facilitators of the dialogue.

These negotiations ended when the Maoists launched their first ever attack against a military facility, striking an army barracks. The Maoists, who had been basically in a defensive mode with regard to the army before this incident, became increasingly offensive in its aftermath.

On 26 November, 2001 the government announced the State of Emergency and implemented the Disruptive Acts (Control and Punishment) Act, 2001, mobilized the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) against the Maoists, and termed the latter as terrorists. On 27 May 2002, the state of emergency was announced again. On 4 October 2002, Sher Bahadur Deuba was declared incompetent by the King and removed from the position of Prime Minister. The King then appointed Lokendra Bahadur Chand as the Prime Minister, acting under article 127 of the constitution.

SECOND DIALOGUE

Both the state and the Maoists declared ceasefire on January 2003. At that time, the state renounced the terrorist label given to the Maoists the previous year. Minister Narayan Singh Pun was given the responsibility of conducting peace negotiations on behalf of the government. The first stage of the negotiations took place on 27 April 2003 and second stage was organized on May of the same month at Shankar Hotel in Kathmandu. On 30 May 2003, Lokendra Bahadur Chand resigned from his post as the Prime Minister and Surya Bahadur Thapa assumed the position on the 4 June 2003. Minister Prakash Chandra Lohani and Kamal Thapa were assigned the responsibility for holding the peace talks on 12 June. The government established a central Coordination Committee for peace talks in the Prime Minister's Office.

Table 3: Dialogue Team

| State | | Maoist |
|---------------|---|--|
| Dialogue Team | Mr. Narayan Singh Pun Dr. Upendra Devkota Mr. Badri Prasad Mandal Mrs. Anuradha Koirala Mr. Ramesh Nath Pandey Government Changed(30 May, 03) Mr. Prakash Chandra Lohani Mr. Kamal Thapa | Dr. Baburam Bhattarai Mr. Krishna Bahadur Mahara Mr. Ram Bahadur Badal |
| Facilitators | Mr. Padma Ratna Tuladhar, Mr. Karnadhoj Adhikari, | Mr. Daman Nath Dhungana, Mr. Sailendra Upadhya |
| First stage | 27 April, 2003, Kathmandu | |
| Second Stage | 9 May, 2003, Kathmandu | |
| Third stage | 24 May, 2004, Dang | |
| Fourth stage | 17-19 August, Dang | |
| Breakdown | By killing one high ranking army official by Maoist | |

There were some marked differences between the first and second round of negotiations. In the first, the elected government had taken part, while in the second the government was appointed by the King in a situation where the army had already been mobilized. Another difference was the signing of a code of conduct for the negotiations. The most important factor was the involvement of the King himself.

The third stage of negotiations were held in Hapure of Dang and ran from 17-19 August 2003. But while the dialogue was underway in Hapure, state security personnel took 19 unarmed Maoists under arrest in Doramba of Ramechhap and later killed them. Overall, both parties broke the codes of conduct in effect during the ceasefire and negotiations: During the time when dialogue was taking place, the state killed 80 persons while the Maoists killed 47. On 27 August 2003, the Maoists again broke the ceasefire by killing a security officer in the capital the following day.

PEACE PROCESS IN 2004

On 12 August 2004, the government formed a high level peace committee under the leadership of the Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Duba. The general secretary of CPN-UML Madhav Kumar Nepal, President of the National Democratic Party, Pashupati Shamsher JBR, Badri Prasad Madal from the Sabbhawana party and the independent Dr.

Mohammad Mohsin were on the committee. The four opposition parties were not included in this committee.

PEACE PROCESS IN 2005

In 2005 Maoists called unilaterally for a three-month ceasefire (from September 3 to December 2, 2005). There is ample of evidence that Maoists abducted, killed, and disappeared common people even during the ceasefire. One of the interesting developments in solving the 11-year insurgency is the alliance between seven political parties⁵¹ (parliamentarian) and the Maoist forces. In terms of the quest for peace, this alliance is a dim light at the end of the tunnel and, so far, is not unanimously accepted either among or within the various parties with stakes in the outcome.

COST AND RISK OF MAOIST INSURGENCY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Lost governance

Following 49 days of protest by the “people’s movement,” King Birendra restored the multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy on April 9, 1990, thus ending the 30 year old *Panchyat* system. This achievement was considered the happiest moment by millions of Nepalese who cherished it as hope for peace, prosperity and a better future. However, people subsequently have not been getting what they expected from either elected or appointed governments. Instead, they have gotten unstable government, political corruption, and destructive inter-party conflict. The elected governments remain preoccupied with managing party in-fighting at the expense of badly-needed development efforts. The cost this paralysis can not be expressed in monetary terms alone and include:

- Political instability, frequent changes in government (12 govt. K.P. Bhattarai to Deuba from public and King himself as Chairman of Council of Minister) and dissolution of parliament, factionalism and groupism in all political parties,

⁵¹ Seven Political Parties include Nepali Congress (NC), the major political party that ruled the country for seven years out of twelve years democratic period, Nepal Communist Party – United Marxist and Leninist (NCP-UML), Nepali Congress (Democratic)(NC-D), Nepal Peasant and Worker Party(NPWP), Nepal Communist Party (United), Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP), Rastrya Prajatantra Party (RPP).

criminalization of politics and politicization of crimes. All these have corroded the values and norms of democracy (see table 4).

Table 4: Formation of Government after restoration of democracy

| Year. | Head of the Government/ party | Duration (months) | Remarks |
|--|-----------------------------------|----------------------|--|
| After restoration of democracy in 1990 | | | |
| 1990/91 | Krishna P. Bhattarai/ NC | 13 | Coalition/Interim govt. (after restoration of democracy in 1990) |
| 1991/94 | Girija P Koirala/NC | 42 | Majority party govt. (General election in May 1991) |
| 1994/5 | Manmahan Adhikari/CPN-UML | 9 | Minority govt. (Mid-term poll in Nov. 1994) |
| 1995/97 | Sher Bahadur Deuba/NC | 21 | Coalition govt. |
| 1997 | Lokendr Bdr. Chand/RPP | 6 | Coalition govt. |
| 1997/98 | Surya Bahadur Thapa/RPP | 7 | Coalition govt. |
| 1998/99 | Girija P Koirala/NC | 13 | Coalition govt. |
| 1999/00 | Krishna P Bhattarai/NC | 11 | Majority party govt. (general election in May 1999) |
| 2000/01 | Girija P Koirala/NC | 16 | Majority party govt. (elected in 1999) |
| 2001/02 | Sher B Deuba/NC | 14 | Majority party govt. (elected in 1999) |
| After Royal Takeover | | | |
| 2002/03 | Lokendra B Chand | 8 | Nominated by the King |
| 2003/04 | Surya B Thapa | 12 | Nominated by the King |
| 2004/Feb 1 2005 | Sher B Deuba | 8 | Nominated by the King |
| Feb. 1, 2005 | King Gynendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev | | Chairman of Council of Minister, King himself |

Source: DoI (2001). Kingdom of Nepal. Kathmandu: Department of Information; International Forum, A monthly Magazine Vol. 169; 181; 183.

- Frequent *bandhs* (closures) and strikes have affected tourism, industry, education and ultimately the overall economy of the country. Since 1991 to 2005, 119 days of Nepal band (shutdowns) were observed. But it is difficult to gather exact data relating to valley, region, district and other levels of *bandhs* organized by Maoist and other political party(s) (see table 5).

Table 5: Vandalism/Nepal Bandha organized by the Parties from 1991 - 2005

| Name of the Party | Called by Nepal Bandha | Remarks |
|--|------------------------|---------|
| UML | 2 | |
| UML & other NCP | 14 | |
| RPP | 1 | |
| Other communist Parties | 30 | |
| UML-Led students | 4 | |
| Maoist | 50 | |
| Five parties (UML, NC, NC, NSP/A, NPCP, UPF | 6 | |
| Nepali Congress)democratic (NC/D) | 1 | |
| Nepali Congress-led students | 5 | |
| NC/UML led students | 5 | |
| Total | 119 | |

Source: Nepal Chamber of Commerce Golden Jubilee 2059 (PP75-95)

- Rampant corruption has prevailed in the country. However, the rate of registration of corruption cases as well as trials of corrupt figure in the justice system is very low (see table 6).

**Table 6: Type of corruption and total cases registered in
Commission to Investigate the Abuse of Authority (CIAA)**

| Organization | 2000-01 | 2001-02 | 2002-03 | 2003-04 |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| CIAA | 1261 | 2522 | 3966 | 3732 |
| Regional Offices | | | | 266* |
| District Office | | | | 1164* |

Source: CIAA, Aktiyar News Bulletin Year 3 Vol 2 (8), July 2004, pp 18-19

*Note: * Cases registered up to mid May 2004 only*

- During the eleven-year parliamentary period, altogether 290 Bills out of 431 were endorsed by the parliament. Some of the notable outputs during this period were enactment of public laws on corruption control, liberalization of economic activities, and simplification of laws for creating and working with civil societies/NGOs, reforming the administrative system, etc. Since 2002, the number has dropped precipitously (see table 7).

Table 7: No. of Bills submitted and passed in the parliament during 1991-2002

| Total bills presented in the parliament | During 1 st - 7 th parliamentary sessions (1991-1994) | 8 th – 15 th parliamentary sessions (1994-1999) | 16 th – 22 nd parliamentary sessions (1999-2002) | Total | Since October 4, 2002 (Asoj 18, 2059) |
|---|---|---|--|------------|---------------------------------------|
| Total Bills presented | 162 | 145 | 124 | 431 | |
| Total Bills passed | 120 | 113 | 57 | 290 | |
| Types of Bills | | | | | |
| Main Bills | 78 | 72 | 75 | 225 | |
| Revised Bills | 84 | 73 | 45 | 202 | |
| Economic Bills | 48 | 110 | 54 | 212 | |
| Others | | | 56 | | |
| Ordinance | | | | 17 | 48* |

Source: Parliament Secretariat (1999); Parliament: Bills Description (1991-1998); Parliament Secretariat (2003); Parliament: Bills Description (1999-2002)

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Every human being has the right to live free of fear. But in Nepal since 1996, Nepalese have been suffering from the terrorist activities which compel them to live in a dangerous and uncertain environment created by the Maoist insurgency and political violence. During this period, many innocent people have been killed both by Maoists and the state, have had to migrate to relatively safety either to urban areas or in India, and have been subject to abduction or disappearance. To cite a few examples:

- The Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) reports that altogether 12,814 people were killed during ten years of Maoist insurgency and counter insurgency. This death toll includes children, teachers, students, social workers, civilians, politicians, farmers, lawyers, health workers, laborers, businessmen, army, police, armed police, civil servants etc (see Table 8).
- INSEC reports that the death toll includes 341 children under age 17 who were killed: 172 at the hands of the state and 169 by the Maoists (see Table 9).

Table 9: Children killed by Maoist and the state

| Age | By State | | | By Maoist | | |
|--------------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|-----------|------------|
| | Male | Female | Total | Male | Female | Total |
| - 15 years | 56 | 24 | 80 | 124 | 37 | 161 |
| 16-17 years | 59 | 33 | 92 | 5 | 3 | 8 |
| Total | 115 | 57 | 172 | 129 | 40 | 169 |

Source: INSEC, 2005

- The Human Rights Yearbook reports that 50,356 individuals have been displaced by the conflict and insecurity up to 2005. According to another estimate (the IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council) this figure could exceed 200,000 people (Report, 2004) (see Table 10).

Table 10: Displacement

| Regions | By State | By Maoist | Due to Terror | Total |
|--------------------------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| Eastern Dev. Region | 32 | 1342 | 2605 | 3979 |
| Central Dev. Region | 910 | 3185 | 696 | 4791 |
| Western Dev. Region | 2785 | 3333 | 1129 | 7247 |
| Mid-Western Dev. Region | 110 | 7658 | 19813 | 27581 |
| Far Western Dev. Region | | 5802 | 956 | 6758 |
| Total | 3837 | 21320 | 25199 | 50356 |

Source: INSEC, 2005

- Between 1996 and 2005, Maoists abducted 38,384 people from across the country, with the majority of abductions occurring in the mid-western and far-western regions (see Table 11).

Table 11: Abduction by Maoist Since 1996-2005

| Regions | Released | Disappeared | Killed | Total |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| Eastern Development Region | 6617 | 1250 | 4 | 7871 |
| Central Development Region | 4240 | 1095 | 5 | 5340 |
| Western Development Region | 4362 | 982 | 2 | 5346 |
| Mid-western Development Region | 8823 | 1496 | 1 | 10320 |
| Far Western Development Region | 8264 | 1242 | 1 | 9507 |
| Total | 32306 | 6065 | 13 | 38384 |

Source: Insec, 2005

- Countrywide, people have disappeared on a daily basis. While the Maoists have been responsible for most of these disappearances (6,065 since 1995), the state too has been involved in such activities, abducting 1,232 people since 1996. (see Table 12).

Table 12: Disappearance by the state and Maoist

| Regions | State | Maoist | Total |
|--|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| Eastern Development Region | 216 | 1250 | 1446 |
| Central Development Region | 478 | 1095 | 1573 |
| Western Development Region | 112 | 982 | 1094 |
| Mid-western Development Regions | 367 | 1496 | 1863 |
| Far-western Development Region | 59 | 1242 | 1301 |
| Total | 1232 | 6065 | 7297 |

Source: Insec, 2005

ECONOMIC IMPACT

It is difficult to estimate the “cost” of any conflict, especially and ongoing and extremely violent one; and the cost of insurgency is especially incalculable because of the complex nature of the losses. There are both direct economic costs – which can be estimated to some degree – and the long-term, unseen, socio-cultural losses, which are difficult to quantify, particularly in monetary terms.

Improvement in economic indicators in FY 2004/05 has been less than satisfactory because of unfavorable weather, slack international trade and unexpected negative impact on tourism and the transport sector, even though the peace and security situation in the country, especially towards the end of FY 2004/05, has somewhat improved.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Nepal was negative (-0.5%) in FY 2001/02; however, the GDP has gradually increased, reaching 5.4% in 2005/06 (see table 13). Improvements to the economy can be seen across the board, from agricultural output to manufacturing. Nepal is also getting huge influx of remittances from abroad, and has seen a strong upsurge of investment in the housing sector.

Table 13: Economic Structure of Nepal (1999/00- 2004/2005)

| Fiscal Year | 1999/ 00 | 2000/ 01 | 2001/ 02 | 2002/ 03 | 2003/ 04 | 2004/ 05 | 2005 /06 |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Real GDP(%change) | 6.1 | 4.1 | -0.5 | 2.3 | 3.5 | 4.6 | 5.4 |
| Agriculture GDP | 4.9 | 5.5 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.5 |
| Non- agricultural GDP | 6.8 | 4.3 | -2.1 | 2.5 | 3.9 | 5.7 | 6.4 |
| Manufacturing | 7.2 | 3.8 | -10.0 | 0.4 | 2.3 | 6.7 | 7.2 |
| Other sectors | 6.8 | 4.4 | -0.6 | 2.9 | 4.2 | 5.5 | 6.4 |

Source: Nepal Country Assistance Strategy, 2004-2007, The world Bank, 11p., Economic survey, 2005

Despite these positive indicators, poverty in Nepal is not moving in a satisfactory direction. The percentage of Nepalese living below the poverty line has increased steadily following the restoration of democracy in 1990, rising from 41.5% in 1985 to 45% by 1996. (See Table 14) In recent years, the percentage of people living in poverty (approx. 30%) has decreased to approximately 30%. But the gap between rich and poor has increased alarmingly. The intensity of this poverty gap is greatest in rural areas of the country (see table 15). One of the factors underlying the insurgency is rural poverty; in fact, Maoist Movement was initiated from the countryside particularly in mid-western region of Nepal.⁵²

⁵² In Nepal, the poverty line indicates daily income of people less than one dollar (US).

Table 14: Increasing trend of poverty in Nepal

| Poverty level (%) | Remarks |
|-------------------|--|
| 36 | Survey on employment, income, distribution, & consumption patterns in 1977 |
| 41.5 | Multipurpose House Budget Survey (MHBS) in 1985 |
| 45 | Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS) in 1996 |
| 30 | Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS) in 2003/04 |

Source: NPC, 1977; NRB, 1988; CBS, 1996, 2003/04

Table 15: Indicators of Poverty Measurement (Poverty line based on NPR. 4404/ per capita per year at 1995/6 prices)

| Geographical Region | Poverty incidence: % of people living below poverty line | Poverty gap: Depth /intensity of poverty (%) | Severity of poverty (%) |
|---------------------|--|---|--------------------------|
| Mountain | 56.0 | 18.5 | 8.2 |
| Hills | 41.0 | 13.6 | 6.1 |
| Tarai | 42.0 | 9.9 | 3.4 |
| Rural/Urban | | | |
| Urban | 23.0 | 7.0 | 2.8 |
| Rural | 44.0 | 12.5 | 5.1 |
| Nepal | 42 | 12.1 | 5.0 |

Source: World Bank (1999); NPC, HMG/N 2002:15

TOURISM

The tourist industry, the backbone of Nepal's economy, has been heavily affected by the insurgency. Many hotels in both urban and rural areas have closed due to the lack of tourists. Many skilled and unskilled laborers, directly or indirectly associated with the tourist industry, lost their jobs. Other handicraft industries as well have been severely affected.

Table 16: Tourist arrivals and foreign exchange earnings

| Year | Total arrivals | Change Percentage | Gross Foreign Exchange (US\$ m) | % change in US\$ |
|------|----------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|
| 1996 | 393613 | NA | 119.0 | 0.4 |
| 1997 | 421857 | +6.69 | 108.5 | -8.8 |
| 1998 | 463684 | +9.2 | 131.0 | 20.7 |
| 1999 | 491504 | +5.66 | 171.4 | 30.8 |
| 2000 | 463646 | -6.00 | 169.8 | -0.9 |
| 2001 | 361237 | -28.34 | 162.8 | -4.3 |
| 2002 | 275468 | -31.13 | 101.6 | -37.5 |
| 2003 | 338132 | +18.53 | 134.2 | 32.1 |
| 2004 | 284796* | -18.72 | NA | NA |

Source: Nepal Tourism Boards, 2004

Tourist Arrived only from Air Services

Roughly 3.9 million tourists arrived in Nepal by air in 1996 bringing with them foreign exchange worth 119 million in US dollars (see table 16). Since then the tourist inflow in Nepal has declined steadily from one year to next. Since the 1996/97 tourist seasons, tourist arrivals have decreased by one-half, largely due to the insurgency. The flow of foreign exchange into Nepal has likewise decreased. Tourists come to Nepal for entertainment, trekking, and adventure; but few today want to visit a Nepalese countryside rendered unsafe by war, even in the face of Maoist rebel pledges not to attack foreigners. Their promises are undermined by the widespread Maoist practice of extorting "donations," "fees," or "taxes" from visiting foreigners. Even those hardy tourists who love Nepal are reluctant to brave the current environment.

PHYSICAL DAMAGES

According to an estimate by the National Planning Commission (NPC) (April 2003), the rebuilding of infrastructure damaged by the Maoist insurgency could cost up to US \$300 million (approx). Sabotage attacks have been central to the Maoists' strategy and both the number and value of the infrastructures damaged is high. The Maoists have attacked and damaged hydroelectricity installations (major ones, Jhimruk 12MW, Adhikhola 5MW and Modi 14MW) and rural microhydro plants nationwide. They have also attacked and caused major damage on the electrical grid, transmission lines and power substations. Airports, mainly in the remote areas are targeted with 14 airports suffering substantial damage. They have also attacked and damaged more than 300 mainly rural government offices, including health posts, post offices, forest range posts and agricultural training centers. The number of police posts that have been attacked and damaged stands at over 100. Another direct economic cost has been the robbery of banks, from which the Maoists have taken cash and jewelry in the vaults, and also set fire to banking documents. In May 2002 the Maoists took about US\$11.5 million (approx) cash and gold from the banks they had looted⁵³.

Not even the drinking water supply safe from Maoist attacks. The total cost of physical damage to infrastructures of the Water Supply and Sewage Department has been estimated at about US\$ 1.2 million. They have also attacked and damaged bridges (26), buildings (15), public buses (statistics not available), and private vehicles (statistics not available) according to HMG/N, Department of Roads in 2005.

Another frequent target of Maoists is Telecommunication towers and their substations. The Nepal Telecommunication Corporation (Now, Nepal Telecom) reported damage over time to 112 telephone stations and substations in 45 out of 75 districts, resulting in the disruption of services to 8,898 subscribers. The total direct cost in terms of restoration and maintenance of the damaged systems was estimated at US \$ 2 million in early 2003 according Nepal Telecom (2004).

⁵³ ECON, Centre for Economic Analysis, Economic Aspects of the Insurgency in Nepal, 2002

SOCIO-CULTURAL IMPACT

Violence associated with the Maoist insurgency and the government's counter insurgency operations have destabilized Nepal's social structures causing widespread terror and insecurity. The gory killing, threats, extortion, indiscriminate violence and torture have created a climate of fear which has affected basic rights and livelihoods. Likewise, the anguish of bereaved widows, orphans and friends and family of those killed in conflict – both combatants and civilians- cannot be expressed in terms of economic cost. The displacement of people and resulting multifaceted consequences of homelessness, are also alarming. The long term impacts of the unseen social costs are more far-reaching than the measurable costs, such as the value of replacing damaged infrastructure. Some observations are as follows:

- A report produced by the Himalayan News Service (2003) claims that Maoist insurgency has directly affected the lives of 23 million people⁵⁴ in Nepal.
- Eleven years of continual violence has resulted in the breakdown of social and communal bonds. For example, the kinship networks and neighborhood relationships that bound communities have disintegrated because of fear, distrust and loss of self-confidence.
- The Maoist insurgency has spread its activities across almost all of Nepal's 75 political districts (except 5 Himalayan districts) by the end of 2004. It has created widespread feelings of insecurity, fear, disunity, and lack of peace, harmony, and tolerance. A large number of civilians have been displaced and have migrated to district headquarters and urban areas, making them refugees in their own land. Hundreds of youths have gone to India and Gulf countries in search of jobs. Women and children, in particular, have been victimized psychologically and economically.
- Academic institutions, schools, colleges, and universities, have been closed down by strikes, *bandhs*, and threats. As a result, children are deprived of their right to education and have started leaving the country for education. Due to the deterioration of law and order, social security, and distributive justice, frustration

⁵⁴ At present, the total population of Nepal, 34 millions (approx.)

among the people has heightened. People in the remote areas have been deprived of basic needs and access to essential commodities like food, health, and clothes.

- Maoists have also interfered in cultural affairs, for example, by banning the performance of the last tribute ritual function (*Kriya*⁵⁵) by the people. They have brutally arrested people (*Kriya Putri*) individuals taking part in the rites.⁵⁶ They stopped other traditional celebrations in the countryside as well. Maoists also did not allow teaching *Sanskrit* as the Brahmin language.⁵⁷ Such activities carried out by the Maoist have caused widespread social disruption.
- Maoists forcefully seized farmland in the name of reversing social exploitation. They also evicted people, army and police men in particular but also civilians, from their homes. In crafting a peace settlement, the question of how to compensate victimized farmers and property owners will have to be raised.

DISCUSSIONS

From the above description, the price of the Maoist insurgency and the government's violent response in Nepal is incalculable from lost governance, human right, economic and socio-cultural perspectives. But, the ultimate desire of common people of Nepal remains peace and democracy. One of the prominent questions is "Whether peace and democracy will be restored in Nepal?" The political development of Nepal is uncertain, and recent developments give little hope in the near future due to the polarization of the nation's political actors with the King and his followers, the Constitutional political parties (seven political party alliance), and the Maoists all constituting opposing factions. Up to now, all remain stagnant in their conflicting and polarizing views. In one sign of hope, however, the seven political parties drafted 12 points of agreement (see in Annex) with Maoists to establish a minimum consensus for settling the current problems facing Nepal. Whether the monarchy agree to any of these

⁵⁵ Kriya, according to Hindu tradition, is a last ritual function performed by the son/daughter of died parent

⁵⁶ Kriya Putri is son(s) or daughter (s) required to stay at sacred place without touching other people.

⁵⁷ Sanskrit i.e. mother language of Hindi, Nepali, Maithali and so on, is the one of the oldest language in world.

12 points remains uncertain. The King's immediate response was to dissolve the House of Representative (HOR) on the grounds of the incompetence of political parties, bad governance, and a deteriorating security situation. He asked the political parties to take clearer position on issues of corruption, their views regarding the Maoists, and other issues.

In addition to the above, the international community is another actor on Nepal's political stage. It remains to be seen whether the international community will pressure to the domestic actors (the King, the constitutional political parties, and the Maoists) to act in the real interest of Nepalese people. The interests of Nepal's neighboring countries (India and China) are quite different. The interests of influential world powers like the United States of America and other international actors like the United Nation's are also vital for the settlement of the present crisis.

The Maoists called for a three-month ceasefire (September 3 to December 2, 2005) which was extended for another month. The Maoists have allowed political parties to run activities in their areas of influence in controlled manner. However, the Maoist extortion of funds, the abduction of people from remote areas of Nepal, and the disappearance of people have not yet stopped. According to the Spokesperson of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), Colonel Umesh Kumar Bhattarai, 19 people were killed and 4,013 people were abducted by Maoist forces during the period of the ceasefire.

Another important question is whether the Maoists are seriously committed to resolving the present crisis. The Nepalese people are skeptical of their intentions because the Maoists have violated similar commitments many times. Their behavior has often been inconsistent with their stated commitments. In addition, other questions remain: Whether Girija Prasad Koirala, the influential leader of the seven-party political alliance who provided the popular support to the present king after the royal massacre, will dismantle or weaken the Monarchy of Nepal? Whether the alliance between seven political parties and the Maoists will be stable or not? In past, it is certain that had such alliances been possible, the present situation would not have developed in Nepal. Will the Nepalese people be able to bear the extremist rule of either the King or the Maoists? Most Nepalese people are in favor of democracy but not in favor of either politically opportunist parties or extremist rule.

From the above discussion, it is clear that there is a shortage of honest and visionary leadership in Nepal. Up to now, such leadership has not been seen in any of the political parties of Nepal. Emerging student leaders of each party cadre are already so corrupt that few Nepalese can tolerate them (independent observation). For instance, where the student leaders have had the opportunity to act, they have focused only on their vested interest rather than the broader interest of the country. If such persons again come to power, the outcome would be unfortunate for Nepal. They have not demonstrated the capabilities, interests, sincerity and honesty required to lead Nepal. Until and unless an alternative to such leadership emerges to replace the present leadership, the problem of Nepal will continue.

CONCLUSIONS

The Maoist insurgency and political violence have not only claimed thousands of Nepalese lives but also have impaired many others and damaged property worth billions of rupees. The actual “price” of the insurgency and violence can hardly be calculated, not only because of the fighting is still underway but also because of the nature of its impact, most of which cannot be expressed in monetary terms alone.

From the above study, it is clear that there are two types of costs related to the Maoist insurgency and the government’s violent response. The Nepalese people face both immediate and long-run costs of insurgency and violence. The first category includes killing, disappearance, displacement, and abduction of people; damage to physical infrastructure; and destabilization of the politics of Nepal. The price of socio-cultural, political, economical, psychological torture is incalculable. The Nepalese common people bear the brunt of this misery. At present, a little ray of hope is raised due to the alliance of constitutional political parties and Maoists. The second category of longer-term costs includes the long term possibility of national disintegration in the name of caste and ethnicity, international interference in the name of restoring peace and security, the expansion of the marketplace of illegal arms and ammunition, and the destruction of social harmony.

Therefore, the constitutional political parties, the King and Maoists should think and rethink how long such a fragile Himalayan country as Nepal could withstand such

incalculable and mounting costs due to insurgency and political violence. Maoists should lay down their arms. They must stop the killing of people. The king should also back away from his present extremist stance, as the Nepalese people are in favor of peace and democracy. Constitutional political parties should explore solutions in which all stakeholders could adjust and exercise a stable and effective democracy.

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ANNEX A.
40 POINT DEMAND PRESENTED BY MAOIST

4 February, 1996

Right Honourable Prime Minister
Prime Minister's Office,
Singha Darbar, Kathmandu

Sub: Memorandum

Sir,

It has been six years since the autocratic monarchical partyless Panchayat system was ended by the 1990 People's Movement and a constitutional monarchical multiparty parliamentary system established. During this period state control has been exercised by a tripartite interim government, a single-party government of the Nepali Congress, a minority government of UML and a present Nepali Congress-RPP-Sadbhavana coalition. That, instead of making progress, The situation of the country and the people is going downhill is evident from the fact that Nepal has slid to being the second poorest country in the world; people living below the absolute poverty line has gone up to 71 per cent; the number of unemployed has reached more than 10 per cent while the number of people who are semi-employed or in disguised employment has crossed 60 per cent; the country is on the verge of bankruptcy due to rising foreign loans and deficit trade; economic and cultural encroachment within the country by foreign, and especially Indian, expansionists is increasing by the day; the gap between the rich and the poor and between towns and villages is growing wider. On (lie other hand, parliamentary parties that have formed the government by various means have shown that they are more interested in remaining in power with the blessings of foreign imperialist and expansionist masters than in the welfare of the country and the people. This is clear from their blindly adopting so-called privatisation and liberalisation to fulfill the interests of all imperialists and from the recent 'national consensus' reached in handing over the rights over Nepal's water resources to Indian expansionists. Since 6 April, 1992, the United People's Front has been involved in various struggles to fulfill relevant demands related to nationalism, democracy and livelihood, either by itself or with others. But rather than fulfill those demands, the governments formed at different times have violently suppressed the

agitators and taken the lives of hundreds; the most recent example of this is the armed police operation in Rolpa a few months back. In this context, we would like to once again present to the current coalition government demands related to nationalism, democracy and livelihood, which have been raised in the past and many of which have become relevant in the present context.

OUR DEMANDS

Concerning nationality

1. All discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, should be abrogated.
2. The so-called Integrated Mahakali Treaty concluded on 29 January, 1996 should be repealed immediately, as it is designed to conceal the disastrous Tanakpur Treaty and allows Indian imperialist monopoly over Nepal's water resources.
3. The open border between Nepal and India should be regulated, controlled and systematised. All vehicles with Indian licence plates should be banned from Nepal.
4. The Gurkha/Gorkha Recruitment Centres should be closed. Nepali citizens should be provided dignified employment in the country.
5. Nepali workers should be given priority in different sectors. A 'work permit' system should be strictly implemented if foreign workers are required in the country.
6. The domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business and finance should be stopped.
7. An appropriate customs policy should be devised and implemented so that economic development helps the nation become self-reliant.
8. The invasion of imperialist and colonial culture should be banned. Vulgar Hindi films, videos and magazines should be immediately outlawed.

9. The invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs and INGOs should be stopped.

Concerning people's democracy

10. A new constitution should be drafted by representatives elected for the establishment of a people's democratic system.
11. All special privileges of the king and the royal family should be abolished.
12. The army, the police and the bureaucracy should be completely under people's control.
13. All repressive acts, including the Security Act, should be repealed.
14. Everyone arrested extra-judicially for political reasons or revenge in Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Gorkha, Kabhrc, Sindhupalchowk, Sindhuli, Dhanusa, Ramechhap, and so on, should be immediately released. All false cases should be immediately withdrawn.
15. The operation of armed police, repression and state-sponsored terror should be immediately stopped.
16. The whereabouts of citizens who disappeared in police custody at different times, namely Dilip Chaudhary, Bhuwan Thapa Magar, Prabhakar Subedi and others, should be investigated and those responsible brought to justice. The families of victims should be duly compensated.
17. All those killed during the People's Movement should be declared martyrs. The families of the martyrs and those injured and deformed should be duly compensated, and the murderers brought to justice.
18. Nepal should be declared a secular nation.
19. Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be stopped. Daughters should be allowed access to paternal property.

20. All racial exploitation and suppression should be stopped. Where ethnic communities are in the majority, they should be allowed to form their own autonomous governments.
21. Discrimination against downtrodden and backward people should be stopped. The system of untouchability should be eliminated.
22. All languages and dialects should be given equal opportunities to prosper. The right to education in the mother tongue up to higher levels should be guaranteed.
23. The right to expression and freedom of press and publication should be guaranteed. The government mass media should be completely autonomous.
24. Academic and professional freedom of scholars, writers, artists and cultural workers should be guaranteed.
25. Regional discrimination between the hills and the tarai should be eliminated. Backward areas should be given regional autonomy. Rural and urban areas should be treated at par.
26. Local bodies should be empowered and appropriately equipped.

Concerning livelihood

27. Land should belong to 'tenants'. Land under the control of the feudal system should be confiscated and distributed to the landless and the homeless.
28. The property of middlemen and comprador capitalists should be confiscated and nationalised. Capital lying unproductive should be invested to promote industrialisation.
29. Employment should be guaranteed for all. Until such time as employment can be arranged, an unemployment allowance should be provided.
30. A minimum wage for workers in industries, agriculture and so on should be fixed and strictly implemented.
31. The homeless should be rehabilitated. No one should be 'relocated' until alternative infrastructure is guaranteed.

32. Poor farmers should be exempt from loan repayments. Loans taken by small farmers from the Agricultural Development Bank should be written off. Appropriate provisions should be made to provide loans for small farmers.
33. Fertiliser and seeds should be easily available and at a cheap rate. Farmers should be provided with appropriate prices and markets for their produce.
34. People in flood and drought-affected areas should be provided with appropriate relief materials.
35. Free and scientific health services and education should be available to all. The commercialisation of education should be stopped.
36. Inflation should be checked. Wages should be increased proportionate to inflation. Essential goods should be cheaply and easily available to everyone.
37. Drinking water, roads and electricity should be provided to all villagers.
38. Domestic and cottage industries should be protected and promoted.
39. Corruption, smuggling, black marketing, bribery, and the practices of middlemen and so on should be eliminated.
40. Orphans, the disabled, the elderly and children should be duly honoured and protected.

We would like to request the present coalition government to immediately initiate steps to fulfil these demands which are inextricably linked with the Nepali nation and the life of the people. If there are no positive indications towards this from the government by 17 February, 1996, we would like to inform you that we will be forced to adopt the path of armed struggle against the existing state power.

Thank you.

Dr Baburam Bhattarai

Chairman

Central Committee, United People's Front, Nepal

Source: Deepak Thapa, ed., *Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal*, Kathmandu, Martin Chautari, 2003, pp. 391, First published in Dr Baburam Bhattarai, *Barta ra tatkalin rajnaitik nikasko prashna*, Kathmandu: Publication Department, Special Central Command, CPN (Maoist), Fagun 2059 BS.

ANNEX B.
**THE 12-POINT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MAOISTS AND
THE SEVEN-PARTY ALLIANCE AS LISTED IN STATEMENT BY
PUSHPA KAMAL DAHAL (NOV. 22, 2005).**

1. Today, the main desire of most Nepalis is to have democracy, peace, prosperity, social upliftment and an independent and sovereign Nepal. Toward that end, we fully agree that the main obstacle is an autocratic monarchy. Without an end to the autocratic monarchy and establishment of complete democracy we are clear that there will be no peace, progress and prosperity in the country. Therefore, we have reached an agreement that all forces against autocratic monarchy will step up their movement to end the autocratic monarchy and establish complete democracy.

2. The agitating seven political parties are fully committed to the plan to reinstate parliament whose decision will lead to the formation of an all-party government, hold talks with the Maoists and go for an election to a constituent assembly. They identify this as the way to end the present conflict and restore sovereignty to the people. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) has made the commitment to organise a national political convention of democratic forces. The meet should decide on the formation of an interim government and hold elections for a constituent assembly to achieve the agreed goal. The seven political parties and the CPN (Maoist) will engage in dialogue and explore a consensus on procedural matters. It has been agreed that People's power is the only alternative to meet the goals.

3. The country wants a positive solution and a permanent peace. That is why we are committed to these goals and an end to the armed conflict through the end of autocratic monarchy, elections for the constituent assembly and the establishment of absolute democracy. The CPN (Maoist) expresses its commitment to move ahead in a peaceful new political current through this process. There has been an understanding on keeping the Maoists' armed forces and the Royal Nepali Army under the supervision of the United Nations during the elections of the constituent assembly, conduct elections in free and fair manner, and accept the results of the elections—all these after an end of the autocratic monarchy. We also expect the involvement of reliable international interlocutors in our dialogue process.

4. The CPN (Maoist) makes public its commitment to clearly institutionalise the values of competitive multiparty system, civil and fundamental rights, human rights and the rule of the law.

5. The CPN (Maoist) has made the commitment to let the leaders, activists, and the people who were displaced during the armed conflict to be resettled in their homes. It has also committed that all land, houses and property seized unjustly will be returned. This will create an environment where people will be allowed to freely conduct their political activities.

6. Through self-criticism and self-evaluation of the past mistakes and shortcomings, the CPN (Maoist) is committed not to repeat those mistakes.

7. The seven political parties have realised they made mistakes when they were in parliament and in government and have committed that they will not repeat those mistakes.

8. Human rights and press freedom will be respected while moving the peace process ahead.

9. The talk of municipal elections and parliamentary polls is to trick the people and the international community and to legitimise the illegitimate and autocratic rule of the king. We will boycott these polls in our separate ways and urge the people to make such elections unsuccessful.

10. The people and their representative political parties are the real guards of nationalism. We are fully committed on the self-reliance, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity. It is our common duty to have friendly relations on the basis of the principle of peaceful co-existence with all the countries of the world, especially with our neighbours India and China. We urge all patriotic people to remain alert about Mandale nationalism that the king and the monarchists are preaching to the people. We also appeal to international powers to support the democratic movement against autocratic monarchy through all possible ways.

11. We urge civil society, professionals, people of all caste, communities and areas, the media, intellectuals and general Nepalis to actively participate in the people's movement that will be conducted on the basis of our agreement that has democracy,

peace, prosperity, progressive social change, freedom, sovereignty and integrity of the country as the cornerstone.

12. Past misbehaviour of the parties will be investigated, and action taken against those found guilty and the findings made public. Any problems arising will be sorted out at the concerned level or through discussion at the leadership level.

(Unofficial translation)

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SUICIDE BOMBINGS THE INDONESIAN CASE JAMNHARI MAKRUH

On the 11th of September 2001 two Boeing airliners struck the twin towers of the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York City. As a result of this attack on one of the most well-known buildings in the world, the two towers collapsed and more than 3,000 people were buried in the ruins. The methods employed by those responsible for this attack were reminiscent of the methods used by the Japanese Kamikaze pilots to attack American naval ships during the Second World War. The reaction to the tragedy around the world was unprecedented, with all corners of the globe expressing their dismay and condemnation of the attack. Having had the opportunity to reflect on the tragedy, it is evident that profound disillusionment looms large in the minds of many. The world community is still wondering what drove those responsible for the attack to do that which would take the lives of countless innocent civilians. Furthermore, why were these individuals willing to sacrifice themselves for the attack?

Just over a year after 9-11, on the 12 October 2002, the world was again forced to witness brutal devastation when suicide bombers struck Bali. This time three suicide bombers targeted two very busy Bali nightclubs, killing more than 200 people and injuring hundreds others. Bali, an island that thrives on tourism, not only suffered the deaths of many innocent civilians but also the death of tourism on the island, which many of the Balinese people rely on for work to earn enough to survive.

The Bali bombings left the Indonesian people, particularly Indonesian Muslims, both stunned and puzzled as they tried to fully grasp what happened in Bali. This sense of shock was compounded when Indonesian Police discovered that *Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)*, an Indonesian group, was behind the bomb attack. The immediate reaction of Indonesian Muslims was to deny the existence of *Jemaah Islamiyah*. Even some of the Muslim elite reacted strongly to the police statement by declaring that such an accusation was equal to accusing the Indonesian Muslim community as a whole. This is because the term *Jemaah Islamiyah* simply means "Muslim community". The strong negative reactions to the initial police findings were indications of the disbelief amongst the Indonesian Muslim community that a Muslim could be responsible for such a terrible attack.




Figure 1. Osama bin Laden (and his terrorist network) is responsible for terrorism in some countries (%)

Since 2000, Jakarta and other areas in Indonesia have experienced a number of bombings, some of them suicide bombings, which have resulted in numerous casualties (See table 1).

Table 1. Bombs in Indonesia

| Year | Location | Type | Place |
|-----------------|-------------------|--------------|-------------|
| August, 2000 | Philippine | Car Bomb | Jakarta |
| August, 2000 | Malaysian | Grenade | Jakarta |
| September, 2000 | Jakarta Stock | Car Bomb | Jakarta |
| December, 2000 | Churches in some | Timed Bomb | Jakarta and |
| September, | Plaza and Mall | Timed Bomb | Jakarta |
| October, 2001 | KFC Restaurant | Timed Bomb | Makassar |
| November, 2001 | Australian School | Timed Bomb | Jakarta |
| January 2002 | Churches in some | Timed Bomb | Jakarta and |
| October, 2002 | Kuta | Suicide Bomb | Bali |

| | | | |
|-----------------|------------------|--------------|----------|
| December, 2002 | McDonalds | Tinned Bomb | Makassar |
| February, 2003 | Police Head | Timed Bomb | Jakarta |
| April, 2003 | Jakarta Airport | Timed Bomb | Jakarta |
| August, 2003 | JW Marriot Hotel | Suicide Bomb | Jakarta |
| September, 2004 | Australian | Suicide Bomb | Jakarta |
| October, 2005 | Kuta and | Suicide Bomb | Bali |

The recent trends in the rise of suicide bombings in Indonesia, as evident from table 1, have posed a striking question as to why such a trend has surfaced. Particularly in the last 5 years, Indonesia has witnessed an unprecedented growth in religious radicalism, with the emergence of intolerant Islamic movements as a powerful force in the Indonesian political landscape (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2005). These movements flourished rapidly following the political transition in the late nineties that took place in the wake of President Suharto's fall from power, and such movements tried to take significant steps towards reconstructing the Indonesian constitution by making it more 'Islamic'. Although Islamic parties fared poorly in the 1999 and 2004 elections, Islamic movements representing a large segment of civil society have demonstrated a pervasive influence in inspiring the struggle for the application of Islamic Law (*Syari'ah*) and for the attack on 'moderate' or 'liberal' Islam. These movements employ a variety of methods to promote, express, and even enforce their religio-political ideas, including street-demonstrations, civic protests, public discourse, providing social-economic services, and even violent attacks.

These threats - that is the rise of radical Islamic movements and suicide bombings - to the stability of Indonesia have an unmistakably close correlation to one another. The decreased capacity of the central government to impose order has opened up opportunities for factionalism, radicalism, and terrorism to come to the fore. Yet, as support for these ideas increases in the Indonesian society, the already weak government is increasingly powerless to curb their growth, resulting in a scenario in which Indonesia is caught up in a vicious cycle of government incompetence and social chaos. Such a phenomenon is evident in the difficulties of the current regime in containing terrorism. Because the government has to

date failed to curb violence, social groups within civil society have been encouraged to find their own way of solving social problems like secession, radicalism and terrorism

HATRED GENEALOGY

In an interview with Tempo Weekly Magazine, Imam Samudra, one of the main actors of the 2002 Bali Bombings, said:

"Yes Bomb terror is not popular. It is similar to the Prophet Muhammad. Before he received revelation from Allah, people in Arab[ia], including Jews and Christians, loved him and called him "*Al-Amin*" (the trusted man). However, after the revelation, people called him a crazy man and a liar. The *Qur'an* says: "Allah sent you hi Muhammad with *hidayah*, to be won, though *kafir* hates you." So hatred [between Muslims and *Kafir*] is continued and permanent. If *kafir* did not hate a Muslim, meaning that he/she has not arrived at the highest level."

The quotation above demonstrates clearly the view of Imam Samudra, who claims to be a follower of the Salafi teachings, about the permanent hatred that exists between Muslims and Christians. It was on the basis of this argument that Imam Samudra and his friends attacked two nightclubs in Bali which were believed to be the places where most foreigners enjoy the nightlife of Bali.

Religious hatred is one of the oldest factors in human history leading to conflict and war. The history of the Crusades, the wars between Christians and Muslims that lasted for over three centuries, is historical evidence of the existence of hatred between these two religions. For some Muslims, the war between Muslims and Christians will continue forever. American domination of the world has only fueled such a belief and is regarded by some Muslims like Imam Samudra as Christian rule over Muslims.

The hatred between Muslims and Christians originates in their respective claims of absolute truth in their religions. Because of this absolute claim, there is no room for dialogue and compromise between the two and, as a result, war may be regarded as the only way to solve their differences.

In addition to religion, ethnicity is also a factor contributing to hatred. Ethnic conflicts in Africa are an example of hatred that is sparked by ethnic differences. The

Balkan war three years ago, which apart Yugoslavia apart, was also a result of ethnic hatred. The conflict that exists between the Islamic and Western cultures is also used by Muslims to justify their hatred toward Christians.

Colonialism is also an important factor that sparks hatred amongst human beings. The poor relationship that exists between China, Korea and Japan is a good example of how colonialism has contributed to the continued hatred among people living in those areas.

What has been learnt by people like Imam Samudra who experienced three years of war in Afghanistan, is one justification for war: religion.

SUICIDE BOMBINGS: WORLD PHENOMENA

Some researchers on suicide bombing in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan have concluded that political desperation has contributed to the act of suicide bombing. Entering the new Millennium, world communities have witnessed an increase in the phenomenon of suicide bombings. Observing the lack of balance of power among nations – an imbalance which appears to be increasing - suicide bombings have been chosen by the oppressed as a way of fighting injustice. Horrifying stories of youngsters with bombs attached to their bodies blowing themselves up in public places like malls, stations, and other public facilities, are now commonplace. In fact, in 2005, the rate of increase in this phenomenon appears to be growing: Seventy-two suicide bombings have occurred during 2005, killing more than 900 people leaving and some 20,000 injured (Lori Allen, 2005).

Suicide bombing, as a means of struggle, is not a new phenomenon. It is an old practice which has gained momentum in the modern era. According to historical reports, suicide bombings were used by a zealous Jewish Sect to fight against Rome during the first century CE. Muslim Assassins (Hashashim) also employed suicide bombings during the wars of the crusades. The Japanese military used Kamikaze pilots, known as God's Army, to attack American Ships during the Second World War (Scott Atran, *Genesis and Future of Suicide Terrorism*). On the island of Mindanao in the Philippines during the first decade of the 20th century, the Amok group of Moros went on a killing spree against the US Army and its Filipino supports until they themselves were killed. Monks in Thailand have burned themselves as a way of

protest to the government.

In the context of the Middle-East conflict, suicide bombings were used for the first time by a member of Hizbullah, in Beirut, Lebanon in December 1981. The bombing killed twenty seven people and injured one hundred. In September 1982 a suicide bomber succeeded in killing Lebanese President and Israel supporter, Bashir Gemayel. This success inspired Palestinians to employ the same method in their struggle against Israeli occupation. In this regard, suicide bombings gained momentum as a violent means of protesting the 1992 Oslo agreement. With support from Hizbullah, members of Hammas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine have successfully recruited large numbers of civilian volunteers for suicide bombings (Avishai Margalit, *The Suicide Bomber*). Between 2000 and 2002 alone, more than 640 people were killed in suicide bombings in Israel-Palestine.

In Indonesia, suicide bombings can be traced back to history of the Indonesian struggle against Dutch colonialism. Some people in Aceh used suicide attack to kill members of the Dutch military. The Dutch called this tactic "*Aceh Moord*." In Bandung Muhammad Toha exploded himself in front of gun warehouse owned by the Dutch.

Hamas and Islamic Jihad have regarded suicide bombing as being "willing to die as an act of ultimate devotion in a 'defensive' holy war" (Avishai Margalit, *The Suicide Bomber*). Jihad, for these groups, has two faces: "holy war" to spread Islam, and "holy war" to defend Islamic territory from the invasion of Kafir powers. To support this teaching, Fathi Shiqaqi, the founder of Islamic Jihad, in 1988 formulated a guideline for martyrdom (Syahid) using human bombs. Quoting a Quranic verse, Shiqaqi said that God admires martyrs but not those who commit suicide for personal reasons (Qur'an, 3:40-45).

Although Islam has been associated with suicide bombings, in the international context the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka have been responsible for the highest number of suicide bombings. The Palestinians have been responsible for the second highest number of such attacks, while terrorist groups like Hizbullah, and more recently Al-Qaeda, are recorded as the third highest users of suicide bombings.

THREE PERSPECTIVES

There are at least three perspectives from which to explain the reasons behind suicide bombings. Firstly, the psychological perspective sees suicide bombing as pathological behavior. This assumes that suicide is committed only by people who are psychologically-ill. There is no easier argument to explain why people have carried out suicide bombings than by labeling them mentally ill.

Secondly, if we observe the socio-economic backgrounds of those who undertake such acts, it is evident that one of the primary factors correlated with someone becoming a suicide bomber is socio-economic status. Most of the perpetrators of suicide bombings come from poor areas, especially slums, and most did not have higher education. From the data collected, most of perpetrators of suicide bombings are aged from 20 to 35 years old without any fixed jobs. One of the motives behind becoming a suicide bomber is economic, that is, to provide their family with the income that is paid to the families of those who commit such acts.

Thirdly, suicide bombing is a means of political and cultural struggle. From the cultural perspective, which focuses on the ideological aspect (whether religion, ethnicity, or nationalism) suicide bombing is used to attract political recognition to a cause. As mentioned earlier, in the context of the Palestinian political struggle, for example, suicide bombing is seen as jihad (holy war) not only to fight against Israeli occupation but also to defend Islam. Another important element of suicide bombing is the concept of martyrdom (syahid). From statements left behind by the suicide bombers through letters, records, video cassettes, there is a strong indication that the concept of martyrdom is more valued by many than the concept of jihad (Avishai Margalit, *The Suicide Bomber*).

Explaining suicide bombings will always make for interesting and valuable research. If the motives and factors behind the actions of suicide bombers could be better understood, that would go a long way to helping countries prevent further civilian casualties at the hands of suicide bombers. However, Mia Bloom, a political scientist from Rutgers University Center for Global Security and Democracy who conducted intensive research on suicide bombings in Palestine, Europe, and Sri Lanka, asserted that suicide bombing is an extremely complex issue. She argues that

while the political, economic, and psychological factors are useful in explaining suicide bombings, one should not forget the ideological (religious) factor behind such attacks. According to Bloom, a suicide bombing is not a means to an end itself, but a means to convey particular messages.

In almost all cases, the use of suicide bombing is employed by a weaker group fighting against a stronger power. The weaker group realizes that it would be impossible to fight a stronger opponent using conventional means. Therefore, suicide bombing is seen as a last resort weapon to use against the stronger power. It is also true that most suicide bombing is committed on a voluntary basis, albeit at times with a little persuasion from charismatic leaders.

Though political and cultural perspectives may be useful in understanding the justification for suicide bombings, in moral terms, suicide bombings are by no means considered an act of honor. Until now however, there are no explanations that can satisfactorily interpret suicide bombings. From suicide attacks in Palestine and Baghdad, to the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, from the jets that struck the twin towers to the two Bali bombings, we must seriously ponder the factors that provoke individuals to voluntarily conduct suicide bombing attacks. While this question is yet to be fully answered, we can say that religious ideology contributes heavily to the process of compelling an individual to undertake the act of suicide bombing.

JIHAD

Suicide bombings in the Middle-East, South Asia and Southeast Asia are closely connected to the concept of Jihad. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, for instance, perceive suicide bombing as a religious duty. Following the Bali bombings and the J. W Marriot bomb, the spokesman of Al-Qaeda praised the bravery of those who carried out these attacks, labeling their actions as part of the true Jihad which sought to demolish the Kafir.

In the mind of many Muslim communities, using suicide bombings to defend Palestine is part of Jihad and is permissible under Islamic teachings. Nahdatul Ulama (NU), one of the biggest Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia, declared at its annual conference in 2003 that suicide bombings to defend Islam, such as those in Palestine, are allowed by Islamic teachings. However, in the case of Indonesia, the Indonesian

Council of Ulama declared that suicide bombing in Indonesia is unlawful.

This ideology of jihad and martyrdom is the strongest element in the rise to prominence of suicide bombings in the modern era. Jihad may provide the main players carrying out a suicide bombing with that which they seek in achieving Islamic “righteousness.” However, martyrdom is the fervent motivation for individual Muslims to join voluntarily in any plans for a suicide bombing. There are strong sentiments among Muslims throughout the world about the lack of power of Muslims against non-Muslims. This situation drives young Muslims to defend Islam with honor. In the extreme form, this hatred toward the superpowers for the injustices they commit around the world – such as colonialism and political marginalization – spurs those with enough hate to join violent Jihad movements.




Figure 2. Non-Muslim will not be happy until all Muslims have converted to their religions (%)

Imam Samudra justified the 2002 Bali bombings as "the only way to fight against the Kafir, not through democratic election." Non-Muslims will always make Muslims powerless, Imam Samudra believed, so jihad was the only choice. For Imam Samudra, Muslims who do not support his idea of jihad are simply cowards who have neglected the true message of Islam (Imam Samudra, *Melawan Terroris*).

A Palestinian wrote a letter to his family before conducting a suicide bombing, "... for me, God's justice will only be achieved through jihad and martyrdom" (Avishai Margalit, *The Suicide Bomber*).

Similar reactions came from the wife of Ali Julani, one of many Palestinian suicide bombers. She said, "I am proud of him. I supported his action and give respect to those who follow his way." When asked whether she felt sad because her husband died and left 3 children and one still in the womb, she answered, "No. He left us behind with God's blessings. The child in the womb will grow as an orphan like my husband before. God will bless my children." All the wives of those responsible for the Bali bombings live together in pesantren al-Islam in Lamongan. They cradle their children by saying, "please grow up like the brave Imam Samudra. *Insya Allah*."

The question is, then, what drives individual Muslims to voluntarily die as martyrs? Is it, for example, a result of brain washing by charismatic leaders?




Figure 3. How strongly Muslims desire to die as a martyr (%)

The end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist countries of Eastern Europe has led to a new phase of the world order. The end of the Cold War also signified the triumph of globalization. Democracy, liberal democracy to be specific, has triumphed. However, globalization and the democratic era also have drawbacks, especially the injustice that is being suffered by a number of Muslim countries. For Muslims, America hypocritically champions democracy while still provoking violence and wars. Therefore, democracy, which is supposed to provide a mechanism of regime change without violence, only mushrooms ethnic conflict and terrorism. The irony of democracy is that while it may guarantee individual freedom of expression, at the same time it loosens primordial attachments, especially religion. In the case of Indonesian Muslims, 70% of them said that religion is still important in guiding them in their social and political lives. However, while democracy strongly acknowledges individual freedoms, social cohesion is undermined. As a result, when an individual Muslim wants to solve his or her problems, be it personal or community, he or she does not need to consult the leader or other members of the community. This loosening of social cohesion provides more room for individuals to freely commit acts such as suicide bombings without considering its effects on society.

CONCLUSION

Islamic teachings on Jihad and martyrdom are believed to be the strongest elements for suicide bombings. As Imam Samudra said, the *salaf al-Saleh* support the idea of committing Jihad and martyrdom acts of honor to defend Islam from being overpowered by the *Kafir*. Though it is true that the political, economic, psychological, and cultural elements may contribute to the suicide bombings, religion is the core element motivating suicide bombings. This can be illustrated by examining the case of JI in Indonesia. JI consists of two groups. The first includes the alumni of the Afghanistan war against the Soviet Union. In Afghanistan, these fighters read and received Islamic teachings from *ularua* who followed Salafism, which interprets Islam in textual manner. The second group are the alumni of pesantren Ngruki in Surakarta led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, currently detained in jail for terrorism-related charges in Indonesia. The pesantren also followed Salafism as it is taught in Afghanistan. Both Afghan Salafism and Ngruki Salafism read the same books and follows the same religious teachings.

**TERRORISTS SANS FRONTIERS (TSF)
- A SOUTH ASIAN PERSPECTIVE
RANGA KALANSOORIYA**

Paper presented at the first international Conference of Council for Asian
Terrorism Research Held in Bali, Indonesia October 19, 2005

INTRODUCTION

With more than one fifth of the world's population and a legacy of some of the world's most ancient and sophisticated civilizations, South Asia has significant potential for a new, post-colonial greatness and prosperity. That bright future could be blocked by a cocktail of political and social impediments including terrorism and political violence.

Terrorism in the South Asian (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives) region is, slowly but surely, sapping our energies and undermining the condition of our societies and peoples as they struggle to continue fifty years of renewal in the aftermath of half a millennium of colonial domination and triage. Terrorism is becoming more ruthless, more networked and more sophisticated to a degree we have never seen before.

The 50-year-long insurgencies of the tribal people in the North East India, the insurgency of Maoist rural people's movement in Nepal, the Kashmiri people's struggle and the related inter-state conflict between India and Pakistan, the somewhat dormant Chakma tribal insurgency in Eastern Bangladesh, and the LTTE-led separatist war in Sri Lanka are but the most well known internal conflicts in South Asia.

The origins of almost all terrorists groups in South Asia – except, perhaps, the Nepali insurgency – may be partially traced precisely to colonial trauma and the demographic, cultural and socio-economic manipulation and dislocation that Western colonialism left in its wake. The new, colonially defined and imposed 'nation-states' left tribes and whole tribal federations divided, ethnic community aspirations frustrated and misguided, and national political institutions poorly constructed and unable to smoothly and rationally deal with these problems.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Gunasekara, Lakshman - Justice is key to South Asian unity and resurgence

As it happened in many parts of the world, the post 9/11 developments added a new dimension to the fight against terrorism in South Asia. Being the most immediate neighbor to (or rather the home to) Afghanistan -- the prime target of the war against terror of the US -- South Asia was a vulnerable, but important player in crushing the Al Qaeda-Taliban network and its allies in the region.

It is sensible to say that post 9/11 developments restructured the landscape of terrorism, including that of South Asia. The war, which was fought on the doorstep of South Asia, had vital impacts on the region as a whole and also on individual nations. It demanded some rethinking of policies and strategies on the part of many key players in the region. Further, it redesigned the behavioral patterns and strategic attitudes of many South Asian nations and some terrorist groups, too.

However, the greatest impact was not on the State actors but on the non-State actors, especially the terrorist and various violent political outfits. These impacts of 'The War against Terror' forced some key terrorist outfits in the region to seek a change in their respective operational strategies and enter into politically negotiated settlements, at least on short term basis. Assuming that hard consequences would follow if they continued with violence, many terrorist outfits considered ceasing hostilities and resuming talks. But what we are seeing today in many domestic theatres is a reversal of this trend barely four years later. Many terrorist groups are attempting to backtrack from peace processes and resort again to usual forms of violence.



Map of South Asia: *Source http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:South_asia.jpg*

Most notably, the satisfactory developments in Indo-Pakistan relations and the Tamil Tigers' (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam - LTTE) separatism in Sri Lanka marked important changes in the respective landscapes of terrorism. Though the pro Al-Qaeda groups operating in Pakistan and Bangladesh continued with their strategic attacks on selected targets, the Nepali Maoist rebels and Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers initially changed their military strategies and attempted to join a negotiated solution to their respective conflicts. But, the Nepali truce did not work out for long.

Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka -- who are banned in the US -- showed flexibility in adopting a Norwegian-brokered ceasefire. Following decisions by the US and UK to

toughen their stance against terrorism, many categorized the move by the rebels as an outcome of post-9/11 developments. However, after a couple of years of ceasefire, the Tigers re-embarked on low-intensity violence with targeted killings, while claiming that they were honoring the ceasefire. This was the general behavioral pattern of non-Islamic groups as they realized that they would not be vulnerable in the ongoing 'war against terror.'

The implications of the September 11 aftermath for Nepal were not extensively tangible. Violence by Maoists there increased. A few months later negotiations with the Maoist insurgents broke down and the government had to resort to military suppression of the insurgency.⁵⁹

As far as India and Pakistan tension is concerned, post-9/11 developments had a major role to play in defusing the situation and getting the two nuclear powers into the same camp in 'war against terror.' Both the neighboring rivals offered the best possible assistance to US efforts while Pakistan severed its long relations with the Taliban regime.

The attack on the Indian Parliament could also be seen as an ice-breaking incident between India and Pakistan, especially in the field of counter terrorism in the post-9/11 context. Pakistani-based Islamic militants attacked the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 putting the region into a new era of terror. President Musharaf assuring stern action against the attackers took bold measures to ban five militant groups operating from Pakistan including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. US pressure mounted on President Musharaf, forcing him to take bold measures against cross-border terrorism which resulted in its considerable reduction. The Islamic extremist groups operating from Pakistan still remain to be dismantled, however. Although relations between India and Pakistan have continued their usual fluctuations, the two countries have collectively maintained their shared commitment to fight against terror.

Many internal conflicts in South Asia are not confined to the conventional boundaries of nation-states. They are internationally networked, widely inter-linked, and sometimes heavily interdependent.

⁵⁹ Khanal, Krishna P. – Post-11 September Developments and Nepal : Implications for Curbing the Maoist Insurgency

The present situation in the Maldives is also a matter for serious consideration. The human rights conditions, unsatisfactory situation of media freedom, and the misuse of democracy add fuel to a smoldering political violence in the archipelago which could, perhaps, lead up to an outbreak of terrorism. It is high time that the international community give serious considerations to addressing the situation. The crisis of good governance, the best practices of democracy, and the role of media are all under question in the Maldives, conditions that make that nation vulnerable to a future rebel uprising.

THE SOUTH ASIAN ‘SPAGHETTI BOWL’ OF TERRORISM

The major internal conflicts of many South Asian nations have a cross-border dimension, and many are inter-related due to various obvious factors ranging from religious to economic. Several countries -- especially those that are facing well-established, protracted armed insurgencies like India, Nepal and Sri Lanka -- have also been facing serious socio-economic crises and most significantly they have cross-border linkages between ethnic and other social groups.

In the present context of Islamic extremism, as in many parts of the Islamic world, we have seen smooth linkages between Pakistani, Bangladeshi and sometimes Indian groups that are suspected to be working hand-in-hand with the common base of the Al-Qaeda network. This was somewhat apparent in the recent series of bombings in Dhaka and New Delhi.

The Maoists in Nepal have been engaged in armed rebellion -- what they call “People’s war” -- for the past nine years while maintaining strong links with like-minded groups in India. Their bedfellows in India have extended their support base from the most populated State of Bihar to the IT hub of Andhra Pradesh. Common political ideologies are a powerful motivating force, even though these groups have different objectives in their respective ‘struggles’ at home. Their level of cooperation has risen to the point of sharing experiences and training facilities and assisting each other on specific attacks.⁶⁰

The LTTE in Sri Lanka, even after they were banned in India following the assassination of former Premier Rajiv Gandhi by a female Tiger suicide bomber, continued to maintain links with groups in South India and elsewhere in the sub-continent

⁶⁰ Sarkar, Sudesh; Tamil Tigers training Nepal’s Maoists: Nepal – IANS, July 09, 2005

providing training, maritime services and expertise. The interests of the Tigers in maintaining these links are primarily commercial; but they also have a clear strategic goal of destabilizing the region, which would undermine the hegemony of the dominant nations of South Asia, particularly that of India.

Tamil-dominated South India had been a safe heaven to the LTTE during its formative stages. The logistical and moral support of the Indian government in the early '80s was a source of strength for many Tamil terrorists groups that were operating in the northern Sri Lankan peninsula of Jaffna. Unofficially considering the Tamil political violence as a response against oppression, India assisted aggressive Tamil youths (there had been at least a dozen Tamil terrorist groups operating in Northern part of Sri Lanka in early '80s) by providing training, safe heavens and other logistical support.⁶¹

After intense in-fighting within these groups, mainly fomented by the Tigers who wanted to become the sole representatives of the Tamils, the LTTE became the most powerful group, essentially eliminating its competitors. Then it turned its gun against its own cradle – India – killing former Premier Rajiv Gandhi who was instrumental in signing the historic Indo-Lanka Peace Accord in 1987 that demanded decommissioning of the LTTE and other armed groups in order to seek a politically negotiated settlement. Dhanu, a young girl from Northern Sri Lanka who had been motivated to join the ranks of the LTTE by the 'atrocities' of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces wrapped herself with explosives and blew herself up at a political meeting held by Gandhi in the South Indian city of Sri Perumbudur on May 21, 1991.⁶²

This incident led India to ban the LTTE, but its operational activities and support links still remain in South India. It maintains close links with various groups operating in this region and elsewhere in India. Though its open operational activities have been hampered by the ban, the other networking activities continue.

The LTTE's activities in the region include providing training, logistics, and sharing their expertise with other rebel groups operating outside Sri Lanka. According to unconfirmed media reports, they provide training to Maoists and the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), operating in the Indian State of Bihar.

⁶¹ Kalansooriya, R; LTTE & IRA, P 17

⁶² Kaarthikeyan D.R, Raju Radhavinod; The Rajiv Gandhi Assassination, 2004

WHY IS IT A ‘SPAGHETTI BOWL?’

A simple analysis of the social, cultural, economic and political environment in South Asia would prove that the conditions are extremely conducive to the easy establishment and sustainment of strong cross-border linkages among terrorist groups.

The cultural, ethnic and religious bonds are heavily interconnected with historical legacies that have run through the South Asian continent for thousands of years. The cross-border dimension of these linkages has created a smooth operational path for many terrorist groups to carry out their activities across the recognized borders of nation states.

On the other hand, post-independent political structures in South Asia have not been able to address the necessity for coexistence of multicultural, multiethnic and multilingual societies in the region. The post-colonial political and economic approaches of the region’s governments have not provided credible solutions for the communal, caste or class divisions in these highly sensitive societies. Also the colonial geographic demarcations go well beyond - and sometimes violate - the demographic features of ethnic, cultural and linguistic clusters.

Another contributing factor is the failure by respective governments to protect their own boundaries. Porous borders have created an increasingly favorable environment for terrorist groups to maintain their supply routes and cross border operations.

One of the best examples of this situation is the high infiltration rate of Nepali Maoist terrorists to Northern India via the less secure Nepal-Bihar border. Nepali operatives receive training and other logistical support from their counterparts in India thanks to this unprotected border. Another situation is the rebel unrest in Assam and other Indian states where the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDF), the United National Liberation Front of Manipur (UNLF), the National Liberation Front (NLF) of Tripura, and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) guerillas use neighboring Myanmar as a support base through the unsecured border.

Terrorists make use of the advantages of globalization to further aggravate their violent ‘struggle.’ Bold and attractive features of globalization, such as increasing global interconnectivity and cheaper and more rapid communication, further threaten even well-protected geographical borders. This is especially the case for transnational groups like

the LTTE -- which operates a massive commercial shipping network with 22 cargo ships and various other international businesses -- that heavily benefit from the latest technology and trends in globalization.

Cross-border political interest is another reason for the easy proliferation of terrorism in the region. This is a two-way process. As far as the governments are concerned, the fragile relations between neighboring nations not only have been a cushion for terrorist operations across borders, but sometimes a blessing in disguise as well. India continued to accuse the Pakistani intelligence service, ISI of assisting Kashmiri terrorist groups while Sri Lanka in early and mid '80s accused the Indian intelligence organization's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of facilitating the Tamil terrorist groups.⁶³ Cross-border political interests by individual nations, in this instance, played a pragmatic role in 'nurturing and harboring' terrorism. However, this has now become somewhat a diminishing phenomenon owing to many factors.

The absence of a well-coordinated counterterrorism response among South Asian nations has also contributed to the creation of the 'Spaghetti Bowl.' The historic Indo-Pakistan rivalry has been the major impediment to the establishment of such a coordinated structure, especially among the security agencies in the region.

DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF INTERESTS AMONG TERRORIST GROUPS

Many terrorist groups themselves also have interests spanning borders beyond their country of origin. These interests vary from ethnic to economic, and the scattered multiethnic, multicultural and multilinguistic nature of South Asia provides them with a smooth avenue to maintain closer links with each other.

The Islamic fundamentalist groups operating in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India share a common goal of politico-religious interest influenced by on-going terrorist activities against the West and its allies. Such shared interests could also gain momentum from sectarian violence elsewhere in the Islamic world. The recent bomb attacks in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh indicates a closer collaboration of operational tactics and ideologies between the responsible groups.

⁶³ Kalansooriya, R; LTTE and IRA, P 17

As far as Bangladesh is concerned, there is increasing concern among analysts that the country might serve as a base from which both South and Southeast Asian terrorists could regroup. There have been reports that up to 150 Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters fled to Bangladesh from Afghanistan in December 2001 aboard the MV Mecca, which reportedly sailed from Karachi to Chittagong. This was evidently not the first Al Qaeda connections with Bangladesh. Al Qaeda has reportedly recruited Burmese Muslims, known as the Rohingya, from refugee camps in southeastern Bangladesh to fight in Afghanistan, Kashmir and Chechnya.⁶⁴

Shared political interests can be seen among groups like the LTTE and Tamil nationalist movements in South India. It is suspected that Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers are working hand-in-hand with South Indian bandit groups, including that of the former bandit Veerappan. Some unconfirmed media reports in 2004 claimed that some LTTE members are suspected of several underworld killings in Bombay -- presumably as a result of contracts awarded to LTTE gunmen.⁶⁵

SEPARATISM IN INDIA

Most of the Indian separatist movements share many political and operational interests. New Delhi has already designated most as terrorist groups under its Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002, but the US has not yet taken a decision in this regard. The National Democratic Front of Bodoland, the United National Liberation Front of Manipur, the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the United Liberation Front of Assam are prominent among many such separatist-terrorist movements, mainly operating in Northeast India. They share the common goal of gaining independence from India while using foreign territory for logistic purposes. India accuses Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan of turning a blind eye toward these groups by allowing them to use their territory and allowing movement across unprotected borders.

Armed overthrow of the state and establishment of a communist regime in Nepal have been the long-cherished goals of the communist movement in the Himalayan

⁶⁴ CSR Report for Congress, March 8, 2004

⁶⁵ Personal interviews in New Delhi and Chennai

kingdom.⁶⁶ The only major internal dispute they have had concerns its timing, argues Krishna P Khanal. “Perhaps this has been one of the factors keeping them divided ever since the foundation of the communist party of Nepal in the late 1940s. First, in the late 1960s, taking inspiration from the Cultural Revolution of China and fraternal linkages with the Naxalites of India, a small group of radical communists was engaged in a violent movement aimed at exterminating the class enemies, Khanal says.

Most of these groups share many commonalities, especially their fundamental commitment to low-intensity conflict. Aiming at soft targets while maintaining the grass-roots level support base, they are focusing on economic and social disparities with their respective countries, beginning at local level.

The ultimate goals of the Indian and Nepali Maoists do differ. The Indian Naxalite-communist insurgents engage in violent struggle in pursuit of a better future for the landless laborers and tribes.⁶⁷ With main operating bases in Andra Pradesh and Bihar and with some 2000 trained cadres under the wing of People’s War Group (PWG), these groups engage in lethal terrorist operations primarily in these two states. However, a strong nexus exists between the Nepali and Indian Maoists.

THE LTTE’S LEADING ROLE

Among terrorist groups in the region, the most experienced, the most lethal and the most established group is Sri Lanka’s LTTE which aims to play a lead role in providing training, logistics and other facilities for their counterparts in the neighboring countries.

The LTTE is well known for its capacity to provide training and logistics to terrorist outfits in South Asia and beyond. Its training capabilities extend beyond the shores of South Asia, sometimes reaching far eastern destinations like the Philippines, Aceh, and Thailand.⁶⁸ The fleet of 22 ships of the LTTE has become a great source of

⁶⁶ Khanal, Krishna P. – Post-11 September Developments and Nepal : Implications for Curbing the Maoist Insurgency

⁶⁷ <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/index.html>

⁶⁸ Kalansooriya R; Foreign Groups operating in Southeast Asia: April 2005, Kuala Lumpur

strength to many groups operating around the world. Transportation of illegal weapons and many other outlawed goods is a major revenue generator for the Tamil Tigers.⁶⁹

A recent unconfirmed media report published first in New Delhi and later in Kathmandu alleges that the LTTE provides military training to Nepal's Maoists insurgents.⁷⁰ The news report, based on an IANS interview with an unnamed rebel leader, said that 'the Lankan rebels were teaching Nepalese and Indian outlaws to form human bomb squads for suicidal missions' in camps in Narkatiaganj and Ghorasahan in Bihar near Nepal border. "Women and teenage boys and girls were being recruited for these squads. They also carry cyanide capsules with them," the report quoted the Maoist leader speculated to be Baburam Bhattarai, once the second-in-command of the Maoist movement. (The Tamil Tigers pioneered the tactic of wearing a cyanide capsule around the neck, in order to commit suicide in case of a potential arrest.) Bhattarai visited New Delhi in May and met Indian politicians as well as Nepalese political leaders. Elaborating on the type of training the Tigers provide to Maoists, the story says that the former have formed four Human Bomb Dalams (squads) of women. "Each Dalam has 20 women. Similarly, 12 Dalams of the suicidal squads have been formed. Each Dalam has 40 young boys and girls.

This story also suggests a network among Tamil Tigers, Maoists and United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). Representatives of all three organizations participated in a secret meeting during which it was decided that the Tigers would provide full support to the Indian and Nepalese Maoists while Indian Maoists would provide shelter and training camps to the Nepalese.

The nexus between the Indian and the Nepalese Maoists has grown to such an extent that they mutually collaborate with each other on attacks. The report says that Nepali rebels joined forces with their Indian counterparts to attack police stations and two banks in Bihar in June in which at least 21 people were killed. It further states that French trainers are providing training to Nepalese rebels in Uttaranchal, in districts like Tanakpur, Pithoragarh, and Bageshwar.

⁶⁹ Personal interviews

⁷⁰ Sarkar, Sudeshna – IANS, July 8, 2005

IS IT DIFFICULT TO COUNTER?

Any counterterrorism strategy requires a concerted effort on the national, regional and international levels. As far as the South Asian region is concerned, out of its seven nations all but two (the Maldives and Bhutan) face serious threats of terrorism. Nevertheless, it is disappointing to see that no comprehensive measures are being taken on national or regional level by individual nations in combating terrorism.

In this phenomenon, new strategies and approaches are essential if the nations of the region is to counter terrorism in South Asia. Without abandoning military means, these strategies should find new ways of understanding the historic root causes of the conflicts and their socio-economic implications. Proper understanding of the respective cultures, level of poverty and sensitivities of a particular society is extremely important in order to craft counter-strategies and military approaches.

An emerging school of thought profoundly contributes to the argument that poverty has a limited role to play in terrorism. Citing the socio-economic standards-of-living of many suicide bombers -- including those in London, 9/11 and elsewhere in Europe -- supporters of this school maintain that most of the terrorists in the present context do not come from the ranks of the poor.

This argument is half correct, if one does not consider the profiles of most of the terrorists operating in their domestic theatres. Specifically in South Asia, where 42 per cent or 488 million people out of a population of 1.4 billion survive on less than a dollar a day. In South Asia -- home to nearly half the world's population⁷¹ -- poverty plays a greater role in many social 'epidemics.' Terrorism is no exception.

It is extremely risky to use the same yardstick when evaluating or analyzing phenomenon in two different parts of the world. What is applicable in the West is not necessarily so in the East. Therefore, an argument valid in the West would not necessarily be valid in Asia or specifically South Asia where poverty plays such a pivotal role in almost every social aspect of life. Sometimes it may not be the deciding factor, but it is nearly always a major contributing factor.

⁷¹ Alam, Imitiaz; South Asia Security Dilemmas; South Asia Journal; January – March 2004

NEXUS BETWEEN POVERTY AND TERRORISM

There is much evidence to support the connection between poverty and terrorism. The development budgets of many South Asian nations had to be cut in order to make more resources available for military operations. For example, Sri Lanka's defence expenditure sky-rocketed to almost six percent of the total Gross Domestic Products (GDP) during the years leading up to 2000, before the signing of the ceasefire agreement. Some twenty five years ago, before the commencement of the war, this figure was less than one percent.⁷² These developments, no doubt, add more fuel to the fire aggravating the issue of poverty and creating an environment conducive to the nourishment of terrorism. However, this is a vicious cycle, and one resembling a 'Chicken - Egg' cyclical argument.

In some cases, the cadres are not fighting just for a specific cause, but as a means of supporting their families. Most of the LTTE cadres are paid a decent salary and their families are well looked after. Eradicating poverty is a pre-requisite of any countering strategy in South Asia.

Adopting flexibility in the foreign policies of individual nations is another priority. This would allow networking and the sharing of experience among security and intelligence agencies. These measures should not be limited only to the South Asian region, but should be extended to the other parts of the world in order to disrupt global financing systems and other supply channels. Crackdown by the US and other Western nations on money laundering and informal mechanisms for monetary transactions has been of some help. Perhaps this could be an area of future cooperation between the governments of South Asia and the West, the former of which depend heavily on remittances from their nationals working abroad.⁷³

Most post-modern societies now know that globalization means *more* rather than *better* integrated economies, cheaper communication, and increasing global interconnectivity. They need to rethink their defense priorities,⁷⁴ and need to think of better ways to exploit the impacts of globalization in order to combat terrorism.

⁷² World Bank Sri Lanka office

⁷³ Sobhan, Farooq - Impact of 11 September on Bangladesh

⁷⁴ Naumann, Klaus – 11 September: Consequences for Europe

FAILED STATES

In specific instances like in Nepal and (to a greater extent) in Sri Lanka, the emergence of insurgencies has led to higher-intensity acts of terrorism – a manifestation of failed states where the prime notion of participatory democracy has been overlooked or neglected. Lack of trust between the ‘marginalized’ and the rulers, continued oppression, and weak institutions that have not addressed the basic needs of the grievances of the ‘oppressed’ have been the result.

In Nepal, the Maoists took full advantage of the lack of commitment, determination, and coordinated action of the state to strengthen and consolidate their capabilities both in terms of arms and political influence. The crisis in governance has played a major role in aggravating the conflict in Nepal where the legislature has mostly been overlooked by the Monarch.

The heavily-polarized nature of politics and governance in Sri Lanka has so far led to the failure to find a pragmatic approach to a lasting solution to its conflict. Both the LTTE and the government have repeatedly declared that the ultimate solution to the issue is a politically negotiated settlement, but the absence of a strong government at the center has been a major impediment to such a solution.

Hence, it is vital to have strong political will and a commitment by the respective governments to find a pragmatic path to resolving conflicts that have led to terrorism. Winning the hearts and minds of the people, understanding cultures and engaging in concentrated, well focused negotiations are better alternative strategies to adopt in combating terrorism.

SAARC PROCEDURES

The recent history of international relations in South Asia has witnessed a failure in improving regional cooperation, mainly with regard to combating cross-border terrorism. Alas, in some cases, countries have actually encouraged terrorism against a rival nation. Classic examples are the Indian assistance for the LTTE in its early stages and the terrorist groups that use Pakistani soil to propagate violence against India, specifically in the disputed region of Kashmir.

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been deliberating the issue of terrorism at its highest summit levels since its inception, and concluded a Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in August 1988 incorporating several principles listed in the UN Resolution 2625. At the Islamabad summit in January 2004, the member countries adopted an additional protocol to the SAARC's Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. During the Dhaka summit, the additional protocol came into effect with all the seven member countries ratifying it to "wage a joint war against terrorism".⁷⁵

Fresh impetus by SAARC and other regional groups is necessary if they are to address terrorism at the regional level. But the continuing failure of the respective regimes to take stern actions consistent with these protocols and multilateral conventions are the outcome of the lack of will by the member nations and the absence of a coordinated structure in dealing with the issue. Many of these countries have yet to bring their domestic laws into agreement with the provisions of the SAARC Convention, despite more than 17 years having elapsed since its adoption.

The major impediment for a comprehensive regional cooperation in combating terrorism has been the historic rivalry between the two key players in the region, India and Pakistan. Other nations like Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka have had to pay a heavy price for the confrontation between India and Pakistan over the past half-century. It is this more than anything else that has stood in the way of regional cooperation. No forward progress of SAARC can be expected until these two nuclear powers resolve their bilateral differences through political deliberations.

In addition to political gatherings like SAARC, it is essential that multilateral arrangements of organizations with non-political interests adopt comprehensive measures for combating and countering terrorism in its all forms. The recent meeting of intelligence agencies of the BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation) member countries held in Bangkok in April 2005 to search for ways and means by combating money laundering of terrorist groups was a classic example for this development.

⁷⁵ <http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers17%5Cpaper1626.html>

The recently concluded Malta meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government also deliberated on the issue of terrorism. With more than half the SAARC nations being Commonwealth members, the impact of these meetings should put pressure on respective governments to get their acts together in countering the menace.

Terrorist attacks in recent times have brought tolerance to the top of the public agenda. And one cannot be one-dimensional about it: the roots of terrorism may be found in faith, ethnicity, culture, nationality, socio-economic marginalization, and even straightforward political beliefs and ends. Similarly, one needs to tackle terrorism, extremism, and exclusion in an equally varied way. Tolerance is the key,” said Commonwealth Secretary General Don McKinnon during the meeting.⁷⁶

Who can guarantee of a bright future for these kids...? Who can guarantee that these kids will not fall into the hands of interest groups?

South Asia faced two massive natural disasters within the course of a year - first the killer tsunami waves in Sri Lanka in December 2004, followed by the worst ever earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005. Over 160,000 were killed and 3.5 million people displaced in these two events.⁷⁷

Most importantly these two calamities occurred in areas where South Asia is experiencing its most ruthless and oldest conflicts, Sri Lanka's North-East (and south) and Pakistan's portion of the disputed Kashmir region.

These two governments, neither of which have the experience and resources to handle a human crisis of this magnitude, still have not been able to meet the basic requirements of the affected populace. In Sri Lanka the hardest hit areas were in the north east, a considerable arportion of which a is under the control of the LTTE.

⁷⁶ Commonwealth People's Forum, Wednesday, 23 November 2005, Malta

⁷⁷ <http://www.tafren.gov.lk/>, <http://aopp.org/eq.htm>

If the governments and the international community who have pledged massive recovery, reconstruction and rebuilding packages fail to deliver within a justifiable timeframe, it is possible that the frustration and desperation of the affected people, especially of the youth, will deliver them into the hands of terrorist groups.

Natural Disasters Vs Man Made Disasters



Top: Two Children in between earthquake rubbles in Muzafarabad – Pakistan

Below: Three tsunami hit kids at a refugee camp in Eastern Sri Lanka

The refugee camps have been a breeding ground for many terrorist groups over the years. Young children – both male and female – in these camps have been targeted by these groups for recruitment.⁷⁸ Out of frustration and desperation they opt to join either as a means of employment or as a way of finding justice for their 'marginalized' societies.

Natural disasters aggravate the situation. In the present cases, the level of frustration and desperation is high, since the relief and rehabilitation work that has been

⁷⁸ The writer interviewed in Sri Lanka's rebel held territory of Killinochchi two teenagers who had been recruited by the LTTE from refugee camps.

done so far has not been able to bring normalcy to peoples' lives. Millions are still in refugee camps living under worst possible conditions. The situation provides a favorable breeding ground for rebel groups operating in these areas in many ways.

Therefore, it is necessary that the respective governments and the international community take stern and speedy action to make sure that the lives of these affected communities are put back on a normal track, as has been promised, thereby obstructing moves by the terrorist groups to fish in troubled waters.

CONCLUSION

The region of South Asia is becoming more vulnerable to threats emanating from transnational and indigenous terrorism. Crisis of governance, negative impacts of globalization, the rivalries between major countries in the region, can be seen as major impediments for a comprehensive plan of action against the menace. The war against terrorism cannot succeed unless these issues are addressed in a coherent manner, since those issues have global, regional and national dimensions.

Following the realization that the much talked about 'war against terror' would, by and large, confine itself to two major focuses - capturing Osama bin Laden, Ayeman Al Zawahiri and Mullah Omar 'dead or alive' and destroying Al-Qaeda and its related networks - many indigenous terrorist groups are slowly but steadily raising their ugly heads across South Asia and elsewhere. Therefore, it is extremely important to reemphasize a wider scope to the war against terror without confining it to specified organizations or groups of people.

At the level of SAARC, more concentrated efforts are necessary to introduce new legislation by respective member countries to deal with internal and cross-boarder terrorism, to create an effective multilateral mechanisms for sharing intelligence, experience, training, and most importantly searching for the root causes of terrorism in order to address them in more collective manner.

The existing bilateral arrangements in combating terrorism should be expanded to the multilateral level within the region. Specifically. new legislation with a broader scope in member nations is extremely important, mainly to address issues such as extradition, drug and arms trafficking, money laundering etc.

It would be extremely difficult for South Asian nations to reach consensus against terrorism as long as the two resident nuclear powers have broader conflicting perceptions of the issue and their related implications. Therefore, it is high time that the two most powerful nations in South Asia rethink their future role in the region, identify the threats of terrorism as a region-wide epidemic, and take a common stand to act against it. It is also high time for them to understand the capacities of South Asia in the global context and leave aside animosities to march forward for a better future.

Finally, the region which has been hit by two major natural disasters should make a concerted effort to bring normalcy to the lives of the affected people. Their continuing frustration will make these people more likely to align themselves with the unlawful organizations operating in the affected areas.

PART II
THE ANATOMY OF TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

South Asia is one of the world's most vibrant and volatile regions. It is ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse and hosts ongoing resistance and separatist movements in every country except tiny Bhutan. Widespread poverty and a large and growing gap between rich and poor aggravate existing tensions and unrest, foster mistrust of often corrupt governments, and create an environment that is at least tolerant of groups that advocate radical political change. Most of these groups pursue their political and ideological goals by peaceful means, but a significant number are committed to the use of violence – whether terrorist or insurgent – to advance their ends. Virtually all of these movements – whether ideological, ethnic, or religious – also have important cross-border and international dimensions. Every state in the region – including peaceful Bhutan – hosts one or more training camps or sanctuaries for terrorist and insurgent groups from outside their borders, sometimes wittingly and more often unwittingly. Terrorists are able to move manpower, funds, and weapons across national borders, in part, because long-standing bilateral political disputes have prevented the governments of the region from forging effective cooperation on countering terrorism and political violence. And all of this unfolds under the umbrella of the Indo-Pakistan nuclear stand-off.

This double session could only begin to touch upon the complexity and scope of issues related to the anatomy of terrorism in South Asia. It did, however, identify a number of themes worthy of much deeper investigation and research by CATR members and other institutions. In particular, the discussions highlighted the degree to which many of the factors that have contributed, in the past, to division and conflict in the region – religious, ethnic, and ideological pluralism; overlapping identities; religious diversity; complex civil societies with countless stakeholders; and large expatriate communities scattered all over the globe – can, in the future, be harnessed as forces for positive change. Progress, however, will require imaginative approaches, a genuine commitment to conflict resolution and reconciliation on the part of key elites and community leaders, patience, and a willingness to take risks.

Religion is often at the root of communal conflict, especially in South Asia where numerous faiths and sects exist in close and often entwined proximity. The divisive potential inherent in such religious diversity has been exacerbated in this region by governments and political parties seeking to play on popular insecurities for expedient

political gain. Regimes and mainstream political parties have cynically exploited the fear of terrorism to discredit political competitors, intimidate their critics, and demonize legitimate political opposition. Since 2001, moreover, some regimes have jumped on the “counterterrorism bandwagon” to secure military aid and security cooperation from the United States. All of this has undermined the long-term success of the war on terrorism by instilling the suspicion in opposition parties and the general public that anti-terrorism legislation is merely a cynical attempt to give regimes a free hand in repressing political debate and enhancing regime (as opposed to national) security.

On the flip side, most regimes in the region have – from time to time – winked at terrorist activity directed against domestic or international rivals and forged political alliances with extremist religious parties when to do so helped ensure their political power. Bangladesh offers the most recent, but by no means the only, example of such expediency. The problem with such arrangements is that neither the regimes nor the terrorists/insurgents feel particularly constrained to honor those alliances. Cease-fires and political partnerships collapse into violence with distressing frequency.

Governments in this region – and throughout much of the world – will have to find more systematic ways to build trust and accommodate the legitimate political voices of religious parties and movements for a number of reasons. First, purely political settlements, negotiated from the top, that do not respond to the long-standing concerns and aspirations of religious communities have very little chance of succeeding in the long term. While it is true that religion is seldom the sole root cause of communal or terrorist violence, it is a powerful mobilizing force and has the power to turn and justify turning discontent into violence and, more importantly, to harden attitudes on both (or all) sides of a conflict against compromise. Second, good faith attempts to reach mutual accommodation and reconciliation with religious groups and movements can pave the way for the kind of open-mindedness and sense of shared interest at the grassroots level that could, eventually, enable more concrete political solutions to succeed. In this sense, bottom-up reconciliation and relationship-building is not a sideline to political negotiation but a precursor to it.

Overlapping identities in South Asia that extend beyond simple differences in religious doctrine can play an important role in countering radicalization in South Asia, as well. In most of the region, the Muslim community historically experienced much less cultural and ideological “Arabization” than did Muslims in the Middle East and North

Africa. As a result, they have not inherited the same degree of ideological rigidity and anti-Americanism that has become more common elsewhere in the Muslim world. The internal diversity of these states has, traditionally, fostered a degree of cultural tolerance between faith communities that give way to overt violence only under the pressure of external political forces, especially the rise of ethno-nationalism. In South Asia, even when ethnic and religious groups become politically polarized, the close proximity in which they must exist makes some degree of dialogue, coexistence, and compromise a necessity. In the past this has frequently led to the rise of civic organizations and associations that cross religious and ethnic boundaries to facilitate, or at least sustain, a minimal level of communication and compromise.

It is impossible to overstate the importance of civil society in the struggle against terrorism and political violence in South Asia. Relationships are extremely important in this part of the world, and civil society consists of interconnected webs of family and clan, as well as tribal, religious, political, professional, and social relationships. Much is made of the fact that tribal and clan hatreds can cut deep and last for generations, and it is clear that military solutions to instability and unrest are, in the long-run, more likely to harden than break down cleavages in civil society. Instead, much more can be gained by working within civil society to build, revive, and foster cross-cutting relationships.

Strengthening civil society's role in countering extremism can pay off in a number of important ways. Working through civil structures can reduce unease among traditional and fundamentalist religious groups by creating local structures for airing grievances and building cooperation. A vibrant civil society is also much more likely to hold governments – at local and national levels – accountable, thus foster greater confidence in secular government as well as a greater sense of security in the face of technical and economic modernization. Civil institutions will also be invaluable in promoting the voices of moderate community leaders – be they ethnic, ideological, or religious – who advocate reconciliation and resolution of conflict through peaceful means.

THE PAPERS

Vipula Wanigasekera's article, "Behavioral Aspects in Multifaceted Armed Conflicts and Their Implications," probes the two-decade-long Sri Lankan insurgency for clues to how ascertaining the internal behavioral motivations of terrorist leaders might

contribute to effective counterterrorism and peaceful political resolution of conflicts in the future. While he acknowledges that an understanding of the social, economic, and political “root causes” of terrorism is an important foundation for effective policy, Wanigasekera argues that they do not necessarily point to effective counterterrorism steps in the short-term. In the short-term, he contends, it is necessary to understand the deeper, more personal motivations that are often the real drivers of terrorist acts and the greatest barrier to effective negotiations. Wanigasekera uses the example of the leadership elite of the LTTE to illustrate the origins and effects of individual behavioral motivations on the organizational behavior of insurgent and terrorist groups. Once these hidden motivations – be they personal trauma, thirst for adventure, or the desire to be loved and admired – are identified and analyzed, it is possible to: 1) anticipate likely terrorist actions under specific future circumstances, 2) take steps to prevent attacks or mitigate their destructive effects, and 3) develop more effective strategies and structures for counterterrorism and peace negotiations.

In “Religion and Political Violence in Kashmir: The Need for Creative Responses,” Tahir Aziz also suggests a behavioral approach to breaking through barriers to effective counterterrorism and negotiation, but focuses on the role of faith as a foundation for progress. He begins by asking the question: How do we move beyond the current focus on defining terrorism since it so often blocks the path to real progress? After all, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter – universally accepted definitions of terrorism are impossible to achieve and the quest for them may be unnecessarily divisive. Aziz calls, instead, for creative approaches that can begin to forge bridges of reconciliation between communities in conflict long before the cumbersome processes of formal diplomacy between national governments can produce political solutions. By way of example he presents the efforts of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy to apply a method of faith-based reconciliation to bridge barriers of hatred between communities in Kashmir. Such approaches deemphasize the differences between people of faith, drawing instead on their common beliefs, better natures, and shared humanity. Aziz contends that by forging relationships based on forgiveness and faith between individuals on two sides of a conflict, it is possible to bypass the sticky and perhaps insoluble political issues to pave the way for diplomacy and statesmanship. A foundation of reconciliation is built on the compromises necessary to achieve permanent peace.

Hekmat Karzai warns, in “Return of the Black Turban: Causes of the Taliban Resurgence,” that an escalating Taliban insurgency threatens to undermine the stability of the nascent democracy that has emerged in Afghanistan since 2002. Three factors in particular could, if unchecked, allow Afghanistan to revert to its pre-2001 status as a terrorist safe-haven: (1) the limited ability of the Afghan security apparatus to deal effectively with terrorists and drug traffickers, (2) the Coalition Forces’ continued disproportionate reliance on kinetic rather than political approaches to establishing stability and supporting the authority of the Afghan government; and (3) the continued interference of outside actors, especially Pakistan, in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Much also depends on the ability of the Afghans themselves to continue their slow but steady progress toward building the constitutional and administrative processes needed to effectively unify and rule the nation. According to Karzai, the Taliban’s political isolation in Afghanistan has led it to adopt al-Qaida’s tactics, a development that has given it access to training, foreign fighters, and operational experience in Iraq. The growing links between the Taliban and outside groups is reflected in its shift toward a lethal new strategy that includes, for the first time in Afghanistan, such terrorist tactics as beheadings and suicide bombings. The Taliban’s links with the drug trade has revived its financial resource base, and slow economic development and a series of cultural missteps by Coalition Forces have created a renewed popular sympathy for the Taliban cause. It is not too late, Karzai concludes, to reverse this trend; but to do so will require a careful rethinking of military, political, and social strategies.

Bangladesh has also reached a critical turning point in its short history as an independent nation, according to ABM Ziaur Rahman in “Terrorism: The Case of Bangladesh.” A dramatic series of coordinated terrorist bombings on 17 August 2005 rocked cities across the country and forced the current government (a coalition that includes a number of Islamic parties) to acknowledge the presence of a major Islamist terrorist movement in the Northwest part of the country. While terrorism is not new to Bangladesh, its current scope and lethality is. Rahman traces the history of the rise of the leading Islamist extremist group, the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), offers some possible explanations for the recent escalation of religiously-motivated political violence, and suggests one approach to dealing with it. Among the most important root causes, according to Rahman, are tensions between mainstream secular and religious parties in the Bangladeshi political system; class discrimination and economic inequity; educational inequity and the inability of madrasa graduates to achieve economic

security; ineffective law enforcement and intelligence establishments; domestic resentment of the “war on terror” rooted in the belief that the US is at war with Islam; international arms smuggling; the presence of foreign insurgents, especially from India; and foreign financial support for terrorist groups. Success in countering and reversing the trend toward increasing terrorist violence will, Rahman concludes, require meaningful regional cooperation in counterterrorism enforcement and intelligence; madrassa reform; a concerted effort by religious elites to reeducate the population concerning the abuse of Islamic doctrine by extremist groups; and the swift and proactive pursuit and prosecution of terrorists by the Bangladesh government.

In “Indian Muslims and Terrorism,” Satu Limaye argues that close analysis of the Indian Muslim community – the second largest in the world – could provide valuable insight into the role of democracy and other factors in countering radicalization in the Muslim world. Indian Muslims, despite the fact that they share many of the characteristics commonly cited as possible “root causes” of international terrorism – relative economic and educational deprivation, discrimination, political alienation, and a government that is forging stronger ties with US policy – have been remarkably absent from global jihadist movements like al-Qaida. Limaye is careful to point out that Indian Muslims have engaged in terrorism and political violence, but this has been limited largely to their “domestic” context – namely, the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, political violence directed against Indian politicians and political institutions, and the cycle of communal violence that has plagued India’s Hindu and Muslims communities at local levels since independence. Limaye reviews the most prominent social science theories that have been advanced to explain this phenomenon: the “minority vulnerability” theory, the democracy theory, the complexity of Indian government policies toward the outside world and the US, and finally, the contention that the Indian Muslim community is *sui generis* and thus offers few generalizable insights. The article concludes with Limaye’s own hypothesis: a number of factors account for the absence of Indian Muslims in the ranks of al-Qaida and other global terrorist movement. First, the Indian government has maintained a “safe” distance from US policy. Second, while Indian Muslims are relatively deprived, they are not politically oppressed by India’s democratic government and feel they have access to legitimate political expression. Third, democracy matters, although much more study is necessary in order to discern what particular features of Indian democracy accounts for the phenomenon. Fourth, there is very little push for radicalization from within the Indian Muslim community; and,

finally, there has also been little “pull” from the outside Muslim world. Al-Qaida and its ilk have not made India’s Muslims either a target for recruitment efforts or a *cause celebre*.

Education will clearly play a major role in the fight against terrorism and political violence in South Asia. Azhar Hussain, in “Pakistani Madrasa Reform,” offers a history of the madrasa as the traditional institution of Islamic education as well as a survey of the current pedagogical style of madrasas in Pakistan and the mindset of their students and administrators. The challenge of reforming madrasa education in Pakistan depends in part, according to Hussain, on reintroducing madrasa administrators to the history of Islamic education. Far from their current image as narrow institutions devoted to instilling strict, uncritical, and narrow-minded doctrine into students with little exposure to non-religious subjects or the outside world, madrasas were historically institutions that reflected a deep appreciation of learning of all kinds – religion, science, math, poetry, and the intellectual traditions of other cultures, including the classical world. The defensive narrow-mindedness of the contemporary madrasa is, according to Hussain, a modern reaction to the humiliation of Muslims at the hands of Western imperial powers and, later, the socially disorienting effects of modernization. The situation is further aggravated by the poor state of public education in Pakistan, the influx of radical Wahabist teachers from Saudi Arabia since the 1960s, and the effects of the jihad in Afghanistan. Pressure on the Pakistani government to reform madrasa curriculums since 2001 has reinforced the defensiveness of madrasa administrators, who see secular educational reform as just one more avenue for Americanization. Hussain outlines an approach to madrasa reform that shifts the emphasis away from imposing change mandated from outside toward creating incentives for internal reform by madrasa educators themselves. The first step is to equip madrasa administrators with new tools for expressing anger and discontent (other than advocacy of violence) and for understanding and not being threatened by those with different ideas. The next step is to forge relationships between madrasa administrators and students from different ideological backgrounds in an effort to broaden their scope and encourage tolerance – starting in a local and manageable context.

Muhammad Amir Rana’s “Changing Tactics of Jihad Organizations in Pakistan” traces the outcome of efforts by the Musharraf government in Pakistan to eliminate jihadist groups. At first glance, these efforts look successful. Of an original 104 declared

jihadist organizations prior to the Musharraf crackdown, only 25 remained in late 2005. Much of that reduction, however, reflects the restructuring and realignment of jihadist groups rather than the elimination of jihadists from the political landscape. The new survival strategy of these groups involves a number of tactics: elimination of words that indicate a jihadist inclination (such as jihad, lashkar, jaish, and mujahideen) from organizational titles; a concerted effort to overcome past divisiveness and focus on building unity among jihadist parties; an emphasis on strict secrecy, including restrictions on press releases and other public statements concerning the organizations' ideological agendas and activities. It is true that a number of smaller groups have disbanded; but, according to Rana, most of these have merely merged their membership with larger organizations. The result of this consolidation has probably been a net improvement in the status of jihadist groups. Fewer organizations are competing for resources and recruits and property holdings have been consolidated. Political unity has resulted in some improvement in the performance of jihadist parties at the polls. It is probably also true that Pakistani jihadist groups have been somewhat less active in sending fighters into Afghanistan and Kashmir because to do so risks tipping their hands. Here again, the success is a mixed blessing in Rana's view. Pakistani jihadists are turning their focus inward, toward the reform of Pakistan's law, education, politics, and social mores; and the influence of these parties in Pakistan's madrasas is spreading nationwide. Rana's message is clear: if the Pakistan government hopes to free itself from jihadist disruption of its political system, it must constantly monitor the situation as organizations transform themselves and adapt in order to survive under pressure.

***BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS IN MULTIFACETED ARMED CONFLICTS AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS - SRI LANKAN CASE***
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**PRESENTED AT THE SYMPOSIUM ON ‘ THE ANATOMY OF TERRORISM
AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH ASIA HELD FROM 19 -21 OCTOBER
2005 AT HOTEL SANTIKA BEACH BALI, INDONESIA**

1. INTRODUCTION

“ A MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT WHO ANALYZED THE LTTE SPEECHES, ANNOUNCEMENTS, INTERVIEWS ETC PREDICTED THE PERIODS OF THE LTTE ATTACK ON SRI LANKA’S PRESIDENT CHANDRIKA KUMARATUNGA IN 1999, AND THE RAID ON SRI LANKA’S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN 2001. THE PRESIDENT LOST HER RIGHT EYE IN THE SUICIDE EXPLOSION AND OVER 20 AIRCRAFTS WERE DESTROYED IN THE AIRPORT ATTACK ¹ ”

If such movements of an insurgent group could be predicted accurately with analysis of behavioral expressions, it implies the importance of examining behavioral elements of the anatomy of terrorism, not only as a contribution towards the efforts to combat terrorism but also to find solutions through negotiation, wherever possible.

The role of intelligence communities during the Cold War is known. What emerged after this period is what we have commonly termed ‘terrorism.’ The gravity of terrorism in the global sense is such that it is now called the ‘third world war’. As a result, intelligence communities have grown in numbers to work on every possible way and means of combating terrorism. Whether the quality of the intelligence is also advancing is a question that is looming from many quarters.

The situation today with regard to terrorism is increasingly complex. Most terrorist groups seem to be one step ahead of intelligence in their covert operations from

¹ Intelligence consultations, Colombo July 2004

planning and organizing to implementation thus making orthodox tracking systems somewhat ineffective. The operators of the terrorist groups do not keep records. The new members represent intellectual quarters from political science to IT. Informants are scarce as fewer and fewer terrorist operatives prove willing to take the risk.

September 11 showed the world a new reality: the issue of terrorism is far more serious than initial assessments suggested. That is, many countries believed their military and security forces might protected them, until the attacks spread into the developed world. No longer could the developed world believe that the terrorism was confined to the third world alone and correlated with poverty and ignorance².

For instance, suicide cadres were commonly thought to be brainwashed with political and religious ideologies. Contrary to such beliefs, today's suicide bombers are not depressed and lonely individuals; nor are they religious fanatics. UN instruments such as the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing seem to have their own implementation limits. The London attackers validate this point. If international efforts to shut down terrorist access to the financial system had been an effective preventative measure, Britain would have a safer London today, even given the fact that the modes operandi of the recent attack was less sophisticated – and hence less dependent on major financial support – than earlier ones.³

These factors lead us to the realization that behavioral elements that were hitherto underemphasized, are becoming exceedingly important. Ascertaining internal human behaviors will play a crucial role in combating acts of terrorism and finding political solutions in the future.

To substantiate this argument, this paper focuses on the Sri Lankan case. The conflict in Sri Lanka has now lasted for over two decades. Over 65,000 people, including civilians, have perished. Political leaders, including two national leaders, have been assassinated. The Sri Lankan conflict is multifaceted. It displays the full spectrum of root causes from socio-economic conditions to political ideologies. It has gone through several phases of war and negotiations. Most importantly, it has been extremely violent and characterized by both organized insurgency and terrorist attacks.⁴

² Thanuka Terrorism Jargon of the Past , Mirror Colombo May 2005

³ Thanuka ‘ Suppression of Terrorist Financing & Unique Tamil Diaspora , July 2005

⁴ Solheim Erik briefing to Diplomatic Corps in Oslo 2003

There are important and complex historical, political, economic and international dimensions to the Sri Lankan conflict. The conflict has an enormous political implications for India as well as the region overall. The LTTE has developed the organizational structure of a “proto-state,” which enables it to run its organization effectively. Moreover, it has mobilized the roughly 800,000 Tamils living and working abroad, enlisting (or coercing) regular contributions of hard currency to the movement. The LTTE runs a variety of businesses ranging from sales of telephone cards to the establishment of restaurants abroad. The LTTE procurement system is similarly sophisticated and complimented by their shipping fleet ⁵.

In Sri Lanka, the LTTE controls a force of around 20,000 direct cadres while, in addition, several thousands are attached to their para- units. Ground forces, naval units, suicide cadres, a women’s unit and an air wing complete the LTTE structure. Therefore the Sri Lankan case provides a unique example for studying the problem of terrorism and insurgency.

The Governments that are determined to combat terrorism have tended to identify the root causes of political violence as stemming from political and legal, economic, cultural and social, and religious tensions. In fine-tuning these, they have been reclassified as poverty and discrimination. The analysis seems to have ended there, not taking the personal motivations of individual terrorists and insurgent leaders sufficiently into account..

The following model attempts to describe the those internal, behavioral elements, that precede and motivate participation in terrorist activities. While acknowledging that perception, learning, and motivation trigger individual participation in terrorism, this paper concludes that it is often the resulting secondary behaviors that can explain the real cause of actions.

The study expands the exploration of the anatomy of terrorism into behavioral spheres beyond external behavioral influences into the realm of perception, learning and motivation. This presentation explore how individual psychological factors have influenced certain activities of the LTTE through its leadership. The Sri Lankan authorities have not yet considered these behavioral aspects to be vital inputs in designing

⁵ Thanuka : Suppression of Terrorist Financing and the unique Tamil Diaspora July 2005

future strategies. This presentation focuses on eleven internal behavioral factors, and gives examples of how they operate within individuals and groups resulting in violent actions and reactions. The purpose of this study is to ascertain to what extent these resulting behaviors can be studied so that the strategies can be adapted to predict and deal with them. Its hypothesis is that understanding these inner behaviors enable authorities to a) anticipate terrorist actions in various given situations b) take measures to prevent and mitigate the level of damages, and c) develop strategies for the future to effectively devise structures effective not only in combating terrorism but also negotiating peace.

The current situation in Sri Lanka is a disturbing omen for a region in which the LTTE has been a trend setter. The LTTE is now operating from a position of strength, effectively applying the principles of the Stockholm syndrome to render governments helpless⁶. If present trends continue, the LTTE will demonstrate that terrorism works provided it is conducted in the LTTE manner. The LTTE will therefore be considered a success story for various other groups, which have already adopted some LTTE methods, including suicide bombing.

In pursuing a strategy to move the LTTE towards a final settlement of the conflict, these behavioral aspects – particularly the concealed internal factors – can play an important part only if one takes the time to study them and present the implications to governments and security forces on regular basis. This study will offer food for thought for concerned parties to strengthen the analytical processes and ascertain the usefulness of enhancing such analytical capabilities as would be valuable to the entire region. Such understanding is necessary in order for the states of the region to share the experiences and knowledge to their mutual benefit.

THE SRI LANKAN CASE AND ANATOMY OF TERRORISM

The Sri Lankan conflict has now lasted for over two decades. Over 65,000 people in all communities, including security forces, have perished. The majority of those, however, were civilians. During this time, four Sri Lankan Executive Presidents have governed Sri Lanka and one was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber.

⁶ Thanuka ‘ Stockholm Syndrome, is it operative , Mirror September 2005

The study of the Sri Lankan case is particularly important to the international community because of its multifaceted character. It displays a range of social, political, and economic root causes and has passed through several cycles of war and negotiations. Overall, the Sri Lankan case has been extremely violent, and finding lasting solutions has proven extremely difficult. The challenge of negotiating a permanent settlement has become even more difficult as the LTTE has gained a position of strength through its increasing military capability. The LTTE, once willing to explore a federal solution, has now gone reverted to its original position demand for full independence and the establishment of a separate Tamil state in the North and East of Sri Lanka.

There is an historical aspect to the Sri Lankan conflict as well. The government's language policy in the 1950s sparked ethnic strife. This was followed by other national policies which the Tamil community regarded as discrimination in education and political colonization of Tamil territory. The lingering effects of these historical resentments can be seen in LTTE propaganda and political grievances expressed by pro-LTTE Tamil politicians.

In international relations, India plays a vital role in the conflict, as it is the Indian subcontinent that has been shaping the content and direction of the civilization in Sri Lanka for centuries. It was from India that the two major ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamils, and its two dominant religious cultures, Buddhist and Hindu, made their way into the island. The conflict in Sri Lanka has an enormous political impact on India due to the presence of over 55 million Tamils in Tamil Nadu. The LTTE once fought the Indian Army and took the life of Rajiv Gandhi. The LTTE leader and a few others are now wanted by India and are on the Interpol most-wanted list.

The economic aspects of the conflict are dominated by the open economic policies introduced by the government in 1978, which affected the Northern Tamil farmers who depended on the cultivation of foodstuffs as a basic source of income. This income was reduced considerably by the Indian practice of dumping agricultural produce onto the Sri Lankan market, allowing under the latter's more open economic policies. The resulting poverty, in turn, aggravated the conflict ⁷.

⁷ Kinihira, Political Debate , Swarnavahini , Colombo June 2005

The LTTE has developed a sophisticated organizational structure through which to conduct its operations. The over 800,000 Tamils living abroad are a substantial and dependable source of hard currency for the movement. In addition to its business enterprises, the LTTE operates a commercial shipping fleet and has recently entered the media realm with its satellite television network. Its propaganda machine operates 24 hours a day in many modes.

All this supports an LTTE force of around 20,000 direct cadres and several thousand additional forces attached to para-military units ⁸. The ground forces, naval unit, suicide cadres, women's unit and an air wing complete the LTTE octopus.

Dealing with the LTTE threat will require the governments of the region to understand the complexity of the LTTE's current structure and capabilities. Therefore it is absolutely necessary to share knowledge and experience and develop collective efforts if the states of South Asia are to develop a strategic approach to eradicating global regional violence and terrorism.

The anatomy of any terrorist organization begins with its leadership. An insurgent leader need not maintain a highly public personal profile and the leadership is not necessarily confined to one person. It could revolve around a group of persons with similar characteristics, traits and ideology.

The organizational structure is the other key element of the anatomy of terrorist groups. As business organizations, such groups must set organizational goals and develop plans for meeting them. Human resources, fund raising, and procurement are essential to enable the creation and sustainment of necessary units, engagement of cadres and training.

In the LTTE case, the challenge of propaganda, fund raising, and procurement extends beyond Sri Lanka's borders. The majority of the Sri Lankan Tamil population in the diaspora in Europe, US, Australia and in other countries generally maintain a keen interest in Sri Lanka's internal affairs and play an important role in influencing the conflict from thousands of miles away.

⁸ Intelligence Consultations July 2005 Colombo

EXPLICIT CAUSES FOR TERRORISM

Poverty

Many analysts maintain that poverty is a monster breeding terrorism. Beyond the most basic definition of poverty as the lack of the means of providing material needs or comforts, there is little agreement concerning either what constitutes “poverty” or how it contributes to the spread of terrorism.

Countries follow many economic philosophies from closed- to open-economies and the middle path. Unfortunately, they do not pay much attention to the main economic factors that contribute to terrorism. The first of these is corruption, which surfaces in various forms – bribery, dishonesty and fraud – and leads to deprivation in many ways. If the level of corruption is uncontrollable, governments will sometimes lose the moral legitimacy to condemn terrorism or to convince their populations that deprivation is preferable to civil violence. The second factor, the inequitable distribution of wealth, is a major challenge for most governments to overcome but is something that the authorities should take into consideration, particularly in Sri Lanka. The chena cultivator has to live on average two meals per day without other basic needs such as adequate clothing while Ferrari’s and Jaguars are roaming the cities ⁸.

The resentment that such inequity breeds provides fertile ground for terrorist and insurgent ideologies. It is not just the poor who are radicalized by poverty. Another important element of society is made up of those who see poverty expanding and threatening to their status and well being. They often see traditional social norms as threatened and will try hard to defend them under difficult circumstances. Prabhakaran of LTTE emerged from such a society and was radicalized when he saw the “selfish intentions” of many politicians doing little to build a stronger country.

The most embarrassing issue that the Government of Sri Lanka faces in finding a political solution is the challenge of convincing the LTTE to embrace the present system of governance in the South, despite the fact that it has not worked even after 2 ½ years of relative peace following the most recent ceasefire agreement.

⁸ Thanuka : Poverty , Silent Monster in the South Colombo, Mirror August 2005

Discrimination

Discrimination is defined as unfair treatment of a person or group on the basis of prejudice. There are several types of discrimination. For purposes of this paper, discrimination will be used in the common colloquial sense of the word as the irrational, economic, social, racial, religious, sexual, ethnic and age-related discrimination against particular individuals or groups. Discrimination can produce adverse consequences in the behavior of those against whom it is directed.

Intentional or unintentional acts which adversely affect employment opportunities, privileges, benefits, or working conditions because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, marital status, or national origin, or other factors can result in serious consequences. For example: they can lead to the emergence of social tensions stemming from frustration and, more dangerously in terms of terrorism, in the rise of ethnic or religious hatred. Racial and religious discrimination have been cited as ingredients of causes for terrorism.

The perceived discrimination against Tamils in Sri Lanka has almost faded away. However no constitutional guarantee against discrimination has so far been offered to the Tamils. This means that with the Sinhala Majority in the parliament, there will always be the danger of a change of heart against the Tamils. In the Tamil mind, this leaves them vulnerable.




Figure 1. – Violent behavior model

RECOGNIZED INTERNAL FACTORS

The other complexities of the conflict -- such as the effect of organizational cultures and psychological developments on individually members – have not been sufficiently grasped by governments preoccupied with the day-to-day effort to put out fires and overcome the operational hazards to national survival. But such an understanding can provide valuable insights into long-term counterterrorism approaches and strategies.

Perception

In marketing jargon, perception is more important than reality. In terrorism, it cannot be any other way terrorist groups gain support and seek to achieve political ends by manipulating the perceptions of society. Perception is defined as a complex process by which people select and organize sensory data into a form that has a meaning to an individual⁹. Perception is influenced by direct experience as well as past experience, learning and attitudes. Attention, and the external elements that control it – the intensity of stimuli, position, contrast, novelty, repetition, and movement – is one determinant of what is being perceived. The internal factors affecting attention include beliefs, interests, needs, motives, and expectations. It is also said that ‘ people perceive what they want to perceive’.

If the leaders and followers are taken as the elements of a terrorist organization, perception theory applies to both groups in broader sense. The perception generates secondary behaviors that drive them to accept terrorist violence as being one way of solving a problem. The purpose of this paper is to elaborate the secondary behaviors derives from perception as they relate to support for or participation in terrorist activity.

Learning

Learning is said to be a permanent change in behavior occurring as a result of experience and practice. The learning process involves associations, reinforcement, and motivations. Memory – both short- and long-term – is necessary for learning to occur and has various stages such as encoding, storage, retrieval ¹⁰. Traumatic memories are often especially powerful.

⁹ Williams K.C Behavioral aspects of Marketing (London Heinemann 1981)

¹⁰ Williams K.C Behavioral aspects of Marketing (London Heinemann 1981)


There have been many ethnic riots involving Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka over the years, but the July 1983 riots stand out as the nightmare of every Tamil, whether in Sri Lanka and abroad. The riots began when 13 Government soldiers were ambushed and killed by LTTE cadres led by Prabakaran, the LTTE leader. The attack had two objectives. The first was to show the Tamil people that Tamil rebels had begun the armed struggle and that they were capable of taking on the Sri Lankan Army. The second, was to trigger ethnic riots, which it was hoped would be a milestone for the rebels in their quest to carve out a separate state. The LTTE achieved both these objectives: the July riots killed more than 2000 Tamil civilians in the cities, resulting in Tamils fleeing the country to establish a diaspora around the world. The searing memories they carried with them became the flame that has kept the LTTE alive. The events of July 1983 resulted in a permanent change in the political behavior of the Tamils, instilling in them the conviction that armed struggle would be the only means for them to ensure their long-term security and well-being.

The Tamil community that left Sri Lankan soil had associated little with the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka. They had no experience of the Sinhalese as a community with characteristics similar to their own, except for the ‘happy go lucky’ attitude among metropolitan Sinhalese. Most of the Tamils left straight from their villages and territories to greener pastures abroad. But, it was the criminals, thugs, and hooligans that killed the Tamils in July 1983 and not the average Sinhalese. Unfortunately, the Tamils believed those who attacked them were representative of all Sinhalese. Some of those Tamils who met Sinhalese abroad gradually came to realize that Sinhalese were not like the image that had developed in their minds ¹¹.

Motivation

Motivation is the internal drive to accomplish a task or the interrelationship between needs, behavior aimed at overcoming needs, and the fulfillment of these needs. When one need is fulfilled, another arises. Motives are the unlearned psychological and primary drivers as well as the learned higher, or secondary drives. Motives can be positively- or negatively- directed.

¹¹ Thanuka : Suppression of Terrorist Financing and the unique Tamil Diaspora July 2005



Maslow's hierarchy of needs

Abraham Maslow's theory of the Hierarchy of Needs explains that needs are arranged in a hierarchical order. When one need is fulfilled, the others rise to replace it. Motivation research aims to provide insight into attitudes, beliefs, and environmental pressures that influence behavior¹².

Applying Maslow's theory to the terrorism in Sri Lanka –specifically, applying it to Tamils who support the LTTE financially or otherwise – suggests that a failure to meet basic needs in the 1980s following the implementation of the open economy has triggered support for a political ideology calling for self rule. In other words, safety and security needs influenced the Tamils, leading them to identify their alternatives as either to join the LTTE in their territories or leave Sri Lanka.

There are types of group behavior that are directly related to terrorism. The group expresses a collective political or religious cause. Without such an explicit cause, the

¹² Williams K.C Behavioral aspects of Marketing (London Heinemann 1981)

anatomy of terrorism is not complete. But again, the group consists of individuals and the behaviors of these individuals naturally determine the group actions.

This is the most vital implication of Maslow's theory for the Sri Lankan conflict. The Tamil community is generally a closed society still structured around caste related to social structures and religious and social rules. Families are close-knit. When the Tamils fled Sri Lanka, they retained their social norms making them a unique diaspora.

The unavoidable need of members of the diaspora is to nurture this uniqueness and establish links with their homeland. While the LTTE's fund-raising has become an integral element of the Tamil Diaspora, there has not been sufficient research into the degree to which the search for togetherness rooted in the identity, rich language, literature and vibrant culture is a motivation for support to the LTTE. Such motivation may have enabled the LTTE to portray itself as the defender of the future of the Tamils world wide.

The LTTE strategically harnessed its migrant community much earlier than other Tamil groups, thus taking a commanding position in controlling the diaspora. In addition to the dissemination of propaganda through the Internet, telephone hotlines, community libraries, mailings, Tamil television, (the LTTE's own TV channel was launched this year), radio broadcasts, there are regular political, cultural, and social gatherings coordinated with venerated dates such as Prabhakaran's birthday, Martyrs' Day, Black Tigers' Day, etc. Thousands of resident Tamils gather at these events, at which the chief guests are usually prominent politicians of the host country.

The majority of the diaspora believes that it is the LTTE that will help them to retain the social and cultural norms which influence each individual in the diaspora. The diaspora now living in the West does not experience the economic hardships that other Tamils back home go through as a result of the war. They have their basic material needs fulfilled. For them, other needs drive their decision to continue to support the LTTE.

Applying Maslow to Prabhakaran, it becomes clear that his behavior is no longer motivated by the quest to fulfill basic needs: his massive security entourage of close relatives and friends meets his security needs. His behavior is now motivated by the drive to fulfill his need for esteem needs. He has been busy rearranging his organizational structure to achieve greater status for himself and his organization in the eyes of the international community.

Militarily, Prabakaran controls a large ground army and recently established an air wing, despite the fact that the available air strip in Iranamadu is not big or long enough to accomodate large aircraft. The LTTE political team has been received for meetings with politicians, diplomats and officials of several other countries. Prabakaran also runs a shipping fleet, an international procurement structure, and back in Vanni, he has opened banks, administrative officers, police stations , courts etc.

However, there is still no official international recognition given to the LTTE, which is in fact banned in several countries. This is a source of frustration within the LTTE leadership, which is a concealed motivation for some of its behavior.

CONCEALED INTERNAL FACTORS

Prestige and Pride

The only international airport in Sri Lanka was attacked by an LTTE suicide mission in July 2001. Significantly, not a single passenger or civilian was killed in the attack though many aircraft -- including Sri Lankan Air Force A-330s and fighter jets -- were destroyed. The international media called this ‘ a spectacular and stunning attack’. The LTTE killed two birds with one stone with this attack: the LTTE effectively halted the Government’s air raids on their territories and also showed the world their capability to plan, organize, and implement attacks on any important facility they wish to target. Immediately after the attack, vast amount of funds were generated by the Tamil diaspora abroad.

Three weeks after the airport attack the LTTE carried out a raid in the east of Sri Lanka on a Government commando unit. This attack was conducted by a group of women cadres of the LTTE, with not a single male participating in the operation. The LTTE looted the camp when the troops withdrew, demonstrating once again how effective the women cadres were. If the sole objective was to seize the arms, the LTTE would not have risked the lives of so many women cadres.

During the peace talks LTTE theoretician and negotiator Anton Balasingham announced at a press conference in Oslo in 2002 that they had to dispose of the decomposing bodies of over 700 Sri Lankan soldiers after the Government refused to accept her combatants killed in action. The reason was to show that LTTE, unlike the

Government, looks after their cadres even after their death. There are many sites in the North and East where the dead LTTE cadres are buried and honored.



LTTE leader Prabakaran meets with Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen in 2003

Coercion

Ruthlessness is a strategy of the LTTE intended to create psychological fear among the population. The LTTE eliminates every Tamil that goes against them politically or otherwise. The massacre of 36 Buddhist monks in Arantalawa and 100 Muslims praying in Katitankudi Jumma Mosque along with the elimination of all suspected rivals has enabled the LTTE to hold the Government for ransom. As a result, the organization has acquired the position of strength in negotiation in relation to the government. The present government has backed away from meeting the LTTE since April 2004, fearing the wrath of the people if they offered many concessions. Following the signing of the ceasefire, the last two governments were humiliated when they had to allow LTTE cadres to enter Government controlled areas for political work, offer escorts to the LTTE cadres, allow LTTE political teams to visit other countries, and offer helicopters and security to the LTTE cadres traveling within the country.

The LTTE cadres who are engaged in fundraising have received military training and have participated in combat. Their presence, even in a civilian capacity, exerts a

certain amount of pressure on Tamil people to contribute money for their movement. For instance Lawrence Thilagar, a one time LTTE fund raiser in Europe was a fully trained cadre¹³.



TRO representative Lawrence Thilagar during his Military combat days.

Hatred and Vengefulness

Anita Prathap, in her book *Island of Blood* describes how Prabakaran reacted when he heard from a messenger of an attack by the Indian Peacekeeping Force on a group of LTTE cadres in the 1980s ¹⁴. The hatred that LTTE harbors is reinforced by the unforgiving mind and physical exhaustion that gripped the Tamils who fled their homeland. The initial despondent life the members of the diaspora had to endure until they established themselves abroad fanned the flames of vengeance, making the LTTE leader the sole beneficiary who opportunistically uses his anger and acts of retaliation to show that he is with his people all the time.

In another case, a teenager, Krishanthi Kumaraswamy, was gang raped by the Sri Lankan security forces¹⁵. Although the soldiers involved were sentenced to life imprisonment, this atrocity became a permanent motivation for LTTE women cadres.

The late Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, had been a prime target of the LTTE for over a decade. Kadirgamar, himself a Tamil, took on the LTTE in a fashion that earned him exceptional honor from the Sinhalese Buddhists in the country. He entered politics at a time when LTTE propaganda, fundraising and procurement were

¹³ Gunaratne, Rohan International & Regional Security – Implication of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency (Col 1997)

¹⁴ Prathap Anita *Island of Blood* (India, Penguin Pub 2001)

¹⁵ UTHR (J) Disappearance & Accountability, Gaps in Krishanthi Kumaraswamy case (Col 1999)

flourishing in the international arena. Pressure was mounting, particularly among the Sinhalese abroad, for Sri Lankan Embassies to take action to counter the LTTE's propaganda.

The late Kadirgamar launched a full diplomatic offensive, initially with the backing of the President for his strategies. Through bilateral and multilateral talks, including an active role in pushing the relevant UN conventions, he convinced the US and the rest of the world to include the LTTE on their terrorist list and also confront its human rights issues.

The LTTE planned the assassination of Kadirgamar for years and made several unsuccessful attempts: electrocuting a hotel pool he was to use, placing several suicide cadres in routes he was traveling, etc. The security detail for the late Minister, however, did not anticipate a 'shadow assassin'. The Minister was a difficult target, and his assassination required a trained marksman. Had the sniper missed his target, the late Minister would have again intensified his security. Clearly, the LTTE had zero tolerance for failure in this mission.

Why did the LTTE hate Kadirgamar so much? Was it because he went all-out to influence the international community to denounce the LTTE as a terrorist organization? Or was it because he was a Tamil himself working against them? If one analyzes LTTE's comments in the past on Kadirgamar, the sources of resentment become clearer: the late Minister had received his primary education in a prestigious school, was brought up in an English-speaking elite society, went to Oxford for advanced academic studies, worked abroad with a UN body for a decade before taking up the position of foreign minister, and he received this posting through the national list rather than through a national election. Despite his constant travel abroad, he had not met members of the Tamil diaspora or Tamil opinion leaders. In short, from LTTE's viewpoint he did not have the right to speak on issues concerning the Tamil community.

The Sinhalese on the other hand made him a hero to such a degree that Kadirgamar could not play a neutral role in the peace process. Kadirgamar in one of the meetings spoke a few words in Sinhala, which were aired at the end of his funeral.

The LTTE has also assassinated other important national leaders. Rear Admiral Clancy Fernando launched an unprecedented naval offensive against the LTTE's naval

unit, and the LTTE vowed to take revenge. Several months later an LTTE suicide bomber took Fernando's life while he was on his way to Army headquarters in Colombo.



LTTE representatives met with a government delegation led by A.C.S. Hameed in Trincomalee in mid-1990. The LTTE delegation included Yogaratnam Yogi, Secretary PFLT; Anton Balasingham, ideologue, LTTE; Adele Balasingham, advisor, women's wing; Paduman, special commander, Trincomalee (first batch, India); and Ruban, political leader, Trincomalee (fourth batch, India). Admiral Clancy Fernando, who was later assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber in November 1992, is also pictured.

Rear Admiral Clancy Fernando (Ex right) with LTTE representatives during peace talks under President Premadasa

Fear

Fear causes the LTTE to act from time to time. In early days this was the fear of being apprehended and tried by the national government. Now it is the fear of losing organizational strength.

a) Air raids by the Sri Lankan Air Force are one Government military action that the LTTE found particularly hard to endure, bringing as they did high levels of casualties and demoralization. The raids reduced the morale of LTTE cadres. The establishment of the air wing, though far from confronting the Sri Lankan Air force, is helping to create the belief that some day the LTTE will have a fully-fledged Air Force.

b) The Long Range Reconnaissance Petrol (LRRP) has damaged the LTTE more than anything else. The LRRP who secretly went into the jungles were able to get several LTTE leaders.

c) Naval patrols carried out with the assistance of India are troubling to the LTTE as they have resulted in the loss of several shipments of contraband that the LTTE was transporting into their territory. These shipments are of great monetary and organizational value to the LTTE, and losing them is a huge setback.

f) Most recently, the breakaway Karuna-led group is posing a major threat to the LTTE. Karuna, the former eastern leader, is not only a trained and experienced military leader but also commands nearly 3000 eastern cadres who fled the LTTE with him. He is now an independent operative and has successfully attacked several LTTE targets and leaders, including the political leader in the east, Kaushalyan. When Kaushalyan was killed, the international community felt that the 4th Eelam war might soon begin. The UN Secretary General issued a statement of condolence.



LTTE leader with the defector Karuna during the time they were together when Karuna was heading the LTTE Eastern unit

Frustration

Frustration results when there is perceived interference with the attainment of a goal. Reaction to frustration may be positive or negative. From the LTTE perspective, frustration occurred in several areas:

a) When Western governments listed LTTE as a terrorist organization and the EU imposed a travel ban on the LTTE

b) When President Kumaratunga's Government delayed a settlement in after 40 odd communiqués had been exchanged during the peace talks in 1994/5

c) When UNF Government could not adhere to the withdrawal of government forces from the High Security Zone as indicated in the MOU with the UNF Government in 2002


The LTTE has reacted to all these situations violently. The recent brutal kidnapping and killing of SSP Wijewardena in Jaffna can be ascribed to the frustration with the lack of progress on the peace front after the new Government came into power in 2004. The goal may have been to trigger riots in the south of the country.



**Senior Superintendent of Police Charles Wijewardena
who was brutally killed by the LTTE by hacking him
with knives and swords**

Ignorance

The LTTE may not be aware that it could win the battles but lose the war. Or they may be beginning to realize that this is the case. The LTTE is still paying the price of losing India's support as a result of the killing of Rajiv Gandhi, which Anton Balasingham has described as an "historical blunder" by the LTTE. This act was caused by sheer ignorance. The LTTE feared another Indian intervention to eliminate the LTTE, which was clearly not the case. As a result of the assassination, India has no desire to involve itself in the Sri Lankan situation in the future.



LTTE with India's Rajiv Gandhi when Gandhi was attempting to bring LTTE into negotiating position

Excitement


"Catch me if you can" is the unofficial motto of Kumaran Pathmanathan, also known as KP. He heads the LTTE's international logistical and shipping operations and is a chief contributor to the LTTE's transformation from a small group of rebels to today's full-fledged conventional army ¹⁶. Among the LTTE cadres in the last 20 years, this man has the reputation for facing tremendous risks and evading capture without carrying either a gun or one of the LTTE's signature cyanide capsules.

The network KP has built over time would pose a serious concern for other countries with similar conflicts, were it not for his commitment to the LTTE. As a

¹⁶ Thanuka, Mastermind of LTTE's procurement system, Mirror July 2005

freelance procurer, he could be one of the wealthiest merchants today. His long career as the developer and operator of a secretive, undercover and uninterrupted international operation for nearly two decades has accomplished a “mission impossible” for the LTTE, both in business and military terms.

His initial motivation, “The Tamil cause,” has combined with his flair for adventure. Analysts believe that KP, appearing in the wanted list of Interpol as Kumaran Shanmugam Tharmalingam, now is driven largely by the very danger of the job that requires him to be constantly on the move.



1998/4743 THARMALINGAM SHANMUGAM KUMARAN

**Most wanted by India and Interpol
Kumaran Padmanadan, LTTE Chief in
Procurement and Shipping Operation**

Deceptive Behavior

Narayan Swamy in his book described Prabakaran’s childhood days. His family had a mini poultry farm behind the house. Every morning, Prabakaran would pick up an egg, make a tiny hole, suck out the contents and replace the now empty egg back to the sack before taking it to the market ¹⁷.

This tale characterizes the deceptive behavior reflected throughout Prabakaran’s two decades of operations. In the Pallai debacle, where he killed nearly 800 Sri Lankan

¹⁷ Narayan Swamy M.R. INSIDE AN ELUSIVE MIND- (Literate World, Fremont 2002)

soldiers engaged in a defense operation, the LTTE deliberately leaked information to the air force commander that the LTTE had deployed a number of anti-aircraft guns have been fitted to shoot down aircraft. The air force refused to provide air cover for operations after having lost a few by SAM missiles fired by the LTTE. The government's operation failed with a massive loss of soldiers.

The LTTE plant, Babu, continuously deceived President Premadasa, posing as a messenger between the government and the LTTE. Babu was in fact a suicide bomber deployed to get kill the President, an operation which he carried out to the great satisfaction of the LTTE leadership.

Late Minister Kadirgamar is said to have been assured that the LTTE would not attempt to assassinate him as long as he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Otherwise, it is unthinkable that the Minister, who took many precautions during his tenure, suddenly took to swimming at his new house when the pool could easily be seen from higher elevations in the surrounding area. The business tycoon who gave the assurance to the late Minister is now under surveillance.



The place selected by the LTTE from which to shoot Foreign Minister Kadirgamar in August 2005.

MISERLY AND SELFISH BEHAVIOR

This an area that has not been studied in behavioral analyses of the LTTE leadership. Take the case of Prababkan, for example. He does not share his wealth or power. It is difficult for his people to out-smart him financially. Following the Nilaveli

robbery, Prabakaran wanted his share of the loot the next day in order to visit India to reorganize his party.

It is such behavior that resulted in the formation of Karuna faction, when Prabakaran sent his auditor to check the accounts in the east managed by Karuna. In sorting out the state of financial ruin in which the renegade commander had left the district, the LTTE's auditors and accountants found that he had borrowed more than thirty million rupees from local societies and businessmen. Karuna had obtained the monies directly through Kuhanesan. There are no records of the loans or of how the funds were spent. However, the LTTE, in negotiations with its creditors, has promised to repay the loans over a specific period of time.

The LTTE's next target is EPDP's head Douglas Devananda who is seeking independent political leadership among the Tamils – something the LTTE does not allow. The LTTE has already made several attempts to get Devananda, who is said to have nine lives. The last failed attempt was made by an LTTE woman cadre who exploded herself inside Colombo 3 police station when apprehended, taking the lives of four police officers.



**LTTE's political contender
Dauglas Devananda of EPDP**

Copying Behavior

Prabakaran, during his youth, was a fan of western movies, such as those starring Clint Eastwood. He imitated the movements and the gun-slinging in these movies. He copies whatever he thinks is useful to him and his organization but adopts them to the unique needs of his organization.

After the Sri Lankan Air Force hired Ukrainians to train pilots, a few of whom took part in air raids, Prabakaran also used mercenaries to shoot down a number of government transport aircraft ¹⁸.



Ukrain pilots training Sri Lankan pilots for anti LTTE air raids

STRATEGIC THINKING

The LTTE thinks and works ahead, behavior that cascades down to its lower-level commanders. Prabakaran wrote to his friends abroad as far back as 1981 – in a letter carrying the LTTE Emblem – that the ‘LTTE will be building an Army strong enough to fight the Government troupes’ and that it was only through this strategy the Tamils could

¹⁸ Gunaratna, Rohan, International & Regional Security – Implication of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency (Col 1997)

win their demands. Twenty-four years later, he has built a full-fledged army ready to engage in both offensive and defensive operations.



LTTE Emblems in 1981 and now – Remains unchanged

IMPLICATIONS

In a multifaceted conflict, the Government needs to realize that a strategy to deal with the LTTE requires a broad, synergistic approach guided by an agreed policy and programs.

In Sri Lanka, the military option of an offensive strategy to defeat the LTTE has failed. By the year 2001, the LTTE had overrun over 12 Army base camps and in most cases took all the arms and ammunitions with them. As result the government completely gave up on military responses and with that the military was neglected. The negligence has had the effect of reducing the military's offensive and defensive capabilities.

It is necessary to protect all possible targets: economic, intelligence and other security units. The government must prevent further loss of human life and the morale of the intelligence personnel, and prevent patriotic groups in the country from demanding a return to military actions.

The fundamentals of security must be preserved without allowing the government to be deluded by LTTE moves. All possible targets should be defended with well-trained, thoughtful people.

Government peace delegations must seriously participate in talks and not use them merely for confidence building. LTTE is a serious organization with legitimate

grievances that must not be ignored. An slow but steady approach is desirable to prevent frustration from setting in.

Security forces must avoid getting cornered by the LTTE, as happened in the killing of SSP Wijewardena in Jaffna, as well as numerous cases in which Sri Lankan soldiers and Police officers have been encircled in LTTE-controlled territories.

The present U.S. Director of the CIA said, immediately upon taking office, that the most precious asset of his intelligence department is its people. Applying this to the Sri Lankan situation, politicization of intelligence has made respective units completely ineffective. What the country needs today is not just intelligence personnel to gather information but also personnel that can conduct effective analysis and make policy recommendations, not only to prevent attacks but also to further peace negotiations.

Contrary to common belief, the need for intelligence during peacetime is as important, if not more so, than in wartime. Intelligence also has a big role to play in finding ways and means of building bridges between the Sinhala and Tamil communities, both in Sri Lanka and abroad, which is a crucial factor in resolving the Lankan conflict politically.

In the analysis of concealed internal factors that has been the focus of this study, the LTTE needs to be officially recognized. The question is how the Sri Lankan government can work out a program to offer reciprocal and mutual recognition between the two parties? The critical words are the reciprocity and irreversibly.

The coercion in which LTTE is engaged can be exposed with international pressure. The Sri Lankan Government has already announced co-chairs to take up the Sri Lanka issue and its recent statements not only condemn the LTTE attitude but also demand that it come to the table for talks without delay. The EU recently imposed a travel ban on the LTTE due to continuous dialogue by the government. The LTTE has effectively infiltrated Colombo and placed their cadres in many local cells. The local intelligence has failed to ascertain the level of threat nor has it been able to apprehend these cadres.

The government must have a strategy to offer regular gestures designed to reduce hatred and anger that motivates the LTTE and its supporters. These measures need not be solely political. The government's refusal to allow Anton Balasingham to leave the country for kidney transplant was considered a blunder on the part of the Sri Lankan

Government. Balasingham left the country covertly and had the operation done in Norway with assistance of the Norwegian government on humanitarian grounds.

It is also necessary to understand the pulse of the Tamils abroad who are funding the LTTE. The diaspora is a crucial factor in the future of the LTTE. Except for a few attempts to reach out to the diaspora the government foreign policy does not at present have a provision for dealing with the impact of Tamil's living abroad.

The LTTE fears certain actions by the Government as a result of its past experiences. It is unwise for the Government to come up with precipitate actions simply in the belief that LTTE will collapse in fear, but the government should be conveying the message to the LTTE that it is aware that the LTTE fears them and is keeping its options open. For instance India has agreed to increase the naval patrol with the Sri Lankan Navy, a step that certainly conveys a message to the LTTE.

A counter-productive degree of frustration is usually the result when the government initiates negotiations without a clear plan and well-defined terms to negotiate, as was in the case in early nineties. It is not advisable to drag negotiations out. The high security zone issue, in which the Government was trapped by the LTTE through the MOU, could have been predicted. This situation must be avoided by planning negotiating strategies carefully.

The LTTE needs to be convinced that it may win battle, but it cannot win the war. This message can be conveyed through the diaspora as well as Tamil opinion makers, particularly the parliamentarians. This type of specialized strategic communication must, however, be carefully developed with the help of experts in the field of persuasive communication.

Kumaran Pathmanathan, when he offered his services to the peace delegation, could have been allowed to participate in spite of being on the wanted list. The fact remains that he has not been apprehended for 22 years despite his active procurement and shipping work. The question Sri Lanka has to ask is whether to allow him to remain in hiding and continue his clandestine operations or bring him into the open and enlist him to work for peace. After all, the international community speaks to Prabakaran who is also on the wanted list.

Is there a strategy to engage the LTTE procurement team in the development work in the North and East?. To realize this, the peace talks must succeed and one way of doing this is to commence the development work in the North and East with the LTTE.

The intelligence community and government must bear in mind that until such time as the LTTE agrees to a permanent solution, precautions must be taken not to be misled by their indirect movements. The LTTE's deceptive behavior has done vast damage and the Governments must not ignore this history.

The government must understand the self-serving behavior of the LTTE that prevents it from allowing any other group or non-LTTE individuals to deal directly with the Tamil community in any capacity, including political or economic development.

The LTTE copies whatever might advance its development and the government needs to take suitable precautions. For instance, when the Sri Lankan government advertises for new recruits it reveals many training methods in TV advertisements showing recruits in training.

The LTTE is guided by long-term goals; starting with its continuing adherence to the goal of a separate state. Any attempt to find a solution thus must take a similarly long-term and strategic view. Governments must move away from the current short-term thinking and politicization of the conflict. A new government should be able to build on what has been achieved. An agreement similar to Liam Fox needs to be worked out without delay. Such a move will enable the government to proceed towards settlement of this issue even if it requires another 10 years.

Finally, the Sri Lankan conflict has many implications for South Asia and beyond. The LTTE has been the trendsetter among terrorist organizations in developing methods for fundraising, procurement, suicide bombing and political assassinations. It would be in the interest of the international community to assist Sri Lanka in resolving the conflict before other groups adapt the LTTE modus operandi to conflicts elsewhere. In the light of this, it would be useful to explore how the behavioral aspects operate within other individuals and organizations as this could provide valuable insight for those assigned to deal with terrorist issues. This study has made that attempt with one terrorist organization and leaves it for other analysts to gauge how useful it is for other situations on a case-by-case basis depending on available information and resources.

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**RELIGION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN KASHMIR:
THE NEED FOR CREATIVE RESPONSES
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Abstract

Terrorism is becoming a defining feature of the 21st century. But the term itself is highly contested - one man's terrorist can be another man's freedom fighter. Very often, it is impossible to differentiate the violence caused by a terrorist activity from the violence that results from a freedom struggle. So the threshold between a 'freedom fighter' and a 'terrorist' is quite vague and the terms can often be used interchangeably, depending on one's perspective. The situation gets even further confused in those regions in which conflict has prevailed for a long time. Such regions become natural breeding grounds for militants, if not terrorists. Kashmir is one such region that is marked by an intractable conflict between India and Pakistan that has continued for the past 58 years and, more importantly, where religion has been and continues to be a primary contributor to communal tension.

The particular complexities and ambiguities surrounding terrorism and political violence hold an important relevance to the Kashmir situation and should be kept in mind in dealing with it. Nevertheless, strategies for responding to this situation need not be solely based upon whether we view the violence there as a function of terrorism or the consequence of a struggle for freedom. In either case, creative strategies are needed that deal with root causes rather than symptoms. One such approach – faith-based reconciliation – has been pursued in Kashmir by the Washington-based International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) since 2000. By displacing the divisive influence of militant religious beliefs and the ensuing violence, the ICRD is working to build long-lasting peace in Kashmir. Through its faith-based approach, the ICRD is reconciling communities torn by longstanding, deeply-seated animosities and, in the process, breaking the cycle of revenge that typically accompanies identity-based conflicts. Rather than promoting any preconceived political settlement in Kashmir, the ICRD aims to knit the torn fabric of the Kashmiri society by bringing the transcendent

aspects of personal religious faith to bear in overcoming the secular obstacles to peace. This, in turn, will not only create opportunities for a solution to the Kashmir issue but will also provide glue to sustain a solution once it is achieved.

Faith-based reconciliation has a strategic vision that explicitly engages both “Track One” (official government) actors as well as “Track Two” representatives from civic society – the latter being a too often overlooked dimension of peace processes. Thus it supplements and complements official diplomacy. Above all, it refocuses the role of religion and draws on religious faith as an important asset for peace building rather than as a source of division. It should be noted that this approach resonates well in those parts of the world where western secular political approaches make little sense. At a broader level, therefore, the work of healing and reconciliation in Kashmir will, in the long run, contribute to restoring relationships across the political and religious divides between the West and the Islamic world and will establish the much needed cooperative spirit between them.

INTRODUCTION

A very thin line separates political violence as part of a struggle for freedom from terrorism; and the two can easily trespass each other’s boundaries. In the early 1990s the end of the Cold War marked the era of freedom, resulting in various liberation movements across the globe. But a decade later, the same liberation movements are overshadowed and face new challenges. Simply put, they carry a risk of being defined under the rubric of terrorism. It is, however, crucial for us to recognize the difference between the quest for liberation and terrorism. In particular, the effort should be to understand the delicate nuances behind their political usage. Terrorism is generally understood as being the systematic use of terror, especially as a means of coercion. Although it largely refers to national and international groupings of people who employ force and violence as a means of achieving political or social goals, terrorism is not restricted to non-state actors. The US Code of Federal Regulations describes terrorism as “...the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85) On the other hand, the UN Charter lays down in categorical terms that the right to self determination is the founding pillar of international world order and the basic human right of all the humans. It is

applicable to all peoples whose self-determination has been suppressed. It is recognized as one of the fundamental norms of international law. The United Nations Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960, on the “Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples,” states:

The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.

Keeping this problem of definitions in mind, let us consider the following situation in Kashmir: An Indian Army soldier follows a suspected Kashmiri militant and kills him. He then locates his family and raids their residences to arrest the remaining members of the family of the now dead militant. Upon meeting resistance, the soldier kills all the male family members, humiliates the women, and destroys their home. In the eyes of the surviving women of this destroyed family as well as their thousands of sympathizers, this soldier is a terrorist who used force to kill innocent human beings. In this act of “terrorism” he was sponsored by the state of India. To the Indian government, for whom the word terrorist is often synonymous with anyone who fights for the right of self-determination in Indian Administered Kashmir, the same soldier could be hailed as a hero for killing the “terrorists.” Now let us look at another case: A Kashmiri militant conducts a suicide attack and kills around a dozen Indian soldiers in Kashmir. From the Indian state’s point-of-view this militant was a terrorist, whereas many sympathizers with the militant movement in Kashmir, the deceased militant was a *Mujahid* who is now a martyr.

The above examples are meant to illustrate the difficulties of clearly defining terrorism. They also provide object lessons in the ease with which a thin line can very easily be crossed or be understood to be crossed by someone fighting for the liberation of their land or other political rights. And the militants are not alone; many scholars hold similar points of view. Cynthia Mahmood suggests in her policy brief:

As the United States reconsiders its policy toward Kashmir, it will be tempting to build a policy on the short-term perspective of the war on terrorism. However, a policy which takes account of the cultural and

political factors generating the conflict, and the rights of the Kashmiri people, will likely do more to reduce terrorism in the long term.²

VIOLENCE IN KASHMIR

The genesis of political violence and militancy in Kashmir can be traced to the struggle of Kashmiri Muslims against the oppressive Dogra rule in the pre-partition era. The dilemmas raised by the earlier phase of resistance continue to persist to this day despite the change of personalities, parties and circumstances.³ In the circumstances surrounding partition of the sub-continent into the separate nations of India and Pakistan, religion became the defining factor and religious identities took primacy over other ethnic or political identities. The ‘two nation theory’ defined the political climate of the sub-continent and consequently people were effectively left with two choices: to join either Muslim Pakistan or Hindu majority India. This took a heavy toll in Kashmir.

The initial character of the Kashmir conflict was distinctly religious. The leaders mobilized masses on such issues as the ban on the Jumma Khutba (Friday Sermon), desecration of the holy Qur’an by a non-Muslim official, and issues related to the plight of Muslim community. Established religious leaders like Mir Waiz⁴ also supported this movement.⁵ The controversy between the secular nationalists who wanted to join India or remain independent and the Muslim nationalists who wanted to join Pakistan has been of crucial significance throughout the history of the Kashmir conflict. However, the fact that the post-1989 phase of the Kashmir conflict is overwhelmingly characterized by militancy and violence is essentially driven by religious organizations – such as the Jamaat-i-Islami Kashmir – on the one hand, and by the state of India on the other. India sees the Kashmir conflict as a Muslim insurgency that has the potential to spread beyond

² Cynthia Mahmood, Policy Brief: Kashmir and the “War On Terrorism”, No.8, October 2001.

³ Tahir Amin, “Mass Resistance in Kashmir: Origins, Evolution, Options,” Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, 1995, 82.

⁴ Mir Waiz Maulvi Muhammad Farooq, a respected religious leader and father of Mir Waiz Omar Farooq, the current leader of one of the two factions of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The elder Mir Waiz was assassinated in May, 1990 by unidentified gunman, when militancy in Kashmir was at its peak.

⁵ Ibid., 82.

Kashmir and is determined to crush it through force. Kashmiri militants insist they seek only independence for their region.

The Jamaat-i-Islami Kashmir was formed in 1952. Until 1960s the Jamaat sought to cultivate a constituency for itself through publishing and distributing literature, establishing schools, and through public lectures. The local popular Sufi Muslims as well as the nationalists, however, did not perceive the Jamaat as a true representative organization. But against immense odds and in the face of resistance from Kashmiri Sufis and nationalists as well as the Indian armed forces, the Jamaat strove to continue its work through publications, mass meetings, public rallies, and the efforts of their activists.⁶

The Jamaat says that it has a limited goal of freeing Kashmir and no intention of intervening in Indian internal affairs. India and Pakistan will be able to establish peaceful relations after the Kashmir issue is solved, according to the Jamaat. But at the same time it asserts that this jihad calls for participation of all Muslims not just Kashmiris. On numerous occasions the leadership of the Jamaat appealed for communal harmony between Hindus and Muslims in Kashmir and blamed that the mass exodus of Kashmiri Pandits in early 1990s was instigated by the Indian authorities to project the Kashmiri struggle as an Islamic terrorist movement. But at the same time, and quite paradoxically, it vehemently denies Kashmiri nationalist discourse and sees Islam and nationalism as being in complete contradiction to each other.

The Jamaat-i-Islami Kashmir follows an ideology that breaks with the original political philosophy of their founder, Maulana Maududi, in two important respects: 1) the vigorous pursuit of the policy of making Kashmir a part of Pakistan and, 2) the legitimization of the use of violent militant means to achieve this goal. Despite its poor representation in elective bodies and very minimal public support, the Jamaat-i-Islami continues to play an important role in defining the pro-Pakistan and religious agendas of the current Kashmir independence movement.

⁶ Mumtaz Ahmed, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia," in *Fundamentalisms Observed*, eds., Martin E. Marty, and R. Scott Appleby (U.S.A.: The University Of Chicago Press, 1991), 457-530.

In addition, other factors are responsible for this dominant role of the Jamaat: the Jamaat-i-Islami has an uniquely democratic organizational structure; its propaganda and recruiting targets educated middle-class youth instead of devoting time and resources toward the ordinary masses⁷; its religious outlook and its role in militancy provide legitimacy; and, most importantly, it does not face resistance from within the religious establishment since there is no active Kashmiri peace movement with roots in religious organizations.

The conventional academic approach to understanding the trajectory of Islamic political activism, which has been to investigate these movements as militant or extremist reactions to the marginalization of religion by the modernist ideology of the secular nation state, needs to be reviewed. Instead of analyzing this phenomenon pejoratively as “fundamentalism” – that is, as an anachronistic reaction to secular modernity – it could be viewed as a liberation movement deriving its inspiration from its commitment to Islamic faith. But above all the most important reason for violence and militancy in Kashmir is the absence of any religiously-based peace and reconciliation movements capable of working as a powerful antidote to violence. Perhaps that would be the right course to follow for the international community –by building on the local religious and cultural resources to facilitate the rise of authentic peace and reconciliation movements within Kashmir.

The role for NGOs

A public dialogue could offer a great deal of opportunity for peace in Kashmir. There is a growing voice coming from all diplomatic circles that Kashmiris need to be recognized and included as equal parties in a future peace process. The international community has expressed this concern consistently. But the formal peace is likely a long way off; the immediate need is to facilitate dialogue and interaction between Kashmiris. Proliferation of such dialogue can be undertaken immediately, through track-two engagement; such discussion need not be preceeded by an official initiative and could, in fact, pave the way for political progress down the line.

Such a dialogue must be a two-way and two-dimensional process that empowers people as well as learning from them by enabling them to communicate. A true dialogue

⁷ Ibid.

will provide the opportunity to build relationships through which all sides can become aware of each other's views. In the context of Kashmir, the peace community needs to engage Kashmiris at multiple levels and develop a mutual understanding of the concepts of peace, justice, friendship, and reconciliation. To promote peaceful transformation of the conflict over Kashmir, non-governmental groups need to develop strategies that avoid direct suggestions for the political solutions of the problem but, instead, enlist the local religious and cultural resources to gradually create opportunities to achieve and sustain peace. Douglas Johnston identifies the complementary role of Track II in the following words:

Because diplomacy typically tries to resolve conflicts according to a patent interest, there is a need to go beyond the normal mechanisms to uncover and deal with the sources of conflict by rebuilding relationships and making concessionary adjustments wherever possible. In this context, reconciliation born of spiritual conviction can play a critical role by inspiring conflicting parties to move beyond the normal human reaction of responding in kind, of returning violence for violence.⁸

Similarly, Mohammed Abu Nimer notes with respect to the importance of religious and cultural resources:

Scholars and practitioners have recognized the critical influence of non-religious cultural attributes in the escalation and de-escalation of conflicts; the cultural religious attributes play an equally important role in such processes of conflict resolution. Religious values, like other cultural values, can motivate people to fight or to reconcile. Similarly, religious rituals (like other cultural rituals) can be powerful tools in transforming animosity to cooperation.⁹

⁸ Douglas Johnston, "Looking Ahead: Toward a New Paradigm," in Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds., *Religion The Missing Dimension Of Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 333.

⁹ Mohammed Abu-Nimer, "Conflict Resolution, Culture, and Religion: Toward a Training Model of Interreligious Peacebuilding," *Journal of Peace Research*, 38, 6, (2001), 686.

The evolution of Kashmiri political identities -- on the two sides of the Line of Control (LOC), in different environments, and in the absence of any significant contact between them -- left people in the region with no option but to develop perceptions of the other side based on obscurity. Kashmir's complexity, however, should not exclude ordinary people from talking about their problems, hopes and fears. Kashmiris can and should talk to each other - including those who identify themselves not as Kashmiris, but as citizens of the wider state (for example, Ladakhi Muslims and Buddhists, and Hindus from Jammu). A new range of voices with new aspirations and insights could be heard by thus empowering Kashmiris.

A comprehensive public dialogue and public involvement at the grassroots level through NGOs (both international and local) is very important. Similarly, religious institutions, especially middle level political and tribal/community leaders, are the basic agents of change. Thus the role of civil society is primary in sustaining a peace process. No peace can be achieved without healing the deep historical wounds. That, in turn, can happen only by providing justice for the victims. Only then can the relationships be built within and between communities that provide the means of reconciliation.

A number of initiatives have focused, in the past, on the Kashmir conflict at the track-two level.¹⁰ These efforts have approached the conflict by attempting to work through the hostile relationship between India and Pakistan and the effects that it has had on Kashmir. Although these efforts involved Kashmiris in the process, their representation remained limited to top level leadership. These efforts revolved around exploring political solutions, thus undermining the role of the public. In so doing, they diminished the possibility of any positive outcome. In the recent past, however, a number of INGOs (the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, the Hanns Seidel Foundation, and others) have focused on facilitating an *Intra-Kashmiri Dialogue* between the Kashmiris from both sides of the LOC.

¹⁰ The Peoples' Forum for Peace and Democracy inaugurated in Lahore in 1994, and the *Neemrana Dialogue*, sponsored in part by the Ford Foundation that was initiated in 1997.

CURRENT SCENARIO

Important progress has been made in the peace process between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, much of it since the Islamabad declaration of January 2004 in which the then Indian Prime Minister Mr Atal Bihari Vajpai and Pakistani President General Musharraf agreed to resolve bilateral issues through 'composite dialogue'. In April 2005, the Srinagar - Muzaffarabad bus service was resumed after almost 58 years. Later on, in June 2005, a high level delegation of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference traveled from Indian-administered Kashmir to Pakistan administered Kashmir to meet with the Kashmiri leadership there. More importantly the recent earthquake that devastated most of Pakistan-administered Kashmir has provided the opportunity for both countries to show signs of increased cooperation in pursuit of a common, humanitarian goal.

But despite the goodwill and positive progress made in the peace process, the basic outstanding issues remain difficult to resolve. India and Pakistan have diametrically opposed positions on Kashmir. Added to this complexity are the different positions of the various political sub-groups in Kashmir, as well as between different Kashmiri regions and across the LOC. It is, therefore, difficult to imagine a final resolution of the Kashmir question without a major (and at this juncture, unlikely) change in at least one side's position. So where does the situation lie? How can progress be made? But many such proposals for a political solution have already been tabled by a variety of intelligent people. Will a new proposal just be one more in an already long list of failed approaches? There are alternatives – new approaches that supplement and complement political solutions instead of proposing them.

One such creative approach is being implemented by the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy in Kashmir. ICRD is an NGO dedicated to the furtherance of faith-based reconciliation. The concept of reconciliation is more than simply a conflict resolution model. It is a strategic vision that engages civil society, an often overlooked player in the peace processes. Faith-based reconciliation models draw upon religious faith as a motivator for grass-roots action in a part of the world where western secular political ideologies have little resonance.

THE WORK OF THE ICRD

The ICRD is committed to the concept and practice of faith-based diplomacy. As such it serves as a bridge between religion and politics in support of peacemaking. It does not promote religious solutions per se, but seeks to draw upon the examples and practices of the various faith traditions, integrates them with diplomacy and peacemaking, and uses them to appeal to the better natures of groups in conflict. The ICRD's work focuses on reconciliation in place of the traditional conflict resolution model. It takes a holistic approach, promoting the socio-political healing process in conflict as a prerequisite for permanent, far-reaching political and diplomatic solutions.

A reconciliation framework or model has three basic objectives: 1) resolving conflict; 2) restoring the political order that has suffered from war and injustice; and 3) reconciling groups of people. There are five basic elements to the process: 1) imparting a moral vision, 2) building bridges between estranged groups, 3) working toward a lasting peace accord, 4) advocacy for social justice, and 5) political forgiveness as a prescription for healing deep wounds. On the whole, faith-based reconciliation is based on eight principles or core values: pluralism, inclusion, peacemaking, justice, forgiveness, healing deep wounds, sovereignty, and atonement.

The ICRD has been involved in Kashmir since September 2000 and has been instrumental in addressing the internal issues of Kashmir, both those that are indigenous and those that result from the broader Pakistan-India dispute. Douglas Johnston, President of the ICRD, writes in a recent article about their understanding of Kashmir: "Perhaps it is time to consider a sequenced approach to peace making in Kashmir, one in which official diplomacy reinforces and builds upon the trust that religious third parties can sometimes bring to such situations."¹¹

For the past five years ICRD officials (particularly its Sr. Vice President, Rev. Brian Cox, and Senior Associate Dr. Daniel Philpott)¹² have conducted a series of faith-

¹¹ Douglas M. Johnston, "Escaping the Corner in Kashmir," ICRD, 2001.

¹² In fact ICRD's Senior Vice-President for Dispute Resolution Training and Project Director for Kashmir, Rev. Brian Cox, is the person who has drawn these concepts together in the shape of faith-based reconciliation seminars. Building on over 15 years experience in Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East, Rev. Cox began faith-based reconciliation work in Kashmir in September 2000. He has worked closely on this project with Dr. Daniel Philpott, Associate Professor at the University of Notre Dame and Senior Associate with the ICRD. Both Rev. Cox and Dr. Philpott have been working hard

based reconciliation seminars on both sides of the Line of Control for over four hundred participants as a means of fostering a reconciling spirit and a common lexicon of core values. This ground work led to the “First cross - LOC bridge-building meeting” for Kashmiris, which was conducted by officials of the ICRD on November 10 – 15, 2005 in Kathmandu, Nepal. The purpose of this meeting was to bring the leaders of Kashmiri civil society, who are graduates of previous faith-based reconciliation seminars and come from four regions of Kashmir representing both sides of the Line of Control, to a neutral venue to engage in a faith-based learning exercise as a contribution to the present momentum for peace.

There were a total of 18 Kashmiri civil society leaders who took part in the Kashmir Bridge-Building meeting. The participants represented Kashmiri Muslims from Azad Kashmir, Kashmir Valley and Jammu; Kashmiri Pandits from Jammu; and Ladakhi Buddhists and Muslims. The meeting was structured as a faith-based Learning Conversation. One of the aims was to translate the benefits of reconciliation efforts on the civil society level to Track-One negotiations. There was a clear recognition by the participants of two realities:

- Without reconciliation at the civil society and grass roots levels, the official peace negotiations may lack the proper larger context in which they can be successful.
- Effecting reconciliation on the civil society and grass roots levels may actually change the “facts on the ground” and create new possibilities in the peace negotiations.

Towards this end the working groups discussed ways that civil society could contribute to the peace process and how to mobilize it towards that end. There was also considerable discussion of how a unified Kashmiri voice could be developed to articulate the legitimate aspirations of the Kashmiri people in a manner that enable them to be

to foster the vision of faith-based reconciliation among Kashmiris for over five years and have achieved important milestones on both sides of the LoC. Besides their experience and commitment to building peace in Kashmir, their most outstanding quality, which has earned them respect and trust among Kashmiris, is the ability to build relationships with people on both sides of Kashmir. Above all, their heartfelt sympathy for Kashmiris has been critical.

heard, understood and respected in the peace negotiations. In a sense, the meeting itself was a microcosm of how to create a unified Kashmiri voice. The group unanimously produced a statement (see appendix) based on the recommendations of the working groups and represented a consensus of civil society leaders from all four regions and both sides of the Line of Control.

The bridge-building meeting served as a microcosm of how the principles, practices and sacred texts of the various religious traditions could form the theoretical framework and practical basis for effecting reconciliation in intractable identity-based conflicts that exceed the grasp of traditional diplomacy. An essential ingredient in ICRD's methodology of faith-based diplomacy is the prayer and fasting team. In the various religious traditions, prayer and fasting is a tangible way of demonstrating reliance on divine intervention in conflict situations. The presence of the prayer and fasting team also demonstrated to the participants that ICRD actually practices what it advocates.

Precisely, at the heart of faith-based reconciliation is the expectation of God's work in changing hearts. The conflict in Kashmir will not be resolved by third-party intervention, even by the best and the brightest. It will not be resolved by some brilliant proposal for a negotiated settlement. It will require changed hearts. People of faith understand this. During the very first seminar in Gulmarg in June 2001 there was a Kashmiri Muslim man whose brother had been killed in a militant clash. He himself had been shot in the face which required some nine separate surgeries to repair. In his heart he had made a vow to kill the man who had killed his brother. When he first arrived at the seminar, he felt challenged at the core of his being by the teaching on forgiveness. How could he possibly forgive the man who had killed his brother and caused him such suffering? However, during the Service of Reconciliation, God changed his heart to such an extent that he publicly forgave that man, and he, in turn, discovered that an enormous burden of anger, hatred and revenge was lifted from his shoulders.

During the fourth seminar in Jammu in January 2003 a Pandit leader stood up on the first day of the seminar and delivered an angry and strident diatribe against Kashmiri Muslims because of the suffering that he and his family had experienced in 1989 with the expulsion of Pandits from the Valley. A combination of the teaching, small group experience and personal diplomacy by Muslim team members led this same Pandit leader to stand up on the final morning of the seminar and apologize to Muslims for Pandit

insensitivity to Muslim suffering and extend forgiveness in light of Muslim repentance for these actions. His heart was changed!

CONCLUSION

The Kashmir situation deserves consistent and concerted engagement to gradually contain and ultimately eradicate political violence perpetrated by both the Indian state authorities and the militants. Helping Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris to build peace in Kashmir will enhance regional stability and help the fight against terrorism.

Contemporary definitions of peace processes show that sustainable peace can only be achieved by involving wide sections of society, thus broadening the public's stake in the peace process. Oftentimes, clandestine or closed-door peace talks transpire at the track one-level. After days of negotiations, the leaders emerge, victorious smiles and handshakes are exchanged, a document is signed, the outside world utters a breath of relief, and the matter is considered settled. The public masses of the now "peaceful" country watch in a daze of disbelief as they learn of the concessions their leaders have made which they, the constituency, will be obliged to fulfill. What is more, as in the case of the process leading to the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords, where foreign diplomats were "imported" to facilitate the brokering of peace, the very process of negotiations may appear to be an imposition of Western paradigms. Hence, the peace process is interpreted as yet another form of neo-colonialism that the public will be forced to accept and absorb. While the leadership is highly involved in the creation of shared space (sometimes having years of secret talks to adjust to the idea of cooperation with "the enemy"), the people are expected to shift instantaneously from a mentality of defensive victim to peace-loving neighbor.

Bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan on Kashmir—*Tashkant*, *Simla*, *Lahore*—all fell through mostly because of the absence of Kashmiris, who are the primary party to the conflict. Logically, any future agreement between the two governments will likely have the same fate. Not only were the Kashmiris not party to the agreements, their ability to have free and meaningful dialogue among themselves—both within each of the two regions and across the Line of Control—has been minimal. However, this time a strong and united voice is being raised by the Kashmiris, with the support of the international community, for the involvement of Kashmiris in the peace process and more importantly for an intra-Kashmiri dialogue. Thus there is greater need

to support and facilitate effective and consistent intra-Kashmiri dialogue at every level, which would enhance the capacity of Kashmiris and strengthening the peace process.

By enhancing the potential role of the Kashmiris from both sides of the LoC, in the incipient peace process between India and Pakistan, it is possible to build the capacity of political and civil society actors --enabling Kashmiris to increase their stake in the peace process. Building trust and relationships will help Kashmiris understand the conflict from a different angle—a problem solving approach of believing in dialogue and adopting non-violent means for the resolution of Kashmir conflict. In effect, it will transform their thinking about the conflict and make them part of the process rather than just passively vouching for minimalist political solutions to the Kashmir problem.

A multilevel approach is required to deal with the immediate as well as long term issues in Kashmir. In the short term the international community must maintain diplomatic pressure on both India and Pakistan to continue the ongoing dialogue for the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir conflict and also to include Kashmiris in this dialogue. More importantly, long term strategies of peace-building and reconciliation such as that initiated by the ICRD should be supported. These strategies should draw on the local religious and cultural concepts and practices of the local Kashmiri communities related to justice and the healing of the wounds of history. In other words, a peaceful resolution of the dispute will emerge when the political, social, and spiritual dynamics of the region are transformed through reconciliation based on religious and cultural concepts of justice among and between the affected parties, starting with the Kashmiris themselves.

On the whole, this coherent strategy would isolate militants by delegitimizing their methods and answering the grievances they purport to remedy. Only by displacing militant religious beliefs and by separating extremists from co-religionists who have not made up their minds about the appropriateness of violent response is the momentum of the ‘political violence’ or ‘terrorism’ likely to be slowed.

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APPENDIX A
JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE
FIRST KASHMIR BRIDGEBUILDING MEETING IN
KATHMANDU, NEPAL NOVEMBER 15, 2005

JOINT STATEMENT

We the members of civil society of the state of Jammu and Kashmir gathered in Kathmandu, Nepal on November 11-14th, 2005, under the auspices of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy based in Washington D.C. We come from both sides of the Line of Control and from regions of Azad Kashmir, Kashmir Valley, Jammu & Laddakh. We are people of faith. We are Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists who believe that faith-based reconciliation is a key to the peace process and to the future prosperity of the Kashmir region.

We are committed to a pluralistic vision of the community and the restoration of human values. As such, we believe that the return of Kashmiri Pandits and all displaced persons to their homeland is central to the peace and normalcy. Therefore, we urge both the governments and civil society to facilitate this process as a matter of great priority.

We are committed to an inclusive community and to demolish the walls of hostility that exist among the various identity-based groups. As such we express appreciation to the governments of Pakistan and India for creating the opening in the Line of Control. However, we encourage any means possible to allow the free flow of the Kashmiris so that there might be healing and restoration among us. We also deplore violence in any form from any side.

We are committed to the peace process between India and Pakistan, especially as it relates to Kashmir. As such, we see the need for a unified Kashmiri voice to emerge so that the legitimate aspirations of the people of the State of Jammu & Kashmir might be heard, understood, and be given proper respect by India and Pakistan. We also urge the members of civil society to take an active role in the peace process.

We are committed to social justice as a key foundation of Kashmir society. We are committed to sharing power and privilege among different identity based groups. As such we urge the governments to setup the mechanisms to facilitate the economic restitution and restoration of land and businesses to Kashmir Pandits and all other displaced persons.

We propose that the principles of Human Rights and the essential moral and ethical values of religions be made a standard part of all school curriculums and that security forces be trained in respectful treatment of citizens.

We are committed to a process of forgiveness among Kashmiri people as essential to creating a better future together. We are committed to healing the wounds of our history. Collectively we grieve the sale of Kashmir by the British in 1846 and ask them to apologize. We call for the establishment of a “Kashmir Truth & Reconciliation Commission” as a means of exposing human rights violations and other wrongdoings with an eye towards justice and healing rather than revenge.

We urge the international community to support the ongoing peace process between India and Pakistan. We urge the governments of India and Pakistan to involve all identity-based groups and regions in the dialogue and negotiations leading to the resolution of the Kashmir Conflict. We urge all Kashmiris regardless of their religious traditions to pray for peace and reconciliation in our land.

We depart from Kathmandu with a sense hope and joy at having been together from across the Line of Control and different regions of the State of Jammu & Kashmir. We believe that faith-based reconciliation in Jammu & Kashmir is an idea whose time has come.

(Signed by all of the seminar participants)

THE RETURN OF THE BLACK TURBAN: CAUSES OF THE TALIBAN RESURGENCE

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Immediately after the horrific acts of 9/11, the United States warned the Taliban, the ruling authority in Afghanistan, to hand over Osama Bin Laden or suffer the consequences. The Taliban's response was very clear: Osama is a Muslim who has fought in the Jihad against the Russians and to surrender him would violate our code of hospitality. Hence, on October 7th, 2001, the United States and the coalition forces started their offensive against the Taliban and their Al Qaeda guests. Their aim was to destroy Bin Laden's training camps and facilities, and to target the Taliban, with the presumed goal of destroying their morale and effecting their disintegration. This strategy was effective in destroying the camps where thousands of Jihadists were trained. However, large numbers of the Al Qaeda group fled to neighboring Pakistan and Iran. The few battles that took place were between the Allied Forces, accompanied by the various Afghan militias, and the hard-core extremists. The Taliban had dispersed to hideouts, villages, and residential areas where they were almost impossible to distinguish from the local population. Within weeks, major Afghan cities such as Mazar and Herat fell, leading to the subsequent surrender of the capital, Kabul, on November 13th.

Four years have passed since U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom toppled the brutal Taliban regime. While much work remains, the overall conditions of the Afghan people appear consistently improved, perhaps exceeding the conditions of the pre-war period two decades ago.¹³ Afghans generally believe that their country is moving in the right direction, as demonstrated by the return of more than three million refugees. The country currently enjoys an elected government, an enlightened and redefined constitution, and expanded educational opportunities that now include schooling for all children regardless of gender. Yet, future success for Afghanistan is far from assured. Security remains a major consideration in the daily lives of the average Afghan as the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Hizb I Islami and their sympathizers continue to actively regroup and undertake terrorist

¹³ Surveys conducted by Asia Foundation, IRI and ABC.

attacks throughout the south and the east of Afghanistan. Just in 2005, 85 American soldiers and over 1,400 individuals -- including NGO workers, religious leaders, international officers and government officials -- were killed. The goal of preventing the country from once again becoming a terrorist haven rests on a number of elements: whether the Afghan Security apparatus will be able to deal with the terrorist attacks as well as the booming drug trade that underpins its financial sources; the Coalition Forces' commitment and their ability to apply political means rather than heavy-handed military power; and the role of external actors, in particular Pakistan, which has had a history of interference in Afghan affairs. Finally, a consolidated and proactive legislative policy by the Afghan Parliament will act as both a preventative and prosecutorial strategy in relation to the broader struggle.

This paper is divided into three sections: First, it traces the Taliban movement from its inception to 9/11. Second, it assesses the various factors that have either directly or indirectly supported the recent resurgence of the Taliban. Third, it offers strategies that could improve the efficacy of our efforts in the battle against the Taliban.

HISTORICAL SETTING

The dominant factor in Afghanistan's recent history is continuous war since 1978.¹⁴ This cycle of violence can be categorized in four unique stages: first, the Soviet invasion and the Mujahedin resistance (1979 – 1989); second, the very destructive civil war amongst the Mujahedin (1989 – 1994); third, the marriage of convenience between the Taliban and the Salafi Jihadist group Al Qaeda, subsequently, leading to the 9/11 attacks (1994 – 2001); finally, the Taliban acting as terrorist/militant group against the Afghan Government and the Coalition forces (2002 --?)

In 1989, after a decade of war, the Soviet Union withdrew all of its troops, “condemning Afghanistan to a civil war that tore apart the nation's last remnants of religious, ethnic and political unity.”¹⁵ The subsequent culture of international neglect that Afghanistan experienced contributed to the nation's chaotic condition in the post-war

¹⁴ Larry Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban* (Seattle: Washington Press, 2001) p. 54

¹⁵ Martin Evans, *Afghanistan: A short history of its People and Politics* (United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 2002) pp. 238 --260

period. Instead of uniting themselves and striving towards the reconstruction of the country, the Mujahedeen -- who defeated the Soviets -- capitalized on this vacillating situation and engaged in armed conflict amongst themselves in competition for economic and social influence. The regrettable result was a period of immense social distress for the populace.

The Taliban, who drew much of their strength from the general disillusionment of the populace with the Mujahedeen, gained in popularity by presenting themselves as a viable and constructive political alternative; offering as an example their rapid restoration of security in the country's southern provinces.¹⁶ They were not, however, a new phenomenon in Afghanistan. Participation of Talibs and mullahs has been a constant feature of jihad against foreign invasion in Afghanistan for a hundred years. They have been a component of the religious establishment, but have always lived in the shadow of other military, political and economic groups. Mulla Shor Bazar, an Afghan fighter known for inflicting heavy losses on the British during the Third Anglo-Afghan war of 1919, was a Talib as were Mirwais Khan Hotaki and Mulla Mushki Alam, who fought against the British occupation of Afghanistan.¹⁷

During the Afghan-Soviet war and subsequently the war against the communist regime, the Talibs and the mullahs fought, not as an organized movement, but instead under the banner of a variety of Mujahedeen groups. The majority fought under Harakt-e-Inqilabi led by Maulawi Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi and Hizb Islami (Yunus Khalis). After the fall of Kabul in 1992 and the establishment of a new government by Mujahedeen leaders, most of the Talibs and mullahs went back to their madrasahs to continue their study and teaching.

¹⁶ "Taliban" is derived from Arabic word Talib which means a student or one who seeks. In Arabic, Taliban means two students. The word Talib in Arabic is not used strictly for religious students. In fact, it is used for students at all levels including those who study in university. In Pushto and Dari (Farsi), two of official Afghan languages, Taliban is a plural form of Talib. It strictly refers to those who seek religious (Islam) scholarship in traditional circles of learning in deeni madaris (Islamic schools/madrasah), part-time or full-time. The students in theological and Islamic studies in modern universities are not called Talib.

¹⁷ Kawun Kakar, *An Introduction of the Taliban*, in *Institute of Afghan Studies*, 2000, available at http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/AFGHAN%20CONFLICT/TALIBAN/intro_kakar.htm (21 June 2004).

When the Taliban re-appeared as an organized military force, the majority of the Afghans were prepared to support them and their broad objectives for Afghanistan:¹⁸

1. An end the conflict between rival mujahedeen groups that continued to ravage the country and cause lawlessness;
2. Uniting the people under one central government;
3. Restoration of peace and security for the population and protection of their rights and liberties;
4. An end to the corruption by various parties and establishment of a credible and accountable government;
5. Disarming the population of the multitude of weapons that were abundance after the Afghan-Soviet War;
6. Enforcement of the shariah, establishment of an Islamic state, and preservation of the Islamic character of Afghanistan;
7. Rebuilding war torn Afghanistan.

Drawing from popular sentiment, the Interior Ministry of Pakistan lead by Nasrullah Babar decided to promote the Taliban and provide it assistance. Pakistan has traditionally supported various Afghan Mujahedeen groups in pursuit of their own interests. During the resistance against the Soviets, the resources and funds coming from the United States and Saudi Arabia were channeled through the Pakistani intelligence

¹⁸ See Transcript of speech by Sayyid Rahmatullah Hashemi, roving ambassador of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, available at http://sydney.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=8468 (21 June 2004); Facts and realities under Taleban Administration, available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20010216174708/www.taleban.com/taleb.htm> (21 June 2004); Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords*, p. 22; Afghanistan Atlas Project, in University of Nebraska at Omaha, available at http://www.unomaha.edu/afghanistan_atlas/talhist.html (21 June 2004); Michael Rubin, *Who Is Responsible For The Taliban?*, in *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol. 6, no. 1, Mar 2002, available at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue1/jv6n1a1.html> (21 June 2004); Kawun Kakar, *An Introduction of the Taliban*, in *Institute of Afghan Studies*, available at http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/AFGHAN%20CONFLICT/TALIBAN/intro_kakar.htm (21 June 2004); see *Interview with Abu Abdul Aziz Al-Afghani*, in *Nidau'ul Islam*, 18th issue, April-May 1997, available at <http://www.islam.org.au/articles/18/taliban1.htm> (21 June 2004); Tony Karon, *The Taliban and Afghanistan*, in *Time.com*, available at <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,175372,00.html> (21 June 2004); U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), cable, *Meeting with the Taliban in Kandahar: more questions than answers*, 15 February 1995, document no. (declassified) 1995ISLAMA01686, available at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal7.pdf> (9 July 2004).

establishment – the ISI – which nurtured groups that were pro Pakistan and extremist in their outlook. In the case of the Taliban, Pakistan sought political guarantees and found them in a group which appeared to seek stability, and thus could provide secure conditions for trade with newly independent states of the former Soviet Union that lay just north of the Afghan border. Another element behind the Taliban emergence was Jamiat I Ulema-Islam (JUI) led by Moulana Fazlur Rahman, an organization that was itself responsible for running many madrassas.¹⁹ Shortly after Pakistan began lending support, the Taliban forces that were advancing through Afghanistan suddenly were equipped with tanks, APCs, artillery and even aircraft. Their numbers rapidly expanded, and within a matter of six months, they had mobilized over 20,000 men. Most of these men were given permission to cross the border from Pakistan – in fact, many were Pakistani -- and their basic training took place in camps not only within Afghanistan but also on the Pakistani side of the border.

Financially, the Taliban were supported by many elements -- Saudi Arabia and other wealthy Arabs through out the Middle East, keen on seeing a doctrine similar to Wahabism spread across Central Asia, were major contributors to the cause as they. The Taliban also were able to generate funds from tolls on transport and the drug trade, the latter of which had started to generate major profits. Finally, Pakistan provided millions of dollars in aid and at times even paid the salaries of the government officials.²⁰

The role of Osama Bin Laden and his group deserves recognition because they did play a significant part in the maturation process of the Taliban. The international community, led by the United States and Britain, forced Sudan to expel Bin Laden as he was becoming a recognizable threat. As a result of the pressure, Bin Laden and his close circle of associates came back to Afghanistan where they already had an established infrastructure during the Jihad against the Russians. Taliban leader Mullah Omar welcomed them and praised Bin Laden for his contribution toward the Jihad – a deadly marriage of convenience had started.

¹⁹ Martin Evans, *Afghanistan: A short history of its People and Politics* (United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 2002) p. 255

²⁰ Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge Press, 2005) p. 194


Analyzing the details of the relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda is beyond the scope of this paper; but, in short, the Taliban provided security and sanctuary to Al Qaeda, enabling it to train thousands of recruits, establish a state of the art terrorist network and plann various operations including 9/11 from its territory. Al Qaeda's support, in turn, came in several forms: they provided much need resources; they trained Taliban fighters for the latter's fight against the opposition in the North; they mobilized the well trained 055 Brigade (a group of 500 to 1000 Arab fighters) for key battles; and most importantly, Al Qaeda ideologically influenced the Taliban leadership, which contributed to the latter's extreme vision.

By late 1997, the Taliban had imposed their ultra-purist vision of Islam on much of the country.²¹ Couples were stoned to death if caught in adultery; thousands of widows were banned from employment; girls were barred from schools and colleges; men were not allowed to shave or trim their beards; TV, music, soccer, and women wearing white socks were all banned. The Religious Police Force fervently enforced these edicts. As the societal and cultural restrictions expanded, the support the Taliban once enjoyed evaporated and Afghans sought to remove their children from the country in order to evade their conscription into the front line action against the Northern Alliance. The vile treatment of the average Afghan continued until the attacks of 9/11.

STRUCTURE OF THE TALIBAN

At its strongest, the Taliban forces were never more than 25,000 to 30,000 men. During the early phases of the movement, the Taliban command structure was as follows:

²¹ Peter L. Bergen, *Holly War, INC.* (New York: Touchstone Press, 2002) P. 158



1. Amir UI Mumminin (Commander of the Faithful)

This was the title given to Mullah Omar as the Head of State of Afghanistan and the Supreme Leader of the Taliban.

2. Supreme Shura:

The highest decision making body of the Taliban, this organization was based in Kandahar. It functioned as interim ruling council. The original Shura was made of 10 members but military commanders, tribal leaders, elders and the Ulama also took part in Shura meetings. The decision-making process remained loose and amorphous with as many as 50 people often taking part. Mullah Omar's friends and colleagues dominated the Shura.

3. Military Shura:

The Military Shura was a loose-knit body that planned strategy and implemented tactical decisions; however, it appears to have had no strategic decision-making or enforcement authority. Military strategy, all key appointments, and the allocation of funds were decided upon by Mullah Omar.

4. Kabul Shura:

The Kabul Shura dealt with the day-to-day operation of the government, the city of Kabul and the Kabul front against the Northern Alliance. Important issues were conveyed to the Supreme Shura for decision-making.

With time, the leadership became more centralized and Mullah Omar took charge of issuing orders. He have four sets of very close advisors: the very few conservative Afghan clerics that shared his view, Bin Laden and his top leadership, the Pakistani

intelligence service who served a military advisory role, and the religious body led by Moulana Fazul Rahman and Nizamudin Shamzi.

The military campaign against the Taliban, led by U.S. general Tommy Franks, was initially dubbed “Operation Infinite Justice” but quickly renamed “Operation Enduring Freedom,” due to perceived religious connotations of the former. The overwhelming mobile firepower of the U.S. forces achieved two very important objectives. First, they killed or captured a significant percent of the Taliban leadership from the Supreme Shura, Military Shura and the Kabul Shura. The detainees were transferred to Bagram Air Base and the Guantanamo Naval Base. As the battle continued, the Taliban began losing the ability to coordinate their operations, and their morale sank. The remainder of the leadership were either on the run or were hiding in neighboring countries. Mullah Omar himself, after hearing of the devastation brought upon the others, left his strong hold of Kandahar and still remains at large. The leadership of the Taliban was in disarray and the governing structure vanished.

The second achievement of the U.S.-led invasion was the destruction of the terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan. The Taliban and Al Qaeda had established many terrorist camps with very specific objectives in mind. Training infrastructure has always been an essential ingredient of terrorist organizations, providing their cadres with the capability for armament use and the indoctrination vital to sustaining the ideology that drives the groups’ members to action.²² One of the most important camps was the Darunta Complex, which was located about eight miles from the eastern city of Jalalabad. Inside this complex were four sub-camps: Abu Khabab camp, where intelligence sources say chemicals and explosives were stored and terrorists were trained in how best to use them to produce the most casualties; Assadalah Abdul Rahman camp, operated by the son of blind cleric Omar Abdel Rahman (currently in jail in the U.S. for plotting to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993) and Hizbi Islami Camp, operated by a group of Pakistani extremists fighting in Kashmir; and, lastly, the Taliban Camp, where religious militia were trained and indoctrinated to fight the Northern Alliance. The combination of Tomahawk cruise missiles, 15,000-pound “daisy cutter” bombs, and AC-130 gunships

²² In fact, religious indoctrination was considered far more important than battlefield or combat training. Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, (Melbourne, Scribe Publications, 2002) p.73

caused these “terrorist universities” evaporate. Like Darunta, all other camps and facilities used by Al Qaeda and Taliban to recruit and train future fighters were destroyed.

Many experts allege that because of mistakes made by the U.S. military, Taliban fighters and Al Qaeda members were able to escape and establish sanctuaries in major Pakistani cities and among tribal protectors along the Pakistan – Afghanistan frontier. Though the Taliban stayed quiet for some time as they recovered from their losses, the group gradually began to resume cross-border attacks on NGO workers and civil servants. Today, the Taliban acts as a terrorist group and has gained significant momentum by attacking US convoys and Afghan military personnel. It is clearly a much more sophisticated group than it once was and there are several factors that have led to its re-emergence.

Factor 1: A New Lethal Strategy

Taliban’s new lethal strategy is a culmination of three factors: 1) the reinstatement of financial, military training, weapon support from combination of entities and individuals; 2) the return of foreign fighters; and 3) the reinstatement of financial support through the influx of the lucrative narcotics trade.

Today, the Taliban operates as a number of scattered, decentralized terrorist cells that containing anywhere from 5 to 25 men, and regularly crossing the border from their sanctuaries to attack their targets in Afghanistan. The new outlook has allowed the Taliban to operate in a mobile manner and, at times, even capture small districts, illustrating their organizational abilities.

In the face of the early setbacks in their military operations against the coalition forces, the Taliban realized that they could not face the US military “force on force.” They shifted their strategy to a strategic defensive posture by attacking “soft targets”, such as aid workers, government employees, and civilians. They also targeted Afghans that openly criticized their actions and supported the recently installed government of President Hamed Karzai. The new strategy was successful. The UN and major international organizations -- including the International Committee of the Red Cross -- scaled back their operations in the south and southeast, depriving approximately one-third of the population of much-needed development assistance. Security concerns also led the Noble Peace Prize-winning Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) to

abandon their mission even though they had been in Afghanistan for over two decades.²³ With the retreat of these vital social services, the citizens of the south and southeast grew dissatisfied with the new administration -- specifically because their basic needs, such as essential healthcare, were not being met.

After 9/11 the pressure from the United States forced many of the actors who were proponents and supporters of the Taliban to abandon their ties and support the war on terror instead. Over time, however, the Taliban regained military training, financial support and weapons from individuals and entities that once supported them and now wanted to re-exert their influence in the region by destabilizing the country. The goal of the Taliban is to overthrow the perceived occupation and revert the government to their original ruling objectives. With time, many of the restrictions that prevented foreign individuals and entities from engaging in ties with the Taliban softened, thus providing these groups room to operate. Afghan intelligence believes that since 2004 several camps have been established in Pakistan just across the Afghan border, where many Taliban have been trained and taught insurgency skills.²⁴

Al Qaeda also became active in the region, and has appointed two of its most able commanders to Afghanistan. Specifically, Khalid Habib, a Moroccan who led a group of foreign fighters and fought with the Taliban, has been placed in charge of the southeastern part of Afghanistan; while Abd al Hadi Iraqi, a respected commander who fought against the Northern Alliance in Takhar province, has been put in charge of the southwestern provinces. These commanders aim to demonstrate the utter failure of the United States' campaign in Afghanistan, beginning with the southeastern and southwestern areas, and subsequently moving outward from these pockets of Al Qaeda success. An Afghan source close to the Taliban has said, "the Taliban have divided up into groups... and in each unit there is a member of al Qaeda from Pakistan or an Arab, who teaches them tactics developed in Iraq."²⁵ Many seem to believe that members of the Taliban have gone to Iraq to train with the insurgency and that many of these fighters

²³ Cheryl Benard, *Afghanistan Without Doctors*: see RAND commentary <http://www.rand.org/commentary/081204WSJ.html>

²⁴ Author's interviews with several Afghan intelligence personnel, September 2005

²⁵ Mitchell Prothero, *Taliban regroup to fight U.S. troops*, Washington Times, September 3, 2005

have come back to Afghanistan to assist Taliban against the US led coalition.²⁶ Strengthened by these actions, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have initiated an offensive campaign, attacking US bases and ambushing American convoys and patrols as well as Afghan National forces that were working with the coalition. The transfer of knowledge from Iraq and the influx of resources and training from the outside have provided new levels of sophistication to the Taliban's operational and planning capabilities.

Taliban tactics have also improved as a result of its interaction with Al Qaeda. As a military unit, the Taliban was not very advanced in their knowledge and capabilities early in the conflict. Together with the foreign fighters, however, the Taliban lately have been responsible for conducting several of the most difficult types of operations. First, their improvised explosive devises (IEDs) are very powerful and can destroy the most protected tanks, HWWMV, and jeeps. The Taliban's level of sophistication allows its fighters to trigger their IEDs at the time of their choosing to hit a particular target. As a result, protecting their troops against the IEDs is becoming the biggest challenge to the coalition forces.

Second, the Taliban are carrying out beheadings similar manner as the ones in Iraq. Thus far, there have been several cases. Most recently, Ramankutty Maniyappan, a driver who worked for the Indian State-run Border Roads Organization was kidnapped and later beheaded by the Taliban. Mr. Maniyappan's organization was warned by the Taliban to leave the country and stop the road project with which they were assisting. The Indian government did not comply and afterwards called the killing "inhuman and barbaric"²⁷

Third, the Taliban and their foreign fighters have introduced a new arsenal into their protracted war -- suicide bombing²⁸. The concept of suicide bombing is new to

²⁶ Authors interview with the Afghan Intelligence officers September 2005

²⁷ Body of a kidnapped Indian man has been found in Southern Afghanistan, BBC News Service, 23 November, 2005

²⁸ Among the most noteworthy and destructive suicide bombings that took place since its inception follow:

September 2005 – 12 killed army base in Kabul

June 2005 - 20 killed in Kandahar mosque

May 2005 - 3 killed in Kabul internet cafe

October 2004 - 3 killed in Kabul shopping centre

August 2004 - 10 US security contractors killed in Kabul

Afghanistan, but it has caught on quickly. Many Afghans allege that suicide attacks are carried out by foreign fighters because the phenomenon is alien to the Afghan culture and the brand of Islam that they practice. Before the Taliban spokesperson, Mullah Latifullah Hakimi, was arrested by the Pakistani authorities, he warned that 45 more suicide attackers were awaiting orders to strike. His prediction proved accurate as there were eight suicide attacks in the months of October and November alone, including one in the heart of Kabul in front of the army training center that killed over nine people while injuring hundreds.

The Taliban's Media Strategy

While the Taliban were in power, they were considered a very conservative entity because they banned music, television, and even photography. Countless individuals were beaten and arrested for taking pictures or even just possessing a camera. Today, those same Taliban are utilizing advanced technology in order to promote their ideological goals. The Taliban have established a media committee that is responsible for propaganda and production of their version of the news. They are constantly in touch with major radio stations like the BBC and others in order to provide news updates. One of the Taliban commanders, Mullah Osmani, even gave a television interview to the privately-funded Pakistani television network, GEO, where he praised his leader Mullah Omar and the success of the Taliban movement. Another commander of the Taliban, Ismail, gave two interviews to NBC News describing the lethal attack that took the lives of several Navy Seals.²⁹ The Taliban's most surprising action came when they joined the information super-highway and began posting their videos and magazines online. Today, many of their fancy videos, depicting their battles against the coalition forces, can be seen over the thousands of Jihadist websites. There are many websites, list servers and chat rooms that constantly encourage Muslims to join the Taliban in their battle against the infidel.³⁰ The Taliban's engagement with the various media channels has four main objectives: propaganda, recruitment, indoctrination, and psychological warfare.

²⁹ An interview with a Taliban commander -- accessed on:

<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10619502/>

³⁰ Addresses of some websites that encourage support for the Taliban:

<http://www.tawhed.ws/c?i=41>; <http://www.burks.de/alansar.htm>; <http://alsarya333.cjb.net/>;
<http://www.mobile4trad.com/>; <http://alsaha.fares.net/sahat?128@206.6FrjpVU6HyF.2@.1dd6f597>;

The Taliban preach a message similar to that of Osama Bin Laden: Islam is under attack, and it is the duty of all Muslims to defend the lands of Islam. In a very recent Taliban video entitled 'War of the Oppressed,' a Taliban member refers to the various places where Muslims are suffering and under duress by saying "Look at our Muslim brothers that are suffering in Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir and Chechnya from the hands of the infidels."³¹

Narcotics

In 2004, cultivation of the opium poppy had more than tripled to 510,000 acres, which made Afghanistan the source of ninety-percent of world's opium. The Presidential In a report to the U.S. Congress, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, estimated "Afghanistan's current annual opium production at 5,445 tons, some 17 times more than second-place Myanmar."³² While most of the drugs may end up as heroin sold on the streets of Europe and Russia, their sale "supports terrorist groups," as a top UN official recently said.³³ Some estimate the annual revenue from the Afghan drug industry to be worth 2.6 billion US dollars, and the Taliban clearly has enjoyed its share of the profits. Afghan government reports have shown that the Taliban have used the funds generated from the drugs to finance recruitment and weapons procurement.

The link between narcotics and terrorism is not without precedent. For decades, leftist insurgent groups in Colombia, principally the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and their right-wing paramilitary opponents have been financed largely by that country's cocaine trade.

Until recently, the United States paid scant attention to the drug issue in Afghanistan. Engaged in its own battle with the Taliban, the U.S. had transferred responsibility for the issue to the British, who had, at best, minimally sufficient

<http://www.alsunnah.info/>

³¹ War of the Oppressed, translation from Pashto to English by the author. (Downloaded from the net)

³² Robert Longely, *Afghanistan On Verge of Becoming a 'Narcotics State*, March 2005 accessed on <http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/defenseandsecurity/a/afghandrugstate.htm>

³³ Paul Watson, *AFGHANISTAN: A HARVEST OF DESPAIR*. The Los Angeles Times, May 29, 2005 accessed on <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-drugs29may29,0,3324290.story?coll=la-home-headlines>

experience in this area. Only in 2005, with the backing of the Department of Defense, did the State Department develop a five-point plan designed to promote alternative crops for poppy farmers, enhance efforts at crop eradication, and improve detection and destruction of heroin labs and storage facilities. Both the Bush administration and the U.S. Congress supported the plan, authorizing \$780 million dollars to implement and enforce it. The Afghan government has also undertaken major initiatives, such as establishing a Counter Narcotics Ministry and a Counter Narcotics police force to deal with the nexus of the Taliban and drugs.³⁴

NEW PLAYERS HAVE EMERGED WITH NEW LINKS

Although both the US and Afghan government agree on the notion that narcotics have a positive correlation with the growth of terrorist activity. The actual structure of this connection and its internal mechanisms have not been clearly mapped out yet. As a result, severing this relationship has proven to be an arduous task especially as the Taliban gains stronger control over drug infested areas in the south.

Factor 2: Afghan Security Institutions

Before the formation of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) in December 2001, most Afghan State institutions had been paralyzed by two decades of brutal war. While state bureaucracy may have existed throughout these years, it was barely functional. The problem was further exacerbated by the lack of qualified Afghans, most of whom had migrated to the West or the neighboring countries. According to the United Nations, over one-fifth of Afghanistan's 25 million population became refugees during the conflict years.

So, when the AIA was given its six-month mandate to govern, it basically inherited institutions that had no capability to execute reforms. The massive "brain drain" that faced the AIA further increased the challenge of state building. The Bonn Agreement signed between the Afghan government and the United Nations called upon the Security Council to deploy an international force to Kabul and eventually to other

³⁴ Hekmat Karzai, *Afghanistan's War on Narcotics*, accessed on <http://e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allArticles/51A627F618D0DBF7872570130071B63D?OpenDocument> on the Afghan Government's policy and actions.

areas.³⁵ It was also decided that the international community would help the Afghans establish new security forces. These forces would consist of an army under the Ministry of Defense, a police force under the Ministry of Interior and an intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), which would be an independent body reporting directly to the President. In early 2002, most of these institutions barely existed or were in the early stages of being established. Therefore, they did not have the ability to execute what they were tasked to enforce. As a result, when the insurgency gained momentum, these security forces were minimally effective at best.

Afghan National Army (ANA)

Throughout Afghan history, the ANA has been the backbone of Afghan security. Although generally loyal to the government, its operations have dealt mainly with revolts and major internal crises. Since its inception in the early 1900s, the ANA was considered a valued national institution. In 1992, when the Mujahedin took over Kabul, their first move was to dismantle the ANA in favor of private militias. The Mujahedin were under the impression that their forces could fill the vacuum of state power, but that turned out not to be the case. Instead of providing security to the Afghans, the various militias fell into fighting among themselves, reducing many cities to ruins.

The new ANA is being trained by the US military with the help of the UK and France. It started slowly due to recruitment challenges but has now reached over 27, 000 soldiers and is steadily growing. During its early training, the ANA was deployed full-time only to the Central Garrison in Kabul, with mobile units occasionally venturing into the provinces for short visits. But in response to recruitment problems and serious Taliban attacks, that limited strategy changed. The ANA now has been permanently deployed to four major regional military garrisons where they work to recruit new soldiers and gain a foothold against the Taliban. On a routine basis, the ANA is embedded with the Coalition Forces as they engage the enemy. In this way, the ANA is gaining valuable operational experience that will contribute to its ability to deal effectively with counterinsurgency in the future.

³⁵ For complete analysis of the Bonn Agreement, see:
<http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm>

Afghan National Police (ANP)

The concept of policing is still new to most parts of Afghanistan as villages, where most of Afghanistan's population lived, have traditionally provided their own security. If and when there was a conflict, the village leadership resolved it through the local mechanism of the Shura (Council). In some cases, the tribal elders established a system where the Pashtonwali code of honor was used. There was no such thing as local or community policing.

Germany has taken over the job of training the Afghan National Police (ANP) with the support of many coalition partners including the United States. They have established eight different regional centers where future officers from specific provinces and districts are recruited. The mutual efforts of Germany, the United States, and others have trained over 50,000 police officers, who are currently engaged in efforts to stabilize the country. The training provided to the police officers spans several weeks in duration, but does not offer the wide ranging skills to effectively diffuse the threat posed by insurgent and criminal groups. Thus far, ANP has been deployed in a variety of operations including: ensuring against attack and disruption of landmark occasions such as Presidential and Parliamentary elections, operating in provinces where warlords are in conflict with each other, and engaging the Taliban when they attempt to attack and hold government check points.

National Directorate of Security (NDS)

Afghanistan's intelligence service -- Khotwali -- was given a new name and a new outlook by the KGB in 1970's. During the communist era, the most ruthless members of the security forces were appointed to KHAD and they were responsible for killing over 200,000 Afghans during the time of the Russian occupation. In the late 1990's, the Mujahedin took over the intelligence service but were not able to establish any significant reform. After the fall of the Taliban, the U.S., with the support of its Central Intelligence Agency, embarked on establishing a professional intelligence service. Most of the top leadership were removed and replaced with new cadres who were politically neutral. President Karzai appointed a new NDS director who has also introduced new personnel and reforms.

The most important change that has yet to occur in Afghan intelligence is the shift in thinking from internal to external security. The KGB trained the Afghan intelligence service to spy on the country's politicians, activists, and opposition groups. But at present, the immediate threat Afghanistan faces is from terrorist groups like the Taliban and Al Qaeda, who are constantly planning and carrying out new attacks. Another eminent threat is the drug lords who are generating financial support for the terrorists

The terrorist networks that have been established throughout the years in the cities and rural areas by members of the various groups have not been infiltrated by the NDS. For example, a recent suicide attack on a mosque that took place on June 1, 2005 killed over 19 people and injured more than 50. Prior to the attack, there was intelligence that foreign fighters had entered the southern city of Kandahar; unfortunately, the human intelligence (HUMINT) was not sufficiently developed to identify the attackers and their affiliates or detect specific targets. The terrorist was reported to be of Arab origin, but local support and assistance to the bomber in target identification and location was provided by the local Taliban network. The "handler" of the terrorist was never brought to justice.

Factor 3: Lack of Cultural and Environmental Understanding on the part of the Foreign Troops

On October 1st, 2005, Stephen Dupont, a cameraman and freelance journalist shot the following footage while he was embedded with the Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade: five U.S. soldiers in light-colored military fatigues standing near a bonfire in which two Taliban bodies lay burning side-by side. This incident, which took place in the southern part of the country, raised countless complaints about the soldiers' behavior in light of the Islamic prohibition of cremation. Many Afghans wanted to punish the soldiers for their carelessness; after an investigation, the soldiers involved were given reprimands but did not face prosecution. The investigation's report said the incident was not criminal, but illustrated poor judgment and a lack of knowledge of Afghan culture. The Afghan government stated that the U.S. military has been 'very lenient' in punishing American soldiers for burning the bodies. "The burning of the bodies is against our Islamic and Afghan traditions. It is totally unacceptable and it should not be repeated by any means

under any circumstances again.”³⁶ Afghan religious leaders also criticized the findings. "These soldiers should be severely punished," said Khair Mohammed, a senior cleric in Kandahar. "Foreign soldiers in Afghanistan must respect our religion. If they continue to do things like this, every Muslim will be against them." In fact, local popular opinion has swayed as a result of this and other such instances. "Continued violation of human rights by US military in Afghanistan would change the minds of Afghans in favor of Taliban as they did not expect rights violation from the US military when they respect them as their liberators," an Afghan tribal leader stated. "It took the Russians 10 years, 120,000 soldiers, and they still were not able to dominate us but we are working with the Americans who are still not respecting our culture," another Afghan villager noted.

Many experts agree that when security forces react with extreme measures, their actions inject political oxygen to the terrorist campaigns is. The case of Afghanistan reinforces this notion. A recent survey conducted by an American academic states that, "the number of Afghan civilians killed by US bombs has surpassed the death toll of the 11 September attacks."³⁷ Nearly 3,800 Afghans civilians have died since the conflict started. Targets have been clinics, wedding parties, and groups of tribal elders traveling to attend official business.³⁸ In addition, "U.S. soldiers routinely conduct search operations without the permission of the village elders and they further lose our good will."³⁹ There have also been countless cases in which male soldiers have entered houses and searched women whose male relatives were not present.

There are reports indicating that at least two Afghans have died at the US military detention center in Bagram Air Base and several others have been beaten and tortured. Many Afghans do not expect such behavior from a US military that was responsible for putting an end to the brutal regime of the Taliban. "The reason why US military was so successful during its battles with the Taliban and Al Qaeda (Operation Enduring

³⁶ Afghan Government: U.S. 'Very Lenient' By DANIEL COONEY, Associated Press Writer Mon Nov 28, 2005

³⁷ Report by University of New Hampshire Professor Marc Herold: accessed on, http://www.cursor.org/stories/civilian_deaths.htm#1

³⁸ For further incidents and attacks see: Kathy Gannon, *I is for Infidel: From holy war to holy terror* (New York: Perseus Books, 2005) pp. 114 -- 125

³⁹ Author's interview with village elder in Kandahar, September, 2005

Freedom) was due in great part to the fact that Afghans wanted them to succeed and we supported them in every way possible.”⁴⁰

The Taliban and its radical elements have constantly capitalized on such incidents as the “burning bodies,” torturing of prisoners, and general cultural unawareness to exploit the situation for their own propaganda in order to mobilize local support. Taliban spokesmen have stated on numerous occasions that the “U.S. military powers do not value Afghan life.” The Central Government of Afghanistan has responded by stating that US troops in Afghanistan should respect Afghan culture and that those who violate the culture should be punished. Dealing with the Taliban will require more than just military measures on the part of the soldiers – social, economic and political measures have to be part of a broader approach. The wisest thing the U.S. forces and Afghan soldiers can do is to apply minimum force and “avoid a firepower heavy operational strategy that is likely to cause significant civilian casualties, despite the ‘smartness’ of one’s high-technology.”⁴¹

Factor 4: The Role of Pakistan

President George W. Bush has constantly reiterated one of the major success stories in the “War on Terror;” “we have captured and killed over seventy percent of Al Qaeda’s leadership.” It is actually with the support of General Pervez Musharaf, President of Pakistan, and his Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) that individuals like Khalid Shiekh Mohammed, Abu Faraj Al Libby and Abu Zubideh were apprehended within major Pakistani cities. Many would argue that Pakistan is an invincible ally in the “War on Terror.” Yet, others contend that, “aid has been frustratingly selective.”⁴² Since March of 2005, the Taliban have gathered momentum and are attacking with sophisticated weapons in several regions of Afghanistan that border Pakistan. As a result, many American soldiers and hundreds of Afghans have been killed. Most Afghan and even Pakistani politicians are convinced that the infiltrators are, “coming from Pakistani

⁴⁰ Ibid.,

⁴¹ Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna, *Coping with Asymmetric threats the ‘Propaganda-Minded Way: Lessons from 1950s Malaya*, speech in a conference title, “coping with terrorism”, August 6, 2005

⁴² *Afghanistan's Forgotten War*, New York Times, Editorial. August 5, 2005 accessed on <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/05/opinion/05fri1.html>

training camps.”⁴³ One of the most respected Pakistani journalists recently reported that “at least some training camps that were closed on Musharraf’s orders have been reopened.”⁴⁴

An Afghan political activist once described the reason why certain actors in Pakistan have gone back to their old policy of destabilizing Afghanistan:

Most importantly, since the ‘War on Terror’ has started, Western countries have forgiven most of Pakistan’s debt; Washington has provided lavish foreign aid - \$3 billion dollars, along with new weapon systems and intelligence equipment. Accordingly, why should they stop putting some logs on the fire that keeps the war going? Various government officials know that as soon as the ‘War on Terror’ is over, the U.S. will abandon them for a strategic partnership with India – Pakistan’s arch rival – to offset China’s ever growing influence in the region.

Factor 5: Slow pace of Development

After the 9/11 attacks, Afghanistan became the main focus of the international community once again. Almost everyone felt sympathetic to the Afghan nation that had suffered three decades of war and destruction. The international community expressed high expectations for the Afghans themselves.. The UN had estimated that a minimum of \$10 billion was needed over five years, with \$15 billion needed over a decade, while Afghan officials had put the figure at between \$25 and \$35 billion over a decade. However, the International Conference on Reconstruction Aid for Afghanistan, held in Tokyo on January 21st and 22nd of 2002 ended with just \$US4.5 billion in grants and loans being pledged toward rebuilding the war-ravaged country.⁴⁵ The rebuilding funds

⁴³ Maulana Fazlur Rehman, chief of his own faction of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and leader of the opposition in the National Assembly mentioned that Pakistan is sending infiltrators to Afghanistan. Ahmad Rahid, *Musharraf’s double game unravels*, International Herald Tribune 08/10/2005 accessed on <http://e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/146244C004F030BC8725705900540148?OpenDocument>

⁴⁴ Paul Watson, *Pakistan Connection Seen in Taliban’s New Tactics*, Los Angeles Times, July 28, 2005

⁴⁵ For details on the Tokyo conference, refer to: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/

that were mostly dispersed through the international organizations and the NGO community (comprised of over 3,000 organizations). The decision not to allocate funds to the Central Government but rather to invigorate parallel institutions that provide social services “undermines the goal of state building and erecting institutions of governance,” according to Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, former Minister of Finance. Many Afghans became disappointed with the reconstruction efforts and believed “the money goes to Westerners [working for nongovernmental organizations and aid groups] and is taken out of this country... the Afghans are still poor and jobless.”⁴⁶ Furthermore, the NGO efforts are mostly focused in and around Kabul. Coordination of services provided by the NGO community has also posed a challenge in that the goals of the NGO community are not defined nor are they required to work in consultation with the strategic national vision of the Central Government. The lack of progress in certain segments of the population, coupled with the constant propaganda that “the new government is a slave to America,” has fueled resentments and drawn a small segment of the population to sympathize with the Taliban.

RECOMMENDATIONS

According to a well known proverb, success has many fathers whereas failure is an orphan. While this proverb may be true in other element of life, it does not apply to terrorism or insurgency because volumes and volumes have been written on failed counter terrorism/insurgencies -- from France’s efforts in Algeria to the United States in Vietnam. Conventional wisdom would argue that experts would have learned from the errors of the past, especially realizing that there has never been a purely military solution to terrorism. But this is not the case. One might almost apply Hegel’s words: the only thing one can learn from history is that people do not learn from it.⁴⁷

General Frank Kitson, author of such classic texts such as ‘Low Intensity Operations,’ states that, in dealing with low intensity operations, we have to use political,

⁴⁶ Prothero, *Taliban regroupes to fight U.S. troops*

⁴⁷ Martin Van Creveld, *On Counterinsurgency* in Rohan Gunaratna (edited) *Combating Terrorism* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005) p. 294

social, economic and military measures.⁴⁸ The situation in Afghanistan requires a similar approach.

POLITICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Strengthening Peace Program (Takhim-E Solh):

- In April of 2003, President Hamed Karzai, in a speech to religious scholars, stated that “a clear line has to be drawn between the ordinary Taliban who are real and honest sons of this country and those who still use the Taliban cover to disturb peace and security in the country. No one has the right to harass/persecute any one under the name of Talib/Taliban anymore,”⁴⁹ The President launched his reconciliation policy, “designed to weaken the resolve of the Taliban by breaking their ranks into good and bad Talibs.”⁵⁰ Soon thereafter, an independent commission “Afghanistan's Peace and Reconciliation Commission” was established and chaired by a former President and a respected religious scholar, Sebaghatullah Mojadeddi. The commission offered amnesty to all who would “lay down their weapons, accept Afghanistan's new constitution, and obey the decrees of Karzai's government.”⁵¹ High-level Taliban and individuals accused of war crimes were deliberately excluded from the program. The commission did have a positive effect as many Taliban commanders accepted the amnesty and joined the government. It also created a rift between the conservatives and the moderates -- permitting the moderates to take more of a political approach rather than resorting to violence. In the Parliamentary elections held on 18th of

⁴⁸ General Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion Insurgency & Peacekeeping* (Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers, First Indian Edition 1992)

⁴⁹ Amin Tarzi, *Afghanistan: Is Reconciliation With The Neo-Taliban Working?* Accessed on <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/06/514ec97a-7727-4327-91db-99894c9e0505.html>

⁵⁰ Ibid.,

⁵¹ Ron Synovitz, *Karzai Confirms Amnesty Offer Is For All Willing Afghans*, accessed on <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticleprint/2005/05/7b099d96-969a-4c2c-837e-f12bc916b9f2.html>

September 2005, for example, there were many moderate Taliban candidates who ran for seats in Parliament.

This was the first non-military measure taken directly against the Taliban, which had significant effect. The Taliban who were anxious to return to Afghanistan were given an opportunity to reclaim their lives. Many government reports indicate hard core Taliban preached that if “we go back to our lands and villages, we will be sent to Guantanamo and Bagram prisons.” Initiating such measures like ‘Strengthening Peace’ is an excellent illustration of how to engage terrorists and militants through political means rather than just militarily.

- Enact tougher laws against extremism: The absence of a consolidated legislative structure will continue to inhibit the process of counter terrorism/insurgency in a number of ways. The lack of clear legal strictures against the advent of violent extremism is vulnerable to exploitation. The command structures of all extremist networks consistently demonstrate their understanding of such limits and how they can be manipulated. Effective legal powers can, perhaps, highlight the Achilles' heel of extremism – the lack of deep political support for their agenda. This, in turn, may encourage extremist groups to reorient and reorganize, eliminating the need for the government to address them through coercive measures.
- Afghanistan's relationship with its neighbors is crucial to its long-term stability and as such the country must engage its neighbors in strong relationships, whether in commerce and trade or transfer of knowledge. Due to its landlocked status, Afghanistan must explore exploiting its foreign relationships beyond basic diplomatic ties with its neighbors.

Social Recommendations

- Build bridges with communities by establishing strong but informal networks with the communities that live along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Oftentimes, these communities provide sanctuaries to the Taliban who are on the run.
- Cultural mechanisms should be adopted to deal with terrorism in a way that the tribal leaders are organized into a structure that will work to further the long run

national interests of Afghanistan and desist from harboring, providing sanctuary for or supporting terrorists.

- Social work has to take place especially in areas that are poverty stricken in order to reduce the population's sympathy for the terrorist groups. The long-term goal should be to win the hearts and minds of the population by offering them opportunities for personal growth and to gain independence from the benefits that many terrorist groups may offer.

Educational Recommendations

- Foreign troops must be educated on the cultural norms, customs and traditions of the environment.⁵²
- Counter Ideological measures should be employed such as allowing religious clerics to initiate dialogue with militants as well as their sympathizers in order to dispel notions that terrorism (defined as killing innocents to advance a political agenda) is compatible with Islamic thought.

MILITARY RECOMMENDATIONS

Obviously, the first line of defense against the Taliban/Al Qaeda and their networks is the security services, both the coalition forces and the Afghan the police and the intelligence services. So far, they have found limited success but as they develop further knowledge and understanding of the threat, they will certainly be better prepared. The following steps will further increase their success:

- The military must stop using heavy-handed approaches. Instead, it must establish strong but informal networks with the communities that live along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- Police training, in particular, should be enhanced to better deal with terrorist attacks.

⁵² Interview with Dr. Gerard Chaliand – leading counterterrorism/counterinsurgency expert and author of *Guerrilla Anthologies*, September 2005, Singapore

- The Military must familiarize itself with the Taliban's Modus operandi and analyze their pattern of attacks.
- The police must improve their image by maintaining effective neutrality.
- Intelligence activities in major cities must be improved, in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the majority of the Taliban leadership reside and plan their operations.
- The military must refrain from engaging in corrupt activities– in so doing, they will increase social trust.
- Mechanisms must be created for sharing of intelligence/ideas with partners for regional cooperation.
- Similar mechanisms are needed for the transfer of operational knowledge and exchange of experts.

CONCLUSION

Looking at the experience of other states such as the US, United Kingdom, and many others, it does not really matter how strong or capable the government and security sector is – no government has been able to fully immunize itself against the terrorist attacks. For sure, Afghanistan will mirror this pattern. By drawing from demonstrated best practices, while incorporating issues of cultural and religious sensitivity, a rational middle way may be found whereby terrorist and militant activities can be minimized.

TERRORISM: THE CASE OF BANGLADESH
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INTRODUCTION

Bangladesh is probably passing through the most critical period in her history. The magnitude and spread of the crisis has been nearly overwhelming. This crisis emanates from acts of terrorism and the threat to the national security and integrity of the country that has been created by these acts.

The present situation, although overwhelming, has not been completely unanticipated. Some of the print media in Bangladesh have been clamouring about the existence of Islamic terror outfits in the north-western part of the country. The present coalition government, composed of Islamic parties, had been reluctant to accept this claim until 17 August 2005. On that fateful day, Bangladesh's name was recorded in the Guinness Book of World Records with the explosion of nearly 500 bombs at locations scattered throughout the country. These bombs were placed in important government installations like court buildings, secretariats, police headquarters etc. One noticeable aspect of this incident is that the foreign missions, offices, and staffs of international organisations were not targeted or attacked. Considering the magnitude and spatial spread of the action, the casualty figure was amazingly low. Only two people were killed and nearly 100 were injured.

The next round of attacks, on 3 October 2005, targeted court houses and lawyers in three districts: Chandpur, Laxmipur and Chittagong. These blasts killed two people and injured 38 others. In both the 17 August and 03 October incidents, printed leaflets of Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) were found. Various intelligence and media sources had also indicated that JMB was responsible for the attacks.

The terror attacks have intensified to their highest levels yet with suicide bombings that killed two senior assistant judges and wounded three people on November 14, 2005. Since then, suicide bombings have taken place in many other places across the country.

The change in direction of JMB's actions from a highly coordinated but relatively non-lethal countrywide bombing on 17 August 2005 to the single suicide bombing on 14 November 2005 took less than three months to evolve. So swift a change in techniques is not unprecedented in the history of terrorism, but the law enforcement agencies of Bangladesh seemed unprepared to meet the newly emerging challenge.

In the light of the terror threats that attempt to undermine the political and economic stability of Bangladesh, the following general questions arise,

1. Who are these terrorists?
2. What are the causes of terrorism in Bangladesh?
3. Is terrorism in Bangladesh linked with international terror networks?
4. What measures can be taken to address this problem?

This paper attempts to find answers to the above mentioned questions and by addressing the following topics:

1. A brief history of terrorism in Bangladesh;
2. A brief history of the rise of JMB;
3. Probable causes of terrorism; and
4. Measures that can be taken to address this issue.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF TERRORISM IN BANGLADESH

Bangladesh has not been a stranger to terrorism. Terrorism has existed in Bangladesh since the birth of the country in 1971. Even during the process of the partition of India, through which Pakistan with its Eastern and Western wings were carved out of old British India, many freedom fighters like Masterda Surya Sen and Pritilata were characterized by the British as terrorists. Soon after gaining freedom for Pakistan, however, they were venerated as heroes. This shows the plasticity of the term 'terrorism' which different parties define differently to further their own interests.

Soon after independence from Pakistan, Bangladesh began facing terror incidents waged by a number of left-leaning small terrorist organizations. They were known as *Shorbohara* and also as *Nakshals*. They were somewhat subdued by the government's use of force at the time; but they continue to operate today in some of the south-western districts of the country. Over time, they have reduced their strength and lost their

ideological motivation of advancing their leftist ideologies through the use of force. They have become essentially a local criminal organisation rather than a terrorist outfit⁵³.

Another type of terrorist organization also emerged soon after the birth of the country, this one in the form of an insurgency movement. The people of Chittagong Hill Tracts demanded autonomy, their own legislature, and the retention of the traditional institutions of the tribal leaders⁵⁴. The government of Bangladesh rejected these demands; and, as a consequence, the frustrated leaders of the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Shanghati Shamity (PCJSS) took up arms to realise their demands. With the exception of occasional cease-fires between the government and the rebels, the insurgency continued until 1997. In that year, a peace accord was signed between the PCJSS and the government of Bangladesh whereby the PCJSS agreed to surrender its weapons. Later on, Shantu Larma, the leader of the PCJSS, was made minister in the Awami League (AL) cabinet. Now PCJSS is in the process of transforming itself into a mainstream political party. Thus, this insurgency movement has been somewhat quelled.

One common feature of these two incidents is that they were concentrated in specific regions of the country, and their actions had little impact on the rest of Bangladesh. That is to say, apart from the government organs and the people of that region, most of the country's population was unaffected by the resulting criminal or insurgent incidents.

THE RECENT SPATE OF TERRORISM IN BANGLADESH

The first major bomb blast in Bangladesh took place on March 7, 1999 at a function of the cultural organization known as *Udici* in Jessore, a south-western district. As a result of this incident, which took place during the regime of the AL, eight people died and over 100 were injured. In the last three years of the AL regime, 83 people died as a result of seven bomb blasts at different locations across the country. In the last four years of the present administration of the four-party alliance, there have been 71 deaths

⁵³ Rahman, M., (2003), Impact of Terrorism on Development and the Democratic Process: Bangladesh's Perspective' in *Terrorism in South Asia: Impact on Development & Democratic Process*, Khatri, S. & Kueck, G. (Eds.), p. 167.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p. 165.

resulting from various bombings⁵⁵. This death count, however, was tabulated prior to the 17 August 2005 and other subsequent bombings.

In the past seven years, beginning with the *Udichi* bombing, the terrorists responsible for these actions have not been brought to justice or even identified. As is common in many developing countries, an investigation committee was initiated immediately after each incident and tasked to submit a report on its probe by a certain date. Also in keeping with the tradition, reports of most of these committees have not been published or revealed to the public. In the few cases in which these reports have been published, they came out with findings insufficient to bring any individual or organisation to justice. It has been argued again and again that had these investigations been more fruitful and the culprits identified, future terrorists might have been deterred and the number of terror incidents reduced.

Therefore, in the wake of several terrorist incidents and ensuing investigations, the people responsible for these events remain unknown to the public. The August 17, 2005 bombing and subsequent incidents mark an exception from this previous pattern: the perpetrators of those attacks, the JMB, have been bold enough to publicise their identity. Consequently, this paper intends to deal with the issue of terrorism with particular reference to the actions of JMB.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GROWTH OF JAMA'ATUL MUJAHIDEEN BANGLADESH (JMB)

Many analysts and observers seem to draw a parallel between the origins of Al Qaeda and JMB. While in the former case, powerful actors like the US are said to have nurtured the movement, in the latter case, the government in power in Bangladesh is held to be the creator of the JMB. The second point is, however, a matter of debate since the ruling party in Bangladesh normally faces charges of terrorist activities as a result of its avowed feud with the opposition party. Presently, however, this view has more credence due to the fact that the present coalition government is composed of Islamic parties. Over time, like Al-Qaeda, JMB has turned against its political backers.

⁵⁵ Halim, A. P., 'Bomb Blasts People's Perception: A Survey', *Probe*, October 14-20, 2005.

During 2004, some newspapers reported the presence of Siddiqur Rahman Banglabhai and his associates in the northwestern districts of the country and related stories of their brutal torture of the *Shorbohara* party cadres. The newspapers further alleged the patronage of a ruling government deputy minister whose nephew had been killed at the hands of *Shorbohara* cadres. Initially the government denied these allegations, saying that Banglabhai is an imaginary creation of the media. The government perception, however, has undergone radical change after the events of August 17, 2005.

Mansur reports that during the 1990s a Middle Eastern-based NGO, Al-Harmaine, initiated operations in Bangladesh.⁵⁶ After the appointment of a Sudanese citizen, Yousuf Bodonski, as its head, the banned organization Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), started operations in the mosques and madrassas of 38 districts. Al-Harmine opened its second office in Chittagong and, since then, 196 of their staff have been operating throughout the country. On 30 July 2004, the Al-Harmaine office in Dhaka was shut. However, at that time HUJI and JMB came into existence. These organisations gained strength after the visit of Al-Harmaine's director, S. Tibriz, and the involvement of refugees in Cox's Bazaar, Naikhyachori, and Bandarban in the CHT region.

The Mansur report also mentions that 3,500 HUJI members took part in the Afghan War in the 1980s. Thirty-four of them died in battle in Afghanistan, and the rest returned to Bangladesh. After their return, these top terrorist leaders chose Cox's Bazaar as their safe sanctuary. Some madrassas were established there, financed by foreign donations. Pokkhali Madrassa, in Cox's Bazaar, was allegedly one of the major HUJI training camps. Many of the students of this Madrassa are members of the JMB's *ehsar* (suicide) squad.

Following the bombing incidents in August 2005, the Bangladesh government outlawed HUJI. Previously, in February 2005, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and Jama'atul Mujahideen were also banned. The banning of HUJI followed similar actions outlawing the group in the UK.

What started as a movement by the JMB to eliminate leftist criminals in the northwestern districts in Bangladesh soon matured into the countrywide bombing incident of

⁵⁶ Manur, K. A., 'JMB brought up under the patronage of Al-Qaeda has deep roots', *Samakal* (A Bengali daily), 30 November 2005.

17 August 2005. The geographical scope and the precise timing of the bombings led many analysts to believe that this was a message to the Bangladeshi people: the JMB wanted its presence to be known and taken seriously. The seriousness of their intentions were accentuated by their different attacks against the NGOs, educational institutions teaching secular affairs, cultural organizations, and the judiciary. The country's first suicide bombing took place when one of the *ehsar* members of JMB, Mamun, blew up a van carrying two judges. The judges died on the spot, but Mamun survived and informed the police about the existence of nearly 1,000 JMB *ehsar* members throughout the country. The following is a description of suicide bombing incidents by the JMB following the October event:

| Date | Location | Death | Injuries | Primary Targets |
|------------------|------------|-------|----------|--------------------------------|
| 14 November 2005 | Jhalakathi | 2 | 3 | Judiciary |
| 29 November 2005 | Gazipur | 7 | 24 | Judiciary |
| 29 November 2005 | Chittagong | 2 | 16 | Judiciary |
| 01 December 2005 | Gazipur | 1 | 50 | Administration & the Judiciary |
| 08 December 2005 | Netrokona | 8 | 100 | Cultural Organization |

A glance at the primary targets list demonstrate the predominance of judiciary. According to the statements of JMB members and the leaflets that were found at the bombing sites, the judiciary was targeted because the JMB wants to establish a legal system based on Koran and *Sunnah*. Many scholars believe that the judiciary and the government's administration were seen as impediments to establishing Islamic rule while cultural organisations were targeted for promoting 'un-Islamic' culture.

JMB is led by Siddiqur Rahman, alias Banglabhai, whose spiritual leader is Shaikh Abdur Rahman. This cadre-based organization is reported to have 10,000 full time and 100,000 part-time operatives. These operatives are scattered across the country and receive directives from their immediate superiors in the group hierarchy. Many of the operatives might not have met Banglabhai and might not even be aware of the identity of the person two steps higher in the party hierarchy. In this way, the organization ensures

that the capture of one operative only threatens the freedom of a few more low-ranking operatives, while the kingpins remain at large.

Since the August 2005 incident, the government has taken an aggressive role in apprehending the terrorists. Already there have been some high profile arrests, including that of Ataur Rahman Sunny, the JMB Operations Commander and the younger brother of Shaikh Abdur Rahman. The government also has recovered a huge weapons cache. Despite the declaration of a bounty of 10 million taka for information on the whereabouts of Banglabhai and Shaikh Abdur Rahman, both remain at large. On the institutional front, the government is taking measures to modernise law enforcement agencies, enact legislation against money laundering, and pass an anti-terror bill in the parliament.

CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN BANGLADESH

There are two different schools of thought concerning the causes and involvement of foreign elements in terror incidents in Bangladesh. Based on the premise that, with the exception of the British High Commissioner in Bangladesh, the terror targets were domestic rather than Western, the first school believes that international terrorists were not involved in such incidents. Targets like cultural functions or organisations, the judiciary, educational institutions, intellectuals, and government officials supposedly do little to further Al-Qaeda's agenda.

The second school believes that though the targets local, they are vital administrative organs. Paralysing or destroying them could not only undermine the quality of their rule but also would put government authority in jeopardy. Continuation of such a situation might give rise to instability in the country, which could, in turn, have a ripple effect on countries across the region. The proponents of the second school fear that the terrorists would seize this opportunity to take control state power in Bangladesh in the same way the Taliban did in Afghanistan. International terrorist outfits would, in turn, benefit by gaining new hideouts as their previous sanctuaries or centres of operations become unavailable.

Beyond these analyses, the causes of terrorism in Bangladesh can broadly be divided into two categories: domestic and international. On the domestic front, social, political, religious, educational, economic, and institutional issues are the root causes of terrorism. While on the international front, terrorism is linked with the international political climate and the smuggling of weapons through Bangladesh's territory.

DOMESTIC CAUSES

Political

An examination of the political history of the country would suggest that the present rise of Islamic militancy contradicts the founding principles of the nation state. The birth of Bangladesh in 1971 was an “abnegation of the two-nation theory that had led to the Partition – 1971 was a victory of secular Bengali nationalism based on the pride and indivisibility of the Bengali culture and secularism”⁵⁷. The political process underwent a change in 1975 following a military takeover. This brought a fundamental change in the polity of the country with the introduction of multi-party system of governance, the shift of a socialist-leaning system of economy into a capitalist one, and the provision of limited press freedom. This situation offered an opportunity for the pro-Pakistan fundamentalist forces, namely Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI), to take part in the national politics of Bangladesh. In this manner, religious issues first entered the realm of politics.

Although democracy was restored after a popular uprising in the 1990s, the trend of politicizing Islam continued. In this process, JEI sided with either the BNP or AL, depending on the circumstances. In doing so, it is said that while the secular political parties like BNP or AL gained short-term benefits by using JEI, JEI on gained much longer-term benefits. As Ms. Christine Fair of US Institute of Peace observes, “The rise of Islamist parties creates a permissive environment, making it difficult to crackdown on militants when the people in power are aligned with Islamist politics”⁵⁸.

While the restoration of democracy in the 1990s saw the emergence of fundamentalist parties as political kingmakers, it also marked a period of bitter rivalry between the two major secular political parties. Ruchira Joshi, in this regard, writes,

Despite its reputation as the most ‘democratic’ Muslim polity in the world, Bangladesh’s political climate remains uncertain and violent. The hostility between the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the leading opposition party, Awami League (AL) is mainly responsible for the current situation. The difficult BNP-AL relationship has a historical dimension, determined as much by ideological

⁵⁷ Bhaumik, S., ‘Bangladesh: The Second Front of Islamic Terror’, *Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict*, p. 270.

⁵⁸ Montero, D., ‘How Extremism Come to Bangladesh’, *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 07, 2005, available from <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0907/p06s01-wosc.html>

differences by the personality clashes between Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina Wajed, the ‘supreme’ leaders of these two parties”⁵⁹. Besides politicization of Islam, the nation has also been divided due to the bitter rivalry between the two main political parties. Joshi further mentions, “What was once a ‘battle of wills’ between the two determined women, has now translated into communal disharmony, human rights violation, migration of minorities, fear of the state, corruption, decoity, rape, murder and the criminalisation of politics”⁶⁰.

The extent of enmity between the two major political parties and its repercussions in terms of terrorism are clearly illustrated by the mutual accusations that followed the August 2005 attacks and the opposition’s refusal to cooperate with the government to resolve the terrorist problem – a development that many fear might bring the military to power.

Different political quarters and the media have often suggested a link between JEI and terrorism. These accusations are based on the premise that most of the JMB cadres arrested are former supporters of JEI. Social scientists have pointed out that terrorism often appears when the regular channels of expression of opinion are blocked. In view of that hypothesis, some analysts believe that the failure of the JEI, after becoming a part of the governing coalition, to take action toward establishing an Islamic state in Bangladesh has displeased their followers.⁶¹ These followers, as a result, have come to believe that they are left with no options other than to quit the party and “do it in their own way”⁶².

Socio-economic

Unlike other South Asian countries, where ethnicity has been one of the prime causes of terrorism, ethnic conflict has been absent from the recent incidents of terrorism in Bangladesh. “Bangladesh is a more homogenous nation in comparison to other South Asian Nations”⁶³. Instead, class discrimination has been one of the major factors fuelling terrorism.

⁵⁹ Joshi, R., ‘Religious Fundamentalism and the Continuing Battle between Bangladesh’s Begums’, *Peace Initiatives*, Vol. VII, Nos. I-III, January-June 2001, p. 202s.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 207.

⁶¹ This is for the first time in Bangladesh’s history that JEI has become a part of the government.

⁶² Interview of Brigadier General (Retd.) Shakawat Hossain on Channel I on 02 December 2005.

⁶³ Rahman, M., (2003), *Ibid*.

The process of globalisation in most developing countries has been imposed from the top down. Those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder have very little say in the process. Promises that the benefits of globalization would trickle down to the poorer segments of the society have not been realized. As a consequence, one class of extremely rich people and another class of extremely poor people have emerged. The UNDP's Millennium Development Goal implementation data shows that, in 1990, 32.10% of the population of Bangladesh were living on less than US\$1 per day. By the year 2000, that figure had increased to 31.50%⁶⁴. Apart from the stark difference between the rich and the poor, there are income differences between the rural and urban areas, not to mention of the income disparity on the basis of gender.

Poverty – the gulf between the rich and poor – and other forms of discrimination in Bangladesh have all increased due to pervasive rate of corruption⁶⁵. Official corruption denies citizens their equality and prevents advancement and social mobility. As a result, it gives rise to frustrations which may induce individuals to undertake extreme actions. This phenomenon was evident in the case of Indonesia, where the collapse of the economy, political crisis, and corruption gave rise to a group of militants for whom religious fundamentalism was seen as a means to express national pride and as a way out of misrule, disorder and a corrupt polity. Bertil Lintner records the statement of a foreign diplomat in Dhaka, “In the 1960s and 1970s, it was the leftists who were seen as incorruptible purists. Today, the role model for many young men in the rural areas is the dedicated Islamic cleric with his skull cap, flowing robes and beard”⁶⁶. Thus, this “incorruptible purist” has the opportunity to mould the minds of frustrated youngsters and gradually push them into the folds of terrorism, which they see as a logical response to the goal of ridding the nation of corrupt practices.

The southwest and the northwestern parts of Bangladesh are the poorest regions in the country. Chronic crop failure, environmental degradation, lack of capital and resources, absence of proper infrastructure, and improper government initiative/planning has created widespread unemployment in those regions. Therefore, it is not surprising to

⁶⁴ Majumdar, B. A., ‘MGD’s: Thoughts on the Ways to achieve them?’ *The Daily Star*, 17 January 2006.

⁶⁵ In 2005, Bangladesh has topped the list of most corrupt countries in the world by the Transparency International for the fifth consecutive year.

⁶⁶ Lintner, B., ‘Is Religious Extremism on the Rise in Bangladesh?’ *Janes Intelligence Review*, May 2002.

find most of the JMB members coming from those parts of the country. Coming from such poverty stricken areas, it is not surprising to learn that an amount as small as tk. 100,000 (equivalent of US\$ 1,540) was enough to induce individuals to undertake terrorist activities⁶⁷.

The arrival and spread of cable TV through out country has been viewed by some experts as one source for the wrath of the religious clerics and fundamentalists. Material shown through this medium is perceived by the so-called religious clerics and fundamentalists as threat to their understanding of Islam⁶⁸.

Educational

The general lack of proper education has always been held as one of the most common causes of terrorism. Like many developing countries, Bangladesh has a low literacy rate. Although the access to education has increased in recent years, the literacy rate still remains relatively low, standing at 44.30 percent. This rate varies between the rural and urban areas. While the literacy rate in the urban areas is 63.0 percent, the same figure in rural areas stands at 36.60 percent⁶⁹. Such low levels of education make it comparatively easier for fundamentalist ideas to penetrate rural districts.

The low literacy rate is complicated further by the existence of three types of education system in the country. These are:

Bengali medium: Most of the students come from middle class backgrounds. The official educational establishment of the country supports this system. Such types of schools are spread all over the country;

English medium: Children of the rich and powerful are mostly enrolled in these educational facilities. Most of the curricula of such facilities are managed by the University of London. Almost all of these institutions are private. Such schools are mainly concentrated in the large urban centres of the country.

Madrasah education: Two types of madrasah education systems exist in the country: the Qawmi and the Alia madrasah systems. The Alia madrasahs are registered

⁶⁷ Confessional statement of JMB militant Mamun after his arrest in November 14, 2005 incident.

⁶⁸ Chowdhury, S. "Tackling the Terror Threat", *The Daily Star*, 18 December 2005.

⁶⁹ Statistical Pocketbook Bangladesh 2002, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.

with the government and their curriculum is approved by the Bangladesh Madrasah Education Board under the National Curriculum Board. Besides religious education, students receive some training in science, technology and logic (like *Aqaid* and *Fiqh*). The Qawmi madrasahs, in contrast, have no such government recognition or oversight and their curricula are not approved by the Board. Most of the curricula of Qawmi madrasahs are non-science based and religion remains the main, and often the sole, subject of education. Their irrelevance to the modern education system can be illustrated by the fact that they continue to teach Urdu and Persian with only some basic introduction to Bengali and English⁷⁰. While the Alia madrasahs receive some government funding, the Qawmi madrasahs are run through private patronage or donations. If getting a decent job is one of the chief purposes of an education, then the graduates coming out from these madrasahs are failing to fulfill their aspirations. Bangladeshi journalist Salahuddin Babar observes that the madrasahs produce young men who are "poorly equipped to enter mainstream life and professions [and are] easily lured by motivated quarters who capitalize on religious sentiment to create fanatics, rather than moderate Muslims"⁷¹.

These three different types of educational systems are also creating three different social classes, with the English medium-educated graduates being the privileged ones who get jobs with ease. The Bengali medium students fill most of the remaining demand in the employment market, leaving the madrasah educated the most frustrated segment with the least opportunities to break into the mainstream job market. It is no wonder, therefore, that frustrated students from madrasahs are adopting terror tactics against a state which has failed to provide them with proper jobs. The only way, in their minds, to get a job is through the establishment of an Islamic state in which a madrasah education might be of some relevance. The future promises little improvement in light of the growth of madrasah relative to that of secular schools. Ahmed mentions, "In 1999 the number of primary schools stood at 65,610. This is down from 78,595 in 1996. the number of Alia madrasahs, however, increased from 14,414 in 1989 to 25,201 in 2004".⁷²

⁷⁰ Ahmed, I, 'On the Brink of Precipice: Contemporary Terrorism and Limits of the State', *The Independent*, 05 December 2005.

⁷¹ Karlekar, H., *Bangladesh: The New Afghanistan?* Delhi: Sage Publications.

⁷² *Ibid.*

Institutional

Apart from the “softer” causes of terrorism, law enforcement agencies and intelligence organisations play an important role in the failure to check terrorism. The present police to population ratio is 1:1200⁷³. This ratio is inadequate to effectively maintain law and order in the country, let alone counter terrorism. The members of the police forces are inadequately paid compared to their workloads. They lack proper equipment, training, and, in some cases, motivation.

Besides these institutional factors, the politicization of the police and intelligence establishments has been one of the major factors crippling the fight against terrorism. Ever since their birth, probably due to the Bangladesh political culture, the intelligence agencies have been employed to ‘spy’ on political rivals of the ruling regimes rather than focus on safeguarding vital national interests. Police forces have also been used to oppress political opponents. Throughout the last 35 years of independence, neither the law enforcement nor the intelligence agencies have been able to develop a capacity to check/fight terrorism.

Thus, the failure of these agencies to address the issue of terrorism primarily falls on the shoulders of the Bangladeshi government since independence.

INTERNATIONAL CAUSES

International Political Climate

Although conclusive evidence of the linkage between international terrorism and terrorism in Bangladesh has yet to emerge, the repercussions of the ‘war-on-terrorism’ on indigenous terrorism cannot be under-estimated. In Muslim-majority countries like Bangladesh, the US-led ‘war-on-terrorism’ is viewed by ordinary Muslims -- with fellow Muslim civilians being killed in Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq -- as a war against Islam⁷⁴. The perception of ordinary Bangladeshi people regarding the ‘war-on-terror’, the unilateral actions of the United States’ government, and the stories of repression of the Muslims in the West, triggers sympathy for terrorists in the minds of these people.

⁷³ Police and Population Ratio, Communication and MIS Wing, Rapid Action Battalion Forces, available from <http://www.rab.gov.bd/peoporat.html> [accessed 23/01/06].

⁷⁴ Rahman, M., *Ibid*, p. 179.

However, there are yet to be any clear linkages between these global events and the domestic actions of JMB and, with the exception of the attack on the British High Commissioner, there have not been any significant attacks against western interests in Bangladesh. Despite the fact that Shaikh Abdur Rahman has expressed his admiration for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in his interviews with the press, scholars continue to believe that the influence of global events on the rise of JMB might not be significant.

It has been reported that many of the JMB leaders were educated in madrasahs in India and Pakistan. Intelligence agencies in Bangladesh have assumed that, during that time, they came into contact with terrorists in those countries and were indoctrinated and learnt terror techniques. Most recently, the Pakistan government has imposed a ban on the enrolment of foreign students in Pakistani madrasahs.

Many of the top leaders of the JMB and other terrorist organizations with apparent links to JMB, like Mufti Hannan, are Afghan war veterans. They received their bomb making and weapons training in Afghanistan. This fact has been revealed in the statement of Mufti Hannan, who has been a mastermind of many bombing plots.

Weapons Smuggling through Bangladesh Territory

Bangladesh is situated in the infamous ‘Golden Crescent’ and close to the ‘Golden Triangle’. This makes it a transit point for the smuggling of heroin from Myanmar. This trans-national narco-trafficking is backed by armed insurgents located throughout the region. Besides heroin, weapons are also shipped through this area. On 1 April 2004, a huge cache of sophisticated weapons was seized -- the biggest haul of arms in Bangladesh history. Strategic analysts point out that in the process of moving weapons through countries, some might fall into the hands of local criminals or terror outfits. The seizure of some sophisticated weapons in Bangladesh bears testimony to that hypothesis. In addition, the arms and ammunition seized from JMB show that most of the ammunition was smuggled from India. Such easy availability of weapons and the porous border makes it easier for the terrorists to carry out their activities.

Involvement of Foreign Insurgents

Newspapers report that some of the weapons used by the JMB have been acquired from the defunct Myanmar insurgent PCJSS factions, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and the Arakan Liberation Army, operating in Bangladesh territory.

Evidence of the presence of training camps of the Arakan Liberation Army have been found deep in the forests of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. It has also been alleged that these insurgent organisations have provided training facilities for the JMB followers in their camps.

Foreign Patronage

The involvement of foreign money, influence and other assistance has been identified as one of the major causes of the rise of JMB. However, there is a difference of opinion concerning the countries that might be involved in providing funds to JMB. While BNP and its coalition allies point the finger at India and Israel, some of the media have reported that Saudi- and Kuwaiti-based NGOs are also involved in funding the JMB. There are also charges, in some quarters, of the involvement of Al-Qaeda as a JMB financier.

One analysis shows that JMB requires more than US\$10,000 each month to operate⁷⁵. This is a huge sum of money considering Bangladesh's situation and the economic condition of the north-western region, where the JMB primarily operate. Accumulation of such funds seems impossible from indigenous sources, which leads to the conclusion that foreign funds must be involved. However, the identity of the specific countries involved in this affair remains unclear.

CONCLUSION

Bangladesh is a predominantly Muslim country. Although there might be strong sentiments among the people about the plights of fellow Muslims in other parts of the world, terrorists constitute only a small minority of the population. Many newspapers report parents disowning or handing over their sons to law enforcement authorities when their terrorist identity is revealed. It has been argued that the terrorists have resorted to violence because their political/religious agendas receive no support from the larger section of the population⁷⁶.

Increasingly, terrorism is a trans-national phenomenon that calls for trans-national efforts to fight it. It has been found that most of the plastic explosives and other devices

⁷⁵ Montero, D., *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Karlekar, H., *Ibid.*

used in JMB bomb making were smuggled in from India. Many of the terrorists have received training of Indian madrasahs and have escaped arrest by crossing the border into India. Therefore, in order to root out terrorism, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and other regional bodies have an important role to play. Although in recent years SAARC has repeatedly supported decisions by member states to ban terrorism, effective action is impossible in the absence of clear political will on the part of the member states and in the absence of a meaningful repatriation treaty.

Many scholars believe that, in addition to serious reform of madrasah education, there is a need to create awareness among religious teachers and imams in Bangladesh of the negative consequences of failing to do so. For that matter, the religious teachers and the Imams need to be properly trained in worldly affairs. They should also be trained to make people aware of the misinterpretation of Islam by the fanatics who help breed terrorists.

Parents also have to be made aware of the potentially fine line between being religiously observant and turning to terrorism. In Muslim societies, it is generally held that a man with religious attire is a good man. In Bangladesh, it is a widely held belief that one's son is on a righteous path when he begins more frequent attendance at madrasahs or other Islamic congregations. By being aware of the differences between legitimate religious education and extremist indoctrination, parents can help prevent their sons or daughters from turning into terrorists.

In light of the devastation wrought by terrorist events, the approaching general election, and under pressure from donor organisations, the Bangladeshi government seems to be leaving no stone unturned in its effort to bring the terrorists to justice. This has been manifested by the recent capture of some of the key JMB leaders, although terror kingpin Banglabhai and Shaikh Abdur Rahman both remain at large. As a consequence of such an aggressive stance by the government, the frequency of terrorist events has decreased. However, that should not make the government complacent and cause it to ease up on the hunt for terrorists. Moreover, the government should take proper steps to prevent future terrorist events from taking place by addressing both the softer and the harder root causes of terrorism. To that end, Bangladesh probably requires international assistance more than ever before.

INDIAN MUSLIMS & TERRORISM

BY: SATU P. LIMAYE, PHD

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INTRODUCTION

United States policymakers face an extraordinarily complex and sensitive challenge in addressing the rise of international terrorism perpetrated by Muslims and directed at the United States, its allies, friends and partners. In searching for explanations of Muslim radicalism and terrorism, U.S. policymakers and analysts until now largely have focused on the Arab Muslim world, which accounts for only 20% of the world's Muslim population. Some attention also has been given to non-Arab Muslim majority countries (e.g., Indonesia, Pakistan and Malaysia), Muslim-minority countries in which the U.S. has wider strategic stakes (e.g., China and Russia), or on U.S. treaty allies where there are on-going, intense insurgency movements with strong Islamic and both actual and potential international terrorist dimensions (e.g., Philippines and Thailand). These priorities makes sense given the urgency and immediacy of the problems related to Muslim radicalism and terrorism emanating from those places where violent radicalism is endemic. But to fully understand and address Muslim radicalism, including its involvement in international terrorism, U.S. policymakers should also examine places where Muslims are *not* implicated in international terrorism. India potentially offers such a policy-relevant test case.

India's 140 million Muslims constitute the world's second largest Muslim population after Indonesia. India's Muslims present a compelling puzzle. They defy conventional wisdom by not being involved in international terrorism despite facing many factors that experts say cause Muslim terrorism elsewhere. By understanding *why*, U.S. policymakers could gain practical and as yet undiscovered insights about the causes of Muslim radicalism and how to shape policies that apply or adapt India's successful conditions and policies elsewhere. In short, India's Muslim situation must be carefully evaluated to determine how and whether it can contribute to meeting the challenges faced

by U.S. policymakers. In particular, given India's democratic status, evaluating the non-involvement of India's Muslims in terrorism could test the current guiding conventional policy wisdom that democracy impedes or constrains the emergence of Islamic radicalism and terrorism.

THE DEBATE ABOUT INDIAN MUSLIMS AND TERRORISM

Whether Indian Muslims are involved in terrorism, how much, and in what kinds of terrorism are matters of debate that have attracted the attention of high-level U.S. and Indian officials and leading analysts of the country.

For example, in the summer of 2005, India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, speaking to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., stated that "We have 150 million citizens who practice the faith of Islam. And I say it with some pride about their patriotism that not one of them has joined the ranks of these gangs like the Al-Qa'idah or other terrorist activities."⁷⁷ And B. Raman, a former high-ranking Indian government official and leading terrorism analyst, has asserted that "The Al-Qaeda and the IIF [International Islamic Front] have so far had no major base of support in India or amongst Muslims of Indian origin living abroad."⁷⁸ He has also noted that "...there have been no confirmed instances of Indian Muslims from outside Jammu and Kashmir clandestinely going to Pakistan for studying in the madrasas there."⁷⁹

But such comments have not been restricted to those who can be expected to downplay the engagement of their country's citizens in the murder of innocent civilians. Even Indians who have been highly critical of the government, and worry about certain aspects of developments related to India's Muslim population, have noted ways in which Indian Muslims have shied away from engaging in both domestic and international violence. In this vein, the writer Pankaj Mishra has noted that "...Indian Muslims have

⁷⁷ Cited in "No Indian Muslims have joined Al-Qa'idah—PM," PTI News Agency, July 20, 2005, FBIS.

⁷⁸ B. Raman, "International Terrorism: Root Causes, Pretexts & Alibi," South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) Paper No. 1496, August 12, 2005.

⁷⁹ B. Raman, "Al-Qaeda & India," South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) Paper No. 1498, August 13, 2005.

stayed away from the anti-India insurgency of their culturally distinct co-religionists in Kashmir. More remarkably, they have not heeded the many pied pipers of jihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan who lured Muslims from all parts of the world and managed to delude even a non-Muslim from California.”⁸⁰ While one of Mr. Mishra’s examples is linked to domestic terrorism flowing out of a bitter insurgency conflict (in Kashmir), the other relates specifically to involvement in an international movement of terrorism emanating out of Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan that attracted adherents from around the world. There are many other examples of statements by respected, and respectable, officials, community leaders and analysts regarding the non-involvement of Indian Muslims in international terrorism.⁸¹

Indians are not the only ones who have made assertions about Indian Muslims non-involvement in international terrorism. Some Americans too have made the point. According to former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill, “At 130 million people, India’s Muslim population is the second-largest of any nation in the world, behind only Indonesia. Yet, it is remarkable for the near absence of Islamic extremism in Indian society. For instance, there is no record of a single Indian joining Al-Qaeda, no Indian citizens were captured in Afghanistan, and there are no Indian Muslims at the Guantanamo Bay military detention center.”⁸² Tom Friedman, a columnist for *The New York Times*, has popularized a similar assessment in his opinion pieces. Just two months

⁸⁰ Pankaj Mishra, “India’s Muslim Time Bomb,” *The New York Times*, September 17, 2003.

⁸¹ For example, India’s National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), following a meeting with religious leaders of the Muslim community and other intellectuals reportedly “were unanimous in their opinion that Indian Muslims could never support the spread of terrorism in the name of Islamic jihad” cited in “Indian Editorial Says Liberal Education Can Free Muslims from Jihadi Mindset,” *Dainik Jagran*, July 29, 2005, p.8 translation from Hindi by FBIS. And in response to alleged suggestions that Muslims from West Bengal were participating in “jihadi activities in Bangladesh”, Ahmed Hasan Imran, General Secretary of the Muslim Council of Bengal wrote to the state’s chief minister that “...so far neither you nor any of your ministers has produced an iota of evidence in support of your contention.” Mr. Imran then went on to say that “It is insulting because Muslims, though trapped in poverty and illiteracy, have not joined Naxalites [Maoist guerillas], KLO [Kamtapur Liberation Organization], Maoists or any such movement.”

⁸² Robert Blackwill, “Why is India America’s Natural Ally,” *The National Interest*, May 2005.

after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman framed the issue this way:

Why is it you don't hear about Indian Muslims — who are a minority in this vast Hindu-dominated land — blaming America for all their problems or wanting to fly suicide planes into the Indian Parliament? Answer: Multi-ethnic, pluralistic, free-market democracy. To be sure, Indian Muslims have their frustrations, and have squared off over the years in violent clashes with Hindus, as has every other minority in India. But they live in a noisy, messy democracy, where opportunities and a political voice are open to them, and that makes a huge difference.⁸³

Others do not accept that Indian Muslims are not engaged in terrorism. Australian analyst Alexander Gordon argues that “a small minority of Indian Muslims outside Kashmir have chosen to take up the bomb and the Kalashnikov. This movement is closely tied to violent *jihadi* movements in neighbouring countries, especially the Gulf and Pakistan.”⁸⁴ But it is important to note here that Dr. Gordon is referring to *domestic* terrorism—terrorism committed against India, not Indian Muslims engaged in international terrorism. This distinction is important generally, but specifically in the Indian case because of the presence of significant Hindu-Muslim communal violence in which terrorist acts are committed. While this type of violence is of course regrettable and counter to U.S. interests in the stability and prosperity of the Indian state, terrorism committed in the context of ethnic or communal violence is of secondary importance compared to terrorism directed at the United States homeland, its facilities and personnel overseas, allies, friends and partners. There is a potential spill over that must be watched very carefully. If Hindu-Muslim communal violence were to develop of a scale and direction that attracted or produced international terrorism (the example of the insurgency

⁸³ Thomas L. Friedman, “Today’s News Quiz,” *The New York Times*, November 20, 2001.

⁸⁴ Sandy Gordon, *Muslims, Terrorism and Rise of the Hindu Right in India*, Working Paper No. 389, Australian National University, May 2004.

in Thailand's three southern provinces comes to mind) then of course the distinction between domestic and international terrorism would blur.

According to American analyst, F. Gregory Gause III, making the case that democracy does not by itself halt terrorism, India accounts for 75% of terrorist incidents in "free countries".⁸⁵ Mr. Gause writes that "groups based in Pakistan carried out a number of those attacks, particularly in Kashmir, but clearly not all the perpetrators were foreigners. A significant number of terrorist events in India took place far from Kashmir, reflecting other local grievances against the central government." There are several unclear points about Mr. Gause's assessment as it applies to India's Muslims, however. First, he asserts that terrorist incidents in India account for 75% of total terror in "free" countries. This may very well be true, leaving aside for the moment the definition of terrorism he employs, but his analysis is not clear as to what percentage of these terrorist acts were committed by Indian Muslims. As is well known, India has several on-going insurgencies and conflicts that are entirely unrelated to Muslims and involve the use of terrorism. Second, Mr. Gause notes, citing the United States' government *Global Patterns of Terrorism* report for the period between 2000-2003 that India had 203 *international* terrorist attacks. But it is not clear what is meant by *international* in this context? Does it mean that the perpetrators of these attacks were non-Indian nationals? Third, Mr. Gause argues that ". . . [A]s strong and vibrant as Indian democracy is, both a sitting prime minister and a former prime minister have been assassinated--..." This is indeed true. However, it is useful to note that in neither case were Muslims, either from inside or outside India, responsible. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984 by her own Sikh bodyguards in retaliation for her ordering of an attack on a Sikh temple. Her son, and successor as Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, was assassinated in 1991 by a female suicide bomber who was a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

⁸⁵ F. Gregory Gause III, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005, Vol. 84, Issue 5, pp. 62-76.

(LTTE) of Sri Lanka, purportedly in retaliation for the dispatch of an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka.

Pankaj Mishra, who as noted above has argued how Indian Muslims have *not* been caught up in international terrorism, worries about rising domestic terrorism by Indian Muslims. Mr. Mishra, writing in the wake of the August 2003 bomb attacks in Mumbai, notes that “[t]he four people arrested...in connection with the attacks were Indian Muslims, part of a new group called the Gujarat Muslim Revenge Force...So the surprising thing, perhaps, is not that militant groups like the Gujarat Muslim Revenge Force are now emerging in India, but that it has taken so long.”⁸⁶ However, it should be noted there is still some uncertainty regarding the motives and associations of those connected with this act. Mr. Mishra locates the cause of the emerging Indian Muslim radicalism in “...exactly these sorts of local political frustrations that - in North Africa, the Middle East and, more recently, East Asia - have given the network of terrorism its global range and resilience. In historical retrospect, the explosions in Bombay may come to be seen as the moment when the recruiters of Al Qaeda, heartened by the mess in Iraq and by fresh gains in Indonesia, received news of some more unexpected bounty: militant disaffection among the second-largest Muslim population in the world [India].”⁸⁷ But what Mr. Mishra does not explain in his short editorial piece is why Indian Muslims’ local frustrations are so resonant now, when they have been present to various degrees but not led to radicalization for the past half century. And, it is important to reiterate here that Mr. Mishra does not assert that Indian Muslims have been involved in *international* terrorism—yet—though he warns that day may come if the continue to be radicalized domestically.

Among others who worry about Indian Muslims becoming involved in international terrorism is Dr. Rollie Lall of RAND. Dr. Lall writes that “[a] variety of

⁸⁶ Pankaj Mishra, “India’s Muslim Time Bomb,” *The New York Times*, September 17, 2003.

⁸⁷ Pankaj Mishra, “India’s Muslim Time Bomb,” *The New York Times*, September 17, 2003.

factors are combining to contribute to the rise of radical Islam in India.”⁸⁸ The evidence for this impending radicalization, according to Dr. Lall, includes the fact that “[d]espite the spiritual and religious focus of the Tablighi [an important Islamic organization in India], after September 11 various members of the organization were found to be connected to international terrorist organizations.”⁸⁹ However, the depth and nature of these “connections” are unclear as are the international terrorist organizations to which these members were linked. As already noted, there has been no evidence of Indian Muslims participating in either Al-Qaeda or the major Asia-based terrorist organization the Jemmah Islamiyah. Moreover, she asserts that “Indian Muslims have increasingly begun to identify with their counterparts internationally” though no specific evidence to sustain this assertion is offered. Importantly, Dr. Lall observes that “the focus of Islamic terrorism in India has widened since the September 11 attacks” with “terrorist groups...now shifting their focus from Kashmir to spectacular acts of mass murder in India’s urban centers, with the goal of intimidating and terrorizing the Indian public.” However, it is not clear at all that this terrorism stems from *Indian* Muslim sources or that Indian Muslims—from within or outside Kashmir—in any way support or sympathize with it.

It is clear from the preceding review that a vigorous and unresolved debate about the premise of Indian Muslims non-involvement in terrorism exists. However, as yet, little systematic, empirical, or detailed research has been undertaken to settle this debate.

ASSESSING THE DEBATE ABOUT INDIAN MUSLIMS & TERRORISM

In light of the competing and complex assessments about Indian Muslim involvement in terrorism, what net assessment might be reached?

⁸⁸ Rollie Lall, “Islam in India,” in Angel M. Rabasa et al (eds.), *The Muslim World After 9/11*, RAND Project Air Force, 2004, p. 309.

⁸⁹ Rollie Lall, “Islam in India,” in Angel M. Rabasa et al (eds.), *The Muslim World After 9/11*, RAND Project Air Force, 2004, p. 309.

The bottom-line of this assessment is that the involvement of Indian Muslims in international terrorism directed at the U.S., its allies, friends, and partners is remarkably limited; remarkably because they confront most of the reasons experts give for the radicalization of Muslims elsewhere *and* face the peculiar hardships of their environment. Indian Muslims are the disproportionate victims of India's Hindu-Muslim communal violence. They are poorer, less healthy and less literate than Indian Hindus. They face considerable social discrimination. There is an on-going tussle between Muslim "conservatives" (particularly an old guard leadership) and "liberals." They are associated, however unfairly, with an on-going Muslim insurgency (in Kashmir). They are politically alienated. And their country's government is improving relations with the United States precisely when global public opinion is increasingly critical of U. S. policy. According to conventional wisdom, these and other factors should make Indian Muslims ripe for radicalism and involvement in terrorism; but they apparently do not. In other words, it is not the absolute absence but rather the small scale of Indian Muslim terrorism—both domestically and abroad—that is surprising given the context they face.

Moreover, it is important to be precise about the kinds of terrorism that Indian Muslims *are* involved in. First, Indian Muslims are engaged in a degree of domestic terrorism. Examples of such domestic terrorism encompass the bombings of the Bombay Stock Exchange in 1993, which are believed to have been carried out by the Indian Muslim mafia leader Dawood Ibrahim in retaliation for Muslims killed during Hindu-Muslim communal violence from December 1992 to early 1993 following the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992. Other examples include the August 2003 Mumbai bombings and the train bombings in Mumbai and the assassination of Hindu leaders in Gujarat following the massacre of nearly 1,000 Muslims in Gujarat in February-March 2002. Even more recently, there have been attacks on the Ayodhya site and bombings in the public markets of Delhi on October 29, 2005 (although, it is far from clear who is responsible for these most recent Delhi market bombings).

A more detailed examination of these examples of domestic terrorism bring some interesting points to light. First, this domestic terrorism remains quite limited in terms of

frequency, number of incidents and number of deaths. Second, given that among India's sectarian minorities, Indian Muslims have lost the most in terms of lives and property in communal violence over India's post-independence history, it is notable that the level of domestic terrorism has been so low. Third, it is possible to argue that the violence cited above is part of communal violence rather than terrorism *per se*. Sandy Gordon argues that while communal violence and terrorism are related (since they can trigger each other), "communal violence is usually a spontaneous affair that is over relatively quickly, after which life usually returns to normal." Terrorism, in contrast, is secret, planned and constant. It almost always has a political purpose. Terrorism can be conducted well away from the locations in which it is spawned. It can be assisted from outside the country and can therefore constitute an important strategic tool in international conflict. Crucially, its secret, on-going nature allows for 'rational players' to engage in it for long-term goals even though it may initially damage their community.⁹⁰ Dr. Gordon's distinctions are useful in thinking through what kind of violence is occurring in India. In particular, domestic terrorism perpetrated by Indian Muslims appears to be directed, if not discriminate and retaliatory, rather than random. And, while certainly not true of all, a high proportion of these domestic incidents appear to have external links. These facts raise the need for a further qualification of the distinction between communal violence and terrorism that Dr. Gordon employs.

Another element of this net assessment is that the evidence suggests there is very little domestic terrorism aimed at international targets (such as foreign embassies, consulates, organizations and individuals located in India). B. Raman has suggested that

⁹⁰ Sandy Gordon, *Muslims, Terrorism and Rise of the Hindu Right in India*, Working Paper No. 389, Australian National University, May 2004, pp4-5. There are a number of problems with Gordon's argument, but an important one is that terrorism perpetrated by Indian Muslims has been retaliatory and targeted (as in assassination attempts against Hindu leaders)—suggesting that it fits into the communal violence framework rather than terrorism which is far more indiscriminate and unlinked to events.

some sleeper cells in India could be targeting US and Israeli interests.⁹¹ But there is little evidence of attacks on Western/US interests in India by Indian Muslims.

Moreover, as already suggested, Indian Muslims appear to have negligible involvement in international terrorism directed against the West and specifically the United States. Indian Muslims also appear to have had no involvement in jihadist activity in Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan, or even nearby Kashmir. They do not appear to be active in organizations such as AQ, International Islamic Front or JI.⁹²

Quite apart from the different *categories* of terrorism, there are general points that lead to the conclusion that Indian Muslims are relatively un-radicalized or un-engaged in terrorism. If it is accepted that communal violence potentially breeds terrorism, this raises the question why there is not more domestic terrorism and why that has not been fused with a wider Indian Muslim involvement in international terrorism—particularly as communal violence has risen over the past decade. Tom Friedman alludes to this state of affairs in his commentary. “It was terrible, [a] pogrom really instigated by the Hindu nationalists in Gujarat. What happened? What happened? Nothing happened. That violence not only did not spread around Gujarat, it didn't spread anywhere else in India. I think that's a very, very positive sign. And that's a sign that people in the rest of India not only are their cultural ties that's still binding Hindus and Muslims in villages. There has

⁹¹ “While there is as yet no evidence of an Al Qaeda presence in Indian territory, Abu Zubaidah (a Palestinian), then No 3 of Al Qaeda, who was caught in an LeT hideout at Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab in March last year and handed over to the USA, was reported to have undergone computer training in a private institution in Pune in the 1990s before crossing over into Pakistan and joining Al Qaeda. It would, therefore, be reasonable to assume that he might have developed a sleeper network in India during his stay here, which might be available to Al Qaeda for any operations directed against US and/or Israeli interests on our soil.” B. Raman, “Al-Qaeda: The Terrorist Threat to India,” May 2003.

⁹² There are some unclear and possible exceptions that appear in articles now and again. See “India jails ‘plane crash plotter’,” *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/4708615.stm. Mohammed Afroz Abdul Razzak was found guilty of criminal conspiracy, forgery and “committing depredation on territories at peace with India” but notwithstanding prosecutorial arguments that he planned to attack the parliament in Delhi, Mr. Afroz was “cleared of conspiracy to wage war on India.” Also recently the press carried news reports of alleged Al-Qaeda activity in Kolkata. See also, Raman, May 2003.

been a lot of mixing of faiths and whatnot. But most importantly, it's about democracy, that's about free markets, that's about people with something better to do.”⁹³

It is also worth noting that Indian Muslim terrorism has been less frequent than other forms of terrorism in India—both by non-Muslims and from terrorism that emanates from outside the country. As even Alexander “Sandy” Gordon, who argues there is in fact Indian Muslim terrorism in India, notes: “Such terrorism is still confined to a very small percentage of Indian Muslims and is by no means the most prevalent form of terrorism in India.”⁹⁴

It must be conceded that disentangling insurgencies and communal conflict from terrorism remains an intricate and difficult challenge. However, it is at least worth noting that prominent experts differ on the explanations of communal violence in India. The Indian scholar Ashutosh Varshney, in his celebrated book *Ethnic Conflict & Civic Life: Hindus & Muslims in India*, concludes, after examining communal violence in a number of cities, that the degree of civic or civil society interaction is the critical variable in determining the extent of communal violence. But Paul Brass, in *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*, argues that, as the title of his book suggests, violence is “produced” in the struggle among competing elites for control over the state, its functions and financial gains emanating from this control. Yet another view is that of Patricia Gossman, who argues in *Riots & Victims: Violence & the Construction of Communal Identity among Bengali Muslims* that such violence is not spontaneous so much as choreographed by politicians to advance their messages and power. The important point here is that there is considerable violence perpetrated against, and by, Muslims in India. But communal violence, and even terrorism in the context of communal violence, must be distinguished from the subject of international terrorism which is of primary national interest to the United States.

⁹³ Thomas L. Friedman Interview with Ray Suarez, National Public Radio, August 12, 2002.

⁹⁴ Sandy Gordon, *Muslims, Terrorism and Rise of the Hindu Right in India*, Working Paper No. 389, Australian National University, May 2004, p. 1.

Another challenge in assessing the amount of terrorism relates to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). The case of Kashmir would appear to belie the assertion regarding Indian Muslim involvement in limited terrorism, both because Indian Muslims from Kashmir clearly have committed terrorist acts and because the issue of Kashmir has at least some resonance in international jihadist pronouncements. There are several possible responses to the case of Kashmir. First, much of the terrorism in J&K comes from outside of India—that is, it is not committed by Indian Muslims.⁹⁵ Indian analysts, in systematically reviewing incidents of suicide attacks in Kashmir, suggest that they are overwhelmingly committed by foreign groups and aimed at “official” targets rather than indiscriminate terrorism.⁹⁶ Moreover, “terrorism” in Kashmir increased as the conflict began to be “internationalized” after the end of the Afghan conflict; further suggesting that it is not only Indian Kashmiris who are implicated in the terrorism. Another analyst notes that the number of terrorist incidents in Kashmir has declined in conjunction with a reduction in cross-border infiltration—again suggesting a link with external sources of terrorism in Kashmir.⁹⁷ Indeed, given the involvement of non-Indian Kashmiris as well as foreign nationals with links to wider international terrorism in the Kashmir conflict, one might expect Indian Muslims, Kashmiris and others, to be more implicated in international terrorism through links with these groups and individuals. There is ample

⁹⁵ B. Raman, for example, argues that “While Al Qaeda itself has not been active in India, four of the five Pakistani components of the IIF have been active in our territory and have been responsible for 80 per cent, if not more, of the terrorist incidents by *jihadi* elements in India.” “Al-Qaeda: The Threat to India,” May 2003. Furthermore, Mr. Raman points out that “There was no suicide terrorism in J&K before 1999. It has been imported into our territory since these organisations joined the IIF. Since 1999, there have been 46 suicide attacks on Indian territory, of which 44 are believed to have been carried out by these Pakistani organisations. Indigenous Kashmiri groups, not members of the IIF, were suspected only in the remaining two incidents.” *ibid*.

⁹⁶ See A.R. Mukhopadhyay, “The Terror Scenario in Europe,” *Strategic Analysis*, April 1, 2004, Vol. 28, No. 2., pp 311-331. And for an excellent review of attacks in Kashmir by a former Director General of the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Inspector General of the Indian force deployed to J & K, see E.N. Rammohan, “Terrorist Attacks and Suicide Bombers,” *USI Journal*, April 1, 2004 Vol. CXXXIV, No. 556, pp. 254-261.

⁹⁷ R. Swaminathan, “Terrorism 2005: An Indian Perspective,” *New Delhi Defense Watch*, February 1, 2005, Vol. 4, No. 6, pp. 25-29. “The most significant decline [in fatalities caused by insurgencies and terrorist violence] was in J& K, from 2,542 in 2003 to 1,810 in 2004. There has been a reduction (by about 60%, according to the Union home minister) in the scale of intrusions in recent months.”

evidence of militant groups seeking to recruit Indian Muslims outside of Kashmir to the broader Jihadi cause, but reportedly these groups have had relatively little success.

Second, large numbers of Indian Muslims from elsewhere in India have not joined the struggle in Kashmir, suggesting that it has more of a narrow ethno-nationalist basis rather than a religious or ideological resonance. Third, even Indian Kashmiri militants operating in Kashmir appear not to have taken their struggle beyond the region into India proper. The bottom-line appears to be that Kashmir poses an important challenge but does not necessarily undermine the case that Indian Muslims are only marginally involved in international terrorism, though much more careful empirical work must be done before reaching this conclusion.

A final explanation for the lack of Indian Muslim involvement in international terrorism may be that Indian Muslims are relatively un-radicalized when measured by several important variables including overarching ideologies, political and legal orientations, preferred forms of government, attitudes toward human rights, social agendas, and propensity for violence. Hence, the lack of Indian Muslim terrorism may emanate from the general lack of radicalization of the community. Again, considerable testing of this hypothesis would need to occur before reaching a final assessment.

EXPLAINING INDIAN MUSLIMS' RELATIVE NON-INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM

Based on the hypothesis that Indian Muslims are relatively un-radicalized, eschew involvement in international terrorism, and surprisingly under-involved in domestic terrorism, what factors might explain this hypothesis? Many explanations may be given for Indian Muslims' relative non-involvement in terrorism.

There are four major "clusters" of arguments that need to be evaluated and refined in order to arrive at a net assessment of the explanation for the proposed hypothesis. The first may be called the "minority vulnerability" explanation. The second attributes the relative non-involvement to democracy. The third considers the reason(s) for the non-involvement of Indian Muslims to be *sui generis*. A fourth major argument focuses on the

influence of Indian government policies—particularly in relation to the US. Each of these reasons, of course, has complex nuances and qualifications.

The Minority Vulnerability Argument

It may be argued that a major reason for Indian Muslims not engaging in terrorism stems from their vulnerability as a minority community. As one expert puts it: “...Indian Muslims are un-radicalized [relatively un-engaged in terrorism] not because of democracy or because they are somehow culturally predisposed towards political moderation but because they cannot afford to be anything else. The slightest perception that Indian Muslims were *en masse* pursuing a radical course would lead to their severe chastisement by the powerful Indian security apparatus combined with an increasingly militant Hindu majority population, as the case of Gujarat demonstrated. Other than the trivial case of the tiny Lakshadweep Islands, Kashmir is the only part of India in which Muslims constitute a majority, and consistent with the common-sense explanation that majority or minority status is the key factor, it is the only state that has seen sustained and widespread Islamic militancy. Indian Muslims have been radical where they can be, and have not been radical where they cannot be.”⁹⁸

Pankaj Mishra, in a similar vein, has argued that Indian Muslims are “too poor and downtrodden to join radical causes elsewhere”⁹⁹ A related argument is that the Indian Muslim community is too fractured to unite in radicalism.

There are several challenges that may be articulated about the “minority vulnerability” explanation. First, vulnerability to state security organizations and fear of retribution do not appear to curtail the actions of Muslims engaged in terrorism elsewhere—whether Muslims are in the majority or minority. Indeed, creating a backlash in a minority context in order to gain recruits and for other ends might even be a goal of radical Islamists operating in minority environments (e.g., England, the Philippines and Thailand). Second, it is not clear why Indian Muslims alone, as a minority community,

⁹⁸ Interview #3.

⁹⁹ Pankaj Mishra, “India’s Muslim Time Bomb,” *The New York Times*, September 17, 2003.

should be put off from terrorism when other Indian minority communities are not. Small segments of Sikh and Tamil minority communities have engaged in terrorist acts (including the assassination of two Prime Ministers) in the past. Third, if it is indeed true that the number of Indian Muslims engaged in domestic terrorism is increasing, as some allege including this particular commentator, then minority vulnerability does not appear to be stopping their activities. Indeed, feelings of heightened vulnerability may be inciting such terrorism.¹⁰⁰ Fourth, and specifically related to Kashmir, it is an odd argument indeed to suggest that people will revolt where they can, as if state security forces will keep out on account of it. Indeed, it appears that in Kashmir a small minority of militants both from within and outside are fighting amongst a co-religionist majority. In other words, it is, in the end, even in Kashmir, only a minority that is fighting. Another problem with Kashmir is how to explain periods in which there has not been a militancy or terrorism. In other words, minority status alone, without a grievance, surely cannot explain the turn to radicalism and terrorist acts.

And finally, as to Pankaj Mishra's comment about Indian Muslims being "too poor and downtrodden to join radical causes elsewhere", appears to run counter to at least some evidence suggesting that elsewhere "disenfranchised Muslims have blamed U.S. policies for their own countries' failure"¹⁰¹ and that such social marginalization actually breeds terrorism and radicalism at home and abroad.

The Democracy Argument

The argument has been made that it is India's democracy that accounts for the lack of Indian Muslim terrorism and radicalization.

Former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill's entire explanation for why Indian Muslims are not radical is that "[t]his all *says something important* [emphasis

¹⁰⁰ This is certainly the argument of Alexander Gordon.

¹⁰¹ "U.S. Strategy in the Muslim World After 9/11," RAND Research Brief.

added] about democratic processes and how they are a safety valve for extremist currents within societies.”¹⁰²

Tom Friedman has publicized this notion in his opinion columns. “Why is it you don't hear about Indian Muslims — who are a minority in this vast Hindu-dominated land — blaming America for all their problems or wanting to fly suicide planes into the Indian Parliament? Answer: Multi-ethnic, pluralistic, free-market democracy. To be sure, Indian Muslims have their frustrations, and have squared off over the years in violent clashes with Hindus, as has every other minority in India. But they live in a noisy, messy democracy, where opportunities and a political voice are open to them, and that makes a huge difference.”¹⁰³

One problem with the democracy argument is that it is not clear *what about democracy* accounts for the relative lack of Indian Muslims engagement in radicalism and terrorism. Is it about being able to participate in elections and vote? Is it about the fact that minority rights are protected—particularly Muslim personal law in the case of Indian Muslims? A second issue is the possibility that the exercise of democracy in India might have the effect of ultimately exacerbating terrorism by increasing communal tensions. Alexander Gordon has pointed out that, while at the national level the BJP has sought to woo Muslim votes or at least recast its ideology, “at the state level, BJP governments, and in some cases even BJP-leaning governments, have acted to ‘appease’ what they see as the Hindu vote.”¹⁰⁴ Some have claimed that this is the dynamic underlying communal violence in Gujarat. In essence, it is not clear precisely how democracy constrains or whether it in fact exacerbates the potential for violence.

The importance of the democracy argument cannot be underestimated. As a practical matter, U.S. policy currently emphasizes democracy as an important constraint or impediment to Muslim radicalism and terrorism. If this turns out to be true, it will

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Thomas L. Friedman, “Today’s News Quiz,” *The New York Times*, November 20, 2001.

¹⁰⁴ Alexander Gordon, p.22.

provide strong support for the continued pursuit of this policy objective. If it does not, then serious reassessment of this policy should be undertaken.

The Sui Generis Argument

Some have argued that “the absence of Indian Muslims in global terrorism is for the most part due to sui generis reasons that would be difficult, if not impossible, to reproduce in other national environments.”¹⁰⁵ Though not directly offering a sui generis explanation, B. Raman has argued that “This [non-involvement in terrorism] speaks highly of our Muslim community, our political leadership, our policy-makers and our security bureaucracy. The world has much to learn from India. How to continue to keep India such an oasis.”¹⁰⁶ This explanation, however, does not tell us much about the specific aspects of each of these unique variables.

There are other difficulties with the sui generis explanation. First, even if a phenomenon is said to be unique or “one of a kind” there should still be a reason—however unique. And it is not clear exactly what is the specific, “unique” reason for Indian Muslims relative lack of radicalism and involvement in international terrorism. Second, given that India possesses both some of the alleged drivers of Muslim radicalism and terrorism and some of the constraints, do these constraints and drivers not matter in the face of India’s unique characteristics? If so, how powerful must these unique factors be to negate the drivers and constraints that allegedly operate elsewhere?

Third, what are the possible variables of a sui generis explanation? Where might Indian uniqueness be discovered? Two variables deserve particular consideration.

The first is the historical development of Islam and Muslims in Indian history, including in the British colonial era. It has been argued that the way in which Islam and Muslims adapted to the coming of British rule and subsequently post-independence politics is unique and important in explaining the non-radicalism of the community.

¹⁰⁵ Review #1.

¹⁰⁶ B. Raman, “International Terrorism: Root Causes, Pretexts & Alibi,” Paper No. 1496, August 12, 2005.

Different analysts point to different elements of this history to explain non-radicalism. Some focus on the “moderate” traditions of India’s Muslims that derive not only from the prevalence of a Sufi influence, but also the acceptance of a non-dominant place in the country’s politics in return for the respect of Islam and Islamic laws.¹⁰⁷ Of course there are competing interpretations of this history with some analysts pointing out that India has a rich tradition of Muslim radicalism.¹⁰⁸

A second “unique” explanation deals with the question of Indian Muslim identity. Beyond religion, Indian Muslims reflect many of India’s other dizzying diversities of geography, language and even caste.¹⁰⁹ As the historian of Indian Muslims Mushirul Hasan has written “...most [Indian] Muslims take their commitment to Islam not only as one among other values, but also as something which is itself differentiated internally into a number of detailed commitments.”¹¹⁰ The point is that there are unique constraints to Indian Muslim radicalization because of the nature of Indian Muslims’ multiple and cross-cutting identities which cannot be found, much less replicated, elsewhere. However, there are difficulties with this explanation too. Islam has been overlaid on pre-existing religious and other traditions elsewhere (Indonesia comes immediately to mind), so this might not be a phenomenon unique to India.¹¹¹

The Absence of American Influence Argument

¹⁰⁷ On Sufism as a possible explanation, see William Dalrymple, “The Ecstasy of God’s Dancers,” *The New Statesman*, 13 December 2004, pp. 22-26; on the acceptance of a non-dominant role, see Mihir Bose, “British Muslims Forgetting their Roots,” *The Daily Telegraph*, August 23, 2005.

¹⁰⁸ See Charles Allen, “The Hidden Roots of Wahhabism in British India,” *World Policy Journal*, Summer 2005, pp. 87-93.

¹⁰⁹ For a discussion of caste and Indian Muslims see Salil Kader, “Social Stratification Among Muslims in India,” 15 June 2004, www.countercurrents.org.

¹¹⁰ Mushirul Hasan, *Legacy of a Divided Nation: India’s Muslims Since Independence*, Westview Press, 1997, p. 8-9.

¹¹¹ “After 11 September, there were some sporadic incidents of rioting in small towns after pictures of Osama Bin Laden were found,” according to Mushirul Hasan, a leading liberal Indian Muslim columnist in the *Indian Express*. He told the *Weekly*: “By and large, civil society here is not split along religious lines. Most people condemn the groups which attacked the Lok Sabha last week, and there is no particular sympathy for Kashmiri separatism from Muslims. There are no Muslim or Hindu views on this -- I personally view Kashmir as an integral part of the Indian state.” Muchkund “Who Listens to Bukhari?”

Another explanation is that there has been an “absence of American influence on Indian policy all through the Cold War years and, to a large extent, even now.”¹¹² In a sense this explanation would fit into the reasoning articulated by the U.S. Defense Science Board which draws the linkage between certain key countries without democracy and US support for them.¹¹³ While not a “unique” feature of India per se, this argument purports to explain Indian Muslims’ non-radicalism and non-involvement in terrorism in policy terms rather than any particular feature of a faith, nationality or community. This explanation is also part of a wider debate within the U.S. about the causes of international Muslim hostility against the United States.

As India’s leadership, both in the ruling Congress and opposition Bharatiya Janata parties, seek improved relationships with the United States, it will be important to evaluate whether there is an increase in Indian Muslim involvement in domestic and international terrorism in reaction.

ASSESSMENT OF EXPLANATIONS FOR INDIAN MUSLIMS’ NON-INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM

As noted at the outset, overall Indian Muslim participation in terrorism, including domestically, is quite limited. Moreover, and in particular, Indian Muslim involvement in international terrorism aimed at the U.S. is very limited. And, by a number of important criteria, Indian Muslims are not especially radicalized.¹¹⁴

Basically, while Indian Muslims appear to engage in domestic violence, including some instances of terrorism, largely related to issues of communal violence, they do not

¹¹² See Amulya Ganguli, “Why no Indian Muslim is in Al-Qaeda,” *The Herald Tribune*, July 31, 2005.

¹¹³ “If there is one overarching goal they share, it is the overthrow of what Islamists call the ‘apostate’ regimes: the tyrannies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and the Gulf states. They are the main target of the broader Islamist movement, as well as the actual fighter groups. The United States finds itself in the strategically awkward—and potentially dangerous—situation of being the longstanding prop and alliance partner of these authoritarian regimes. Without the U.S. these regimes could not survive. Thus the U.S. has strongly taken sides in a desperate struggle that is both broadly case for all Muslims and country-specific.” *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, September 2004, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, D.C.

appear animated by the virulent and intense anti-Americanism that is the essential basis of so much international terrorism. Why?

The hypothesis offered here is as follows. First, India's government generally has kept its distance from U.S. policies. Second, Indian Muslims do not find themselves under the repressive tyranny of an Indian state. India is regarded as democratic and independent. The real question is what precisely about democracy is most relevant. In the Indian case, one of the features is the high degree of self-determination given to the Muslim community through the recognition of Muslim personal law and the government's decision to let the community decide for itself about that law.¹¹⁵ It may also be added that Indian Muslims have a number of institutional avenues and a fairly robust civil society in order to pursue and vent grievances without necessarily turning to violence. Third, these factors mean there is no strong *push* from within the Indian Muslim community for radicalism or international terrorism. A fourth factor is that there is no strong *pull* for Indian Muslim radicalism and international terrorism either. As B. Raman has noted Al-Qaeda statements "have been intriguingly free of references to India."¹¹⁶ The reason(s) for this lack of "pull" is unclear. Perhaps India is not seen by Al-Qaeda as an "apostate" state supported by the U.S.

In essence, the factors that constrain Indian Muslims' radicalization outweigh the purported causes of Muslim radicalism (which also exist in India) such as intra-Islamic community disputes, a conservative religious leadership, political alienation, socio-economic marginalization, dislocations of globalization, a sense of oppression, a

¹¹⁴ The reasons for lack of terrorism may be different than the reasons for lack of radicalization.

¹¹⁵ For example, while rejecting separate courts for Muslims, Union Law Minister H.R. Bhardwaj argued that "If anything wrong was being done under the Shariat Law, the community should address it. They should decide whether they would be governed by fatwas or not." On the controversial question of reforming personal laws, the Minister said "We should not try to force any codification of these laws...codification of personal laws can help a community but that community must first prepare itself for the change. When a community is not ready, we cannot force it on them." As to the prospect of creating a uniform civil code, Union Minister Bhardwaj stated that "we will welcome it if the minority community accepts it. Without the consent of the minority community, it will be difficult to implement it. We have changed the laws for Hindus but the Muslims have to desire the change." Cited in J. Venkatesan, "No question of Islamic courts, says Bhardwaj," *The Hindu*, August 18, 2005.

¹¹⁶ B. Raman, "Terrorist Strike at Ayodhya," Paper No. 1440, June 7, 2005.

narrative of grievance and loss, an ongoing insurgency with an Islamic dimension, majority chauvinism and suspicion, increasingly close relations with the U.S., and a history of Islamic ideological extremism. Moreover, characteristics particular and intrinsic to Indian politics, society, and institutions including the state's approach to the management of religious minorities are also critically important in explaining the non-radicalization of India's Muslims.

PAKISTANI MADRASA¹¹⁷

MR. AZHAR HUSSAIN

INTRODUCTION

According to official estimates, there are around 12,000 madrasas, (maybe more), providing rudimentary schooling, free religious education, shelter and food to about one million boys from poor families in Pakistan.

The mission of most madrasas in Pakistan is to prepare students for religious duties. To say that Pakistani religious schools are conservative in their outlook is to state the obvious, and these schools make no excuses for being strictly religious. In fact, many administrators of madrasas state that to “create a religious scholar is the noblest act in the eyes of God.” The *ulema* (religious leaders) bear the responsibility for creating a universal Muslim unity, spreading the message of Islam, and constantly striving to integrate religious theology and practice into the fabric of society -- even through political means, if necessary. As a result, producing religious leaders through religious institutions that teach strictly religious texts is intensely pursued and defended. Students in madrasas, therefore, first need to be grounded in religious texts, a process typically requiring eight years of study (see section on General Curriculum below). Upon completion of this religious study, if the student wishes, he or she may pursue the study of contemporary subjects. This approach makes it difficult to integrate contemporary subjects into existing curricula at the level of basic education. Most Pakistani madrasa administrators argue that religious topics covered in madrasa curricula are sufficient for students. It is not necessary for students to learn what they call “worldly learning” (science, math, geography, etc.).

¹¹⁷ Substantial portion of this report is based on the authors first hand experience working with Pakistani Madrasas.



In contrast to this argument of strictly teaching religion in madrasas, the teachings of Islam are fundamentally gnostic: Islam holds *all* forms of knowledge as sacred. The emphasis on learning in Islam is conveyed materially in the central symbol of the Book (i.e., the Quran) as the revealed source of both divine and human wisdom. In this way, secular learning came to be seen as inseparable from religious practice.

Here are a few excerpts from the Holy Quran that serve as examples of the emphasis placed on the quest for knowledge and learning:

“And he has subjected to you, (as a gift) from him, all that is in the heaven and on earth: behold, in that are messages indeed for those who think” (Quran 45:13)


In the Chapter "The Clot," the sacredness of knowledge is recognized in the following lines:

Read: “In the name of thy Lord who creates, created man from a clot. Read: And thy Lord is the Most Bounteous, Who teach by the pen, Teaches man that which he knew not.”

Several other verses in the Quran support the sacred nature of knowledge. One of God's names, scientia, *ilm* in fact means "He who knows," or *al-alim*. Indeed, Muhammad reiterated the teachings of the Quran by stating that the acquisition of knowledge to the limits of one's abilities represents a critical part of a person's religious duties and faith.

Generally, the appeal of a madrasa education is enticing to both religious and non-religious Pakistanis, whether they are educated or not. Many families feel that they should send at least one son to a madrasa because, according to traditional belief, if an individual memorizes the Quran, it ensures him and seven generations of his forbears a place in heaven.

Scholars in an Islamic Library



CONDENSED HISTORY OF THE MADRASA

The last prophet's mosque, located in the holy city of Medina, was the first madrasa. That mosque, founded in 653, contained connecting buildings that served as a hostel for poor students and for students who came to study from abroad for religious studies. By the year 900, nearly every mosque had a similar elementary school for both boys and girls. The only subjects taught at that time were religion and arithmetic. Students who wanted to study anything else were sent to bigger mosques where they could study biology, algebra, history, law and theology. By the ninth century, the University of Cordoba, in Spain, which was a Muslim university at that time, had eleven thousand students enrolled in full-time studies. Oxford University and other European educational institutions did not come into existence until in the 12th and 13th centuries.

Madrasas have been a part of a magnificent tradition of the Islamic world. And historically, they have served as a guiding light for civilizations that have used the madrasa as a role model to set up their own education systems.

In *The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West*, George Makdisi has demonstrated how terms such as having ‘fellows’ holding a ‘chair,’ or students ‘reading’ a subject and obtaining ‘degrees,’ as well as practices such as inaugural lectures, the oral defense, even mortar boards, tassels, and academic robes, can all be traced back to the practices of madrasas. It was in cities not far from Islamic Spain and Sicily—Salerno, Naples, Bologna, and Montpellier— that the first universities in Christendom were developed.

Here, one also will note an example of Italian Abbot Toderini, circa 1393 A.D., who had the opportunity to observe Ottoman Turkish madrasas in detail. He says:

What makes Ottoman Muslim scholars knowledgeable and reliable is the fact that there are not underdeveloped academic pursuits to be found among them and that they all know Arabic and Persian.” *He then compared madrasa education with European and said:* “They are more advanced than those in all of the nations in Europe with respect to liberalite and grandeur. [sic]

Christian scholars such as Adelard of Bath would travel to the Islamic world to study the advanced learning available in the madrasas. Alvaro of Córdoba, a Mozarab, or Christian living under Muslim rule, wrote in the fourteenth century:

My fellow Christians delight in the poems and romances of the Arabs; they study the work of Muslim theologians and philosophers, not in order to refute them, but to acquire a correct and elegant Arabic style. Where today can a layman be found who reads Latin commentaries on Holy scripture? At the mention of Christian books they disdainfully protest that such works are unworthy of their notice.

More recent history of madrasas, however, paints a different picture of academic excellence and progress. After frequent defeat by and the loss of vast resources and lands to Europeans, Muslims turned to protecting their identities and cultural heritage. According to a renowned madrasa leader: “We must regain our culture and identity. We will have to keep fighting the foreigners who have taken advantage of us because we trusted them. We must never trust their intentions.”

DarulUloom, Deoband, India



Following the Indian 1857 Mutiny against British occupation by Muslims and Hindus, the British punished the Muslims most severely by prescribing the following collective punishment for Muslim communities: They no longer could take part in the public life of India under British rule and were shunned from participating in governance of the country once ruled by Muslims. To actively fight the British oppression of Muslims, an important institution opened in Deoband, India, in 1857. This Deobandi madrasa was founded by students who formerly had studied in the Delhi madrasa, which the British had destroyed completely and punished its leaders. Two primary issues motivated the leaders of this Deobandi madrasa: 1) a commitment to indoctrinate Muslim youths in Islamic values, and 2) a commitment to instill an intense loathing towards occupiers (the British, in this case). At present, the legacy of the Deobandi madrasa is an internalized distrust and ongoing attempt to prove the West to be an inferior, immoral civilization. These are intrinsic values now taught and practiced by madrasas in Pakistan as well. From their inception, madrasas distinguished secular, worldly knowledge from strictly Islamic, spiritual knowledge. They have also strictly forbidden Western models of education and the study of any subjects not related to the study of Quran. Hence, any

Western influence and teachings would be viewed as undesirable and, in fact, would trigger hostility towards any person who shows flexibility towards making the attempt to understand aspects of Western ways.

Currently, the website of the Deoband madrasa cites: "the determination to free India from the English yoke." The Deobandi madrasa also takes much credit for uplifting the Muslim spirit and giving South Asia's Muslims the confidence to fight the forces of imperial colonists. The website continues: "Political decline had reduced Muslims to a state of helplessness and misery, distraction and anxiety; by the establishment of Darul-Uloom, Deoband, they received equanimity, composure and stability." The Deoband movement, which started in 1857 to dislodge the British Raj, is still very much felt in the region. Afghan and Pakistani madrasas take much inspiration from what was started more than a century ago. The Deobandi madrasa in Karachi, Pakistan, receives inspiration from the 1857 struggle against imperialism and states in its website that "the revolutionary freedom-lovers who rose up there were the products of the grace from the spring of thought of Deoband and we must continue to develop such products to fight the onslaught of western values in our country." Conflicts caused by religious ideologies from hundreds of years ago are being revived today by groups who are convinced that if they don't destroy today's modern societies, their traditional ways of life will be destroyed by the Western values that are being adopted by many Islamic societies.

Besides overt acts of terrorism, there are many other ways traditional societies are fighting back to protect their identities from perceived threats to their way of life and their cultures from Western imperialism. Classrooms across the Muslim world have become a major battleground in combating perceived occupation by the Western world. Well-known examples are Palestinian schools where "...textbooks glorify jihad and martyrdom as the only legitimate means to liberating Palestine." It is, however, important to note that Israel has been cited by the Human Rights report for contributing to the problem: "The Israeli government operates two separate school systems, one for Jewish children and one for Palestinian Arab children. Discrimination against Palestinian Arab children colors every aspect of the two systems."

OVERVIEW OF PAKISTANI MADRASAS

Currently, Pakistan's literacy rate is 42.7 percent, and the percentage of school-aged children who have never attended school is 53 percent for boys and 61 percent for

girls. A system for delivering quality education needs to be developed to improve this low rate of literacy.

Pakistan is one of only a few countries that actually spends less than 2% of its Gross National Product (GNP) on education. The average Pakistani boy receives a fifth-grade education, while the average girl receives only a third-grade education. In short, Pakistan has failed to provide its citizens basic educational privileges. This education gap creates much demand for any institution that has a semblance of an educational program – and some madrasas are thriving for no other reason than the Pakistani poor have no other options for educating their youth. Another major reason for the expansion of



madrasas is that Mr. Zia-ul-Haq, who was the Chief Marshal Law Administrator, allowed the government departments and armed forces to recruit madrasa graduates into lower posts – which, in turn, allowed them to build influence in society. In addition, Mr. Haq, a devout Deobandi (a sect similar to Wahabism), found Wahabi doctrine very attractive. As a result, he allowed Saudi money to flow freely to support the spread and growth of madrasas headed by Deoband-Wahabi ideologues.

Despite the rapid growth of madrasas in the wake of Saudi funding, the radicalization of the madrasa element really escalated during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. During this time, madrasas were used to instill the belief that the communists were “evil” and that Communism was an anti-Islamic ideology. Saudi Arabia, with the help of U.S. intelligence services, promoted a jihad against the communist evil in Afghanistan. Some of the most effective media used were textbooks denouncing communism and other materials that instigated the young to fight against this “evil.” According to Mr. Ishtiaq Ahmed, Associate Professor of Political Science at Stockholm University, “The joint CIA-Saudi initiative resulted in a proliferation of madrasas, regardless of the genuine need for religious scholars. Thanks to the CIA’s \$51

million U.S. grant to the University of Nebraska to produce textbooks glorifying jihad, killing, maiming and bombing other human beings was made sufficiently “entertaining.” “Sadism” now could be cultivated as a virtue. When the Taliban came to power, these textbooks were distributed for use in schools.

Critics of the madrasas, like a Washington Post report, focused on the “violent images and Militant Islamic teachings,” such as a picture of a jihadi carrying a gun with his head blown off, the image accompanied by a Quranic verse and a tribute to the Mujahideen who were “obedient to Allah.... Such men will sacrifice their wealth and their life to impose Islamic law.” Yet, at the height of the Afghan jihad movement, former President Ronald Reagan is said to have praised Mujahideen madrasa students as “the moral equivalent of the founding fathers [of America].” At that time, many more Pakistani madrasa doors were opened to the poor masses. The new “education” they received focused on instilling hatred of the Soviets and urging students to kill them or drive them out of Afghanistan. Later, when these hero fighters finally drove the Soviets from their country, they shifted the focus of the anti-Soviet education they had received to include any non-Muslims on their land and to any real or imagined occupational ambitions by all Western nations.

The subsequent misinformation campaigns directed at the madrasas increasingly disillusioned madrasa administrators to the degree that, today, they believe, no government is to be trusted. In this environment, it is difficult to believe that the United States could win the confidence of Pakistani madrasa supporters, especially in light of the dubious strategies employed by the U.S. government as well as the Pakistani government’s use of religious institutions to further its own political agendas.

Working with madrasa administrators and teachers, one finds many who fought against the Soviets and still are willing to defend the Islamic way of life with their lives. At present, the enemy of Muslim identity is not the former Soviet Union but the entrusted friend of the Pakistani government – the United States. The sense of having been betrayed by the United States has instilled deep distrust and made it unlikely that madrasa educators and their constituents would see any outsiders whom could be relied upon. In turn, the Pakistani government, is looked upon as a traitor to its own national interest. In such an environment, madrasas are the sole institutions that are left to safeguard the identity of Muslims.

It is interesting to note that the institution of the religious madrasa is looked upon



as repressive and backward in secular and Western circles; yet to many Pakistanis, this institution represents freedom from imperial repression and is viewed as a protector of Islamic cultural identity. Many madrasa administrators proudly declare that it is because of their ancestors' struggle, begun in India, that Muslims were liberated from colonial occupation.

The public education system also is looked upon as an agent of "Americanization" since secular topics are studied there and many of its students lean towards modernity, which in the minds of madrasa supporters is synonymous with Westernization. Another notable cultural feature of madrasa supporters is a sense of victimization. A very common concern, even among ordinary Pakistanis, is that someone or some nations are conspiring against "us Pakistanis." Madrasa staff especially have fallen victim to this syndrome, suspecting all Western nations of making grand plans to defeat Muslims: what they see as an "American conspiracy to cause chaos in Pakistan." When asked just how Americans create such chaos, the response varies from Sunni-Shia violence being ignited by Americans to blaming most other domestic ills facing Pakistani society on America.

Another factor contributing to defensiveness is the fact that the public education system is not perceived as being either indigenous or sensitive to Muslim identity. During the colonial period, Europeans imposed their version of education on the Muslim masses. Moreover, there was little opportunity for economic security or social mobility within the colonial system unless one had a secular, European-style education. Thus, religious forms of education came to be denigrated and increasingly marginalized. The madrasas' resentment toward the government is real because the government represents the very system (that is, secular, European public education) that many sub-continental madrasas were created to counter. Hence, a large part of the hostility towards America and the

West are legacies of imperial expansion and the deep prejudicial and classicist traditions promoted by those Western powers. It is ironic that the United States and Britain are critical of madrasas, reflecting the blatant prejudices of the West, when the madrasas are, in a sense, the West's legacy coming back to haunt it.

However, blaming all ills of Muslim society on Westerners is not going to alleviate the problems of poverty, under-education, and depressed living conditions that prevail in most Muslim countries. As Uzma Anzar states in her paper, *“Islamic education: A brief history of Madrasa”*:

“. . . the increased isolation and ghettoization of Islam is the result of a reactionary, rather than precautionary stance taken by the ulema.... Closing the doors to wider aspects of learning, which were the hallmark of advanced Muslim civilization, has pushed Islamic education into an abyss. When faced with utter defeat and disgust, Muslim leaders have often called for aggressive means of making their point.”

THE MINDSET OF THE MADRASA STUDENT

The education and upbringing of young madrasa students in Islamic institutions emphasizes the rejection of much of what this world has to offer them. They are constantly reminded that only by abandoning the world and disassociating from elements of modern life can one truly be a pious Muslim and a true believer. They are taught to be worshippers of God only. They come to rely on God so much that they no longer dream of or dedicate their efforts to building and maintaining a sense of the well-being of themselves or others in this world. In fact, these students are reminded not to worry about their material well-being, as God already predetermines man's sustenance.

When I asked several parents who are sending their children to live at the madrasa boarding schools how they know their children are being properly fed and cared for, many responded with variations of, “God brought the children into this world and He will take care of them.”

Almost all of the students I talked to frowned upon the idea of advancement, modernity, self-achievement and career enhancement. Why? Because, according to them, focusing on these lesser matters takes one away from serving God. Material comforts are considered both secular and “American.” The term “Americanized” is used as a

derogatory term to describe people who are self-absorbed and focused solely on the material things in life. In this environment, it is easy to understand why people in madrasas don't make an effort to improve their own living conditions, and why they reject the idea that one must work to improve his or her environment: God will provide.

PEDAGOGY IN THE MADRASA

The way a particular conflict is taught in the classroom can either support that conflict and exacerbate the chances of peace movement or create abilities of coexistence where stereotypes and biases are challenged. The methodology of teaching must take a nuanced approach and teach historical events where both perspectives are incorporated into a lesson.

Washington Post

In the majority of madrasas in Pakistan emphasis is placed on rote memorization, a process that relies on routine repetition, often without comprehension of the meaning behind the text being read. Upon interviewing a *Hafiz*, a student who has memorized the entire Quran, about how he managed to accomplish this monumental task, his response provided insights to the madrasa pedagogical approach. In order to encourage his memorization, he was disciplined severely: when he could not memorize a part assigned to him, he was beaten with a long flexible stick and asked to stand on one foot for long periods of time. At other points, he was assume a seated position but without a chair. When he fell, he had to resume the same position over and over again until he could no longer stand, at which point he was left lying where he fell. Another student described his experience being disciplined as "very good for me" as now, he said, no one can hurt him physically: "I have been beaten so much that I feel no pain when I am hit on my face." Interestingly enough, both of the above students now are teaching in madrasas and endorse their teachers' approaches to discipline.



Since critical thinking is discouraged, students must listen to their teachers and not only respect, but adopt the teaching exactly as it is taught. Intolerance is taught against people with unorthodox thoughts as well as those people who self-interpret concepts or show individuality of thinking. This approach to teaching creates one-dimensional adherence to a worldview that is simplistic in nature and naive. Students are not equipped to think critically or to consider other perspectives. When talking to teachers and students, care must be taken not to mention any ideas affiliated with the West, for that will unleash a fierce response and immediately brand the speaker as “Americanized.” These students then become the targets of strange looks and hostile commentary.

The pedagogy of madrasas is central in shaping the students’ attitude towards the way in which he approaches new ideas and operationalizes what he learns. Because all madrasa learning is didactic and does not provide room for questioning, challenging, or reflecting on ideas, students fail to learn how to interact with people who are different from themselves or have a different life philosophy. Isolated from the larger society, they turn further into their own circle of colleagues and live in a state of perpetual isolation. Alternative information is shunned making it easy to convince individuals to absolutely reaffirm what they learn from the madrasa’s teachings. “I owe all to this madrasa, and will give my last drop of blood to save Islam and be honorable in my teacher’s eye.”

Another idea successfully taught by the madrasa is the notion that male madrasa students are superior to women and that women themselves must be made to accept their inferior status. A fourteen-year-old male madrasa student said, in the company of his other colleagues, that women should be allowed only to take care of their families. When he sees women outside of their houses, he added, “I like to yell at them and tell them to get back into their houses ...my friend and I sometime make them afraid to be outside walking in the market.”

The madrasa curriculum studied for this report is typical: the subjects taught were deeply religious and the teachers use an ancient pedagogical approach. The emphasis is on rote memorization, learning text word-by-word and regurgitating it back just as it was read. This memorization technique has been passed on since the Prophet’s time and was originally intended to accurately transmit the Quran by maintaining the authenticity of the original from generation to generation. The problem arises when this technique is used in teaching other courses, with students memorizing parts of a book so they can pass the final exam and proceed to the next level.

A typical approach is: students are asked to read a part of the Quran or other religious texts, the teacher explains the concept in Urdu and editorializes his understanding of what the student has read, only then does he ask if the students have any questions. Most students, of course, did not ask questions, in part because the teacher already had expressed what he thought of the issue and preempted creative debate. Many times, the teacher would ask the students to define what a certain idea meant, but the exchange often was stifled by the overwhelming sense that the student would be corrected no matter how complete of an answer he would provide. Hence, students who reluctantly answered were careful not to be “wrong.”

One madrasa educator, who taught principles of jurisprudence to students in Lahore, suggested that the curriculum needs revision and should place a greater emphasis on Islamic history. When asked if contemporary courses should be added to the existing curriculum, he responded with a conditional “yes,” his greatest reservation being that he did not want to secularize the madrasas by teaching “worldly subjects.” Madrasa administrators, however, welcomed any opportunity for teacher developmental programs, provided the offer of such help did not involve any cost to them.

Madrasa administrators were adamant that their curriculums were not teaching violence, intolerance of others, or anti-Westernization. But what most of the madrasa administrators fail to understand is that their students (who are mostly young, uneducated, and largely dependent on the madrasa for their daily sustenance) are easily influenced by the ideas and prejudices of their institutions and administrators. They unconditionally accept such prejudices because that is all they know; and they are expected not to question authority, elders or especially, their teachers. Yet many teachers simply did not accept the idea that they have the ability to influence students merely by expressing their opinions. In many ways, these madrasas, while trying hard not to teach intolerance, fail to recognize the power and influence they have over their students. *“It is all a big conspiracy by others,”* said one madrasa administrator, adding, *“And we want to make sure our students can understand that.”* He continued by saying, *“Muslims who don’t believe that other nations and regimes are out there to destroy Islam are themselves blinded with greed and have lost their Muslim identity.”*

The interviews with madrasa administrators also revealed several under-valued or totally rejected skill sets that were badly needed in order to help students succeed in the wider world. Among others, these include the ability for self-discovery through reading a variety of materials, asking challenging questions and disagreeing with questionable assumptions – even when those come from teachers. Such skills could sharpen the ability of students to understand issues and circumstances. This approach could be further enhanced by exposing students to models of successful problem-solving that demonstrate how others deal with everyday problems and by introducing them to places, situations, and relationships that they might not otherwise encounter through field trips, study tours, etc.

I interviewed one madrasa leader, who is currently the administrator of six large Ahle-Hadith madrasas (with about 700 students each). His mother is the administrator of a modern madrasa for girls (enrolling about 400 students). He is a graduate of his father’s madrasa, is studying for his master’s degree in computer science at Lahore University, and is considered an upcoming leader in madrasa education. He is clear about his reason for teaching students religion first. According to his analogy, the relationship between faith and reason (or worldly knowledge) is like a string and a kite where faith is the string that guides the kite. If the string is severed, the kite will fly off in any direction. From his perspective, to make these students *“ideal Muslims who will not hesitate to sacrifice their*

lives for the cause of Islam” is yet another reason to focus primary education on religious texts. When asked why anyone would have to sacrifice their life to protect Islam, he responded, *“Islam is threatened and needs protection by real Muslims, not the Muslims who talk from both sides of their mouth.”* The very idea that Islam is threatened is a major cause of concern for this leader and drives him to develop materials for his students that will convince them of the fact that *“Islam is under attack.”*

Most madrasas have various levels (primary, middle, high) that teach the Quran, Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, logic, and *Hadith*. Higher level madrasas offer graduate and post-graduate degrees in such subjects as mastery in theory, mastery in Islamic literature, mastery in *fiqh* (philosophy) and theology. The depth of religious teaching varies by level. The primary and middle-level madrasas produce Hafiz-e-Koran (the one who memorizes the Quran fully) and/or Qari (the one who can recite the Quran with good pronunciation and in a melodic tone). The high-level madrasas usually produce Alims (Islamic scholars) who are certified by a notable madrasa. Such degrees are regarded as representing the equivalent of a master’s degree in Islamic studies from a regular Pakistani university. However, these graduates are not considered fit for the regular job market or mainstream educational institutions. This issue was raised with faculty from a few Pakistani universities. Typical of the response, one professor stated: *“the way madrasa students are learning does not provide for them a foundation for critical thinking, querying, and exploring in-depth through research, analysis and creative thinking.”*

Ms. Shukat Jamila, Director of the Islamic Studies Program at Lahore University, confirmed this generally negative assessment of the quality of madrasa students. Ms. Jamila works with many students who have graduated from madrasas and are now trying to attain their bachelor’s or master’s degree at Lahore University. According to Ms. Jamila, madrasa graduates who attend her university programs have “inferior skills in research, analysis of texts, and in reading skills.” She also asserted that the madrasa students struggle to keep pace in regular subjects because they have not had exposure to basic courses and lack an educational background that emphasizes the development of analytical skills.

GENERAL CURRICULUM

The curriculum, as generally practiced by most Pakistani madrasas, includes the following:

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| First Year: | Biography of the Prophet Muhammad (Syrat), Grammar and Conjugation (Sarf), Syntax (Nahv), some Arabic literature, Chirography, and Chant illation (Tajvid). |
| Second Year: | Grammar and Conjugation (Sarf), Syntax (Nahv), Arabic literature, Jurisprudence (Fiqa), Logic, Chirography (Khush-Navisi), Chant illation (David)... |
| Third Year: | Koranic Exegesis (Critical explanation or analysis of the text), Hadith, Islamic brotherhood, Syntax (Nahv), Arabic literature, Jurisprudence (Fiqa), Logic, Chirography (Khush-navisi), Chant illation (Tajvid), and the Islamic movement (especially in Subcontinent) . |
| | |
| Fourth Year: | Koranic Exegesis (Critical explanation or analysis of the text), Jurisprudence (Fiqa), Principles of jurisprudence, Rhetorics, Hadith, Islamic brotherhood, Syntax (Nahv), Arabic literature, Logic, Chirography (Khush-navisi), Chant illation (Tajvid), and the Islamic movement (especially in the Subcontinent) |
| Fifth Year: | Beliefs (Aqa'id), Koranic Exegesis (Critical explanation or analysis of the text), Jurisprudence (Fiqa), Principles of jurisprudence, Rhetoric , Hadith, Islamic brotherhood, Syntax (Nahv), Arabic literature, Logic, Chirography (Khush-navisi), Chant illation (Tajvid), and History (mostly limited to Muslim Indian Kings) |
| Sixth Year: | Interpretation of the Koran, Principles of jurisprudence and interpretation, Arabic literature, Philosophy, Chant illation (Tajvid), and study of the Prophet's traditions. |
| Seventh Year: | Sayings of the Prophet, jurisprudence, Belief, Responsibility (Fra'iz), Urdu Text, Chant illation |
| Eighth Year: | 10 or more books by various authors on the sayings of the Prophet. Four to eight written reports are required to graduate. |

As can be deduced from the above, the mission of most Pakistani madrasas is to prepare students for religious duties by teaching strictly religious content and requiring constant repetition of that content.

Many Muslim scholars traditionally have refuted the way Quran is taught in madrasas: here is one example from fourteenth-century Arabic historian and educator Ibn Khaldun who said:

“The fact that the people of Ifriqiyah (Africa) and the Maghrib (West) restrict themselves to the Qur'an makes them altogether incapable of mastering the linguistic habit. For as a rule, no (scholarly) habit can originate from the (study of the) Qur'an because no human being can produce anything like it. Thus, human beings are unable to employ or imitate its ways (uslub,) and they also can form no habit in any other respect. Consequently, a person who knows (the Qur'an) does not acquire the habit of the Arabic language.”

PREVAILING PERSPECTIVE

Just by reading some of the newsletters from the madrasas, it was easy to see how messages of intolerance take hold. For example, in one article entitled “*Terrorism, Islam and Pakistan*,” the authors differentiate between types of terrorist activities and try to present a balanced view of the negative effects of terrorism. In the process, however, they also place the blame for these terrorist activities on the United States, Israel, and the government of Pakistan. The article continues by advising readers not to trust anything these say. The newsletter’s other articles are equally provocative, providing, for example, explanations for why Muslims are committing acts of terrorism.

Another well-known newsletter from the Wafaqul-ul-Madaris girls’ madrasa addresses “*Western education policy and its poison*” and highlights the historical injustices of Western powers towards Muslims. It then goes on to suggest how “*there is a plan to do the same by imposing western educational standards on Muslim countries.*” Newsletters from different madrasas, such as the Deobandi and other sects, are similarly focused on the West’s culpability for Muslim acts of terror. There appears to be a consensus that Islamic extremism stems from the foreign policy of United States, with almost no soul-searching about their own contributions to the problem. Similar explanations are offered for sectarian violence in Pakistan.

CREATING HOPE AND HEALING PAST WOUNDS

Western approaches tend to focus on the character of madrasas as extremist and reactionary. But very little attention is paid to the important role of these schools' perception of past and recent historical injustices towards Muslims by the West. Talking to madrasa administrators and students revealed a common theme of discontent: *"they don't respect and honor our culture and our religion. They only want us to look inward as though they are pure...they are criminals."* What must be addressed and acknowledged is the level of injury exerted on Muslim identity through past interactions between Muslims and the West. In the absence of such acknowledgment, the madrasa will follow the clear advice of the Quran to fight injustice:

"Oh you who believe, stand up firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even if it be against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be against rich or poor; for God can best protect both. Do not follow any passion, lest you not be just. And if you distort or decline to do justice, verily God is well-acquainted with all that you do."
(Quran 4:135)

What to Do

One promising approach is the emerging partnership between a U.S.-based think tank, the International center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) and a Pakistani-based organization, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS). The organizations already have completed four fifteen-day workshops on "Islam and Contemporary Thought" that were designed to acquaint madrasa administrators and senior faculty with the scientific and social disciplines as well as with issues of religious tolerance and human rights. The workshop itself was participatory in nature and encouraged dialogue and discussion in addition to critical analysis. Although there were deep doubts and suspicions to be overcome, program participants soon warmed to the task; and all who came stayed for the full two weeks. Not only was there an openness to studying liberal arts and the sciences, but the participants expressed a desire for training in conflict resolution skills that could enable them to reach out to the other religious sects and other countries. They even expressed an interest in understanding the American point of view (although they are instinctively opposed to it, they are honest enough to admit that they don't really know what it is). Among other things, these workshops placed a heavy emphasis on interactive pedagogical techniques.

The ICRD/IPS madrasa reform project already has met huge success, with madrasa participants who attended a ten-day ICRD/IPS seminar inviting IPS to conduct similar workshops and educational programs in their own madrasas for all their teaching staff. Five such workshops have been conducted so far within madrasas. The next phase will be to conduct a “training the trainers” session where madrasa teachers will be trained to do similar workshops for other madrasas. In essence, this process is becoming more of the madrasa’s own initiative, with proposed changes to their curriculum and mindset coming from their own educators.

The overall assumptions of this program are:

- Madrasa administrators and teachers must take the ownership in bringing about changes to their environment.
- Reducing madrasa faculty and administrators’ intolerance, bias and stereotypes will lead to a better, more rational and objective understanding of “others.”
- Anger can be good and also can be very destructive...teaching dynamics of anger management can have significant impact on madrasa administrators’ ability to teach history and other subjects in an objective way.
- Develop teacher competencies in observation, analysis and reflection so that administrators identify issues within the madrasa education system, adopt healthy pedagogical approaches and understand the dynamics of conflict.

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CHANGING TACTICS OF JIHAD ORGANIZATIONS IN PAKISTAN

BY: MUHAMMAD AMIR RANA

The Musharraf-led Government has made an all out efforts to stamp out Jihadists, but they survive in today's Pakistan. They have adopted new plans and tactics for their survival. Before the crackdown against jihadi organizations, 104 such organizations were active while only 25 remain active and are working under new plans.¹¹⁸

The Muttahida Jihad Council (MJC)¹¹⁹, the alliance of Kashmiri jihadi organizations was restructured in January 2004. The structure of the new body is a unique one. Six smaller alliances were formed within the MJC, with each alliance representing various organizations. The logic behind the restructuring was that:

- 1) jihad organizations will no longer use the words jihad, Lashkar, jaish or mujahideen in their names allowing them to appear more political than militant.¹²⁰
- 2) In the new structure, leaders of the MJC stressed the principle of unity. Five Pakistan-based organizations Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Brigade 313, Al-Bader Mujahideen and Jamaatul Furqan, which were not previously part of MJC, have been included in the new structure.¹²¹
- 3) Secrecy was the third important feature of the new MJC and its leaders agreed that no member organization would issue any press statement nor disclose the activities and operations of the parent group.

This surprising move aimed to counter international pressure and remove the obstacles created by the government. However, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the response from the Jihadists was not so systematic. After the fall of the Taliban, jihadi

¹¹⁸ There are 244 religious organizations working in Pakistan out of which 25 are political in nature and participate in elections, 145 have sectarian bases, 12 don't believe in democracy and wants to set up Khalafah and 104 are jihadi.

¹¹⁹ Muttahid Jihad Council (Untied jihad council) was established in 1991 to solve the internal differences among different jihad groups and for adopting joint operational strategies.

¹²⁰ President General Musharraf in his historic January 12, 2002 speech had announced that all the organizations, which have the words like jihad, lashkar, jaish or mujahideen will be banned. He had said "There is no need for Lashkars (Army), Jaishs (Armed group) and "Mujahideen" (Holy Warriors) in presence of a regular Army.

¹²¹ Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jiash-e-Muhammad, Brigade 313 and Al-Bader Mujahideen are considered as important jihad organizations but they were not the part of MJC because their leadership is Pakistan based. All these organizations were making efforts to become the member of MJC and were adjusted in the new structure.

organizations suffered greatly as their commanders and hundreds of their foot soldiers were killed in fighting against the US forces. President Musharraf also banned several groups and security agencies, arrested thousands of their members, sealed their offices, and banned their fund raising campaigns.¹²²

Smaller organizations could not survive in these circumstances and either merged with the big organizations or dissolved¹²³. Even the big organizations were finding it hard to survive in the crisis. The atmosphere triggered mistrust and panic that caused division amongst Jihadists. Jaish-e-Muhammad split on the issue of whether attacks on Christian missions and foreign interests were legitimate or not.¹²⁴ A group of Harkatul Mujahideen that wanted to continue targeting foreign interests parted ways with their organization after disagreeing with the high command that believed that it should only focus on trends in Kashmir.¹²⁵ Various groups blamed one another for being used by security agencies and some of them went to the extent of labeling others as infidels.

Markaz-Al-Daawa tul Ershad, Lashkar-e-Taiba's (LeT) sister organization, was an exception that realized the gravity of the situation just after the shift in Pakistan's pro-jihad policy. It renamed itself the Jamaatud Daawa and dissolved LeT's Pakistan chapter, shifting its offices to Azad Kashmir.¹²⁶

¹²² Five organizations; Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami, Harkatul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat Muhammadi suffered a lot and some of their important commanders and hundreds of workers were killed. Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami's 340, Harkatul Mujahideen's 79, Jaish-e-Muhammad claims that 36 and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi's 27 militants were killed; 14 of Harkatul Mujahideen, 7 of Jaish-e-Muhammad and 11 of Harkatul Jihad militants were found in Guantanamo bay. (These figures published in their publications)

¹²³ Organizations belonging from the Bralivi school of thought suffered especially much and out of 14 now only one organization, Lashkar-e-Islam is still active.

¹²⁴ Amir Rana, Daily Times April 12, 2003---Jaish-e-Muhammad's supreme commander had ordered attacks on the churches in Pakistan. He claimed that he did it with Maulana Masood Azher's consent. Later Masood denied this and expelled 12 important commanders including Jabbar from the organization.

¹²⁵ A group of Harkatul Mujahideen parted ways from the organization in February 2002 and formed Harkatul Mujahideen Alalmi. They started targeting foreign interests. This group was involved in the attacks on French Engineers Bus, American Consulate and also tried to assassinate President Musharraf

¹²⁶ Daily Jang Islamabad December 29, 2001-Jamaatud Daawa's head Prof Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in a press conference on December 27, 2001 announced the dissolution of Lashkar-e-Taiba. He declared LeT as an independent organization which will work only in Kashmir

Jamaat-e-Islami/Pakistan (JI) also shifted the offices of its militant wing, Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) to Azad-Kashmir.¹²⁷ Jamaat also declared that it did not have any organizational link with Hizb, although it had been operating from the premises of JI offices in Pakistan since 1990. JI leadership had also asked the Hizb to remove all stockpiles and signboards from Jamaat offices across the country. However, these were just face-saving steps. Otherwise, HM is still working as a JI subordinate in Pakistan, and has also become part of Shabab-e-Milli (SM), the youth wing of the JI.¹²⁸

Other organizations followed in the footsteps of the LeT and JI: Jiash-e-Muhammad converted into Tehrik Kudamul Islam (Movement of Islamic services), Harkatul Mujahideen renamed itself Jamiatul Ansar (Party of Hosts), and Sipah-e-Sahabah became the Millat-e-Islamia. (See Chart1)¹²⁹ From December 2001 to August 2002, these organizations remained quiet, but with the passage of time they started their activities again. This time these outfits appeared with new faces, under cover of religious-political or political groups, removing explicit agendas based on Jihad and sectarian hatred from their manifestos.¹³⁰ Nonetheless, they are still working for the same objectives and goals. Some organizations used their political influence to bargain with the Pakistani government. For example Sipah-e-Sahaba, the sectarian political party, adopted the new name Millat-e-Islamia and its lead member of the National Assembly, Maulana

¹²⁷ Many of its founding members were the veterans of the Afghan struggle who had fought under the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbaden Hikmatyar. It depended on the experience and the training of the Afghan war veterans. The Jamaat-e-Islami adopted it in 1991 when insurgency in the India-held Kashmir peaked. Hizb was working under the direct patronage of the Jamaat and its offices were in JI offices around the country. While Qazi Hussain Ahmad was the chief Patron of the HM according to the constitution of the organization and had the authority to remove or assign any person to HM head. The Chief of Jamaat-e-Islami, Qazi Hussain Ahmad in May 2003, talking to a reporter in a seminar categorically stated that his party had no links with the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) and added that the jihad outfit was based in India-held Kashmir and was fighting indigenously for the right of self determination of the Kashmiris. When a reporter tried to pin him down on reports that most HM offices in Pakistan were being run by the JI workers, he said these offices were set up by the HM's sympathizers in the party and not by the JI.

¹²⁸ Amir Rana, Daily Times, Lahore, September 8, 2003

¹²⁹ Mussharaf had banned the 7 organizations on January 12, 2005, while Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Muhammad were already declared terrorist organization on August 2001. This is the table of the organizations, which were banned and later changed their names.

¹³⁰ It is interesting that Anti-Shia party, Sipah-e-Sahaba (Millat-e-Islamia), in its new manifesto, stressed sectarian harmony and unity, which was totally contrary to its previous manifesto.

Azam Tariq, joined the government in November 2002. It was at a time when the pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League had requested a parliamentary vote of confidence for the Prime Minister. Maulana Tariq exploited his position and in return not only got hundreds of his party workers who had been involved in the sectarian killing released, but also won freedom of movement for his group across the country.

Other jihadi leaders joined the religious political parties and contested the 2002 general elections. Though only a few were elected, the rest benefited from the move and groomed their image as politicians.¹³¹

Yet, this was a complex situation for the jihadists, who by their actions disappointed a large number of lower cadre militants. These militants subsequently joined Al-Qaeda's undergrounds groups and renewed operations on Pakistani soil.¹³² (Chart 3; Al-Qaeda underground groups)

By the end of 2002, jihadists managed to make a comeback, strengthening the impression that the government had failed to control these non-state actors. In another bid to contain jihadi leaders, the government forbade all registered members of jihadi groups from leaving their areas without informing local police stations, but this step too did not work as the government expected. Only the ban on collecting funds from the public was implemented effectively, creating serious financial problems for jihadi groups. But they again foiled the government's efforts by discovering ways to counter the ban: for example, they started investing in agricultural lands and buying commercial plots as a means of generating money.

Jamaat-ud-Daawa (JD) invested 20 million Rupees in several of its departments which include education, publishing, health, farming, and transportation.¹³³ Investment properties, purchased for 25.5 million Rupees, are separate from land upon which the

¹³¹ Some of them were elected to the JUI seats despite being members of Harkatul Mujahideen and Hizbul Mujahideen

¹³² These are just operational groups and obey command instructions, which are given time to time. After completion of their missions, they were assigned other targets with the different group name. According to an intelligence official, Al-Qaeda itself chose the members from the different jihadi organizations, especially banned sectarian terrorist groups like LJ and Harkatul Jihadi Islami Alalmi.

¹³³ Friday Times, Lahore, February 2003

organization intends to build training centers, madrasas, and mosques. The Jamaat plans to establish centers, madrasas, and mosques in all the districts of Pakistan. In the first phase of these plans, attention was paid to three districts in Sindh province, where large tracts of lands had been bought for this purpose.

JD properties in Pakistan have reached a value of sixty million rupees and the organization aims at achieving a target of an additional 120 millions rupees worth of property over the next five years. Apart from these, the number of students in its model schools has reached approximately ten thousand, and in the madrasas it has approached six thousand. In order to increase its area of influence, it is also establishing health centers and dispensaries. According to one of its leaders, the Jamaat and Lashkar will be self-sufficient to such an extent that it will not need to collect contributions, and will be in a position to train five thousand mujahideen.

Another challenge for the militant organizations was to identify new operational areas. The Afghanistan chapter had been closed and in Kashmir, due to border security and the Indo-Pakistani Peace process, infiltration was reduced rapidly. Some organizations found new fields of endeavor – abandoning the battlefield for missionary work. Jamaat-ud-Daawa and Al-Rasheed Trust have set up their new network in Interior Sindh, specifically in the Hindu majority districts. These organizations have set up dozens of madrasas, mosques, dispensaries, and other welfare centers. Their first target is to ‘reform’ the Hindu population of the area. In view of its aims and objectives, Jamaat-ud-Daawa has already launched a Sindhi-focused magazine, and this area also gets special attention in its other publications as well.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ Several reports and travelogues also found a place in the publications of the Jamaat and Al-Rasheed Trust. *Mujalla Al-Daawa* published one such travelogue; an extract from which follows: “Most of the Hindus have decorated their doorways in the town of Mutthi with the pictures of Hanuman. Walking thorough this town, one gets the impression that it is a Hindustani village where Hindus perform their rites against Islam and Muslims. They also make a dent on their faith. This group came back after two days of moving around in the desert and saw so many things during this time that exhibit how artfully their faith has been defiled and it is difficult for an ordinary Muslim to even mark that defilement. The Hindus are spreading their culture by mixing their ways into the Muslim lives. The ulema and propagators of faith should try their best to stop this wave, and if every Muslim tries to play his role, the increasing influence of the Hindus on the religious and political lives in Sindh may be stopped. If no attention is paid to these, not only the people and the country will be affected crucially but they shall be liable to answer on the Day of Judgment. May God give us senses”.

While the northern areas of Pakistan share borders with China and Afghanistan, a narrow strip of Afghanistan called ‘Wakhan’ separates it from Tajikistan. Most of the people in this region are Ismaili or Asna Ashari shias. Those of the Ahl-e-sunnat comprise only ten percent of the population and they believe that the Ismailis want to establish their own state.

Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat, Baltistan is the representative religious organization of the Sunnis. They have a good number of their madrasas and mosques in this region. The Agha Khan Foundation network is quite strong in the area and the latter are already running a number of welfare projects. However, Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat asserts that they are working only for the Ismaili population and their efforts to establish a separate state in Baltistan. Apart from Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat, Tanzeem-ul-Akhwan also has been running welfare organizations in this region. The al-Rasheed Trust, Jamiat-ul-Ansar, Jamaat-ud-Daawa, and Tahreek-e-Khuddame-e-Islam have begun setting up their networks as well. The aim of these organizations is, in part, to minimize the impact of the Agha Khan Foundation in this area, and to locate safe training camps for their mujahideen so that they can infiltrate up into Afghanistan and central Asia more easily.

The government of Pakistan made another attempt to crush the jihadist in November 2003, banning some more organizations, and barring them from working under new names.¹³⁵ However, the second ban did little to affect the jihadist organizations. They responded to the ban strongly, not only changing their names but also the structure of their organizations. Six of them now are working as charities. Alternatively, inside Pakistan, Jiash-e-Muhammad is now working under the name Al-Rehmat Trust, Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami is Al-Ershad Trust and Harkatul Mujahideen as Al-Asar Trust, but in Kashmir all three are still functioning under their original names and following the MJC codes.¹³⁶

In NWFP and Balochistan, the organizations are surviving but they have lost the confidence of their own operatives despite favorable conditions.¹³⁷ In these regions,

¹³⁵ See chart no 2

¹³⁶ These jihadist trusts have started different welfare projects, like ambulance services, free medical camps, etc.

¹³⁷ In Balochistan and NWFP jihadists have no need to join the Taliban or AL-Qaeda through Pakistani jihad organizations as they believe all jihad organizations are created by the Pakistani ISI and are working under its direction.

militants do not need support from any organization in order to carry out jihad. They can directly join the Taliban, especially in Tribal areas of Pakistan and Balochistan's Phuston Belt 14. According to local sources, the Taliban has allowed individuals to join them only on the condition that they not form any Pakistani sub-group within the Taliban. The Taliban adopted this policy after some bitter previous experiences with Pakistan's jihadi organizations.¹³⁸

Jihadist organizations are still working in Pakistan. After 9/11, they have continuously changing tactics for survival. However, the government also has achieved some of its goals. At present no jihadist group can recruit mercenaries, collect funds, or hold open public meeting because of government's surveillance. Their organizational structures are at present weak, but they still pose a threat.

There is need to do more to crush the threat of non-state actors in Pakistan, which now become more of an internal threat than they are a threat to Pakistan's neighbors. During 2004-5, there were more than 100 terrorists attacks in Pakistan -- including 10 suicide bombings -- which targeted only Pakistanis. The culprits arrested for the bombings and targeted killings belonged to militant outfits.¹³⁹

The present situation of militant groups in Pakistan has developed during the last four years, especially since 9/11. Among the tactics these organizations use:

1. After every ban, these organizations change their names.
2. In addition, they are now changing identities and emerging as charities and missionary organizations
3. They are finding new ways to ensure financial survival, such as purchasing land and investing in education and health businesses.
4. They are developing new, political images.

In the changing situations these organizations have also established new goals, including:

¹³⁸ The Taliban blamed some Pakistani jihad leaders for cooperating with the government thus being responsible for the arrest of some Al-Qaeda leaders.

¹³⁹ Jash and HUJI militants have been involved in the most of the attacks.

1. Launching generous charity projects in order to gain popular support, recruiting new militants, and raising funds.
2. Concentrating on Kashmir as a battlefield. Afghanistan is now very dangerous for these groups and their direct participation could result in the complete collapse of their organizations.
3. Targeting Christian missions, foreign interests, and minority Muslim sects.
4. Bringing the Islamic revolution through education.
5. Enhancing their role as non-state actors to enforce Shariah in the country.¹⁴⁰

These new targets pose new threats not only for Pakistan but also for the rest of the world.

- 1: The role of militant groups in Afghanistan has been curtailed by the Pakistani government. Carrying out the jihad in Kashmir is becoming more difficult day-by-day. The trend of setting up underground jihad organizations is accelerating and poses a serious threat that the militants may knit together a large transnational terrorist network in Pakistan and other countries.
- 2: The Jihadists are rapidly penetrating the education system and are misleading the youth.
- 3: They are strengthening ties with political groups, and may use these political alliances to increase pressure on the government in order to achieve their militant goals.

This poses a big challenge to the Musharraf government in dealing with the jihadists' tactics and their new targets and goals. It is the new ideological front which requires more attention, and on this front the government has completely failed. Despite Musharraf's modern, enlightened slogans, the government has rolled back all the steps

¹⁴⁰ Their role as non-state actors is dramatically expanding. Recently, Jamaatud Daawa announced his intention to establish District Shariah courts around the country. In NWFP, the provincial government of the religious party's alliance is already trying to impose self-made Shariah laws. In tribal areas a Taliban commander, Biatullah Mehsud, has prepared a Lashkar (army) for imposing Shariah on the people.

initially taken as an ideological response to the jihadists. Whether on the issue of amendments to blasphemy laws, bringing changes in the school curriculum, or Madaris reforms, the government has compromised with the religious forces, despite the latter's inability to generate a mass movement against government. The government is responding to terrorist activity alone, and has not taken seriously the jihadists' expanding role in the education and social services sector. The jihadists may look suppressed, but there remains a need for the government to respond on the ideological front. If the government fails to step up, no one can halt the production of new jihadists.

Chart 1. Banned Organizations in Pakistan

| No | Organization Name | Banned Date | Current Status | New Name |
|----|--|-------------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1 | Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT) | January 12, 2002 | Active | Not Changed |
| 2 | Jiash-e-Muhammad (JM) | do | Active | Tehrik-e-Khudamul Islam |
| 3 | Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) | August 14, 2001 | Active | Using different names |
| 4 | Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) | January 12, 2002 | Active | Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan |
| 5 | Sipah-e-Muhammad (SM) | August 14, 2001 | Active | Not changed |
| 6 | Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat Muhammdi (TNSM) | January 12, 2002 | Active | Not changed |
| 7 | Tehrik-e-Jafria (TJ) | do | Active | Tehrik-e-Islami |
| 8 | Hizbul Tehrir (HT) | November 20, 2003 | Active | Not Changed |
| 9 | Jamiat-ul-Ansar (JA) | November 20, 2003 | Active | Not Changed |
| 10 | Jamaat-ul-Furqan (JF) | November 20, 2003 | Active | Not Changed |
| 11 | Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (MIP) | November 16, 2003 | Active | Sunni Action Committee |
| 12 | Tehrik-e-Islami (TI) | November 16, 2003 | Active | Millat-e-Jafria Pakistan |
| 13 | Tehrik Khudamul Islam (TKI) | November 16, 2003 | Active | Al Rehmat Trust |

Chart 2. Suspected sectarian and terrorist groups identified by the law enforcement agencies 2004

| Name | Status | Description | Network |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|--|-----------------------------|
| Al-Badar Tigers | | Faction of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi | Punjab, Balochistan |
| Ahle Hadiath Youth Force | | Jamait Ahle Hadiath youth wing | Pakistan |
| Ali Tigers | | Sectarian | Underground |
| Al-Farooq | | Sectarian | Underground |
| Almi Jamaat-e-Ahle Sunnet | Under observation | Sectarian | Punjab |
| Harkatul Mujahideen Alalmi | Do | Terrorist | Underground |
| Jamaitul Mujahideen Alalmi | Do | Deobandi jihadi outfit | Pakistan |
| Tehrik-e-Taliban | | Jihadi | Active in Tribal areas |
| Tehrik Defah-e-Sahaba | Under observation | Sectarian | Punjab, NWFP |
| Lashkar-e-Jhangvi | Banned | Terrorist | Underground |
| Jhangvi Tigers | | Terrorist | Underground |
| Sipah-e-Muhammad | Banned | Terrorist | Still active in Balochistan |
| Ashgaryia Organization | | Shia sectarian | Sindh |
| Khumani Tigers | | Shia sectarian and Jihadi | Underground |
| Nojawana-e-Ishat Toheed wal Sunnah | | Sectarian | Punjab, NWFP |
| Lashkar-e-Umer | | terrorist | underground |
| Tehrik Tahafooz Namoose-Sahaba | | Sectarian | Some parts of Punjab |
| Majlis-e-Ahrar | Under observation | Sectarian jihad supporter | Pakistan |
| Mukhtar Force | | Shia | Punjab, NWFP |
| Imamines | Under observation | Shia sectarian outfit | Punjab |
| Jamaat Ahle Hadiath | | Sectarian | Pakistan |
| Jamait Ghurba-e-Ahle Hadiath | | Sectarian & support jihadist | Pakistan |
| Hizb-e-Islami | | Reportedly recruiting Mujahideen for Taliban | NWFP |

Chart 3 Terrorist groups operated by Al-Qaeda

| Outfit | Strength | Areas of operation | Head |
|----------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|--------------|
| Gaand Ullah | 20 | Karachi | Ataur Rehman |
| Harkatul Mujahideen Alalmi | --- | Karachi | ---- |
| Lashkar-e-Jhangvi | Above 200 | Pakistan | --- |
| Al Badar group | --- | Balochistan and Karachi | --- |
| Lashkar-e-Ummer | 15 | Punjab and NWFP | Osama Nazir |
| Harkatul Islami | ---- | Balochistan | --- |

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PART III
TECHNOLOGY AND TERRORISM

INTRODUCTION

Terrorist access to advanced technology poses significant challenges to national and international counterterrorism efforts. Modern information technology, especially the internet, has dramatically accelerated the speed at which the extremist ideologies that underlie most terrorist movements can spread and evolve. It also offers terrorist organizations a virtually limitless and uncontrolled marketplace within which to propagate their agendas, raise funds, and recruit new operatives. For the most sophisticated groups, the cyber-marketplace also offers opportunities to exchange operational information, coordinate activities, and send messages through codes, encryption, and by embedding information in apparently innocuous websites. While it still seems unlikely that a terrorist organization could launch a cyber attack that results in widespread casualties or physical destruction, a number of examples have already occurred (so far, unrelated to terrorism) of denial of service and other web-based attacks that can cause significant economic disruption and could, if so targeted, cause widespread chaos in public service and other critical infrastructure sectors. Perhaps the greatest concern for counterterrorism is the tendency for the new information environment – the internet, satellite television, and 24-hour global news services – to increase the incentives for those who want to bring their agenda to the forefront of public attention to escalate the level and theatricality of their violence. In short, the loudest chaos gets the most airtime.

Fortunately, the news (so to speak) is not all negative. Terrorist access to and use of the world-wide web presents opportunities for law enforcement, intelligence, and counterterrorism agencies. Passive monitoring of message traffic – be it emails, cell phone calls, or online message boards – can provide valuable information concerning the structure of terrorist networks and the nature of their traffic. Whether or not to allow such activities to continue is a major dilemma for counterterrorism in the future: intelligence agencies are reluctant to shut down such sites because to do so costs them a valuable source of intelligence. Law enforcement and counterterrorist agencies, on the other hand, are loathe to allow terrorists to continue to use the internet to plan and, potentially, to carry out operations unimpeded.

Law enforcement has already made progress in using cyber-technology to trace, and in some cases shut down, terrorist financial networks – at least within the mainstream

financial institutions. At present, with a few exceptions, terrorist groups do not seem to be using the internet as a platform for their primary financial and fund-raising activities. A major exception seems to be the use of online credit card fraud and identity theft to finance small-scale operations and sleeper cells. But here again, the activity is carried out on a scale that is unlikely to trigger the attention of counterterrorism dragnets – small charges (say, a round-trip airfare) are hidden in the credit accounts of individuals and businesses in a way that is likely to be taken as a clerical or accounting error and that, at any rate, is not traceable back to the organization responsible.

Terrorist acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other advanced offensive capabilities is, of course, another source of concern for counterterrorism. This conference looked at both terrorist access to WMD and efforts to acquire and employ aviation assets. In both areas, the message was similar. At present, much of the initiative toward acquiring such capabilities is focused in local groups rather than in international terrorist organizations like al-Qaida. In the case of aviation assets, local terrorist and separatist groups have had some success in acquiring basic aviation capabilities and training, although they are far from acquiring significant offensive “power projection” capabilities. Still, their ability to monitor and defend their own airspace, their increased ability to move people and materiel either for operational or logistical purposes, and the existence of terrorist cadres trained in aviation technologies, all serve to increase the threat level and complicate the job of counterterrorist agencies and civilian aviation security.

Terrorists’ attempts to acquire WMD constitute a more complicated issue. The local groups that have the most interest in acquiring such capabilities have a relatively low level of technical competence, while the global terrorist groups that at one time had substantial technical expertise have been disrupted by the detention or death of key figures. It is wise to assume, however, that the necessary confluence of will and technical capability will eventually re-emerge, most likely in al-Qaida or some similar organization. So, while the risk of a terrorist attack with WMD may be low in the very near term, the threat has far from disappeared.

Another important and related issue is the ability of terrorist groups to adapt – both to new technologies and to counter-measures. The problem of conducting defensive measures against an adaptive terrorist threat applies equally to both information and kinetic weapons technologies. In the information realm, as counterterrorism efforts get

better at tracing and identifying terrorist activities on the internet and global communication networks, the terrorists get better at hiding their activities or driving them underground – to operate below the high-tech radar, if you will. Likewise, the evolution of the insurgency in Iraq shows that terrorist and insurgent groups learn quickly and have the expertise and flexibility necessary to develop technological and operational responses to new counterterrorism strategies and to do so very quickly.

THE PAPERS

Tony Fainberg traces the history and current prospects of terrorist use of WMD and discusses emerging countermeasures in “Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Past Performance, Future Prospects, and Technical Issues.” The series of major attacks on commercial aircraft – beginning with PanAm 103 and culminating with the 9/11 attacks – make it clear that today’s generation of terrorists have no qualms about causing mass casualties. Similarly, a series of variously successful chemical/biological attacks – most notably the Aum Shinrikyo chemical attacks on the Tokyo subway – indicate terrorist intent to acquire and use chemical/biological weapons. Fainberg provides a survey of all the major types of WMD weapons, their past use, and the prospects for their employment in mass casualty terror attacks in the future. He includes nuclear and radiological (“dirty bomb”) weapons in his survey, although neither has been employed by terrorists to date. Fainberg concludes that while the intent of terrorist groups, especially al-Qaida, to acquire WMD is clear, the technical obstacles to their doing so remain daunting. Biological agents are difficult to weaponize and distribute reliably. Chemical weapons are easier to produce and use, but the effort of developing them seems unnecessary given the existence of a nearly unlimited number of existing stockpiles of toxic materials (chemical plants and storage facilities, for example) just there for the taking. Radiological weapons are easier than nuclear ones to produce – the technology is relatively simple and the radioactive material much easier to acquire – and could lead to massive economic disruption on a local level. Still, as mass casualty weapons, their scope and thus their effectiveness is limited. Developing nuclear weapons would – despite the ease of getting access to “blueprints” and the basic science – be extremely difficult for terrorist groups, although they might be able to purchase such weapons on the black market. Given the catastrophic consequences of even one nuclear terrorist attack, the most important step for WMD counter-terrorism, according to

Fainberg, is to develop international cooperation in monitoring, controlling, and safeguarding nuclear material.

In “From Internet to Islamnet: Net-Centric Counterterrorism,” B. Raman argues that jihadist groups have made extremely effective use of the internet in a number of key areas. First, terrorist groups have found in the internet a practically limitless and largely unregulated platform for spreading their ideologies and indoctrinating new followers. In particular, they have used the internet to spread anger toward the United States and Israel, popularize their skewed interpretations of Islamic doctrine and practice, offer “how-to” advice to aspiring terrorists, and aggravate feelings of alienation among Muslim populations to a degree that they never could using print media. Second, email, encoded messages, and other uses of encryption have resulted in the internet replacing cell and satellite phones as the terrorist’s preferred method of communication. Third, the internet is a nearly bottomless source of information and data that terrorist groups can use in planning propaganda, PSYWAR, and kinetic attacks. A fourth area, cyber-war, has not yet lived up to its hype in the late 1990s, largely because it remains difficult to use the internet to cause the kind of physical damage and catastrophic casualties that terrorists prefer. Cyber attacks can cause substantial economic and communication disruption using denial-of-service attacks, worms, viruses, and Trojan Horses, but these seldom have the shock value favored by terrorists. That is not to say, however, that this is not an arena that jihadist groups might not enter in the future. The number of jihadist ideologues with IT experience or training is substantial and growing; and the threat is even greater if one considers the number of “lone wolf” cyber attackers who are willing to sell their IT talents to the highest bidder. Raman warns that, while intelligence and law enforcement communities are getting better at tracking terrorist activity on the internet, more aggressive cyber-CT capabilities must be developed, including better code-identification and breaking, HUMINT, denial-of-access, and counter-data mining.

In “The Jihad Online: The Lashkar-e-Taiba on the Internet,” Praveen Swami identifies one of the central paradoxes of the terrorist jihad: while the extreme Islamist right wing claims to be engaged in a holy war against the forces of modernization and secularism, they can only conduct their campaign by embracing the tools of both. Jihad, in short, is a thoroughly 21st century phenomenon. Swami’s analysis of how jihadists are using the internet focuses on one group, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is known to have sent fighters and terrorist cadres to Jammu and Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo,

Somalia, Eritrea, the Philippines, and the Middle East. Lashkar-e-Taiba's online presence is managed by the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, a Pakistani political organization. The Jamaat conducts recruiting, fundraising, and education for the Lashkar via links from its own websites. While the immediate focus of the Jamaat is local (Kashmir), it shares the Lashkar's global outlook and strategic agenda. The first target for the Lashkar-e-Taiba's internet "outreach" was the radicalization of the Indian Muslim community. While that effort has met with limited success, its second target, enlisting support from the vast South Asian Muslim diaspora, has proven quite successful. The Lashkar-e-Taiba has used its internet presence to stimulate the emergence of a nationalist identity among its followers in the diaspora that might motivate them to support the jihad in their adopted homelands. To date, there is evidence that this campaign has played a role in the careers of several "homegrown" Western Muslim terrorists, including four of the participants in the suicide bombings in the London Underground in 2005. Swami concludes by stressing the need to devote much more research into the scope and effects of internet jihadists in diaspora communities.

In "The Threats Posed by Aviation Assets in the Possession of Terrorist Groups and Proto-States," Shanaka Jayasekara traces the acquisition and use of aviation assets by terrorist and separatist groups and the motivations behind them. In assessing the operational risks these capabilities pose, Jayasekara concludes that while few of these groups are likely to assemble significant offensive capabilities that would enable them to carry out strategic-type operations, they nonetheless pose a serious threat. All such groups operate inside the recognized territory of nation states, and their possession of aviation capabilities vastly complicates the job of national forces in establishing and maintaining security. Moreover, the mere possession of such assets makes an important political statement: that the terrorist/separatist groups believe they operate outside the operational and legal control of nation states and can, by controlling their air space, defend their self-declared autonomy. It is also significant that most of the spread of aviation capabilities among terrorist and separatist groups has unfolded with the significant assistance of outside patron states. According to Jayasekara, the existence of these unofficial "air forces" should be a source of serious concern to the community of nation states not only because of their terrorist potential but because of the threat that these renegade air forces pose to the orderly administration of legitimate aviation and the safety of the air traffic control system.

TERRORIST USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD): PAST PERFORMANCE, FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND TECHNICAL ISSUES

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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This paper will discuss how terrorists have tried to use various weapons to cause mass casualties, will describe terrorist trends that have a reasonable probability of developing in the future, and will outline some countermeasures, some already in place, others being developed, to the use of such weapons, especially against civilian targets.

As early as the 1980's, occasional scholars have considered the eventual possibility that terrorist groups could use unconventional weapons in attacks to advance their agendas. The increased diffusion of expertise and technologies related to chemical, biological, or radiological/nuclear materials and weaponization raised the specter that, eventually, a very small number of actors could machinate the deaths of thousands of humans in one attack by these means. Such unconventional weapons of potentially large effect came to be categorized as weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

Major attacks on commercial aircraft in the 1980's and 90's, including the destruction of PanAm Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, made it clear that some terrorists, at least, did not shrink from actions that could kill hundreds of innocents. This suggested that future use of WMDs could not be excluded. Indeed, some years earlier, analyses had been published to try to explain the absence of significant attacks of that sort up to that point.¹ Starting in the 1980s, analytical efforts examined the

¹ Simon, Jeffrey, *Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons – A Discussion of Possibilities*, R-3771-AFMIC, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1989; additional views may be found in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal Effort*, OTA-ISC-481, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991, pp. 19-22.

possibility of “nuclear terrorism” and only some of these were fiction.² The number of studies and conferences devoted to aspects of WMD terrorism increased after the Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system in 1995.³ It is worth mentioning that the success of the Aum Shinrikyo efforts was quite limited, although 12 died in Tokyo and 7 had earlier died in Matsumoto, Japan, in a first, less-publicized attack. This was in spite of the considerable resources (over 20,000 members, more than \$1 billion in assets, and some PhDs in relevant disciplines) available to the group. Successful mass killings with chemical or biological attacks may be harder to achieve than is widely thought.

The 9/11 attacks, which killed an unprecedented number of victims (about three thousand), themselves constituted, use of weapons of mass destruction by any reasonable definition. Clearly, use of innovative concepts of operations can achieve many casualties, even without resorting to chemical, biological, or radiological/nuclear weapons. Moreover, developments since then have strongly indicated attempts by at least al-Qaeda, if not by other terrorist groups, to develop “classically” defined WMDs.

Below, in Tables 1-3, are listed agents that are generally considered as potential instruments of chemical, biological, and radiological terrorism. The list is not complete, but provides most of the agents normally considered as potential hazards in these categories (except for most toxic industrial chemicals, which are many – two of those, phosgene and chlorine, have been used as military agents and are listed). The last table includes materials useful for radiological weapons, in spite of the fact that they are unlikely to kill more than a few people at a time.⁴

Biological weapons. Their sporadic use in warfare is of long standing, although only a small amount of terrorist use, with very limited success, has been documented in

² Eds. Leventhal, Paul and Alexander, Yonah, *Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat*, Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986; a later study added chemical and biological terrorism to the analytic mix: Alexander, Yonah, and Milton Hoenig, eds. *Super Terrorism: Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear*, Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 2001. Terrorist use of nuclear weapons also became a favorite topic for post-Cold War techno-thrillers, e.g., Clancy, T., *The Sum of All Fears*, New York: J.P. Putnam, 1991..

³ E.g., Ed. Roberts, B., *Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses*, Alexandria, VA: The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997.

⁴ Most experts in the United States, in fact, currently refer to radiological weapons as weapons of mass disruption, rather than destruction, since their effects could be economically catastrophic rather than catastrophic through massive loss of life. The economic losses would result from postulated public panic in the wake of an attack, effectively causing the denial of use of contaminated areas, until and unless extremely costly and long term decontamination processes were completed.

recent years. What is somewhat surprising is the number of occasions that bioagents have been used over the course of many centuries.

Table 1. Potential Biological Agents

| Disease/Agent | Comments | Past Use |
|---------------|--|--|
| Plague | Bacterium <i>Yersinia pestis</i> ; can infect via the pulmonary route (pneumonic) or the lymph system, (bubonic). The former is nearly universally fatal and fairly contagious; the latter is more treatable and is usually transmitted by rodent-borne fleas. | Biowarfare: Kaffa, Crimea by Tatars/Mongols of the Golden Horde, 1346; Reval, Sweden by Russia, 1710. In both cases, plague-infected bodies were catapulted into besieged cities. In the first case, this probably led to the spread of the “Black Death” in most of Europe, which began to appear the following year. Allegedly also used in experiments on prisoners by Japanese Unit 731, starting in the 1930’s in China and later elsewhere, including dispersal with bombs. ⁵ |
| Smallpox | Virus <i>variola</i> ; approximately 30% fatal, treatment by vaccine has some effectiveness if applied before onset of symptoms. Virus in nature has been globally eliminated; only two legal sets of samples exist, in US and Russia. | Biowarfare: “gifts” of contaminated blankets to native Americans in 1763 by Lord Amherst during French and Indian Wars. ⁶ |
| Anthrax | Bacterium <i>Bacillus anthracis</i> ; high mortality rate if not treated before onset of symptoms – thought to be 90% if respiratory, but recent evidence indicates more likely around 50%. Not easily transmitted. Unlike nearly all other potential bioagents, <i>B. anthracis</i> can survive for long periods in sunlight. | Terrorism: Anthrax letters, USA 2001; failed attempts by Aum Shinrikyo, 1990-1995, Japan. ⁷ Some indication of use by Japanese Unit 731 in China in 1930’s and 1940’s. ⁸ |
| Viral Fevers | For example, Ebola, Marburg, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis, all with high levels of mortality; no treatment yet, although some vaccines being developed. | |
| Tularemia | <i>Francisella tularensis</i> , known as rabbit fever, usually not fatal, mortality rate can be as high as 20% if not treated. Highly contagious. | |
| Glanders | <i>Burkholderia mallei</i> Affects horses and variety of animals, including humans. Not usually fatal in humans when treated. | Biowarfare: reported attempts by German agents to infect horses of U.S. Cavalry and of other nations opposed to Central Powers during World War I. Not definitively confirmed. ⁹ |
| Toxins | Usually botulinum, produced by <i>Clostridium botulinum</i> and SEB (staphylococcus enterotoxin B) are considered most likely agents. Highly toxic, can be fatal, many inadvertent cases of poisoning of the former. | Terrorism: attempts by Aum Shinrikyo in 1990 and 1993. ¹⁰ |
| Salmonella | Many different types and strains of <i>Salmonella</i> bacteria. Not usually considered a useful agent; often shows up as contaminating agent in improperly processed or stored foodstuffs. | Terrorism: used by Rajneesh cult, Oregon, USA, 1984 in failed attempt to affect local elections. ~700 infections, no fatalities. ¹¹ |

⁵ Eitzen, Edward M., Jr., M.D., M.P.H., FACEP, FAAP; and Takafuji, Ernest T., M.D., M.P.H. (1997). [Historical Overview of Biological Warfare](#) in *Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare*, Brigadier General Russ Zajtchuk, MC, U.S. Army, Editor in Chief. Washington, DC:Office of The Surgeon General.

⁶ Eitzen, *op. cit.*; there are many sources for this including historical documents from the War and in historical studies, starting in the 19th century.

⁷ See Kyle Olson, “Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?” *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1999), posted on website of Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, U.S. <http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/olson.html>, accessed 14 October 2005.

⁸ Eitzen, E., *op. cit.*

⁹ Eitzen, E., *op. cit.*

¹⁰ Olson, K. *op. cit.*

¹¹ http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761558349_2/Chemical_and_Biological_Warfare.html#p14, accessed 27 October 2005.

Table 2. Potential Chemical Agents¹²

| Type of Agent | Examples | Effects |
|---------------|--|---|
| Blister | Mustard (HN), Lewisite | Causes blisters on contact with tissues; especially effective in pulmonary system. |
| Blood | Cyanide compounds | Prevents transport of oxygen by blood within organisms. |
| Choking | Chlorine, phosgene | Impedes breathing by causing build-up of liquids in lungs (pulmonary edema). |
| Nerve | Tabun (GA), sarin (GB), soman (GD), VX | Even in minute quantities, interferes with normal transmission of nerve signals by neurotransmitters, leading to paralysis and death. |

Table 3. Potential Radiological Agents

| Isotope | Legitimate Use | Comments |
|--------------|--|--|
| Cobalt-60 | Medical treatment | Widely available, not easy to disperse in metallic form. |
| Cesium-137 | Medical treatment | Widely available |
| Strontium-90 | Thermoelectric sources | Fairly available |
| Iridium-192 | Manufacturing uses as x-ray sources for diagnostic purposes in process monitoring and materials testing. | Widely available |

¹² Mostly as listed in <http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/cw/agent.htm>, plus information contained in references therein; accessed 27 October 2005. In addition, blood agents, HCN (hydrogen cyanide) and ClCN (cyanogen chloride) have been added. The latter interfere with the transport of oxygen by the blood to body tissues.

Chemical weapons. These have very rarely been used by terrorists, although their employment in warfare is well known, beginning with their massive use in World War I. More recently, they were used by Egypt, during the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser in the early 1960's, against Yemeni monarchists who were fighting republicans allied with Egypt. Allegedly, technical assistance had been furnished by some German chemists who had performed similar work for the Nazi regime. Chemical weapons were also famously used by Saddam Hussein's Iraq against Iran and against its own people in the 1980's. Some use by Iran in response to Iraq's use is also widely thought to have occurred. As a benchmark for the scale of potential consequences of a massive exposure of the public to chemical agents, a well-known accidental release of a toxic chemical material, with catastrophic results, occurred in Bhopal, India, at a Union Carbide plant in 1984, when a cloud of methyl isocyanate escaped, killing over 3800, and sickening or disabling thousands more, some permanently.

This event demonstrated the advantage to the terrorist of causing a large release of normal toxic industrial chemicals within a populated area: thousands of casualties could ensue. One might deduce that terrorists could plausibly gain greater success by taking advantage of the large quantities of poisons available at industrial locations, causing their dispersal, rather than manufacturing their own agents in much smaller quantities and dispersing those instead. Chemical plants and transports of large quantities of toxic chemicals are thus obvious terrorist targets. Protective countermeasures are essential. They will require efficient and innovative concepts of operations as well as normal physical security measures and equipment.

Radiological weapons. Also known as "dirty bombs," these have not yet been used in large-scale terrorist attacks, although there have been reports of the covert use of radioactive sources as assassination weapons. Chechen agents did bury a box of radioactive cesium, together with an explosive device, in Ismailovo Park, Moscow, in 1995. However, they had tipped off the Russian police and apparently meant the action to serve as a warning rather than as an attempt to kill people. Just as Bhopal provides a tragic analogy for estimating consequences of a chemical attack, there is a documented, accidental release of radioactive material to the public. The inadvertent dispersal of a few grams of radioactive cesium in Goiania, Brazil in 1987 resulted in the deaths of 5 people, the hospitalization of scores, the examination and treatment of thousands, and a massive economic disruption to the city, requiring decontamination that lasted a number of years.

There are, in the literature, a number of analyses of the potential effects of radiological weapons, and of the Goiania case.¹³ The amount of radioactive isotope dispersed in Goiania was equivalent to slightly more than 1,000 Curies, a measure of radiological activity. For comparison, legitimate sources of radioactive isotopes, used in medical treatment, food irradiation, or industrial processes, are frequently on the order of 10-30 times this level and, occasionally, more.

Nuclear Weapons. Rather than presenting a table for nuclear weapons, the list of nuclear materials is short: simply put, either highly enriched uranium, plutonium, or both, are generally needed to cause a nuclear detonation. It is a consensus among proliferation experts that the most serious obstacle to building a nuclear weapon is obtaining the material itself. Once material is obtained, producing a weapon, especially a uranium-based one, may be within range of a relatively sophisticated terrorist group. Uranium weapons may be assembled for detonation in a gun-like configuration. Plutonium is far more radioactive, so a plutonium weapon must be very rapidly compressed in a spherically symmetric way, to allow a super-critical density to be achieved before premature ignition by a neutron from spontaneous fission (see discussion below under Technical Obstacles to Terrorists' Use of WMD). This requires considerably more technical capability than a "gun" weapon.

A terrorist group would have the option of stealing, purchasing, or otherwise obtaining an already-built weapon, or of obtaining the material (almost certainly beyond the capability of a sub-state group to produce itself) and constructing a weapon from the material. Nuclear weapons are, of course, heavily protected everywhere, although concerns had been expressed in the 1990's about some security procedures and systems for their protection in the former Soviet Union. Considerable effort has been expended by the United States and other western nations in working with Russia to improve its controls over both weapons and material. Most observers conclude that a lot of progress has been made, especially in the area of protecting weapons, but that still more needs to be done to improve protection of materials.

¹³ See, e.g., Zimmerman, Peter with Loeb, Cheryl, "Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited," *Defense Horizons* No. 38 (January 2004). <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH38/DH38.htm>

EXPLOSIVES AS WMD

Explosives are not usually considered to be WMD. But they have been and continue to be very effective tools of terrorists. They have been the prime weapon of choice, along with assault weapons in paramilitary attacks. Particularly when used to destroy civil aircraft in flight or to cause massive destruction through vehicle bombs, terrorist use of high explosives has succeeded in causing hundreds of fatalities in single incidents. So far, this greatly exceeds the minor terrorist successes with chemical and biological weapons. The technologies for making bombs are well known and well within the abilities of many terrorist groups. The effects are generally quite predictable, unlike, to date, has been the case with chemical and biological attacks.

Should the use of explosives to cause mass casualties be considered a use of WMD? To an extent, this is a semantic issue, but not completely. For example, the amount of resources allocated to deal with WMD terrorism may have been, in the United States, skewed by the perception of the awfulness of the classic WMD trio, to the detriment of attempts to deal with the explosives threat. Since the likelihood of the continued use of explosives by terrorists is 100%, and since the level of casualties for single incidents can be in the hundreds, many more lives may well be threatened by terrorist use of high explosives than by (at least) chemical or biological weapons for quite a while. This realization may be leading to a interest in the explosives threat in the United States. Whereas WMD used to be synonymous with CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear), there is a tendency now to use the formulation CBRNE in North America, in defining the WMD terrorist realm.

TERRORIST INTENT

There have been two recent examples of sub-state groups using biological weapons, Aum Shinrikyo and the Rajneesh cult. Both of these are religious groups, the first an apocalyptic cult that has appropriated elements of Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity, *inter alia*; the second was a bizarre offshoot of Hinduism, focused on material enjoyment and conspicuous consumption. In addition (see below), al-Qa'eda, which has a strong religious component, has demonstrated a significant interest in WMD. The statistics are clearly limited, but one wonders whether extreme religious (perhaps politico-religious) cults are more likely to use WMD, excusing their actions as carrying out the will of God.

True, there have also been a number of minor, unsuccessful or aborted attempts by non-religious organizations in this direction. One event was a report of a small terrorist group in the United States, which intended to deposit typhoid cultures in the water supplies of a major city.¹⁴ In other cases, individual right-wing actors in the United States, have been found to have manufactured a biotoxin, ricin, more useful for assassination than mass casualties.

A principal concern today is the WMD strategy of al-Qaeda. Its terrorist attacks are usually designed to produce mass casualties (the 9/11 attacks are obvious, having produced fatalities in the thousands; other, later attacks by al-Qaeda or affiliated terrorist groups in, e.g., Bali, Madrid, and London, produced hundreds of fatalities and may have aimed at even larger numbers). Indeed, analyses of statements by an al-Qaeda spokesman in 2002 confirm the intention of at least that person, Suleiman Abu Gheith, of killing up to four million Americans. The number was reached by an obscure calculus, in which millions of Muslim deaths were ascribed to U.S. or Israeli actions, mostly U.S. sanctions against Iraq in the 1990's.¹⁵ Such an elevated number appears to imply terrorist attacks using WMD, probably nuclear weapons, since with conventional means, it would be virtually impossible to accomplish this goal within a normal human life span.

A second indication of al-Qaeda intent may be found in reports of documents retrieved at al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in early 2002, following the overthrow of the Taliban regime. These included a document entitled "Superbombs," which contained a discussion and a primitive, unworkable design of a nuclear weapon.¹⁶ Comments by U.S. officials appear to assess the overall interest of al-Qaeda in WMD as appreciable, but their capabilities as rather primitive thus far, in all WMD areas.

In addition to the retrieved documentation, there have been reports that two Pakistani scientists, with some knowledge of nuclear matters, met with al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan in August 2001, just before the 9/11 attacks. These two

¹⁴ U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring Security*, OTA-ISC-511, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, p. 40.

¹⁵ Allison, Graham, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*, New York: Holt, 2004 has a discussion on pp. 12-14.

¹⁶ Allison, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-24 and <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/01/24/inv.al.qaeda.documents> accessed 12 October 2005.

scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudry Abdul Majeed, operated a charity in Kabul called Umma Tameer-e-Nau (Reconstruction of the Islamic Community), but are also said to have provided information regarding WMD to Bin Laden at his request.¹⁷ Conversations were allegedly intense and lasted for three days.

A third potential indication of intent might be deduced from the case of Jose Padilla, an American citizen, who was allegedly a member of al-Qaeda. Arrested by American authorities on his arrival in the United States, Padilla had been allegedly authorized by Bin Laden to assemble and detonate a radiological weapon in the United States. Although the intent might have been present, the level of technical ability to accomplish an effective act of this sort seems to have been rather limited in this instance.

The Chechen resistance, which has some links with al-Qa'eda, have also shown some interest in WMD. Chechens, apparently under the command of Shamil Basayev, an extreme Islamist, have organized a series of terrorist attacks in Russia, as part of their insurgency against Russian occupation of their republic. They have used various tactics, including military-like assaults, bombings of civilian (as well as military) aircraft and detonations of bombs at a public school. Their attacks have caused hundreds of civilian deaths, and may indicate an openness to future use of WMD, to achieve even larger effects. The only other data point concerning Chechens and WMD, so far, is the incident, noted above, in which Chechen agents placed a radiological device in a Moscow park, but did not detonate it. Overall, it appears to be within the realm of possibility that, if Chechen separatists were to obtain WMD, they might well use them against Russia.

A final indication of the possible intent of extreme Islamist groups to use WMD is the *fatwa* of Saudi cleric Sheikh Nassir bin Hamid al-Fahd, issued in May 2003, in which he examines, from a scholarly and legalistic point of view, whether it is justified under Islamic precepts in using weapons of mass destruction against the United States. Al-Fahd found in the affirmative, deciding that the United States had, directly or indirectly, killed 10 million, rather than 4 million (as Abu Gheith alleged) Muslims. Al-Fahd recanted this *fatwa* in November 2003 on Saudi television, following his arrest and incarceration by the Saudi government. There have been some reports that the recantation was itself later recanted, but these are difficult to confirm. There is not an openly acknowledged tie between this cleric and al-Qaeda. However, one might conclude that, whether or not

¹⁷ Allison, *loc. cit.* Additional sources for details of this information are given there.

there was a cause and effect relationship intended in either direction, the existence of this *fatwa* could be used by Bin Laden, who himself has no scholarly cachet to issue them, to justify publicly the use of WMD, with the goal of causing many thousands of casualties.

In summary, there is considerable evidence that at least some terrorist groups, in particular, al-Qaeda, are interested in using WMD in future terrorist attacks.

TECHNICAL OBSTACLES TO TERRORISTS' USE OF WMD

Intent alone does not create a viable threat, however. There are numerous technical obstacles to a major successful attack using WMD, that is, an attack that actually caused a very large number of fatalities (unlike the Aum events, mentioned above). None of the obstacles is insurmountable, but one may learn something by considering their range for each of the categories of WMD.

Biological Weapons. The biological weapon threat may be categorized as follows. One type covers presently available organisms, which would furnish by far the easier approach for sub-state actors. The second covers the future availability of genetically engineering techniques for greatly enhancing the capabilities of existing pathogens.

Ken Alibek, in his book, *Biohazard*, described Soviet efforts to modify bacteria to enhance their resistance to antibiotics and to increase their production of deadly toxins.¹⁸ Such engineering is not easy to accomplish, since modifying organisms often has the result of decreasing their viability. But it is possible, with sophisticated equipment and expertise, and in the future, such techniques will become ever more widely available. As far as today's sub-state terrorism is concerned, however, the threat from genetically-modified pathogens, while real, is not likely to appear for at least 15-20 years; unless provided by a state actor, which already has advanced capabilities in this area.

Regarding work with existing pathogens, the main obstacles for terrorists would be obtaining the material and dispersing it effectively. Samples of live pathogens have been obtained from commercial laboratories in the past. However, with additional attention to the proliferation of biological weapons and, especially given the mandates of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to carefully control materials relevant

¹⁸ Alibek, Ken with Handelman, Steven, "*Biohazard*," New York: Random House, 1999.

to WMD and to criminalize their unauthorized possession, many states have made efforts to close this loophole.

Anthrax in the spore state is the common pathogen with the greatest resistance to ultraviolet light from the sun (to which many bio agents are vulnerable) and which also causes a high rate of mortality, especially when infecting through respiration. It is therefore quite attractive to terrorists. Anthrax samples may be gathered from infected animals, both domestic and wild, in many parts of the world (the same is true of plague, *Yersinia pestis*). Some significant level of technical capability would be required to gather samples of pathogens in the field effectively and to isolate and culture them in a laboratory, but a PhD in microbiology, or even a competent graduate student could accomplish this with adequate laboratory equipment. It would be even easier to produce botulinum toxin in a lab. Obtaining pathogens or toxins, perhaps even in large quantities (say, kilogram amounts), while challenging to a sub-state group, should be eventually feasible for a number of actors. However, even simply obtaining sufficient useful pathogens for dispersal may be somewhat less easy than generally thought.

Al-Qa'eda did not appear to be very advanced in this respect and Aum Shinrikyo, with microbiologists on staff, made fundamental errors in not obtaining appropriately virulent strains of anthrax. In addition, their attempt to disperse botulinum toxin also failed, perhaps because the material degraded rapidly in the open air. Nevertheless, one must expect that in the future, terrorist groups will be able to obtain pathogens and disperse them more effectively. Indeed, the example of the anthrax letters in the United States in 2001 demonstrates that someone did.

Dispersing pathogens for maximum effect is more difficult than simply acquiring them. Advanced engineering techniques, many of them classified as secret by those nations who developed them, are needed to produce uniform-sized and dried pathogens that are in the 1 micron range necessary to enter and remain in pulmonary passages. If not stolen from the laboratories of states that perform research in these areas for offensive or defensive reasons, these techniques must be recreated in rather sophisticated laboratories. At the same time, one needs to take care not to infect those producing the material. If the material can be manufactured and dispersed effectively, such as from specialized sprayers mounted on low-flying aircraft, very large numbers of fatalities could, in principle, result. However, this amounts to a fairly complicated task, and one would expect the

perpetrators to engage in several test runs, to have any possibility of achieving a major impact.

In summary, biological attacks are certainly possible now, given past evidence. But attacks that cause mass casualties are less certain to be successful. Quite advanced microbiological and engineering techniques would be needed as would carefully gained test and operational experience. The technical requirements have been beyond the capability of interested terrorist groups in the past. However, this sanguine assessment is unlikely to continue for many more years: eventually, such techniques will be widely available. Given the likelihood of tests, perhaps even in populated areas, before a major attack (and Aum Shinrikyo did this) it would be useful for state and international medical organizations to maintain surveillance and keep a lookout for occurrences of exotic or unusual diseases,

Chemical Weapons. Obtaining chemicals that are highly toxic is extremely easy today. Further, many toxic industrial chemicals are normally produced in high-volume facilities and are even transported in multi-ton quantities, either by road or rail. These chemicals are attractive targets for dispersal, when located in densely populated areas. The example of Bhopal is salient, in which thousands were killed, not by terrorist malice, but through lack of safe industrial procedures that resulted in a massive release of methyl isocyanate into the surrounding, heavily populated area.

It would likely be far easier and more effective for a terrorist group to take advantage of the presence of a large quantity of a toxic chemical in one location and release it, rather than to manufacture it in large quantities and disperse it oneself. Of particular concern, because of their wide availability and essential use in many industrial processes, are chlorine and phosgene.

Radiological Weapons. Radioactive materials that have fields intense enough to be useful for a radiological weapon are widely available in most developed countries and only slightly less available in developing ones. Medical sources of cesium or cobalt are found all over the world, frequently with an intensity of more than 1,000 Curies (Ci). This is an intensity that, if unshielded, could cause serious health problems for humans within a few meters of the source for a few hours. Other types of isotopes, of equal strengths, such as x-ray sources for the industrial evaluation of manufactured metal items for flaws, are also generally present in large foundries, turbine manufacturing facilities, and other engineering locations.

The chief technical problem for a sub-national group would be to find a way of dispersing highly radioactive material over a wide enough area to cause massive, long-term contamination or to cause a large number of deaths while, at the same time, not disabling the terrorist operative before he has finished his work. Means of dispersion include, e.g., an explosive; dissolving the radioactive agent in a water supply; or spraying from a dispenser (which would entail serious shielding issues for the operator, if the material were radioactive enough to cause widespread contamination). Some quantitative information on likely consequences of plausible radiological weapons may be found in ref. 14 and in other open sources.¹⁹ The consensus of most experts who have analyzed the matter in detail is that the number of short-term fatalities from an explosively driven “dirty bomb” probably would not greatly exceed the fatalities from the explosion itself. Injuries from exposure and from later cancers may be somewhat increased through inadvertent transmission from individuals who are directly contaminated to those with whom they come into contact.

Another form of radiological weapon attack would be breaching the containment of a nuclear reactor to cause a major release of radioactive material. Large reactors, which could cause the most contamination, are inherently protected to a great degree by meters of steel and concrete, in order to protect those working at the reactor itself and at nearby locations. However, various modes of terrorist attack on reactors have been widely discussed, including the possibility of a 9/11-type attack with aircraft. While difficult for the terrorist, breaching the containment of a reactor (or of its associated spent fuel pond, consisting of many highly radioactive exposed fuel elements) is not impossible and increased safety and security measures are being applied, since more active consideration of this threat. The United States has been in the midst of improving the security of such facilities, as are other nations with nuclear facilities.

Nuclear Weapons. Although the most reliably catastrophic of weapons of mass production, nuclear weapons are the most difficult for terrorist groups to obtain or produce. Only nine or ten nations have produced nuclear weapons to this point, sixty years after their initial development. A high level of technical ability in many fields would be required to make a nuclear weapon, starting from zero. The most serious

¹⁹ For example, Levi, Michael and Kelly, Henry, “Weapons of Mass Disruption,” *Scientific American*, November 2002.

obstacle is in obtaining the nuclear material that fuels the weapon, either highly-enriched uranium or plutonium. Once the material is obtained, particularly for uranium, it may well be within the ability of a technically trained group of people to cause a nuclear detonation with a relatively simple “gun” device. A plutonium weapon would require a higher level of ability in bomb design. Plutonium is rather radioactive, unlike uranium, and produces many thousands of neutrons per second in a kilogram quantities. These neutrons would pre-detonate a “gun” device, disassembling the material before a significant nuclear yield would be produced. To work effectively, a plutonium weapon must be rapidly compressed by a symmetrical explosion to a super-critical density. A weapon “design” found at a Qa’eda camp in Afghanistan did not come close to this requirement and would not have worked.²⁰

Enriched uranium would be of great interest to a terrorist group bent on using nuclear weapons. Terrorist groups would be more likely to try to steal enriched uranium rather than produce it themselves. Developing one’s own uranium enrichment program is difficult enough for a state, unless the technology could be purchased from a criminal network, such as that of A.Q. Khan, who peddled enrichment and other nuclear-weapon related technologies to a number of customers. Plutonium, the less attractive material, needs to be produced in a nuclear reactor, which is probably not practical for a terrorist group. So, theft may be the only option.

Uranium is more desirable than plutonium, not only because it may be more easily weaponized, but also because its radioactivity is at a lower level and harder to detect, than plutonium. Thus, it may be transported with less fear of discovery. Its lone serious disadvantage is that a significantly larger quantity is required for a uranium weapon than for a plutonium device.

The easiest technical options for a terrorist group would be either to obtain a weapon, or else, a sufficient quantity of uranium to assemble into a weapon. It is for this reason that the United States and other western nations have worked closely with former Soviet states to secure nuclear weapons and nuclear material. Also, assistance has been provided to many former Soviet states to emplace radiation monitoring equipment at ports and border crossings to detect transport of nuclear material. While much progress has been made in protecting assembled weapons, much work remains in the area of

²⁰ Website in footnote 17, *loc. cit.*

protecting nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium. The situation would improve further if efforts, similar to those undertaken in the former Soviet Union, were made to improve controls over and protection of nuclear weapons in other weapon states as well.

In addition, there are far more countries that have only nuclear material, for example, for purely research purposes, than also have nuclear weapons. There has been an effort, both by the International Atomic Energy Agency and by individual nations over the past decade to control or reduce the amount of such material in the world, to protect it better, and to find substitute, non-weapon-usable material for it, where possible.

Protecting and controlling current sources of nuclear material is the most effective means of preventing nuclear terrorism. That is, unless some material or weapons have already found their way into the hands of potential terrorists.

COUNTERING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

The nuclear possibility is the most serious WMD threat in terms of its predictable consequences, should a nuclear detonation ever again take place in a populated area. The United States feels particularly concerned about the nuclear terrorist threat, since its realization would probably be the most effective way of waging an asymmetric war against the most powerfully armed country in the world. But all nations have an interest in preventing terrorist use of nuclear weapons: they could quite conceivably be used for many other reasons and causes other than to harm the United States.

Efforts to counter this emerging threat in the United States are in full swing. These activities include developing an overall architecture for a layered system of countermeasures to a nuclear terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland. While elements of this architecture have not yet been finally determined, they will include continuing to promote control and protection of nuclear material around the world, as well as supporting and strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. In addition, an increased and more effective international control of information related to production of nuclear material is essential. Control over the diffusion of sensitive dual-use technology, through existing export control regimes is another tool that could be strengthened and made universal. Again, it is hoped that these improvements will be an outcome of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

As part of a layered defense, and beyond international controls over materials and technology, the United States is establishing domestic radiation detection and tracking systems to interdict the transportation of illegal shipments of nuclear material into and through the United States. In addition, it is cooperating with host governments around the world, to assist them in the deployment of radiation detectors at key points along borders and in ports. The U.S. government is also interested in monitoring shipments from other countries to assure that no weapons or materials are being smuggled into the United States. Agreements are now being worked out with so-called Megaport host nations to enable such monitoring at points of departure.

In summary, the U.S. places a high priority on protecting itself from surreptitious nuclear terrorist attack, because of the unimaginably serious consequences and because of evidence that this form of asymmetric warfare is being strongly considered by at least one active adversary. The United States is undertaking a set of major protective efforts that include international cooperation to protect nuclear material wherever it exists; promoting international non-proliferation arrangements; and installing detection systems that will enable interdiction of material during transport. Key to many of these approaches will be increased cooperation and communication among all nations.

COUNTERS TO OTHER WMD, INCLUDING HIGH EXPLOSIVES

Following the 9/11 attacks and the appearance of the anthrax letters in the eastern United States, the government concentrated many of its counterterrorist efforts in a new agency, the Department of Homeland Security. This Department is working along several lines. One is research and development to produce new technical approaches to defense and protection. Procedures and practices are being developed to produce applicable concepts of operations for enforcement authorities to counter threats from chemical and biological weapons against civilian targets. And, since detection of chemical and biological agents before release is very difficult, considerable effort will also be devoted to early detection of and response to releases of these agents.

Some legal measures needed to be taken even before 9/11. For example, the specific criminalization of illegitimate possession and activity aimed at dispersal of chemical and biological agents was enacted in the United States and many other nations will follow suit, some as a result of Resolution 1540.

But legal measures are only a first step. In the case of biological weapons, early detection is essential to provide treatment before symptoms appear and to prevent rapid spread of disease, in case infectious pathogens are used. One technique being developed, which also has obvious public health applications, is called syndromic surveillance. This involves a centralized monitoring system that keeps track, in near-real time, of hospital admissions, unusual purchase volumes of relevant pharmaceutical items, elevated school or work absences, etc. When effective, such a system would clearly be a major help in halting spread of emerging diseases and could, indeed, help prevent or slow pandemics, which are now increasingly feared on a global level. Other countermeasures include the further development and deployment of detectors in areas that may be considered targets, the development of vaccines and therapeutics that do not currently exist for some agents, and the production of stockpiles of those vaccines that do exist. This work, too, has obvious public health implications, for example, in containing and mitigating outbreaks of hemorrhagic fevers. Finally, control over access to the more serious pathogens needs to be instituted on a world-wide basis, so that only legitimate researchers are able to obtain cultures of concern. Knowledge of technologies for weaponization of biological agents, although much of it is decades old, also needs to be carefully controlled to the degree possible, as is done with nuclear weapon-related information.

To counter the chemical threat, detection technologies are fairly advanced, although some improvements would still be helpful. Most effort should be focused on protecting such attractive targets as large-scale toxic chemical production and storage facilities, as well as to minimize the transport of these chemicals. Where transported, protective measures need to be augmented, especially to avoid attacks on rail or truck targets in populated areas. Deployment of protective equipment to first responders is taking place now in the United States. The same equipment can often be used in the case of biological or even radiological attack, if carefully designed. Finally, to add to the other countermeasures, defense will include the deployment of antidotes to regions of concern and of detection technologies near potential targets.

To defend against major attacks using explosives, different techniques need be applied, depending on the specific targets and threats. For years, explosives have been used to attack civil aircraft and to target civilian crowds in hotels, restaurants, office buildings, and, more recently, in mass transit systems.

Since attacks on civil aviation began many years ago, explosives detection equipment has been developed and, since 9/11, massively deployed around the world, particularly in the United States. One reason this was feasible is that civil aviation naturally uses choke points to transport passengers, baggage, and cargo, which greatly facilitates short-range detection of relatively small amounts of explosives in items being carried on aircraft.

Unfortunately, the rise of large-scale vehicle bomb attacks and suicide, or leave-behind bombings against a wide variety of civilian targets requires either impractically large numbers of detection systems or longer-range detection. This is still a technically challenging problem and one being worked by scientists and engineers in a number of countries. Successfully countering suicide bombers would require their detection at a distance (say, at least 10 meters), before they are able to approach large concentrations of people. It will likely never be possible to stop all suicide bomb attacks, but their worst effects may be reduced. Countering vehicle bombs demands detection of large quantities of explosives in a car or truck, ideally at distances of tens of meters. In both cases, a careful consideration of concepts of operations is needed, which will provide the context for the application of the more effective technical approaches. These concepts will vary widely, depending on the area of infrastructure to be protected. In the absence of rather specific intelligence, a lot of work and a major investment of resources will be required before we will be able to reduce significantly the explosives terrorist threat.

BALIPAPERFROM INTERNET TO ISLAMNET

NET-CENTRIC COUNTER-TERRORISM

B.RAMAN

INTRODUCTION

The Internet enables every jihadi to feel part of a larger whole. It enables every angry Muslim to give vent to his or her anger in myriad ways. It enables every Muslim to become a participant in the jihad in his or her own way, with or without a leader. It has strengthened Islamic solidarity. Cyber space has become the spawning ground of jihadi warriors. The use of the Internet by the jihadi terrorists illustrates the folly of dismissing them as irrationals or as persons with a medieval mind. An irrational person or one with a medieval mind cannot use the Internet as effectively as the jihadi terrorists have been doing. In this paper, the increasing use of the Internet by international jihadi terrorist organisations would be discussed under six headings: propagation; communication; data-mining; cyber warfare; other aspects; and net-centric counter-terrorism.

PROPAGATION

All political dissident and other minority groups that in the past lacked access to the conventional media---print or electronic--- have found in the Internet an easily available means of propagating their cause, creating an awareness of their ideology, winning adherents and promoting a feeling of solidarity and unity of action for achieving their objective. Web activism is not a recent phenomenon and not confined to Islamic groups---moderate or extremist.

Terrorist organisations of different hues ---ethnic, ideological or religious--- too have found in the Internet an ideal tool for facilitating the pursuit of their objectives. The international jihadi terrorist organisations were not the first to turn to the Internet. Ethnic terrorist organisations like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), ideological terrorist organisations such as the Maoist groups of India and Nepal and religious terrorist organisations such as those of the Punjab in India and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the UK were amongst the earliest to have realised the utility of the Internet as an operational tool in their attempts to achieve their objective.

Amongst the indigenous jihadi terrorist organisations, those of the Palestinians and pro-Palestinian groups, the Chechens and the Kashmiris were the first to start using the Internet for propagating their cause. These were followed by organisations in Indonesia. Jihadi terrorist organisations with pan-Islamic objectives and trans-national networking started using the Internet in a big way only in 2000 and, since then, have replaced the indigenous jihadi terrorist organisations as the most extensive and innovative users of the Internet.

The initial use of the Internet---whether by the indigenous jihadi organisations or by the pan-Islamic ones--- was confined to the creation and the use of web sites for propagating their cause, for enrolling members and collecting funds. The web sites were also used for psychological warfare (PSYWAR) against their State adversaries through the dissemination of details of their alleged suppression of the Muslims.

Well-known and well-identified jihadi organisations restricted their use of the web sites to purposes that would not bring them into conflict with the law. They refrained from using their web sites, for example, to provide instructions on how to wage a jihad through means such as the fabrication of an improvised explosive device (IED), to publicize their claims relating to the successful commission of acts of terrorism etc.

Among the ostensibly legitimate purposes for which they used their sites were: proclaiming their objectives and policies, disseminating statements of their leaders, posting articles on different aspects of Islam, and making appeals for volunteers and funds. The web site operators took care not to be seen as indulging in and justifying acts of terrorism.

However, this cautious policy did not prevent them from indirect facilitation of acts of terrorism through such means as dissemination of articles carried by the professional journals and web sites of governmental institutions like the military and the police on matters such as the low-intensity conflict, which indicated the various ways in which terrorist and insurgent organisations functioned. Their purpose in carrying such articles was to facilitate copy cat terrorism without falling foul of the law. In their perception---which was valid---since they were mostly reproducing articles on the modus operandi of other terrorist organisations written by governmental experts, they used a legal loophole to avoid running afoul of the law.

The period before 2000 also saw the emergence of a number of web sites created by either Muslim individuals or by organisations not identified with indigenous or pan-Islamic terrorist organisations. They sought to encourage feelings of Islamic solidarity and make Muslims aware of the writings and teachings of well-known jihadi leaders associated with organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. An important example is the writings and statements of the late Abdullah Azzam, considered one of the mentors of Osama bin Laden, which started appearing on these web sites. The purpose of these sites was to provide religious and ethical justifications for jihad.

POST-1998 MUSHROOMING

Statements condemning the US and Israel and projecting them as the enemies of Islam and Muslims started appearing with increasing frequency on all the web sites of the pan-Islamic jihadi terrorist organisations after the formation of the International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People by Osama bin Laden from his base in Kandahar, Afghanistan in February 1998. The IIF sought to bring together in one trans-national network bin Laden's Al Qaeda (an exclusively Arab terrorist organization) and a number of non-Arab jihadi terrorist organisations operating from countries such as Pakistan, the Central Asian Republics, Egypt, the Philippines, and Bangladesh. The frequency and virulence of the anti-US statements carried by these organisations increased after the US cruise missile attacks on alleged training camps of the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Sudan in August 1998.

The projection of the US as the principal enemy of Islam became the defining characteristic of all pan-Islamic jihadi extremist or terrorist organisations after the cruise missile attack. However, the indigenous jihadi terrorist organisations such as those of the State of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) in India and Chechnya in Russia refrained from adopting any anti-US propaganda line in their web sites.

In February 2000, a search of the World Wide Web (WWW) by this writer, even if not very exhaustive, led to about 1,500 sites of Islamic organisations. Most of them had the benign objective of helping to provide a better understanding of Islam among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. They contained interpretations of the holy Koran, explanations of Islamic religious traditions and practices, and articles on the contribution of Islam to science and fine arts. They also provided a useful database of the Muslim scientists, thinkers and women engineers of the world, the Muslim media and so on.

The following conclusions emerged from the study undertaken by this writer at that time:

A large majority of these were Sunni and Wahabi sites, with very few Shia or Iranian-based ones. Some were anti-Ahmadiya.

- The preponderance of sites were run by members of the Muslim community within the United States. The next greatest number were those from Western Europe, Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan.
- There was a large network of Muslim Students' Associations in US universities, all of whom had their own sites.
- The US also had some websites meant for Muslim members of the US armed forces. There was one site, called Muslim Military Members (MMM), which enrolled adherents from Muslims serving in the armed forces of different countries all over the world. It described its aim as follows: " The MMM is an information source for brothers and sisters serving in the armed forces. We are a gathering point. A place where information is disseminated. A means to keep people informed. Through MMM, you will stay informed of different events, resources and news items to help you survive as a Muslim in the armed forces. The MMM is not an official organisation, but rather a loose association of military personnel and those in the service of military personnel. The cost of the web site is provided freely as a service by the Islamic Information Office, paid by Muntadanet.inc."
- There were comparatively fewer sites from West Asia and North Africa, which might be explained by the restrictions on non-government organisations (NGOs) and possibly by local curbs on access to the Internet in countries within their region.
- Surprisingly, while there were about 50 sites focusing on the problems and history of the Muslims of Jammu & Kashmir, one noticed only three sites relating to the Muslims in the rest of India-- those of the Aligarh Muslim University Alumni, the Indian Muslim Relief Committee and the "Islamic Voice" (a journal published from Bangalore). It was possible there were many more sites, but these were not picked up by the search engines used in this study.

- While many sites discussed the relations of Islam with Christianity and Judaism, no sites were found to include similar discussions on relations with Hinduism. Of the 1,500 sites studied by this writer, only about 150 contained extremist material relating to the so-called jihad. The rest of them appeared to be benign in their objectives. The majority of the jihadi sites were run by Muslim extremist organisations in different parts of the world who had taken to violence to achieve their political and/ or religious objectives. Some were also kept by individual Muslims with assumed names such as Abu Mansoor, Abu Mujahid, and Abu Jindal.

Some of these jihadi sites performed the following services:

- Dissemination of information regarding the jihad in different countries.
- Instructions on how to become a Mujahideen, how to manufacture explosives, etc.
- Databases on the availability of arms and ammunition for purchase, including prices. The sites providing this information were apparently run by Muslims in the US, because the arms sellers recommended by them were all based in the US.
- A bibliography of articles on urban warfare and low-intensity conflict, which had appeared in US military and strategic journals. A list of 266 such articles was available. Many of them had been collected from the US Marine Corps Doctrine Publications, the Marine Corps Warfighting Publications, the Marine Corps Reference Publications and the US Army Field Manuals. One can directly access many of these articles at the Army Doctrine and Training Digital Library sites, by just clicking on the relevant titles. Examples of such articles included: Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict; Physical Security; Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield; Intelligence Officers' Handbook; Military Operations in Built-up Areas; Urban Warfare Communications; Air Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts; Bomb Protection Handbook; Chemical/Biological/Radiological Incident Handbook (purported to have been prepared by the CIA); Chemical Warfare Handbook of the Marine Corps Institute; Chemical Warfare Agents; Military Intelligence--Using Organic Assets; Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare (purported to have been prepared by the CIA's Psywar Division for use in Nicaragua); Dealing With Vehicle Hijacking Situations; Emergency Response to Terrorism; Media Facilitation; Public Affairs Operations; Media Relations;

Building a Newspaper--Tactics, Techniques and Procedures; and Combat Neurosis.

While most of these articles and papers made available by the jihadi web sites were apparently procured from open sources, the origin of the documents purportedly written by the CIA was not clear [although at least some of these, too, are available from open sources]. Were the pro-jihadi Muslim members of the US Armed Forces and security agencies providing some of this material to the jihadi web sites? One had a strong suspicion, which could be neither proved nor disproved.

Nearly one-third of the 150 jihadi websites related to Kashmir. These were run by indigenous Kashmiri organisations such as the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF); Pakistan-based terrorist organisations such as the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad and its militant wing, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET); and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. Western-based Kashmiri organisations such as the Kashmir American Council, and the Kashmir Canadian Council; Kashmiri activists based abroad such as Ajaz Siraj, moderator of the Kashnet, Dr. Ayub Thakur of the World Kashmir Freedom Movement, Azmat A. Khan, Secretary-General of the JKLF, UK/Europe, and Bashir Siraj of the Kashmir Forum. Some Western personalities with an interest in the Kashmir issue such as Lord Avebury of the UK and Ms. Karen Parker of the US had their own sites. Some of the Kashmiri sites seemed to have been constructed and run by a Colorado-based Internet Service Provider with the typical Hindu name of Indra's Net.

Amongst other jihadi organisations active on the Internet were those of Chechnya, which maintained sites in eight different languages, with video/audio coverage of the fighting, scenes from the training camps, and interviews with the Mujahideen. Jihadi organizations in Kosovo, Indonesia and the Xinjiang province of China also maintained sites. Interestingly, the Uighur jihadi organisations of Xinjiang seemed to operate as lone wolves, with no links to other jihadi groups. No satisfactory explanation for this was available. There were also no sites from the jihadi organisations of the Central Asian Republics.

The Taliban Government of Afghanistan used to maintain its own site, apparently from Islamabad. After the enforcement of the UN sanctions against the Taliban in November 1999, this site closed down with a message that, due to difficulties in loading and maintaining the site directly from Afghanistan, it had been discontinued. The visitors

were advised to read the "Dharb-e-M'umin", an online electronic monthly, for news about Afghanistan, Kashmir and Chechnya.

Among the organisations in West Asia and North Africa having their own sites were the Hamas, Hizbollah, and the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria.

Some of the jihadi sites were in the Malaysian language. Surprisingly, the 150 jihadi websites contained very few references to Osama bin Laden. Instead, the sites contained more references to the late Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian who, along with bin Laden, was quite active during the Afghan war and who was mysteriously killed in an explosion in Peshawar in the late 1980s. The complete text of a book on jihad by Azzam was available on the web as early as 2000.

In a note assessing the sites as of February 23, 2000, this author had stated: "It would be difficult to estimate the impact of these jihadi web sites on the ground situation in terrorism-affected areas. In regions such as Chechnya, where the Russians don't allow foreign journalists, the web sites definitely become reference points for outside people wanting to have a version different from that of the Russians. One does not know in how many instances, the terrorists were established to have learnt their tradecraft from the web sites. However, it is important for the security agencies to closely monitor the jihadi sites."

The period between 9/11 and the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in March-April, 2003, saw a mushrooming of jihadi web sites, with organisations suspected or identified as facades for the Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda individuals starting a plethora of them. Since the organisations and individuals behind these web sites had no reasons to take care not to come into conflict with the law, they made no secret of their desire to use their web presence not only to propagate their cause and carry on a campaign against the US and other countries perceived as supporting the US, but also to spread the jihad across national borders by paying homage to suicide terrorists, and by converting the Internet into a virtual madrasa and jihadi training centre. The number of such sites has further grown in the wake of the US-led occupation of Iraq. The number of jihadi web sites is estimated to have increased from about 150 in February 2000 to about 4,000 today.

The military operations by the US-led coalition in Afghanistan after 9/11 not only deprived Al Qaeda and other jihadi organisations associated with it of their training

infrastructure, but it also damaged the ability of their leadership to personally interact with and motivate their cadres. The scattered remnants of Al Qaeda and other jihadi organisations found themselves forced to split into small groups and take shelter in different places in Pakistan as well as in other countries such as Iran, Bangladesh, and Yemen. The post-9/11 security measures made travel to other countries difficult, drastically reducing the possibility of personal meetings. This period also saw the emergence of the phenomenon of free-lance jihadis----- individual Muslims, angered by the actions of the US and other Western countries in Afghanistan and Iraq, waging individual jihads, either alone or in association with like-minded co-religionists, without necessarily belonging to Al Qaeda or other member-organisations of the IIF. These free-lance jihadis also made their presence felt on the Internet.

As these scattered small groups, on their own initiative without directions or guidance from a central leadership, planned and executed jihadi terrorist strikes in different parts of the world, they started depending on the Internet more and more for maintaining the motivation of their cadres and for sharing knowledge and expertise in matters such as the fabrication of explosives from commonly available materials, the construction of IEDs, and the use of modern innovations in science and technology for the commission of acts of terrorism.

The web sites consequently became the main tool for jihadi organization not only to the propagate their cause, conduct psywar against their adversaries, collect funds and motivate their supporters, but also to disseminate knowledge and instruction on techniques of reprisal against their adversaries. A telling example of such dissemination of knowledge concerns the use of mobile telephones for triggering IEDs. It was through the Internet that lessons on this subject were spread across the world so that today one finds widely scattered jihadi terrorist groups, none of whom had direct contact with any other post-9/11 group and none of whom had the benefit of any formal training, successfully using the mobile phones as a trigger in different areas such as Casablanca, Madrid, Iraq, southern Thailand and so on.

While there has thus been a remarkable growth in the number of web sites operated by pan-Islamic jihadi terrorist organisations, a similar growth has not been witnessed in the web presence of indigenous terrorist organisations--- whether they are ethnic, ideological or religious. The Internet today is dominated largely by pan-Islamic jihadi terrorist organisations, who have pushed other terrorist organisations to the

background. Moreover, since the leaders of the indigenous jihadi terrorist organisations do not face difficulty in travelling clandestinely within the territory of the country in which they are operating in order to brief and motivate their cadres through personal meetings, they do not have the same operational dependence on the Internet as the pan-Islamic, trans-national jihadi terrorist organisations.

The pan-Islamic jihadi terrorist organisations are aware that the Internet is a double-edged sword. While it facilitates their trans-national networking and operations, the Internet also makes them vulnerable to detection by their opponents' intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies. They, therefore, avoid the use of their web sites for the dissemination of any knowledge regarding their future operational plans, as well as any information which might enable the agencies to determine the identities of their followers and their whereabouts. Their net-centric warfare is more strategic than tactical, more general objectives oriented than specific operations oriented.

Those operating these web sites are also increasingly adept at Internet-specific evasive techniques such as frequently changing their location in order to add to the difficulties of agencies monitoring them, and exploiting other legitimate web sites as safehaven for concealing their web presence.

What has been the impact of the growing web presence of the international jihadi terrorist organisations on their operations? First, they have been able to add to the anger against the US, Israel and other countries supporting the US through the skillful use of video and audio clips of atrocities allegedly committed against Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq. This anger has strengthened the motivation of their own cadres and motivated many other Muslims in different parts of the world to undertake acts of free-lance jihadi terrorism. Second, they have been able to create or aggravate feelings of alienation amongst the Muslims of countries which have been supporting the US. Third, they have been trying to intimidate some states and individuals presently co-operating with the US to stop doing so through methods such as the kidnapping and murder of their nationals and the publicising of their acts through the Internet. Fourth, they have been able to propagate their cause in the Islamic Ummah and in the Muslim diaspora in Western countries and thereby widen the base of support for their jihad against the US. Fifth, they have been able to disseminate knowledge and expertise in the techniques of carrying out acts of jihadi terrorism. And finally, they have been able to bring about an apparently inexhaustible flow of volunteers for suicide missions in Iraq through their skillful

motivational techniques, using video and audio clips of atrocities allegedly inflicted on the Sunni Muslims.

However, there is so far no evidence to show that their web presence has contributed to the success of any specific operation. It is difficult as well to assess and quantify the extent of funds coming to them through the Internet.

COMMUNICATION

Till the early 1990s, couriers and landline telephones were the preferred means of communication of all terrorist organisations---ethnic, ideological or religious. They then started using mobile and satellite telephones. They have been increasingly using the Internet for their communications since 1995. Their use of the Internet in this manner includes e-mail, messenger services, message boards, and chat rooms.

In the past, personal couriers were the safest means of communication unless the couriers were intercepted and interrogated by the security agencies. Telephones are quite vulnerable and communications through them could be easily intercepted unless the terrorists use scramblers. The success of the Indian counter-terrorism agencies against the Sikh terrorist organisations in the Punjab in the 1990s was made possible by the frequent use of the landline telephone by the terrorists.

Terrorist organisations started using satellite and mobile telephones in the early 1990s. The mobile telephone calls posed some difficulty for the technical intelligence agencies, particularly in determining where the persons making and receiving the calls were located. This was particularly so if the terrorists used stolen mobile phones or used the phones while moving around from place to place. The widespread use of the mobiles by the terrorists in Karachi in 1995 forced the Government of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, to ban the use of such phones. This forced the terrorists to go back to using landline telephones. This, in turn, enabled the Pakistani security agencies to capture or kill a number of terrorists by intercepting their telephone calls and pinpointing their location. Solutions to the difficulties posed by frequency-hopping and mobile telephones has since been found by a number of security agencies. It is understood that the arrest of a number of operatives of the Al Qaeda in Pakistan after 9/11 was made possible by their unwise use of satellite or mobile phones and the success of the US intelligence agencies in intercepting their conversations and in pinpointing their location.

E-mails are a safer means of communications than telephones. Terrorists have become adept at frustrating the efforts of the intelligence agencies to intercept e-mails and identify the sender and receiver by employing evasive techniques such as the use of one-time e-mail addresses and one-time use of Internet cafes (different e-Mail addresses and different Internet cafes are used for each operational message).

Interception of e-mails poses certain special problems. Whereas a telephone conversation can be intercepted even while the conversation is in progress and the location of the terrorist making the call determined with a fair measure of accuracy, e-mails can be intercepted only after the terrorist has typed the message and sent it. Consequently, instantaneous interception of a suspect E-mail and successful follow-up action on it is more the exception than the rule. By the time an intelligence agency intercepts an e-mail, analyzes it and determines from which Internet cafe it was sent, it usually is far too late and successful identification and arrest of the suspect becomes very difficult.

To ensure that even a single interception does not damage their operations, the terrorists have been using encryption techniques. The most primitive, but the most effective encryption technique is the use of “domestic codes” in messages. A domestic code is a set of pre-determined meanings for certain words and phrases used in an e-mail message. The message, when intercepted, appears unencrypted, but the words and phrases used have a special, unique meaning. It is virtually impossible to break a domestic code unless one has a human source in the targeted terrorist organisation who knows what the key words and phrases in the message actually mean.

It is believed that Mohammad Atta and his associates, who carried out the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, often, if not always, used domestic codes for their communications among themselves and with Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM) in Pakistan and with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Unless one knows that the sender is a terrorist, one would not suspect the messages sent by him as having anything to do with a terrorist operation. To be able to use domestic codes effectively, however, periodic personal meetings are necessary. The post-9/11 security measures making travel by terrorists more difficult have reduced the chances of personal meetings and thereby affected to some extent their ability to use domestic codes.

However, after 9/11, aside from Iraq, there has hardly been any jihadi terrorist strike in which the perpetrators came from outside the targeted country. Many, if not

most, of those, who participated in the jihadi terrorist strikes at Bali, Mombasa, Casablanca, Istanbul, Madrid and London were locals, who would have been able to communicate among themselves in domestic codes without any major difficulty.

In other cases, to overcome the difficulties and to protect themselves against interception of their messages, the jihadi terrorists have been increasingly using commercially available encryption keys. To be able to break them, the intelligence agencies need a large number of sample messages originated by the same organisation or individual using the same keys. This is quite difficult and may explain why intelligence agencies fail to detect preparations for specific terrorist strikes. In the case of the international jihadi terrorists, inadequate knowledge of their language and inadequate understanding of their allusions to the Holy Koran in their messages add to the difficulties faced by the intelligence agencies in making effective use of e-mail intercepts. Intelligence professionals know how difficult it is to pinpoint and examine suspect telephone conversations in the English language. To make their task manageable, they use special software containing key words and phrases through which help separate suspect messages from innocent ones. Even then, there is often a time-gap between the interception of a message and its analysis and subsequent follow-up action.

Such difficulties are considerably magnified in the case of E-mail messages, which are in millions, if not billions, and particularly when a foreign language is used. Not infrequently, the foreign language itself becomes a kind of a domestic code.

The case relating to the 2002 kidnapping and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl by Karachi-based jihadi terrorists provides an interesting example of the operational use of e-mail services by terrorists and the difficulties faced by intelligence agencies attempting to track them. Pearl had heard that the final instruction to Richard Reid, the shoe bomber based in Paris, to embark on his terrorist mission came from someone in Karachi through an e-mail. Pearl wanted to establish the identity of the individual in Karachi who sent this message and his organisational linkages. He made preparations for his visit to Karachi through e-mails exchanged with known and unknown people in Pakistan.

Pearl was keen to meet Mubarik Shah Gilani, the leader of a Pakistan-based organisation called Jamaat-ul-Furqa (JUF), which had a large number of members in the Afro-American community in the US and the Caribbean. He entered into e-mail correspondence with a number of persons in Pakistan in order to seek their help for

arranging an interview with Gilani. One day, an individual, who claimed to know Gilani, sent him an e-mail offering to arrange the interview and asking him to come to a Karachi hotel for the initial meeting.

Without knowing about the real identity of this individual, Pearl agreed to come for the meeting and found himself in a terrorist trap, which led to his kidnapping and murder. After the kidnapping, the terrorists involved in the plot exchanged many e-mails among themselves, with the media and others relating to the conditions for the release of Pearl. Through a study of these messages and other enquiries, the Pakistani intelligence agencies were ultimately able to establish the identities of the perpetrators and arrest them, but they could not establish where Pearl was kept hostage and rescue him before he was murdered.

The use of Messenger Services, Message Boards and Chat Rooms by the terrorists to discuss their plans and to convey instructions poses similar difficulties to intelligence agencies in their collection of Technical Intelligence (TECHINT). This again may explain why there have been very few confirmed instances of specific terrorist operations being thwarted and terrorists arrested through timely interceptions on the Internet.

Intelligence agencies monitoring the use of the Internet by the terrorist groups are often able to pick up general intelligence concerning likely or planned targets, but not details of specific plans. Thus, through the Internet chatter, intelligence agencies by 2004 had assessed that Spain and the UK were the likely next targets, but they were unable to collect specific intelligence about when, where and how the terrorists would carry out the strikes.

Terrorists also use the Internet for commercial purposes under cover names for augmenting their funds and for the procurement of arms and ammunition. The LTTE, for example, regularly uses the Internet to exchange communications relating to its commercial fleet of ships and to remain in touch with its arms procurement networks in Thailand, East Europe and other places. It was reported, for example, to have procured a microlite aircraft through the Internet.

It is not possible to prevent the terrorists from using the Internet for communication purposes, but it should be possible to intercept their messages and chats, break the codes used by them and collect timely preventive intelligence. But, in view of the millions, if not billions, of messages in different languages passing through the

Internet, identifying suspect messages in this traffic, decoding them, translating them if they are not in English, understanding their significance and implications and taking effective follow-up action is a phenomenal task.

Such a task requires human and material resources, powerful super computers, linguistic competence and a large data-base built up with the help of intercepts broken in the past. Very few countries can mobilise such multi-dimensional resources. While the jihadi terrorists are increasingly becoming global in their thinking, planning and execution of their operations, national technical capabilities alone, however good, will not help in countering them. There has to be an international networking of individual national assets, a network which is superior to the network of the terrorists. Such an international network, however, has yet to emerge.

DATA MINING

Not much elaboration is required regarding the terrorists' use of the Internet for data-mining. This refers to the collection of data for propaganda, PSYWAR and operational purposes. The trend towards greater transparency in the working of governments and the private sector, the mushrooming of online journals and the availability of the print media, specialised journals and the research products of think tanks on the Internet place at the disposal of the terrorists a large volume of essential/useful data, to which they might not otherwise have access. The kinds of data which the terrorists now can get with the help of various Internet search engines includes the following:

- Details regarding sensitive infrastructure such as the location of sensitive Government offices, banks and other financial institutions, stock exchanges, power stations, nuclear establishments, airports, railway stations, and traffic choke-points.
- Reports of parliamentary and Congressional proceedings.
- Details of parliamentary and other enquiries into the functioning of intelligence and security agencies, which often highlight their deficiencies.
- Case studies of important terrorist incidents giving details of how the terrorists operated.
- Case studies of the successes and failures of the counter-terrorism agencies.

- Testimony given by intelligence and security managers before parliamentary and congressional hearings.
- Articles on arms, ammunition, different kinds of explosives, and weapons of mass destruction material.
- Articles on the counter-terrorism methods of the intelligence and security agencies.
- Articles on the threat and vulnerability perception of national security agencies.

A careful collection of the relevant material from the Internet facilitates the commission of terrorism by placing at the hands of terrorists considerable material which they require for a successful strike. Before the advent of the Internet, the terrorists had to spend a lot of money and time to “case” their targets through spot visits and enquiries. Now, much of the preliminary work can be done through the Internet. Their knowledge of the working of intelligence and security agencies, including their weak and strong points has improved. Copy cat terrorism has also become easier.

What is required to counter this and deny the terrorists the information they need? The answer lies not in reversing the process of greater transparency, but in carefully monitoring and controlling transparency in order to exclude from the Internet information which might not otherwise be available to the terrorists and which could directly facilitate the commission of acts of terrorism. There is now a greater awareness worldwide of the need for such measures.

CYBER WARFARE

Cyber warfare refers to techniques designed to cause massive disruptions in the economy and critical infrastructure of an adversary, as well as denying the adversary the ability to effectively use the Internet for operational purposes, such as waging a conventional or unconventional warfare. As the world, its economy and infrastructure become more and more Internet dependent and driven, they become more and more vulnerable to catastrophic acts of mass disruption not only by state and non-state actors such as terrorists, and trans-national crime syndicates, but also by lone-wolf cyber warriors, working either independently, or in tandem with other lone-wolf warriors or under the employ of state or non-state actors. Cyber warfare provides the means of

conducting covert actions such as sabotage, subversion, or mass disruption without having to physically cross borders.

While many states are believed to be acquiring a capability for waging cyber warfare, evidence is still lacking as to whether the terrorist organisations too have been doing so. The terrorists have definitely acquired a capability for disfiguring the web sites of their adversaries; there have been innumerable instances of such attacks. Are they also trying to acquire a capability for mass disruption operations through the Internet against economic and other critical infrastructure? The evidence regarding this is still incomplete and weak.

Much has been written and discussed concerning the dangers of cyber warfare by terrorists involving mass disruption covert actions against their adversary states. The debate on this subject is based more on perceptions of vulnerabilities than on those of real threats. However, intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies cannot afford to overlook this danger while developing their capabilities in the field of net-centric counter-terrorism.

OTHER ASPECTS

Since 9/11, the jihadi terrorists have been increasingly using the cyber space for some of their activities. The remarkable manner in which they have built up their cyber capabilities speaks to the availability of a fairly large reservoir of information technology (IT) proficient volunteers who are prepared to place their services at the disposal of these organizations for operational purposes. Some IT experts have been identified and apprehended. Prominent among these were: Abu Zubaidah, a Palestinian, who was arrested at Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab in March 2002 and handed over to the US authorities; and Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan, of Pakistani origin, who was arrested at Lahore in August 2004. At the time of the arrest of Abu Zubaidah, sections of the Pakistani media reported that he had completed a course in computer technology at Pune, India, before crossing over into Pakistan and joining Al Qaeda.

Many madrasas in Pakistan---some on their own and others at the prodding of the government -- have been teaching IT to their students from different countries, in addition to lessons in religion and the techniques of waging jihad. While the aim of the Pakistani government in pressuring the madrasas to include IT in the syllabus is to provide the students with legitimate means of livelihood after they come out of the

madrasas, in an attempt to wean them away from terrorism, many of these IT-trained and religiously-motivated students add to the reservoir of IT-proficient volunteers available to Al Qaeda and the IIF.

There is reason to believe that in addition to these, there are many lone-wolf Muslim cyber professionals living all over the world who have been assisting the jihadi terrorists in cyber space. As a result of this, international jihadi terrorists have never been lacking in competent cyber professionals, who either act at the instance of Al Qaeda and the IIF or on their own, in the pursuit of common objectives.

While their increasing web presence has enabled the jihadi terrorists and their allies in the community of free-lance jihadis and lone-wolf cyber activists to promote and strengthen feelings of Islamic solidarity and to give a push to the trend towards the monolithisation of the “community” (though this objective is still far away), its actual contribution to the success of specific acts of terrorism is difficult to quantify. However, their ability to communicate with each other through the Internet without their planned operations being detected by the intelligence agencies has definitely been an important factor in some of their successful terrorist strikes.

Terrorist organisations cannot be defeated in the military sense. They can only be made to wither away by repeatedly denying them success, by diluting the motivation of their cadres and by drying up the flow of volunteers and funds. An important component of cyber counter-terrorism, therefore, is devising ways of denying them success in the cyber space. The international community is nowhere near achieving this objective.

Most of what the intelligence agencies know about the web presence of the jihadi terrorist organisations seems to be based on their observations in the web space and the interrogation of arrested terrorists. Inadequate human intelligence (HUMINT), which is one of the serious deficiencies of the counter-terrorism agencies of the world over, prevents these agencies from penetrating the web network of the jihadi terrorists. In the absence of penetration, which could provide agencies inside information about the kind of encryption used, and how and when it is changed, code-breaking becomes time-consuming and often simply a matter of luck.

NET-CENTRIC COUNTER-TERRORISM

Neither prevention nor pre-emption is possible in cyber-space. Only effective counter-measures can deny the terrorists the advantages presently enjoyed by them. Countering their innumerable web sites by suppressing them would be counter-productive. The web sites run by the jihadi organisations and their associates are a valuable source of open information regarding the terrorists. There would be no point in suppressing them in their entirety. What needs to be suppressed, instead, are those pages or sections of their web sites which disseminate information about how to commit acts of terrorism. An effective counter to terrorist use of the web for propaganda and PSYWAR purposes again does not lay in suppressing them, but in governments developing better means of their own for the dissemination of information and a better PSYWAR capability, in order to discredit the terrorist organisations and wean their followers away from them.

The most important component of net-centric counter-terrorism is the capability to monitor and intercept their communications through the Internet, to break their codes and to take timely action on the intelligence thus collected. Very few countries in the world presently have the human, financial and technical resources required for this. It would be very difficult to undertake this task through national capabilities alone. While there has been an increase in international co-operation by way of intelligence-sharing, there is very little co-operation by way of technology-sharing.

Technology, which could facilitate better countering of the web presence of any entity is double-edged. What can assist in countering the web presence of non-state actors, would be equally helpful against states themselves. Hence, the reluctance to share this technology. The scope for co-operation will, therefore, continue to be limited. The post-9/11 period has seen greater bilateral and multilateral co-operation in cyber security, but this remains restricted to the sharing of training facilities and transfer of low-tech expertise. Every country, faced with threats from international jihadi terrorists and other terrorist organisations, has to invest considerable resources, time and effort in developing a national capability for Internet communication penetration.

The Internet provides a means of penetrating terrorist organisations through human moles by taking advantage of these organizations' online recruiting. This is an area of intelligence exploitation, which deserves better attention than it has received so far.

The objective of counter-data mining has already been touched upon above. As regards cyber warfare, the fact that the terrorists have not so far made any attempt in this direction should not give rise to any complacency that they are unlikely to do so in future too. This is an area of serious vulnerability, which should continue to receive the careful attention required. (16-10-05)

**The Jihad Online:
The Lashkar-e-Taiba on the Internet
Praveen Swami**

American intellectuals, most of whom are Jewish, have arrived at the conclusion that their shameless civilisation was nothing compared to the pure faith of Islam. This faith, however, was blocking the progress of the new world order under America.... America, Israel, India and Russia are scared of our excellent army. All these enemies of Islam are frightened by the jihadist passion of the Muslims. They were determined to uproot this passion. The American plan is to keep this great army embroiled in civilian affairs for a long period of time during which they would seduce our youth into a life of decadence.²¹

SECOND only, perhaps, to the Islamist campaign waged with the assault rifle and plastic explosive is their parallel war against degeneracy, manifested in attacks on its symbols: television, film, pop music, liquor, western clothes, and contraception.

To students of communications theory and history, this poses an interesting paradox. Islamists in South Asia in general reject the intellectual-ideological constructions of modernity – which are articulated, most notably, through the mass media – but have enthusiastically adopted many of its material manifestations: for example, while television sets are frequently destroyed in public by Pakistan-based Islamist groups, the same organisations have no similar problems with, say, the Kalashnikov rifle or the remote-controlled explosive. At first glance, this might just seem a question of necessity. To my mind, however, it illustrates a fundamental paradox: the Islamist right wing’s war against modernity, and against the processes of secularisation in particular, becomes possible only when they embrace that same modernity. In other words, the jihad *is* an irreducibly modernist enterprise: in particular, it is a production inconceivable without that most twentieth century phenomenon, the mass media.

In this paper, I shall explore one small aspect of this paradox – the use of the internet by the Lashkar-e-Taiba, one of the most powerful terrorist groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir, to reach audiences outside the theatre of conflict itself. I shall argue that the conflict can best be understood as a theatrical production intended to generate applause and approval among audiences in the United States, Europe and

²¹ Muhammad Alamgir Khan, editorial in *Nawa-e-Waqt* (Lahore), April 18, 2002.

Western Asia. As such, the internet enables the Lashkar-e-Taiba to transcend its limitations in time and space, and to reproduce the jihad as a truly global enterprise. Few analysts have studied either the Lashkar-e-Taiba's message or its use of the medium of the internet with any seriousness. This, I shall suggest, is a failure which places serious limitations both on our understanding of the working of this specific organisation, and the core concerns of the broader jihadist enterprise.

THE MESSAGE OF THE MEDIUM

Before turning to the use of the internet by the Lashkar-e-Taiba, it will be useful to understand what the systems of belief that the online jihad seeks to propagate.

A Pakistani political group, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, represents the Lashkar-e-Taiba online. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa, named thus after its earlier incarnation, the Markaz Dawat wal Irshad [MDI, or Centre for Proselytisation and Preaching] was proscribed in 2002, is based in a 160-acre campus at Murdike, near the Pakistani city of Lahore. Formed to train mujahideen to fight the Soviet Union's forces in Afghanistan, the MDI in turn gave birth to a jihadist organisation, the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Lashkar-e-Taiba cadre have fought, as is well known, in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, but also in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Somalia, Eritrea, the southern Philippines and the Middle East.²²

By most accounts, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa today commands a formidable empire, using education as a tool to propagate its worldview and recruit cadre for the Lashkar-e-Taiba. It today controls over 200 schools, 11 seminaries and two colleges of science, equipped with state-of-the-art facilities, a stark contrast to Pakistan's woeful state education facilities. Students at Jamaat-ud-Dawa institutions are taught in a manner very different from those at normal schools. For example, the school's English alphabet primer emphasises military skills: "instead of the concept 'c' for cat and 'g' for goat", the Jamaat-ud-Dawa leader Zafar Iqbal has recorded, "we introduced the concept of 'c' for cannon and 'g' for gun".²³ Jamaat-ud-Dawa teachers, in turn, must have directly participated in the jihad at least once.

²² Muhammad Amir Rana (trans. Saba Ansari), *A-Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan* (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004). 334

²³ Muhammad Amir Rana (trans. Saba Ansari), *A-Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan* (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004). 324

Prior to the India-Pakistan military crisis, the MDI made no secret of its ambitions, attracting considerable support from Pakistan's military in the process. At a November 1997 conference held by the MDI, it called for an end to democracy in Pakistan, arguing that "the notion of the sovereignty of the people is anti-Islamic".²⁴ Pakistani newspapers noted that the venue was festooned with signboards proclaiming that the appropriate response to democracy was through grenade and bomb explosions ["*jamhooriyat ka jawaab, grenade aur blast*"].²⁵ Notwithstanding the designation of the MDI as a terrorist organization by the United States, the Director-General of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, Lieutenant-General Mahmood Ahmad, attended its April 2001 convention, where a resolution was passed calling on its members "to capture Hindu temples, destroy the idols and then hoist the flag of Islam on them".²⁶

Although the Jamaat-ud-Dawa has, since 2002, denied that it has any connection with the Lashkar-e-Taiba, and indeed that it has any involvement in terrorism, most scholarly and media investigation of the organisation dismiss this assertion. For example, the scholar Muhammad Amir Rana has reported that the offices and cadre of both organisations are in practice interchangeable.²⁷ Whatever the truth, the fact is that the Jamaat-ud-Dawa is frankly supportive of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and its jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. In the Jamaat-ud-Dawa vision, the:

*... only ray of our hope is MUJAHIDEEN [sic., throughout]. It were them who disintegrated and demolished super power soviet Union and again it is them who are showing lions teeth to U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The only superpower of today is on its last legs. Our leaders should keep thin [this] in mind that if properly helped these Mujahideen have the spirit to break India's neck and back and what we need today is strong believe in ALLAH, along with patience and perseverance.*²⁸

²⁴²⁴ B Raman, 'The Lashkar-e-Taiba' (Chennai: South Asia Analysis Group Paper 374, December 15, 2001). Online at <http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper374.html>

²⁵ B Raman, 'The Lashkar-e-Taiba' (Chennai: South Asia Analysis Group Paper 374, December 15, 2001). Online at <http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper374.html>

²⁶ B Raman, 'The Lashkar-e-Taiba' (Chennai: South Asia Analysis Group Paper 374, December 15, 2001). Online at <http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper374.html>

²⁷ Muhammad Amir Rana (trans. Saba Ansari), *A-Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan* (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004). 328

²⁸ Abu Shams, 'Monkey Business: Musharraf's Formula gets no ear from Kashmiris', *Voice of Islam* (Muridke), November 2004.

Figure 1 makes explicit the system of belief underpinning the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's public communication operations. It represents a knife, held by a Lashkar-e-Taiba *Mujahid*, stabbing the joint hands of India and Israel. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa sees itself as a defender of the world of Islam against a predatory alliance of infidels, notably India, Israel and the United States of America. "All these forces", the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's founder and chief Hafiz Mohammad Saeed has argued, "are united against Islam". He continues:

Under a concerted plan Muslims are massacred in different parts of the world. Jews for their own safety brought up Christian against Muslims [sic., throughout]. Pakistan being a nuclear power has become a prime target of Zionism. India wants to get full advantage of the situation... We do feel an extremely dangerous development in the shape of Hindu-Zionist unity, whereas Jews will be sitting behind and Hindus in action in the field.²⁹



Figure 1

One point, often ignored in discussions of jihadist groups, is key here: although the Jamaat-ud-Dawa is enmeshed in local concerns having to do with Pakistan and the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir, its objectives are global. As such, the local jihad is merely a small part of a larger political enterprise which is expressly internationalist in character.

²⁹ Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, 'Indian new design to rob Pakistan of Water: Need to learn a lesson from the Fall of Dhakah', *Voice of Islam* (Muridke), December, 2004.

In its literature, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa frequently calls for the creation of a Caliphate that would run from Spain in the west to the Philippines in the east. In practice, as I have noted earlier, this has turned into a commitment of cadre to Islamist causes worldwide. I shall not cover these linkages further in this paper. My purpose is to examine to whom the Lashkar-e-Taiba speaks through its new media operations; to look carefully at those it seeks to reach out to through the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's online presence

I use the term "new media" with some care, for the Lashkar has long run a number of conventional print publications which speak to its core political constituency and act as a recruiting pool in Pakistan, notably the magazine *Ghazwa*. Why then does it need an internet presence at all?

AUDIENCES IN INDIA

Any answer to this question demands an understanding of the fact that the Jamaat-ud-Dawa is serious about its internationalist project: it speaks to multiple audiences worldwide, amongst whom it seeks ideological legitimacy and from whom it hopes to draw support for the jihad.

Amongst the most important of these audiences, from the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's point of view, are Muslims in India. Figure 2 is a Jamaat-ud-Dawa rendition of one of the most iconic media images of the 2002 anti-Muslim pogrom in the Indian state of Gujarat: the riot victim Qutub-ud-din Ansari begging members of a neo-fascist Hindu group for his life. On it, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa has superimposed a question: "would he not be better off with a gun in his hand?" The Jamaat-ud-Dawa's use of the internet illustrates the fact that the local jihad, in this case the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir, can be understood as a performance staged for constituencies elsewhere. To vulnerable Muslim communities battered by violence perpetrated by Hindu chauvinist organisations, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa represents itself as an organisation that can give the kinds of protection democratic institutions have failed to ensure – and provides the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir as evidence of its resolve.



Figure 2

Flying the flag of Islam on the Red Fort in New Delhi has been a long-standing motif in south Asian Islamist discourse. As early as April 1948, Kasim Rizvi, an Islamist militia leader who sought to fight off Indian forces that had entered the city of Hyderabad, proclaimed that this was his ultimate objective.³⁰ Interestingly, Pakistan's history of support to such groups has a pedigree of precisely the same length. One remarkably candid admission has come from Lieutenant-General Gul Hasan Khan, who served as commander-in-chief of the Pakistani armed forces. General Khan's memoirs record that an unnamed "elder statesman" in Pakistan organized the covert supply of weapons to the princely state of Hyderabad in 1948, which was using armed force to resist accession to the Indian Union. According to General Khan, the 'elder statesman' organized at least one shipment of .22 caliber pistols on a DC-3 aircraft.³¹

Post-independence religious violence in India offered Islamists the opportunity to turn fantasy into praxis. India's first modern Islamist terror group was born 1985, when activists of the ultra-conservative Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadis' Gorba faction gathered in the western Indian town of Bhiwandi to speak about the need for armed resistance to a wave of religious violence that had been unleashed against Muslims earlier that year. Among their most enthusiastic recruits was Jalees Ansari, the son of a textile mill worker who went on to become a medical doctor – and to help set off a series of 43 explosions in

³⁰ Associated Press of India dispatch of April 12, 1948, cited in Lieutenant-General LP Sen, *Slender Was The Thread*. Orient Longman (New Delhi), 1994. Page 13

³¹ Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan Khan, *Memoirs*. Oxford University Press (Karachi), 1993. Page 230-231

Mumbai and Hyderabad as well as 7 separate explosions on trains, all on December 6, 1993, the first anniversary of the Babri Masjid's demolition by Hindu fundamentalists.³² Ansari had been tasked to execute a second series of explosions on January 26, 1994, thirteen days after his arrest. By that time, other members of the group had made contact with the Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, providing the latter terrorist group with a nucleus for jihadist operations in India outside of Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistani nationals came to play an increasingly direct role in these jihadist operations. In July, 1998, for example, Indian authorities arrested Mohammad Salim Junaid, a resident of Kala Gujran village in Pakistan's Jhelum district. Junaid had begun his career with the Lashkar-e-Taiba in 1991 as a foot soldier for the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir, rising rapidly through the organization's hierarchy as a protégé of Azam Cheema, who was in charge of the trans-border factions of Lashkar-e-Taiba. In May 1998, another key Lashkar-e-Taiba member active in Uttar Pradesh, known only by his alias Abu Talha, was killed in an encounter with police in Srinagar. Then, on July 30, 1998, the Delhi Police arrested three other members of a Lashkar-e-Taiba cell, who were led by Abdul Sattar, a resident of Islamnagar in Pakistan's Faisalabad district. With his colleagues Shoaib Alam and Mohammad Faisal Hussain, Sattar had put together a base of operations in the famous pottery town of Khurja, in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. The group had built a bunker under a pottery kiln for the storage of explosives. Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives have often been able to tap sympathetic Indian nationals in order to obtain identification and build cover identities.. Junaid, for example, had married a Hyderabad woman and set up a spare-parts export enterprise. Similarly, Lashkar operative Zahid Hussain, tried to set up a business after being tasked to develop bases outside Jammu and Kashmir.

Considerable evidence exists to show that the Lashkar-e-Taiba has been able to recruit young Indian nationals from across the country. In June, 2004, police in the state of Gujarat shot dead several Lashkar-e-Taiba cadres alleged to be involved in planning an attack on the Mumbai Stock Exchange. Those killed included a young Mumbai college student, Ishrat Jehan Raza, and Javed Sheikh, a convert to Islam who lived in the western Indian city of Pune. Little is known about Raza's recruitment as a Lashkar-e-Taiba operative, but like many young people her age, she used the internet occasionally. She

³² Praveen Swami, 'The "liberation" of Hyderabad', *Frontline*, (Chennai), May 26, 2000.

may, therefore, have come across the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's exhortations to Indian Muslims to "rise up for their protection".³³ "Only Jihad", Hafiz Mohammad Saeed had written on the group's site a few months before Raza's death, "is the defence of the oppressed Muslims. The [anti-Muslim] riots have proved that the Hindus are fully armed but the Muslims are badly ill-equipped to cope with such a situation". In the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's view, recent anti-Muslim violence in India was not the outcome of a particular ideological tendency within Hinduism, but inherent in the faith. It asserted, for example, that "the Hindus have no compassion in their religion."³⁴ In another article, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed wrote that that "the Hindu is a mean enemy and the proper way to deal with him is the one adopted by our forefathers... who crushed them by force".³⁵

It is possible that the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's ability to link anti-Muslim violence to the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir explains why, unlike other Islamist groups, it has succeeded in recruiting some numbers of Indian Muslims to its cause. Several other Pakistan-based jihadist groups have tried to find supporters and sympathisers in India, with little success. In 1994, the jihadist leader Mohammad Masood Azhar, who went on to found the feared Jaish-e-Mohammad, met clerics at the seminary of Deoband, in an effort to drum up support for the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. By Indian intelligence accounts, Azhar found little support amongst the pietistic, ultra-conservative clerics for his project "to liberate Kashmir from Indian rule, and to establish Islamic rule in Kashmir".³⁶ In late - 1994, the Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front [JKIF], a terrorist group responsible for a series of murderous bombings in and outside of Jammu and Kashmir, made similar efforts. It succeeded in making connections with key members of the Dawood Ibrahim Kaksar mafia, which had executed the 1993 serial bombing of Mumbai in retaliation for an earlier anti-Muslim riot.³⁷ In 1995, the JKIF released a photograph of an operative,

³³ Praveen Swami 'Lashkar fishes in troubled waters', *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 16, 2004.

³⁴ Cited in Yoginder Sikand, 'The Jihad in Kashmir and India', *Economic and Political Weekly* (New Delhi), January 20, 2001. Online at <http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=2001&leaf=01&filename=2100&filetype=html>

³⁵ Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, No More Dialogue on Kashmir, <http://www.dawacenter.com/magazines/voiceofislam/sept99/editorial.html>, cited in Yoginder Sikand, , 'The Jihad in Kashmir and India', *Economic and Political Weekly* (New Delhi), January 20, 2001. <http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=2001&leaf=01&filename=2100&filetype=html>

³⁶ [SECRET] *A Note of Background Information of Interrogation*, (Jammu and Kashmir Police, Joint Interrogation Centre, Kot Bhawal, signed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Joint Interrogation Centre, Kot Bhalwal). 11

³⁷ Praveen Swami, 'Extending Terror,' *Frontline*, (Chennai), March 26, 1999.

Sajjad Ahmad Keno, sharing a platform with one of the Mumbai bombers, Abdul Razzak ‘Tiger’ Memo. The photograph, it was claimed, had been taken in Srinagar. One of the participants in the affair, Usman Majid, has since confirmed the long-standing speculation that it was in fact taken at an ISI-run safe-house in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan.³⁸ However, like the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the JKIF did not actually succeed in recruiting riot victims.

Having said this, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s reach through new media amongst Muslims in India is at best peripheral. Although no open-source information is available on the number of hits the Jamaat-ud-Dawa site obtains from various regions, the internet is quite clearly not a useful medium with which to communicate with Muslims in India. In general an economically and educationally underprivileged community, Indian Muslims can therefore be safely assumed to have even lower levels of access to new media than the population as a whole. Personal networks, rather than the internet, seem to be the principal network through which recruitment takes place. It is important to note, too, that if reaching out to Indian Muslims was its core purpose, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa would not host a substantial body of English-language content. To whom, then, does the Jamaat-ud-Dawa internet site address itself? For an answer to this question, we must turn to an even wider circle: the audience for the Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s message in the west.

THE DIASPORIC AUDIENCE

A degree of irony is vested in the fact that the Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s message of hatred against the West is hosted from a server physically sited in San Francisco.

Jamaat-ud-Dawa literature is deeply sensitive to debates underway in the West, intervening in mainstream debates to propagate its concerns amongst Pakistani communities overseas. One recent article on the SARS virus, for example, proclaims that the disease was the product of a United States biological warfare experiment intended to ensure “Muslims are to be scared away [sic.] from their holy places to make it easier to

³⁸ Praveen Swami, ‘From terror to politics’ *Frontline*, (Chennai), March 1, 2002.

capture their oil wealth that the West desperately needs”.³⁹ Its author, however, reassures readers that this plot will fail, for “bird flu cannot penetrate truly Muslim societies”.

Another article reproduces that notorious anti-Semitic forgery, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and insists that “events till today elaborate [*sic* throughout] that Jews hidden hands are active fulfilling their agenda”.⁴⁰ Events in Iraq and Afghanistan are covered in great detail: the December 2003 issue of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s *Voice of Islam* magazine, which is reproduced on the internet, had a cover claiming these conflicts would soon bankrupt the United States, juxtaposing this news with the wishes of a former North Atlantic Treaty Organisation official, identified as Murad Huffman, that his son convert to Islam.

Underpinning much of this propaganda is an effort to challenge the notion of the jihad as an outcome of backwardness; to represent it, instead, as a considered, even scientific, response to a modernity that diasporic South Asian communities often find threatening to the values and cultural norms they have carried with them to their new homelands. In an interview with the Pakistani journalist Mohammad Shehzad, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s Saeed insisted that the Great Kashmir Earthquake was the outcome of divine wrath against the Pakistani state’s efforts to impose cultural modernity. Saeed said:

*They wanted the women to abandon hijab; run with men nude in bikinis; and learn dance and music. They were not afraid of Allah but [US President George W.] Bush. At his behest, they wanted to purge our schoolbooks from verses on jihad; befriend India and recognise Israel. They banned all the jihadi outfits and abandoned jihad. They made jihad an abusive term. They wanted all the Pakistanis to adopt the ‘get-up’ of Bush. They blatantly ridiculed the commandments of Allah. Thus they invited the wrath of God in the form of the earthquake.*⁴¹

³⁹ Manzoor Ahmed, ‘Bird Flu: Is it to become Muslim specific by Hajj’, *Voice of Islam* (Muridke), November 2005. Online at http://www.jamatuddawa.org/Voiceofislam/Nov-voice/is_it_to_become_muslim_specific.html

⁴⁰ ‘International Zionism and Greater Israel’s documented plan get caught’, *Voice of Islam* (Muridke), October 2005. Online at http://www.jamatuddawa.org/Voiceofislam/Oct-voice/international_zionism_and_greater_Israel.html

⁴¹ Mohammad Shehzad, ‘If the LoC is opened, more harm will be caused to Pakistan’, *Rediff.com*, October 24, 2005. Online at <http://us.rediff.com/news/2005/oct/24inter1.htm?q=tp&file=.htm>

What sense might one make of these discourses? Since the experience of seeing women in bikinis is not a widely experienced reality in Pakistan, it is likely Saeed was speaking to the diaspora where cultural debates around the issue of women's 'modesty' have been intense. Understanding the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's efforts to reach out to the West necessitates engagement with the close relationship Pakistani diasporas in the West have had with jihadist groups, the layers of immigrant cultural anxieties and neurosis that have led some within these communities to turn to the religious far-right. Although the issue is far too large to be addressed comprehensively in this paper, I have chosen the case of Pakistan's Mirpur-region diaspora, a working class community now well entrenched in the United Kingdom, to illustrate the relationship between Jamaat-ud-Dawa discourse and the broadcasting of the jihad in the West. Although hard figures are difficult to come by, Mirpur is known to have contributed large numbers of cadre and funds to the Jamaat-ud-Dawa; the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, in turn, has long been active in the area, and has been at the cutting edge of relief work there after the Great Kashmir Earthquake of October, 2005.

As the British scholar Roger Ballard has perceptively recorded, Mirpur's historical experience taught it that "the route to real prosperity lies overseas".⁴² Turned over to the Maharaja of Kashmir after the British took control of the province of Punjab in 1800, the region missed out on the great wave of colonial modernisation that took place just a few kilometres to its west and south. Developments in the mid-nineteenth century played a major role in shaping the character of the region, which is now part of the Pakistan-administered province of Azad Kashmir. A major source of employment in Mirpur was the recruitment of crews for merchant boats which sailed along the Indus and its tributaries, carrying cargo to the major trading centres of Punjab. As railway connections were built between Lahore and Karachi during the colonial period, this river-based economy collapsed almost overnight. At around the same time, however, new opportunities opened up for the Mirpuri boatmen who had been redundant – as coal stokers on Britain's merchant fleet, which was in the process of shifting from sail to steam. Mirpuris rapidly occupied this niche in the global economy: by the early 1880s,

⁴² Roger Ballard, 'Growth and Poverty Reduction: Reflections on the Basis of South Asian Experience', (London: DFID, 2002). 28 My discussion of the Mirpur experience is heavily indebted to Ballard's authoritative discussion of these groups.

the great majority of stoker-foremen in British ships sailing out of Karachi and Mumbai are believed to have been from this region.

Mirpuri seamen were to play a central role shaping the region's identity. An ethnic colony of some size had begun to evolve in the port of Sydney by the end of the first quarter of the last century, and substantial enclaves of Mirpuris also emerged in the United Kingdom during the Second World War. Using these footholds, Mirpuri immigrants began to feed the United Kingdom's growing post-war industrial labour needs, and succeeded in defying official efforts to restrict new immigration. With strong ethnic networks binding them to Mirpur – reinforced through the institution of cousin-marriage – Mirpuris in the United Kingdom made large scale remittances back to their home province. Immigration grew sharply after the large-scale inundation of agricultural land after the construction of the Mangla Dam in 1966, and a massive flow of remittances began into Mirpur from the beginning of the next decade.

To students of the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, this period is of obvious significance. Although this is not the place to recount the long history of Pakistani covert warfare in Jammu and Kashmir, the period after the war of 1971 was one of crisis for the jihadist enterprise and its state sponsors.⁴³ Al-Fatah, the last major Pakistan-backed terrorist group to operate prior to the outbreak of the ongoing jihad in 1988, had fallen apart soon after the conflict, and the attention of the Inter-Services Intelligences had turned firmly towards countering sub-nationalist movements in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province. At precisely this moment, diasporic wealth made it possible for both Islamists and Kashmiri nationalists in Mirpur, who were increasingly convinced that the Pakistani state could not liberate Jammu and Kashmir, to begin their own anti-India movement: it was called the National Liberation Front [NLF], which would in later years become the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front.

What meaning did the formation of the NLF have? It was, of course, intended to liberate Jammu and Kashmir from Indian rule – but the fact that the NLF also represented a loss of faith in the Pakistani state is of enormous significance. Much of the NLF's work was conducted amongst Mirpuri immigrants in the United Kingdom. Its most visible pre-1988 operation, the assassination of the Indian diplomat Ravindra Mhatre in 1983, was

⁴³ For a full discussion of these groups, see Praveen Swami, *Covert in Kashmir* (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

carried out in Birmingham. To these immigrant communities, who lived in conditions of extreme hardship, deferring everyday pleasures in the hope of gratification on their return home one day, the National Liberation Front was a source of pride and meaning. It gave Mirpuris an identity distinct from that of other Pakistanis, and the prospect of a homeland which the increasingly-affluent community could one day dominate. As Sultan Shaheen has thoughtfully noted, the Kashmiri nationalism of the Mirpuris was hostile to ethnic-Kashmiris themselves: none were “prepared to accept the inevitable domination of the better educated and numerically stronger ‘hatos’ [coolies, or manual labourers], as they contemptuously refer to the Kashmiris of the valley, in case Kashmir is united”.⁴⁴

Kashmiri nationalist tendencies, along with Islamist groups, were strengthened by a second economic boom in the 1980s made possible by a variety of sources: the availability of new remittance-economy opportunities in West Asia; investments in property made by earlier immigrants to the United Kingdom in lands and built-up properties; and the income injected by the United States-led jihadist war against the Soviet Union’s forces in Afghanistan. Transnational networks forged during this boom were critical, as is well known, to the course of the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir, notably the hawala channels used to funnel funds from West Asia and Europe to terrorist groups operating out of Srinagar.⁴⁵ A less well-understood consequence of the economic boom in Mirpur was the decline of agriculture in the region. As the relative returns on agriculture diminished in comparison with what could be made from the remittance or immigrant economies, a large pool of unskilled and newly employed poor became available for recruitment by organizations -- ranging from al-Badr in the early stages to the Lashkar-e-Taiba today -- engaged in the Jammu and Kashmir jihad. Mirpur’s poor also became increasingly vulnerable to the Islamists’ network of patronage, notably schools, hospitals and seminaries.

Why is this history important for our discussion here? First, and perhaps foremost, it places the Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s outreach to the West in context. At its core, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s message is part of that most modern of projects: the formation of a nationalist identity. Having found wealth, diasporic elites seek cultural and ideological

⁴⁴ Sultan Shaheen, ‘How Azad is Azad Kashmir’ (undated, <http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/insights/insight990902.html>)

⁴⁵ For a thorough discussion of these networks and their origins, see Roger Ballard, ‘A Background Report on the Operation of Informal Value’ (London: CASAS, 2003)

tropes which allow them to distinguish themselves from the dominant classes both in their old and new homelands. In the case of the Mirpuri diaspora, support for the jihad has been a means to challenge the hegemony of the ethnic-Punjabi elites who dominated the political and economic life of the original homeland in the colonial and post-independence period. At once, the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir enables them to position themselves in the west as a category distinct from other immigrant groups, one with a historical and political experience that gives the fact of its diasporic existence meaning beyond that of merely being an economic refugee. Mirpuri support for the Jamaat-ud-Dawa or other manifestations of the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir, in this key sense, is not *about* Kashmir's struggle for independence from India: it is, rather, about a way of translating the region's affluence, and the new elites it has spawned, into concrete political power.

THE JIHAD ONLINE

To anyone willing to see it, the impact of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's project of proseletysation in the West is only too evident and gathering momentum.

In recent years, growing numbers of Islamist terrorists who are citizens of western countries have been linked to the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain, three of the men who carried out the horrific serial bombing of London's underground train network in 2004, were reported to have trained at Lashkar-e-Taiba camps in Pakistan.⁴⁶ A year earlier, authorities in the United States detained eleven men they said had been trained to carry out terror strikes on behalf of the Lashkar-e-Taiba.⁴⁷ Given the absence of evidence, it is hard to say precisely what role the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's internet propaganda had in building their support for jihad – but it seems reasonable to speculate that it would at least have contributed to building up a cultural climate within which such diasporic recruitment could take place.

Somewhat disturbingly, little scholarly work has been done to explore the size of the audience for the internet-based proseletysation of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and other jihadist groups like it. Although counter-terrorism authorities in the United States, more

⁴⁶ Luke Harding and Rosie Cowan, 'Pakistan militants linked to London attacks', *The Guardian* (London), July 19, 2005. Online at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,2763,1531454,00.html>

⁴⁷ '11 Lashkar terrorists arrested in United States', *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), June 28, 2003

likely than not, will have a coherent idea of just how many people access the Jamaat-ud-Dawa website and from where, there is no public project engaged in such monitoring – an enterprise of no great technical difficulty. Nor have surveys been carried out amongst diasporic communities to determine the reach the jihad online has amongst them, or the impact of Islamist propaganda amongst young second and third-generation immigrants. We know nothing, either, of the relationship between the jihad online and Islamist study cells in mosques and campuses.

It could be a failure that proves costly. Terrorism does not begin when an individual picks up a gun: the gun, like the internet, is but a medium; a medium that draws on modes of communication that we are only just starting to understand.

THE THREATS POSED BY AVIATION ASSETS IN THE POSSESSION OF TERRORIST GROUPS AND PROTO-STATES

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INTRODUCTION

There has been much focus on aviation terrorism since the tragic events of 11 September 2001. The attention of counter-terrorism experts has focused primarily on passenger aviation, a possible reflection of the vulnerability of commercial air traffic as experienced in the 9/11 attack, and the potential disruptions such acts can have on global air transportation. The academic and practitioner interest in potential security challenges has widely expanded the studies on airport security, airline security, cargo security, border controls and other areas relating to security of passenger aviation.

The hostile seizure of passenger aircraft is not a new phenomenon; guerrilla movements supporting independence struggles in the 1960s & 1970s used hijackings to draw attention to political struggles and causes. However, the use of aircraft as missiles or projectiles for collision impact attacks demonstrates a radical shift in the use of air strategy by terrorist groups. The enhancement of passenger aviation security will reduce to practicable levels the threats posed by what could be referred to as “borrowed air capacity;” however, the attention on security implications arising from “own air capacity” is vastly insufficient.

Hijack motives have progressed from mere acts for political attention to mid-air explosions -- such as the Lockerbie incident and the foiled Oplan Bojinka plot -- designed as “un-navigated operations” to the lethal attacks of 9/11, which were “navigated operations” with skilled hijackers who could maneuver aircraft to identified targets. The progression demonstrates the use of air capacity by terrorist groups in future operations to have increased control and navigation of aircraft as strike devices. Working with this

hypothesis, it is likely that groups posing asymmetric threats will acquire an inventory of aviation assets to improve on mission design and minimize disruptive variables.

Global Inventory of Air Assets with Terrorist Groups and Proto-States

The inventory is compiled using open-source information on formal airports/air facilities from flight information data sources. The inventory has also used other secondary sources based on research into specific terrorist groups and proto-States in documenting non-formal aviation infrastructure and hardware. The inventory has listed all aviation facilities that such groups/entities possess, though recognizing that in some cases there is a “capacity-gap” between access to facilities and capability for utilization.

Terrorist Groups

The inventory has taken a wider perspective on the definition of terrorist groups that does not limit its survey to groups that have been proscribed by official designations such as the US List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, the British designations under the Terrorism Act 2000, and the EU List (Common Position on Persons and Groups/Entities).

The definition of terrorism has a common foundation with minor variants. The US Defense Department defines terrorism as the “*calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate government or societies as to the pursuit of goals*”. The US State Department definition of terrorism is the “*premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against non-combat targets by clandestine agents to influence an audience*.” The definition of terrorism by the UK government is “*the use or threat of force, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, which involves serious violence against any person or property*”⁴⁸. The inventory has used the common underlying thread of such definitions: identifying terrorist groups as those who perpetrate acts of violence and intimidation to further their political/doctrinal goals, with an additional condition that the groups have absolute or quasi-control of territorial assets in which to maintain air facilities.

⁴⁸ Whittaker, D.J., *The Terrorism Reader*, (2001), Routledge, London. (p. 3).

Al Qaeda

In 1993, Al Qaeda purchased a T389 military aircraft (equivalent to a civilian Sabre 40) in Tucson, Arizona, and Bin Laden's personal pilot, Essam al-Ridi, flew it through Canada and Europe to an Al Qaeda base in Khartoum, Sudan⁴⁹. Al-Ridi crashed the aircraft at Khartoum International Airport less than a year after it was purchased⁵⁰.

In 1994, Abdul Hakim Murad, a holder of a commercial pilot license and deputy to Ramzi Ahmed Yousuf head of the Philippines Al Qaeda cell, provided the genesis for current airborne terrorism by planning "Oplan Bojinka," an operation designed to detonate explosives on eleven passenger aircraft flying over the Asia-Pacific region⁵¹. Though the mission failed at the time, the use of air capacity to affect spectacular strikes against target-States became an attractive option for Al Qaeda, and part of its repertoire of future tactical assaults.

Al Qaeda received privileged access to air facilities in Afghanistan during the Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001. The hijackers of the 9/11 attack received specialized training in airborne seizure of aircraft at an Al Qaeda training camp located at Mes Aynak in Afghanistan⁵². It is believed that Al Qaeda conducted airborne exercises using gliders in Afghanistan⁵³. In a confession made in 1998, Khalid Abu-al-Dahab, an Egyptian born U.S. citizen linked to a Silicon Valley terrorist cell, stated he had visited Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and trained combatants to fly hang gliders⁵⁴. In July 2003, it was reported that Syrian intelligence had alerted the US authorities of a plot to fly a glider loaded with explosives into the U.S. Navy 5th fleet headquarters in Bahrain⁵⁵.

⁴⁹ Gunaratna, R., *Inside Al Qaeda*, (2002), Hurst & Company, London, (p. 37).

⁵⁰ Gunaratna, Rohan., *Terror from the Sky*, *Jane's Intelligence* (24 September 2001) – (http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir010924_1_n.shtml).

⁵¹ Gunaratna, R., *Inside Al Qaeda*, (2002), Hurst & Company, London (p. 174-180).

⁵² Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004), (p. 156).

⁵³ Telephone Interview with Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Director, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

⁵⁴ Williams, Lance, *Bin Laden's Bay Area recruiter* (*San Francisco Chronicle* – 21 Nov 2001) – (<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2001/11/21/MN155311.DTL>).

⁵⁵ Hersh, Seymour M., *The Syrian Bet* (*The New Yorker* – 18 July 2003) – (http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?030728fa_fact).

In September 2005, Pakistani forces conducting a raid on a suspected Al Qaeda Madrassa recovered a remote control aircraft thought to be a DMZ9403 Delta Dragon, manufactured by Delta Modelz in China. The remote control aircraft had been used to conduct perimeter surveillance out to a distance of 500 meters⁵⁶.

Taliban - (Afghanistan)

In September 1996, when the Taliban Militia (Students of Islamic Knowledge Movement) overran Kabul and captured Bagram air base, they acquired a fleet of over twenty aircraft, including Mig-21, Su-22, and Mi-24 & Mi-35 helicopters⁵⁷. Aerial imagery from IKONOS in August 2001, showed 19 MIG-21 in revetments, and 5 MIG-23 aircraft parked on open ramp space at Bagram Air Base. There were several abandoned aircraft around the airbase, including an AN-12 CUB an AN-24 COKE and an IL-28 BEAGLE medium bomber⁵⁸.

Northern Alliance - (Afghanistan)

Prior to forming a new government in Afghanistan in 2001, the Northern Alliance forces had two Mi-35 and six Mi-17 helicopters⁵⁹, as well as three or four cargo airplanes⁶⁰. It is likely that these military assets have since been neutralized or brought under the supervision of NATO (ISAF-4), currently operating in Afghanistan.

Hezbollah - (Lebanon)

The Syrian-backed Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah movement (Party of God), which has territorial control of the Bekka Valley, has developed an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that could target installations in northern Israel. In November 2004, Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, stated that the UAV known as “Mirsad-1” had made an initial flight over Israeli airspace. He claimed that the drone can carry an explosive of

⁵⁶ Global Guerrillas news report – 15 Sept 2005
(http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2005/09/journal_uavs_fo.html).

⁵⁷ The Military Balance 2001-2002 (IISS) p. 160.

⁵⁸ Globalsecurity.org (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/bagram.htm>).

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ MSNBC Afghan Files (http://www.msnbc.com/modules/new_battlefield/afghanistan.asp).

about 50 Kg in weight. The Mirsad-1, is considered to be a modified version of the “Ababil” type UAV produced by Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA)⁶¹.

Hezbollah has also acquired an initial installment of the superior SA-18 anti-aircraft missiles, which can pose a potential threat to Israeli military and commercial aircraft⁶². The Israeli state run Rafael defense research company has developed the Britening counter-missile system which uses an infrared beam to disrupt approaching missiles as a response to the growing threat to Israeli aviation⁶³.

Palestinian Liberation Front – (Lebanon/Iraq)

The Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), which was led by Muhammad Zaidan (a.k.a. Muhammad Abbas or Abu Abbas, the accused leader of the attack on the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1985), was based in Baghdad prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Israeli intelligence believes the PLF acquired several light-aircraft and gliders from Europe with financial support provided by the Libyan government. The aircraft were modified to carry two men and 180kg of explosives⁶⁴.

The PLF, which operated its air fleet from safe locations in Lebanon, is credited with the first airborne mission conducted by a terrorist group⁶⁵. On 7 March 1981, a two-member squad flying gliders attempted to penetrate the Israeli border in the Haifa area. The attempt failed when both gliders were forced to land near the Israeli border and captured⁶⁶.

⁶¹ Miasnikov, Eugene - Report by the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies – Russia (December 2004) (<http://www.armscontrol.ru/UAV/mirsad1.htm>).

⁶² Middle East Intelligence Bulletin – Vol. 5, No. 4 (http://www.meib.org/papers/0304_I2.htm).

⁶³ Military.com 2004 (http://www.military.com/soldiertech/0,14632,SoldierTech_MissileDef,,00.html).

⁶⁴ Gunaratna, Rohan., Terror from the Sky, Jane’s Intelligence (24 September 2001) – (http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir010924_1_n.shtml).

⁶⁵ Israeli Foreign Ministry website – Dossier on the PLF (http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/9/The%20Palestinian%20Liberation%20Front-%20Headed%20by%20Abu%20al).

⁶⁶ Israel Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism website – PLF Attacks (http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=29#activity).

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam - (Sri Lanka)

The embryonic phase of the LTTE Air Wing known as "Vaan Puligal", was developed by Vythilingam Sornalingam (aka "Shankar"), a former employee of Air Canada with a background in aeronautical engineering. It is believed that the initial procurements for the Air Wing were made in 1997-98, with the purchase of two ultra-light aircraft from AirBorne Windsports in Australia. It is alleged that Thilai Jeyakumar, considered the head of LTTE operations in Australia was responsible for these acquisitions⁶⁷. In November 1998, it was reported that the LTTE Air Wing sprinkled flowers at a hero's day ceremony at Mulliyawalai, near Mullaitivu.

The International Institute of Strategic Studies, in its 2000-2001 publication of *The Military Balance*, states that the LTTE has in its possession a Robinson R-44 Astro light helicopter and two light aircraft⁶⁸. The Indian news magazine *Frontline* also reported in the 10-23 April 1999 issue, of the presence of micro-light aircraft and a two-seater helicopter in the Wanni area⁶⁹. If such information can be corroborated, the LTTE acquired its air capability prior to the ceasefire agreement with the Sri Lankan government in February 2002.

An examination of commercially available satellite imagery indicates clearing and laying of asphalt on an airstrip to the east of the Iranamadu reservoir in the LTTE dominated areas during the period 2003-2004⁷⁰. In January 2003, the Asian Development Bank embarked on a road development project to resurface and asphalt the A9 highway which runs through LTTE-dominated areas employing the services of eight subcontractors⁷¹. It is possible that construction material from the project may have been diverted to asphalt the airstrip. The airstrip is approximately 1250 meters long.

⁶⁷ Dateline SBS Australia - interview with Dr Rohan Gunaratna (4 October 2002) (<http://webhome.idirect.com/~sluna/dateline.htm>).

⁶⁸ The Military Balance 2000-2001 (IISS) p. 175.

⁶⁹ Jeyaraj, D.B.S., Strategic Change in Wanni – *Frontline* 10-23 April 1999 – (<http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1608/16080570.htm>).

⁷⁰ Digitalglobe Satellite Images Archives (<http://archive.digitalglobe.com/common/showmetabrowse.php?catID=10100100030B7D01>).

⁷¹ ADB Project Doc (<http://www.adb.org/Documents/PCRs/SRI/pcr-sri-20224.pdf>); Loan No.1312:SRI(SF) & 1649:SRI(SF).

A Searcher UAV of the Sri Lanka Air Force, conducting a reconnaissance flight over LTTE-dominated areas, detected a light aircraft on the Iranamadu airstrip on 12 & 13 January 2005. On a subsequent night mission conducted on 03 February 2005, the infrared cameras of the UAV detected thermal images of a second light aircraft landing on the airstrip⁷². The images, which were shared with US intelligence, have confirmed one aircraft to be a Czech built Zlin Z-143⁷³. Aviation data sources indicate that the Z-143 is powered by one 175kW (235hp) Textron Lycoming O540J3A5 engine, and has a flight range of approximately 1335km⁷⁴.

The Tamil diaspora has provided technical expertise to the LTTE air wing. In May 2005, Gnanaratnam -- a Tamil employed with a US airline company -- and Sujinthan -- a Tamil resident in Switzerland and attached to a Swiss airline -- conducted several training programs for the LTTE air wing⁷⁵.

On 10 February 2005, a Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) Bell 412 helicopter found its Missile Approach Warning System activated, releasing heat generating flares when it was flying close to the Iranamadu airstrip. This suggests that a basic air defense system might have been installed around the airstrip. The LTTE has fired over twenty SA-7 man-portable surface-to-air missiles (Manpads) at SLAF aircraft in the past⁷⁶.

The acquisition of air capability for the LTTE could serve several functions. It augments the profile of the organization to have sea formations (Sea Tigers) and an air wing. It also could serve political interests, as evidenced by previous experience: In March 2002, a LTTE delegation arriving from Europe traveled directly to Iranamadu reservoir from the Maldives using a sea plane chartered by the Norwegian peace facilitators, thus avoiding transit through the Colombo International Airport. It is possible that the Iranamadu airstrip may be used to facilitate future international travel of LTTE

⁷² Athas, Iqbal., -- Sunday Times Situation Report (6 February 2005)
(<http://www.sundaytimes.lk/050206/columns/sitrep.html>)

⁷³ Athas, Iqbal., -- Sunday Times Situation Report (6 March 2005)
(<http://www.sundaytimes.lk/050306/columns/sitrep.html>)

⁷⁴ Airliners.net -- Zlin-143 (<http://www.airliners.net/info/stats.main?id=388>)

⁷⁵ Athas, Iqbal., -- Sunday Times Situation Report (5 June 2005)
(<http://www.sundaytimes.lk/050605/columns/sitrep.html>)

⁷⁶ Butterworth-Hayes, Philip., - Civil Anti-missile systems Take Wing (Aerospace America -July 2003)
(<http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Paper.cfm?issuetocid=371&ArchiveIssueID=40>)

delegations. The airstrip could also serve for inbound logistics deliveries by third party aircraft.

It is possible that the LTTE plans to operate its own UAV reconnaissance on Sri Lankan forward positions and artillery locations. In March 1999, a UAV of the SLAF crashed near Kunchikulam and it is suspected that the LTTE were able to collect this equipment⁷⁷. On 19 February 2005, Sri Lanka Customs detected a remote control aircraft being smuggled into the international airport. It was revealed that a LTTE operative in Germany, known as Rajitharan, had co-ordinated the operation⁷⁸.

Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement - (Ivory Coast)

The three main rebel movements -- the Patriotic Movement of [Côte d'Ivoire \(MPCI\)](#), the Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (MPIGO), and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) -- which are referred to as the “New Forces”, control the Western and Northern regions of Ivory Coast. In November 2003 the New Forces captured the towns of [Bouaké](#) and Man⁷⁹. The airport at Bouake, the main town in rebel controlled region, has a paved runway of 10,800 feet, and the airport at Man has a paved runway of 6700ft⁸⁰.

Other airfields -- at Bondoukou (Soko airport - unpaved 4900ft), Bouna (Tehini airport – unpaved 4900ft), Boundiali (unpaved 4900ft), Ferkessedougou (unpaved 2200ft), Katiola (unpaved 5200ft), Korhogo (paved 6800ft), Odienne (unpaved 6800ft), Seguela (unpaved 6300ft), and Touba (unpaved 5200ft) -- are all located within territories controlled by the rebels. However, there are no reports of any aviation activity by the rebels or known air capability.

There are 4,000 French troops monitoring a buffer zone between the rebel-held north and the government controlled south, but it is unclear whether the French forces

⁷⁷ Tamilnet.com – 30 March 1999 (<http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=3098>).

⁷⁸ Island Newspaper - 22 February 2005 (<http://www.island.lk/2005/02/22/news17.html>).

⁷⁹ Wikipedia on Ivory Coast - (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man%2C_C%C3%B4te_d'Ivoire).

⁸⁰ Aircraft-charter-world.com Website – Airports /Ivory Coast
(<http://www.aircraft-charter-world.com/airports/africa/ivorycoast.htm>).

have a degree of oversight/supervision of the airports and airstrips in northern Ivory Coast.

Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) - (Dem. Rep. of Congo)

The Rwandan backed RCD rebels led by General Nkunda, have their main base in the town of Goma, on the border with Rwanda. Under the peace agreement for a transitional government, the RCD should have merged into the new Congolese Army, but have maintained separate lines of command. The 2700 meter Goma airstrip is well within the RCD dominated areas⁸¹. It is reported that Air Serv International (ASI) flies a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan aircraft to Goma airstrip in support of humanitarian activities in the area⁸².

Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) - (Nepal)

The Maoist rebels have “coercive control” over substantial regions of Nepal, in what is considered a hyper-mobile guerilla conflict. The districts of Rukum and Rolpa are considered to be the heartland of the Maoist forces. The rebels destroyed the terminal buildings and control tower at Musikot airport in Rukum district. There are two other airports in this region, Bijayshwari, in Western Rukum and Wadachur in Rolpa district⁸³. The rebels do not have complete control of these assets, but have demonstrated a capability to gain access to such facilities.

The United Wa State Army - (Myanmar)

The airstrip at Mong Hsat in Shan State has served the drug trade since the 1950s, when Chinese nationalists transported narcotics using C-47s aircraft to Thailand and Taiwan⁸⁴. This area, now referred to as Wa Territory, is controlled by forces of the

⁸¹ USAID Congo Fact Sheet – January 2002
(http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/drc/fy2002/DR_C_VO_FS01_01-18-2002.pdf).

⁸² Grant, Robert S., Flying for Hire in Dangerous West Africa - Flight Journal Magazine –
(http://www.flightjournal.com/articles/bunia/bunia_1.asp).

⁸³ Mercy Corps Western Nepal Conflict Assessment (p21) –
(http://www.mercycorps.org/pdfs/nepal_report.pdf).

⁸⁴ Shanland.org –Human Rights Publications on Mong Hsat township and map of the airstrip

United Wa State Army (UWSA). It is unclear whether the airstrip is currently under the control of the Burmese Forces or the UWSA; loyalties seem ambiguous since collaboration between the government and UWSA to eliminate a competing drug baron Khun Sa and his Mong Tai Army. The subsequent ceasefire between the government (State Peace and Development Council) and the UWSA in 1989, provided UWSA with absolute control around Pangshang region in Northern Shan State and Mong Yawn region in Southern Shan State⁸⁵. The Mong Hsat airstrip is situated in the Mong Yawn region, close to areas controlled by the 171st Div of UWSA. The 16,000 strong UWSA force has been labeled by the US State Department as the “largest drug-trafficking army in the world.”

In addition, the expansion of the 5250 ft runway to 8000 ft, at the Lashio regional airport in Shan State, has been contracted to Asia World Company, which is owned by Lo Hsing Han, allegedly one of the world's biggest heroin traffickers⁸⁶. Lo Hsing Han's son, U Tun Myint Naing (a.k.a. Steven Law) and Managing Director of Asia World Company, was refused entry to the US in 1996 on suspicion of drug trafficking⁸⁷.

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) - (Colombia)

FARC which is considered the third largest cocaine cartel, after the Medellin and Cali cartels, has been fighting a socialist revolutionary war in Colombia. In 1998, Colombian President Andres Pastrana initiated peace talks with FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN). As part of the peace process the rebels were designated a secure enclave in central Colombia, referred to as the demilitarised zone. The rebels used the enclave to consolidate the drug trade and strengthen their military capability. The Colombian military reported that 27 airstrips were in operation within the demilitarized

(http://www.shanland.org/resources/bookspub/humanrights/wa/mong_hsat_township.htm/view?searchterm=Mong%20Hsat);

(<http://www.shanland.org/resources/bookspub/humanrights/wa/Wa%20images/map08.jpg>)

⁸⁵ World Geopolitics of Drugs (OGD Report April 2000) p. 56-58
(http://www.cedib.org/coca/documentos/OGD/informe_1998_1999/III_asia.pdf); Drug Intelligence Brief – US Drug Enforcement Administration (May 2002)
(<http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02021/02021.html>).

⁸⁶ The New Light of Myanmar – 02 August 2002
(<http://mission.itu.ch/MISSIONS/Myanmar/02nlm/n020802.htm>).

⁸⁷ Bangkok Post – 31 October 2004 (<http://www.rebound88.net/sp/junta/skhinnyunt-oust19.html>).

zone for transport of drugs and weapons⁸⁸. In Spring 2001, the notorious gun-trafficker Luiz Fernando da Costa (aka Ferndinho Beira-Mar), delivered consignments of weapons totaling, 2400 handguns and 543 rifles to the FARC base at Barranco Minas, within the demilitarised zone, using air routes from Brazil and Suriname⁸⁹.

In February 2002, FARC hijacked an internal flight with a Colombian Senator onboard, landing the aircraft in the demilitarized zone⁹⁰. In April 2002, the ELN hijacked an internal flight with 46 passengers and landed it on an airstrip in Simiti, located also within the demilitarised zone⁹¹.

Proto-States

The term proto-States refers to unrecognized breakaway regions that function independently of the principal-State in relation to key functional attributes such as defense and administration⁹². The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933), though limited in coverage to the States in the American hemisphere, provides a blueprint on the principle elements that constitute a state: a permanent population; a defined territory; a governing structure able to exercise its writ within the territory; and the capacity to enter into relations with other States (reciprocal recognition)⁹³. In relation to many proto-States, the attribute of reciprocal recognition seems the element not fully complied with or met. Many breakaway regions have established governing structures, which mirror the structures of recognized States. They have legislative assemblies, judicial structures, executive branches of government and functional bureaucratic structures. These regions exist independently, and function separately from the principal-State. Most breakaway regimes maintain that recognition does not create a State, but

⁸⁸ CIP Colombia Programme - Speech by Sen. Jeff Sessions – 6 June 2002 (<http://ciponline.org/colombia/02060607.htm>).

⁸⁹ Cragin, K., and Hoffman, B., *Arms Trafficking and Colombia*, 2003, RAND, Santa Monica. (p. 38).

⁹⁰ US Dept. of Homeland Security -Terrorist Organisations Reference Guide – January 2004 (p. 30) (<http://www.nbc-links.com/miscellaneous/Terrorist%20Organization%20Guide.doc>).

⁹¹ Resource Centre of the Americas (http://www.americas.org/item_10948).

⁹² Reference made by Dr. Oliver Richmond (St Andrews University) describing breakaway regions that operate parallel governments but unrecognised by the international community.

⁹³ Text of the Montevideo Convention (http://wikisource.org/wiki/Montevideo_Convention).

rather reflects an existing reality. They argue that the attribution of statehood arises from the empirical existence of sovereignty, and not its juridical recognition by other States⁹⁴.

It is necessary to understand the dynamics at play in permitting the continued existence of such second tier States. Lynch, in his study of separatist states in Eurasia, points to several key factors that perpetuate the existence of such structures. Firstly, the political stability of these regimes is founded on what he refers to as “corrupt corporatism”. In his research he cites several examples: in Trans Dniester the Sherrif Conglomerate and the Black Sea Cossacks, with its connections to the self-declared President Smirnov’s control of commerce and trade; in Nargorno Karabakh the defence minister has a monopoly of the cigarette and petroleum trade; in South Ossetia similar trade monopolies are controlled by senior members of the leadership; in Abkhazia the Abkhaz Les, a company linked to the self-declared President Ardzinba has a monopoly on timber exports⁹⁵. In Lynch’s view, the continuous state of limbo provides a conducive haven for corrupt regimes not having to face international responsibility⁹⁶.

A second factor that sustains the existence of such breakaway regimes is that the principal-State can not entice reintegration, as the economic predicament of the renegade region is no worse than the principal-State, thus having no incentive for union⁹⁷.

Lynch points out that the power inertia relating to non-formal states is driven by host of factors, ranging from external actors to sources of support/sponsorship. He believes that the entrenched interests of all groups profiting on all sides, in the political sphere as well as financial sphere, make the known status-quo acceptable and lucrative⁹⁸.

In most cases proto-States are dependent upon the patronage of a second State for its sustenance and survival. This dependency in many situations creates an informal quasi-oversight capacity in which the patron-State can ensure a level of conformity to accepted norms and responsible behavior.

⁹⁴ Lynch, D., *Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States – Unresolved Conflicts and De-facto States*, (2004), United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC. (p. 47).

⁹⁵ Ibid (p. 66-68).

⁹⁶ Ibid (p. 48).

⁹⁷ Ibid (p. 69).

⁹⁸ Ibid (p. 119).

Trans-Dniester (Transnistria) - (Moldova)

The breakaway region of Trans-Dniester in eastern Moldova has maintained an unrecognized government since the Russian intervention in 1990. The Russian 14th Army, now known as the Operative Group of Russian Forces, has a permanent presence in Trans-Dniester and backs the secessionist government known as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.

The Pridnestrovian Armed Forces, established in 1992 with Russian assistance, include combat formations known as motor-infantry, artillery, air forces, air defense forces, special forces and reserves⁹⁹. These units have acquired 29 aircraft and helicopters, which include six Mi-8 & two Mi-6 helicopters, and have control of an aerodrome in Tiraspol¹⁰⁰. The presidential website reports on the use of Mi-8 helicopters for the transport of Igor Smirnov, self proclaimed President of this breakaway region¹⁰¹.

Abkhazia - (Georgia)

Since the Russian intervention in 1994, the region of Abkhazia has been administered by a Russian backed secessionist government headed by self-proclaimed Prime Minister Designee Alexander Ankvab. The Abkhazi Air Force, organized as a fixed-wing division and a helicopter division, has an inventory of one Mig-21, one or two Su-25, one L-39C Albatros, one YAK-52, a few AN-2 Colts and two Mi-8 helicopters¹⁰². The Abkhazi forces also control the airport at Sukhumi Dranda¹⁰³. The Russian 345th airborne regiment is based in Gudauta¹⁰⁴. The Abkhazi forces also have a formidable

⁹⁹ Pridnestrovian Moldavian Presidential Website – Cabinet/ Min of Defence (http://president-pmr.org/english/index_e.htm).

¹⁰⁰ The Military Balance 2004-2005 (IISS) p, 91.

¹⁰¹ Pridnestrovian Moldavian Presidential Website – News 23 June 2004 (http://president-pmr.org/english/index_e.htm).

¹⁰² Air Orders of Battle – Abkhazi Air Force (http://orbat.com/site/air_orbats/orbats/abkhazia.pdf).

¹⁰³ Falling Rain Genomics, Inc. –Airport Data - Sukhumi Dranda airport (<http://www.fallingrain.com/apts/2645.html>).

¹⁰⁴ Aladashvili, Irakli., The International Debut of the Georgian Weapons – Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development - (http://www.cipdd.org/cipdd/_a&s/a&s1999/M1099.htm).

naval strength of 29 vessels including six Grif-class boats that operate in the Black Sea¹⁰⁵.

¹⁰⁵ Army & Society in Georgia (Berkeley University – Slavic & East European Collection- July 1998) p2
– (<http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/doemoff/slavic/pdfs/army798.pdf>).

Ajaria - (Georgia)

The Russian-backed regime of self-proclaimed President Aslan Abashidze administered the breakaway region of Ajaria until its collapse in May 2004. The Ajarian Naval Force consisted of one Grif-class boat, three Aist-class boats and one armed fishing vessel¹⁰⁶. A private company, DGJR & GI Airconstrucktion Co. Ltd., owned by the President's wife, Diana Abashidze, took delivery of two aircraft kits, a Comp Air 8 Turbine and Comp Air 10XL Turbine, in January of 2001, from Aerocomp Inc., in Florida, and assembled them at Batumi airport¹⁰⁷. The Russian forces that supported the secessionist regime maintain an airbase at Batumi¹⁰⁸.

South Ossetia - (Georgia)

A Russian-backed secessionist government headed by self proclaimed President, Eduard Kokoiti, administers the breakaway region of South Ossetia. There are no reports of Ossetian forces gaining air capabilities. However, the Russian 292d Helicopter Regiment base is located in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia¹⁰⁹.

Nagorno Karabakh - (Azerbaijan)

The Armenian-backed regime in the breakaway region of Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan, is reported to have a military inventory of 316 tanks, 324 armored combat vehicles, and 322 artillery guns (all 122mm caliber)¹¹⁰. However, there are no reports of air capability, though the Karabkh forces control the old Stepanakert airport near Khodjaly, now called Xankandi airport, which has a 7300 ft runway. A private company operates flights between Yerevan (the Armenian capital) and Xankandi using Mi-8 helicopters¹¹¹.

¹⁰⁶ Army & Society in Georgia (Berkeley University – Slavic & East European Collection- July 1998) p2 – (<http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/doemoff/slavic/pdfs/army798.pdf>).

¹⁰⁷ Building Comp Air Turbines Overseas – (<http://www.aerocompinc.com/owners/georgia>).

¹⁰⁸ Socor, Vladimir., The Frozen Conflicts : A Challenge to Euro-Atlantic Interests (p6) – (<http://jamestown.org/images/doc/KonstRon.doc>).

¹⁰⁹ Finch, Raymond C. (Major)., Russian Peacekeeping Operations (Foreign Military Studies Office – July 1996) - (<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/rus-pko/rus-pko.htm>).

¹¹⁰ Petrosyan, David., Formation and Development of Armenian Armed Forces (Moscow Defence Brief (<http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/6-2002/dp/fdaaf>)).

¹¹¹ Travel Images – Xankandi (<http://www.travel-images.com/az-xankandi.html>).

Republika Srpska - (Bosnia Herzegovina)

The military assets of the former Bosnian-Serb Air Force (Vazduhoplovstva i Protivvazdusne Odbrane) consist of 17 aircraft and 25 helicopters, which include seven J-22 Orao & six J-21 Jastreb attack aircraft. These air assets remain within designated “containment zones” at Mahovljani airbase and Zaluzani airbase under the strict supervision of the NATO–Stabilization Force (SFOR) in terms of the Dayton peace accord¹¹².

Currently, a process towards integration of the separate armed forces within a common structure is being worked out. However, the Srpska Air Force has been permitted to conduct training exercises within designated flying corridors supervised by SFOR.

Turkish Cypriot North - (Cyprus)

Since the invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces in 1974 and the resulting partitioning of the island, the north has been administered by the Turkish Cypriot government, a regime only recognized by Turkey. There are no reports of the Turkish Cypriot government acquiring air capability. An air squadron of the Turkish air force is deployed on the island. The Turkish Cypriot government has control of airports at Ercan (Tymbou), and Krini. There are scheduled flights from Ercan to Ankara and Istanbul. The airlines operating into northern Cyprus are Kibris Turkish Airlines and Istanbul Airlines.

Palestinian Authority (Gaza) - (Israel)

In 1994, the late Yaser Arafat, under presidential decree no. 87/94, established the Palestinian Civil Aviation Department. The Palestinian Authority selected Pilot Engineer Fayez Zeidan to lead the initiative towards developing an independent Palestinian civil aviation sector. In January 1996, construction began on the Gaza airport located in Rafah Governorate on the Egyptian-Gaza border. The airport was inaugurated as the Yaser Arafat International Airport on 24 November 1998. It has a runway of 3080 meters and is equipped with modern navigational aids. During the period 1998-2000 there were 2879

¹¹² Scramble Dutch Aviation Society – Srpska Air Force (<http://www.scramble.nl/srp.htm>) .

aircraft movements from this airport¹¹³. It is believed that the airport has not been in operation since 2002. There are 3 airstrips located in the West Bank region, but these facilities remain under control of the Israeli forces¹¹⁴.

Palestinian Airlines is known to have operated two Fokker 50-type aircraft donated by the Netherlands government, and one Boeing 727 donated by his Royal Highness Prince Waleed Ben Talal of Saudi Arabia, with scheduled flights to Qatar, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt.

Somaliland - (Somalia)

A former British colony, Somaliland merged with Somalia at independence, but subsequently fought Somali domination to secede from the union. The breakaway region of Somaliland is in control of the airport in its declared capital Hargeisa. There are scheduled flights to Hargeisa airport by Dallo Airlines, Star Airlines, Damal Airline and Ethiopian Airline¹¹⁵. In addition the Somaliland regime has control of airports at Borama, Burao, Las Anod, Erigavo, and Berbera¹¹⁶. The Berbera runway was developed by NASA as an emergency space shuttle landing strip¹¹⁷.

It is reported that the US administration has opened channels of communication with the self-declared independent state of Somaliland, and is negotiating for rights to use its ports in the Gulf of Aden¹¹⁸.

¹¹³ Palestinian National Information Centre – Civil Aviation (<http://www.pnic.gov.ps/english/transportation/ground.html>); Yaser Arafat International Airport Website (<http://www.gaza-airport.org>).

¹¹⁴ CIA World Fact Book –West Bank (<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/we.html>).

¹¹⁵ Hargeisa City Website (http://www.hargeisacity.50megs.com/shopping_page.html).

¹¹⁶ Somaliland Government Website (<http://www.somalilandgov.com/slmap.htm>).

¹¹⁷ Reeve, Simon., Holidays in the Danger Zone:Places That Don't Exist (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/main.jhtml?xml=/travel/2005/05/03/etfront0105.xml&sSheet=/travel/2005/05/03/ixtrvhome.html>).

¹¹⁸ Vaknin, Sam., The Economics of American Foreign Military Bases (Global Politics-20 March2005)- (<http://www.somaliland.org/ns.asp?ID=05032009>).

Western Sahara - (Morocco)

The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member-state of the African Union (AU), and has diplomatic relations with 60 countries, including South Africa. In 1975 when Spain abandoned the region of then Spanish Sahara, Moroccan forces annexed the territory. The Frente-Polisario, has been engaged in a guerilla war ever since in an attempt to achieve self-determination for the indigenous Sahrawi people.

Western Sahara, is physically divided by a 2200 km, sand-wall known as the “berm” built by the Moroccan government in 1980¹¹⁹. The territory to the eastern side of the wall is controlled by Polisario forces. The settlement of Tifariti, within Polisario controlled areas, has a large airstrip¹²⁰. The UN observer mission (MINURSO) has a team-site in Tifariti. The town of Rabouni, across the border in Algeria is considered the administrative centre of the Polisario¹²¹.

Southern Sudan - (Sudan)

The regions of the Southern Sudan are largely under the control of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Amry (SPLM/A) forces. According to the terms of the Machakos Protocol (2002) and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (January 2005), the region will have a form of dual governance for an interim period of six years. Under the terms of the peace agreement a referendum will be held in 2011 to determine the future status of the region.

The humanitarian aid program “Operation Lifeline”, carried out by UN agencies supported by the UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) in Lockichoggio, Kenya, delivered relief supplies to around 60 airstrips in the Southern Sudan¹²².

¹¹⁹ Bhatia, Michael., Western Sahara Under Polisario Control (17-24 April 2001) – (<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Sahara-Update/message/234>).

¹²⁰ Minurso In Focus – Vol, 3, February 2005 (p. 8) – (<http://www.minurso.unlb.org/MINURSO%20New/Docs/Newsletter/MINURSO%20in%20Focus%20-%20Issue%203.pdf>).

¹²¹ MINURSO website – (http://www.minurso.unlb.org/MINURSO%20New/08_camps.htm).

¹²² UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sudan January - December 1997 (http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/appeals/97appeals/sudan/proj24.html); UN Joint Logistics Centre Website – (<http://www.unjlc.org/content/index.phtml/itemId/16629>).

The airport in the main town Rumbek was improved in 2004 with the assistance of the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement of the US State Department¹²³. EASAX Airlines (East African Safari Air Express) operates scheduled flights to Rumbek airport¹²⁴.

Assessment of Air Competencies

Military air capabilities have several key attributes that make them superior to terrestrial forms of military capability. Towle identifies six such attributes: ubiquity, pace, perspective, flexibility, responsiveness and penetration¹²⁵. Air capability provides ubiquity -- the physical division between land and water is not an obstacle. In addition, topography, terrain and some weather conditions can be less of an impediment to air capability. The pace of air operations is greater than surface operations, and speed minimizes exposure to threats and reaction time to counter measures. Air capability provides a greater perspective on the task/threat that is uniquely different from ground observation. Air capability can provide multitask flexibility in supporting combat and logistical capacity. Air capability provides immediate response capacity, especially given the ubiquity and pace of air assets. The addition of a third dimension to land and sea enhances the penetrative ability against the enemy.

The attributes reflect the air capacity found in traditional air force doctrine. However, unlike traditional air force doctrine, asymmetric forces do not necessarily seek competency in all areas of air capability. They instead may secure specific air capabilities that have a selective utility value to enhance their tactical repertoire.

The global inventory just described provides insight into the assortment of air capability that terrorist groups and proto-States possess, thereby providing an indication of the utility such groups aspire to achieve with these resources. The capacities also must be viewed in the context of doctrinal formations, political ambitions, lucrative pay-offs, and the tactical repertoire employed. The air assets listed by particular groups/entities in

¹²³ US State Department Website – (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/pix/b/37518.htm>).

¹²⁴ Sudan Mirror (<http://www.sudanmirror.com/archives/vol2-issue12/regionalnews/flights.asp>).

¹²⁵ Towle, P., The Dynamics of Airpower (ed. Lambert, A., & Williamson, A.C.,), (1996), Royal Air Force Staff College, Braknell. (p. 4 - 8).

the global inventory is indicative of the specific attributes in which they seek to gain competency. Using such criteria, it is possible to develop a broad competency classification by which such assets can be categorized.

Offensive Capability

There are groups and entities which have air assets that provide competencies in the specific attributes of ubiquity and penetrative air capability. The utility of such air capability, with very specific and selected attributes would have an offensive operational capability. For terrorist groups, these air facilities, capabilities, and expertise, provide a tactical element to achieve a level of artificial symmetry with the adversary. In such cases, the deterrent/restraint element is minimal and the use of such assets are unpredictable, with possible uses including training facilities, suicide/collision impact missions, chemical/biological dispersion, and as hijack sanctuaries.

Logistics Networks

There are groups and entities which have either flexibility alone or a combination of ubiquity and flexibility. The utility of such air capability would be in operating clandestine logistics networks or facilities to serve such networks. These include air facilities operating outside legal regimes, either by itself or in combination with air assets that support clandestine logistics operations for narco-trafficking or transnational crime.

Political and Defense Profile/Posture

There are proto-States listed in the global inventory that have air assets that provide competencies in all attributes: ubiquity, pace, perspective, flexibility, response, and penetrative ability. The ambition of such proto-States is to mirror capabilities of a traditional air force. The air capacities are valued as much for their political statement as for their defensive capabilities. These include air assets secured by proto-States, most often from patron-States, and with a permanent presence or influence of the patron-State. In such cases a restraint against irregular activity can be enforced through indirect influences of the patron-State.

The Threat Assessment

Based on the competency classification as developed in the previous chapter, the possible threats they pose to domestic and international security order may be determined.

Offensive Capability - Skills Building Facilities

Air facilities in the possession of terrorist groups and proto-States, which operate outside the supervision of legitimate and recognized administrations, offer opportunity for training in air competencies for its own ranks or trade with other interested groups.

Jenkins points to the fact that groups such as Al Qaeda have been compelled to operate in a less-permissive environment, especially after the loss of its safe haven and training facilities in Afghanistan¹²⁶. Therefore, for Al Qaeda, to replenish its reserves of professional cadre safe training facilities are an essential component in the overall strategy. In particular, air operations would require the expertise of a professional cadre. Hoffman categorises “Atta and his confederates”, who carried out the 9/11 attacks, as such a professional cadre¹²⁷.

While commercially accessible training facilities can build basic skills in air capabilities, as in the case of Mohammed Afroz. Afroz was an Indian Muslim arrested in Bombay after the Indian Airlines hijacking in December 1999, who had trained as a pilot at an Aviation College in Australia with two of the Indian Airline hijackers between 1997 to 1998¹²⁸. The professional cadre requires specialized skills beyond the commercially available training. They need planning and targeting skills and require safe environments to conduct dry-runs. The 9/11 Commission found that several Al Qaeda hijackers received special training in hijacking operations at the Mes Aynak camp in Afghanistan¹²⁹. Therefore, the need for safe facilities is vital for groups such as Al-

¹²⁶ Jenkins, B.M., *Countering Al Qaeda*, (2002), RAND, Santa Monica. (p. 10).

Hoffman, B., *The New Terrorism* (ed. Tan, A., & Ramakrishna, K.), (2002), Eastern University Press, Singapore. (p. 38).

¹²⁸ Rediff.com News Report (7 December 2001) – (<http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/07ter.htm>).

¹²⁹ Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), (p. 156).

Qaeda, and as such can only be outsourced to territories and administrations that function outside internationally-supervised legal regimes.

Offensive Capability - Suicide/Collision Impact Attacks

The use of air assets to stage offensive missions on target States has already been proven to be an effective weapon among terrorists. Air capacity is viewed by asymmetric forces as a tactical option to inflict a lethal devastating strike on target-States, in what it considers a demonstration of symmetry in strike capability. While it is only a single payload capability providing an artificial euphoric event for the perpetrator, the mere fact of penetrative capability is considered to imply a level of symmetry. Air assets, particularly in the possession of terrorist groups (as proto-States are less likely) listed in the global inventory, do not indicate air-to-air combat capability as the competencies do not include attributes such as pace, perspective and response. Al Qaeda training in the use of gliders, the aerial drone (UAV) developed by the Hezbollah, and the single engine aircraft acquired by the LTTE, are types of hardware with the operational capability of only “single payload” strikes, suggesting that the intent is likely to be suicide/collision impact attacks.

Airborne suicide attacks have been attempted by psychopaths and terrorists for sometime. In 1974, Samuel Byck, intended to crash an aircraft into the White House, however, his attempts at seizing the aircraft was foiled in a gun battle at the airport. In 1993, a dissatisfied FedEx employee unsuccessfully attempted to take control of a cargo aircraft and crash it into a FedEx facility. On 12 September 1994, Frank Eugene Corder crashed a stolen Cessna into the South Lawn of the White House, and died in the crash¹³⁰.

As indicated in the introduction, terrorists have progressed from hijackings, through un-navigated midair explosions, to navigated airborne strikes. Several previous attempts at navigated strikes had failed: the hijacking of a TWA flight in Karachi in 1986, with the intention of crashing it into central Tel Aviv, was foiled; the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA) hijacked an Air France passenger aircraft in Algiers in 1994 with plans to crash the fuel laden aircraft into Paris, but failed as well in its

¹³⁰ Kamakazi Jet Hijackings website – (<http://www.rotten.com/library/crime/terrorism/terror-tactics/kamikaze-jet-hijacking>).

attempt¹³¹. On 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda executed the first successful navigated airborne suicide attack outside of a war environment (Kamikaze attacks were conducted by Japanese pilots during the Second World War).

The element of surprise is more vital than ever before in the era of enhanced surveillance and air defense systems. The use of borrowed air assets for airborne strikes is more likely to be stopped prematurely given uncontrollable variables such as mobile calls & SMS text from passengers, changes in flight path, transponder de-activation, or passenger revolt. In the case of United Airlines flight 93, during the 9/11 attack, it is believed the passengers revolted against the hijackers to prevent the aircraft from reaching its intended target. In the Richard Reid case, the passengers overpowered the suspect, preventing a mid-air explosion.

In the design of suicide attacks, terrorist will need to minimize the alert time given to authorities to react. The terrorist have to rely on the element of surprise to effectively execute a surgical airborne attack, and one way to do so is to become part of a routine long-term situation. The LTTE used this strategy to assassinate Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa. The LTTE suicide bomber established a kiosk near the residence of the President and befriended most members of the President's Close-Protection Team over a period of two years. He routinely intermingled with the security personnel and had successfully neutralized their alertness towards his presence. On the fateful day the suicide bomber was able successfully to approach the inner circle of the Close-Protection Team around the President as he was known to most of the security personnel.

Future airborne suicide attacks would likely use a similar approach -- becoming part of the routine, increasing the element of surprise and neutralizing the alertness of the authorities. There are two types of "own air assets" that could be used in such an approach for airborne suicide attacks: namely, "sleeper air assets" and "safe location air assets".

Sleeper air assets could include front companies that own light aircraft, ultra lights and helicopters that they use in the conduct of legitimate business activity -- routine

¹³¹ Hoffman, B., *The New Terrorism* (ed. Tan, A., & Ramakrishna, K.), (2002), Eastern University Press, Singapore. (p. 34).

flying missions, such as heli-charters, pleasure rides, sky-writers, freelance news/traffic-update crews, amateur enthusiasts, or any other airborne activity that will not arouse suspicion when undertaking a lethal suicide attack. The owned sleeper air assets, cultivated over several years and effectively merged with the routine, will provide access and surprise to strategic and high value targets, especially in western countries. This would have a much higher effective strike capability for surgical airborne attacks.

The safe location air assets would include aircraft and hardware maintained in clandestine air facilities in locations outside the supervision of recognized States. The global inventory provides an indication of the geographic location of such facilities. The use of owned air assets from safe locations for airborne strikes in western countries seem remote given the barrier of distance, and the required incursion of international airspace. However, such air capabilities can pose a threat to target states' assets located overseas. The availability of terrorist assets and the existence of lightly-supervised air facilities in overseas territories pose a threat to diplomatic and other assets in such locations.

Offensive Capability – Airborne Dispersion Capabilities

Aircraft crop dusters have the potential to disseminate chemical/biological agents in the form of aerosols that can be dispersed over a wide area. There is debate over the effectiveness of low technology dispersion equipment. However, even inefficient dispersion devices installed on airborne assets have the potential to contaminate a large populated area. The Aum Shinrikiyo had built a large production capacity for chemical weapons, and developed plans to disseminate chemical and biological agents over key Japanese cities. The group had purchased a Russian Mi-17 combat helicopter and two remote control aircraft to disseminate the chemical/biological agents over populated areas

¹³² .

Offensive Capabilities – Hijack Sanctuaries

The hijacking of aircraft has been a common tactic used by several terrorist groups for the last five decades. A key impediment to a successful airline hijacking is the unavailability of safe sanctuaries to ground the aircraft. Most recognized States would by

¹³² Stern, J., *The Ultimate Terrorists*, (1999), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. (p. 65).

legal obligation under international conventions and by moral responsibility, be hostile environments for hijacked aircraft.

One of the early hijack sanctuaries was Cuba, which maintained an accommodative policy towards hijacked aircraft from the United States. But, the US-Cuba Hijack Pact of 1973 reversed the Cuban policy on hijacking of aircraft, thus eliminating Cuba as a safe sanctuary¹³³.

In December 1999, Indian Airlines flight IC-814 from Katmandu to New Delhi was hijacked by Kashmiri terrorists and the aircraft diverted to Kandahar in Afghanistan. The hijackers were able to secure the release of three Kashmiri terrorist leaders from India and escaped without facing any punitive action. The Taliban government in Afghanistan, recognized at that time by only three states (Pakistan, UAE, and Saudi Arabia) was a quasi-renegade member of the international community operating outside international legal regimes. The Taliban government offered the hijackers ten hours to leave Afghanistan as the Taliban was not under international obligations to conform to conventions on unlawful seizure of aircraft¹³⁴.

The FARC and ELN terrorists have used the demilitarized enclave in Columbia as a hijacking sanctuary. In February 2002, FARC hijacked a domestic Colombian flight, which had on board a Colombian Senator: while in April 2002 ELN hijacked a domestic flight with 46 passengers. Both aircraft landed on illegal airstrips within areas controlled by these groups and the hostages transferred to secret locations¹³⁵.

Thus, the availability of airstrips within territories controlled by terrorist groups and proto-States poses additional risks to aviation security. These air facilities can be used as hijacking sanctuaries or drop-off points in hijacking operations. As these groups/entities do not have formal relations within the international system in the event of a hijack landing, access, safety and countermeasures cannot be ensured at such

¹³³ Wilkinson, P., *Terrorism Versus Democracy*, (2005), Frank Cass Publishers, Oxon. (p. 161).

¹³⁴ Rediff.com News Report (31 December 1999) – (<http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/dec/31ia15.htm>).

¹³⁵ US Dept. of Homeland Security -Terrorist Organisations Reference Guide – January 2004 (p. 30) (<http://www.nbc-links.com/miscellaneous/Terrorist%20Organization%20Guide.doc>); Resource Centre of the Americas (http://www.americas.org/item_10948).

locations. This is a clear gap in aviation security with the potential for further exploitation by terrorist groups.

Logistics Networks – Alternate Supply Channels

Arquilla & Ronfeldt, describes “netwars” as a prospect that networked-based conflict and crime will become major phenomena in the future. They point to various actors across the spectrum of conflict and criminal activity that have modified their structures and strategies to take advantage of networked designs¹³⁶.

Arquilla & Ronfeldt believe that the protagonists of netwar are likely to be configured as a set of diverse and dispersed “nodes” that share common objectives and interest, and are arrayed to act in synergy¹³⁷. They point to three types of networks: the line-network (chain), in which end-to-end links run through intermediate nodes; the hub-network, which functions as a franchise, in which a central node co-ordinates the network; and the full-matrix network, a more open system in which all nodes are connected to each other¹³⁸.

The 9/11 Commission Report describes Al Qaeda as a co-ordination body with a consortium of terrorist groups with which it has forged alliances¹³⁹. Gunaratna states that Al Qaeda operates as a loose coalition of groups, each with its own command, control and communication structures. He points out that the coalition has a unique characteristic in that when necessary these groups interact or merge, co-operating ideologically, financially, and technically to bring about a “force multiplier” effect in the pursuit of a single objective¹⁴⁰.

There are two important elements in network-terrorism that will contribute towards its survival and global proliferation: First, the ability of networked groups to effectively use technological advances to stay-ahead of the counter-terrorism technology

¹³⁶ Arquilla, J., & Ronfeldt, D., Networks and Netwars – The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, (2001), RAND, Santa Monica. (p. 6).

¹³⁷ Ibid (p. 7).

¹³⁸ Ibid (p. 7-8).

¹³⁹ Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), (p. 58).

¹⁴⁰ Gunaratna, R., Inside Al Qaeda, (2002), Hurst & Company, London, (p. 57).

efforts. As Hoffman states, success for terrorists is dependent upon their ability to keep one step ahead not only of authorities, but also of counter-terrorism technologies¹⁴¹. A second element is the ability of network-terrorism to adapt to alternative channels of supply and distribution.

While the technological developments in communication and IT may provide sufficient space for inspirational propaganda and operational co-ordination, network-terrorism will need to develop new supply channels for the movement of materials and resources to maintain the combat-readiness of the numerous cells. Network terrorism will proliferate with developments supporting “mail-order catalogue” type services, delivering and supplying the required hardware to the global network.

It is possible that the next phase in the use of air assets will parallel the progression experienced in the e-commerce sector. The growth of e-commerce has seen a corresponding growth in the use of private logistics and courier companies for the physical delivery of e-commerce transactions. Furthermore, the growth in e-commerce trading has led to such vendors establishing regional hubs and distribution centers in high customer regions.

Similarly, air assets available to terror groups and proto-States could form a portion of such vendor infrastructure for terrorist supply services. The air option should be viewed as part of a wider transportation network, in which irregular maritime traffic and surface connections combine with air assets to form the overall supply-chain for network-terrorism.

Political & Defence Profile/Posture

Most of the proto-States listed in the global inventory have acquired air facilities to engage in civil and military aviation and/or have competencies in all attributes of air capability, functioning essentially as a fully-fledged air force. The existence of such air assets outside international aviation legal regimes poses a formidable threat to international airspace management in terms of an administrative anomaly as well as to the stability of regional security in terms of air combat capabilities.

¹⁴¹ Hoffman, B., *Inside Terrorism*, (1999), Indigo, London. (p. 180).

Political & Defence Profile/Posture - Airspace Management

Airspace management is a complex and well-coordinated undertaking that places duties and responsibilities on all contracting States of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (CICA). The world's airspace is divided into a series of contiguous Flight Information Regions (FIR) within which air traffic services are provided. Annex 11 of the convention adopts a subsidiary approach by which the responsibility for air traffic management is devolved to each FIR. The FIRs are demarcated based on territorial boundaries of the contracting states. Annex 11 requires states to implement systemic and appropriate air traffic services within their respective airspace and designated FIRs. The air traffic management agencies designated by individual states are required to maintain an orderly flow of traffic, provide advice and information for the safe and efficient conduct of flights and provide alert services for aircraft in distress¹⁴².

It is essential that the air traffic control elements of a respective FIR has complete information concerning air traffic movements within its area in order to allocate flight paths and maintain safe traffic separation between aircraft. When terrorist groups and proto-States operate air assets without clearance from the respective FIR, it disrupts air traffic management procedures with unauthorized intrusions that can endanger other aircraft.

Political & Defence Profile/Posture - Regional Security

A reconfiguration of military capability by a State or non-State has an impact on the regional security complex. Buzan & Wæver, describing their regional security complex theory, explain the distinction between system level interplay of global powers and sub-system level interplay of lesser powers whose main security environment is their local region. The central idea in the theory is that, since most threats have an impact over short distances, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters, referred to as regional security complexes¹⁴³. They believe that the security constellation is composed of four dynamic levels: domestically generated vulnerabilities; inter-State relations; interactions with adjacent regions; and the role of global powers¹⁴⁴.

¹⁴² ICAO website – Annex 11 (http://www.icao.org/eshop/annexes_list.htm).

¹⁴³ Buzan, B., & Wæver, O., *Regions and Powers – The Structure of International Security*, (2003), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (p. 4).

¹⁴⁴ Ibid (p. 51).

Any change in strength/capability alters the power balance within the regional security complex. As Buzan & Wæver have pointed out, domestically generated vulnerabilities are one such level of interplay, and terrorist groups and proto-States acquiring air capability have a direct impact on the stability of regional security.

Ukraine, which borders Trans-Dniester, is a declared aspirant of NATO and has permitted over 6,000 over-flights for coalition forces during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom in what is considered to be a blanket authorisation for NATO over-flights¹⁴⁵. The presence of unauthorised traffic from Trans-Dniester air force units in areas adjacent to the Kiev FIR, could result in unforeseen air accidents with NATO aircraft. Similar conditions prevail for NATO over-flights using Georgian and Azerbaijan airspace given the presence of proto-states in these countries as well.

Conclusion

It is evident from the above study that terrorist groups and proto-States in possession of air assets have acquired attributes in three broad competency categories with specific operational objectives: offensive capability, logistics networks, and defense/political profile. Furthermore, the threats posed by air assets in the possession of such groups/entities derive from the operational capabilities acquired in these broad categories.

In relation to offensive capabilities, the more sophisticated domestic theater terrorist groups such as the Hezbollah and LTTE use the permissive environment that they enjoy outside the primary focus of international terrorism to innovate and develop new capabilities. These groups are conscious of the global crackdown on international terrorism and remain focused on domestic operations. The pioneering strengths of such groups will redefine the tactical repertoire of next-generation terrorism, including breaking new ground in airborne terrorism. Given that these “innovator groups” have already embarked on acquiring aviation infrastructure and hardware, it is likely that they have plans to engage in “third dimensional” tactics.

¹⁴⁵ Socor, Vladimir., Security Priorities in the Black Sea-Caspian Region (Harvard Black Sea Security Programme) September 2003 (<http://www.harvard-bssp.org/publications/?id=84>).

The use of previously practiced tactics is unlikely to disappear, especially by less-advanced groups or cells. The decentralized operational style of the “new Al Qaeda”, which is based on local entrepreneur cells may, for example, attempt previously employed tactics. However, as the innovator groups engage in successful airborne operations in domestic conflicts, the tactical benefits likely will proliferate to incorrigible actors with a global reach.

The logistics networks will develop as alternate supply channels in tandem with criminality as the demands of network-terrorism expand. The air facilities that operate outside international legal regimes will form the infrastructure backbone for air-links in the supply chain.

The proto-States that operate air assets emulating political/defense structures of recognized States can lead to anomalies in the administration of aviation and consequently the safety of air travel. The air assets of proto-States can also alter the security dynamics of regional complexes with wider implications.

PART IV
ROUNDTABLES I AND II

ROUND TABLE I

DOES TERRORISM WORK?

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS

The refrain that civilized people must not give in to terrorism has become a truism of local, regional, and global struggles against terrorist movements. Political, religious, ideological, and social groups with grievances against their governments cannot, the reasoning goes, be allowed to believe that they can expect to achieve their objectives by committing shocking acts of violence against innocent non-combatants. Yet terrorism as a political tool is a phenomenon almost as old as politics itself, and the determination of political authorities to resist terrorist coercion is no doubt similarly ancient. So if it is true that terrorism is not an effective means of achieving strategic political ends, why does it continue and, in the contemporary world, spread? The goal of this roundtable was to answer the straightforward, but nonetheless complex question: “Does Terrorism Work?”

In his introductory presentation, Dr. Rommel Banloai challenged the notion that terrorism does not work by surveying a series of historical cases in which terrorist attacks seem to have significantly influenced strategic and political outcomes:

- The Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979-81 contributed to the electoral defeat of then U.S. President Jimmy Carter; and a later scheme by members of the Reagan administration to trade arms for hostages unleashed the Iran-Contra scandal during President Ronald Reagan’s second term.
- The Hezbollah-led 1983 suicide truck bombings of a US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut killed 283 Marines and led directly to the withdrawal of American and French peacekeepers from Lebanon.
- The 2002 Bali bombings undermined support for President Megawati in Indonesia.
- The 2004 Madrid train bombings contributed to the defeat of the ruling party, which had supported the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

- Efforts by the Philippine government to crackdown on terrorist activity have aroused suspicion and hostility among opposition groups and parties and undermined the already tenuous stability of the ruling government.

The Republic of the Philippines faces challenges from a number of terrorist groups including Communists and Maoists as well as Islamist extremist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group, Jemaah Islamiyya, the Rojahn Suleiman Movement, and other group affiliated with al-Qaida. Like many governments in the region, however, the Philippine regime finds its counterterrorism efforts constrained by the lack of anti-terrorism legislation that would empower it to prosecute individuals for activities related to terrorism, such as possession of explosives. The Philippine government created an Inter-Agency Anti-Terrorism Task Force in March 2004 that has made significant progress, arresting or killing at least 110 known terrorists. Still, there have been relatively few prosecutions (so far, 10 terrorists have been convicted and sentenced to death), and many terrorist suspects have been released because they could not be charged under existing statutes. The Philippine legislature has begun to take steps to strengthen anti-terrorism laws and give the government the authority to persecute terrorist operatives, but the concern that countering terrorism might be used as a tool for prosecuting legitimate political opposition remains a concern not just in the Philippines, but across the region.

Major General Clive Williams of the Australian National University agreed, in his introductory comments, that the answer to the question “Does Terrorism Work” is complex. Williams defined terrorism as politically- (including religiously-, ideologically- and socially-, but not criminally-) motivated violence directed against non-combatants with the aim of creating terror in pursuit of a strategic objective. States also employ terrorism as a political tool, either directly – by providing financial, technical, or training support to known terrorist groups – or passively by tolerating or failing to pursue terrorist activities within their territory.

Williams suggested that while terrorism alone is rarely decisive in bringing about a desired strategic or political outcome, it has often been effective in pressuring states to change their policies or make concessions to the terrorists’ agenda. While such concessions are often made indirectly (thus maintaining the appearance of not giving in to terrorists), in a few high profile cases such as the IRA and the LTTE, terrorist campaigns have eventually forced governments to engage in direct negotiations with terrorist groups or their representatives. Moreover, in combination with more classic

insurgent or conventional military operations, terrorism has proven an historically effective “force multiplier.”

Williams cited a number of key historical cases to illustrate these points:

- Jewish terrorism influenced the British decision to withdraw from Palestine and leave it up to that region’s Israeli and Arab inhabitants to work out the future political situation; this paved the way for the military defeat of Arab forces and the creation of the Israeli state.
- Throughout the post-World War II era, decolonization led to the rise of insurgent movements, many of which employed terrorism as part of their political/military arsenal to overthrow colonial, and later dictatorial, indigenous regimes.
- In 1983, Hezbollah’s attacks against U.S. Marine Peacekeepers in Beirut led the U.S. and France to withdraw their military presence from Lebanon.
- The Peoples’ Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) put the cause of Palestinian independence on the international political map with its campaign of airline hijackings in the 1970s; in the early 1990s, the international community began negotiations with the PLO and al-Fatah. In exchange for its renunciation of violence, the PLO won recognition of the Palestinian National Authority in Oslo in 1993.

Al-Qaida, in Williams’ view, is similarly positioned to achieve at least some of its strategic and political objectives. While it has been, apparently, unable to conduct direct terrorist attacks on the scale of 9/11 since 2002, it has achieved a degree of “brand recognition” that enables it to operate through affiliates and volunteers. It has succeeded in creating a polarization of the West and the Muslim world, has established a durable international Islamist movement that embraces at least some elements of the al-Qaida agenda, and, by instilling the fear of future attacks, has led to the curtailment of civil liberties in its target states. While al-Qaida may not achieve its ultimate goal of expelling the US and Israel from the Muslim world and creating a new Islamic Caliphate, it has already created pressure – both international and domestic – on the U.S. and other Western powers to alter their foreign policies in the Middle East and South Asia.

Over the course of a broad-ranging discussion of these questions, a consensus emerged that three general factors account for the relative success or failure of terrorism in achieving political goals:

1. The Nature of the Terrorist Group,
2. The Nature of the Terrorist Group's Agenda, and
3. The Nature of National and International Responses to Terrorist Activities.

The Nature of the Terrorist Group

Incorrigible versus Corrigible actors: Al-Qaida is an organization motivated almost solely by hate and fear. According to its own manifestos, it seeks nothing short of the destruction of Israel, the complete withdrawal of Western presence and economic and cultural influence from the Muslim world, and the unification of all Muslims under the authority of a single Islamic Caliphate. There is nothing positive that al-Qaida wants from the West and, thus, no pathways for transition from the current state of confrontation and mutual antagonism to one of dialogue and compromise. In its current form, al-Qaida offers no room for peaceful coexistence with those it has declared the enemies of Islam. Al-Qaida is an extreme case, but there are often hard-line, incorrigible elements existing within terrorist groups that are otherwise open to some degree of communication and compromise. The Real IRA, which has refused to accept the Northern Ireland peace agreement, is a case in point. The most extreme rejectionist factions of HAMAS in Palestine likewise refuse to accept any solution to the Israeli-Palestinian situation that involves a "two-state solution."

It is, however, more common for terrorist groups to have political and social objectives that the international community recognizes as at least partially legitimate. If the root causes of a particular movement are perceived, both within and outside the group's community, as reasonable and just, terrorism is more likely to result in some degree of political success. Corrigible terrorist groups have limited political aims that follow from some measurable and broadly recognized injustice or inequity – such as poverty, ethnic or religious discrimination, economic exploitation, or foreign occupation. The existence of such legitimate and recognized grievances can lend a degree of moral legitimacy to the terrorists' cause, if not necessarily to their methods. In most such cases, the target government can find ways to compromise or make concessions to mitigate the underlying grievances that drive support for the terrorist group and motivate new recruits

to the movement. Once a government has made a public and good-faith effort to alleviate the sources of the grievance, terrorism becomes politically counter-productive and continued violence can undermine the moral legitimacy of the political and ideological movement supporting it.

To say that terrorist groups may act in pursuit of legitimate causes is not, of course, to say that terrorism should be considered, or treated as, a legitimate means of achieving political ends. It is true that terrorism, like other acts of political violence, can bring a previously unrecognized problem or unresolved injustice to public attention. It is also sometimes the case that, once a terrorist group has brought its cause to the forefront, the public it claims to represent rejects the terrorists, the cause, or both. But whatever the case, it is clear that national governments and the international community must establish limits to how far a group can advance its cause (or claim credit for doing so) on the strength of terrorist campaigns alone. This presents governments with a quandary: on the one hand, it is often possible to bring an end to political violence through concession and dialogue; on the other, to do so would likely reinforce the perception that terrorism is an effective and legitimate political tool.

This conundrum, in turn, raises the question: When, if ever, should regimes or the broader international community establish dialogues or negotiations with terrorist organizations or with the political entities they represent? In the West, and especially in the United States, the consistent response to this question has been: never. Western statesmen and analysts believe they have learned from history that negotiating with or meeting the demands of terrorists seldom results in a satisfactory outcome and usually leads to an escalation of violence. Most of the experience that informs such analysis, however, is skewed toward Western assumptions and perspectives. It is possible that, in the context of South and Southeast Asia, different, more context-sensitive analyses would lead to somewhat different regional perspectives. In at least some cases, in which terrorism is carried out as part of a larger campaign for social or political justice in a local or national context, governments in the region may need to become more willing to make concessions to acknowledge the root causes of discontent, although not necessarily to terrorist groups themselves. In short, in many of the cases of terrorism seen in South and Southeast Asia today, counterterrorism cannot be seen as a zero-sum game between governments and terrorists but as a more complex equation that must include the communities of interest that terrorists claim to represent.

Terrorist Elites: One of the dangers of negotiating cease-fires and peace agreements with terrorist organizations is that those agreements will fail and the cycle of violence will escalate. For terrorist groups, the transition from outlaw, shock politics to mainstream political activity is usually difficult or impossible to sustain. If terrorist leaders enjoyed the political skills and savvy necessary to advance their cause in the mainstream political environment they, most likely, would not have resorted to violence in the first place. Political solutions are time-consuming, slow, and labor-intensive, and terrorist elites often revert to violence out of frustration with the process. However charismatic they may be in attracting followers to their cause, many terrorist leaders moreover, lack the organizational and management skills necessary to hold their organizations together and enforce compliance with a negotiated, political solution. In such cases, the emergence of new leaders and splinter groups often contributes to the collapse of political solutions. The same can, of course, happen even in the absence of compromise. More than one terrorist organization has collapsed under the pressure of lack of progress and internal ideological or methodological dissent.

There are terrorist movements and organizations that are better suited to political solutions, at least organizationally. One such category consists of those groups engaged in long-standing ethnic and/or regional separatist movements. In places like Aceh, Mindanao, and the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka, tension and conflict with the ruling regime is often a generations-old tribal or family endeavor. In such cases, community leaders probably could muster the authority and means to enforce a peace agreement, should the mutual interests of the community and the state allow for that. Another category seems to be emerging among international terrorist organizations like al-Qaida and the LTTE, which operate more on the modern model of international corporations than on the old, terrorist-revolutionist model. Terrorist elites in these groups often have technical or business educations or experience and know how to manage large organizations and hold them together through periods of transition. Such leaders may be better able to steer their organizations on the path from terrorism to mainstream political activity; but they are also better able to hold their organizations as they grow and diversify *outside* the political mainstream.

The Nature of the Terrorist Agenda

Terrorism as a Tool of War: It is not enough for terrorist groups to have legitimate grievances. Historical experience indicates that the most successful terrorist campaigns are those conducted in pursuit of limited and clearly defined political aims that leave the target state some room for compromise and concessions. Moreover, these objectives must, in addition to being limited and achievable, be clearly expressed. Most terrorists groups, like al-Qaida, have grand manifestos with broad strategic goals that are rarely achieved. The ones that manage to force their governments to make some compromises are those whose strategic goals can be broken down into smaller, intermediate steps. Such agendas are also much more likely to garner popular support among those communities the terrorists claim to represent and to be at least minimally acceptable to the target state, its supporters, and the international community. Because the option for communication and compromise remains open, such agendas are also less likely to trigger the kind of mutual demonization that makes political progress impossible. Groups that embrace terrorism as a tool of war, in pursuit of clearly defined political aims, also contain the seeds of their own obsolescence since once communication and compromise begin, terrorism becomes politically counter-productive and is likely to trigger a backlash among supporters of the terrorist agenda who will be reluctant to risk losing the gains they have made.

Terrorism as a Tool of Protest: Terrorism is much less successful in achieving strategic goals when the group's agenda, objectives, and messages are not clear. Al-Qaida is the highest profile example of a terrorist group whose agenda is motivated as much by anger and revenge as the pursuit of a realistic, concrete political agenda. Its rejectionist ideology has as its first principle the refusal to accept any compromise with the West, the United States, and Israel – all positions that occasionally reflect but are not guided by the needs and ambitions of the communities that al-Qaida claims to represent. In Indonesia, the recent suicide bombings seem to be generic expressions of anger, anti-Westernism, anti-secularism, and anti-democratization, but the groups that have carried out the attacks have sent no clear messages as to where they want their nation to go. For these groups, and others like them across the region, terrorism is a nihilistic act rather than an effort to change anything, to destroy rather than to reform, and their violence is open-ended. In these cases, there is little to be gained from government efforts at communication and

compromise because the terrorists' lack of any constructive goals means no possible action could disarm their anger and thirst for revenge.

The Nature of National and International Reactions to Terrorism

The question of how national and international reactions affect the outcome of terrorist political agendas is, of course, complex. Three factors emerged in this discussion as worthy of particular attention and future research in the context of the South and Southeast Asian regions: 1) the tension between the need to provide national governments with the legal tools they need to arrest and prosecute those who participate in and support terrorist activity and the desire to protect the civil liberties and human rights of law-abiding citizens and legitimate political opposition; 2) the role of national and ethnic diasporas in fomenting, financing, and popularizing separatist and other resistance groups that use or advocate terrorism as a tool of political struggle; and 3) the role of the national and international media in covering violent political activity.

National legislatures in some countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, have been reluctant to enact stronger anti-terrorism laws for fear that to do so would, in the future, provide repressive regimes with the ability to eliminate legitimate political opposition. Regimes occasionally use charges of terrorism to advance unpopular domestic agendas or increase government power. There is particular concern, not limited to the Southeast and South Asian regions, that the pursuit of terrorists will be used as a justification for violating or restricting civil liberties and human rights. Moreover, concern about terrorism provides regimes with the ability to label parties or organizations that oppose them as terrorist supporters; in many cases, all the public and the outside world knows about particular terrorist groups is what the government chooses to tell them. There is also a widespread perception in the region that the current Western, and especially US, concern over terrorism is causing those powers to back away from their commitment to democracy and reducing their pressure on regional governments to respect human rights and civil liberties. There is also the perception that the West is hypocritical in its definition of "terrorism," using a broad brush to label legitimate resistance groups as terrorists while turning a blind eye toward groups that use political violence to undermine regimes of which the West and the United States do not approve.

The role of national and ethnic diasporas in promoting and supporting violent political activities in their "homelands" is a subject deserving of a great deal more study.

In the Punjab, for example, expatriate Sikhs instigated the secessionist movement that eventually erupted into a period of high-profile terrorist attacks and assassinations in the 1980s. Most of the financial support for those carrying out the terrorist/secessionist campaign also came from the expatriate communities in the West. The movement never really gained political traction or grassroots support among Sikhs living in the Punjab, and the series of shocking acts of violence and the puritanical political/religious agenda of the terrorists undermined both their legitimacy and their local support. The Sikh resistance eventually dissolved as its support base lost its taste for incidents of shocking violence conducted in its name. Other diasporas have been more successful, however, in fomenting and sustaining violent political movements at home, as has been the case particularly in Sri Lanka.

The national and international media can also be a key factor in determining the relative success or failure of terrorism as a political tool. As the coverage of US President George Bush's visit to Latin America in late 2005 showed, the competition for press attention and airtime is keen, and violence and mayhem usually win out. The international news networks devoted virtually all their attention to the limited areas of rioting in cities like Buenos Aires and all but ignored much larger, peaceful protests and vigils. The relative success of terrorism in recent years may be, in part, attributable to this broader phenomenon: increasingly, groups are treating violence as a first rather than a last resort in political and social protest. The fact that violent protest gets more media attention and brings a group's cause in front of a much larger national and international audience reinforces this trend. It is clear that analysts, community leaders, and the media itself must find ways for the media to play a less provocative role in its coverage of terrorism and protest without compromising the basic principle of freedom of the press.


Civil Society is the Key to Reducing the Successes of Terrorism

The most important factor in reversing the trend toward terrorist success will be building anti-terrorist civil societies across the South and Southeast Asian regions. The media, religious leaders, and governments all have an important role to play in building mutual trust and in disarming the ideological appeal of extremist groups that misuse religion and national and ethnic identities to justify their violent pursuit of power.

Roundtable II, “The Religious Dimension of Terrorism,” picks up this theme and deals with how civil society and religious leadership can best contribute to the struggle against violent ideological extremism.

INTRODUCTORY PRESENTATIONS


Does Terrorism Work?
CATR Bi-annual Symposium
Bali
19-21 October 2005



The
Terrorism Intelligence Centre

Clive Williams MG
Strategic & Defence Studies Centre

THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
CANBERRA ACT 2600 AUSTRALIA Tel: 61 2 6155 5111



Definition of terrorism

Terrorism is politically [including ideologically, religiously or socially - but not criminally] motivated violence, generally directed against non-combatants, intended to shock and terrify, to achieve a strategic outcome.

Clive Williams *Terrorism Explained* New Holland 2004

2

State terrorism

State terrorism is politically [including ideologically, religiously or socially - but not criminally] motivated violence, directed by a State against a population group, intended to shock and terrify, to achieve a strategic outcome.

Clive Williams *Terrorism Explained* New Holland 2004

3

State sponsored terrorism

State sponsored terrorism may involve direct State support for a terrorist group - or it may be passive, such as providing sanctuary for terrorists or not interfering with their activities within its territory.

Clive Williams *Terrorism Explained* New Holland 2004

4

Does terrorism work?

- Terrorism on its own rarely achieves a decisive outcome - but it often puts pressure on states to change their policies or make concessions
- It can - in combination with insurgency or conventional military activities - achieve a decisive outcome

Example 1 – Jewish terrorism..


- The Second World War saw terrorism used in the 1940s and 1950s to try to force out colonising powers
- The Jewish-Zionist terrorist groups, *Irgun Tsvai-Leumi* (Military-National Organisation) & *Stern Gang* or *Lehi* (from *Lohamei Herut Israel* meaning Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) mounted attacks against British forces in Palestine from the early 1940s

Palestine, 1940s




Palestine, 1940s





Lehi assassinated Lord Moyne in Cairo, November 1944



Irgun attack on train, January 1946



Irgun King David Hotel bombing, 22 July 1946 - 91 killed



Menachem Begin

Example 1 – Jewish terrorism

Outcome:

- The British withdrew, leaving the Palestinians and Israelis to sort out their land claims for themselves
- The Israelis prevailed and Israel came into being in 1948. The US was the first state to recognise Israel.

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Decolonisation

- Other insurgency/terrorism successes followed in Indonesia, Vietnam, Cyprus, Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, etc..



Example 2 – Palestinian recognition..

- Following the failure of the Arab armies against Israel in 1967 (the six day war), the Palestinian groups turned to high profile international attacks against “Western infrastructure” with support from Arab states and leftist groups.
- The PFLP pioneered the terror tactic of hijacking airliners. The first was the 22 July 1968 PFLP hijack of an El Al Boeing 707 between Rome and Tel Aviv.
- Aircraft hijacks went from six in 1967, to 35 in 1968, and peaked at 85 in 1969.

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Example 2 – Palestinian recognition..

- The most audacious act was the 6 September 1970 PFLP hijack of three airliners to Dawson’s Field in Jordan. Two landed but one, a 747, was too large to land and diverted to Cairo. An attempt to hijack an El Al flight failed. On 9 September another airliner was hijacked to Dawson’s Field.
- All of the aircraft hijacked to Dawson’s Field were eventually blown up and the hostages released.

18



Multiple Palestinian hijacks to Dawson's Field 1970



Example 2 – Palestinian recognition

- The Palestinians made themselves into an international menace

Outcome:

- The international community recognised a Palestinian state through the Oslo Accords in 1993
- In return, the PLO and Fatah renounced international violence

21

Example 3 – the US and France in Lebanon..

- In 1983, Lebanese Hizballah mounted VBIED attacks against the US embassy in Beirut, the US Marine Corps base at Beirut airport, and the French military headquarters

18 April 1983





Example 3 – the US and France in Lebanon

Outcome:

- Both the US and the French withdrew their military forces
- Perception among Islamist extremists that Western nations lack staying power if they suffer enough casualties

Example 4 – Al Qaeda – a work in progress..

- Al Qaeda came into being after the end of the mujahideen war against the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan in 1988
- AQ aims to drive the US and Israel out of the Middle East and establish a caliphate from Muslim states



Example 4 – Al Qaeda – a work in progress..

- AQ supported affiliate activities until 1998 and then started to mount its own attacks



Example 4 – Al Qaeda – a work in progress..

- After 9/11 and Operation Enduring Freedom, it has reverted back to supporting affiliates and volunteers



Example 4 – Al Qaeda – a work in progress..

Outcomes:

- Widespread “brand” recognition
- Polarisation of the West and Islam
- Fear among target populations
- Curtailment of some civil liberties in target states
- Increased pressure on US foreign policies
- An increase in the tempo of affiliate terrorist attacks

29

Example 4 – Al Qaeda – a work in progress

- Pressure on the US to reduce its overseas military presence
- Pressure on those political leaders and governments being targeted by affiliates
- Achievement of an international coalition of Islamist extremists
- Creation of a durable Islamic movement
- Recognition of its long term vision – at least among Muslims

30

Discussion points

- What are common features of successful terrorist groups?
- What are common features of unsuccessful terrorist groups? (700 groups were active between 1968-72, there are only about 80 today)

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The
Terrorism Intelligence Centre

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The March 2004 Madrid Bombing reminds the Philippine government of the December 2000 Rizal Day Bombing.



In Lebanon

A suicide bombing in Beirut in 1983 destroyed American policy of helping to create a stable government in Lebanon.

America withdrew a few months after the attack.

Does terrorism work?

Brian Michael Jenkins (2004)



In Yemen



Bin Laden boasts that the 1992 *jihadi* bombing of a hotel that Americans had occupied in Aden, Yemen, caused the United States to retreat again.

Does terrorism work?

Brian Michael Jenkins (2004)



In Iran

Failure to rescue or negotiate the release of American hostages held in Iran influenced President Carter's defeat in the 1980 election.

Does terrorism work?

Brian Michael Jenkins (2004)



President Reagan's bid to win the release of American hostages in Lebanon by secretly selling arms to Iran created a major political scandal that deeply wounded his administration.

Does terrorism work?


Brian Michael Jenkins (2004)

In Indonesia

The Bali bombing of October 2002 resulted in the decline of popularity of President Megawati.

Before the bombing, Megawati's popularity was so high that it almost assured her of reelection in 2004.

Does terrorism work?



In the Philippines

The Hostage-Taking of Angelo de la Cruz in July 2004 by terrorist group in Iraq led to the withdrawal of Philippine peacekeeping forces deployed there.

The hostage crisis put Arroyo squarely between domestic concerns and her previously strong commitment to the US-led global campaign against terrorism.

Does terrorism work?



In the Philippines

Government campaign against domestic and international terrorism intensifies state-society tensions.

Does terrorism work?



TERRORIST THREATS IN THE PHILIPPINES


- A. Communist Terrorist Movement (CTM)
- B. Abu Sayaff Group (ASG)
- C. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
- D. Al Qaeda, and
- E. Rajah Solaiman Movement



Communist Terrorist Movement

CPP-NPA


While the threats posed by this group still remain, our relentless efforts have borne fruit – NPA's strength and firearms have gone down respectively.





MARITIME TERRORISM

- On 31 August 2005, ASG leaders met in Patikul Sulu to plan kidnapping of foreign nationals in yet undisclosed beach resorts in Malaysia and Palawan before or after the Ramadan.
- In July 2005, JI provided underwater operations training to MILF and ASG recruits in Tawi-tawi to undergo underwater bombings against major seaports and vessels in Mindanao.
- Similar training was also reported in Sandakan, Malaysia, which ended on 27 July 2005.





- Azahari bin Husin and Noordin Mohamed Top known to be the masterminds of the two Bali blasts reportedly conducted training in military camps in the Southern Philippines run by the ASG.
- But the Philippine National Police denies this.
- Noordin and Azahari were reported to be in Purwantoro, Wonogiri (in Central Java province).





- Dulmatin, also known as Joko Pitono (nicknamed Genius) and Umar Patek, are believed to be hiding in the Philippines.
- According to Eid Kabalu, spokesperson of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Dulmatin and Umar Patek were last seen in Maguindanao with other local terrorists associated with ASG in July 2005. But Kabalu eventually denies this.





Based on reports, the number of Indonesian JI members in the country has dropped by 17% or from 40 in 2003 to 33 in 2004.

Key arrest and neutralization of known JI personalities, such as Taufik Rifqi and Fathur Roman Al-Ghozi respectively, are also noted.

But it was recently reported that JI operatives has reached 60 as of August 2005.

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2005 Valentines Day Bombings



"Mini-9/11 in the Philippines"

**Superferry 14 Bombing
February 2004**

*"the world's fourth deadliest
terrorist strike since Sept. 11, 2001, and
Asia's worst
since the Bali bombings of October 2002".*




**THE PHILIPPINE
ANTI-TERRORISM
TASK FORCE**


CREATION OF THE ANTI TERRORISM TASK FORCE

The Philippine Inter-Agency Anti-Terrorism Task Force was organized on 25 March 2004 under the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COC-IS) tasked as the primary government entity to fight terrorism with then Secretary of National Defense and currently Executive Secretary Eduardo R Ermita designated as Chairman.


ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE



MEMBERSHIP IN THE ATTF




Most of the members of the task force are hold-overs from the former COC-IS that are already undertaking counter-terrorism tasks mandated under previous issuances. In the reconstituted ATTF, new member-agencies have been included.




www.bangladesh.gov.bd

TF MINERVA

BANGLADESH



| ATTF TOTAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS | | |
|--|------------|---|
| RECAPITULATION (25 March –01 March 05) | | |
| TERRORISTS | NUMBER | REMARKS |
| Killed | 19 | 19 Abu Sayaff Group members |
| Arrested/ Captured/ Surrendered | 91 | 61 Abu Sayaff Group members 17 Jemaah Islamiyah members 8 suspected foreign nationals 5 other suspected terrorists |
| TOTAL | 110 | 80 Abu Sayaff Group members 17 Jemaah Islamiyah members 8 suspected foreign nationals 5 other suspected terrorists |



Department of Justice
 Republic of the Philippines

Existing Laws

Acts of terrorism are dealt with and prosecuted under the following laws:

- Revised Penal Code
- Other Special Penal Laws



Department of Justice
Kantor Jaksa Agung Republik Indonesia

Cases

156 cases filed

includes kidnapping, murder, piracy, illegal possession of explosives, illegal detention

867 named accused

includes Khadaffy Janjalani, Ghalib Andang (aka Commander Robot), Nadzi Sabdula (aka Commander Global), Abu Ahmad Salayudin (aka Abu Sabaya), Fathur Al Khozi, Radulan Sahiron, Tahir Alonto

10 accused sentenced to death



Department of Justice
Kantor Jaksa Agung Republik Indonesia

PROBLEM

Difficulty in prosecution

- No specific law which deals and punish "Terrorist acts"


CAPTURED AND RELEASED BECAUSE THERE IS NO ANTI-TERRORISM LAW

- Akmad Santos – captured in 2002. Plotted the foiled bombing in Malate. Charged with illegal possession of explosives.
- Angelo Trinidad – captured in 2002 for illegal possession of explosives. Released on Bail. Perpetrated the 2005 Valentines Day Bombing.
- Redento Cain Dellosa – captured in 2002 for illegal possession of explosives. Released on bail. Perpetrated the 2002 Superferry 14 bombing.
- Mario Barrientos – captured in 2004 for illegal possession of explosives. Planned the foiled Malate bombing in 2002.
- Tyron Santos – captured in mid 2005 for illegal possession of explosives. Released on bail a month after his capture.

ANTI-TERRORISM BILLS

- **Philippine Senate – 5 Identical Bills Filed**
- **Philippine Congress – 10 Identical Bills Filed.**
- **One consolidated bill has already been passed by the Justice and Foreign Affairs Committee.**

**An anti-terrorism law
will demonstrate
that terrorism
will not work
in the Philippines!**



**THANK YOU
VERY MUCH!**

ROUNDTABLE II

THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS OF TERRORISM

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

Few issues have been more contentious in the effort to promote international cooperation in countering the spread of terrorism than the role of religion as a motivation for terrorism and political violence. Al-Qaida's overtly religious rhetoric makes it difficult to argue that religion is not a powerful motivator for individuals and groups engaged in political violence and terrorism. Still, as terrorism in Sri Lanka and Nepal clearly show, non-religious motivations can be just as powerful and durable. And most terrorist experts agree that while religion is an important factor, the root causes that motivate terrorists and, more important, their supporters are essentially political. Western nations, in their counterterrorism strategies and policies, insist that they do not see Islam or any other particular faith as a "threat," yet their strategies focus on "militant Islamist ideologies" and their immigration controls seem to single out citizens of predominantly Muslim nations. It is impossible to ignore the powerful role that religious ideology can play in sustaining terrorist movements and rallying popular support, yet the nature of that role is still a source of debate and confusion among analysts, policymakers, and military and law-enforcement officials, one that threatens to undermine international cooperation. The purpose of this roundtable is three-fold: first, to discuss the role of religion as a dimension of terrorism; second, to identify strategies for countering the misuse of religion by terrorists; and finally, to discuss ways that religion and religious leaders can be mobilized as a force for stability and reconciliation to mitigate the root causes of terrorism.

In his opening remarks, Dr. Azyumardi Azra stressed that, while religion is seldom the sole motive for terrorism and political violence in the Muslim world, religious leaders have a vital role to play in countering the ideologies that Islamic radicals use as moral rationalizations for acts of terrorism. According to Dr. Azra, religious doctrine and historical precedent have both been used and abused by terrorists to justify their acts of violence. The general sense that the West and trends like globalization have proven hostile to Islam and to Muslim people across the world and anger at recent trends in US foreign policy have combined with this abuse of religious concepts to legitimize terrorists in the eyes of some Muslims in Southeast Asia. Dr. Azra went on to argue that religious

scholars, the ulema, must step up to the challenge of rethinking the doctrines and traditions that terrorists have used to justify their activities and, more importantly, speak out forcefully in opposition to terrorists' claims of moral and religious legitimacy. Given the nature of Islam, particularly its lack of centralized religious authority, this will be a time-consuming and difficult task. It is one that, according to Dr. Azra, the ulemas in all the sects of Islam must undertake in the interest of the long-term well-being and piety of the Muslim community.

Dr. Douglas Johnston's introductory remarks looked at many of the same issues from the Western perspective. Modern Western states are, he argued, ill-equipped to deal straightforwardly with the increasingly central religious dimensions of conflict on all levels for several reasons. First, the historical roots of modern Western statecraft in the Enlightenment have instilled in the West a belief that religion should not guide the activities and interactions of states in the modern world. Second, this Enlightenment prejudice has, in recent decades, been reinforced by the dominance of "rational actor theory" in Western strategic thinking and policy – an inclination reinforced by the atheistic nature of the Communist threat that drove Western strategy for half a century. According to rational actor theory, the strategic behavior of states is always driven primarily by material concerns: economic and military power in particular. Third, the US Constitution has become a model for most modern democratic states in its insistence on the strict separation of church and state. Finally, as Western societies in general, and the traditionally ethnically homogenous Western European democracies in particular, become more culturally and religiously diverse, religion's potential to divide and destabilize has rendered it "too hot to handle" for most Western politicians.

Western diplomacy and strategy can no longer ignore the religious dimension of statecraft, diplomacy, and conflict. Dr. Johnston suggested a number of steps that the West must take if it is to work effectively with Muslim societies to defuse the danger to Muslims and non-Muslims alike that violent religious extremism poses.

- Integrate a more sophisticated and culturally-sensitive understanding of religion and the role it plays in the civil, political, and legal institutions of non-Western societies;
- Make better use of existing resources, such as military chaplains, in planning and executing policies and military and law-enforcement operations;

- Build stronger cooperation with NGOs that have operated effectively in the non-Western world for decades and which have extensive experience in designing strategies and operations that bridge rather than aggravate cultural differences;
- Enlist the cooperation and support of Muslim communities in the West, most of which are able and willing to serve as a valuable strategic asset in bridging cultural divides;
- Devote serious thought and resources to developing national strategies of cultural engagement.

Religion as a Motivation for Terrorism and Political Violence

The reality that most terrorist movements are motivated primarily by political rather than religious root causes clearly does not obviate the need for policymakers and strategists in every nation engaged in a struggle against terrorism to understand the religious dimension of the problem. In the Muslim world, in particular, the widespread perception that the West is at war with Islam is a major contributor to popular support, or at least tolerance, of violent religious extremists. In the eyes of traditional religious elites in many faith traditions, globalization has undermined faith and piety by introducing young people to alien culture and values. The internet, moreover, has democratized religion and undermined the control of local religious elites over the religious training and moral supervision of their societies. In a few cases, self-proclaimed saviors of traditional faith have undertaken radical, and sometimes violent programs to force their societies back into the strict moral and cultural molds of their traditional faith.

Many of the social and political root causes of discontent – poverty, economic injustice, political corruption and repression – trigger a deep and festering sense of frustrations in individuals. In South and Southeast Asia, violence often comes from minority or marginalized groups that feel their voices are not being heard, their needs are not being met, their interests are not protected, and/or their cultural and religious identities are being threatened by a religious, cultural, or modern majority. For those feeling the urge to engage in political violence – usually at the local level – religion (as well as many secular ideologies) can provide a cloak of moral authority and social legitimacy. It can also provide a source of outside support, resources, and alliances among like-minded co-religionists.

Globalization and economic modernization has left millions in South and Southeast Asia behind, leading to a growing community of the economically and politically dispossessed. The large and growing Muslim diaspora consists increasingly of young people with an incomplete understanding of the doctrines and traditions of Islam. Because they are not armed with the knowledge that underlies a critical understanding, they have few defenses against the simplistic and emotionally-charged rhetoric of charismatic radical clerics and ideologues. Radical salafists and other religious revivalists (which exist in every major world faith) are standing by to offer simplistic and emotionally satisfying versions of their faith that can provide individuals with a sense of belonging, identity, and empowerment without requiring from them the hard work and long, quiet contemplation that is required to achieve real religious understanding in every faith tradition.

Strategies for Countering the Misuse of Religion

The reluctance of Western leaders to engage the skewed perceptions of religious extremists directly, honestly, and straightforwardly only exacerbates the problem of the misperception that the West is “at war” with Islam. It does not help that Western political rhetoric is rife with references to the “Radical Islamist threat,” the “problem” of religiously and culturally distinctive Muslim minorities, and post-9/11 legal harassment of immigrants and profiling of resident aliens and visitors from predominantly Muslim countries. Western realists must come to terms with the fact that such intangible factors as religion (and other emotionally-charged secular ideologies) are powerful motivators in societies around the world, including their own. In an era in which modern communication and the internet facilitate the rapid spread of false doctrines that feed resentment and tolerance of violence, it is vital that Western leaders have well-informed strategies for responding and anticipating religious as well as political criticisms of Western policies and culture. It is also important that they reach out to religious leaders and groups as partners in the common struggle against violent religious extremism of every stripe.

Mobilizing Religious Leaders

Religious leaders also bear a responsibility for responding more energetically to the false doctrines that feed terrorism and political violence. This is a particular challenge in the Muslim world because of the scope and structure of the Muslim community.

Geographically, the Muslim community/umma reaches around the world and constitutes the fastest growing religious community in the world. But the vast and growing Muslim umma has no central religious authority capable of issuing infallible decisions concerning doctrine and religious law. In Sunni Islam, anyone can issue a fatwa; and fatwas – regardless of their source – have no binding authority. The structure of Shi’a Islam is more hierarchical, and fatwas, which can only be issued by certain clerical authorities, do have binding authority on the conduct of the faithful. Grand Muftis and other official religious authorities have, in many countries, been delegitimized in the eyes of the people by their ties to secular political authorities. Throughout the Muslim world, community and religious leaders must work closely together to identify ways to repair frayed civic institutions, and it is absolutely vital that religious authorities be enlisted in this effort. Muslim religious leaders must undertake a serious and public discourse (a renewed *ijtihad*) that confronts the false doctrines of the violent, charismatic extremists and offers a “middle-way” to enable the Muslim faithful to embrace both the modern world and their traditional cultures and values.

**PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND RECTOR OF STATE ISLAMIC
UNIVERSITY, JAKARTA, INDONESIA
BY: AZYUMARDI AZRA**

There is little doubt that the root-causes of terrorism are very complex; in fact there is some combination of various factors including politics, economics, and also religion. In most cases, politics seems to be the most important factor. To take the most recent cases of terrorism in Indonesia such as Bali (2002), Jakarta Marriot (2003), Kuningan Jakarta (2004), Bali II (2005) bombings, it is apparent that politics, both domestic and international, is the main cause of terrorism. At the domestic level, the perpetrators of the bombings have been motivated by their anger and hatred toward an Indonesian political system that they regarded as being 'un-Islamic'. This is particularly true when Megawati Soekamoputri was the president of the Republic of Indonesia; for those behind the bombings, it is unlawful for woman to become the leader (*imam*) of state whose bulk majority of population is Muslim.

As for international politics, it is clear that even before the tragic events of 9/11, 2001, in the USA, the Muslim perpetrators of terrorism have condemned certain injustices in international politics and relations. For them the US and some other Western countries are the enemies of Islam and Muslims. Western countries, particularly the US are basically hostile to Islam and the Muslim world. In fact, they believe, the US and other Western countries have conspired to destroy Islam and Muslims. A number of international cases such as the US continued support to Israel at the expense of the Palestinians and the US military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have only added fuel to their anger and hatred to the US and its allies.

Therefore, religion -- this brief paper, Islam -- is seldom the main, let alone the only, cause, of terrorism. Political, economic, and other non-religious factors, however, could easily acquire religious justification when the perpetrators of any kind of terrorist act put advance certain interpretations of religious teachings. The use, abuse, and manipulation of religious justification are potentially greater in Islam, which does not have a single body of religious authority. From doctrinal point of view, I believe that certain doctrines of Islam can be used and abused for justifying acts of terrorism. The doctrine of *jihad*, for instance, could be easily taken as justification by certain Muslim individuals and groups to conduct holy war against any perceived enemies, including even

Muslims. Certain verses of the Qur'an and the Tradition (*Hadith*) of the Prophet Muhammad are prone to be interpreted that way; indeed, there exist religious interpretations and understandings along that line. The absence of a single authority in Islam -- particularly among the Sunni -- makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to issue religious rulings (*fatwa*) that would decide once and for all that terrorism as *jihad* is religiously unjustifiable and invalid.

Not least important is the precedent in Muslim history of radical acts that can be included in the definition of terrorism. The radical acts conducted by the Kharijis (Seceders) in the post-Prophet Muhammad period, for instance, have in fact continuously inspired many, if not most, contemporary radical Muslim groups. There, indeed, exist certain radical ideologies among Muslims which basically believe that it is religiously valid to conduct such radical and terrorist acts.

Therefore, there is an urgent need among concerned Muslim scholars (*'ulama'*) to rethink, reinterpret, reformulate certain interpretation of classical and medieval *'ulama'* -- concerning *jihad*, for instance. For that purpose the *'ulama'* and Muslims in general must, first of all, discard the defensive and apologetic attitude that is apparent when they respond to terrorist acts conducted by certain individuals or Muslim groups. They should admit that there are indeed terrorists among Muslims who, based on their understanding of Islam, engage in terrorism. Admitting this problem, the *'ulama'* could then proceed to address the issue objectively from religious point of view.

Religiously-linked terrorist groups, like those in Indonesia, basically are not associated with the state. Most radical groups, in contrast, are opposed to the state; they are originally non-state activists of obscure backgrounds. Moreover, they are as a rule outside of mainstream Muslim movements. In fact, they have bitterly criticized mainstream Muslims as having accommodated to and compromised with what they regarded as 'un-Islamic' political, social, cultural, and economic realities.

There is a tendency, however, for certain radical individuals or groups to be recruited by or have certain links or connections with persons in the government or military. This is not new in Indonesia. The terrorists hijack of a Garuda Indonesia airplane in Bangkok during the Soeharto period, for instance, was conducted by terrorists of ex-Islamic state movements in the 1950's that were recruited by certain Soeharto's generals to launch the so-called *'komando jihad'* (*jihad* command). There have been a lot

of indications that certain military factions have incited and manipulated certain radical groups in the post-Soeharto period.

Religiously-linked terrorism is not unique to Islam. One can find throughout human history a great number of terrorist acts that were, in one way or another, linked with certain religions. In contemporary times, with the increased globalization and instant flow of information and news that created a great deal of disruption, the radicalization of religious individuals and groups tends to have accelerated. Religions without central authority are of course more prone to violence and terrorism. But, religions with central authority could also become prone, because of the decline of their religious authority and decentralizing of religious authority and leadership.

There is little doubt that literal and *sharia*-oriented (*zahir*) understanding of Islam is more prone to radicalism. This kind of religious understanding, as a rule, makes some clear boundaries even among Muslims. Those who are opposed to their understanding are in fact regarded by them as having gone astray and, therefore, are target of *jihad* (war). This can be seen clearly in the cases of the Wahabis in the late 18th century Arabia and the Padris of West Sumatra in the early decades of the 19th century.

The non-literal understanding of Islam, such as that represented by Sufism, is more immune to violence. This is mainly because of the strong emphasis Sufism puts on inclusiveness and the 'inner' (*batin*) aspect of Islam. Even though the Sufi, like the literalists, also appeal for purification of religious acts, but they do it in a peaceful manner through spiritual exercises rather than by using force like the way of the literalists.

RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS

BY: DOUGLAS JOHNSON

9/7/05

Religion, the West, and the Global War on Terrorism

- A. This conference is but the latest indicator that we are at long last recognizing the central role that religion is playing and has been playing for sometime now in international affairs.
1. We have been slow to wake up
 - Enlightenment prejudice
 - Longstanding commitment to rational-actor model
 2. Events of 9/11 a dramatic wake-up call
 3. Invasion of Iraq has put on full display the West's inability to deal with religious differences in a hostile setting or with demagogues who manipulate religion for their own purposes.
 4. Not totally a function of purposeful neglect – also relates to some very real operational constraints
 - "Establishment Clause" in the U.S. Constitution
 - Opportunities missed (in Iraq and elsewhere)
 5. Western policymakers have allowed separation of church and state to serve as a crutch for not doing their homework

How this Phenomenon Works

- B. To deal effectively with the religious elements of terrorism, one has to first know how religious terrorism works.
1. Most religions at their core subscribe to laudable principles of neighborly concern and the betterment of humanity
 2. Sadly, these principles are all too easily coopted by power politics and the forces of nationalism, usually in the form of:
 - A badge of identity
 - A mobilizing vehicle for ethnic or nationalist passions
 3. But the problem goes even deeper
 - Misappropriation of scripture
 - Bin Laden's resort to suicidal attacks against innocents

4. This perversion of holy scripture is made all the easier by the impoverished circumstances that prevail in most Islamic countries

- Madrasas -> vulnerability of students
- Religious legitimacy trumps all else
- When religious scripture is retrieved selectively and applied situationally, it can become a powerful tool for justifying the unjustifiable

5. Why doesn't someone set the record straight?

- Starting to happen
 - Yemeni judge in late 2002
 - Post-London fatwas
 - Muslim Public Affairs Council edicts

6. Organic approaches (such as that in Yemen) have enormous potential and should be encouraged wherever possible

7. The above notwithstanding, more needs to be done at the strategic level to enhance national effectiveness in dealing with the religious dimensions of terrorism:

- Thus far, the West has been good at addressing symptoms, not so good at addressing cause

Dealing with the Problem

C. First, one needs to take advantage of existing assets that might be redirected to address this problem.

1. Foremost among these are military chaplains

2. With appropriate training and expanded rules of engagement, chaplains would be well-positioned to enhance the conflict prevention capability of their commands by:

- Advising commanders on the cultural and religious nuances of operational decisions
- Identifying incipient threats to stability through insights borne of close relationships with local religious leaders
- Reconciling differences between their commands and local communities

3. Even the French understand the need to deal with religious imperatives

4. Transnational capabilities of NGOs

- Extensive Maneuverability
- ICRD as a case in point
 - Madrasa Reform (Azhar Hussain)
 - Kashmir (Tahir Aziz)
 - Sudan (institutional initiatives)
 - Iran (peace game)

D. Need for new initiatives

1. Religion attachés
2. Treat local Muslim community as a strategic asset
 - inform public diplomacy
 - inform foreign policy
 - bridge relations with Muslim countries
3. Bureaucratic realignments
 - French experience in Algeria: Muslim Bureau

The Challenge Ahead

A. We need to pay tribute to the considerable and often heroic efforts that are being made to confront terrorists militarily around the globe.

B. But unless we complement these efforts with an effective strategy of cultural engagement, we are never going to get to where we need to be.

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APPENDIX A

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

TAHIR AZIZ has worked as the Director of the Human Rights Commission of the Government of Pakistan-administered Kashmir for four years (1997-2001). From July 2004 to July 2005, he was a visiting fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, under its South Asia Programme. He holds two masters degrees – the first in Anthropology awarded by the Quaid-e-Azam University, Pakistan (with a thesis based on field research conducted on the Kashmiri community in England), and the second in International Peace Studies, awarded by the Joan B. Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, USA. Over the last five years, as a Senior Associate at the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, a Washington D.C.-based NGO, he has been closely involved in efforts for the capacity-building of mid-level political and social activists in Azad Kashmir in order to facilitate a resolution to the Kashmir conflict. Currently he is developing a project for civil society empowerment in Kashmir. Recently with a colleague from Indian-administered Kashmir, Tahir Aziz co-authored a paper titled “Future of Intra-Kashmiri Dialogue,” which is going to be published by the IISS, London on their website in the month of February, 2006.

AZYUMARDI AZRA is a Professor of History and Rector of the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta, Indonesia. He received a Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1992. He has also been an international distinguished visiting Professor at New York University (2001), a Professional Fellow at the University of Melbourne (2004-09), and the editor-in-chief of *Studia Islamika*, the Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies. He also serves as editor of *The Journal of Qu’arnic Studies*, SOAS, London and *Journal Usuluddin* (UM) in Kuala Lumpur. He has published widely on various aspectss of history, religion, and politics. Among his books are *Jaringan Ulama* (Networks of Islamic Scholars, 1994); *Pergolakan Politik Islam* (Tension of Islamic Politics, 1996); *Menuju Masyarakat Madani* (Toward Civil Society, 1999); *Pendidikan Islam: Tradisi dan Modernisas Menuju Milenium Baru* (Islamic Education: Tradition and

Modernization towards the New Millennium, 1999); *Renaissans Islam di Asia Tenggara* (*Renaissance of Islam in Southeast Asia*, 1999), which won the national award for the best book of the year 1999 in the field of humanities and social sciences; *Islam Substantif* (Substantive Islam, 2000); and *Konflik Baru Antar-Peradaban: Globalisasi, Radikalisme, dan Pluralitas* (New Inter-Civilizational Conflicts: Globalization, Radicalism, and Pluralism, 2002). His latest book is *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia*.

ROMMEL C. BANLAOI is a Course Director of the Political Dimension of National Security at the National Defense College of the Philippines where he previously served as Assistant Vice President for Research and Special Studies and Vice President for Administrative Affairs. He earned his BA and MA in Political Science at the University of the Philippines where is currently finishing his Ph.D. in Political Science. He was a fellow of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (Hawaii) and became a visiting scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing), the University of Hong Kong, Zhongshan University (Guangzhou, China), and Leiden University (The Netherlands). His publications appeared in some academic journals such as *Asian Affairs: A Hong Kong Publication*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Foreign Relations Journal*, *Intelligence and National Security*, *Journal of Asia Pacific Studies*, *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*, *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly* and *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. He has authored and co-authored five books, two monographs and some book chapters. His latest book is *War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia* published in October 2004 by Rex Book Store International.

TONY FAINBERG is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He retired in 2005 as Director of the Office of Transformational Research and Development of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office of the Department of Homeland Security where he previously served as Program Manager for Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures and for Explosives Countermeasures in the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department and Director for Federal Laboratories in that Directorate. Prior to moving to USDHS, he was Division Chief at the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Defense and Director of the Office of Policy and Planning for Aviation Security in the Federal Aviation Administration. After receiving his training and degrees in experimental particle physics, Dr. Fainberg worked as a researcher and university lecturer for eleven years, producing

some 40 technical publications. His experience includes work at U.S. National Laboratories; at CERN, the international nuclear laboratory in Geneva; and at universities in the U.S. and Italy. He turned to applied physics in 1977, entering the field of nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation at Brookhaven National Laboratory, where he was responsible for projects involving technical, systems, and policy issues. In the course of his duties at Brookhaven, he worked with officials at the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. In 1983, Dr. Fainberg became a Congressional Science Fellow of the American Physical Society and spent a year as a legislative aide in the office of a U.S. Senator. Following the fellowship, he joined the staff of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, where he has specialized in national security issues. He worked for several years in analyses of missile defense technologies. Later, he worked on projects dealing with the Department of Energy nuclear weapon complex, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has originated and directed projects on terrorism and on technologies of use in military operations other than war. Dr. Fainberg has frequently testified before Congress and has briefed both congressional staff and the media in his areas of expertise; he has appeared on National Public Radio, CNN, and other outlets. He has also briefed National Academy of Sciences panels on aviation security matters. He speaks a number of languages and possesses security clearances up to the SCI level. Dr. Fainberg is also active in professional organizations, such as the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and has co-edited a book on energy supply and demand.

AZHAR HUSSAIN has a well-established history of successful training and development initiatives in diverse settings, including India, Britain, the United States, and Mexico. He has served as adjunct faculty for the Government of Mexico's Ministry of Education and currently works as a Senior Consultant and trainer for the American Association of Retired Persons in Washington, DC. Originally educated in a Pakistani madrasa, he holds a Masters Degree in International/Intercultural Management from the School of International Training in Vermont. He is currently involved in Pakistani Madrasa reform effort and serve as a lead for this project for ICRD.

FUAD JABALI

SHANAKA JAYASEKARA has a Bachelor of Commerce (BCom) with a dual major in Politics and International Relations from Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia; and a Master of Letters (M.Litt.) in International Security Studies from the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. He has also completed an Internship with the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St. Andrews. Mr. Jayasekara held the position of Programme Support Coordinator at the UNDP Office in Colombo prior to joining the Government Peace Secretariat (Sri Lanka) as Deputy Director (Strategy) in April 2002. He has participated in all six rounds of peace talks between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE as an Advisor to the government delegation. He currently holds the designation of Director (Policy) at the Peace Secretariat. Mr. Jayasekara has experience in researching the LTTE and its international operations. He has also done extensive research on the aviation assets of terrorist groups and proto-states at St. Andrews University.

DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON is the President of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy and the author of the book *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (Oxford University, 1994). The mission of the ICRD is to facilitate the constructive involvement of religious people in peacemaking. Dr. Johnston is a distinguished graduate of the US Naval Academy and holds a Master's degree in Public Administration and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University. He has broad experience in government, academia, and the military, starting with ten years in the US Navy where, at age 27, he was the youngest officer to qualify for command of a nuclear submarine. Among his government assignments were: planning officer in the President's Office of Emergency Preparedness, Director of Policy Planning and Management in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower. He has taught international affairs and security at Harvard and was the founder and first Director of its Executive Program in National and International Security. Most recently, he served as Executive Vice President and COO of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

RAANGA KALANSOORIYA Deputy Director, Sri Lanka College of Journalism. A journalist from Sri Lanka with wide experience on reporting the country's conflict to local and international media for over 15 years. Reuter Fellow, Green College,

Oxford University, United Kingdom. Published a research paper at Oxford on Terrorism and Peace Negotiations [Case studies, Northern Ireland and Sri Lankan peace processes]. Masters in Information Management, with International Political Economy as Co-course, Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur and Bachelor of Science (Mathematics), The Open University of Sri Lanka. Author of the publication 'LTTE and IRA – Combating Terrorism and Discussing Peace.' Former spokesman to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sri Lanka and Former Counsellor (Information), Sri Lanka High Commission, Kuala Lumpur. Visiting Lecturer, Journalism and Mass Communication Department, Sri Jayawardhanapura University and Visiting Lecturer, Journalism Department, Colombo University. Diploma in News Agency Journalism, Indian Institute of Mass Communications, New Delhi. Reuters Training on International News Writing, Reuters Headquarters, London and UN training on Reporting UN and International Affairs, UN Headquarters, New York. Colombo Correspondent – Malaysian National News Agency (Bernama) and Sunday Business Post, Ireland.

HEKMAT KARZAI is the designated Head of the Center for the Study of Political Violence and Conflict Management in Kabul, Afghanistan. His research focuses on terrorism threats in South and Central Asia. He has conducted field research on terrorist groups including the Taliban, Al Qaida, and Hizb-i-Islami. He has recently served as RMS Fellow at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore. Prior to taking the post of Head of the Center, Mr. Karzai served as First Secretary to the Embassy of Afghanistan, Washington DC, beginning in May of 2002. There he oversaw daily political and congressional affairs, served as liaison to the diplomatic and political community, US Congress, and the executive branch on politics, security, economic aid and other vital issues pertaining to Afghanistan. As an embassy spokesman, Mr. Karzai has appeared on BBC World Service TV, CNN, CNN International, Fox News Channel, and C-Span's "Washington Journal." He has addressed numerous think tanks and universities and is active in fostering scholarship programs for Afghan students to study at American universities. Mr. Karzai has also served as Program Director for the Geneva-based International Organization for Migration. In 2004, he participated in the Loya Jirga (Grand Council) that ratified the new Constitution of Afghanistan and has been instrumental in forging strong ties between the new Afghan government and the United States. Mr. Karzai has a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Maryland,

College Park, in Political Science and a Master's Degree in Information Technology from American University. He has been a Fellow at the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and was nominated for the 2005 Davos World Economic Forum Global Young Leaders Award. He is the author of several articles; most recently, "Terrorism: Is there a need for a definition?" and "Afghanistan's War on Narcotics" in the *Georgetown University Journal*. Hekmat Karzai was born in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He speaks several languages, including English, Pashto, Dari, Farsi, and Urdu/Hini.

SATU LIMAYE joined the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in Alexandria, Virginia in November 2005 as a Research Staff Member in the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Divisions (SFRD). His work at IDA focuses on the Asia-Pacific region. From July 1998 until November 2005 he was Director of Research & Publications at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), a direct reporting unit to US Pacific Command based in Honolulu, Hawaii. At APCSS, Dr. Limaye directed the research, publications, and regional collaborations and consultations programs of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. He received his Ph.D. in international relations from Oxford University (Magdalen College) where he was a Marshall Scholar. He graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. His previous appointments include: Abe Fellow with the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies in Washington, D.C.; Luce Scholar and Head of Program on South Asia at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo; and Senior Consultant in the International Division of Ogden Energy and Environmental Services in Fairfax, Virginia where his responsibilities encompassed policy, program, economic and budgetary analysis on issues such as uranium enrichment and plutonium use. Dr. Limaye has taught at Georgetown University and Sophia University in Tokyo. His articles have appeared in *The Washington Quarterly*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Southeast Asian Affairs*, *Journal of Democracy* and newspapers such as the *International Herald Tribune*, *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, and *The Nikkei Weekly*. He recently has edited *The Asia-Pacific and the United States 2004-2005* (2004), *Asia's Bilateral Relations* (2004), *Asia-Pacific Responses to U.S. Security Policies* (2003) and *Asia's China Debate: Implications for the United States* (2003) and co-edited *Japan in a Dynamic Asia* (Rowman & Littlefield). He is the author of *U.S.-Indian Relations: The Pursuit of Accommodation* (Westview Press) and *South Asia and*

the United States After the Cold War (The Asia Society). He has lectured widely in the United States and Asia and given numerous newspaper and television interviews. Dr. Limaye has contributed to Oxford Analytica, Ltd. *Daily Brief*, a consulting service based in Oxford, England, and was the Washington correspondent for *Business South Asia* (published by the Economist Intelligence Unit). Dr. Limaye has been a consultant to The Ford Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy, The Asia Society and the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung.

JAMHARI MAKRUF currently is the executive director of Center for the Study of Islam and Society State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta. He also serves as an editor of *Studia Islamika*, an Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies in Southeast Asia. He coedited with Jajang Jahroni book on "Gerakan Salafi Radikal" (A Salafi Radical Movement) in Indonesia.

NARENDRA PAUDEL is associated with Central Department of Public Administration, Public Administration Campus, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal, Email: narendra436@yahoo.com.

ABM ZIAUR RAHMAN is a Research Fellow at the Bangladesh Institute of International & Strategic Studies (BIISS). He did his first graduation in History Jahangirnagar University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, then he completed his second MA in Environment, Development & Policy at the University of Sussex, UK. Following are some of his publications: *Correlation between Green Revolution and Population Growth: Revisited in the Context of Bangladesh and India*; *Renewable Energy Resources in Bangladesh: Challenges and Opportunities*; *A Critique of the "Tragedy of the Commons," Terrorism in the Cyber Avenue*.

M. B. RAMAN served as an intelligence analyst in the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), India's external intelligence agency, from September 1968 to August 1994 and headed its counter-terrorism division from 1988 to 1994. He retired as Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, on 31 August 1994. He was a member of India's National Security Advisory Board from July 2000 to December 2002 and of the Special Task Force of the Government of India for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus in 2000. He is presently the Director of the Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai; a Distinguished fellow of the International Terrorism Watch Programme and of

the Observer Research Foundation (New Delhi), where he is Convenor of its Chennai Chapter. He is an Honorary Member of the Board of Editorial Consultants of the “Indian Defense Review,” published in Delhi. He is also the author of two books, *Intelligence: Past, Present, and Future* and *A Terrorist State as a Frontline Ally*. He writes regularly on terrorism, national security, and foreign policy related issues in newspapers, journals, and online journals and is a regular guest speaker on terrorism and intelligence at the National Defense College, New Delhi; the Army War college, Mhow, Madhya Pradesh; and the National Police Academy, Hyderabad. Mr. Raman lives in Chennai.

MUHAMMED AMIR RANA is researcher associated with Ambassadors of Love Arts and Peace (ALLAP), a research organization. He has worked for Daily Times, a prestigious English Daily of Pakistan and Weekly Friday Times. His areas of research are Jihad, Sectarianism, religious politics and regional security issues. He has produced important research works on Jihadi Culture and its Sosio-political effects on the region. He is also associated with International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore as a visiting research fellow. He received a M.Sc in Geography from Punjab University Lahore with Cultural Geography as his main area of focus. His Master’s Thesis was entitled “Geo-Cultural problems of Pakistan.” Upon graduation, he joined Urdu Daily newspaper “Khabrian”, Lahore, as a sub-editor and later joined magazine of the paper. He also served as the magazine editor and investigative reporter and produces some exclusive peace of reporting. His book “A to Z of Jihad Organizations in Pakistan” is considered a first serious attempt to unfold the jihadi organizations internal affairs, disputes and infightings, and their effects on the militant movements. Its investigative research is much respected by the national and international press. Amir Rana is also a well-known Urdu Short Story Writer, and has published an anthology of Short Stories “Adhuri Muhiabitian, Puree Khanian.”

PRAVEEN SWAMI is New Delhi Chief of Bureau and Deputy Editor for the Indian magazine *Frontline*, as well as an occasional contributor to *The Hindu* and the *South Asia Intelligence Review*. A specialist in low-intensity warfare and defense issues in India, he has reported on the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir for over a decade. He was awarded India’s most prestigious journalism award, the Prem Bhatia Memorial Award, in 2003 for his coverage of defence and intelligence issues. He also won another premier Indian media prize, the Sanskriti Samman, for his reportage of the 1999 India-Pakistan

war in Kargil. Apart from a book, *The Kargil War* (New Delhi: Left Word, 1999), his recent scholarly publications include *Quick Step or Kadam Taal: The Elusive Search for Peace in Jammu and Kashmir* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Special Report 133, 2005) and *Failed Threats and Flawed Fences: India's Military Responses to Pakistan's Proxy War* in *The India Review*, Volume 3.2 (London: Frank Cass, 2004). Another book, *Covert in Kashmir: Pakistan, India and the Secret Jihad*, produced while Swami was a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in 2004-2005, is expected to be published in early 2006.

VIPULA WANIGASEKERA is the General Manager of the Sri Lanka Convention Bureau, Ministry of Tourism, Colombo, Sri Lanka and a political analyst and forecaster. He is a professional marketer, senior diplomat, government official and columnist with 20 years experience in many fields. He holds a Master's Degree in Business Management from the University of Sri Jayawardenapura with special interest in international business culture; he also holds a Bachelor's Degree in Marketing from the Chartered Institute of Marketing, United Kingdom. His career has included international trade, shipping, and tourism, including employment in multinational organizations and Sri Lankan government institutes. In 1995, he joined the Foreign Service of Sri Lanka and participated in efforts to resolve the Sri Lanka conflict. As a diplomat, he has served in Malaysia as Counsellor attached to the Sri Lanka High Commission in Kuala Lumpur where he gained considerable knowledge on the impact of the diaspora on the Sri Lanka conflict. He also opened the first Sri Lankan diplomatic mission in Norway and served as its first Consul General. His contribution to building bridges between Sri Lanka's Sinhala and Tamil communities and forging a political settlement to the Sri Lankan conflict has received widespread recognition.

CLIVE WILLIAMS is a specialist on politically motivated violence, with a career background in Australian military intelligence and Defence's strategic policy and intelligence areas. He has worked and lectured internationally on terrorism-related issues for more than 20 years, and has run terrorism and counterterrorism Masters courses at The Australian National University (ANU) and other Australian and international universities since 2002. He is a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators (IABTI) and the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers (AIPIO). He is

also a member of Greenpeace and the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). Otherwise he enjoys scuba diving, swimming, foreign movies and sports cars!

APPENDIX B

The Return of the Black Turban: Causes of the Taliban Insurgency Slides

The Return of the Black Turban:
Causes of the Taliban Insurgency

By
Hekmat Karzai
RMS Fellow
International Center for the Study of Political Violence and Terrorism Research
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore

Hotel Santika Beach Bali, Indonesia
October 19 -- 21, 2005

HK -- 2005 1

Overview:

- A brief history of the conflict in Afghanistan, especially, depicting the role of the Taliban
- The recent escalation in violence and its main causes
- Lastly, how do we deal with this particular insurgency?

HK -- 2005 2

Afghanistan

Taliban are not a new phenomenon

Participation in the Jihad

Harakat-I Inqilabi-I Islami (Movement of the Islamic Revolution)

Hizb-I Islami (Islamic Party, Khalis faction)

The Soviet withdraw allowed them to resume their lives



HK -- 2005

3

Taliban's Rise to Power

General disillusionment of the Majaheedin

Restored Security in the Southern Provinces

Why did the Afghans support them?



HK -- 2005

4

Taliban's Initial Objectives:

- end the conflict between rival Majaheed groups that continued to disintegrate the country and cause lawlessness;
- unite the people under one central government;
- restore peace and security for the population and protect their rights and liberties;
- end the corruption by various parties and establish a credible and accountable government;
- disarm the population from weapons that were abundance after the Afghan-Soviet war;
- enforce the shariah, establish the Islamic state and preserve the Islamic character of Afghanistan;
- rebuild the war torn Afghanistan.

HK -- 2005

5

Raise to Power:

With popular support came Assistance:

Finance:

Recruitment:

Resources:



HK -- 2005

6

Resistance against the Taliban

Western Front



Easter/Northern
Front



HK -- 2005

7

The Return of Disneyland

Marriage of Convenience between the Taliban
And Al Qaeda:



Training Camps

Radical influence

Change of Goals and objectives



HK -- 2005



8

Brief History

Al Qaeda: from Operational Organization to an Ideological Global Jihad

- Radicals came from 43 different countries took part in the Jihad

South East Asia Groups that went to Afghanistan:

- Darul Islam
 - Jemmah Islamiyah
- Abu Sayyaf Group and Moro Islamic Liberation Front from the Philippines
- Kumpulan Mujahedeen from Malaysia
- Many groups from Southern Thailand

HK -- 2005

9

Ultra-Purist Vision:

- Couples were stoned to death if caught in adultery;
- thousands of widows were banned from employment
- schools and colleges were closed for girls;
- men were not allowed to shave or trim their beards;
- TV, music, soccer, and women wearing
- white socks were all banned.
- The Religious Police Force enforced these edicts fervently



HK -- 2005

10

Destruction of the Buddhas:

Taliban's last draw with the People

Destroying the Buddhas was not only
A crime against the Afghans, But all
of humanity

Any remaining good will was
gone!



HK -- 2005

11

Change of Faith:

September 11 and its effects:

- The end of Taliban as a government
- The start of a political process in Afghanistan via the Bonn Agreement



HK -- 2005

12

Operation Enduring Freedom

Destruction of the Taliban Command and Control

Terrorist Universities were demolished
Base of operation was destroyed



HK -- 2005

13

Recent Development:

Political:

- The return of more than three million refugees
- An elected government
- A constitution ratified by all Afghan
- Educational opportunities have expanded for all children regardless of gender
- Presidential and Parliamentary Elections have been held



14

Recent Development

Security remains a major consideration

Taliban continues to actively regroup and undertake guerilla attacks throughout the South and the East of Afghanistan.

Just this year, 80 American soldiers and over 1,400 individuals, including NGO workers, religious leaders, international officers and government officials were killed.

Recent Development

So, what accounts for this recent resurgence in violence?

Factors1

Taliban's new lethal Strategy

- Early setbacks of OEF
 - No force on force attacks
- Attack 'soft targets'
- Generate local support and resources
 - Narcotics
 - Old relations have rekindled



HK -- 2005

17

Taliban Tactics

- Beheadings
 - Several cases have taken place
- IEDs
- Suicide bombings
 - A new weapon the battle
 - September 2005 - 12 killed army base in Kabul
 - June 2005 - 20 killed in Kandahar mosque
 - May 2005 - 3 killed in Kabul internet cafe
 - October 2004 - 3 killed in Kabul shopping centre
 - August 2004 - 10 US security contractors killed in Kabul

Taliban says it has 45 more suicide attackers awaiting orders to strike

HK -- 2005

18

Media Tactics

- Internet
 - Magazines
 - Videos
- Radio (Mullah Latifullah Hakimi)
- Television (Mullah Osmani)



HK -- 2005

19

Factor 2

Afghan Institutional Capacity

- Afghan National Army
- Afghan National Police
- National Security Directorate



HK -- 2005

Factor 3

Cultural and Environmental Understanding of the Foreign Troops

History
Religion
Culture
People
code of conduct



HK -- 2005

21

Factor 4

The Global Muslim Struggle

Iraq
Palestine
Kashmir
Chechnya
Abu Gharib, Guantanamo, desecration of the Holly Quran

HK -- 2005

22

Factor 5

Slow Pace of Reconstruction

Is Kabul Afghanistan and Afghanistan Kabul?

The Role of NGOs

Factor 7

Role of outside actors

Training

Resources

Recommendations

There has never been a purely military solution to terrorism

General Frank Kitson: "in dealing with low intensity operations, we have to use political, social, economic and military measures."

Political Recommendations:

- Foreign Soldiers should be culturally educated on the norms, customs and traditions of the environment
- Social work has to take place especially in areas that are poverty stricken
- Build bridges with communities
- Counter Ideological measures should be used
- Cultural mechanism should be adopted to deal with terrorism
- Enact tougher laws against extremism
- Stops funds
- Build a better relationship with Neighbors so transfer of knowledge can take place

Military Recommendations:

- The military has to stop using heavy hand approach. Instead establish strong but informal networks with the communities that live across the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most of the times, these communities provide sanctuaries to the Taliban who are on the run.
- The Military has to familiarize themselves with the Taliban's Modus operandi and analyze their pattern of attacks
- Improve intelligence activities in major cities, whether Afghanistan or Pakistan, where majority of the Taliban leadership reside and plan their operations
- Refrain from engaging in corrupt activities– and thus increase social trust.
- Sharing of intelligence/ideas
- Transfer of operational knowledge, Exchange of experts
- Police training in particular should be enhanced to better deal with terrorist attacks

HK -- 2005

27

How do we deal with Terrorism?

Be adoptable to change:

- The enemy is more adoptable, patient, and capable of change;
- War of Attrition
 - Bleeding to death (in lives and financially)

HK -- 2005

28

Strategy:

From

Global War on Terrorism (GWAR)

To

Struggle Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)


Strategy that is forward looking

Thank you

Questions?


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APPENDIX C
Transforming: Pakistani Madrasa Slides



Transforming: Pakistani Madrasa

Presentation
Center for Asian Terrorism Research
Bali
October 19 - 21



Religious Education Reform
Project

International Center for Religion and
Diplomacy (ICRD), Washington, DC
Partnership with
Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Pakistan



Overview

- Pakistan's literacy rate is 42.7 percent, and the percentage of school-age children who have never attended school is 53 percent for boys and 61 percent for girls. (USAID 2003)
- Madrasa fills gaps in failed educational system
- Value: Religious education as integral to the well being of a person/society
- Madrasa holds huge social/political leverage...



Project Overview

The goal of this project is to expand educational opportunities in the South Asia region, with an initial focus on the religious schools of Pakistan. Once it has proven itself in Pakistan, this approach can be taken to neighboring countries.

Project Phases

Pilot Phase:

- 14 days workshop for Madrasa administrators February 16-29, 2004
- Five one day madrasa policy workshops in five major cities..

Second Phase:


- Five ten day workshops to build capacity, ToT
- Six One day seminars inside madrasa to include teachers and neighboring Madrasas.

Impact

- Almost all madrasas (95%) who have gone through our program ask us to come into their institute and conduct similar workshops for their teachers.
- All agreed to enhance/add contemporary courses to their current curriculum...but how?
- All wants to learn better teaching techniques, managing conflicts, developing tolerance/acceptance of 'others in their students...

The aims and objectives of the workshop are to:

- Provide an opportunity to discuss the key issues facing religious education from madrasa perspectives
- Ground the initiative in history of Islamic innovation and progress
- Encourage religious tolerance/co-existence and human rights.
- Examine Islamic perspectives on the natural and social sciences
- Address issues relating to REI syllabi and methods of teaching
- Encourage the development of new pedagogical skills



Overarching Assumptions

- Madrasa administrators must take the ownership in bringing about changes
- Reducing intolerance and bias/stereotypes will lead to better/rational and objective understanding of 'others'
- Anger can be good and also can be very destructive...dynamics of anger management.
- Develop competencies in observation, analysis and reflection so that administrators ID issues within madrasa education system, Healthy pedagogical approaches and dynamics of conflict.

Classroom Dynamics Teacher Student Relationship

- Religious role of a teacher (religious conditioning is a universal thing...)
- Cultural conditioning and nationalism
- Biases are learned they can be reinforced by education and or they can be unlearned...(what's your responsibility?)
- What is the ultimate goal of madrasa? Are we still fighting colonization through madrasa?
- Teacher behaviors that causes students to feel angry, anxious, etc. is that learning?

Underline Value
to struggle

'Oh you who believe, stand up firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even if it be against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be against rich or poor: for God can best protect both

Do not follow any passion, lest you not be just. And if you distort or decline to do justice, verily God is well-acquainted with all that you do.'" (Quran 4:135)


Hunza Valley, Pakistan



Madrasa students



Madras Class Room



Living Space



Madrasa Water Supply



Dean's Office



شکریہ

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APPENDIX D

Landscape of Terrorism in South Asia Slides

Why we are here?

A selected group of experts and students on terrorism and political violence to discuss ways and means on countering them

COUNCIL FOR ASIAN TERRORISM RESEARCH (CATR)

promoting and sharing research to build upon the diversity of scholarly and national perspectives to devise new approaches, capabilities, and integrating efforts to counter-terrorism within the Asia-Pacific region and other regions that affect it.....

With special emphasis on South Asian context

- Not to deliver conventional lectures, conduct teaching sessions, to test the expertise on each other
- BUT TO SHARE EXPERIENCES IN OUR RESPECTIVE FIELDS
- SHARE DIFFERENT VIEW POINTS AND IDEAS
- ENGAGE IN CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE IN ORDER TO WIDEN THE HORIZON OF COUNTER TERRORISM

Why South Asia ?

Because...

- It is becoming one of the most volatile region of the world, and of the Asian Continent
- Home to many designated terrorist groups
- Complexity of issues – A better case study
- Nuclear capability and vulnerability

LANDSCAPE OF TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA

An overview

SOUTH ASIA

- One of the most vulnerable regions of the world
- The internal conflicts have a cross-border dimension, and many are inter-related
- Transnational presence with bases, training facilities, headquarters and supply located within the region, but outside the country of operation or origin

India

- Naxalites (left wing extremists) – Mao Groups
- Nagaland – Six decade long conflict
- National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NCSN-IM) – Naga guerillas
- Assam - United Liberation Front of Asom (**ULFA**)
- Bodoland - National Democratic Front of Bodoland (**NDFB**) – Bodo guerillas
- Ayodhya – Muslim extremism allegedly backed by Pakistan aiming at fueling Hindu-Muslim backlash
- Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (**KLO**),
- Tamil insurgency movements in Tamil Nadu (Possibly with the backing of the LTTE of Sri Lanka)
- 'Enterprise of terror' in Jammu & Kashmir

Pakistan

- Breeding ground for many transnational terrorist outfits
- [Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (**HM**), linked to the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI); Lashkar-e-Toiba (**LeT**), Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami (**HuJI**) and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (**HuM**, formerly the Harkat-ul-Ansar), linked to the Jamaat-e-Ulema (JUI), Al Badr; and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (**JeM**)]
- The umbrella United Jihad Council (**UJC**) coordinates the activities of 14 of terrorist organizations
- Steady influx of Al Qaeda operatives following US invasion in Afghanistan

Pakistan.....

- Reopening camps North West Frontier Province after a year-long closure. Being used as a base to train thousands of fighters for operations in Kashmir and Afghanistan
 - all the major organisations, including Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (**HM**), **Al-Badr Mujahideen**, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (**HuM**) and others, began regrouping in April 2005 by renovating training facilities that were deserted in 2004. - *Herald, July 11, 2005.*

Sectarian violence in Pakistan

- **Sunni groups** - Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (**SSP**), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (**LeJ**); militant Wahabi tribal group, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (**TNSM**).
- **Shia groups** - Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (**TJP**), Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (**SMP**).

Nepal

- Maoist Movement

- Becoming one of the most ruthless outfit in South Asia
- Demands the end of Monarchy and creation of Republic (new Constitution)
- Power base : Extreme poverty stricken areas

Bangladesh

- Chittagong Hills Tracts (CHT) once again become a matter of concern
- The role of fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI),
- The increasing concern on the presence of transnational terrorist groups, including the Al Qaeda
- Cross border operation by anti Indian groups

Sri Lanka

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

- Transnational outfit with bases in all over the world.
- Operates multinational businesses with 23 cargo ships
- Provides training to many other outfits
 - Includes Maoist in Nepal, ULFA in Assom, Gam in Aceh and MILF *
- Operates training camps in Bihar closer to India – Nepal border

* Unconfirmed intelligence and media reports

Bhutan

- No major presence of terrorist groups
- Indian terrorist outfits, the United Liberation Front of Asom (**ULFA**) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (**NDFB**) and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (**KLO**), have set up camps

The anatomy of terrorism in South Asia

- Cross border dimension
 - without getting into usual Indo-Pak debate
- Religion and sectarian violence
- Emergence of terrorism through longstanding (bilateral) political disputes
- Violence as a means of fighting for political identity
- Nexus between poverty and terrorism
- Nuclear strength between two rivalries and the role of terrorism
- Counter terrorism – military or political jargon?
 - finding root causes and address them

How to combat the menace?

- New approaches with multi-faceted dimensions?
- A bridge between War Against Poverty and War Against Terrorism?
- End to conventional rivalries and identify the real enemies of the new millennium?
- Political willingness ?
- Natural Disasters ?



Lets Start with a new
perspective

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APPENDIX E


Jihad Online: The Lashkar-e-Taiba on the Internet Slides



an overview



the conflict in Kashmir



the case of the Lashkar



the audience in Pakistan



the audience in India



 **COME FORWARD**

To
Help The Victims Of Tsunami

Jamat-ul-Dawa has managed to prepare the Medical Teams as well as medicines for the help of the victims. Apart from this we have established contacts and line of coordination with the embassies and the counsellors of the countries effected by this calamity to furnish them with cash, dry food, blankets as well as sheets.

Please Donate
With Open Heart

1. Remember giving charity *can* cause to evade any calamity or misfortune like Tsunami.
2. Make haste, millions of helpless victims are desperately looking for a drop of water, bit of bread and something to cover their bodies from this freezing cold to survive.
An urgent action is required

Last is too late.

Khidmat-e-Khalq Deptt. Jamat-ul-Dawa Pakistan
4-Lake Road, Chungi J, Lahore Pakistan
Tel: 7235818, 7235815, 7235816, 7235819
Fax: 7235818

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conclusions -- and questions



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APPENDIX F

Terrorists San Frontiers (TSF)—A South Asian Perspective Slides



Terrorists San Frontiers (TSF) - A South Asian Perspective

The ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ of terrorism in South Asia

- Major internal conflicts of many South Asian nations have a cross-border dimension, and many are inter-related
- Become a ‘Spaghetti Bowl’

Why is it a 'Spaghetti Bowl?'

- Cultural, ethnic and religious inter-links
- Porous borders
- Cross-border political interests
- Absence of a well coordinated, networked countering mechanism
- Rapid adoptability

Different dimensions of interests

- Politico-religious interests (Pakistani, Bangladeshi and some Indian groups)
- Political interests (Maoists, Naxalites, LTTE, ULFA, NDFB)
- Economic interest (Involvement of LTTE in commercial operations)

Why has it been so smooth?

- Conflict of national interests by respective nation-States
 - *Indo – Lanka foreign policy mismatch in early 80's and Indian assistance to many Tamil insurgent groups – Harboring and nurturing LTTE*
 - *Indo-Pakistan political tension in mid and late 80's – Pakistani assistance to Kashmiri fighters (Cross border terrorism)*
 - *Indo – Bangladesh political tension; use of Bangladeshi soil against India by armed groups*

Why has it been so smooth?

- Common politico-religious goal with historic ethnic, religious and linguistic links
 - *Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladeshi groups sharing a common goal*
 - *Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka and India*

Why has it been so smooth?

- Common political goals
 - *Maoists in Nepal and India*
- Economic goals
 - *LTTE's alleged interest in playing a lead role in providing training and logistics to other groups in the region*

Is it difficult to counter?

- Seven Nations – special focus on five nations
- Understanding the culture and people
- New strategies, approaches, eradicating poverty
- Flexibility of foreign policies of individual nations
- Networking and sharing experience / intelligence
- Involvement of security agencies and the civil society
- To be conscious of level of discrimination in economic and social outcomes

Political level

- More pragmatic approach
- Enhancing the SAARC arrangements
 - *Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism*
 - *Expansion of bi-lateral arrangements into multi-lateral level in the interest area*

New Dimension

Natural Disasters Vs Man Made Disasters



Who could give assurance to their future?



Thank you

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