LOGISTICS COMMAND AND CONTROL
WITHIN THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND

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Logistics Command and Control within the Combatant Command

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The purpose of the project is to determine the correct changes to the organization for logistics command and control within a geographic combatant command and make recommendations for possible organizational realignments. This paper examines the current organization of joint logistics command, control, and execution for a geographic combatant command. The examination includes: (1) Review the logistics issues that make an evaluation of logistics command and control relevant, (2) Review the geographic combatant commanders’ authority and responsibilities in the area of logistics, (3) Examine the functions of the current organizations responsible for logistics command and control, including the combatant command J-4, the Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC), and Service Component logistics staffs, (4) Examine ongoing efforts within the joint logistics community to provide solutions to the logistics command and control requirements. Recommendations are provided to implement changes to the logistics command and control organizations within the combatant command.
LOGISTICS COMMAND AND CONTROL WITHIN THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND

“Sound logistics forms the foundation for the development of strategic flexibility and mobility. If such flexibility is to be exercised and exploited, military command must have adequate control of its logistic support.”

-- RADM Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense (1959)

With the increasing complexity of modern warfare and the need for rapid and precise global military response, effective and efficient command and control of the joint forces is essential. Integrating and synchronizing the joint fight requires the joint force commander to master the six basic functions of joint operations: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protections, and sustainment. The geographic combatant commander represents the pinnacle of joint warfighting and has the responsibility to integrate and synchronize these basic functions for the joint forces assigned to the command. The synergy of the six basic functions of joint operations, coupled with effective planning and execution, allows the combatant commander to accomplish the missions assigned. This paper examines the importance of the command and control of the sustainment function within the geographic combatant command.

This discussion is limited and most applicable to the four combatant commands which have responsibility for employment of joint forces during contingency operations outside the Continental United States (CONUS). These commands are: U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). The use of the term combatant command from this point on refers specifically to these four commands.

This discussion should not be confused with the establishment of a Joint Logistics Command, which was a recommendation from the Defense Science Board in 2005. That recommendation is addressing a larger issue involving the ownership and end-to-end management of the Department of Defense supply chain. A Joint Logistics Command at the national level would provide support to the combatant commanders, but would not be involved with logistics command and control decisions made at the theater strategic level.

The Issue

There are several questions that will need to be answered to properly provide any recommendations for changes to logistics command and control within the combatant command. What is the most effective and efficient way for the combatant commanders to
execute logistics responsibilities and functions within their assigned area of responsibility? Should there be a major change to the current organizations that provide logistics command and control? Is there a requirement for a new organization with the specific responsibility for logistics command and control within a theater of operations?

There are ample reasons for opening the discussion into logistics command and control processes within the combatant command. Ongoing emphasis on defense transformation, coupled with lessons learned and observations from joint operations, compel a reevaluation of logistics command and control. Improving the process of logistics command and control improves the sustainment function, thus allowing better integration and synchronization of the joint fight.

**Defense Transformation**

Defense transformation is defined as, “A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.” The need to consider both new concepts and organizations creates a linkage between defense transformation and this discussion of logistics command and control.

Defense organizations function within a resource constrained environment. The Department of Defense can ill afford large bureaucracies that waste resources, are slow to react and make decisions, and have multiple layers that perform tasks with no value added. To transform these organizations, every effort must be made to capitalize on the capabilities and core competencies of its member agencies and service components. The transformation process should eliminate overlapping capabilities and realign core competencies to the expert organizations or to components where efficient and effective processes currently thrive.

Defense transformation strives to improve the way the joint force will fight, which in turn requires a review of the command and control processes currently in place. In the words of the former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, during testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, "Our focus needs to be on more than just numbers of troops. It should be on finding ways to better manage the forces we have, and by increasing the speed, agility, modularity, capability, and usability of those forces." The “ways to better manage” and the need to increase joint capability applies directly to more effective means of command and control. Improving logistics command and control address one area within the intent of Mr. Rumsfeld’s statement, which falls in line with the basis for the defense transformation effort.
Logistics is specifically spelled out as one of the key issues within the defense transformation framework. The *Elements of Defense Transformation Handbook* specifically states, “there is a clear need for a more dynamic, demand-centered logistics construct to support the more widely dispersed battlefield and permit a truly adaptive, agile, and joint logistics system.” To provide this type of joint logistics system it is only logical that a reevaluation of logistics command and control must be undertaken. Logistics command and control is only one part of the total joint equation. To transform the joint force, a thorough review of the joint logistics system and its associated processes must be undertaken. Every effort must be made to maximize logistics capabilities across the joint force, eliminate unnecessary duplication, streamline processes, and shrink the logistics tail, while providing the necessary support to sustain the current and future joint force.

**Lessons Learned and Observations**

It is always prudent to examine lessons learned and expert observations when considering changes to concepts and organizations. Recent joint operations have provided valuable insights that can be applied to this discussion. Since the 22nd Support Command (Provisional) was established during Operation Desert Shield/Storm through Operation Iraqi Freedom, many philosophical debates have emerged with respect to logistics command and control. These debates have encouraged doctrinal and organizational discussions as well as experimentation into options that could improve logistics command and control. The most promising effort is an ongoing initiative lead by U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Futures Lab. Known as the Joint Experimental Deployment and Support (JxDS) concept, it examines a full range of logistics command and control options. Several lessons learned were highlights in a recent JxDS overview briefing. These four items capture failures or shortfalls of our current logistics command and control organizations and processes. They include:

1. “Logistics by committee,” no single point of contact in charge of overall logistics execution to ensure unity of effort
2. Lack of standing capability; too much “ad hoc”
3. Poor linkage between planners and executors
4. Poor linkage between logisticians and operators

Another source, further emphasizing this point, can be found in a recent article in the *Army Logistician* magazine titled, “Joint Logistics for the EUCOM AOR.” The author summarizes five categories of problems that are specifically related to logistics command and control that impact the combatant command. These include:
1. Lack of a joint logistics organization to ensure that joint logistics functions are executed in support of the theater
   2. Lack of a theater-level logistics commander
   3. Inability to execute Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL)
   4. Lack of logistics command and control
   5. The combatant commands inability to see requirements and respond with the appropriate capabilities

As with the observations from the JxDS concept, this article spells out very similar concerns related to the current logistics command and control process. This article examines the problem from a USEUCOM perspective but it is safe to say that these issues are relevant to the other combatant commands. The Army Logisticians article goes as far as stating there is a “Lack of logistics command and control.” Both sources indicate a lack of unity of effort and unity of command in dealing with logistics functions. These fundamental concerns must be addressed when considering any changes to logistics command and control concepts and organizations.

**Joint Logistics Doctrine**

Doctrine is the fundamental principles that guide military forces or elements. Doctrine is authoritative but requires judgment in its application. Before considering changes to concepts and organizations, it is important to understand what organizational options exist in current joint logistics doctrine. Joint Pub 4-0 lays out six management and command organizational structures that can be used to address command and control of combatant command logistics functions. The options include:

1. Use an existing component service organization
2. Augment the combatant commands logistics directorate (J-4)
3. Delegate to a Joint Task Force commander
4. Establish a stand-alone logistics agency
5. Assign joint logistics responsibilities to the predominate service
6. Expand the logistics readiness center (LRC) within the J-4

These are not revolutionary ideas, but they provide the range of organizations that should be considered when addressing the command and control issues identified in the JxDS concept and the Army Logisticians article. These are the organizations available to the combatant command to execute logistics. The combatant commander has specific authority and responsibilities that allow the use of this range of options and empowers these organizations.
Logistics Responsibilities and Authorities

The combatant command has specific responsibilities in the area of logistics and is provided command authority to execute these responsibilities. The combatant commander derives command authority from the United States Code (USC). USC Title 10, chapter 6, section 164, provides Combatant Command (COCOM) authority as the basic authority to perform the functions of command which involves organizing and employing commands and forces. By law, COCOM, gives the combatant commander the responsibility of giving “authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.”10 This authority allows for, “Assigning command functions to subordinate commanders and coordinating all aspects of support including control of the resources and equipment.” COCOM includes the authority to exercise directive authority for logistics matters (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability).11

Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL)

It is important to expand on and understand the concept of DAFL. This authority, according to Joint Publication 0-2, is to ensure that “effective execution of approved operations plans; effectiveness and economy of operations; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the service components.”12 DAFL enables the combatant command to make changes to normal logistics support systems or processes to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Services continue to have responsibilities for logistics support of their service forces operating within the combatant command’s AOR. DAFL simply allows the combatant command to make changes that provide for better support or command and control. DAFL does not have the authority to alter Executive Agent responsibilities that may be assigned by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Department of Defense (DoD) Executive Agent13 responsibilities are those assigned to a DoD Component, by the SECDEF or his Deputy, to provide support for operational missions, and administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD components. These responsibilities can only be modified by the SECDEF or the Deputy SECDEF. For example, the Army is assigned executive agent responsibility for transportation support. The Army must be prepared to provide transportation support to any other service component operating within a specified area of operations. The combatant command must consider executive agent responsibilities when considering making any changes to support arrangements within the theater under his DAFL authority.
DAFL authority spans both peacetime and wartime situations with some restrictions. During peacetime, DAFL will be consistent with peacetime policies, regulations, legislative restrictions, budgetary considerations, or other conditions as outlined by the SECDEF or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). During wartime more flexibility is given to the combatant commander to change normal logistics processes. There may be limits placed on DAFL based on wartime policies and there is a procedure defined to resolve disagreements between a combatant commander and service. It is important to note that during wartime, the combatant commander will have approval authority over service component logistics programs.

From the authorities provided by Title X and options available in joint logistics doctrine, the combatant commander can modify or empower existing organizations to execute his logistics responsibilities. The four combatant commands being considered have similar organizations responsible for logistics command and control. These organizations have specific responsibilities to the joint force as a whole or to a specific service component. Joint logistics is a team effort by command and staff elements of the combatant command, service components, and logistics agencies.

**Current Organizations**

There are several organizations that provide logistics command and control within the combatant command. These organizations focus on the planning and control of logistics for a theater. Across the combatant commands these organizations are functionally very similar. There will be some small differences in the naming conventions of offices and minor changes in the overall staff organization, but fundamentally they all perform similar functions.

**Combatant Command J-4**

The Combatant Commanders’ Director for Logistics or J-4 is charged with the primary staff role of logistics management within the theater and therefore plays an important part in the command and control of logistics. Joint Pub 0-2 states that, “the J-4 is charged with the formulation of logistic plans, coordination, and supervision of supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, engineering, salvage, procurement, health services, mortuary affairs, security assistance, host-nation support, and related logistic activities.” The J-4 is responsible for advising the commander on all matters related to logistics, formulating theater policies related to logistics support, and coordinating and implementing the execution of the commander’s policies and guidance. Through the combatant commanders DAFL, the J-4 can influence all aspects of logistics and sustainment functions in theater and across the service components.
Within the combatant command J-4 there are six basic functions being managed and controlled: operations, plans, mobility, logistics automation, contracting, and engineering. The operations division is concerned with day to day logistics functions within the theater. Operations division monitors key theater logistics indicators and deals with logistics issues. The staff assigned to the operations division may be organized into a Logistics Fusion Cell, Logistics Operation Center, or the Logistics Readiness Center. There are other functional offices that may be found within the operations division. These include the Joint Petroleum Office, Joint Ammunition Office, and Joint Mortuary Affairs Office. The J-4 plans will focus on review and input to the adaptive planning process and execution of crisis action planning. J-4 mobility will manage all aspects of theater strategic movements, policies, and plans, and work closely with the combatant command J-3 and U.S. Transportation Command. The J-4 will also contain staff elements that manage theater contracting, engineering, and security assistance functions. These functions may be performed by a separate office, division, or be consolidated within the Operations Division or Logistics Readiness Center. Another recent and more significant addition to the J-4 is an organization called the Distribution and Deployment Operations Center (DDOC).

DDOC

The DDOC concept was based on the Joint Movement Center organization. The DDOC was developed through the efforts of U.S. Transportation Command, Army Materiel Command, USCENTCOM, and the Defense Logistics Agency. The first DDOC was organized to support Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Deployed to Kuwait in January 2004, the DDOC has provided USCENTCOM a significant improvement in logistics command and control. Its basic mission is to synchronize all deployment and distribution functions. The DDOC also has responsibility for:

1. Executing geographic combatant commander deployment, redeployment, and distribution priorities.
2. Providing Total Asset Visibility (TAV) and In Transit Visibility (ITV) of force flow, sustainment, and retrograde.
3. Managing, connecting, and establishing theater distribution architecture in coordination with the Services and Joint Staff.
4. Synchronizing strategic and operational distribution with theater forces and national logistics agencies.
5. Developing strategic and operational distribution performance measures.
6. Performing container, airlift equipment (air pallets and nets), RFID tag, and other intermodal equipment oversight responsibilities.

The DDOC capabilities are limited only by the functional experts on its staff and mission responsibilities assigned by the combatant command J-4. The DDOC derives its mission authority from the combatant commanders DAFL. The DDOC is an excellent example of an organization that supports the three imperatives of future logistics vision: Unity of effort, Domain-wide visibility, and rapid and precise response.16 Due in to its overwhelming success, the DDOC concept has been implemented in every combatant command, setting a new standard for joint logistics command and control.

It is important to ensure that any overlap in responsibilities or functions between the DDOC and the combatant command J-4 is examined. Overlaps could lead to command and control conflicts if the DDOC is not collocated with the J-4. A detailed mission analysis and functional lay down must be performed if the DDOC is required to operate independently from the J-4. There would seem to be great potential for overlap of functions and responsibilities in the logistics operations and mobility areas. It is important to eliminate any duplication of effort and clearly define the reporting and execution lines of responsibility prior to a DDOC operating in a separate location from the J-4 staff. Failure to address this concern will impact logistics unity of effort, causing command and control confusion.

Service Components

Each service component within the combatant command will have a logistics staff organized very similar to combatant command J-4 staff. The service component logistics staffs vary in size and composition depending on the component and the functions required by the service component commander. In most cases the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) components may not be collocated within theater of operations. The components within USCENTCOM AOR are a good example. The Army component, also called the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), is located in Kuwait, the Air component (CENTAF) is located in Qatar, and the Naval component (NAVCENT) is located in Bahrain. The Marine component (MARCENT) has a staff element that is collocated with NAVCENT in Bahrain and at MARCENT Headquarters collocated with USCENTCOM in Tampa. Due to the importance of coordination with the Army and to oversee flow of Marine forces into Iraq, MARCENT established a Forward Marine Coordination Element (MCE) located with CFLCC in Kuwait. The SOF component (SOCCENT) has a logistics staff located at SOCCENT Headquarters in Tampa and a forward coordination element within the AOR. These staffs are
responsible for coordination of service Title X support responsibilities for their forces or execution of executive agent or support to other services’ responsibilities. The component logistics staffs can and do coordinate between one another, however, most inter-service coordination will flow to USCENTCOM and back down to another component. This coordination flow can cause friction and inefficiencies in logistics command and control. Additionally, the duplication of effort by the service functional staffs increases the number of people involved with the logistics command and control process.

Other Agencies

Defense or Service level logistics agencies or commands may augment the logistics staffs discussed above. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) will be found embedded throughout the logistics command and control staffs at both the combatant command and service component levels. DLA, as the largest national level provider, has taken the initiative to establish a satellite DLA headquarters collocated with each geographic combatant command. This DLA headquarters is responsible for orchestrating all DLA support activities within the theater to support the combatant commander’s mission.

Service specific support organizations, like Army Materiel Command, will also have a significant involvement with theater logistics command and control. Functional experts from these agencies and commands will be placed in key command and control nodes throughout the combatant command. These Liaison Officers (LNO) provide more effective coordination between the combatant command, service components, and the national level providers. These elements may be only an individual, like the LNO, or they may be in the form of a team, like the DLA Contingency Support Teams (DCST). Any discussion involving changes to logistics command and control concepts or organizations must incorporate these elements.

Another interesting logistics command and control option is something called “dual hatting.” This occurs when a key person on a staff, usually a senior ranking officer, will be assigned dual responsibilities that functionally support one another. A good example of this is within USCENTCOM, the CFLCC C-4 is a position that has dual responsibilities. The primary logistics staff officer for CFLCC wears two hats; as the C-4 for the Army component and a command hat for the Army Material Command Southwest Asia. This arrangement provides a great example of logistics unity of effort and produces incredible synergy for support.

These organizations currently provide logistics command and control within the combatant commands around the world. Several of the examples above are in place supporting combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. These organizations work, but is there a better way to
conduct command and control of logistics. The layering, overlapping, and duplication of logistics functions within these organizations seem ripe for change. Considering the realities of ongoing operations and capitalizing on lessons learned, how can we improve the current process?

**A Solution**

The JxDS concept under development by USJFCOM, Joint Futures Lab provides the most promising solution to these concerns. JxDS is a family of scalable joint and combined capabilities that serve to enhance the coordination, integration, and synchronization of logistics in order to produce an operational effect resulting in increased force employment opportunities and alternatives. JxDS presents a comprehensive analysis and experimentation to produce a range of solutions designed to improve logistics command and control.\(^{17}\) The experiment considers the critical functions including requirements determination, situational awareness of capabilities, shortfall determination, prioritizing of limited resources, directing, planning, and executing theater logistics. The JxDS concept builds on current organizations and presents a range of scalable solutions that, depending on the complexity of the operation, can be used to conduct logistics command and control.\(^{18}\) These options range from the enhancing the current combatant command J-4 to the establishment of a stand alone logistics headquarters called the Joint Force Support Component Command (JFSCC). Ongoing experimentation with these concepts is designed to exercise the various organizations constructs and determine their usefulness to provide the combatant commander a range of logistics command and control options. A brief examination of each of these concepts will shed light on the functions and offer possible solutions to the earlier lists of capabilities gaps derived from the lessons learned and observations.

**Enabled J-4 (eJ4)**

This portion of the experiment is underway within USPACOM and is designed to provide improvements to the combatant command J-4.\(^{19}\) The eJ4 will provide enhanced joint theater logistics capabilities to improve coordination, integration, and synchronization of theater logistics functions and processes. The eJ4 experiment will produce: “An organization within the combatant command whereby rules, tools, and processes, enhance joint capabilities to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize theater logistics functions, and serve as the foundation for logisticians to execute joint theater logistics command and control.”\(^{20}\) By reengineering and updating functions of the current combatant command J-4, the eJ4 will improve operational logistics planning and execution by providing an environment that supports integrated near real-
time planning and execution tracking. This USFJCOM and USPACOM combined experiment is redesigning the way combatant command J-4 will function. The effort is providing more effective integration of the USPACOM DDOC, J-4, and other logistics providers, as well as improving the coordination between the USPACOM J3 and J-4 by redesigning staff processes. The end result is improved command and control which provides unity of effort, visibility of assets, and more precise application of critical logistics resources. This improved integration enhances the involvement of supporting commands and national level providers like USTRANSCOM, DLA, and its service components. USPACOM believes that the eJ4 effort will more effectively empower the J-4 in making decisions across service boundaries. The eJ4 concept seems to address the overlapping functions that resulted when the CENTCOM DDOC was established. As stated in an update brief to the USPACOM J-4, “The effort is refining the J-4 organization, standardizing logistics processes and tools within the combatant command and its components, addressing shortfall within the staff to attempt to eliminate problems, and building synergy within the USPACOM team.”

Joint Force Support Component Command (JFSCC)

The JFSCC is designed to provide a single logistics command with enhanced joint capabilities to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize theater logistics functions. This effort is ongoing within United States Forces Korea (USFK) and uses the already existing logistics structure of the US Army’s 19th Expeditionary Support Command (ESC) as the core of the organization. The JFSCC for USFK will focus on expeditionary warfighting, evolving from the initial operating capability to full operating capability over four successive theater level exercises. The JFSCC will provide joint logistics command and control by providing not only unity of effort, but unity of command for logistics within a theater of operation. A beneficiary of all the lessons learned from the DDOC and tools and processes made available to the eJ4, the JFSCC represents an evolution in logistics command and control headquarters. This single logistics commander is empowered through the combatant commanders DAFL and is charged with all aspects of joint theater logistics. The JFSCC is proving to be a significant improvement in logistics command and control for USFK. The USFK JFSCC will continue to be evaluated, adapted, and expanded through execution of its support mission for USFK and exercises like Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL).

The JFSCC can be further expanded to form a Combined Logistics Coordination Center or a Combined/Coalition JFSCC, with the addition of allied or coalition staff elements to provide the necessary expertise to command and control support for other nations. The key is the
agreements that will empower a combined or coalition headquarters with the proper authority to truly integrate and synchronize multi-national logistics support. The challenges associated with a coalition headquarters will need to be overcome. Unlike combined operations involving our longtime allies, coalition operations could involve countries that the U.S. normally has very limited military cooperation agreements with. Developing standing agreements with regional members states of a combatant commands area of responsibility is crucial to the success of any coalition level logistics headquarters. More than likely, the effort to form a truly integrated coalition level headquarters will be far too difficult. The better course of action may be the establishment of Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA) with potential coalition partners. The ACSA will provide the legal means for a coalition member to obtain support from the U.S. while providing the coalition partner a means to reimburse the U.S. for that support. Most combatant commands attempt to establish ACSAs with every nation in their regions as part of engagement under the Theater Security Cooperation Plan. An alternative to establishing a coalition headquarters may be a coordination center established within the JFSCC to receive and process requests from coalition partners using the ACSA. Prior planning and coordination will ensure interoperability of requested support to the coalition partner. It should be noted that a Combined Logistics Center is still under development within USFK as part of the JxDS effort.

The JxDS concept provides a full range of solutions for logistics command and control. JxDS expands on the options provided in Joint Publication 4.0 by offering improvements to the combatant command J-4 through a fully integrated joint logistics component. The results from this experiment will provide not just paper concepts, but functioning organizational solutions tried during peacetime and simulated wartime exercises. The lessons learned from developing these organizations will impact joint logistics doctrine, increasing the agility and flexibility of the joint logistics command and control and improving sustainment across the joint force.

Conclusion

Defense transformation compels improvements in the way the joint force will fight, while in turn, requiring improvements in logistics command and control. Lessons learned have identified logistics command and control shortfalls which need to be addressed by changes in doctrine, training, or organization. Joint logistics doctrine provides command and control options, but these options need to be expanded through analysis and experimentation to provide a fully integrated organizational solution. The combatant commander has the authority necessary to implement these options both during peacetime and war.
The existing logistics organizations within the combatant commands have similar staffs and overlapping and duplicate functions. Several organizational “band aid” fixes have been applied to improve logistics command and control functions; the addition of the DDOC to improve deployment and distribution coordination; LNOs from national/service level providers to provide visibility of issues and direct coordination; “dual hatting” key positions to provide unity of effort and command. These fixes have provided better logistics command and control, however, it is time for these “band aids” to be formalized or eliminated. JxDS provides a full range of capabilities designed to address shortfalls and incorporate the “band aid” fixes into the combatant commands logistics command and control processes. The success of the DDOC in supporting Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom provides hard evidence of the effectiveness that organizational changes can have on logistics unity of effort. This type of organizational success is exactly what must be applied to improve logistics command and control within the combatant command. The JxDS concept must be implemented within the combatant commands as soon as practical.

Clearly, the proposed eJ4 construct offers improvements and will eventually be implemented across every combatant command in the same manner as the DDOC. The enable J-4 can and should be implemented immediately within every combatant command. The eJ4 is a necessary evolution for the combatant command J-4 and addresses overlapping functions and responsibilities that exist within the DDOC and J-4. The tools and processes that the eJ4 will bring will also provide the next evolution in logistics situational awareness and visibility. Although the implementation of the eJ4 is a step in the right direction, it will not provide the complete answer. Improvements will need to reach beyond the combatant command staff. The J-4, even after being “enabled” under the JxDS concept, is only a staff element. To truly transform logistics command and control and gain real improvements, a revolution in logistics command and control needs to occur. That revolution will be the establishment of a JFSCC within a combatant command.

Similar to the implementation of the DDOC concept, USCENTCOM should take on this initiative immediately. Implementing the JFSCC will be a massive effort; however, the efficiencies gained by implementing the JFSCC will have far reaching impacts on the future of joint logistics. The USFK JFSCC has provided an excellent test bed for the JxDS concept; however, the JFSCC needs to be proven in war. This organization is capable of providing command and control for all logistics within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

USJFCOM, in cooperation with Joint Staff and USCENTCOM, should develop an implementation plan that would consolidate the necessary positions and functions from the
USCENTCOM components and transition them into a JFSCC. Since the Army has already regionally aligned its Theater Support Commands (TSC), the 1st TSC will form the core of the USCENTCOM JFSCC. Like the other USCENTCOM components the JFSCC would be permanently located in theater. The best location for the JFSCC is in Kuwait near the major logistics operations and the hub for reception, staging, onward moving, and integration activities. There are many issues involved with implementing a change of this magnitude during combat operations. The two most significant issues will be developing a manning document with the correct grade structure and developing a transition plan for the service support functions. These issues are far from impossible to solve.

The manning document will require the focused efforts of USJFCOM using the experience gained from the USFK JFSCC. Developing a sourcing plan for the senior officer billets, as well as deconflicting service requirements, will be a challenge. This effort will take clear direction for the highest levels to the service headquarters to ensure the proper level of support. All the senior officer billets must be resolved through the involvement of the CJCS and service chiefs. USJFCOM should provide the basic personnel plan and USCENTCOM should provide input to the plan, but neither should be harnessed with the responsibility to solve the personnel problems. Since it is a joint organization, the Joint Staff must lead the effort.

The next issue is the implementation of the transition plan. This implementation process would follow three steps; collocation, functional consolidation, and functional integration. Initially, the service component logistics staffs would relocate to facility designed for the JFSCC. Once each service logistics staff was in place, functioning, and fully linked back to the service component commander, the next step would begin. Functional consolidation would move similar logistics functions together into a workspace. This is simply getting everyone that works on fuel, food, or maintenance sitting in one office. Integration would begin immediately by cross training, working issues, and developing standard operating procedures for all the logistics functions. Eventually joint collaboration would occur and true integration would be realized. Over time, with proper manning and support, the JFSCC would become fully functioning. This proposal provides only a very general construct for implementation. This sounds extremely simple; however, it will require a great deal of hard work, focused effort, and detailed planning to implement. None of the service components will want to commit to this effort and there will be immense push back from the service headquarters. This process will be neither simple nor painless; however, with proper preparation the USCENTCOM JFSCC can be established. Its success will depend, as always, on strong leadership and direction from the combatant command and CJCS level. Every effort should be made to prove this concept and implement it
immediately. I mentioned only two of the many issues involved with an effort of this magnitude. There are many more involving reporting procedures to services, budget issues, facilities, automation, timing, and the list goes on.

Logistics operations in USCENTCOM are still very complicated; however, they have stabilized. Major troop rotations and RSOI procedures are well established and more predictable. It is a perfect opportunity to take a major step forward in logistics command and control. If the JFSCC concept is simply put on the shelf as a “good idea” or is limited to USFK or some other peacetime location, its true potential will never be realized. If a JFSCC can not support Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, than it is not a viable option and should be discarded. The JFSCC will have a greater impact on logistics command and control than the DDOC did. The historic precedent was set during Operation Desert Shield/Storm when LTG Pagonis was named the Deputy Commander for Support under GEN Schwarzkopf and the 22nd Support Command (Provisional) was established as a theater-level logistics command. The JFSCC should be implemented as soon as a transition plan is developed and approved. A theater level logistics command and control headquarters will work; it requires this first bold step.

Endnotes


5 Elements of Defense Transformation, 15.


7 Randy S. Kendrick, Joint Logistics for the EUCOM AOR, Army Logician, PB 700-05-06 Volume 37, Issue 6 (Nov-Dec 2005), 48


10 United States Code 10, section 164.

11 United States Code 10, Section 165, (c).


14 Joint Publication 0-2, V-15.

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