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THESIS

**RETHINKING INTELLIGENCE TO INTEGRATE
COUNTERTERRORISM INTO THE LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT MISSION**

by

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March 2007

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**RETHINKING INTELLIGENCE TO INTEGRATE COUNTERTERRORISM
INTO THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSION**

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ABSTRACT

Law enforcement agencies are constantly challenged by a changing threat environment, and they attempt to meet the challenges with the resources they have. In the past twenty years, terrorism is a dangerous threat to America while community expectations to address crime have also grown. Americans rely on local, state, and federal law enforcement to understand this threat and to incorporate counter terrorism efforts into their already full missions. In looking for the best ways to understand and combat the threat of terrorism, *intelligence-led policing* (ILP) has been offered as an effective strategy to improve police effectiveness. This thesis studies the ILP practices of two police departments—Metro Nashville and Chicago—and analyzes those elements of their strategies that contribute to successful ILP. This analysis validates the elements of the 3i model of effective ILP operations, and emphasizes several other elements as critical strategic elements necessary for an agency to develop and implement a successful ILP strategy. ILP is an effective policing strategy and the critical strategic elements identified in this thesis should serve as the foundation of efforts to build capacity in an agency. This thesis furthers these critical elements and presents a framework for agencies to implement ILP.

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I. INTRODUCTION: A CALL FOR CHANGE

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Culminating with the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks since the mid-1990s and the subsequent global war on terror have focused much attention on the Intelligence Community's (IC) ability to detect and prevent future attacks. The federal intelligence community has traditionally concerned itself with international threats to the security and sovereignty of the United States and not with domestic threats or issues. On the other hand, local police departments have generally concerned themselves with local crime issues with little or no consideration for national security issues. With more than 700,000 police officers working in the United States, there is a need to extend intelligence capabilities to local jurisdictions.¹ Local law enforcement agencies need to develop and apply a model intelligence structure to their organizations that will allow them to develop better situational awareness of both criminal and domestic and international terrorist threats in their communities. This ability should give law enforcement leaders the information and tools they need to be integrated into the IC, be more effective against crime, and better protect their communities against terrorism. While much has been written in recent years advocating increased intelligence capacity by local law enforcement, much work remains to study and identify effective practices and workable models.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

Law enforcement decision-makers need to integrate and enhance the counter terrorism, intelligence, and crime prevention missions of the police agency to enhance public safety. The research question addressed by this paper asks, "What are successful applications of intelligence-led policing, and can aspects of these programs be generalized to a model for other agencies to follow to improve crime reduction and counter terrorism efforts?"

¹ Timothy P. Connors and Georgia Pelligrini, eds., "Hard Won Lessons: Policing Terrorism in the United States," *Safe Cities Project* (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, July 2005), 17.

C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of this research is to provide information that will aide local law enforcement agencies wishing to improve their counter terrorism and crime fighting capabilities. To accomplish this, the following six objectives will be addressed.

This thesis attempts to:

1. articulate the definition, role, and function of local law enforcement intelligence (Much has changed over the past 25 years, and many agencies have yet to integrate advanced concepts on intelligence into their operations.²);
2. increase understanding of the promising concept of intelligence-led policing (ILP) and establish it as an important and effective tool for reducing crime and fighting terrorism;
3. present and explain the 3i model of effective ILP programs (This framework will be used to compare against working ILP models in an attempt to capture and validate the elements of the model);
4. identify effective ILP practices from working examples and identify the factors that make them successful (Achieving this objective will come from a review of ILP in three countries and an in-depth look at the intelligence-led practices of police departments in two major U.S. cities. This will lead to conclusions on its effectiveness as a policing strategy in crime and terrorism prevention.);
5. offer a set of recommendations to guide jurisdictions in efforts to develop and implement ILP strategy in their operations;
6. offer suggestions for further research in this area of study.

D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

This thesis will further the discussion of ILP as an important policing philosophy for terrorism prevention. The intention of this paper is to identify and attempt to validate certain organizational structures and operating processes required for successful ILP applications. Further, anecdotal evidence will be offered to demonstrate that ILP is indeed an effective policing practice for crime reduction and, by extension, terrorism prevention.

These factors make this research significant to jurisdictions that are either trying to integrate counter terrorism into their mission or to improve crime reduction efforts. Police executives and elected officials should be very interested in a model that increases their ability to reduce crime and prevent terrorism, and potentially to do so within current

² David L. Carter, *Law Enforcement Intelligence: An Overview* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 2006), 14.

resources. Improving the intelligence capacity and performance of local law enforcement should be of interest to federal law enforcement and counter terrorism agencies. Their effectiveness is based in part on the amount and quality of information they collect and include in their analyses. By integrating local law enforcement into the intelligence community, police agencies can become much more effective at providing and using intelligence.

E. LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a clear role for local law enforcement in counter terrorism and in the process of developing and sharing intelligence about terrorist threats. Calling police “The Discoverers,” Lanier reinforces the belief that police officers have unique skills and abilities that make them excellent collectors of relevant information. Through their training and on-the-job experiences, officers develop the ability to detect suspicious behavior.³ The presence of 700,000 officers on the streets and in the neighborhoods across America indicates the potential power of their use. Not only is there a role for local police, but it is critical to leverage these hard-earned core competencies.⁴ These include recognition and investigation of suspicious behavior, an understanding of local context, and physical interdiction of dangerous individuals or groups.

There has been an evolutionary development in law enforcement that has placed increasing importance on proactive identification of threats and strategy development to reduce risks. As consideration is given to the role of law enforcement in the war on terrorism, a number of law enforcement-based organizing principles have been discussed as useful strategies to enhance law enforcement’s effectiveness in protecting their communities against terrorism.

Community policing has been identified as an important tool for local police to prevent and pre-empt terrorism in communities, leading to a new term “homeland

³ Cathy L. Lanier, “Preventing Terrorism Attacks in the Homeland: A New Mission for State and Local Police” (Master’s Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 30-33.

⁴ Blair C. Alexander, *Strategies to Integrate America's Local Police Into Domestic Counterterrorism* (Dissertation, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 28-29.

policing.”⁵ Others cite the importance of community policing, but believe adaptations are necessary to improve its effectiveness against terrorism.⁶ Strong community ties and knowledge of the players and issues in neighborhoods have been identified as strengths of community policing. A benefit of this familiarity is increased citizen reporting of suspicious behaviors and improved ability of officers to identify suspicious behavior in communities.

In his work, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, Herman Goldstein articulates a problem-focused model of policing and outlines an analytical process for police to use.⁷ Police should focus on the identification of factors that foster crime and lawlessness in neighborhoods. By applying a problem-solving model, officers can craft strategies to eliminate the root causes of crime.⁸ This problem-solving relies on analysis to understand the nature and extent of crime and to craft individualized strategies to combat it. Problem-solving authority is pushed to low levels in the organization because of the line level officer’s familiarity with issues. The importance of this policing strategy is the relationship between analysis, criminal intelligence, crime analysis, and effective law enforcement operations.

The practice of crime analysis by police agencies has evolved as well. Generally, police crime analysis looks for crime patterns or identifies offenders by analyzing crimes that have already occurred. These trends can take the form of “hot spot” locations, chronic offenders, or patterns of similar crimes. Cope writes that “essentially analysts are information translators, whose role is to review information and provide reliable intelligence in a practical and operational format.”⁹ Today, crime analysis consists of

⁵ Jose Docobo, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the Local Law Enforcement Level,” *Homeland Security Affairs*, 1, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 11. <http://www.hsaj.org/hsa/vol1/iss1/art4> (accessed March 4, 2006).

⁶ David E. Dial, *Enterprise Policing for the September 12th Era* (Master’s Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 42-57.

⁷ Herman Goldstein, *Problem Oriented Policing* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990), 80-98.

⁸ The SARA model of problem solving advanced by Goldstein has officers Scan the environment for problems, Analyze them for root causes leading to the crime and disorder, Respond with strategies and tactics tailored to address the specific root causes, and Assess level of success. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter II.

⁹ Nina Cope, “Intelligence Led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence?” *British Journal of Criminology*, 44, no. 2 (March 1, 2004): 188-203.

three essential functions. The first is to assess the nature, extent, and distribution of crime to assist in the efficient and effective allocation of police resources. The second function is to provide investigatory support by identifying background information on suspects and victims, and the relationships of each. Finally, analysis works to provide insight into the conditions and criminals facilitating crime and disorder “so that policymakers may make informed decisions about prevention approaches.”¹⁰ This type of crime analysis works to enable proactive strategies to remedy the causes of crime.

As opposed to the generally reactive nature of traditional crime analysis, criminal intelligence has been defined by an IACP model policy on criminal intelligence as “information compiled, analyzed, and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity.”¹¹ Definitional overlaps are seen between crime analysis and intelligence analysis because they both attempt to identify, anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity. Carter opines that “while crime analysis deals with crime that has already occurred, intelligence analysis deals with threats,” or crimes that are likely to occur.¹²

Compstat, or computer statistics, is a program first developed by the New York City Transit Police and then expanded on a large scale by the New York City Police Department in the 1990s. Compstat integrates crime analysis and intelligence analysis and uses the intelligence product to focus operations against identified crime perpetrators, patterns, and locations.¹³ Its use of electronic mapping of crime data was groundbreaking in its identification of crime problems and focusing resources against them.

With intelligence-led policing, police not only look for patterns of crimes that have already been committed, but also try to identify emerging threats. This can be far more sophisticated than traditional crime analysis or Compstat-style mapping. By

¹⁰ Timothy O Shea and Keith Nicholls, *Crime Analysis in America: Findings and Recommendations* (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Dept of Justice, 2003), <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=855>; <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?field=pubdate&order=0&parent=0&item=118> (accessed May 13, 2006), 8.

¹¹ International Association of Chiefs of Police, *Model Policy: Criminal Intelligence* (Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2003), 1.

¹² David L. Carter, Email correspondence to author, May 13, 2006.

¹³ Phyllis P. McDonald, *Managing Police Operations: Implementing the New York Crime Control Mode—Compstat*. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002), 1-25.

focusing analysis on threats, analysts may be able to identify a variety of current and emerging patterns or threats. These could include narcotics, violent crime, gang, and terrorist threats. Intelligence-led policing can give local police the capacity to identify terrorist and criminal threats in their own community so they can implement preventive measures in partnership with state and federal authorities.¹⁴

Authors of recent publications reach a similar conclusion that improved law enforcement intelligence is critical to protect cities and the United States from terrorist threats. These publications include the *National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*, *Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards*, *Fusion Center Guidelines*, *Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Agencies*, *Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence-Led Policing*. There is a gap in the literature, however, in that there is no specific model for implementation of these concepts at the local agency level. There are examples in the literature for analyst training standards and for a model records maintenance policy, but nothing that uses best practices and research to propose a framework to implement these concepts in a large law enforcement agency.

F. METHODOLOGY

1. Limitations of Research

This research presents ILP as an effective law enforcement practice. It is, however, important to acknowledge the difficulty of making statements about causality. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to demonstrate with statistical certainty that the application of ILP directly reduces crime or the incidence of terrorism in communities. To do so would be complicated by a variety of factors, chief among them the fact that the causes of criminality and terrorist behavior are dependent on many social, psychological, political, and economic factors. Measuring whether a change in criminality or terrorism is caused by an application of ILP or some other factor would require controlled experiments or comprehensive statistical analyses, and studies that could control for

¹⁴ Christopher Cleary, "Strategy for Local Law Enforcement Agencies to Improve Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Terrorist Information" (Master's thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 49-52.

different variables would be cumbersome and expensive. Therefore both the experimental and the statistical methods are impractical and unnecessary for the scope of this thesis.¹⁵

2. Methodology

Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence, theory, and common sense, coupled with criminological and psychological research, can guide us toward greater understanding of these issues and to an ILP model that effectively protects communities. The hypothesis of this research states that intelligence-led policing is an effective strategy for police agencies to improve their abilities to prevent crime and terrorism in their jurisdictions, and that certain key elements of a model can be identified for agencies to apply in developing their own programs.

Elements of an effective ILP program will be drawn from a model advanced by Jerry Ratcliffe in an article for the Australian Institute of Criminology.¹⁶ Ratcliffe proposes the 3i model comprised of three structures and three processes necessary for successful ILP implementation. This research builds on that model by evaluating the degree to which these elements exist in case studies of two cities. This analysis forms the basis of the thesis.

A comparative case study using controlled comparison will therefore be used to examine intelligence-led policing.¹⁷ The case study compares ILP efforts of the Chicago, Illinois, Police Department and the Metropolitan Nashville, Tennessee, Police Department and contrasts them against the 3i model to test the hypotheses of ILP. These departments were chosen for comparison because both have implemented new policing strategies that incorporate a form of ILP that is central to their strategy. The analysis of ILP as implemented in Chicago and Nashville allows for an examination of current practices and an analysis of the factors influencing the success of their efforts. Comparing the practices in Chicago and Nashville against the 3i model allows for conclusions to be

¹⁵ Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65, no 3 (September 1971): 682-693.

¹⁶ Jerry H. Ratcliffe, *Intelligence-led Policing, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice*, Australian Institute of Criminology, no. 248 (April 2003): 3. <http://www.aic.gov.au> (accessed August 10, 2006).

¹⁷ Stephen Van Evera, "What Are Case Studies? How Should They Be Performed?" In *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997): 48-88.

drawn about key elements of a successful ILP model. Understanding those elements can lead to recommendations for other agencies considering ILP as an organizing principle.

G. OVERVIEW OF SOLUTIONS

While intelligence-led policing has been in use for a number of years in some foreign countries, its adoption in the United States has been slow and inconsistent. Little has been written for agencies to follow in implementing the philosophy, and implementation efforts seem to have happened without following any set of established criteria. This thesis identifies a number of key strategic elements necessary to incorporate an ILP program in a law enforcement agency's strategy. These include the necessity of structuring and adequately resourcing the intelligence and analysis components while developing sufficient intelligence capacity.

II. LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter lays a foundation for understanding the key concepts associated with this thesis: intelligence, the intelligence cycle, and intelligence-led policing. After an introduction to these terms, an overview of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan is provided to familiarize the reader with the priority placed on the implementation of ILP. To support the objective of this research in providing guidance for law enforcement agencies and fusion centers attempting to establish an ILP capability, a discussion follows of six factors necessary for successful ILP implementation. Advanced by Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe, the 3i model is used as the basis for the comparative analysis of ILP efforts. Finally, a brief discussion of the use of ILP in three countries is presented to provide context and give examples of working applications.

B. LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE

To improve local, state, and federal law enforcement's ability to prevent terrorism and reduce crime, a core recommendation developed during a post-9/11 summit by U.S. police chiefs was to "promote Intelligence-led Policing through a common understanding of criminal intelligence and its usefulness."¹⁸ Before discussing the concept of intelligence-led policing, it is necessary to establish the foundations of intelligence generally.

As a *product*, intelligence is information that is tailored to support decision-making or operational action. In this broadest sense, "intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of cyber, criminal or national security threats and issues."¹⁹ The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) defines it similarly as "information compiled, analyzed and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor

¹⁸ International Association of Chiefs of Police, *Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence-led Policing at the Local, State and Federal Levels* (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, August 2005), 12.

¹⁹ Michael G. Potts, *FBI Intelligence Assessment Process* (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, August 2003), 7.

criminal activity.”²⁰ One of the more important goals of intelligence is to provide indications and warnings of attack or pending dangerous activity. All of these definitions emphasize the ways in which law enforcement gathers information and attempts to gain an understanding of threats and issues. As a *process*, then, intelligence is a series of actions, commonly referred to as the *Intelligence Cycle*, taken to generate this intelligence product.

C. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

The purpose of intelligence is to provide decision-makers with timely, relevant, accurate, and actionable intelligence products to make sound operational and strategic decisions. The intelligence cycle shown in Figure 1 is a useful construct to describe seven steps that are generally necessary to transform raw information into actionable, coherent intelligence. This model can oversimplify what actually occurs, but it generally describes cycle are as follows.²¹




Figure 1. Intelligence Cycle²²

²⁰ IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center, *Criminal Intelligence: Concepts and Issues Model Policy* (Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, June 2003), 1.

²¹ Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006), 54-67.

²² Some information for the discussion of intelligence cycle and the chart in the figure is adapted from lecture materials from the course, *Intelligence for Homeland Security, Organizational and Policy Challenges*, Robert Simeral (Monterey, CA: Center for Homeland Defense and Security Naval Postgraduate School, December 2005), Used with permission.

1. Identify Requirements

Most agencies are unable to develop a deep understanding of every issue that presents a potential threat to their community. Operating with limited resources requires policymakers to establish priorities that allow for efficient resource deployment by focusing on the most dangerous, most common, or most important threats to their community. Policymakers must be concerned with low consequence/high frequency events such as auto theft or larcenies and with high consequence/low frequency events such as school shootings, civil unrest, or terrorist acts.²³ By necessity, then, the intelligence cycle starts with a shifting set of requirements that establish which issues, targets, or areas receive priority. Depending on the threat environment, some issues receive great attention and full resources, others receive moderate attention, and some receive relatively little attention. The risk in operating in this manner is that there might be hidden or developing threats in the community that go undetected, but are still dangerous to public safety. This highlights the importance of setting real and accurate intelligence requirements and explains why setting them is the responsibility of policymakers. The requirements-setting process sets the operational tone of the agency by identifying which issues receive operational attention.

2. Collection

After identifying the requirements to establish agency and intelligence priorities, the next step is to collect relevant information on the targeted subjects or topics. The means of collection might be more or less technical, but the purpose is the same, regardless how the information is obtained. Information is collected to develop a greater understanding of the motives, capabilities, and intentions of the issues and subjects that present a risk to public safety. At this stage, analysts are interested in all potentially relevant information from a variety of sources.

²³ This statement is not to imply that the costs associated with more common crimes such as auto theft or larcenies are inconsequential. Billions of dollars of loss each year are attributed to property crimes, and the U.S. economy suffers great loss of productivity due to victimization of violent crime. The aim of this statement is to highlight the tremendous loss of life, property damage, and psychological harm that results from some low frequency events like terrorism. This causes a situation where law enforcement leaders and elected officials cannot afford to ignore these incidents and must plan for them and attempt to prevent them.

The collection categories of the federal intelligence community have been well established over many years, and local law enforcement uses similar collection methods to a greater or lesser extent.

Human intelligence is the method most widely used by local agencies. It comes from human sources such as informants, or perhaps tips from citizens or Crimewatch groups.²⁴

Signals intelligence comes from sources like intercepted cellular or landline phone calls or e-mail messages.

Imagery intelligence is the use of visual imagery, and includes photographs, satellite images, and data from geographical information systems (GIS).

Measurement and signature intelligence takes measurable readings, including radiation levels and concentrations of chemicals in the atmosphere.

In an additional collection practice, local law enforcement relies heavily on information collected through interpersonal contacts with the public during the course of officers' duties. Much valuable information is collected from traffic tickets, crime reports, and through investigatory stops. Technology has made it easier to collect and collate more information than ever before.

Collection of information is not intelligence, however, and the ability to collect ever-increasing amounts of information can lead to a *needle in the haystack* problem. Also referred to as the *wheat versus the chaff* problem, valuable information must be separated from unimportant information and processed before analysts can yield any useful intelligence.²⁵

3. Processing and Exploitation

To address the wheat-versus-chaff problem, someone must sort through mounds of information in search of useful intelligence, and repackage it in formats that are useful to analysts. This step in the intelligence cycle, sometimes referred to as "collation and

²⁴ Crimewatch is a successful neighborhood-based crime prevention philosophy that partners with neighborhoods to provide education for citizens to monitor criminal and safety information in their neighborhoods. More information available at <http://www.ncpc.org/>

²⁵ Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 60.

evaluation,” ensures that the intelligence process has a steady flow of high quality information in a readily retrievable format.²⁶ The collation and evaluation of raw information are critical functions, and they protect the agency against liability for collecting and storing illegal or improper information.²⁷

Collation refers to the review, indexing, and filing of information to sift out useless, non-relevant, or incorrect information.²⁸ This process puts information into orderly arrangements so analysts can establish relationships between apparently disconnected elements. Through categorization of data, often with the use of computer databases, patterns and trends of criminal activity may become more obvious.

The evaluation of information accepts that not all data collected are equal in terms of quality and relevance.²⁹ Legal and ethical guidelines require that information maintained by law enforcement must be relevant, reliable, valid, and related to criminal activity. Some information collected will reflect legal activity or associations, or may be otherwise irrelevant. The evaluation process ensures that only information pertaining to criminal activity or that represents a threat to the community are maintained in agency files.

²⁶ Marilyn B. Peterson, “Collating and Evaluating Data,” in *Intelligence 2000, Revising the Basic Elements*, eds. Marilyn Peterson, Bob Morehouse, and Richard Wright (Sacramento, CA: Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, 2002), 87-95.

²⁷ Two guidance articles are useful to agencies to ensure their intelligence files comply with federal guidelines. *L.E.I.U. Guidelines*, issued by the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit provide a set of guidelines on intelligence collection, evaluation, file creation, maintenance, and file purging. Code of Federal Regulations Title 28 (28CFR23.20) establishes criminal intelligence system operating policies that are required for any federal agency, or any agency that maintains intelligence files that are supported by federal funds.

²⁸ Peterson, “Collating and Evaluating Data,” 87-88.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 94.

4. Analysis and Production

The IACP report on Criminal Intelligence Sharing simplifies the intelligence process with the following figure.



Figure 2. Intelligence Development Process³⁰

Relevant, credible information comes from the first four steps in the intelligence cycle. Even after collected information has been screened for relevancy and packaged into accessible formats, it is not yet intelligence. The information must be subjected to the “quality analysis” indicated in Figure 2 before it will become useful intelligence. Analysis is the most important part of the intelligence cycle as raw information is converted into useful intelligence.³¹ Aspects of an analyst’s job include the processes of acquiring and summarizing data, extracting meaning from that data, and producing an accurate, relevant product.³²

To be valuable to its customer, analysis should answer four questions.³³

1. Who poses threats? (This identifies the persons, groups, or movements that pose a risk to public safety.)
2. Who is doing what with whom? (This identifies and describes the relationships between conspirators or supporters of criminal and terrorist organizations.)

³⁰ IACP, *Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence-led Policing at the Local, State, and Federal Levels* (Washington, DC Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, August 2005), iv.

³¹ Robert Simeral lecture notes, see footnote 22 for course information (December 2005).

³² Howard N. Atkin, “Intelligence Led Policing,” in *Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements*, ed. Marilyn B. Peterson (Sacramento, CA: Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, 2000), 13-21.

³³ David L. Carter, *Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for Local, State, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies* (Washington, DC: Michigan State University and the COPS Office, November 2004), 150-152.

3. What is the modus operandi of the threat? (This tells how the criminal or terrorist enterprise operates. Information on targeting and attack methods would be included.)
4. What is needed to catch offenders and prevent crime incidents? (This provides insight into potentially successful tactics or strategies that operational elements might employ.)

Analysis is the process by which disjointed, unrelated information comes into focus and can be identified as the “dots.” When information is put into context and conclusions can be drawn from it, the “dots” can be connected.³⁴

5. Dissemination

Once valid, relevant, timely, and actionable intelligence is developed by analysts, it must be disseminated to policymakers and other consumers. This dissemination can take several forms. Strategic or operational assessments would be distributed to policymakers so they can use them in making sound decisions. Tactical assessments affecting smaller, contained incidents or issues might be sent directly to the unit involved. Ideally, as will be discussed later in this paper, intelligence should be disseminated outside traditional law enforcement circles.

Advances in technology allow for dissemination to take on increasingly adaptable formats. Dissemination is no longer limited to a hard copy intelligence report or informational bulletin. Secure web portals, email, listservs, and interactive content management systems are some of the ways information and intelligence can be shared. A large challenge facing decision-makers and the intelligence apparatus supporting them is one of volume. There is more information available than ever before, and officials at every level are barraged with information-sharing reports and assessments, to the extent that it has become white noise and is often ignored.³⁵ This ability to overwhelm decision-makers and others presents a huge challenge to analysts in that they must carefully craft products for dissemination that consider local context and are immediately valuable to the recipient.

³⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The FBI Intelligence Cycle: Answering the Questions, A Desk Reference Guide for FBI Employees,” cited in David Carter, *Law Enforcement Intelligence* (November 2004), 65.

³⁵ Lisa M. Palmieri, *Information vs. Intelligence: What Police Executives Need to Know* (Massachusetts: IALEIA, 2005). <http://www.ialeaia.org/pubs/InformationvsIntelligence.pdf> (accessed February 22, 2007).

6. Consumption

Simeral notes that it is often taken for granted that policymakers will digest and act upon the intelligence they receive, but this is certainly not guaranteed. Policymakers might disregard or discount intelligence for many personal or professional reasons, and the efficiency and effectiveness that might otherwise be realized because of timely and accurate intelligence can be lost. It is necessary for policymakers to receive, digest, understand, and act upon the intelligence developed through the cycle in order to receive the intended benefits.

7. Feedback

Policymakers must evaluate the performance of their intelligence function and the products they produce, suggesting improvements and directing changes in requirements as necessary. This requires that they be fully engaged in the policy that controls the creation of intelligence and assessment of its accuracy and effectiveness. They should constantly reevaluate requirements to ensure that agency priorities reflect the most pressing threats. This will help ensure that the agency is not surprised by a crime trend that has developed unnoticed.

D. MANDATE—THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING PLAN

In the months following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, law enforcement leaders met at the annual International Association of Chiefs of Police conference and identified a need to address chronic weakness in the law enforcement intelligence process that contributed in part to the failure of preventing the attacks. The chiefs identified an absence of a national process for intelligence generation, difficulties in accessing necessary information, reluctance to share information, and deficits in analysis and technology. In response to the IACP's recommendation, the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) was formed and this new group generated the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP).³⁶

³⁶ International Association of Chiefs of Police, *Recommendation from the IACP Intelligence Summit, Criminal Intelligence Sharing* (Arlington, VA: IACP, August 2002).

Foremost among the goals of the GIWG was to establish the importance of criminal intelligence, intelligence-led policing, and community policing. Their efforts focused on developing a capacity within law enforcement agencies to produce intelligence about threats in or to their communities, and then to apply that intelligence to operational and strategic decisions. GIWG's goal was to educate police leaders on the facets of ILP and encourage its adoption as an integral part of each agency's philosophy and operations. Further, the growth of the community policing concept in the previous decade had established that police have close and positive relationships with community members, giving officers "unfettered access to local, neighborhood information as it develops."³⁷ The participants identified the promotion of intelligence-led policing as core to achieving the goals of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan.

E. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

In intelligence-led policing (ILP) law enforcement takes the intelligence product and puts it to work. The concept is reflective of a significant change in the field of policing that has rapidly developed over the past twenty years.³⁸ Against a backdrop of an exploding volume of complex data, accessibility to and scrutiny of police, and an increasingly agile, complex, and mobile criminal element, traditional reactive, random policing methods were increasingly seen as ineffective.³⁹ Financial constraints and increasing demands on police for effectiveness, transparency, and efficiency have driven a shift to more intelligence-led philosophies.

ILP causes a shift in the nature of policing from incident-driven, reactive practices to a more directed, proactive focus. Most experts agree that ILP must be more than a policy or new method; rather, it must be a cultural change for law enforcement that is implemented agency-wide at every level of the organization.⁴⁰ Agencies around the world have developed and adapted the concepts of ILP to put intelligence to use and improve the effects of their efforts.

³⁷ U.S. Department of Justice, *The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan* (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, October 2003).

³⁸ Mike Maguire, "Policing by Risks and Targets: Some Dimensions and Implications of Intelligence-led Crime Control," *Policing and Society* 9 (2000): 316.

³⁹ Atkin, *Intelligence Led Policing*, 13.

⁴⁰ Carter, *Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide*, 41.

There are two main factors in ILP. In the simplest terms, ILP is predicated on both the production and application of intelligence.⁴¹ Thus the first requirement of ILP is the generation of accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence. This would be developed in accordance with agency priorities through the process outlined in the previous section. The generation of this intelligence is useless unless the customer, in this case law enforcement, can effectively put the product to work. The second factor, therefore, is that the intelligence is used to lead police operations. Analytic products should be used to develop and guide strategy, operational planning, and actions that address crime and public safety problems. For example, the NYPD Crime Control strategy calls for a combination of “timely and accurate intelligence” and “effective strategies and practices.” Police resources and efforts are focused in locations and against persons determined to be a threat to public safety by police analysts through the intelligence analysis cycle.⁴²

As will be discussed in later chapters, ILP attempts to understand crime, criminals, and the threat of the next crime. Analysts not only look for patterns in crimes already committed, but they also try to identify emerging threats. If analysts are able to achieve a degree of predictive analysis, it is far more sophisticated than traditional crime analysis or simple information mapping, though all are used effectively in ILP applications. Analysts focus on threats (what might happen) instead of focusing exclusively on already committed crimes (what has happened). Analysts work to identify a variety of current and emerging patterns and threats.⁴³

1. Applications of Intelligence-Led Policing

In recent years, agencies have attempted new and innovative approaches to incorporate this intelligence product into their operations. These applications have been widely discussed in law enforcement and academic literature. Whether they were acknowledged as a form of ILP or not, some key examples include:⁴⁴

⁴¹ Atkin, *Intelligence Led Policing*, 13.

⁴² McDonald, *Managing Police Operations*, 8.

⁴³ Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-led Policing,” 4.

⁴⁴ These examples, cited by Atkin in *Applications of Intelligence*, 14, are documented widely and in detail throughout law enforcement and academic literature.

- *Pro-Active Policing* shifts police activity from responding to proactively interdicting criminals.
- *Problem-Oriented Policing* focuses on specific problems and finds specific solutions to address and prevent them.⁴⁵
- *Community Policing* uses community-based programs and community/police partnerships to identify and solve problems.
- *Compstat* involves computer generated crime statistics and mapping to identify crime threat locations to deploy resources.

These approaches all share a reliance on intelligence and on intelligence-led methods. While law enforcement agencies have varying degrees of sophistication in their ability to develop quality and actionable intelligence, these examples demonstrate a broad acceptance. In the following sections, a brief description of these models will highlight applications of ILP. It is apparent that there are many similarities and overlaps among these policing strategies, and that the common thread among them is a basis in ILP.

2. Pro-Active Policing

As opposed to the traditional reactive posture of police operations, proactive policing is a generic term that refers to identifying potential crime problems and taking action to address them rather than waiting on a crime report before responding. An example of proactive policing took place in the early 1990s when the Houston (Texas) Police Department altered its policing strategy to a proactive stance it called *Crime-Specific Policing* (CSP).⁴⁶

Based on a belief that law enforcement can impact crime not by addressing quality of life issues, but by arresting criminals and conducting aggressive, visible patrols, Houston experienced a significant drop in crime after implementation of the new strategy. This strategy requires the police to have some degree of analytical capability to identify crime areas in need of attention that have been called “hot spots.” This focus of police resources on areas identified as crime-prone is a central element of proactive

⁴⁵ Description of some policing models are summarized by Nicole Billante, “The Beat Goes On: Policing for Crime Prevention,” Issue Analysis 38 (St. Leonards, New Zealand: The Centre for Independent Studies, July 2003), 2.

⁴⁶ Roy R. Roberg, et al., *Police Management*, 3d ed. (Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury, 2002), 279.

policing.⁴⁷ This is a relatively simple use of intelligence to identify crime hot spots and chronic offenders. The process of analyzing and identifying crime-prone locations, individuals, and times led to the emergence of the problem-oriented policing philosophy.

3. Problem Oriented Policing

In the 1990s, the problem oriented policing method took hold in many police agencies across the country.⁴⁸ Its concepts provide police with a simple model to guide intelligence development and application called the SARA method.⁴⁹ The acronym SARA stands for Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment.⁵⁰

Police first scan the environment for problems, often looking at reported crimes or geographic clusters incidents that caused police response. These problems are then analyzed in an attempt to determine the underlying causes and provide insight into an appropriate response. The response may involve using a variety of governmental and private resources based on the analysis, and is not limited to a police-only solution. Finally, feedback and a review of results contribute to an assessment of the degree to which the problem is improved. The response can be altered based on this assessment to increase effectiveness. Problem oriented policing does generally use intelligence and problem identification, but it usually focuses on specific problems and specific solutions to address them.⁵¹

The *crime triangle*, or *problem-analysis triangle*, is a way of understanding crime problems that is used by police in their analyses.⁵² The model is based on the idea that for a successful crime to occur, three elements are required: a vulnerable victim, a motivated perpetrator, and the two together in a suitable location at the same time. If any element of

⁴⁷ Loreen Wolfer, "Problem-Solving Policing: Eliminating Hot Spots," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, (November 1999): 1.

⁴⁸ Goldstein, *Problem Oriented Policing*, 32-49.

⁴⁹ Problem Oriented Policing and the SARA method have been widely documented in academic and law enforcement literature. The discussion here is from the author's recollection and training materials provided by the Indianapolis Police Department in the early 1990s.

⁵⁰ Wayne W. Bennett and Karen M. Hess, *Management and Supervision in Law Enforcement*, 3d ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001), 131.

⁵¹ Billante, "The Beat Goes On: Policing for Crime Prevention," 6.

⁵² Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, "The Problem Analysis Triangle," <http://popcenter.org/about-triangle.htm> (accessed February 11, 2007).

the triangle is absent, the crime cannot occur. This idea has given law enforcement a conceptual framework for problem solving. The theory is that if police target repeat offenders, repeat locations (hot spots or geographic clusters of incidents), or repeat victims, they can produce viable crime reductions.⁵³ One way of doing so is to ensure that there is a capable guardian to protect the vulnerable victim, a manager to protect the place, and a handler to prevent the offender from committing the criminal act. Protecting the location can be achieved through means such as police patrols, neighborhood watch programs, door locks, surveillance cameras, or security guards.⁵⁴ The police focus on repeat offenders and repeat victims in order to reveal patterns, individuals, and activities that might be targeted to prevent crime.

Goldstein recommended that police consider a range of potential alternative solutions once problems are identified.⁵⁵ These solutions may involve resources from other government agencies and private and community resources. This non-police approach to solving problems was a considerable break from traditionally reactive approaches.

4. Community Policing

The community policing philosophy accepts that the police are not the sole guardians of law and order, and it incorporates the public as an active partner to identify and solve community problems.⁵⁶ Community policing is proactive and uses problem-solving, thus it builds upon the other proactive and problem-solving approaches already described. But community policing also incorporates community cooperation and participation. Though implementation of community policing varies widely, two key elements are generally universal: police-citizen interaction and cooperation, and problem-solving efforts to reduce crime-related community problems. Police work to establish working relations with community groups and neighborhoods, and they work with them to establish a consensus about the crime-related problems that the community identifies

⁵³ Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, "The Problem Analysis Triangle."

⁵⁴ Home Office, *Routine Activity Theory*, <http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/skills/skills08.htm#guardian> (accessed February 11, 2007).

⁵⁵ Goldstein, *Problem Oriented Policing*, 102.

⁵⁶ Roberg, et al., *Police Management*, 58-59.

as most important. Police value the community's needs and prioritize their work to address these needs. The problem-solving efforts work to reduce the problems that the community has identified through its work with the police. This means that police may find themselves spending more time enforcing quality of life problems such as noise violations and truancy than they otherwise might have. This collaboration between the police and community to identify and solve community problems has been called democracy in action as it involves citizen involvement in the determination of police resource allocation.⁵⁷

5. Compstat

In the mid 1990s, the New York City Police Department implemented its intelligence-led crime control strategy called Compstat, or computer-driven crime statistics.⁵⁸ With obvious roots in the SARA method, NYPD's implementation rests on five basic principles:

1. specific objectives,
2. timely and accurate intelligence,
3. effective strategies and tactics,
4. rapid deployment of personnel and resources,
5. relentless follow-up and assessment.

Compstat decentralized responsibility and authority for crime reductions while creating a centralized intelligence and analytical support capability. NYPD has successfully integrated the application of intelligence into nearly every aspect of its operation and reinvented itself as one of the most effective police agencies in the country.

Six key elements of COMPSTAT-like programs have been identified after a review of a number of departments.⁵⁹

1. *Mission clarification:* The agency's crime fighting mission is clarified to focus efforts.

⁵⁷ Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action* (Washington DC: BJA, 1994), 4.

⁵⁸ McDonald, *Managing Police Operations*, 8.

⁵⁹ James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and David Weisburd, "COMPSTAT and Bureaucracy: A Case Study of Challenges and Opportunities for Change," *Justice Quarterly* 21 (September 2004): 463-496.

2. *Internal accountability*: Processes are put in place to measure police activities and their impact on crime.
3. *Geographic organization of operational command*: Operational commanders are given responsibility and authority over patrol officers and special units within an area, and are held accountable for their efforts.
4. *Organizational flexibility*: Commanders retain flexibility of their resources to direct them against identified problems.
5. *Data-Driven analysis of problems and assessment of problem-solving efforts*: This provides a semi-scientific assessment of crime problems and underlying causes, and the effectiveness of police efforts.
6. *Innovative problem-solving tactics*: The organization picks problem-solving tactics because they have the highest probability of success.

There is recognition that what works in New York may not work in other places. The principles of ILP may remain the same, but local factors can limit the universality of any ILP approach. As will be shown in later chapters, there is flexibility in applying the principles of ILP to local needs to provide the most effective policing.

6. Catching Terrorists with ILP

The success of a police department is often measured by using official statistics of reported crimes over a period of time. The FBI's Uniform Crime Report program indexes crime in several categories and is commonly used as a barometer of agency effectiveness.⁶⁰ This is a measure of crimes that have already occurred, however. In considering terrorism, success must not be determined by measures such as successful prosecutions of terrorists *after* an attack or a UCR-like count of incidents. Success must be measured by a lack of attacks, by prevention of attacks before terrorists have a chance to carry out their plans.

Terrorism has presented a new threat to American law enforcement requiring new practices and partnerships to combat and defeat. Establishing the national doctrine for protecting America against terrorism, the National Strategy for Homeland Security defines terrorism as "any premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public welfare that is intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or governments."⁶¹

⁶⁰ FBI, *UCR FAQ* (Washington DC: FBI, 2006), <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/ucrfaq.pdf>, (accessed December 17, 2006).

⁶¹ Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington, DC, July 2002), 2.

This definition of terrorism as unlawful behavior places terrorist activities in the realm of behaviors police must address. The potential for substantial death, injury, and property damage requires that law enforcement at every level of government consider prevention and interdiction of terrorist activities a priority.

Despite skepticism during the past couple decades, researchers today are concluding that police do matter, and that they can reduce crime and increase safety in communities.⁶² Law enforcement cannot focus only on incidents that occur with high frequency, but must also attempt to prevent and prepare for the occurrence of low frequency/high impact occurrences. Though the police obviously cannot prevent every terrorist attack, they can improve their effectiveness by adopting the intelligence-led policing model that has created crime reduction successes.⁶³ The tools to do so are the same as the tools to reduce crime in the community: an informed, engaged community; trained, skilled, observant police officers; good intelligence and a willingness to follow it; information sharing; and effective tactics.

Activities necessary to develop and execute a terrorist plot within the United States mirror activities necessary for planning and executing a criminal plot. Potential terrorists operate within communities as they plan and await execution of their plots. This means that terrorists interact with citizens and their activities are somewhat open to observation by residents and police. Otherwise ordinary criminal acts may actually be the activity of potential terrorists as they raise funds for or plan terrorist acts.⁶⁴ Terrorists have been known to participate in low level criminal activity for fundraising, material acquisition, etc. Examples from the past include cigarette smuggling, burglary, and document forgery. This puts local police officers in the best position to encounter, discover, and interdict terrorist operations before their plans are carried out. The practice

⁶² George Kelling and William Sousa, Jr, *Do Police Matter: An Analysis of the Impact of New York City's Police Reforms* (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, December 2001), 18.

⁶³ Paul Howard and Mark Riebling, eds, "Hard Won Lessons: Problem-Solving Principles for Local Police," *Safe Cities Project* (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, May 2005), 2.

⁶⁴ Melvin Carraway, quoted in Stephan Loyka, *Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series: Vol. 4: The Production and Sharing of Intelligence* (Washington DC: Police Executive Research Forum, February 2005), 8.

of community policing that builds strong ties between the police and community members is an excellent vehicle to share information about potentially suspicious individuals.⁶⁵

As with other crime prevention programs, citizens should be educated about signs and indicators of suspicious activity and provided a mechanism to report tips. An example of a successful initiative was a video titled *Seven Signs of Terrorism*, and produced by the Michigan State Police to educate citizens about terrorism indicators.⁶⁶ Through training and experience, police officers develop well-honed abilities to detect suspicious behavior and disrupt criminal activity.⁶⁷ With added training for officers on indicators of terrorist activity, they can become increasingly effective at identifying local terrorist activity.⁶⁸ As citizens are better educated about suspicious activity, they will be better able to notice it. Because of improved trust and communication with the police through community policing, citizens are more inclined to report their suspicions.

Once citizens and police become more efficient at discovering and reporting suspicious activity, there must be a mechanism to receive these tips and determine their validity. It is critical to develop the analytical capacity to determine whether a tip or series of tips might indicate terrorist activity. This requires resources structured and committed to intelligence analysis and specialized training to develop expertise in terrorist capabilities, tactics, motivations, targets, and trends. Analysts need to understand precursor crimes and characteristic behaviors of terrorist plotters. The need to develop this capability is widely acknowledged.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Robert Chapman and Matthew Schneider, "Community Policing and Terrorism," *Homeland Security* (April 2003): 3.

⁶⁶ Michigan State Police, *Seven Signs of Terrorism*, http://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,1607,7-123-1586_1710-155763--,00.html (accessed December 17, 2006).

⁶⁷ Cleary, "Strategy for Local Law Enforcement Agencies to Improve Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Terrorist Information," 22.

⁶⁸ Howard and Riebling, "Hard Won Lessons: Problem-Solving Principles for Local Police," 22.

⁶⁹ Loyka, *Protecting Your Community from Terrorism*, 31.

Finally, effective law enforcement tactics need to be employed when intelligence identifies a credible threat. Traditional law enforcement tactics are transferable to many counterterrorism scenarios, but new threats require the development of new tactics.⁷⁰

F. FACTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL ILP IMPLEMENTATION – THE 3i MODEL

For an agency to follow the NCISP and adopt this philosophy within their local context, a police leader must be able to identify the basic principles necessary to implement intelligence-led policing.⁷¹ A set of criteria have been gleaned from an article prepared for the Australian Institute of Criminology that introduced a 3i model (interpret, influence, and impact) of six necessary components of effective ILP implementation. This ILP model has three structures and three processes that are required for effective intelligence-led policing. Ratcliffe explains that after studying examples of successfully implemented ILP efforts, these six factors are necessary components of a true intelligence-led policing operation. As outlined in Figure 3, this model forms the basis for the comparative analysis that follows in the next chapter.

⁷⁰ Bruce Hoffman, et al., *Preparing for Suicide Terrorism: A Primer for American Law Enforcement Agencies and Officers* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 22-28.

⁷¹ Jerry H. Ratcliffe, in *Intelligence-led Policing, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice* presents the 3i model of a successful ILP implementation, which serves as an efficient comparison tool across jurisdictions. The principles offered in this article are consistent with other writings on ILP.




Figure 3. The 3i Model for Effective Intelligence-Led Policing

1. Criminal Environment Structure

While it seems obvious, Ratcliffe argues that there must be a criminal element that threatens public safety for law enforcement to study and analyze. Crime problems in America are now compounded by the threat of terrorism, providing activities and behaviors for analysts to study and understand.

2. Intelligence Structure

As a process or function within an agency, the agency must incorporate the intelligence cycle—the continuous cycle of tasking, collection, processing, analysis, dissemination, and feedback—which leads to generation of an intelligence product. Managed by upper management, this must generate intelligence with local relevance and be clearly and instantly significant to decision-makers. Ratcliffe writes that “within the model ... intelligence therefore requires a number of [internal] organizational structures

to work effectively in both the interpretation of the criminal environment and the dissemination of a product that can shape the thinking of decision-makers.”⁷²

This is a critical component because structure matters a great deal in organizations. In other words, “performance is not manna that fall from heaven; organizations have to be structured, mobilized, and funded to carry out the activities that generate results.”⁷³ For example, if the information collection function of an agency is organizationally separated from the analysis function preventing information from getting to the analysts, then obviously little quality intelligence would be developed. The fact that processes and structure matter is an often forgotten aspect of organizational performance.

3. Decision-Maker Structure

Systems have to be in place to share actionable, relevant intelligence with the decision-maker(s) in the agency. Agency decision makers must give priority to the intelligence and be able to properly understand and respond to the information. Decision-makers must not be detached by cultural or organizational barriers that prevent them from receiving and acting on intelligence. This prevents intelligence from impacting threats and problems. The decision-maker structure is a bridge between the model’s interpret and the influence processes, and enables the intelligence to impact the threat.

4. Interpret Process

Scientific data analysis by skilled experts with the proper tools and collective understanding is critical to allow the agency to interpret a criminal or terrorist environment. This reflects a commitment of resources to build this analytical capacity within the agency. These necessary resources include people, tools, skills, techniques, and an understanding of the problems and targets.⁷⁴ A more detailed discussion of the necessary personnel, training, skills, and tools to achieve quality analysis is included in Chapter IV.

⁷² Ratcliffe, *Intelligence-led Policing*, 4.

⁷³ Allen Schick, ed. “Getting Performance Measures to Measure Up,” *Quicker, Better, Cheaper? Managing Performance in American Government* (New York: Rockefeller Institute Press, 2001), 52.

⁷⁴ Information drawn from presentation on the 3i model included on Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe’s Web site <http://jratcliffe.net/research/index.htm> (accessed January 5, 2007).

5. Influence Process

A core concept of ILP is that intelligence influences operational decisions. The decision-makers who would direct those operational decisions must first be influenced by the intelligence they receive. This highlights a very basic truth, that information can only affect behavior if it is used. There is no use in generating volumes of quality intelligence if it will be ignored by commanders or if they are not required to use it. It is also important that intelligence be produced for, disseminated to, and used by different levels of the agency hierarchy. A lieutenant or supervisor of a shift of officers needs intelligence that is tactical in nature and focused on his sphere of interest. District commanders, on the other hand, would find more value in intelligence that assesses district-wide problems and is more strategic in nature. When the chief executive identifies ILP as an agency priority, the chief signals to decision-makers to pay attention to and use the intelligence that they receive.

6. Impact Process

There is little value in implementing ILP if the decision-maker cannot reduce crime, prevent terrorism, and increase community safety. The implementation of proven strategies and tactics in response to accurate, actionable intelligence should result in these positive outcomes. The strategies and tactics that agencies develop and implement are often specific to their jurisdiction and to the problem at hand. The experiences of using the crime triangle framework, community policing, and Compstat have developed a skill set in law enforcement of developing and applying effective tactics to address specific problems.

The presence of these six factors in an agency's ILP efforts should then facilitate a successful and effective program. Success, of course, depends on many variables that are difficult to control. It is argued that the application of the tenets of this model should enable an agency to generate positive results.

G. ILP IMPLEMENTATION IN THREE COUNTRIES

Given the variety of implementation of ILP in the United States, it is useful to briefly discuss its use in other countries. This can provide a preliminary view of various

models of implementation. Three countries were selected and analyzed for similarities in their cultures and societies. The United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada are all Western democracies with relatively open societies. They all have organized criminal elements and a clearly identified terrorist threat.

1. United Kingdom⁷⁵

Intelligence-led policing was first identified and practiced as a distinct policing strategy in England in the early 1990s in response to rising crime and criticisms of police effectiveness. Police were believed to spend too much time responding to calls and too little time identifying and targeting offenders.⁷⁶

There is strong support for the ILP model as an important aspect of policing in the United Kingdom, evidenced by the following statement in a government review of national crime strategies:

Intelligence led decision making lies at the heart of effective delivery. We want every CDRP/CSP to undertake an intelligence led, problem-solving and outcome orientated approach to community safety. We believe the police National Intelligence Model provides a good practice framework for routinely analysing data and intelligence to inform strategic direction, accurately direct resources and manage risk.⁷⁷

As part of larger crime reduction strategies, police in the United Kingdom require intelligence analysis in the development of operational plans. Decision-makers who utilize intelligence and have become skilled at applying innovative, targeted tactics to problems identified through this process have achieved real crime reductions and successful terrorist disruptions.⁷⁸ Numerous successes using the ILP concept as the basis

⁷⁵ Home Office, *Tackling Personal Robbery, Lessons Learnt from the Police and Community Partnerships* (London: Home Office, 2003) <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/dpr5.pdf> (accessed August 15, 2006). Anecdotal evidence of the success of intelligence-led policing generally in the UK is taken from many reports, including this summary from the Home Office documenting the sophistication of analysis and organizational support for the concept in the United Kingdom. This report gives insight to the factors used in this case study analysis.

⁷⁶ Ratcliffe, *What Is Intelligence-led Policing?* 1.

⁷⁷ Home Office, *Review of the Partnership Provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998—Report of the Findings* (London: Home Office, January 2006) <http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/partnerships60.doc> (accessed August 28, 2006).

⁷⁸ Paul Howard, ed., “Hard Won Lessons: How Police Fight Terrorism in the United Kingdom,” *Safe Cities Project* (New York: Manhattan Institute, December 2004), 5.

of crime reduction strategies are noted, including combating robbery, burglary, international fraud, narcotics, and hooliganism. Law enforcement in the United Kingdom has significant experience in counterterrorism operations based on their decades-long struggle with domestic terrorism. Though not directly linked to intelligence-led policing in articles, recent terrorism investigations in the United Kingdom demonstrate the power of the concept as collected information was analyzed and used to direct counter terrorism operations. Successful disruptions have resulted.

The July 2006 arrests related to a terrorist plot to explode bombs on in-flight airliners indicates an advanced capacity in information gathering, analysis, and acting on actionable intelligence. These arrests demonstrate the difficulty of developing skilled analytical capability and a deep understanding of the threats within a community. Intelligence is hard, complex, inexact work that attempts to paint an accurate picture of assymetric, shadowy, international figures. These difficulties make exact predictions problematic.

2. Australia

Intelligence-led policing has been widely accepted within Australian law enforcement, though its application varies somewhat across agencies.⁷⁹ Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty highlighted the importance of ILP to Australian law enforcement during a 2004 address when he stated, “Importantly, we have moved to intelligence-led policing, to build our understanding of the environment and make most efficient use of our resources.”⁸⁰

The Australians have used analysis to identify and target hotspots and recidivist offenders.⁸¹ For example, an ILP application called Operation Anchorage targeted burglaries and led to a 21 percent reduction in burglaries in the Australian Capital

⁷⁹ Jerry Ratcliffe, *Intelligence-led Policing*, 1.

⁸⁰ Mick Keelty, *Policing the 21st Century: Technology, Terrorism, and Transnational Crime*, Speech at 2004 John Barry Memorial Lecture at University of Melbourne, Australia (December 6, 2004), 4. <http://www/criminology.unimelb.edu.au/barrylecture/barrylecture2004.html> (accessed July 30, 2006).

⁸¹ Billante, *The Beat Goes On: Policing for Crime Prevention*.

Territory.⁸² In this operation, a high ratio of intelligence analysts were assigned to the problem to achieve a much more objective targeting of offenders and locations. In counter-terrorism operations, state and territory police serve as the first line of reporting for suspicious activity, and have their own intelligence structure to analyze these activities. This highlights the importance of integrating intelligence sharing among the various levels of law enforcement.

The Victoria Police Service identified ILP as one of its main priorities in its five-year strategic plan.⁸³ Aspects of their program include employing additional analysts to identify and target serious and repeat offenders through “crime data analysis, forensic sampling, and information sharing with other criminal justice agencies.” Their objective is to “enhance [their] research and evaluation capacity to address crime, community safety, and organizational performance.”

ILP is a concept that appears to allow wide variety in implementation based on the needs of the jurisdiction, and this is evidenced by the Australian examples. Aspects of Ratcliffe’s model were noted among the writings, including the need to hire more and increasingly specialized analysts, and the need for management to incorporate the concept as an agency priority to institutionalize its use.

3. Canada

ILP within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is well developed.⁸⁴ That RCMP decision-makers support the concept was emphasized in an August 2005 speech by RCMP Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli. He discussed the growing importance of intelligence-led policing in Canadian law enforcement.⁸⁵ The

⁸² Jerry Ratcliffe, “Policing Urban Burglary,” *Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice*, (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, August 2001): 5. <http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/ti213.pdf> (accessed July 30, 2006).

⁸³ Victoria Police Service, *The Way Ahead: Strategic Plan 2003–2008*, 11-12. http://www.police.vic.gov.au/files/documents/352_The-Way-Ahead-Strategic-Plan-2003-2008.pdf. (accessed September 3, 2006).

⁸⁴ Angus Smith, *Towards Intelligence-Led Policing: The RCMP Experience* (International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, 1998), 1. <http://www.carleton.ca/law/JusInRe/v4/4-6-towards.htm> (accessed August 18, 2006).

⁸⁵ Giuliano Zaccardelli, speaking notes from presentation on intelligence-led policing at the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police Conference, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, August 23, 2005. Also see http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/speeches/sp_cacp_3_e.htm (accessed August 18, 2006).

commissioner emphasized its importance in efforts against both criminal and terrorist activities. He articulated the importance of analysis integrated across disciplines to ensure proper local context. The intelligence program has been integrated into the decision-making structure of the RCMP, and both decision-makers and line-level officers turn to intelligence for insight and guidance. Solutions to crime problems have become more innovative, and overall results are “impressive.”⁸⁶

Another example of the implementation of ILP in Canada was found within the Edmonton Police Service. EPS undertook a multi-year development and agency-wide implementation of ILP, called IMPACT (Intelligence Management, Performance and Accountability, Coordination of Tactics).⁸⁷ Districts hold tactical management meetings to discuss intelligence and strategies, and to align operational activities with intelligence. By 2004, the EPS had added at least eleven analysts to the service to improve analysis. Strategic management steers the intelligence process to ensure that priorities and energies are properly directed.

Successes are noted across Canada in burglaries, robberies, narcotics, and traffic safety. While there is no direct link attaching intelligence-led policing activities to the June 2006 arrests of seventeen Canadians who were planning terrorist attacks, the disruption of the plot prior to attack is potentially a successful application of improved intelligence capacity within Canada. Based on the comments of the RCMP’s top officer, there is strong support for ILP among Canadian law enforcement. He admits that they continue to face challenges, including developing analytic capacity and changing law enforcement culture from reactive to proactive. These examples tend to demonstrate a movement in Canada toward successful ILP implementation and to validate the criteria in Ratcliffe’s model.

H. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Law enforcement agencies have a variety of means at their disposal to develop a picture of the situation in the community. Law enforcement intelligence is a structured

⁸⁶ Giuliano Zaccardelli, speaking notes, 1.

⁸⁷ David Veitch, John Warden, Jonathan Alston, Laura Thue, “Maximizing Impact: The Edmonton Police Service’s Intelligence-led Policing (ILP) Model,” *Canadian Review of Policing Research* (2004), <http://arcpr.icaap.org/issues/issue1/v-w-a-t.html> (accessed August 10, 2006).

process that agencies can follow to develop an understanding of the threats in a community, criminal and otherwise. As a product, intelligence can be used to guide executive and operational decision-making to target known threats. There has been a push nationally to improve the intelligence capabilities of agencies to more effectively address crime and terrorist threats. The NCISP also places a priority on police agencies adopting the intelligence-led policing philosophy. Intelligence-led policing is offered as an operational strategy that should improve the ability of police to identify threats and coordinate resources against them, ultimately making for safer communities. After studying successful implementations of ILP, Jerry Ratcliffe developed a model of elements necessary for a successful program. The 3i model is used as a basis for comparison of ILP applications in this paper. Finally, this chapter concludes with a review of ILP applications in three foreign countries to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the concept.

III. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING IN TWO U.S. CITIES

A. POLICE MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION

This chapter begins with a discussion of the reasons police managers choose different policing models and associated internal resource allocations. Police agencies across America adopt various models and choose widely different internal structures to implement their strategies. Two cities were selected for analysis in this study because they have adopted aspects of intelligence-led policing in their strategies. The Chicago Police Department in Chicago, Illinois, and the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department in Nashville, Tennessee, have implemented different policing models in the past decade, each with aspects of ILP. A discussion of the policing and ILP efforts of both departments follows in this chapter, and this is followed by a comparison of similarities and differences in the two examples.

Over the last century and a half, policing has evolved through at least four models to make itself compatible with a democratic society.⁸⁸ These models have resulted in the police assuming differing roles in society, and being more or less effective at reducing crime in communities. The political policing model (1840s to the 1930s) was marked by considerable political influence over all aspects of police work. Police had a close relationship with citizens, but delivery of services was heavily influenced by politics and corruption, and was generally ineffective. During the period influenced by the reform model (1930s to the 1960s) police adopted strict organizational principles and emphasized strict law enforcement. Turning to more modern management styles in the 1960s, the service model of policing dominated (1960s to the 1980s). Police assumed a broader role than the strict law enforcement mission of the reform era, and emphasized community relations, diversity in employment, and crime prevention. Much has been written about the community policing model and its transformation of the policing mission. As discussed in Chapter II, beginning in the 1980s and continuing today, this policing model is based on a belief that police and the community should collaborate to identify and solve community problems.

⁸⁸ Roberg, *Police Management*, 47-56.

Regardless of the policing model adopted by agencies, police managers and elected officials must make decisions about staffing levels and internal allocation of police resources.⁸⁹ Whether they use the intuitive, workload, or comparative approach, managers attempt to achieve the right level of police staffing for the demand and service load in their community.⁹⁰ Within the agency, then, resources are allocated to various duties and functions (e.g., patrol, investigations, administrative, community policing, etc.) that are believed to be the most effective at accomplishing the goals of the organization. The manager's view of how to best allocate resources (process, purpose, time, area) is reflected in the design or structure of the organization (its positions, functions, and specializations).

The challenge for police managers is to select the proper police model and align police structure and processes within the resources of the community to deliver efficient, effective police services. There are likely as many examples of policing model and organizational configuration as there are police departments in the United States. Two agencies were chosen for this study based on their implementation of a policing model that incorporates elements of intelligence-led policing and caused organizational changes to achieve their objectives.

The Chicago, Illinois, Police Department transformed its policing philosophy in the early 1990s, implementing a sweeping and comprehensive shift to community policing. This organization was selected for this study because in spite of this transformation, crime and the public perception that crime was continuing to increase caused another shift in policy to address crime problems. This most recent change introduced significant aspects of intelligence-led policing.

The Metropolitan Nashville Police Department has a similar story. Practicing a traditional policing model through the early 1990s, elements of community policing were introduced to improve relationships with and responsiveness to the community. Crime

⁸⁹ Roberg. *Police Management*, 333-351.

⁹⁰ Roberg et al. describe three methods police managers use to determine proper levels of police staffing. The intuitive approach is basically an educated guess that draws on the experience and judgment of managers. The workload method requires an analysis of community expectations of police performance, amount of work requiring police attention, and resources required to handle it. The comparative approach compares ratios of police officers to population.

remained a problem, however, and when a new chief was hired several years ago, he brought in a new policing model that built on community policing, but also focused on effectiveness and efficiency. The practices and tools he implemented in Nashville are another flavor of ILP.

B. CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

The city of Chicago, Illinois, has a great tradition and rich history in America. The largest city in the Midwest, it has transformed its image from a rough and tumble industrial city to a global, cosmopolitan center of culture and commerce.⁹¹ As a top destination for businesses and tourists, Chicago attracts over 30 million foreign and domestic visitors per year who spend nearly 10 billion dollars in the local economy.⁹²

The skyscraper is an iconic image of the city's heritage of commerce, and the city's economy continues to grow. At \$390 billion, Chicago claims the third largest gross metropolitan product in the United States.⁹³ Despite the perception that Chicago is an aging Rust Belt city, some experts report that it has the largest high technology and information-technology employment in the United States.⁹⁴

The city has always had a diverse population, and the racial makeup of Chicago continues to reflect that diversity and shows that new waves of immigration continue to shape the city. A 2006 estimate puts the city's population at 2,873,790 people,⁹⁵ and census data show city residents are 36 percent Black, 42 percent White, 26 percent Hispanic or Latino, and 4.3 percent Asian. Demonstrating the international diversity of the city, 21.7 percent of the city's population was foreign-born in 2000 and 35.5 percent of residents lived in households where a foreign language was spoken.

⁹¹ Some background information on Chicago was obtained online from Wikipedia at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago> (accessed January 12, 2007).

⁹² *Chicago Sun Times*, "Visitors Pumping Up City Economy" (October 25, 2006), http://www.suntimes.com/business/109470,CST-FIN_Tourism25.article (accessed January 12, 2007).

⁹³ Wikipedia. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago> (accessed January 12, 2007).

⁹⁴ Karen Chapple, et al., "Gauging Metropolitan 'High-Tech' and 'I-Tech' Activity," *Economic Development Quarterly*, 18:1 (2004): 10-29, <http://edq.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/18/1/10> (accessed January 12, 2007).

⁹⁵ U.S. Census Bureau, *State and County Quick Facts*. <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/1714000.html> (accessed January 12, 2007).

In the minds of many, this view of a successful Chicago competes with a more infamous picture. For decades, Chicago leaders have struggled to overcome historical images of the city as crime-ridden and controlled by organized crime. The most infamous period in Chicago crime history was during the 1920s when organized crime figures like Al Capone and his Outfit controlled many aspects of city life. Organized crime in Chicago has contributed to colorful figures and incidents like Sam Giancana, Frank Nitti, and the St. Valentine's Day Massacre.

Since the 1940s, organized street gangs have contributed to violent street crime. Growing involvement with and struggles over control of the illicit drug trade have contributed to the growth of these gangs and associated violence. Dating to the 1950s, the Vice Lords are the oldest and second largest gang in the Chicagoland area, and they have a history of violence.⁹⁶ The Black Gangster Disciples trace their origins to the 1960s, and today remain heavily involved with drugs, murders, and white collar crime.⁹⁷ Hundreds of subgroups and minor gangs contribute to the problems of street violence. More than half of the homicides committed in Chicago each year are attributed to gangs that control drug markets.⁹⁸

For years Chicago has averaged around 600 homicides per year, and attempts by the city to impact levels of crime in the community lead to the implementation of Community Policing in the early 1990s.⁹⁹ Under the direction of Mayor Richard Daley, CPD Superintendent Matt Rodriguez oversaw the establishment of community policing in 1992 and its implementation in 1993.¹⁰⁰ Called the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy program, or CAPS, it is an ongoing effort to bring communities, police, and

⁹⁶ Know Gangs, *Vice Lords*. http://www.knowgangs.com/gang_resources/vice/ (accessed January 12, 2007).

⁹⁷ Know Gangs, *Black Gangster Disciples*, http://www.knowgangs.com/gang_resources/black_gangster_disciples/bgd_001.htm (accessed January 12, 2007).

⁹⁸ Dennis P. Rosenbaum and Cody Stephens, *Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in Chicago: Strategies and Tactics of the Chicago Police Department* (Chicago: Center for Research and Law in Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, June 15, 2005), 6.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁰⁰ Background information collected on history and development of Chicago Police Department from opens sources such as the CPD Web site at <http://egov.cityofchicago.org/city/webportal/portalEntityHomeAction.do?entityName=Police&entityNameEnumValue=33>, and wikipedia articles at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago_Police_Department (Both last accessed January 12, 2007).

other city agencies together to prevent crimes rather than react after crimes occur. CAPS successfully integrated the community policing philosophy into the culture of the Chicago Police Department and improved relationships with Chicago citizens.¹⁰¹

Despite these improvements in police-community relations, crime remained a pernicious problem, and continued to capture media attention. This frustrated the mayor and civic leaders who wanted to transform the city into an attractive metropolis of the world, requiring them, instead, to refocus their attention on problems of crime and violence.¹⁰²

In 2003, Mayor Daley appointed Phillip Cline as superintendent of police to lead the department's crime reduction efforts. Changing the culture or redirecting the focus of any agency is a difficult test of leadership, and to do so in the CPD is a monumental task. With over 13,000 sworn officers and 2,600 other employees, CPD has a long and proud tradition. Building on a successful community policing model, Superintendent Cline sent a clear message to all employees that the focus of the entire organization was public violence, with the primary goal the reduction of homicides. Everyone, from officers on the street to commanders, knows that there are three priorities: gangs, homicides, and public violence.¹⁰³

Superintendent Cline's strategy was to implement Compstat-like intelligence development and accountability, but to do so Chicago-style. His plan was that CPD would get smarter about knowing the criminals, organizations, and locations in the city that fostered violence and homicide, and commanders would be held accountable to applying effective tactics to prevent and reduce crime. The superintendent's management strategy to accomplish these objectives included incorporating a new management philosophy and required some reorganization and restructuring.

¹⁰¹ Wesley Skogan and Susan Hartnett, *Community Policing, Chicago Style* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 194.

¹⁰² Rosenbaum and Stephens, *Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in Chicago*, 6.

¹⁰³ Lt. Susan Schmidt, *Chicago Police Department, The Chicago Police Department Deployment Operations Center* (Chicago, IL: Conference Presentation, May 24, 2006).

1. The Deployment Operations Center

Superintendent Cline made necessary personnel changes to make sure he had the right management team to implement this philosophy, and he created some special units and beefed up others. The change most central to implementing the superintendent's strategy was the creation of the Deployment Operations Center, or DOC, and he created it to identify areas where resources would have the greatest impact.¹⁰⁴ CPD policy defines the function and duties of the DOC:

The DOC acts as the intelligence hub for the Department. The unit conducts tactical and analytical activities supporting effective deployment of field units. These analytical support activities are primarily focused on fostering reductions in violent crime, criminal gang activity, and organized crime activity as well as fostering counter terrorism efforts.¹⁰⁵

The DOC became the central point for collection, analysis, and distribution of crime information in the CPD. While each district retained some staff to work on district-level crime stats, this centralization of resources reinforced the superintendent's philosophy that the entire organization was involved with the crime-fighting mission. Resources committed to the DOC are significant: a commander, lieutenant, eight sergeants, and forty police officers. The organization and duties of the DOC are spelled out in policy:¹⁰⁶

1. Criminal Enterprise Group – Group is responsible for understanding and investigating traditional organized crime, to include terrorism. The unit also serves as the department's liaison to Interpol.
2. Counter Terrorism Section – Officers are responsible for obtaining intelligence on any homeland security issue, and conducting follow-up investigations. Section prepares threat assessments on special events and critical infrastructure. CT Section serves as liaison to federal agencies involved in counter terrorism investigations.
3. JTTF—The Joint Terrorism Task Force is a joint partnership of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies and is responsible for follow-up investigations on international terrorism concerns.
4. Deployment Analysis Group—“This group gathers information to assist in the effective recommendation for the deployment of Department resources

¹⁰⁴ Rosenbaum and Stephens, *Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in Chicago*, 8.

¹⁰⁵ Chicago Police Department Special Order 05-07, *Deployment Operations Center*, June 8, 2005.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*.

and the timely implementation of proactive policing.” Officers in this group work with field units to target places and people that are identified as problematic. “The Deployment Analysis Group gathers this information and analyzes it in conjunction with other factors such as incident analysis, calls for service, and input from correctional sources, and other agencies to provide accurate intelligence.”¹⁰⁷ The Deployment Analysis Group collects information from the widest possible range of sources to identify geographic areas in each Police Area that will have the highest propensity for violence in the upcoming week. This information is disseminated through DOC reports and weekly DOC meetings.

5. Gang Analytical Program/Technology Development Group—Group serves as the repository for gang information for the department. They maintain and update intelligence on gangs, hierarchies, organizations, etc.
6. Morning Briefing/Administrative—Group is responsible for collecting all reports and intelligence related to violent crime that occurred within the past twenty-four hours. Information is evaluated for potential retaliatory threats and its relation to ongoing conflicts. A daily report is prepared for the executive staff.

Thus the DOC became the embodiment of the intelligence cycle discussed earlier, and was created to develop and provide intelligence in support of agency-wide efforts. Chicago’s shift to ILP broke down traditional parochial intelligence structures and centralized intelligence in the DOC. Chicago has operationalized the intelligence cycle discussed in Chapter Two, with the DOC at the core. The superintendent has established the intelligence requirements and communicated them throughout the agency. These requirements establish the priorities that analysts in the DOC follow, and they drive operational activities. The next section discusses the various means of collecting information for analysts.

2. Collection

In an agency of 13,000 police officers assigned to hundreds of different assignments in dozens of facilities across the city, identifying and collecting relevant information about crime and criminals is a challenge. Creation of the DOC provided one central point to which information can flow for analysis. DOC supervisors call the unit “intelligence-driven,” and its mission is to collect information from all possible

¹⁰⁷ Chicago Police Department Special Order 05-07, *Deployment Operations Center*, June 8, 2005, 2.

sources.¹⁰⁸ The effect has been that the CPD has increased the flow of information within the department and among criminal justice units.¹⁰⁹

Watch officers on duty in the DOC are responsible for collecting gang and violent crime information from throughout the city. Officers call them with information and watch officers stay in contact with officers in the field. A 24-hour department operations desk receives reports with all kinds of information from the field that are fed to the DOC. Relationships have been developed with state and local Department of Corrections staff to collect information on gang members, associates, and activities. DOC officers also go into the field and work with citizen sources and officers to glean additional information. A great amount of effort goes into collecting information on gang members and understanding gang activity.¹¹⁰

As an example of the department's aggressive collection efforts, narcotics, gang, and DOC officers respond to the area of violent crimes. While other detectives work on solving the immediate crime, these investigators work to leverage as much information as they can from their sources and contacts about the crime and the factors and actors associated with it. All of this information is fed to the DOC analysts.

CPD has also used traditional enforcement activities as a tool to glean information about crime and criminals. For example, the CPD conducts seatbelt enforcement checkpoints in affected neighborhoods in the days following a violent crime. The checkpoint accomplishes a dual purpose. The traffic safety function is achieved, but perhaps more importantly, officers have a brief conversation with a number of citizens in a relatively non-confrontational setting. Officers can briefly inquire about the person's knowledge of the recent crime or other criminal activity. The information they glean is forwarded to the DOC.

Perhaps the major element of street-level intelligence-gathering activities in Chicago is the contact card. Beginning in 2003, CPD placed greater emphasis on officers completing contact cards on people they encounter during their tour of duty.

¹⁰⁸ Schmidt presentation.

¹⁰⁹ Rosenbaum and Stephens, *Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in Chicago*, 10.

¹¹⁰ Schmidt presentation.

Demographic information is discretionarily collected from any person they encounter who they think could aid in investigations. Information includes names and identifiers as well as gang affiliations, associates, nicknames, etc. Cards are forwarded to the DOC where the information is used in the analysis, and has been extremely valuable. Commanders are held accountable for how many cards are completed by their officers, especially in violent crime areas. Officers completed 86,034 cards in 2003, and that number increased to 209,719 in 2004. Because of improvements in technology, the DOC is able to leverage all of this information.¹¹¹

3. Analysis

All of the information collected is used to facilitate the DOC analysts' ability to understand violent crime, gangs, and narcotics activity. The managers of the DOC have worked to develop the quality and sophistication of their analysis. In so doing, they work to change the focus of analysis from reactive to predictive. The DOC attempts to predict geographic areas, individual criminals, and groups that might be a source of violence. They make recommendations that identify high risk individuals or groups; they predict where violence is likely to erupt; and they recommend increases in police presence and targeted enforcement activity. DOC recommendations attempt to target violent offenders and try to anticipate and quell inter- and intra-gang and narcotics conflicts. First Deputy Dana Starks noted the distinction when she said that the "DOC just isn't about putting officers in locations after something happened but it is preventative."¹¹²

The forty police officers and support staff assigned to the DOC are assigned one of the police districts to specialize on issues and problems in that area. In this way they develop a deeper understanding of crime and issues in that district, and they develop relationships with officers and citizens who provide them information. The analysts do communicate with one another to understand where crimes cross district boundaries, and to identify high risk individuals. Their main focus is to identify high risk people of interest and locations of concern.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Quoted in Rosenbaum and Stephens, *Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in Chicago*, 24.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 11.

¹¹³ Schmidt presentation.

The elements of the DOC that concentrate on terrorism were outlined earlier. The analysts of the DOC provide an optimal mechanism to identify terrorists operating in the community. The JTTF and Counter Terrorism Units are responsible for follow-up investigations. As DOC analysts review collected information, they are well situated to monitor for patterns of activity and behavior indicative of terrorist activity. Rather than have a separate unit of analysts reviewing all information looking for terrorism, all DOC analysts are trained as terrorism generalists.¹¹⁴

4. Dissemination

The intelligence cycle calls for intelligence developed by analysts to be disseminated to decision-makers and operational resources so that it can affect decision making and resource allocation. The CPD has implemented a variety of ways to disseminate intelligence from the DOC.

The most visible and intensive mechanism for dissemination is a weekly DOC meeting held by the superintendent. DOC meetings involve all exempt (executive) personnel. They are held Friday afternoons at 5:00 p.m. and can only be cancelled by the superintendent.¹¹⁵ At these meetings, information about crime trends, patterns, incidents, and issues is presented to commanders. Strategies for addressing the identified problems are discussed, and citywide operations for the coming week are planned. This accomplishes the Compstat-style meetings for information sharing and accountability.

The DOC also disseminates information directly to officers and units by publishing bulletins, safety alerts, offender profiles, parolee releases, etc. All reports, maps, and other products produced by the DOC are available on the department's intranet. The superintendent emphasizes communication and information sharing and has put IT systems into place to facilitate it.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Schmidt presentation.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Rosenbaum and Stephens, among others, have documented Chicago PD's development of technology to support law enforcement. CLEAR (Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting Program) has integrated multiple departmental data sources and external sources. It has improved real time access to information and the flow of information within the agency and among other criminal justice agencies. Developed by the Chicago PD and the City of Chicago, it is now in the process of being adopted across Illinois to integrate law enforcement information under the I-CLEAR moniker.

5. COMPSTAT Comparison

The Chicago model of intelligence-led policing contains the six key elements described by Mastrofski, et al., as presented in Chapter II. These elements are listed here again with a brief discussion of Chicago's activities in each element.

1. **Mission Clarification:** The superintendent very clearly articulated CPD's mission and said that it is the mission of every member of the agency.
2. **Internal Accountability:** Through DOC meetings, VISE meetings, and data-driven review of effectiveness, accountability for commanders and officers is achieved.¹¹⁷
3. **Geographic Organization of Command:** Twenty-five CPD commanders are responsible for the resources in their districts and for the results of their efforts. Area commanders are similarly held accountable, and have the ability to move resources across districts based on intelligence.
4. **Organizational Flexibility:** The DOC meeting leads to strategies that cause commanders to deploy or redeploy resources among districts. Traditional barriers to sharing resources have been stricken by the superintendent, and there is a shared focus on violent crime.
5. **Data-driven analysis of problems and assessment of problem-solving efforts:** The Chicago Police Department now has one of the most sophisticated information systems in law enforcement. This system facilitates hot spot identification and accountability measures. The sole purpose of the DOC is to develop the data-driven analysis that is then used by commanders to craft strategies.
6. **Innovative problem-solving tactics:** CPD employs a variety of traditional, community-based, and creative measures to address crime concerns.

It is clear from this review that Chicago does employ the basic principles of an effective Compstat process. As with its community policing initiatives from a decade earlier, Compstat was developed unique to the circumstances in Chicago.

6. Impact

Superintendent Cline summarized the impact of the changes they have implemented: "That means we're deploying more officers into violence-prone areas.

¹¹⁷ Violence Initiative Strategy Evaluation, or VISE, meetings are facilitated by the Bureau of Crime Strategy and Accountability and are held at the district level to evaluate violence reduction strategies and progress. The DOC meetings are agency-wide, while the VISE process serves to drive the ILP concept down into district operations. Accountability measures are conducted separate from the DOC. The DOC is focused on violent crime, and the Bureau of Crime Strategy and Accountability is responsible for analysis of effectiveness and accountability. This is intentional to prevent suspicion and distrust of the DOC.

We're being proactive in these areas by increasing our contacts with these people, conducting more traffic missions, investigating more narcotics locations and going after gang members more strategically in order to prevent violent crime. As a result, violent crime in these areas is down."¹¹⁸ There have been dramatic reductions in crime since Superintendent Cline introduced his philosophy. Homicides were cut by more than 400 per year, and shootings were down 28 percent.¹¹⁹ Rosenbaum concludes that "with equal intensity, good street intelligence and real-time data from its warehouse, the CPD has responded rapidly to locations and individuals where gang retaliation is expected."¹²⁰

C. NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

Known as *Music City USA* for the country music industry's concentration in the city, Nashville has been a center of commerce and culture in the South since before the Civil War. In modern times it has grown into a modern metropolis with a vibrant economy and diverse population. Nashville's economy has a major presence of the health care, music, publishing, and transportation industries.¹²¹ The city's population has grown to over 545,000 people, and more than 1.4 million people live in the region.¹²² The racial breakdown of the city is 65 percent White, 27 percent Black, and 4.7 percent Hispanic origin.

Due to an attractive cost of living and growing job market, Nashville has become an attractive destination for immigrants to settle. In the decade preceding 2000, Nashville's foreign-born population more than tripled in size to nearly 40,000 people. Large groups of Mexicans, Kurds, Vietnamese, Laotians, Arabs, Somalis, and others call Nashville home.¹²³ Local government has been innovative in meeting the needs of a

¹¹⁸ "Chief Cites Reasons for Chicago Crime Dip," *Organized Crime Digest* (June 10, 2005), http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4441/is_200506/ai_n16062359 (accessed January 12, 2007).

¹¹⁹ Schmidt presentation.

¹²⁰ Rosenbaum and Stephens, *Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in Chicago*, 38.

¹²¹ Background information gathered from various open sources, including *Wikipedia* at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nashville_Tennessee (accessed January 11, 2007).

¹²² U.S. Census Bureau, *State & County Quickfacts*, <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/47000.html> (accessed January 13, 2007).

¹²³ Daniel B. Cornfield et al., *Immigrant Community Assessment: Final Report*, August 15, 2003, i. <ftp://ftp.nashville.gov/web/finance/immigrant-community-assessment-nashville.pdf> August 15, 2003, i. (accessed January 13, 2007).

growing community. In 1963, the municipal government of Nashville merged with the County government of Davidson County, forming what is referred to as the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, popularly “Metro Nashville.”

The police departments were also consolidated so that today the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department serves all of Nashville and Davidson County. The department has over 1,300 sworn officers and its jurisdiction covers 533 square miles.¹²⁴ Crime trends in Nashville have followed those of many other cities. The 2004 statistics showed that Nashville’s crime rates were higher than Tennessee’s and the national averages. The city’s crime problems include commercial and street robberies, aggravated assaults, and gangs.¹²⁵ In recent years, Hispanic gangs have contributed to violence and homicides in the city.¹²⁶

Nashville’s concerns about terrorist activity occurring in the city are similar to those of other major cities in America. The September 2006 release of details from the National Intelligence Estimate reaffirms that this threat is growing. The “operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance to U.S. counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the Homeland.”¹²⁷

Nashville has experienced the type of activity associated with planning by a domestic terrorist. The May 31, 2006, arrest of a former Davidson County corrections officer for possession of pipe bombs, weapons, silencers, and the deadly poison ricin (that he apparently manufactured in his backyard shed) demonstrated the fact that no community is immune from the threat of terrorist-style weapons and planning.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Ronal Serpas, *Presentation to Public Safety Committee*, Presentation provided on MNPDP official web site at http://www.police.nashville.org/news/reports/serpas_to_public_safety_committee_061121.ppt (accessed January 13, 2007).

¹²⁵ Louise Kelton, interview with MNPDP Commander Louise Kelton (December 19, 2006).

¹²⁶ The City Paper, “Fighting Gangs Should be City’s Focus,” *The City Paper Online*, (Nashville, January 12, 2007) http://nashvillecitypaper.com/index.cfm?section=38&screen=news&news_id=54078 (accessed January 14, 2007).

¹²⁷ Directorate of National Intelligence, *Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate, Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States*, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf (accessed February 25, 2007).

¹²⁸ Sarah Kelley, “Suburban Terrorism,” *Nashville Scene*, (January 18, 2007), 1. http://www.nashvillescene.com/Stories/Cover_Story/2007/01/18/Suburban_Terrorism/index.shtml (accessed February 25, 2007).

1. Accountability Driven Leadership

Ronal W. Serpas was appointed chief of the MNPB on January 12, 2004, and he promptly initiated Accountability Driven Leadership (ADL).¹²⁹ The chief has developed his management strategy based in large part on the elements of Compstat and he has incorporated a version of intelligence-led policing into Nashville policing. Chief Serpas began his law enforcement career and served more than twenty years with the New Orleans, Louisiana, Police Department. During his tenure with New Orleans, Chief Serpas worked on development of a Compstat-style policing strategy for New Orleans PD. After his retirement, Chief Serpas was appointed chief of the Washington State Patrol where he implemented his policing philosophy under the Accountability Driven Leadership moniker.¹³⁰

As implemented in Washington, ADL focuses on effectiveness and efficiency of police operations. Chief Serpas reorganized the force to achieve his management objectives, creating a Management Services Bureau. ADL's main objectives are management definition of priorities, identification of desired outcomes, and performance measures to achieve those outcomes. It achieves the concepts of Compstat and includes non law enforcement functions in management accountability. In the Washington State Patrol, Serpas held commanders accountable for budgeting and administrative functions as well as law enforcement objectives.¹³¹

Prior to his arrival in Nashville, Chief Serpas provided copies of his article on ADL to the Metro Nashville PD executive staff, informing them that this would be the new policing strategy. The chief mandates that the entire agency participates in ADL, and uses a Compstat setting to identify problems, make operational decisions, and review the success of strategies.¹³² He reorganized the investigations and analysis functions of the department to facilitate the new philosophy. More analysts were added and investigations

¹²⁹ Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, *Ronal W. Serpas, PhD. Bio*, Department Web site at http://www.police.nashville.org/bureaus/chief/chief_serpas_bio.htm (accessed January 14, 2007).

¹³⁰ Ronal Serpas, "Beyond Compstat: Accountability-Driven Leadership," *Police Chief* (71:1 January 2004) 24-31.

¹³¹ Ronal Serpas, *Beyond Compstat: Accountability Driven Leadership in a Statewide Agency: The Washington State Patrol—Effectiveness Through Efficiencies*, unpublished paper provided by Chief Ronal Serpas on January 5, 2006 (undated), 7-9.

¹³² Kelton, Interview.

were decentralized, with detectives reassigned from headquarters to the districts. The new processes implemented by Chief Serpas operationalized aspects of the intelligence cycle discussed in Chapter Two. The chief established the requirements for the entire agency, and communicated them effectively to staff at all levels. A centralized analysis unit assigned to the chief's office is responsible for collecting information from all available data sources and preparing Compstat materials. The next sections discuss how Nashville performs the next steps in the intelligence cycle.

2. Collection

The analysis unit is responsible for collecting information from all available data sources in the department. This ensures consistency of information across the geographically dispersed districts. Operations personnel collect information in the field and provide it to the unit for inclusion in the analysis.¹³³ Improvements in information technology have given analysts access to more data systems and are enabling the analysis of near real-time data.¹³⁴

3 Analysis

There are two tiers of analysis within Metro Nashville PD. The department-wide comprehensive analysis of crime and the effectiveness of crime reduction efforts are accomplished by the central analysis unit. This office puts together Compstat books for the weekly Compstat meeting. Increased data quality has allowed an increase in analytical sophistication. Temporal analysis showing crime data across time and location has enhanced their understanding of problems and improves the effectiveness of resource allocations. Emphasis on high risk individuals has focused on recidivists and gang members. An effort to identify repeat offenders has supported operations targeting these high risk individuals. Increased gang analysis has been tied to increased gang enforcement. Each district has also retained CAP officers who perform statistical analysis. This has enabled district commanders to take analytical products from the central analysis unit and focus district-level activities on identified problems.

¹³³Kelton, Interview.

¹³⁴Ronal Serpas, Interview with MNPD Chief Ronal Serpas (January 5, 2006).

Commanders believe that they have a better understanding of crime problems allowing them to develop better strategies to address them.¹³⁵

4. Dissemination

The primary vehicle for disseminating intelligence is the once-weekly Compstat meeting. Chief Serpas believes that he himself must demonstrate the importance of the Compstat process by personally attending and participating in each meeting. Nashville's meetings can only be cancelled by the chief, and only once has he cancelled a meeting.¹³⁶

A characteristic that distinguishes Nashville's process is that every section of the department is required to participate and present on their activities of the week. In addition to operational field commands, this includes administrative (e.g., fleet, finance, property storage), and community-oriented (e.g., Crimewatch, PAL Club, etc). As part of the ADL philosophy, the intent of including these commands achieves several purposes. First, the prominence of crime reduction as the primary department objective can be reinforced to all areas of the agency. Second, every commander understands that they have some responsibility for that mission, and they are quizzed about their efforts that week. Finally, the meetings enhance intra-agency communication as well as problem identification, understanding, and strategies.

Another layer of Compstat meetings involves a weekly district-level Compstat meeting. These meetings follow the Compstat format that presents a summary of crime and trends and issues, but only for an affected district. The district commander involves all supervisors in the district. This process requires the commander to reinforce crime reduction priorities, review crime data and strategies with supervisors, facilitate vertical communication, and hold lower level supervisors accountable for results. As management is achieving results through others, involving the supervisors down to the line level is an important aspect of this strategy.¹³⁷ Commanders have accepted the ADL philosophy and incorporated it into their operations. Through the process, they have increased

¹³⁵ Kelton, Interview.

¹³⁶ Chief Serpas reported that in ten years of doing Compstat meetings across three agencies, he has only cancelled the meeting once. That cancellation was due to an officer being shot in the field an hour before the Compstat meeting was to start.

¹³⁷ Serpas, Interview.

information sharing, enhanced understanding of crime problems citywide, and improved accountability and ownership of problems and solutions.¹³⁸

5. COMPSTAT Comparison

Chief Serpas developed Compstat in New Orleans Compstat and expended those principles to develop the Accountability Driven Leadership model. The Nashville model of intelligence-led policing does contain the six key Compstat elements. These elements are presented again with a brief discussion of Nashville's activities in each element.

1. **Mission Clarification:** The chief has very clearly articulated Nashville's mission, and ensured that every commander and officer understands that it is the mission of every member of the agency.
2. **Internal Accountability:** Through citywide and district Compstat meetings, accountability for commanders and officers is achieved.
3. **Geographic Organization of Command:** District commanders are responsible the resources on their districts and for the results of their efforts.
4. **Organizational Flexibility:** Citywide and district-level crime problems are discussed at Compstat meetings and commanders discuss strategies to address them. Resources are shared across traditional district boundaries based on this analysis.
5. **Data-driven analysis of problems and assessment of problem-solving efforts:** MNPDP continues to develop the technology and analytical skills to improve the sophistication of their analysis. Chief Serpas believes they are "on the cusp" of making predictive analysis.¹³⁹
6. **Innovative problem-solving tactics:** MNPDP commanders are encouraged to develop creative, innovative strategies and tactics to address problems. Policy supports risk taking and encourages community participation.

6. Impact

"The Compstat philosophy has changed this police department," is how one commander described the effect of increased intelligence and accountability.¹⁴⁰ Violent crime is down overall across the city, though there was an increase in homicides at the

¹³⁸ Kelton, Interview.

¹³⁹ Serpas, Interview.

¹⁴⁰ Kelton, Interview.

end of 2006. Crime in the North Precinct, one of the city's more crime-ridden districts, is down 7.78 percent.¹⁴¹ Community support for the police has improved and citizen perception of safety has increased.¹⁴²

D. COMPARISON OF TWO APPLICATIONS

Both departments have implemented their own versions of intelligence-led policing unique to the local needs and circumstances. Understanding that achieving new results requires new actions, the chiefs in both cities openly acknowledged that a shift in policing strategy was necessary to achieve different results than they had previously been able to achieve. There were many similarities in the approach that both agencies followed, and a few differences. A review of these will help to identify the strategic dimensions of an effective ILP program.

1. Similarities

Consistent with the intelligence cycle, the chief or superintendent in both cities has clearly articulated and clarified mission around specific priorities. In Chicago, Superintendent Cline directed the focus of the entire agency toward homicide, gangs, narcotics, and public violence. In Nashville, Chief Serpas established crime reduction as the priority of the entire agency.

A central aspect of each leader's strategy was to increase the importance of analysis, and each furthered that objective by creating or strengthening a centralized analytical unit. These units serve to develop intelligence and as the agency repository. In Chicago, the superintendent eliminated the department's stand alone intelligence unit, and he created and fully resourced the Deployment Operations Center. Nashville's central Crime Analysis Unit was established as the point in the agency for gathering and developing intelligence on crime issues and trends. This physical reorganization and functional realignment caused the intelligence function to be redefined and institutionalized.

¹⁴¹ Kelton, Interview.

¹⁴² Serpas, *Presentation to Committee*.

Because of this centralization and reorganization, increased sophistication of analysis is possible to allow for narrowly identifying specific high risk individuals, groups, and locations. The DOC in Chicago is providing extremely detailed analysis, identifying high risk locations and individuals *before* violence occurs. In Nashville, analysts have improved the sophistication of their work by providing temporal analysis and identification of recidivist offenders.

One key to producing sophisticated analyses of threats has been to increase the amount and quality of information that is collected and made available to analysts. Both agencies worked to improve information systems so that as many internal data sources as possible are available, accurate, and in as close to real time as possible. This is often a very difficult task and requires much effort. Both agencies expanded their reach into external information sources as well, to ensure that analysts can develop an accurate estimate of threats. Finally, both agencies, but notably Chicago, have increased their efforts to proactively obtain information from the field. In Chicago, DOC officers, gang and narcotics specialists go into the field to interview officers, suspects, witnesses, and informants to glean information. Nashville has mechanisms in place to incorporate information from officers and citizens, and while its efforts are not as aggressive or extensive as Chicago's, they demonstrate the emphasis placed on obtaining information and sharing intelligence.

Technology enhancements helped improve collection, analysis, and dissemination. Chicago has leveraged a partnership with an information technology corporation over the years to develop and implement an information management system that provides real time access to records and information.¹⁴³ Relational databases give analysts the ability to see patterns and trends in minutes, work that might have taken hours or days in the past. Chief Serpas described efforts to improve information technology to provide this type of power and flexibility with data. Improvements have allowed greater temporal analysis, and he said that they continue to improve information management systems.¹⁴⁴ The experience in both cities highlights this issue as one of

¹⁴³ Oracle Corporation, *Chicago Police Department Cuts Administrative Costs, Gains the Equivalent of 300 Extra Officers on the Street*, <http://www.oracle.com/customers/profiles/PROFILE4257.HTML> (accessed January 18, 2007).

¹⁴⁴ Serpas, Interview.

great importance in implementing an effective ILP strategy. As agencies improve their collection of information and expand their information sources, the ability to effectively process and exploit that information and make it manageable for analysts is increasingly dependent on information technology.

Another similarity of the Chicago and Nashville efforts has been one of focus. As collection efforts have expanded the amount of information available for analysis, and as analysis has increased in sophistication, the focus of analysis has shifted from micro street-level problems to district, agency, or citywide threats. In both cities, the superintendent or chief directed the shift in focus to address citywide problems across traditional boundaries. This appears to have resulted in increased cooperation between department units and improved the effectiveness of their efforts.

In previous sections, the efforts in both cities were compared against the elements of Compstat programs. That comparison showed that both Chicago and Nashville require intelligence input into operational decisions. Both agencies effectively incorporated intelligence into the problem identification and strategy development processes. This began as a requirement from the chief executive, but it became a standard practice as the quality of analysis improved.

To support effective crime strategies, intelligence must be timely. In both cities, great effort has been given to producing and disseminating intelligence reports as quickly as possible. Improved information technologies, information collection, and internal processes have likely led to these improvements.

Weekly command meetings serve to disseminate intelligence, reinforce the chief executive's priorities, communicate problems and strategies, and enhance accountability. In Chicago, these take the form of DOC meetings held every Friday afternoon at 5:00. In Nashville, Compstat meetings are held every Friday morning. In the meeting format that developed in both cities, command accountability is achieved without belittling or embarrassing commanders.

The positive effects of the weekly command meetings are replicated at lower organizational levels in both cities. Weekly district-level crime strategy meetings serve to drive chief's priorities down to street level; disseminate and communicate intelligence;

discuss and evaluate problems and strategies; and enhance accountability at the district level. This improves ownership of problems and strategies at the street level.

Both departments have maintained and built this strategy on existing community policing practices. There is a belief that maintaining close relationships with the community enhances communication, improves the effectiveness of police in the community, and enhances intelligence-led efforts.¹⁴⁵

Finally, the primary focus of ILP efforts in both cities has been on crime identification and reduction, and terrorism has been a secondary priority. Chicago has counter-terrorism resources in the DOC and their analysts are terrorism generalists, which seems to satisfy commanders. Nashville maintains an intelligence unit in liaison with the JTTF and provides training for officers and other personnel on terrorism issues.¹⁴⁶

2. Differences

The main differences noted between the practices of the two agencies stem from the several year head start that Chicago had on Nashville. This, along with the millions of dollars that Chicago has spent on information technology systems, has given them a decided advantage. The elements of the intelligence cycle are clearly institutionalized in the Chicago Police Department with the DOC as an effective central hub. Nashville is implementing the same model and has seen early success. One noticeable difference is that Nashville maintains a separate intelligence unit apart from the central analytical unit. Based on the findings of this research, this separates parts of the functions of the intelligence cycle and provides potential gaps in information collection and sharing, especially given the nature of some internal units to hoard information. Incomplete or

¹⁴⁵ This belief was evident in interviews with personnel from both agencies, particularly Commander Kelton from MNPD and with Lt. Schmidt from CPD. Additionally, official statements from both agencies emphasize the importance of community policing and/or strong ties to the community.

¹⁴⁶ JTTF, or Joint Terrorism Task Force, as discussed previously, is an FBI task force responsible for conducting follow-up investigations on potential terrorist activity. In a telephone interview, Chief Serpas expressed hesitancy to including terrorism investigation and intelligence duties into their crime reduction priorities. His argument was that local resources are stretched thin, and that terrorism investigation is a federal responsibility. The chief was wary of local police assuming federal responsibilities because it draws resources away from local priorities and provides federal authorities an opportunity to accept less than their full responsibility. Thus, the intelligence unit in the Nashville PD liaisons with the JTTF, but is largely an investigative unit responsible for field investigations, informant files, etc. and has no analytical capability.

inaccurate assessments on the crime and terrorist threat are possible if analysts do not have access to every available information source, and inadequate or misdirected strategies can be the result.

Another difference noted is Nashville's inclusion and review of the activities of every section of the department. While Chicago's focus is on a several specific crime categories, Chief Serpas' ADL model attempts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of every part of the agency. Finding efficiencies and improving effectiveness can lead to having extra resources to dedicate to operational activities.

E. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter began with a brief discussion of the reasons and ways police agencies organize themselves to deliver services to their specific jurisdictions. There is a relationship between organizational structure and the agency's ability to implement a particular policing philosophy. For example, certain philosophies, such as Community Policing, require more resources focused on community interaction and less on rapid deployment. Understanding this will help police executives structure their agencies to deliver services efficiently and effectively.

The relation between organizational structure and effective service delivery were highlighted when the ILP efforts of two large city police departments were analyzed. The Chicago, Illinois, PD and the Metro Nashville, Tennessee, PD both initiated a change in policing strategy, and this shift was preceded and facilitated by a change in organizational structure. Chicago PD implemented ILP throughout the organization, and the centralized Deployment Operations Center was a central element of their success. Metro Nashville's ILP implementation continues to develop and a formalized Compstat model, called Accountability Driven Leadership, has established their philosophy. Both agencies have achieved improvements in efficiency and reductions in crime. The ability to develop through their own versions of ILP increasingly sophisticated estimates of the elements of the threats to community safety is at the core of the successes in both cities.

Though implementation of ILP across different agencies can appear haphazard and specific to the local jurisdiction, this review shows that in these two cities, there are certain important factors of effective strategies. The next chapter will compare the

strategic dimensions of the 3i model against dimensions of the Chicago and Nashville policing strategies. This will provide insight into whether the dimensions identified in the 3i model are present in the applied models in CPD and the MNPd.

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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter begins with a review of the 3i model introduced in Chapter II as a set of criteria to assess the effectiveness of intelligence-led policing programs. A comparison of the aspects of the programs in Chicago and Nashville against the criteria in the 3i model leads to recommendations for the implementation of intelligence-led policing. After identifying the strategic dimensions of an effective program, a framework for identifying implementation factors will be explained. Implementation of a new strategy or philosophy in any business inevitably encounters obstacles. A brief discussion is presented here on potential barriers to implementation and suggestions for overcoming them.

A. CHICAGO AND NASHVILLE VIS A VIS THE 3i MODEL

Table 1 presents the strategic dimensions of the 3i model and indicates whether the implementations of ILP in Chicago and Nashville contain that dimension. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop quantitative measurements of these strategic dimensions and statistically measure conformity. It is useful, however, to identify the degree to which each department utilizes the strategic dimension. This nominal measure, from high to low, as presented in Table 1, provides a general assessment of the implementation of that element by the agency based on this analysis.

Table 1. Comparison of Chicago PD and Metro Nashville PD against the 3i Model

3i Dimensions	Chicago Police Department	Metropolitan Nashville Police Department
Criminal/Terrorist Environment Structure	High	High
Intelligence Structure	High	High
Interpret Process	High	Medium/High
Decision Maker Structure	High	High
Influence Process	High	High
Impact Process	High	High

A quick review of crime statistics in both cities reveals that in spite of successes at crime reductions, crime remains an issue. The presence of *criminal structure* is a basis of the 3i model so that there are factors of crime to analyze. *Criminal enterprise* is a problem both prior to and after implementation of the model.

The *intelligence structure* was reorganized and redefined in both the Nashville and Chicago Police Departments. The Deployment Operations Center in Chicago became the central point for the collection of information and generation of intelligence in support of agency-wide operations. This was made possible by the restructuring and consolidation of the intelligence resources and functions. Nashville similarly consolidated intelligence resources and functions, though not completely. The steps taken increased capacity for analysis and intelligence creation.

This concentration of intelligence functions and resources improved the ability to produce targeted, quality, relevant and timely intelligence products. It is clear that both agencies developed the capacity to identify and understand criminal threats and problems in their jurisdictions. The DOC in Chicago developed processes and skills to produce advanced and sophisticated analyses. The quality of the analysis produced in Nashville continues to increase. Thus, both agencies developed sufficient *interpret processes* to support effective ILP.

The 3i model articulates a need for a *decision-maker structure* to enable agency decision-makers to receive and act on intelligence about issues and threats. Various organizational barriers can exist that would prevent such intelligence from reaching the decision-maker and impacting decisions. Personal barriers such as apathy or differing priorities could block intelligence from them. The decision-maker structure in both Chicago and Nashville, however, facilitates intelligence reaching the decision makers. This has been achieved through policy (chief or superintendent order), structure (centralized intelligence structure), and technology. All of these elements are also captured in the command meeting. The DOC meeting in Chicago and the Compstat meeting in Nashville serve to deliver intelligence to departmental decision-makers in an effective, targeted manner. Decision-makers are accountable for results of their efforts addressing problems, ensuring that intelligence is received and acted upon.

Once mechanisms are in place for intelligence to reach decision-makers and they have given it priority, the 3i model requires that their decisions will be influenced by it. Identification of these *influence processes* in both departments was discussed and verified. The question is whether the intelligence influences operational decisions. Both Chicago and Nashville require intelligence to make operational decisions. These influence processes are facilitated by several factors. Creation of a centralized intelligence structure ensures a consistent, reliable intelligence product which facilitates decision-making. The weekly command meetings present intelligence to commanders where they discuss strategies that were developed based on intelligence. Commanders in both agencies rely on this intelligence information to make operational decisions as it has been shown to be effective and more efficiently targets their limited resources.

The *impact process* is an evaluation of whether the ILP processes and structures impact crime or terrorism. In the case of both Chicago and Nashville, indications are that they have. Even without the ability to identify all the factors that might influence crime and criminality to statistically show correlation between ILP measures and reduced crime, there is encouraging anecdotal evidence that it has made a difference. The implementation of proven strategies and tactics in response to accurate, actionable intelligence should result in more effective and efficient policing.

1. Strategy Map of Strategic Factors

The strategy map provides a visual depiction of the strategic dimensions that allow for a successful business model, in this case intelligence-led policing.¹⁴⁷ As shown in Figure 4, the strategic elements of the policing strategy of four police strategies are charted in the strategy map. Chicago PD policing strategy is charted both before and after the creation of the DOC and their implementation of ILP. The policing strategies of Metro Nashville PD before and after implementation of ADL are also charted. The strategy map lists several dimensions of policing strategy across the Y axis. Six of these factors are the elements of successful ILP program articulated in the 3i model (see Table 1). Based on the analysis of their operations, three other dimensions are important

¹⁴⁷ W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, *Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant* (New York: Harvard Business School Press, 2005), 25-28.

elements of the ILP programs in Chicago and Nashville and are presented here to illustrate their importance. These three additional dimensions are a *proactive crime focus*, a *centralized intelligence function*, and *organized collection of information*. As with the factors listed in Table 1, these nominal measurements represent generalizations about the degree the strategic element is present in the policing strategy of the agency, as determined by the preceding analysis.

Proactive Crime Focus: Previous sections showed how agencies implementing ILP look at proactively at crimes and criminals as opposed to being operating reactively. The analyses of Chicago and Nashville police departments demonstrate that both agencies made this strategic shift, Chicago more so than Nashville, but both have made great strides. As the strategy map illustrates, before their implementation of ILP, both agencies had a much more reactive focus.

Centralized intelligence function: The 3i model demonstrates the importance of an effective intelligence structure. It is clear that both Chicago and Nashville centralized the intelligence function as a central tenet of their strategies. This appears to have been important to the success of their programs, and is therefore listed as a separate strategic dimension. The *intelligence structure* dimension therefore refers to the internal structure, assignment of sufficient personnel, skills, training, etc., that make up an effective intelligence unit. The *centralized intelligence function* dimension refers to the degree to which the intelligence structure was centralized to implement the strategy. It is clear that Chicago PD did so, and Nashville is making progress toward high effectiveness.

Organized collection of information: Without collection of an adequate volume of the right kinds of information, there will be no intelligence generated. So while it may seem integral to building an adequate intelligence structure, collection is here broken out as a separate strategic dimension due to its importance to the entire cycle. As shown in the analysis of the programs in Chicago and Nashville, both agencies made improved collection a priority, and this is reflected on the strategy map.




Figure 4. Strategy Map—Intelligence-Led Policing in Two Cities

The strategy map highlights the great changes in policy, process, and structure made by both agencies. Note that neither the pre-ADL Nashville PD nor the pre-DOC Chicago PD register influence process or impact process. This illustrates the 3i model’s argument that in order to be able to influence decision-makers, accurate and relevant intelligence must first be generated. Similarly, for decision-makers to impact crime through ILP, they must have intelligence of the type described herein. Prior to the implementation of ILP models in these two cities, the police certainly had the ability to impact crime and disorder in their communities through traditional or community-based means. The agencies did not have the structures or processes in place, however, to influence leaders or impact crime with good intelligence.

The analysis of the intelligence-led policing efforts in Chicago and Nashville highlights the importance of the 3i model elements as well as the other strategic dimensions shown in the strategy map. These should be considered when an agency

considers implementing a strategic shift to incorporate ILP. As the analysis of Chicago and Nashville demonstrates, it is possible to be flexible in designing the model to account for local issues. The next section provides a framework for evaluating a police agency's strategy and ensuring that the critical strategic dimensions of ILP are included in an agency's strategy while allowing for local variation.

B. IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE THEORY OF ILP

1. Four Actions Framework

Once a police manager understands the strategic dimensions of an effective policing strategy as presented in the strategy map, the four actions framework helps the decision-maker evaluate current operations.¹⁴⁸ Designed to assist the decision maker in understanding the factors necessary to change the current organization and achieve the efficiencies and increased effectiveness of the ILP strategy curve presented in Figure 4, the four actions framework asks four questions to challenge the current strategy:

1. Which of the factors in the current policing strategy should be eliminated?
2. Which factors (e.g. policies, staffing, practices, etc.) in the current policing strategy should be reduced well below levels of the current strategy?
3. Which factors should be raised well above traditional levels?
4. Which new factors should be created that the police agency has never done?

With an understanding of the 3i model and the above analysis of effective intelligence-led policing efforts, the answers to these questions are answered in the next section as they would apply to an agency looking to transform to ILP. Figure 5 presents the four actions framework of critical factors for an agency looking to implement ILP. Each agency considering a strategic shift of its policing model to ILP would apply this framework to their organization and develop recommendations specific to their structure and personnel.

¹⁴⁸ Four Actions Framework discussion and figure adopted from Kim and Mauborgne, *Blue Ocean Strategy*, 29-31.



Figure 5. Four Actions Framework

a. Eliminate

- Eliminate reactive strategic focus—The agency should shift its thinking about crime problems and work to prevent crime problems by understanding and anticipating the factors contributing to crime and violence.
- Eliminate separation of intelligence and operations—Chiefs should understand the past tendencies of agencies to place the responsibility for anything termed intelligence to a small specialized unit that is insulated from the larger organization. This practice must be eliminated for ILP to be successful and to realize efficiencies and increased effectiveness. The reforms in Chicago give a clear example of this.

b. Reduce

- Reduce technological and organizational barriers to the sharing of intelligence—Organizational barriers should be removed and policies and processes implemented that facilitate communication and information sharing need developed. Improved technology,

reorganization, and new policy have increased the ability of both Chicago and Nashville to develop and share intelligence within the agency.

- Reduce small unit monopoly on the creation and holding of intelligence—Agencies should ensure that units within the agency are not allowed to squirrel away the intelligence they develop as part of their duties. This is a common occurrence, especially in larger organizations. Through performance of their duties, police develop information about criminals and crime threats. This sometimes results in a situation when specialized units develop a fairly complex understanding of a particular crime, but fail to share what they know with other units, even if the information is specific to the other units' crime specialty. This problem highlights the importance of a centralized, sophisticated intelligence structure and policies that support sharing.

c. Raise

- Raise analytical capacity—To have an adequate intelligence structure to support operational decision-making, it is necessary to develop analytical capacity to produce sophisticated and accurate intelligence. This can be achieved by ensuring that there are an adequate number of analysts and by improving the analytical acumen through training and experience.
- Raise delivery to and incorporation of intelligence into decision-maker actions—The 3i model highlights the importance of the decision-maker structure. Decision-makers need policies and processes to ensure that they receive and use this improved intelligence to guide their decisions.
- Raise intelligence-driven tactics—Police commanders should develop and apply tactics and strategies which are specifically crafted to target threats, problems, and trends identified through the ILP analytical process.

d. Create

- Create capacity for robust collection—The agency needs to place an emphasis on collecting information from a wide variety of internal and external sources.
- Create targeted, timely dissemination—In order to be most valuable to operational decisions, bulletins and other disseminations of intelligence information must be timely, accurate, and targeted to specific audiences (e.g., commanders, unit-level, agency-wide).

- Create intelligence-based accountability—Intelligence-driven operations must become the heart of the department’s strategy, and to ensure that its members are focusing their efforts where they will have the greatest impact, the intelligence must become the source of accountability. Both Nashville and Chicago have transformed their operations by doing so, and have done so without creating an atmosphere of fear and mistrust.
- Create agency-wide mission alignment—Perhaps the most important lesson from the case studies of ILP in two cities is that the chief executive must establish specific agency priorities, and articulate the centrality of ILP to the mission of the agency. It is evident in the success of both Chicago and Nashville’s efforts that the support and involvement of the leader is critical.

This application of the four actions framework is illustrative of the insights that can be gained in an analysis of an agency’s operations. To implement the change to an intelligence-led policing model, this type of careful review of an agency must precede changes to ensure that organizational structure, policies, and processes align with the new mission. The next section identifies several factors that can present significant barriers when implementing change.

2. Implementation Barriers

Managers attempting to bring about change in an organization often face four hurdles to successful implementation.¹⁴⁹ Though every change is different, and a manager may not face all four, it is important to anticipate and understand these potential hurdles to manage the organizational risk inherent in change. Addressing this risk early improves the chances that when it comes time to implement the new strategy, adequate measures have been taken to prevent these hurdles from undermining the leader’s efforts.

Cognitive Hurdle—The first hurdle is cognitive. Managers must instill the need for the strategic change in employees. Police officers, supervisors, and managers may be comfortable in traditional patterns, and if they have performed well in the current

¹⁴⁹ The discussion of hurdles to implementation is adapted from Kim and Mauborgne, *Blue Ocean Strategy*, 147-169. It is presented here to illustrate the internal challenges a manager faces when attempting to implement change in an organization. The potential for internal opposition to change is steep, and this section is not intended to present an exhaustive list of all possible problems a manager might encounter. There are many strategies that can be developed to anticipate and overcome this opposition; however the outline developed in *Blue Ocean* is presented as an example that is concise, thorough, and practical for managers to follow.

organization, they may not agree with the need to change. For a change to be successful, employees and managers need to believe in the need for change.

Police managers may attempt to make their case by citing crime statistics, but officers are often not swayed by this argument because numbers are abstract representations and can be manipulated. To get police supervisors and managers to understand the need for change, it is often necessary to have them experience the problems first hand. It may have been years since many commanders have spent much time in the field dealing with the problems faced by officers. Similarly, over time, it is easy to lose touch with the problems that residents sometimes face when trying to receive service from the agency. One way to truly understand the issues and problems that an agency faces in efficiently delivering its services is to put commanders and executives into the field doing the job of line-level officers. Requiring them to spend time handling the problems and experiencing the frustrations can force them to understand the need for change. Also, putting commanders in the position of interacting with residents can provide eye-opening feedback. Chicago Superintendent Cline has all exempt (command) personnel work in the field every Friday night after the weekly DOC meetings so that they experience and understand the crime problems that they talk about in the abstract during the meetings.

This is one method to break the cognitive hurdle and have employees understand the need for strategic change. Police executives must understand the importance of this aspect and give it attention.

Resource Hurdle—Often a change in strategy to address crime or other problems is associated with a call for additional resources. Calls by chiefs and police unions for additional officers to answer rising crime are common. This may present itself as a hurdle internally and externally. Police commanders, police unions, and elected officials may resist a change to an ILP strategy based on the belief that there are insufficient resources to implement such a change.

These concerns must be answered in order to gain the support of key players for the change. One answer to these concerns is that intelligence-led policing should by its nature allow police to more effectively apply its resources toward problems, thus increasing efficiency.

To use a fishing metaphor, ILP allows the agency to stop fishing by throwing out a wide net to catch single fish hidden among the school, and instead to start using a fish finder, putting the hook in front of the right fish. By studying the strategy canvas for ILP and using the four actions framework, police executives should identify units or positions that do not contribute to the core missions identified by the chief, and reassign those officers to the areas of greatest need. As seen in the Nashville and Chicago case studies, these important functions include increasing the intelligence analysis function and providing additional officers for targeted policing efforts. This increased efficiency and internal resource trading to reinforce the chief's priorities help to jump the resource hurdle. Nashville was able to implement ADL and achieve crime reductions not only within resources, but during a time when the number of officers actually declined.¹⁵⁰

Motivational Hurdle—The third challenge to implementation is motivational. The leader cannot implement change alone, and needs key players in the organization to move with speed and energy to break from traditional policing to ILP. Once the key players in the police agency recognize the need for change and understand that ILP is an efficient policing model, they need to be motivated to act on the chief's priorities in a meaningful and sustained manner.

The nature of ILP as implemented in Nashville and Chicago facilitated motivation because it utilized three motivational factors necessary to support such a change.¹⁵¹ Rather than try to motivate everyone en masse, the chief should focus on the individuals with the greatest ability to influence others in the organization. Kim & Mauborgne call these internal leaders *kingpins* who are well respected and persuasive in the organization. In Nashville, the chief did this by sending copies of his issue paper to commanders before he arrived, and then empowering district commanders to initiate the change. In Chicago,

¹⁵⁰ Serpas, *Presentation to Public Safety Committee*.

¹⁵¹ Kim and Mauborgne, *Blue Ocean Strategy*, 161-165.

the DOC was given resources and authority and pilot districts were selected to initiate the change. Thus, both leaders identified district commanders as kingpins with the ability to exert great influence in the organization.

The efforts of these internal leaders should be highlighted so that their actions or inactions are visible for all to see, as if in a fishbowl.¹⁵² This motivates the leaders to succeed and improves the chances of others joining the efforts. The DOC meetings in Chicago and Compstat meetings in Nashville serve to place the efforts of these leaders in the spotlight, and give commanders a platform to showcase their successes. If success breeds success, then other commanders are motivated to match or beat the success of their peers.

Finally, initiating such a large strategic shift in an organization can be threatening and stressful for employees. This fear can prevent some from taking action, and internal communications are important to manage this effect. Employees can be helped by breaking down the larger strategy into smaller “bites” that address the mission of a unit or area. Rather than try to grapple with the effort necessary to achieve the entire agency’s mission, officers and supervisors are more likely to believe that they can achieve a more limited mission statement crafted for a smaller segment of the organization. For example, if a unit understands that their objective is to make several city blocks safer, they may perceive that as obtainable, whereas they might feel intimidated if they tried to grasp the larger mission of securing the entire city.

Political Hurdle—The last hurdle is internal politics. Change does not come easily to an organization, and it is often resisted by employees with an interest in maintaining the status quo. This is perhaps the most difficult challenge. The police executive needs to have a senior leader on his staff who can advise him on the potential supporters and opponents of his strategy. The executive needs to understand the nature of the opponents’ arguments and attempt to build win-win solutions to their arguments. Highlighting and rewarding the positive performance of those who embrace the new strategy is an important step.

¹⁵² Kim and Mauborgne, in *Blue Ocean Strategy*; call this the “fishbowl technique” of highlighting the actions or inactions of subordinate leaders.

3. Other Issues

Once an executive determines that the agency will implement a strategic shift to ILP, and negotiates the issues outlined above to determine the shape and direction of that change, the chief and his management team will have myriad other technical issues to manage. It is the purpose of this research paper to identify and offer recommendations on strategic issues related to a transition to intelligence-led policing, not to be a technical reference guide. Resources are available to law enforcement executives that provide guidance on some of the more technical issues. Several issues are discussed in this section to be illustrative of the issues and provide some resources to help address them.

Training—To establish the intelligence capacity needed for law enforcement operations and to identify threats in the community from criminals and terrorists, officers, analysts, and managers need training and education. They also need sufficient experience to gain sophistication and skill in ILP techniques.¹⁵³ There are adequate guidance documents and many schools and training courses available to help agencies determine the type of training that they need and to help them obtain it.

Every member of the law enforcement agency should participate in some form of training to facilitate the implementation of ILP. Training for non-intelligence personnel, including recruits, patrol officers, and investigators should aim to help them better understand the intelligence process and their role in that process. This is designed to prepare them to understand, contribute to, and benefit from intelligence.¹⁵⁴ Analyst training should improve domain awareness and preparing local threat assessments. The subject matter of intelligence training for analytical staff can be divided into two categories: (1) protocols and methodology of intelligence process, and (2) subject matter expertise.¹⁵⁵ The former deals with the administrative issues of managing an intelligence unit, and the latter deals with knowledge of the types of enterprise they are investigating: drug trafficking, international terrorism, Islamic jihad, auto theft, money laundering, gangs, etc. The intelligence specialist must be a subject matter expert on the type of

¹⁵³ Riley, et al., *State and Local Intelligence*, 61.

¹⁵⁴ Marilyn B. Peterson and Howard N. Atkin, "Training the Intelligence Unit" in Peterson, ed., *Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements*.

¹⁵⁵ Carter, *Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide*, 112.

criminal activity investigated. A major recommendation of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan was for increased training and standardization.¹⁵⁶ Minimum criminal intelligence training standards have been developed which provide standardized curriculum.¹⁵⁷ The standards outline core minimum criminal intelligence training standards for each of several training classifications, including intelligence analyst (40 hours), intelligence manager (24 hours), law enforcement executive (4 hours), general law enforcement officer (recruit 2 hours/in service 2 hours), intelligence officer/collector (40 hours), and train-the-trainer (16 hours).

28CFR Part 23—The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan recommends that law enforcement agencies should adopt the requirements of 28CFR Part 23 as the minimum standards for their data collection efforts. This federal regulation establishes criminal intelligence systems operating policies, and though it legally applies to federally funded multi-jurisdictional computerized criminal intelligence systems, the recommendation of the NCISP is sound for all agencies to adopt its requirements. The regulations provide guidance on critical issues such as the collection of information, retention of records, established process of records review, purging standards and processes, and dissemination criteria.

Non law enforcement inclusion—It has been argued here and in a number of other places that local law enforcement agencies are well situated to participate in the war on terrorism because of their close ties to the community. For similar reasons, it is important to incorporate non law enforcement disciplines into the intelligence process. Firefighters, EMS, public health, and other emergency response agencies interact with the public every day. In the course of their responses, they are in a position to observe suspicious activity and indicators of criminal or terrorist activity. Additionally, as they respond in these neighborhoods, they place themselves in potentially dangerous situations. A response by a local fire company or ambulance crew to a residence where terrorist suspects are housed presents a potentially dangerous situation.

¹⁵⁶ DOJ, *The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*, 82.

¹⁵⁷ BJA, *Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards for United States Law Enforcement and Other Criminal Justice Agencies*, (Washington, DC, 2004).

Public Health is another example of a non law enforcement discipline with a wealth of potential information for law enforcement. Health officials monitor health outbreaks and emergency medical responses, and should have a mechanism to report information to analysts. Private sector security personnel also have the potential to serve as important “eyes and ears” for law enforcement, but they must first understand what to look for and how to report. As law enforcement develops the capacity to understand threats from criminals and terrorists, they must understand the importance of sharing outside of law enforcement circles. The value of an informed responder and security force comes from their interactions in the community and ability to observe and report important information. As they do so and interact with terrorists or their tools, it becomes imperative that law enforcement use the intelligence they have developed to educate these responders so that they have the knowledge to protect themselves as they serve the public. Recent research highlights this need and provides potential solutions for providing intelligence to non law enforcement personnel in an appropriate context.¹⁵⁸ Eaneff provides a model of dissemination to non law enforcement personnel that can increase awareness and sharing and result in improved intelligence.

Unfortunately, while this need is increasingly acknowledged, the ability to bridge this gap and provide relevant intelligence to non-traditional responders is hampered by both inadequate process and unwillingness by law enforcement officials.¹⁵⁹ For example, due to its interpretation of Indiana law regulating criminal intelligence information, the Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC) considers any information that comes into its possession as criminal intelligence information and will not disseminate it except to law enforcement agencies.¹⁶⁰ This may be an example of the law being outpaced by the needs

¹⁵⁸ Charles Eaneff, *The Impact of Contextual Background Fusion on Perceived Value and Quality of Unclassified Terrorism Intelligence*, (Master’s thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2007), 11.

¹⁵⁹ Eaneff uses the term “Non Traditional Responder” (NTR) to describe the non law enforcement public safety personnel, security forces, and critical infrastructure operators. Eaneff acknowledges the important role the NTR sector can play in collecting information and intelligence generation, as well as the importance of disseminating intelligence to them in the proper context so that they can effectively carry out their protective missions. Eaneff argues that the NTR generally neither need nor want classified intelligence, rather, to be useful, they need declassified intelligence in the context of their mission.

¹⁶⁰ This assessment is based on conversations with the executive director of the Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center that took place in January 2007. The Director acknowledges the importance of sharing with NTR’s, but feels constrained by Indiana code and inadequate mechanisms to do so.

of information sharing in today's world. It also highlights the importance of understanding the need to share information, and adjusting laws and policies to accomplish critical needs.

Resources—Resources are available to provide law enforcement managers guidance on the technical aspects of implementing ILP. While not meant to be a complete listing, several of them are:

- *The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*:¹⁶¹ The NCISP serves as a reference guide providing guidance on establishing an intelligence function.
- *Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies*:¹⁶² The Guide provides an overview of intelligence and detailed technical information on establishing intelligence units. It is current and addresses important management issues.
- *Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements*:¹⁶³ Intelligence 2000 is a detailed primer on law enforcement intelligence. It provides an overview of the intelligence function as well as very detailed information on how to implement and manage an intelligence unit.
- Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards¹⁶⁴ The standards provide standardized curriculum on law enforcement intelligence training. Agencies could immediately adopt these standards and improve their capabilities.

C. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter began with a discussion of the Chicago and Nashville models of ILP as applied to the 3i model presented in Chapter II. This analysis validates the elements of the 3i model, and identifies several other elements necessary for a successful ILP program. This analysis supports the notion that agencies have to focus both on structure and policy to develop an effective ILP program. To develop ILP capacity, an agency must structure itself and establish policies to collect, develop, and use intelligence. In a

¹⁶¹ U.S. Department of Justice, *The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan*.

¹⁶² Carter, *Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide*.

¹⁶³ Peterson, ed., *Intelligence 2000*.

¹⁶⁴ U.S. Department of Justice, *Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards*.

shift from the reactive culture of traditional policing models, ILP requires that the agency institutionalize the intelligence cycle in every aspect of their operation to take a proactive stance against identified threats.

A discussion followed of considerations for police executives in moving an agency to an ILP strategy. The Four Actions framework provides leaders with a tool to challenge current operations and develop recommendations for organizational elements that should be reduced, increased, eliminated, or created in order to achieve the strategic shift. Considering the discussion of critical elements for ILP adoption, the Four Action Framework was presented with these factors applied to a non specific agency. The chapter concludes with a discussion of potential barriers to implementation of ILP in an agency, and other factors for consideration by executives.

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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

A. PREVENT TERRORISM WITH ILP

The threat of domestic and international terrorism to cause widespread property damage, pain, human suffering, injury, and death is a real concern in America and throughout the Western world. The recently updated National Strategy for Combating Terrorism describes today's terrorist enemy as a "transnational movement of organizations, networks, and individuals—and their state and non-state supporters—which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for their ideological ends."¹⁶⁵

Add the threat of terrorist acts posed by domestic groups and it is apparent that the challenge of preventing terrorism in America is large indeed. Public safety agencies cannot rely solely on federal law enforcement for their protection. As local crime problems continue to demand increasing attention and resources, the challenge to police executives is to squeeze the counter terrorism mission into the jobs their agencies perform. ILP is presented as an option to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement in identifying and reducing the threat of crime in the community, potentially without the burden of adding additional resources.

1. Integrate Counter Terrorism and Crime Prevention Activities

The same model of intelligence-led policing that can develop an understanding of criminal trends and issues in the community can be effective at identifying, understanding, and assessing the terrorist threat. This is made possible because terrorist planning activity often manifests itself through other criminal activity, exposing it to observation and analysis by the police. Similarly, an engaged community can observe and report suspicious activity, providing information for analysts to consider. In spite of the fact that much of the classified intelligence on the presence of terrorist groups in America is held by federal law enforcement officials, mechanisms exist to bridge the gap. These include Joint Terrorism Task Forces and State Fusion Centers. Neither JTTFs nor Fusion Centers, however, have the capacity to engage the community like local police agencies.

¹⁶⁵ White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, DC, September 2006), 9.

Law enforcement agencies, therefore, should implement intelligence-led policing to improve their ability to combat crime *and* to improve their ability to protect their communities against terrorism. They alone possess the means to develop a deep understanding of the character and issues of their communities.

2. Develop Analytic Sophistication for Terrorism Analysis

For analysts to generate intelligence about crime trends and threats in the community, they need training in the mechanics of intelligence as well as education to become subject matter experts in crime type(s). With sufficient training, when they study collected information, they are able to discern patterns of activity and behavior indicative of a particular crime.

The same process should be used to develop the capacity for analysts to identify terrorist activity in a community. This is no simple task, but it is critical for law enforcement executives to facilitate the development of this base of knowledge among their intelligence analysts. Analysts need training, education, and experience to understand terrorists, terrorist groups, their motivations, and actions, so that when they study behavior patterns, they will be able to make sense of behavior and reach correct assumptions. If they can develop the sophistication and expertise to develop deep understanding of their local communities, analysts within local police agencies are well situated to understand whether the behavior and activities they are analyzing are within local norms or truly constitute threatening behaviors. This can happen as a result of the closer ties to the community enjoyed by local police.

3. Embrace Community Policing

Adopting a community policing philosophy that values community partnerships has been an important strategy for improving the responsiveness and accountability of police. The trust built through close community ties facilitates increased information sharing necessary for intelligence-led policing. Citizens willing to report criminal activity can interrupt an otherwise unnoticed criminal enterprise. These same strengths contribute to interrupting terrorists organizations operating in the neighborhoods of our cities.

Community policing efforts that engage communities and build relationships and understanding with citizens should serve as the foundation upon which intelligence-led policing strategies are built.

B. BUILD ILP CAPACITY ALONG STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS

This paper's analysis and conclusions have identified the important strategic elements for developing an effective intelligence-led policing program in a law enforcement agency. The following recommendations draw upon the conclusions of that analysis and establish a framework for agencies to follow in developing and implementing an ILP program.

1. Use the 3i Model as an Effective Framework

The six elements of the 3i model serve as key aspects of an effective program. The model is sufficiently flexible to allow development of a strategy that meets local needs and issues while developing an effective ILP program. Police executives should evaluate the structure and operations of their organization and cause changes to ensure the structure, policies, and processes align with the tenets of the 3i model.

2. Centralize Intelligence and Analysis

An effective intelligence structure provides the foundation for the rest of the 3i model to work. This thesis has shown that to be most effective, departments should create or reinforce a robust centralized intelligence operation. The main role of this unit should be the identification and analysis of major threats and trends, with minor investigative emphasis. The work of this unit should be of central importance to the operations of the department, and should have the full support of the chief executive.

3. Develop Comprehensive, Organized Collection Efforts

Accurate, targeted, and timely intelligence analysis is made possible in large part by ensuring that analysts have as much relevant information as possible from as many sources as possible. An agency that wishes to have an effective ILP program must ensure that information from the widest possible array of internal and external sources is made available to the intelligence analysts.

4. Consider Whole Jurisdiction as Focus for Crime Strategies

The benefits of establishing an aggressive, sophisticated central intelligence analytical capability are seen in the ability to identify and understand complex crime trends and threats, while improving neighborhood-level efforts. Agencies will realize the most benefit from implementing ILP if they require a jurisdiction-wide assessment of problems. More localized problems will develop as a subset of these larger problems, and agencies will be more effective at eradicating threats if this broader perspective is taken.

5. Build Accountability for Results at All Levels

Even the most accurate and insightful intelligence is useless if no one pays attention to it. For an agency to achieve the crime reduction benefits made possible by improved intelligence, it must be utilized in operational decisions. Police executives must implement a mechanism by which intelligence is shared and discussed in relation to threats and operational activities. Intelligence must be the basis by which accountability for the success of operations is measured.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

1. Integration with State and Federal Intelligence Sources

This report has demonstrated that the ability to create a capacity within a law enforcement agency to develop, understand, and act upon intelligence is challenging but possible when the chief executive makes it his or her priority. The model presented in this paper does require law enforcement agencies to organize and dedicate resources to break from former patterns of operation and to institutionalize and facilitate new patterns. The intelligence development activities described in this paper do require personnel dedicated to the necessary functions, thus this model may be impractical for smaller agencies to implement. The examples of Chicago and Metro Nashville police departments used in this paper are large police departments with over a thousand personnel. Reorganization and restructuring of personnel within agencies of that size should make personnel available to dedicate to the necessary intelligence structure. It is recognized that smaller agencies may not be able to reallocate sufficient personnel to establish a full-service

intelligence unit in the agency. Though their need for accurate, timely intelligence about threats and conditions in their jurisdiction is no less real, the manpower issue is a real barrier.

Further research is required to develop a model for intelligence-led policing among smaller agencies. If all resources in smaller agencies are focused on operational activities, there remains a need to create the full intelligence structure in the agency. This need may be met in partnership between the agency and a state or regional Fusion Center. Fusion centers provide collection ability, analytical resources, and are increasingly equipped to disseminate intelligence products in real time to law enforcement agencies.¹⁶⁶ Fusion Centers are supposed to serve as a conduit for information and intelligence flow between local, state, and federal sources. This is an important role, but to truly provide value to local agencies the Fusion Center must understand local priorities and requirements in order to provide the local agency with relevant intelligence in the local context.

For a Fusion Center to develop the ability to support police agencies with the kind of sophisticated intelligence about criminal and terrorist threats in a specific community would require close collaboration between the agency head and the Fusion Center. The Fusion Center would have to accept local agency priorities and allow them to drive the intelligence requirements of their analysis. There would be certain challenges to ensuring that the intelligence truly supported the needs of the local agency if a Fusion Center provided their intelligence. Fusion Centers would likely have to expand the scope of their collection and analysis, thus losing some autonomy over their mission. Their focus would have to expand from a primarily terrorism focus to one that includes all crimes, as established by their agency partners. The needs of smaller agencies for quality intelligence should justify this expansion of the Fusion Center role. Additionally, the justification for such continued spending at current levels on Fusion Centers should be linked to its effectiveness in reducing threats from both terrorism and crime in communities. Further research should examine the role and function of Fusion Centers and study how they might improve their relevance to local law enforcement issues.

¹⁶⁶ U.S. Department of Justice, "Executive Summary," *Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era* (Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs)

2. ILP Effectiveness Metrics

As police agencies attempt to become more effective at reducing threats of crime and terrorism in their communities, police chiefs and commanders need to have methods and processes available to them to assess the effectiveness of their efforts. The difficulty of ascribing causation to crime fighting efforts was discussed in earlier chapters. Police executives generally do not need statistically significant scientific findings of effectiveness of their efforts, however. When trying to apply the most effective police tactics to problems identified through the ILP process, police commanders need to have the means to assess whether a tactic has worked or not so that they can continue it or adjust to other tactics. Further research into this issue should attempt to develop tools and skills for use by commanders and analysts to assess whether identified threats are reduced after law enforcement intervention.

D. CONCLUSION

Law enforcement agencies are constantly challenged by a changing threat environment, and attempt to meet the challenges with the resources they have at hand. In the past twenty years, terrorism has emerged as a dangerous threat to America while community expectations to address crime have grown as well. Americans rely on local, state, and federal law enforcement to understand this threat, and to incorporate counter terrorism efforts into their already full missions. In looking for the best means to understand and combat the threat of terrorism, intelligence-led policing has been offered as an effective strategy to improve police effectiveness. Several models of policing have been developed that integrate aspects of intelligence-led policing into an agency's strategy. This paper has studied the ILP practices of two police departments—Nashville and Chicago—and analyzed the elements of their strategies that contribute to successful ILP. Drawing from the 3i model of effective ILP operations, this analysis validates the elements of the 3i model, and identifies several others as critical strategic elements necessary for an agency to develop and implement a successful ILP strategy.

A framework to understand and apply the elements of the ILP strategy is provided to understand how police executives can evaluate their own operations and develop a strategy to implement ILP in their own agency. This evaluation is critical, because as this

research has demonstrated, structure, processes, policies, and executive direction do matter, and properly implemented ILP can make a tremendous difference in the effectiveness and the efficiency with which police identify and address threats in their communities. This thesis has advanced the body of knowledge related to defining and improving the abilities of law enforcement to effectively contribute in the global war on terrorism. Future research will build on the results of this thesis and identify issues and provide solutions for homeland security practitioners. The security and safety of our nation depend on the work of these dedicated professionals.

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