

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**FIGHTING A GLOBAL INSURGENCY UTILIZING GALULA'S  
COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE THEORY**

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The world in the twenty-first century has become a very dangerous place. In order to defend ourselves from those that wish to harm us and our way of life, we must clearly understand the nature of "the long war" and how to fight successfully to defeat our enemies. Many experts and politicians claim we are fighting a global war on terrorism. This is simply not true. The goal of these non-state actors is to get the United States, and the rest of the Western World, to succumb to their demands, their ideology and eventually, their way of life. We are in the midst of a global insurgency, and the best way to counter this insurgency is to employ the counterinsurgency warfare theory of David Galula, apply it to a global stage, and adapt it to fit the nature of this insurgency.

The following strategy research project will define insurgency and the nature of insurgencies. Then, it will outline Galula's counterinsurgency warfare theory by reviewing his strategy, operations and tactics. And finally, it will explore some of the underlining causes of insurgencies and how to apply Galula's counterinsurgency warfare theory to the conflicts we face in the twenty-first century.



## FIGHTING A GLOBAL INSURGENCY UTILIZING GALULA'S COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE THEORY

...conduct of counterinsurgency operations is a "graduate level" endeavor full of paradoxes and challenges... It is important, then, that leaders develop a solid appreciation of the nature of irregular warfare...

—David H. Petraeus<sup>1</sup>

The world in the twenty-first century has become a very dangerous place. In order to defend ourselves from those that wish to harm us and our way of life, we must clearly understand the nature of "the long war" and how to fight successfully to defeat our enemies. The United States Government has recently published an updated National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism in February 2006. Many experts and politicians claim we are fighting a global war on terrorism. This is simply not true; terrorism is the means the various non-state actors are using to destroy our will. Ulrich and Cook assert, "[a]ll of the general's testimony used the word "insurgency" when describing the conflict in which the enemy (however termed) was engaged,"<sup>2</sup> even though, as stated above, many of the experts and politicians claim that we are fighting a war on terrorism. I believe the experts, politicians and policy makers classify the current war as a war on terror to de-legitimize the causes, motivations and underpinnings of the organizations that use terror tactics. Ulrich and Cook also assert, "[w]hen key civilian and military actors cannot openly discuss the nature of the conflict, strategy adjustment is necessarily constrained."<sup>3</sup> The goal of these non-state actors is to get the United States and the rest of the Western World, to succumb to their demands, their ideology, and eventually, their way of life. We are in the midst of a global insurgency and the best way to counter this insurgency is to employ the counterinsurgency warfare theory of David Galula, apply it to a global stage, and adapt it to fit the nature of this insurgency.

This paper will define insurgency and the nature of insurgencies, detail the aspects of the global insurgency, and discuss some of the conditions that continue to foster and support that insurgency. Then, the paper will outline Galula's counterinsurgency warfare theory by reviewing his strategy, operations and tactics. And finally, the paper will explore how to apply Galula's counterinsurgency warfare theory to the conflicts we face in the form of a global insurgency in the twenty-first century.

## What is an Insurgency?

Before we can determine how to counter insurgencies we must first define insurgency. According to Webster's dictionary, insurgency is "a condition of revolt against a recognized government that does not reach the proportions of an organized revolutionary government and is not recognized as a belligerency."<sup>4</sup> Webster's dictionary further defines belligerency as, "the state of being at war or in conflict; *specific*: the status whereby a recognized military force is granted the protection of international laws and usages of war (as those laid down by the Hague Convention in 1899)."<sup>5</sup> This definition of insurgency is a situation or environment that facilitates a group or organization, not recognized as a formal military, to engage in a revolt against or overthrow of a state or government that does not reach the level of conventional war. United States Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* defines insurgency using the Joint Publication 1-02 definition as, "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02)."<sup>6</sup> While similar to Webster's definition in terms of the target of the insurgency, it is still broad in nature and does not specify a state, but simply a constituted government, which would infer a state.

French counterinsurgency theorist David Galula's definition is more specific and clearly articulates the true nature of an insurgency. Galula defines an insurgency as, "a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading to the overthrow of the existing order."<sup>7</sup> While this definition is more germane to the nature of insurgencies, Galula, although not specifically stated in his definition, envisions the nature of the conflict to be within the internal confines of a state or nation-state even though he uses, "of the existing order." Thus, Galula classifies the struggle between an insurgent and a counterinsurgent as revolutionary war conducted within the confines of a state system. He does admit however that any insurgency, while operating within a state, will be influenced by external forces, although these are mainly other states.<sup>8</sup>

## How Insurgency Differs From Terrorism

Many today confuse insurgency with terrorism. As stated above, insurgents will use terrorism as a tactic to achieve their objectives. Terrorism alone is an act performed to inflict fear and chaos to advance an individual or group's issue or agenda without necessarily aiming to overthrow the governing body. Dr. Boone Bartholomees explains, "[o]ften used as a tactical part or preliminary stage of a larger campaign or insurgency, terrorism can in fact be a strategy, and sometimes even a goal in it self."<sup>9</sup> He goes on to say, "[m]any ideological terrorists – perhaps the best example are ecological terrorists – have no desire or intent to progress

militarily beyond terrorism.”<sup>10</sup> This is the purest form of terrorism, terrorist acts without intent to overthrow the existing governmental control.

In his strategy research paper, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Morris expounds further on the differences between insurgency and terrorism. He states,

...insurgencies combine violence with political means in pursuit of revolutionary purposes in a way that terrorism can not duplicate. Terrorists may pursue political, even revolutionary goals, but their violence replaces rather than complements a political program.<sup>11</sup>

Therefore the distinguishing factors between terrorism or terrorist acts and an insurgency is that an insurgency has the pursuit of a political agenda or the overthrow of a governing body and terrorism is the objective itself or an employed tactic. Frank Gaffney explains, “...we are *not* fighting a “War on Terror.” Terror is, after all, an instrument of war not an enemy.”<sup>12</sup> We must clearly identify and understand the nature of this war in order to combat it effectively.

### Nature of Insurgencies

Like Clausewitz, who believes you must understand the true nature of war in order to be successful, Galula believes you must understand the nature of an insurgency to counter it effectively. While each insurgency is different, Galula outlines some general conditions that favor the insurgent or comprise the nature of an insurgency. Like Mao, and because he was most familiar with Maoist insurgencies, he believed successful insurgencies were protracted struggles conducted in phases, “step by step.”

Galula explains the nature of an insurgency by describing prerequisites for a successful insurgency. The first is the requirement for a cause. Galula states, “[t]he first basic need for an insurgent who aims at more than simply making trouble is an attractive cause, particularly in view of the risks involved ...and active supporters ... have to be recruited by persuasion.”<sup>13</sup> Galula then details the strategic criteria of a cause, describes the nature of the cause, and states that the cause may be tactically manipulated to maintain momentum of the people to continue the insurgency.<sup>14</sup> Cause is the most critical element of an insurgency.

The next element of a successful insurgency is a weak government or counterinsurgency force. It sounds elementary but the conditions of a government will determine whether or not an insurgency can begin, let alone survive. Galula explains these conditions in reverse form; the strengths of a government. He asserts that if the state has: a lack of problems, national consensus or solidarity, determination on the part of the counterinsurgent leader, knowledge of the nature of the insurgency, control of the population (in the form of political structure, administration, police enforcement, and armed forces), solid geographic conditions, control of

internal borders between regions, and a calm political climate that does not present exploitable crises, the insurgency will fail.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, if a state lacks these characteristics an insurgency can exploit those weaknesses and be victorious. Galula concludes, “[i]t is the combination of all these factors that determines whether an insurgency is possible or not once the potential insurgent has a cause.”<sup>16</sup> A government can control its own fate depending on its demonstrated strengths or weaknesses.

Geographic conditions are the next element of the nature of an insurgency. Galula discusses geography as a condition of a weak government but explains the importance in detail from the insurgent point of view. He states, “[t]he role of geography, a large one in an ordinary war, may be overriding in a revolutionary war.”<sup>17</sup> Galula details geographic conditions in terms of the location of a country and whether it is isolated by barriers or in proximity to other countries that favor the insurgency. He also covers the size, configuration, length and security of international borders, terrain, climate, population, and economy as factors that favor the insurgent. Geography, while not as critical as cause, can be a determining factor in the success or failure for insurgencies.

The final condition to consider in an insurgency is outside support. This is self explanatory. If insurgents receive outside support they can continue their protracted struggle longer, and this support will complicate counterinsurgency efforts.

### Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory

Now that the nature of an insurgency and the factors that will determine whether or not it succeeds or fails are defined, we need to determine what strategy to follow to counter insurgents. First and foremost Galula contends that the insurgency is at its weakest in its inception, it “is as vulnerable as a new born baby.”<sup>18</sup> Galula’s strategy for counterinsurgency is divided into two types corresponding to his conception of the stages of an insurgency: a cold revolution and a hot revolution which moves from peace to war.

#### Cold Revolutionary Insurgency

The best chance of countering an insurgency is during the cold revolution phase, to identify it early before hostilities begin and counter it before it gains popularity. Galula outlines four basic actions or tactics for the counterinsurgent to employ against the insurgency in a cold revolution:

1. He may act directly on insurgent leaders.
2. He may act indirectly on the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency.
3. He may infiltrate the insurgent movement and try to make it ineffective.
4. He may build up or reinforce his political machine.<sup>19</sup>



Cold revolutionary insurgencies can be rendered ineffective with foresight and action. The best way to battle the cold revolutionary insurgents is through engagement. The Geographic Combatant Commands engage their respective areas of operations (AORs) through Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). This engagement is based in part on the Clinton Administration's National Security Strategy of Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now. The critical portion of this policy is to shape the environment through security cooperation with the host nation governments and to train and assist them with security. General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander of the United States European Command, in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee stated that America needs to:

...take a more engaged approach to achieving long term stability through proactive, preventive measures. Consequences for inaction may include continued and repeated U.S. intervention in conflicts and humanitarian crises, disruption of economic trade ... and increased presence of radical fundamentalism...<sup>20</sup>

While these comments were geared specifically for his region, they hold true for the global environment. GEN Jones goes on to say, "ungoverned pockets that extend across national borders ... threaten to further destabilize an already fragile region. Broad expanses of marginally governed areas can become havens for terrorists and criminals and have become attractive to terrorist groups increasingly denied sanctuaries in Afghanistan and the Middle East."<sup>21</sup> We must engage these ungoverned or weakly governed areas around the world, combat the conditions that fuel insurgents and work with official governments to improve their security; that way we can defeat the cold revolutionary insurgencies around the world before they evolve into hot revolutionary insurgencies that are much more complex and difficult to defeat.

#### Hot Revolutionary Insurgency

A hot revolutionary insurgency is more complicated and difficult to suppress. Security is vital and must be established before the process of gaining the support of the population begins. Galula outlines eight steps to employ in a selected region. Once order and security have been established in one area, he instructs the counterinsurgent to move to the next area, until the entire state has been secured. This technique has come to be called, "clear and hold." His steps include: concentrate enough forces to expel or eliminate the armed insurgents, leave a stay-behind force among the population to keep armed insurgents from returning, interact with and isolate the population from the insurgents, destroy the insurgent political movement, establish a new local government, enable these local governments by organizing self-defense

units or security forces, involve and educate the leaders and population in a national political movement, and finally, win over or suppress the last remnants of the insurgency.<sup>22</sup> The counterinsurgent has a greater chance of success once the state is secured. One must exercise care, however, in the manner used to suppress the insurgents. Inappropriate tactics and disproportionate use of force could backfire, turn the population against the counterinsurgent and create an environment ripe for recruitment by the insurgents, thus defeating the efforts. The French suffered from this misuse of force when they used torture to root out the insurgents in Algeria. According to Lou DiMarco:

The negative results of torture included decreasing France's ability to affect the conflict's strategic center of gravity; internal fragmentation of the French Army officer corps; decreased moral authority of the army; setting the conditions for even greater violations of moral and legal authority; and providing a major information operations opportunity to the insurgency.<sup>23</sup>

The United States is currently struggling with this balance in Iraq where some experts state we are creating more insurgents than we are killing or neutralizing.

#### Application of Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory to the Global Insurgency

As already stated, America is fighting a global insurgency. Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, in his article, "Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare," states:

The war on al-Qaeda and its surrogates can be viewed as a global counterinsurgency in which the United States and its coalition partners endeavor to isolate and eradicate the base and other networked terrorist groups who seek sanctuary, support, and recruits in ungoverned or poorly governed areas where the humiliated and the have-nots struggle to survive.<sup>24</sup>

This enemy we are fighting is comprised of many various insurgent factions around the world, but the central organizing structure or "base" of this insurgency is al-Qaeda. According to the *National Strategy For Combating Terrorism*, "The Al-Qa[e]da network is a multinational enterprise with operations in more than 60 countries."<sup>25</sup> Al-Qaeda is not a traditional state, and it does not represent a particular government as its influence transcends state boundaries and impacts the global environment.

Galula envisions his theory to be applicable to the internal confines of a state or nation-state. His pure form of strategy applies to the current states of Iraq and Afghanistan as a subset of the global insurgency, and the counterinsurgency can be conducted as directed in those areas according to Galula's hot revolutionary strategy. However, Galula's strategy must be adapted to combat the remaining global insurgency, which could be defined in his terms as a

cold revolutionary insurgency that is potentially moving to or on the verge of becoming a hot revolutionary insurgency in some regions of the world.

We hear quite often that we must win the war in Iraq to defeat the terrorists. Iraq is important to the global counterinsurgency and can be treated as a separate insurgency, but it is merely a battle that must be won in the larger scheme of the global insurgency. The world is filled with Islamic radicals, and their intent is to inflict harm on us, attempt to destroy our will, and to create an Islamic Caliphate. Around the world we face various insurgent groups as diverse as al-Qaeda, Hizballah, Hamas, Abu Sayyaf Group, Jemaah Islamiya, and radical elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, etc. While at present, these groups are not coordinating their efforts, they have essentially the same goals and, whether planned or by chance, could execute their operations simultaneously to overthrow western governments. The focus of this discussion will be on Al-Qaeda as it is the most notorious, best organized and most public group of this insurgency and one that tries to provide the necessary overarching coordination and leadership. The following analysis of al-Qaeda uses Clausewitz' "remarkable trinity" and can be applied to other insurgent groups that comprise the larger global insurgency just as easily with the same accuracy.

Even though al-Qaeda does not fit the normal state model it can still be dissected and examined much like a state with a global scale. According to Carl von Clausewitz, to win a war, a nation must have unity of purpose between the government, military and people. He referred to these three elements as the "remarkable trinity." The *government* is to determine the type of war to be fought, and the policy and objectives of the war. The *military* is to provide the courage and talent of the commanders and the army to fight the war. The *people* provide the will, primordial violence, mobilization and commitment to the war effort.<sup>26</sup> Clausewitz goes on to explain, "A theory that ignores any one of them [legs of the "remarkable trinity"] or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless."<sup>27</sup> Although al-Qaeda is not a nation, and Clausewitz intended his paradigm to be used to assess nations, there is much to be gained by considering al-Qaeda in Clausewitzian terms. However, it is difficult to assess the al-Qaeda "remarkable trinity" by examining each leg separately, because they are closely intertwined. Al-Qaeda has fully integrated all three legs of this triad in their strategic planning for war against the United States and its allies.

The *government* leg of al-Qaeda's strategic triad is founded in its religion; Islam. It is governed by the teachings of the Koran, traditional Sharia (Islamic Law), and fatwas (religious rulings). This religious government is not limited by state boundaries. Osama bin Laden is

considered the leader of this 'government'. According to Collin McCullough, "bin Laden called for the establishment of a pan-Islamic Caliphate — an ancient system of government based on Islamic law (*Sharia*) under a sole leader called the Prince of Believers."<sup>28</sup> He controls the actions of all three legs whether dead or alive. McCullough states, "In February 1998, bin Laden issued a religious ruling (*fatwa*) ... which called on all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens and their allies."<sup>29</sup> This fatwa and the idea of an Islamic world are the integrating forces and main objective of the three legs of the al-Qaeda trinity.

The *military* leg of al-Qaeda is imbedded into the *people* leg. It is that part of the *people* leg that is actively participating in the insurgency. The military is comprised of insurgent cells that blend into local societies. Each cell operates independently or under the control of a central leader. Their uniting principal objective is to kill U.S. citizens and their allies. Al-Qaeda provides material support and operational guidance through a support network of 'sleeper' agents and handlers for larger operations such as the attacks on 9-11.<sup>30</sup> The cells operate like Mao Tse-Tung's guerrillas; they are the fish and the society is the water in which they dwell.<sup>31</sup> Cells are reported to be operating in Europe, Singapore, Africa, Iraq, Asia and the United States. It has also been reported recently that Al-Qaeda is threatening attacks should the United States or any of its allies attempt to usurp Sudan's sovereignty by imposing any force other than the African Union to settle the Darfur crisis.<sup>32</sup> This demonstrates that Al-Qaeda also has an interest in the ungoverned areas of Africa.

Al-Qaeda has strong unity of command within its *military* leg. Six new leaders of the insurgent network emerged from the shadows to replace those killed, captured or dispersed by the U.S. offensive in Afghanistan. These new leaders are spread throughout the Middle East and Asia. They have limited communications but still exercise operational control.<sup>33</sup> Abu Ayyub al-Masri was quick to take over from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to lead al-Qaeda in Iraq immediately following his death.<sup>34</sup> This adaptability continues to demonstrate the resilience, tenacity, and depth of al-Qaeda's *military* and *people* leg.

The *people* leg of Al-Qaeda is very powerful and has a worldwide demographic base. As with the *military*, it is closely tied to the *government* leg of al-Qaeda without the limitations of national boundaries. It has a world Muslim population of approximately 1.4 billion from which to recruit. The common factor that unites the people of al-Qaeda is the idea of an Islamic world and hatred for western civilization. Also, like Mao's guerrilla warfare, al-Qaeda has recruited the services of "[m]any bandit groups,"<sup>35</sup> such as Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiah, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and al-Jihad to support their cause under bin Laden's unifying goal. Most recently added is, "Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) -- which recently swore

allegiance to [the] al Qaeda group in Algeria.”<sup>36</sup> Al-Qaeda continues to recruit and rally support from global organizations with like ideologies.

Al-Qaeda also indoctrinates a new generation of terrorist by funding or operating madrasas in Middle Eastern countries that promote hatred for the United States and other western civilizations through radical Islamic fundamentalism. While the U.S. and its allies have succeeded in arresting members of al-Qaeda and neutralizing associated terrorists groups, there remains a large base from which they continue to build strength.

Osama bin Laden expertly integrated Clausewitz’ trinity into al-Qaeda to create a formidable adversary. The al-Qaeda organization is trinitarian and much like a state on a transnational level. It is clearly a transnational revolutionary organization. Even though al-Qaeda is a transnational state, it can be analyzed and examined in traditional Clausewitzian terms of the remarkable trinity. By examining al-Qaeda in this context as a transnational insurgency, the United States can apply an adaptive form of Galula’s counterinsurgency theory of dealing with revolutionary movements to defeat al-Qaeda around the world. Galula has developed a method for dealing with insurgencies even though it was primarily directed to an internal state. He maintains that control of the population is the key. This is also true for al-Qaeda, as the people leg of the trinity is the most important. We must continue to locate cells and destroy them without further agitating the water in which these fish dwell.

This is why Galula’s counterinsurgency strategy is key to fighting this global insurgency; its main focus, as outlined in the following section is the “people.” While we engage in a hot revolutionary war in Iraq and Afghanistan we must also counter a cold revolutionary war in the rest of the world and engage the Muslim community for the support of its moderate members. The following presents some ideas from Galula adapted for the war on al-Qaeda.

#### Addressing Grievances: Take Away Their Motivation

The attacks on September 11, 2001 left many Americans stunned, appalled and wondering who was responsible and why. What motivates anyone to execute horrific actions against the civilian population, military personnel, and structures in the homeland of the United States? The United States is a democratic super power. Its citizens are among the world’s largest charitable donors, and its economic power contributes to the prosperity of many nations. What causes hatred of this magnitude for the citizens of America? *The National Strategy For Combating Terrorism* states, “[w]hile we recognize that there are many countries and people living with poverty, deprivation, social disenfranchisement, and unresolved political and regional

disputes, those conditions do not justify the use of terror.” Even though true, in order to combat this global insurgency we must address the issues that motivate the insurgents.

Many analysts attribute this intense hatred and motivation to kill American residents and destroy United States' property to a growing decline in the economic and political stability of the countries in the Middle East. Increases in population, especially a youth population bulge; a phenomenon identified by the size of the population that is less than 25 years of age as compared to the overall population, contribute to the economic and political instability in the region. Add to this population bulge a high unemployment rate, lack of potential future employment for the educated as well as the uneducated, and a strong disillusionment with the governing authority that has not provided solutions to the growing economic disparity in their countries and one gets the potential for social unrest and an ideal breeding ground for the type of terrorists capable of the heinous events on September 11, 2001. A *Newsweek* Special Report, “Why Do They Hate Us?” states, “Globalization has caught it [the Arab world] at a bad demographic moment.”<sup>37</sup> This is depicted in Thomas Barnett’s “New Pentagon Map,” in figure one. The countries within the red outline are countries that are not integrated into the global economy or are not open to globalization whether by choice, geographic or environmental conditions, regional influence or tyrannical governmental control. As you can see, this non-integrated region comprises the most volatile, unstable, weak, or failed states that either support the global insurgency or are unable to eliminate or counter the insurgency within their states. A youth population bulge in the Middle East may help explain one or more factors that contributed to the tragic events on September 11, 2001 and continue to plague the region with an environment ripe for recruitment for the global insurgency. In the article, *The World in 2005*, Robert Kaplan states, “Aggravating the kind of political and economic turbulence ... will be bulges in the number of youths across the Middle East.”<sup>38</sup> Kaplan’s observations recognize the youth population bulge impact on two critical elements; politics and economics. The United States Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, explains, “Without a viable economy and employment opportunities, the public is likely to pursue false promises offered by an insurgency, which may be fostering the very conditions keeping the economy stagnant.”<sup>39</sup> It is critical to promote an environment conducive to economic stability and prosperity. Galula’s theory maintains that by taking away the cause, the counterinsurgent can defeat an insurgency before it becomes a hot revolutionary insurgency. Promoting economic development and globalization go hand in hand and work toward this end and will take away al-Qaeda’s cause. As these countries become more and more tied to the global economy, they will realize the economic benefits of cooperating globally and, by extension, increase their tolerance




Figure 1: Thomas Barnett's New Pentagon Map<sup>40</sup>

of other religions and governments and remove one of the causes that al-Qaeda could use for recruitment. Some of these causal factors can be mitigated if the United States promotes stability through political engagement and employment of the expanding youth population. This engagement can be affected by readdressing our foreign and economic policies in the Middle East, promoting globalization and modernization along with self determination, and building up the United States' human intelligence capabilities for early warning and diffusion within latent trouble spots before they become hot revolutionary insurgencies.

Another factor or grievance that must be addressed or eliminated is political and ideological. Galula asserts that external forces or outside support can complicate counterinsurgency efforts. These, therefore, must be eliminated or neutralized to defeat al-Qaeda. This influential force extends from the Middle East, through the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and throughout Indonesia and the Philippines. The main battle in this global insurgency will be fought over ideals. Queen Noor of Jordan explains, "Moderates of all creeds must embrace their shared, universal values, and defy those who cloak hatred in religious rhetoric."<sup>41</sup> We need to rally moderates and take away their support for, or their tolerance of,

radical Islamism. In this way we deny the radical Islamist a population base for recruiting.<sup>42</sup> Winning support of moderate Muslims is critical to our success in defeating al-Qaeda.

The way to do this is to implement Galula's strategy to take away the cause or reason for the growing insurgency. As already stated, cause is the most critical element in an insurgency. The causes that must be addressed are the belief, whether true or not, that Muslims are treated poorly and kept at a disadvantage economically and socially. We must address the root causes of these beliefs and contributing factors that fuel the insurgency. The *National Strategy For Combating Terrorism* explains:

Ongoing U.S. efforts to resolve regional disputes, foster economic, social, and political development, market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of law, while not necessarily focused on combating terrorism, contribute to the campaign by addressing the underlying conditions that terrorists often seek to manipulate for their own advantage.<sup>43</sup>

America must embark on a strategic informational campaign that addresses the concerns of the Muslim community to eliminate or mitigate al-Qaeda's source of power. The military element of national power must not be the only resource to battle this global insurgency. Mahmood Mamdani explains, "Even a successful military confrontation...requires...political isolation, precisely by addressing the issues raise[d]."<sup>44</sup> The United States needs to engage its national elements of power of diplomacy and economic measures to help diffuse the situation and combat the insurgents. These diplomatic and economic efforts must not be restricted solely to Iraq and Afghanistan. We must address the entire region, formal governments, and all non-state actors. The efforts should include solutions for the conflicts between Israel and Hamas, Israel and Hizbullah, Lebanon and Hizbullah, al-Qaeda world wide, and in Iraq all factions including the government, al-Qaeda, Sunni and Shia leadership. Regional governments and institutions that have an interest in the stability of the Middle East and influence in the region, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, and the North African nations, must be involved for a comprehensive solution. There must be a consolidated solution in order to maintain any type of peace and security in the region and world.

The forth basic action or tactic that Galula recommends for combating a cold revolutionary insurgency is to build up or reinforce the political machine. The United States must reevaluate its foreign policy with concern to the Middle East. Rashid Khalid asserts:

From the nineteenth century until at least the middle of the twentieth, the United States was in fact viewed quite positively in the Middle East as a non- or anti-colonial power, as having no imperialistic designs on the region and as engaged primarily in benevolent activities there such as education and health care.<sup>45</sup>



Our foreign policy in the region has evolved over the years to supporting an Israeli state at the expense of the Palestinians. This policy was essentially established in 1948 when the U.S. took over the responsibilities of Great Britain following WWII.<sup>46</sup> Every subsequent President and administration has provided unconditional support or silent acquiescence to Israel's actions in the Middle East. Especially critical is our strategy and policy in Iraq. Khalid maintains that "a cold, amoral, and cynical policy that won the United States few friends in the Middle East and is part of the baggage America has carried as it has become deeply involved in Iraq."<sup>47</sup> We must take a fresh unbiased approach to the current situation in the Middle East and develop a new national strategy and policy for Iraq and the entire region.

Resolving the Middle East problem and facilitating success in Iraq will not take place overnight. We need to realize that it is not only a military solution and that "any serious understanding of democracy would posit that it involves a lengthy organic process of societal, legal and political development that cannot be short circuited or imposed."<sup>48</sup> We are in a long war, and Iraq is critical in the battle to counter the global insurgency.

### Conclusion

One could argue that the premise of a global insurgency invalidates Galula's strategy, as he envisioned insurgency as internal to a state or nation-state. While his strategy should be purely applied in hot revolutionary insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, I contend that his strategy is also broad enough to apply against non-state actors, or an insurgency without state borders, such as al-Qaeda and its ilk.

This essay has defined insurgency and the nature of insurgencies. Also outlined were David Galula's counterinsurgency warfare theory and a review of his strategy, operations and tactics. We concluded by exploring how to apply Galula's counterinsurgency warfare theory to the conflicts we face in the twenty-first century. We must understand the true nature and scope of this global insurgency and not limit this war only to Iraq and Afghanistan. As intimated above, this global insurgency cannot be countered through military effort only. It will require all of the elements of national power of the United States and our allies to succeed. We must identify the true nature of this global conflict and apply the counterinsurgency theory and practices of David Galula on a grand scale to counter this insurgency effectively.

### Endnotes

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, 173.

<sup>4</sup> Philip Babcock Gove, ed., *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged* (Springfield, MA: Miriam-Webster, Inc., 2002), 1173.

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<sup>6</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, December 2006), 1-1.

<sup>7</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (New York: Fredereck A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), 4.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, 3.

<sup>9</sup> J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., "A Survey of the Theory of Strategy," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, 2nd ed, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees Jr. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy, 2006), 97.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>11</sup> Michael F. Morris, *Al-Qaeda as Insurgency*, Strategy Research Project, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 18 March 2005), 2.

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<sup>13</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (New York: Fredereck A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), 18.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, 19-25.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, 26-35.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, 33.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, 35.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 26.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, 64-65.

<sup>20</sup> James L. Jones, "Statement Of General James L. Jones, USMC Commander, United States European Command Before The Senate Armed Services Committee On 7 March 2006," 7 March 2006; available from <http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2006/March/Jones%2003-07-06.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 December 2006.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>22</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (New York: Fredereck A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), 80.

<sup>23</sup> Lou DiMarco, "Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and *Guerre Revolutionnaire* in the Algerian War," *Parameters* 36 (Summer 2006), 72.

<sup>24</sup> Robert M. Cassidy, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, "Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare," *Military Review* (October 2006): 2.

<sup>25</sup> George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2003), 7.

<sup>26</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

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