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**THESIS**

**THE PROACTIVE GRAND STRATEGY FOR CONSENSUAL  
AND PEACEFUL KOREAN UNIFICATION**

by

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March 2007

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**THE PROACTIVE GRAND STRATEGY FOR CONSENSUAL AND PEACEFUL  
KOREAN UNIFICATION**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis assesses the reasons for the continuous division of the two Koreas and proposes necessary policies for Korean unification. In modern times, Koreans have been unable to determine their own destiny. Many examples show that Korea's circumstances have been influenced by other countries. Korea's division and the North Korean nuclear standoff are not only Korean problems but also international issues. In these contexts, Korean unification requires not only domestic efforts but also international efforts. Also, for successful consensual and peaceful unification, domestic and international efforts should not be passive and reactive. They should be practical, proactive, and comprehensive.

In other words, Korean unification has been difficult because there have not been sufficiently proactive domestic and international efforts. Internal and external efforts can be implemented in three fields: military containment and negotiation, political negotiations and economic and social engagement. These three approaches are the fundamental pillars on which to build successful unification.

Proactive and synchronous implementation of the three policies is the pivotal point in order to deal with North Korea because each policy is important and can be implemented in different fields. Strong defense is critical to supporting other policy implementation. Political negotiations can deal with the peace treaty issue. Economically, an engagement policy should be maintained to open North Korea and provide humanitarian aid.

Through the proactive implementation of those policies for Korean unification by the two Koreas and four powers, northeast Asia will be more stable and peaceful. Peaceful Korean unification will be an important first step on the road to a more peaceful world in the twenty-first century.

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'Peace Bridge' is the nickname of the ROKAF F-16 aircraft that I fly. It is also what I want to be in the Korean peninsula as a ROKAF officer. I want to play an important role in promoting peace for my country. I would like to say thank you to my country and the Republic of Korea Air Force for giving me a chance to study at the Naval Postgraduate School. When I fly over the northern area of South Korea, I can look at the North Korean territory over which I cannot fly under the 1953 Armistice Agreement. ROKAF pilots have an alert duty to respond to any threat in several minutes. I think the sacred duty of a military officer is to protect people and the territory and bring peace to the Korean peninsula. The goal of political science is the same one as the duty of a military officer. Therefore, I have studied international relations, especially the relationship between the two Koreas and four great powers surrounding the Korean peninsula, to accomplish my duty.

The separated families are another concern. Many people suffered and were separated during the Korean War. Many families have been separated for over 50 years. I feel a responsibility to help make an environment in which they will know how they can live with each other. I cried after I heard their family stories during the separated family meeting. The goal of political science is to make people happy and I would like to play a role in helping them as an officer.

I have wanted to be a 'peace bridge' in the Korean peninsula and my study at the Naval Postgraduate School has built a strong foundation for my future career. Many outstanding professors at NPS have led me in the right direction and have provided the environment to concentrate on my studies. It has been the greatest pleasure to become one of the NPS students and contribute my efforts to achieve my goal. Especially, I would like to say thank you to my thesis advisors, Dr. Edward A. Olsen and Dr. Alice Lyman Miller. Also, there are many outstanding professors who taught me at NPS: Dr. Robert E. Looney, Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Dr. Anshu Chatterjee, Dr. Christopher P. Twomey, Dr. Anne L. Clunan, Capt. Scott E. Jasper and others.

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. INTRODUCTION

Ironically, the most heavily militarized frontier in the world is the demilitarized zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula. The DMZ was established by the Korean War Armistice Agreement, signed on 27 July 1953.<sup>1</sup> Even though the Cold War has been over since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Korean peninsula remains unstable and is often referred to as the last remnant of the Cold War. Korea is still divided into two countries and the Korean War is not officially over. Korean unification seems far more remote. This thesis seeks to answer two questions: Why has Korean unification not happened yet? What is necessary for Korean unification?

The answer should be found in the history. Historically, Korea has been the focus of conflict because of its strategic location. Don Oberdorfer writes: “Geography dealt Korea a particularly difficult role. Located in a strategic but dangerous neighborhood between the greater powers of China, Japan, and Russia, Korea has suffered nine hundred invasions, great and small, in its two thousand years of recorded history. It has experienced five major periods of foreign occupation--by China, the Mongols, Japan, and after World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union.”<sup>2</sup> The international setting has impacted tremendously on the national agendas of Korea. All important political and economic changes and their influence on the Korean peninsula cannot be explained by domestic factors only but must also include an international context. Most political and economic changes on the Korean peninsula grew out of intertwined international and domestic factors. The difficulty of Korean unification can be explained by the international context. This thesis will be concerned with how international settings exerted more influence than domestic considerations on the Korean division. The context in which such a discussion has to be put is the relationship between Korea and the great powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union.

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<sup>1</sup> Bradley K. Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*, 1st ed. (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004.), 87.

<sup>2</sup> Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (New York: Basic Books, 2001.), 3.

Even though the two Koreas' national ambition is Korean unification, policy toward Korean unification has not been implemented proactively by the two Koreas and the great powers. The four great powers surrounding the Korean peninsula officially support Korean unification, but they might prefer status quo on the Korean peninsula. This is regrettable action because the great powers have influenced the destiny of Korea. Thus, very proactive actions should be taken to achieve Korean unification. The proactive strategy should be implemented by the two Koreas and the four powers together. Any policy for Korean unification would not be effective without coordination between the two Koreas and the four powers.

The roots of the Korean War and the current North Korean nuclear crisis show the reasons why Korean unification has not happened yet and why unification efforts should be achieved through Korean and international efforts. Also, the strategy for Korean unification should be a combination of three policies – military containment and negotiations, political negotiations, and economic and social engagement – and should be implemented together. Without the implementation of those three policies by the two Koreas and the four powers, Korean unification would be extremely difficult. The purpose of this thesis is to assess which factors are important for peaceful Korean unification and to provide policy options to make the unification process successful.

## **B. HYPOTHESIS**

International support is indispensable for Korean unification. Also, the prerequisites for consensual and peaceful Korean unification would be convergence of the militaries, politics and economies of the two Koreas and the four powers (China, Japan, Russia, and the United States). Their convergence is possible when the international context is favorable and essential conditions are met. That is, Korean unification efforts should be made proactively by internal and external military, political, and economic and social approaches.

## **C. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

In order to explain why international support is necessary for Korean unification, Chapters II and III of the thesis analyze the impact of the international setting on the Korean peninsula. The best example of international influence on the Korean peninsula is the Korean War. Chapter II explains the roots of the Korean War in its internal and

external contexts. The North Korean nuclear crisis also shows the importance of international influence. Chapter III explores North Korea's motivations to develop nuclear weapons in a context of internal and external change. These two examples demonstrate the necessity of understanding the international context to interpret any change on the Korean peninsula.

Given these contexts, Chapter IV explains a proactive grand strategy for consensual and peaceful Korean unification that combines domestic and international efforts. Peaceful Korean unification will make all of northeast Asia peaceful and solve North Korean problems. The grand strategy has three important pillars – military containment and negotiations, political negotiations and economic and social engagement – for successful implementation. These approaches are explained in detail in Chapters V, VI, and VII. To be sure, each approach should be implemented internally and externally. Chapter V examines military containment and negotiations because any ambiguity or concern about military and security issues will impede successful policy. Robust defense is essential for implementation of the other two approaches and military-to-military negotiations should follow later. Chapter VI discusses political negotiations and offers a detailed implementation policy for a peace treaty on the Korean peninsula. Political negotiations should be initiated by the two Koreas and supported by the United States and China. Also, endorsement of the United Nations would be ideal. Chapter VII discusses possible and necessary economic and social engagement policies. The combination of these three approaches will help unify the two Koreas and continue to be beneficial after unification. In sum, the tripod of the grand strategy can be drawn as in Figure 1:




Figure 1. The Grand Strategy for Peaceful Korean Unification



## II. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL SETTING ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: THE KOREAN WAR

North Korea launched its massive offensive against South Korea on 25 June 1950. However, it has not been clear to many scholars how and why the attack was made. The Korean War has been a very attractive subject to study because there seems to be no clear answer for the causes of the Korean War and solutions for a peaceful Korea. Some scholars even argue that South Korea struck first and North Korea's invasion was a responsive action.<sup>3</sup>

The ambiguity still exists on the Korean peninsula. Even though the Cold War has been over since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Korean Peninsula remains unstable and is referred to as the last evidence of the Cold War. When the 38th parallel was drawn and the Armistice Agreement was signed, they were only intended as temporary measures. However, the 38th parallel still divides the Korean peninsula into two separate states that are technically still at war. The Armistice Agreement still influences any aggressive action between the United States—along with South Korea—and North Korea, because no peace treaty has ever been signed and unification has not happened. The objective of this chapter is to describe and clarify the roots of the Korean War in order to understand how the Korean War occurred and to find the solutions for a peaceful Korean unification in the future.

What were the main roots of the Korean War? The beginning of the Korean War cannot be tied to one specific cause. It was largely the result of competing Great Power interests intertwined with indigenous competition between South Korea and North Korea. This meant that the Korean War fed into and was impacted by both external and internal causes. Domestic movements seeking independence, sovereignty, and international support intertwined with American-Soviet competition occurring on the Korean peninsula. The Korean War emerged from nationalistic domestic actors struggling for political power, but eventually came to be understood as having broader international significance sufficient to engage the great powers in competition with each other. This thesis argues that the reason for

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<sup>3</sup> Karunakar Gupta, "How did the Korean War Begin?" *The China Quarterly*, No. 52, October-December 1972, 699.

various explanations is that the Korean War did not break out because of one clear cause. The reasons for the Korean War had been forming through the period since the end of World War II. Consequently, the reasons for the war cannot be explained only by internal factors but must also include external factors.

The first section surveys the preceding analysis and explains various perspectives on the Korean War such as the traditionalist or revisionist positions. It is necessary to know each approach to develop a coherent theoretical framework as a means of distilling each position and blending the wisdom of both positions. In the second and third sections, the roots of the Korean War will be divided into internal and external groups. Each explanation will produce the possible assumptions and reasons for its position, but one approach cannot explain all of the roots of the Korean War. The secret to understanding the roots of the Korean War is to combine those approaches. Based on those explanations, this thesis will conclude with the solutions for a consensual and peaceful Korean unification. Because the roots of the Korean War can be explained by both domestic and international factors, solutions for Korean unification must be not only Korean efforts, but also international cooperation and support.

## **A. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO AND EXPLANATIONS OF THE KOREAN WAR**

There are two main approaches to explain the Korean War—traditionalist and revisionist. While the traditionalist approach has focused on Soviet expansionism, the revisionist approach has explained the Korean War as a civil war. However, neither the traditionalists nor the revisionists have an adequate framework for understanding the complex roots of the Korean War.

### **1. Traditionalist**

#### ***a. Soviet Expansionism***

The traditional perspective considers the Korean War as a Soviet-inspired external war. President Truman and his advisors were typical traditionalists who assumed that North Korea was a puppet and the Soviet Union was the puppeteer. The United States intervened because it thought it was a Soviet attack. On 27 June 1950, the President announced his order to send U.S. troops to Korea and explained the reasons:

In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support. The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed

beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.<sup>4</sup>

President Truman explained in his memoirs and speeches why he decided to deter the Soviet attack. Almost one year after, on 11 April 1951, President Truman broadcast a radio report to the American public on Korea and affirmed that the cause of the Korean War was the Soviet expansionism:

I want to talk to you plainly tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East. In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war....The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot—and will not—sit idly by and await foreign conquest. The only question is: What is the best time to meet the threat and how is the best way to meet it? The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze.<sup>5</sup>

Interestingly, even Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that the Korean War must have been a Russian conspiracy to make the United States and China fight each other. He said, “In any case, the opportunity to stimulate a head-on clash between America and China must have been welcomed by Stalin, and deservedly so.”<sup>6</sup> There are other traditionalists’ arguments, mainly from the 1960s. David Rees explains that the Korean War plan was made by the Soviet Union and June 1950 was best for North Korea to initiate the war:

Lastly, the planning of the invasion. It was a Soviet war plan, reportedly worked out by the Russian General Antonov, and during the winter of 1949-50, the remainder of the KVC crossed into Korea, Sino-Korean relations, long strained, were patched up, and large scale Russian deliveries of tanks, artillery, and heavy equipment were made to North

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<sup>4</sup> “Statement, dated June 27, 1950, by President Harry S. Truman, announcing his order to send U.S. air and naval forces to help defend South Korea and explaining the rationale for his decision. Papers of George M. Elsey,” [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/korea/large/week1/kw\\_27\\_1.htm](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/week1/kw_27_1.htm) (accessed on 15 August 2006).

<sup>5</sup> Harry S. Truman, “Radio Report to the American People on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Far East,” Truman Presidential Museum and Library, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=290> (accessed on 15 August 2006)

<sup>6</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, “How the Cold War was Played,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 51, No. 1, October 1972, pp.181-209.

Korea...With this well-trained and heavily-armed Soviet satellite army now fully ready for action, and with the current political confusion and strategic weaknesses of American Far Eastern policy, together with

the political and economic chaos in the ROK, there could hardly have been a better moment to launch a North Korean invasion across the 38th parallel than in June 1950.<sup>7</sup>

Cho Soon Sung said, “The truth appears to be that Russia initiated the conflict mainly because the United States had shown little interest in Korea, and accordingly Russia thought it could seize control of the South without risking total confrontation.”<sup>8</sup>

**b. Counterargument**

Traditionalists maintain that Soviet expansionism and its foreign policy caused the Korean War, but that is not enough to explain the Korean War as a whole. There are two reasons for this idea’s inadequacy. First, it cannot explain the absence of the Soviet Union in the Security Council meeting on 27 June 1950, right after the beginning of the Korean War. If the Soviet Union had initiated the Korean War, it surely would have vetoed UN involvement in the hostilities. The Soviet Union had insisted that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) should occupy one of the permanent seats on the Security Council, instead of the Republic of China.<sup>9</sup> The Security Council decided to have the UN become involved in the Korean War under the United States’ control. If the Soviet Union had been present, or the PRC had taken one of the Security Council seats, UN involvement in the Korean War would not have happened.<sup>10</sup> The Soviet Union claimed that the UN involvement decision was illegal, in August, when it returned to the Security Council to assume the rotating presidency of that body.<sup>11</sup>

Second, newly released documents from Russia show that North Korea was the main actor of the Korean War. Traditionalists did not explain the domestic

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<sup>7</sup> David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), 19-20.

<sup>8</sup> Cho, Soon Sung, *Korea in World Politics 1940-1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 271.

<sup>9</sup> William R. Slomanson, *Fundamental Perspective on International Law*, 4th ed. (Balmont, CA: Thomson West, 2003), 125.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Robert Leckie, *Conflict: The History of the Korean War, 1950-1953* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1962), 54.

struggle as part of causes of the Korean War. When traditionalists claimed that the Soviet expansionism was the root cause of the Korean War, Russian documents on the Korean War had not been released. After the end of the Cold War, previously classified documents became available to scholars. In 1994, 216 documents covering the period 1949-1950 were released.<sup>12</sup> Kathryn Weathersby has done extensive translation and holds a firm belief that the Korean War was initiated by North Korea.<sup>13</sup> She says, “The North Korean attempt to reunify the country through a military campaign clearly represented a sharp departure from the basic Soviet policy toward Korea. The initiative for this departure came from Pyongyang, not Moscow.”<sup>14</sup>

## **2. Revisionist**

The most important point of the revisionists is that they explain the origins of the Korean War as internal in nature. They consider the Korean War as a civil war. Revisionists are adept at showing flaws in the traditionalist vision by pointing out how domestic politics played an important role.

### **a. Civil Conflict**

(1) “Trap” Theory - South Korea’s Provocation? Bruce Cumings is the most important revisionist. His theory is called the “Haeju seizure” theory.<sup>15</sup> Also, his theory is known as the “trap” theory because “it is possible that the North was responding to a provocative attack from South Korea, as the DPRK has consistently maintained.”<sup>16</sup> Bruce Cumings argues that the conflict at Haeju, at the Ongjin peninsula, was the start of the Korean War and South Korea started first. He explains his rationale:

What no one saw fit to point out is that the Ongjin peninsula is hardly the place to start an invasion if you are heading southward: it’s a cul-de-sac, and the 17th Regiment could simply have been blocked near Haeju if Kim

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<sup>12</sup> Selig S. Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 357.

<sup>13</sup> Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence From Russian Archives,” *Cold War International History Project, Working Paper*, No. 8, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, 1993), 31.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> “Historian Debunks Claim that South Started Korean War,” *The Chosun Ilbo*, 23 June 2006, <http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200606/200606230014.html> (accessed on 15 August 2006).

<sup>16</sup> Weathersby, 3.

Il Sung feared a southern counterattack after his invasion. It is a good place to jump off if you are heading northward, since it commands transportation leading right to Pyongyang, and in June 1950 was remote from the Seoul-based American attempts to rein in southern army commanders.<sup>17</sup>

He argues that “the war began in the same, remote locus of much of the 1949 fighting, the Ongjin Peninsula, and some hours later spread along the parallel eastward, to Kaesong, Chunchon, and the East Coast.”<sup>18</sup> According to Cumings, whether or not the question remains open as to who initiated the Korean War, Koreans were the main actors of the Korean War and each hoped to unify Korea under its control with the great powers’ support.<sup>19</sup> He argues that Kim Il Sung acted independently and the Soviet influence was minimal.

Cumings has developed the perspectives of two previous revisionists—I. F. Stone and Karunakar Gupta. I. F. Stone is the first scholar to claim that South Korea provoked North Korea. Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, publisher of I.F. Stone’s book *The Hidden Story of the Korean War*, agree with Stone and summarize their position about outbreak of the Korea War:

In the view of the background, and all the surroundings circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that what probably happened is that Syngman Rhee deliberately provoked the North Koreans in the hope that they would retaliate by crossing the parallel in force. The northerners, for their part, fell neatly into the trap.<sup>20</sup>

Karunakar Gupta, an Indian Scholar, boldly argues that the South Korean Army ignited the Korean War with an assault on Haeju, a North Korean city on the Ongjin peninsula. His argument influenced Bruce Cumings’ revisionism. Karunakar Gupta claims the South Korean Army’s provocation attack in his article, “How did the Korean War Begin?”

Certainly there is no denying the massive nature of the assault mounted by North Korea on the morning of 25 June 1950, even if it appears unlikely

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<sup>17</sup> Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War* (Princeton, N.J.: University Press, 1990), 571-572.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 568.

<sup>19</sup> Steven Hugh Lee, *The Korean War* (London: Longman, 2001), 39.

<sup>20</sup> Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, “Publisher’s Foreword,” in I.F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952), x.

that this was sanctioned by the Soviet Union. But what is missing from this line of analysis is any consideration of the degree to which South Korean provocation may have taken two forms: First, the immediate provocation represented by the assault of Haeju, ... And second, a more fundamental political provocation expressed in terms of the basic nature of Syngman Rhee's regime, its declared policies towards the North, and the indications of a hardening commitment by the U.S. towards this same regime.<sup>21</sup>

(2) Political Rivalry in the North. Robert Simmons finds the cause of the Korean War in political rivalry in the North. He says, "However, the specific timing of the June 25 invasion was caused by intense intra-Korean Worker's Party (KWP) rivalry in the north, combined with appeals from South Korean-based guerillas who had powerful supporters in the North."<sup>22</sup> Selig S. Harrison concludes that Kim Il Sung as a primary actor was responsible for the Korean War and rivalry in the north was the cause of the Korean War. He says, "Historians have now established beyond doubt that it was Kim Il Sung, not Stalin, who instigated the invasion, primarily in response to an internal factional challenge from his most significant rival for control of the ruling Workers Party in the North, Pak Hon Young, who was later purged."<sup>23</sup>

**b. Counterargument**

Jung Byung-joon, a professor at Mokpo National University in South Korea, contradicts the "trap" or "Haeju seizure" theory in his 2006 book, *The Korean War: Confrontations at the 38th Parallel and the Formation of the War*. He concludes that a surprise attack by North Korea, in accordance with support from Stalin, was the beginning of the Korean War.<sup>24</sup> He claims that Bruce Cumings' argument has two shortcomings. First, he argues that Bruce Cumings did not refer to declassified document from Russia and North Korea before he wrote his 2 volumes, *The Origins of the Korean War*, in 1981 and 1990. According to the Russian documents declassified in 1994, the Soviet Union finally agreed to support Kim Il-Sung's decision to attack South Korea and

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<sup>21</sup> Gupta, 714.

<sup>22</sup> Robert R. Simmons, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 103.

<sup>23</sup> Harrison, xiii.

<sup>24</sup> Jung Byung-joon, *Hangukjeonjaeng: 38seon chungdonggwa jeonjaengui hyeongseong* [The Korean War: Confrontations at the 38th parallel and the Formation of the War] (Paju, Kyronggi Province: Dolbegae, 2006), 71.

played a certain role in making the decision. Second, the Haeju situation is not clear because the first and second battalions of the 17th regiment from Ongjin had already been defeated and their communications were lost.<sup>25</sup> On 26 June 1950, the Defense Ministry of South Korea made a wrong announcement that Haeju was occupied by the South Korean Army and the United States Far East Command believed that the South Korean Army had taken Haeju on 28 June 1950.<sup>26</sup>

Jung found new South Korean and North Korean documents at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in 2001. Based on those new Korean documents, he says, the South Korean Army command directed the 17th regiment to follow Operation Command 38, which was not an attack plan but part of regular defense planning made by the South Korean Army.<sup>27</sup> The order was issued on the morning of 25 June 1950 after North Korea had already launched its attack at dawn and the 17th regiment had been defeated.<sup>28</sup> Without any evidence due to the loss of communications, however, the South Korean government believed that the 17th regiment might retaliate for a North Korean attack and even hid the real situation from the public. In reality, the 17th regiment was totally lost at the battle and some members showed up at the Inchon port several days after North Korean attack, on 28 June 1950.<sup>29</sup>

The bottom line is that there has been confusion over the battle situation on 25 June 1950 because of both Operation Command 38 developed by the South Korean army in March 1950 and the South Korean government's lies about the battle in the Haeju area without any clear evidence. Several scholars such as I. F. Stone, Karunakar Gupta, and Bruce Cumings have developed their "trap" or "Haeju seizure" theory from these unclear situations. Actually, the South Korean Army had not prepared any massive or provocative attack against North Korea.

<sup>25</sup> Jung Byung-joon, *Hangukjeonjaeng: 38seon chungdonggwa jeonjaengui hyeongseong* [The Korean War: Confrontations at the 38th parallel and the Formation of the War] (Paju, Kyonggi Province: *Dolbegae*, 2006), 71.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> Bae, Young-dae, "6.25 'Namchim Youdoseol' Chomokchomok Banbak (Refuting the Korean War provocation theory one by one)" Joongang Ilbo, 25 June 2006, <http://article.joins.com/article/viewaid.asp?ctg=&aid=2741433> (accessed on 30 August 2006).

<sup>28</sup> Jung Byung-joon, *Hangukjeonjaeng: 38seon chungdonggwa jeonjaengui hyeongseong* [The Korean War: Confrontations at the 38th parallel and the Formation of the War], 74.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 75.



## **B. THE ROOTS OF THE KOREAN WAR**

The root cause of the Korean War was Kim Il Sung's miscalculation and a power struggle among North Korean leaders. But, other external causes need to be considered to understand the Korean War as a whole. Domestic actors struggling for power on the Korean peninsula became connected with Great Power competition as the United States and the Soviet Union began to search for support for their interests. That is, there are many causes of the Korean War. It is like a "chain of errors." If even one in the chain of internal or external errors had been disconnected, the Korean War would have been prevented. Because there is a lack of explanation in both traditionalist and revisionist reasoning, it is necessary to consider carefully all of the internal and external roots and understand the relationships between them.

### **1. Internal Roots**

#### **a. *Kim Il-Sung's Misjudgment***

Kim Il-Sung had believed that Korea could be unified only by force, even before the end of the World War II. Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Litai Xue introduced Kim Il-Sung's background in their book, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*, "Kim shared his vision of a future Korea with his brigade comrades. One of them recalls that the new battalion commander Kim 'never believed in peaceful unification; he never had such an idea. He only stuck to the idea of armed unification.'"<sup>30</sup> This perception led to misjudgment about Korean unification in 1950.

Kathryn Weathersby has done the most extensive translation of Russian documents since declassification in 1994. She concludes that "the Soviet role was essential, but it was a facilitator rather than initiator."<sup>31</sup> She introduces an interview of Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Litai Xue, with a retired brigadier general of North Korea, Chung San-chin, on 13 April 1992. Chung San-chin explained Kim Il-Sung's rationale to persuade Stalin:

According to the report of Mun, Il, Kim's translator on the trip to Moscow, Kim, Il Sung made four points to persuade Stalin that the United States would not participate in the war. First, it would be a decisive surprise

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<sup>30</sup> Goncharov, Sergei N., Lewis, John W., and Xue, Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 131-2.

<sup>31</sup> Harrison, 106. quoted in Weathersby, *Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War*.

attack and the war would be won in three days; second, there would be an uprising of 200,000 communist party members in South Korea; third, the guerrillas in the southern provinces would support the Korean People's Army (KPA); and fourth, the US would not have time to participate.<sup>32</sup>

This interview was for the book, *Uncertain Partners*. It is the same as the testimony of Yoo Sung Chul, the head of the KPA Operations Directorate published in *Hangukilbo* [Korea Daily] on 9 September 1990.<sup>33</sup> According to Yoo Sung Chul, Kim Il-Sung thought that the occupation of Seoul in three days would be enough to unify Korea.<sup>34</sup> Yoo Sung Chul said that North Korea only planned three days because Pak Hon Youn, Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the South Korean Workers' Party (SKWP) claimed that 200,000 party members would overthrow the South Korean government after the occupation of Seoul.<sup>35</sup>

Actually, Kim Il-Sung convened a general meeting of the South Korean Assembly members after the occupation of Seoul in order to make Rhee Syngman resign. All situations were consistent with the four points that Kim Il-Sung made in order to persuade Stalin. However, Kim Il-Sung's prediction turned out to be a serious misjudgment because the war lasted three years instead of three days. There was no support from the members of the SKWP and guerrillas in the South and the United States quickly entered the war.

**b. No Political Consensus on the Korean Peninsula**

The political situation on the Korean peninsula after World War II was total chaos. In 1947, it was impossible to compose a provisional government. Based on the report written by Joseph E. Jacobs to George C. Marshall and shown *On the Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), there were three parties and 35 social

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<sup>32</sup> Weathersby, 26.

<sup>33</sup> Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, 144.

<sup>34</sup> Lee, Jung-Hoon, "Inmingooneun Seoul Jeomryong hoo Whe Samilgan Shieodna? [Why did the KPA take a rest for three days after the occupation of Seoul?], Weekly Dong-A, 22 June 2000, [http://210.115.150.1/docs/magazine/weekly\\_donga/news239/wd239cc050.html](http://210.115.150.1/docs/magazine/weekly_donga/news239/wd239cc050.html) (accessed on 1 September 2006).

<sup>35</sup> Lee, Jung-Hoon, "Inmingooneun Seoul Jeomryong hoo Whe Samilgan Shieodna? [Why did the KPA take a rest for three days after the occupation of Seoul?], Weekly Dong-A, 22 June 2000, [http://210.115.150.1/docs/magazine/weekly\\_donga/news239/wd239cc050.html](http://210.115.150.1/docs/magazine/weekly_donga/news239/wd239cc050.html) (accessed on 1 September 2006).

organizations in the North and over 400 parties in the South.<sup>36</sup> In the South, the total claimed members of all parties was more than 62 million, which was three times more than the entire population in the South.<sup>37</sup> According to a brief estimate of the political situation in NSC 8, political stability was not achieved. It said, “The tendency of Korean political elements to polarize into extremes of right and left and to pursue their ends through the use of violence acts as a serious deterrent to the achievement of political stability on a democratic basis in Korea.”<sup>38</sup>

It is possible to quantify the political situation by referring to “Political allegiance of applicants for consultations” made during the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission sessions for trusteeship on Korea.<sup>39</sup>

Table 1. Political allegiance of applicants for consultations, accepted by USSR (American criteria) Source: United States Department of State (USDS) (1960A: 53-4)<sup>40</sup>

	Number of organizations	Membership (million)	Membership (percentage)
Right	44	12.483	24.1
Moderate Right	18	4.029	7.8
Moderate	9	2.882	5.6
Moderate Left	6	4.609	8.9
Left South	41	14.450	27.9

<sup>36</sup> James I. Matray, “Korea’s Partition: Soviet-American Pursuit of Reunification, 1945-1948,” <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/korpart.htm> (accessed 5 August 2006).

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> NSC 8: “Report by the NSC on the Position of the United States with Respect to Korea,” 2 April 1948, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948*, vol. 6 (USGPO: 1974), 1166.

<sup>39</sup> Erik Van Ree, *Socialism in One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, 1945-1947* (Oxford: BERG, 1989), 256.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

Left North	28	13.257	25.6
Total	146	51.710	100

During the political chaos before the Korean War, two political figures—Yo Un Hyong and Kim Koo—could have worked for unification of Korea and have prevented the Korean War. Yo Un Hyong formed the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) (later the Korean People’s Republic (KPR)) after Nobuyuki Abe, the last Japanese Governor General of Korea, transferred power to him and asked for protection for all Japanese nationals until their repatriation to Japan.<sup>41</sup> Kim Young-Sik considers CPKI as “the first and the last true government of the Koreans, by the Koreans, and for the Koreans.”<sup>42</sup> He adds, “Koreans from all walks of life and political ideology worked in harmony, side by side, for the good of Korea. In that brief time period, the Korean people proved that they were fully capable of governing their own country.”<sup>43</sup> The KPR included all nationalist elements both non-Communist and Communist.<sup>44</sup> Yo’s efforts to create a unifying coalition of all nationalists failed because political leaders such as Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo and other conservative leaders stood against him.

Selig S. Harrison explains that the rise of other political leaders was due to the sponsoring of the occupation authorities.<sup>45</sup> He describes the political situation from 1945 to 1947 as “an internecine political conflict.”<sup>46</sup> Yo was assassinated by an extreme rightist, Han Ji Geun in 1947. If the KPR had established one Korea, the Korean War could have been prevented. After Yo’s death, the political and ideological division was intensified on the Korean peninsula. The attempts to unify the Right and the Left resulted in criticism from both the Communists and non-Communists. In South Korea, a Medal of

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<sup>41</sup> Kim, Young Sik, “Long Live August 15, 1945!: An Excerpt from ‘The Left-right Confrontation in Korea-Its Origin,’” Association for Asian Research, 28 October 2003, <http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/1630.html> (accessed on 2 September 2006).

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Harrison, 103.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

National Foundation was awarded to Yo Un Hyong posthumously by President Roh Moo Hyun in 2005, 60 years after independence. Yo Un Hyong has been treated as a leftist in South Korea.

Another assassination was a result of the political chaos. Kim Koo, the former Premier of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) had returned home from China on 23 November 1945 and had participated in anti-trusteeship demonstrations against the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>47</sup> Like Yo Un Hyong, he wanted to build a unified and independent Korea. Thus, he opposed South Korea's general election in 1948.<sup>48</sup> He expected that the separate election would lead to a civil war and wanted to prevent it. During his activities for creating one Korea, he was assassinated on 26 June 1949 by Ahn Doo Hee, who was killed by Park Ki Seo, a bus driver and one of Kim Koo's followers in 1996.<sup>49</sup> Ahn Doo Hee did not reveal the details of the assassination. Some argue that it was on Syngman Rhee's order, or a right-wing conspiracy, and others argue that it was a conspiracy of the United States. The motive of assassination is still obscure.

In September 2001, Professor Bang Sun Ju, a Korean-American historian and Professor Jung Byong Joon, who was a member of the Korean History Compilation Council, found some documents about Ahn Doo Hee at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). According to their findings, Ahn Doo Hee was an employee of the US Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in Korea as well as a member of the extreme rightist terrorist group, *Baik-yi-sah* [White Angels Association] and Yum Ung Taek, a head of the extreme right group may have planned Kim Koo's assassination.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Bruce Cumings, "American Policy and Korean Liberation," in Frank Baldwin, ed. *Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), 75.

<sup>48</sup> John Holliday, "The United Nations and Korea," in Baldwin, Frank, ed. *Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), 116.

<sup>49</sup> Seo, Young Hoon, "Baekbum Sihae Jinsang Gyumyong [Inquiring into the true state of Kim Koo assassination], *Hankookilbo*, 1 June 2004, <http://news.hankooki.com/lpage/society/200406/h2004060117103521930.htm> (accessed on 21 February 2007)

<sup>50</sup> Jung, Byong Joon, "Hanguk Hyundaesa 'Migoong'eseo Majoochin Bomool [Treasure found in the mystery of Korean Modern History]," *The Hankyoreh*, 29 June 2006, [http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/culture/culture\\_general/137209.html](http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/culture/culture_general/137209.html) (accessed on 4 September 2006).

After the assassination of two political leaders who were eager to prevent the division of Korea, Syngman Rhee became the leader in the South. Meanwhile, Kim Il Sung was designated a national leader by the Soviet Union. Both Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung emerged as competing nationalist leaders bent on uniting the Korean peninsula. It was the division of Korea into two competing regimes—each claiming to speak for all of Korea—that contributed to the outbreak of a civil war. In sum, there were diverse political parties, social organizations and leaders. They manipulated the external powers for their own advantages. The five-year internal political chaos finally brought about the tragic war.

## **2. External Roots**

### ***a. Japanese Colony and Pro-Japanese Collaborators***

The Japanese occupation resulted in Koreans who worked for the Japanese. The root cause of the conflict among the left, Communists, and the pro-Japanese conservatives was Japanese imperialism. The Korean War resulted from the entangled struggle among these groups. If the Japanese colonial collaborators had been disciplined by a legitimate legal system, there would have been no Korean War. South Korea is still trying to deal with the issues of pro-Japanese collaborators in the twenty-first century. Eventually, the Korean Assembly passed “the special law on the inspection of collaborations of Japanese Imperialism” in May 2005. This was the first legal foundation to inspect the collaborators and their actions since the end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945.

To implement the special law, the Roh Moo Hyun administration established the Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism (PCIC). This shows that the truth of pro-Japanese and anti-national actions had not been clarified earlier. The Chairman of PCIC announced the purpose of PCIC: “despite the end of the colonial rule in Korea 60 years ago, it has been great national shame in our history not to punish traitors of the people. Now preparing the start of a new national history at the very first of the twenty first century, the inspection of

Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism is a historical mission which cannot be delayed any more.”<sup>51</sup> This law should have been passed 60 years ago and could have prevented the Korean War.

Lee Hwal-woong, former Foreign Service officer for the South Korean government and currently a Fellow at Korea 2000, a Los Angeles based research council on Korean reunification, defines the Korean War as a conflict between “anti-Japanese and pro-Japanese forces.”<sup>52</sup> Lee argues that the United States helped pro-Japanese collaborators to contain the left:

With the end of World War II, the United States divided the peninsula and proclaimed an anticommunist military government in the southern half. It then helped the coalition of right wing elements and pro-Japanese collaborators to establish the Seoul government. Unable to secure a political foothold in Seoul, the left wing elements, many of them by then sworn communists, set up the Pyongyang government with Soviet blessing. Thus, one Korea became two Koreas: one run by anti-Japanese and the other by pro-Japanese forces.<sup>53</sup>

The decisions made by the United States after World War II determined the fundamental political structure in Korea. Bruce Cumings says that “The Americans were operating through the existing Japanese structures and using employees both in the government and the police who violated the strictures against former collaborations.”<sup>54</sup> Many of the conservative elite had collaborated with the Japanese during the colonial period. They opposed major postwar reforms to Korean society such as land reform and the purging of colonial collaborators.<sup>55</sup> Lieutenant General John Hodge, the head of the US occupation force, retained the colonial power structure to contain the left.<sup>56</sup> Pro-Japanese collaborators, especially the colonial police force, could work again. This policy brought further complications.

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<sup>51</sup> “The Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism,” <http://www.pcic.go.kr:8088/pcic/english.htm> (accessed on 27 August 2006).

<sup>52</sup> Bradley K. Martin, “Discussion of “The What-If Question,” *Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online*, [http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0002E\\_Martin\\_Discussion.html#item2](http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0002E_Martin_Discussion.html#item2) (accessed on 27 August 2006).

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Cumings, “American Policy and Korean Liberation,” 66.

<sup>55</sup> Steven Hugh Lee, 23.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 22.

**b. Division of Korea before the Korean War**

(1) Trusteeship. A five-year trusteeship was decided on by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in Moscow in December 1945. Part of Section three of the Moscow Agreement reads as follows:

3. It shall be the task of the joint commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

The proposals of the joint commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.<sup>57</sup>

Two Korean scholars, Syn Song Kil and Sin Sam Soon, blame Stalin for the establishment of trusteeship. They said, “It should be noticed that since the decision on trusteeship was adopted in Moscow, the criticism-charging lack of faith in and respect for the Korean people and the infringement on Korea’s independence and national sovereignty--was aimed mainly at Stalin. As it turned out, he was indeed responsible for the establishment of trusteeship over Korea.”<sup>58</sup>

This trusteeship policy was considered by the Roosevelt administration. Roosevelt and his advisors thought that the success of its postwar policy in Asia would require a stable government in Korea.<sup>59</sup> An international trusteeship for Korea was considered as “an effort to eliminate this strategic area as a potential source of tension and conflict in the postwar world.”<sup>60</sup> On the other hand, Bruce Cumings argues

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<sup>57</sup> “Soviet-Anglo-American Communiqué, Moscow Conference, 27 December 1945,” *Nautilus Institute*, [http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/agreements/CanKor\\_VTK\\_1945\\_12\\_27\\_soviet\\_anglo\\_american\\_communique.pdf](http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/agreements/CanKor_VTK_1945_12_27_soviet_anglo_american_communique.pdf) (accessed on 1 September 2006).

<sup>58</sup> Syn, Song-Kil and Sin, Sam-Soon, “Who Started the Korean War,” *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. XIV, No.2, Summer 1990, 245.

<sup>59</sup> James I. Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 8.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*



that “Roosevelt’s policy toward Korea, as toward Indochina, was trusteeship. This quintessential internationalist device was meant to accommodate postwar American security concerns, open the colonies to American commerce and tutelage, and corral communist and anticolonial revolution.”<sup>61</sup>

Steven Hugh Lee explained why the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union supported the trusteeship framework. According to Lee, the trusteeship favored “American new liberal imperialism, which downplayed protectionism and emphasized increased access to markets, low tariffs, and an ‘open door’ economic policy.”<sup>62</sup> The United Kingdom recognized the United States as the strongest power after World War II and supported the decision. The Soviet Union agreed to a trusteeship because it expected that a unified Korea would be friendly toward Moscow.<sup>63</sup>

Korean reaction was “immediate and hostile.”<sup>64</sup> When Roosevelt’s trusteeship policy for Korea was recommended in December 1942, Kim Koo, the president of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in Chungking, declared that “Korea must secure her...absolute independence. Korea’s political experience was of longer duration than Japan.”<sup>65</sup> After the Moscow agreement, there was “a storm of protest.”<sup>66</sup> The Anti-Trusteeship movement started in December 1945 and continued until the U.S.-Soviet Joint Committee was dissolved in August 1947.

Lee Chul Seung, chairperson for the National Committee of Liberty and Democracy, said in 2003 that “The anti-trustee movement could be considered as the second independence movement for Korea.”<sup>67</sup> Also, he said, “The collapse of the Soviet Union and superiority of the South Korean system to North

<sup>61</sup> Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-47*, Vol I, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. 129.

<sup>62</sup> Steven Hugh Lee, 17.

<sup>63</sup> Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950*, 66.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>67</sup> “Anti-trusteeship Movement Establishes Korea’s National Identity, Says Lee,” The Korea University News, <http://www.korea.ac.kr/english/news/EF8S01T00F00-view.jsp?idx=1300&page=7&search1=&search2=> (accessed on 1 September 2006).

Korea's are evidence that justify spirits of independence, democracy and unification of the anti-trusteeship movement.”<sup>68</sup> The trusteeship policy split Korean into two groups—anti-trusteeship groups and pro-trusteeship groups. The Communists and members of the extreme left denounced trusteeship for all Koreans, but they reversed their position and supported the Moscow Agreement because the Soviet Union most likely ordered them to switch.<sup>69</sup> Even though the Koreans had not experienced self-government, international guidance would not have been required. Without a trusteeship policy, the conflict between pro-trusteeship groups and anti-trusteeship groups, as well as the Korean War, would not have happened on the Korean peninsula.

(2) 38th Parallel. The United States and the Soviet Union divided the country along the 38th parallel with each primarily concerned with its own occupation zone. Without the 38th parallel, there would have been no Korean War. The hasty adoption of the 38th parallel as the dividing line on the Korean peninsula showed the lack of foresight about the almost permanent division of Korea because the 38th parallel still exists.

On 10 August 1945, Soviet forces moved toward northern Korea and there was an all-night meeting in the Executive Office Building next to the White House.<sup>70</sup> Lieutenant Colonels Dean Rusk, later Secretary of State under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and Charles Bonesteel, later U.S. military commander in Korea, were ordered to draw a line across Korea.<sup>71</sup> They had not prepared for that task.<sup>72</sup> They used a *National Geographic* map and thought that “if the Soviet Union accepted this, two-thirds of the country’s population and the capital city, Seoul, would be under American administration.”<sup>73</sup> Rusk later confessed that the decision was made in haste without deep knowledge,

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68 “Anti-trusteeship Movement Establishes Korea’s National Identity, Says Lee,” The Korea University News, <http://www.korea.ac.kr/english/news/EF8S01T00F00-view.jsp?idx=1300&page=7&search1=&search2=> (accessed on 1 September 2006).

69 Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea*, 67.

70 Steven Hugh Lee, 21.

71 Oberdorfer, 6.

72 Ibid.

73 Steven Hugh Lee, 21.

Rusk said that neither he nor any of the others involved were aware that at the turn of the century the Russians and Japanese had discussed dividing Korea into spheres of influence at the thirty-eighth parallel, a historical fact that might have suggested to Moscow that Washington had finally recognized this old claim. Had we known that, we almost surely would have chosen another line of demarcation.<sup>74</sup>

The Soviet Union accepted the 38th parallel proposal. Zhao Suisheng explains that the reason for the Soviet acceptance was because “Stalin wished to maintain satisfactory relations with the United States if possible.”<sup>75</sup> The 38th parallel was intended to be temporary, but it has been an almost permanent line dividing Korea and even all-out war could not change the line.<sup>76</sup>

(3) Establishment of the ROK and DPRK in 1948. In 1947, the United States introduced a resolution in the UN General Assembly for a national assembly election in Korea: the Soviet Union boycotted the vote and did not accept the resolution. A commission to observe national assembly elections visited Korea and met only the representatives of the right. The commission members resisted observing elections in the south only, but they gave way to the pressures from “the United States and other involved governments.”<sup>77</sup> Burton I. Kaufman said “Although unstated at the time, the administration’s policy was now clearly one of holding elections in anticipation of establishing a separate South Korean government.”<sup>78</sup> The position of the United States was made by the threat of Communist strength in South Korea. Communists were in a better position on the Korean peninsula. A separate regime in the south was considered as imperative policy by policy makers in Washington under the circumstances.<sup>79</sup> Kaufman introduced the report written by Joseph E. Jacobs,

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74 Oberdorfer, 6.

75 Zhao, Suisheng, *Power Competition in East Asia: From the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 92.

76 Ibid.

77 Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), 296.

78 Burton I. Kaufman, *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command*, 2nd ed. (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1997), 11.

79 Ibid.

In September 1947, Jacobs reported from Seoul that “at least thirty percent of the people in South Korea [were] leftists, following the Comintern Communist leaders who would support the Soviets behind the United States lines.” Once the United States was effectively removed from Korea, all kinds of possibilities existed for Communist domination of the entire peninsula within a relatively short period.<sup>80</sup>

South Korea (the Republic of Korea) was established on 15 August 1948 and North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) on 9 September 1948 respectively.<sup>81</sup> Kathryn Weathersby explains the establishment of separate states in 1948 as the result of the external influence,

The division of the county had been the action of the U.S. and USSR, not of Koreans themselves, who had never accepted the division as legitimate or permanent. Furthermore, the great powers officially regarded the establishment of independent states in the two occupation zones as a provisional measure; both occupying powers remained officially committed to the establishment of a unified government for Korea.<sup>82</sup>

*c. Stalin’s Shift*

Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue had an interview with a high-ranking Soviet diplomat who held one of the top positions in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive in 1991. According to one senior Soviet diplomat, “Up to April 1950, Stalin was always cautioning Kim Il Sung concerning his plans for military action, but after that he for some reason changed his mind and began to push for a military solution very actively.” There are several possible reasons for Stalin’s shift. Selig S. Harrison said that “Stalin finally yielded to Kim because he mistakenly concluded that the war would not take long and would not lead to conflict with the United States.”<sup>83</sup>

Kathryn Weathersby shows the documentary evidence of Stalin’s final shift to support Kim Il Sung’s decision to attack South Korea. Her conclusion is that Stalin changed his mind in the spring of 1950 and agreed to provide military means after

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<sup>80</sup> Burton I. Kaufman, *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command*, 2nd ed. (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1997), 11.

<sup>81</sup> Simmons, 146.

<sup>82</sup> Weathersby, 1.

<sup>83</sup> Harrison, xiv.

having believed that the United States would not intervene.<sup>84</sup> She cited one Foreign Ministry background report, “On the Korean War, 1950-1953, and the Armistice Negotiation,” written in 1966 by staff of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It clearly explains Stalin’s involvement in the Korean War,

In the DPRK, a people’s army was created which in manpower and equipment significantly surpassed the armed forces of South Korea. By January 1, 1950, the total number of DPRK troops was 110,000; new divisions were hastily being formed.

Calculating that the USA would not enter a war over South Korea, Kim Il Sung persistently pressed for an agreement from Stalin and Mao Zedong to reunify the country by military means. (telegrams #4-51, 233, 1950).

Stalin at first treated the persistent appeals of Kim Il Sung with reserve, noting that “such a large affair in relation to South Korea... needs much preparation,” but he did not object in principle. The final agreement to support the plans of the Koreans was given by Stalin at the time of Kim Il Sung’s visit to Moscow in March-April 1950. Following this, in May, Kim Il Sung visited Beijing and secured the support of Mao.

The Korean government envisioned realizing its goal in three stages:

- 1) concentration of troops near the 38th parallel,
- 2) issuing an appeal to the South for peaceful unification, and
- 3) initiating military activity after the South’s rejection of the proposal for peaceful unification.

At Stalin’s order, all requests of the North Koreans for delivery of arms and equipment for the formation of additional units of the KPA were quickly met. The Chinese leadership sent to Korea a division formed from Koreans who had been serving in the Chinese army, and promised to send food aid and to transfer one army closer to Korea “in case the Japanese enter on the side of South Korea.” (telegram 362, 1950)

By the end of May 1950 the General Staff of the KPA together with Soviet Military advisers announced the readiness of the Korean army to begin concentration at the 38th parallel. At the insistence of Kim Il Sung, the beginning of military activity was scheduled for June 25, 1950. (telegram 408.1950)<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Weathersby, 24-25.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 25.

It is clear that Kim Il Sung requested Soviet support and Stalin's support was important for the Korean War. After Stalin's shift, the Soviet Union sent military advisers to draft the battle plan.<sup>86</sup> Yoo Sung Chul, a retired North Korean lieutenant general translated the operational plan after Kim Il Sung returned to Korea.<sup>87</sup> The Soviet role in drafting the plan shows Stalin's shift and support.

According to Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, the reason for Stalin's shift was not simple and there are several aspects of explanations. They said,

...we believed his reasoning was far more complex.... Stalin would have concluded from press reports and intelligence that, though the Americans might want to aid Taiwan or even South Korea, it would take them many months to amass and get that aid to the western Pacific. The timing was on Kim's side if he moved quickly and decisively. In the worst case, the U.S. intervention would lead to a clash between Beijing and Washington and a denial of Taiwan to the Chinese Communists. The resulting rise in Sino-American hostilities would only increase Mao's reliance on Stalin....

Thus, we would argue, it was a mixture of short- and long-term estimates of the U.S. posture in Asia, as of April 1950, that finally led Stalin to become directly involved in Kim's military designs. In doing so, as we have remarked, the Soviet dictator would be pursuing his goals on several levels-to expand the buffer zone along his border, to create a springboard against Japan that could be used during a future global conflict, to test the American resolve, to intensify the hostility between Beijing and Washington, and, finally and foremost, to draw U.S. power away from Europe.<sup>88</sup>

A structural change of the international system in 1950 would also have played a role in Stalin's shift.

***d. The U.S. Policy on Korea after World War II***

There was American-Soviet competition outside of Asia after World War II. As reflected by NSC 8, Korea was a place of limited American interests before 1950. NSC 8 focused on the withdrawal of occupation forces and encouraged UN participation in the Korean problem,

3. In light of the foregoing, it is concluded that:

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<sup>86</sup> Weathersby, 25.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, 144.

a. It should be the effort of the U.S. Government through all proper means to effect a settlement of the Korean problem which would enable the U.S. to withdraw from Korea as soon as possible with the minimum of bad effects...

c. The U.S. should be prepared to proceed with the implementation of withdrawal, following the formation of a government in south Korea, such withdrawal to be phased in consonance with the accomplishment of the objectives outlined herein and the relevant commitments of the U.S. vis-à-vis the UN. Every effort should be made to create conditions for the withdrawal of occupation forces by 31 December 1948...

e. The U.S. should encourage UN interest and participation in the Korean problem and should continue to cooperate with the UN in the solution of that problem.

f. The U.S. should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that any action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea could be considered a *casus belli* for the U.S.<sup>89</sup>

Later, several competitive trends between the United States and the Soviet Union influenced the decision making of the United States. The rebirth of the Comintern in 1947, the Berlin blockade, the first Soviet Atomic bomb test in 1949, and the Chinese revolution in 1949 were perceived as the expansion of Communism and NSC 68 was created and committed the United States to the defense of Asia. In NSC 68, atomic capabilities of the Soviet Union were immediate threats and more than ever a substantial military increase was recommended,

The foregoing analysis indicates that the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States....the United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives.<sup>90</sup>

Some scholars argue that the limited strategic importance of Korea to the United States before the Korean War gave a wrong signal to Kim Il Sung. Cho Soon

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<sup>89</sup> NSC 8: "Report by the NSC on the Position of the United States with Respect to Korea," 2 April 1948, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948*, vol. 6 (USGPO: 1974), 1168-1169.

<sup>90</sup> NSC 68: "A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950," 7 April 1950, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950*, Vol. 1 (USGPO: 1977), 288.

Sung points to two pieces of evidence—Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s speech to the National Press Club on 12 January 1950 and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connelly’s public prediction in *U.S. News & World Report*, on 5 May 1950.<sup>91</sup> According to the speech of Secretary of State Acheson, Korea was not included in the line of his “defensive perimeter. He said,

This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands. We will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held. The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands...<sup>92</sup>

He also said that “the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it.”<sup>93</sup> Cho said that “He hinted that the United States would probably not intervene in the event of large-scale military conflict, since Korea was not ‘very important.’”<sup>94</sup> Senator Tom Connally stated publicly that “Korea was not an indispensable part of the U.S. defense strategy.”<sup>95</sup>

Kathryn Weathersby introduces an interview of Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Litai Xue, with a retired brigadier general of North Korea, Chung San-Chin, on 13 April 1992. “Chung also said that the Acheson speech was known and ‘produced a certain influence on Kim Il-Sung.’”<sup>96</sup> Kim Il Sung cannot answer whether he decided on the attack because of those public statements. But, if Dean Acheson had included Korea in the U.S. Defense line and Tom Connelly had stated the administration’s strong commitment to intervene should North Korea attack South Korea, the possibility of North Korea’s attack would have decreased and the Korean War might have been prevented.

### **C. SUMMARY**

Because the Korean War has domestic and international roots, it has been described as “a civil war, an exercise in collective security, a forgotten war, an

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<sup>91</sup> Cho, 259-261.

<sup>92</sup> Cho, 259.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 260.

<sup>94</sup> Cho, 261, quoted in Trumbull Higgins, *Korea and the Fall of MacArthur* (New York, 1960), 14.

<sup>95</sup> Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, 151.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.



international conflict, a necessary war, a police action, a proxy war, and a revolutionary struggle.”<sup>97</sup> In order to understand the meaning of domestic and international roots of the Korean War, the most appropriate definition of the Korean War is “internationalized civil war.”<sup>98</sup> The fact that the Korean peninsula has been technically at war since 1953 is evidence of how difficult it has been to solve the Korean conflict. Nobody had expected this long division. The 1953 Armistice Agreement has not been replaced with a peace treaty, which must be the very first step of the Korean unification. It will provide an opportunity to make a gradual integration of the two Koreas and release the tension between South Korea and North Korea. It is necessary to be patient and cautious because North Korea will not quickly let down its guard. David C. Kang warns of the danger of rapid change on the Korean peninsula,

Slow change is not bad—rapid change on the peninsula will be dangerous. The stakes are high—war or even chaos in North Korea could end up involving four major powers and costing billions of dollars and millions of lives, many of them American. Because the stakes are so high, it is all the more imperative that the United States remain patient, take the long-term view, avoid outdated cold war caricatures, and deal with North Korea as it is.<sup>99</sup>

In the twentieth century, the Koreans had not decided their destiny for themselves. For example, the Taft-Katsura Agreement between the United States and Japan of 1905 was a secret trade-off to assure American hegemony in the Philippines in exchange for United States acquiescence to the Japanese conquering of Korea.<sup>100</sup> After that, Japan ruled Korea for thirty-six years. This made Korea weak and brought on the Korean War. A sovereign and independent Korea was promised by the major powers – the United States, China, and Great Britain – in the 1943 Cairo Declaration. Also, the Korean War was ended by the United States led U.N., China, and North Korea—not by South Korea. All these cases show intervention in Korea by other external countries.

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<sup>97</sup> Steven Hugh Lee, 5.

<sup>98</sup> Alexandre Y. Mansourov, *Communist War Coalition Formation and the Origins of the Korean War* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, 1997), 1.

<sup>99</sup> Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 69.

<sup>100</sup> Harrison, 106.

In the twenty-first century, the international community must deal with issues left behind from the chaos of World War II in order to develop a more peaceful world. The official end of the Korean War will be one of the symbolic changes in the development in the international community. Bruce Cumings concluded his book, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, with the future unified Korea's liberty.

Perhaps a century of conflict and turmoil, with millions of lives lost, will still have been worth it if a unified Korea has liberty as Koreans define it (*chayu*): Liberty as a nation and liberty for its people to be what they want to be.<sup>101</sup>

It is the most important thing to understand about the internal and external roots of the Korean War because the lessons must be learned for a peaceful Korean peninsula.

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<sup>101</sup> Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 495.

### **III. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL SETTING ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR STANDOFF**

North Korea conducted a nuclear test on 9 October 2006. The nuclear test was analyzed and found to have produced “a low yield of less than one kiloton.”<sup>102</sup> The solutions for North Korea’s nuclear crisis have not been found. There seems to be no clear answer for the motivations of the North Korean nuclear test and solutions for it. It makes Korean unification more difficult and complex. Korean unification seems far more remote with a nuclear North Korea. The objective of this chapter is to describe and clarify the internal and external roots of North Korea’s nuclear program in order to understand why North Korea developed it and to find the solutions for a peaceful Korean unification in the future.

What were the main motivations for North Korea’s nuclear program? The development of North Korea’s nuclear weapon cannot be tied to one specific reason. It was largely the result of the international context unfavorable to North Korea intertwined with indigenous reasons. This meant that North Korea’s nuclear development fed into and was impacted by both internal and external factors. Domestic motivations seeking security, independence, and sovereignty intertwined with international isolation and economic difficulty in North Korea after the end of the Cold War.

North Korean nuclear development emerged from domestic efforts seeking independence and security after the Korean War. It eventually came to be a real problem and to have international significance after the end of the Cold War. This thesis argues that the reason for the various explanations is that North Korea’s nuclear program arose from a number of motivations, not just one. Just like the Korean War, the reasons for the nuclear development cannot be explained only by internal factors but must also include external factors.

The motivations of North Korea’s nuclear program will be divided into internal and external groups. Each explanation will produce the possible assumptions and reasons for its

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<sup>102</sup> Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Options” *CRS Report for Congress*, 12 December 2006 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service), 1.

position, but one approach cannot explain all of the motivations. Like the roots of the Korean War, the secret to understanding the roots of North Korea's nuclear program is to combine those approaches. Based on those explanations, this thesis will propose the solutions for North Korea's nuclear crisis and for peaceful Korean unification. Because the motivations of the nuclear program can be explained by both internal and external factors, solutions for Korean unification must be not only Korean efforts, but also international cooperation and support.

## **A. INTERNAL ROOTS**

### **1. Political Factors to Hold on to Power**

The primary concern of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il is to hold on power. To do this, it is necessary to maintain the support of the military. It is useful to use external threats and rely on military forces to press any movement in opposition to his power. Since the end of the Cold War, a North Korean attack has become less plausible. According to the analysis of Chanlett-Avery and Squassoni, "...the test may have been intended to appease hardliners in the regime. In the wake of the partially failed missile tests in July 2006, the military leadership in North Korea may have pressed for another indication of their resolve."<sup>103</sup>

Victor D. Cha brings evidence of a low possibility of North Korea's invasion for hegemonic unification, "A low-key but very significant event at the September 1998 session of the Supreme People's Assembly (1st session, 10th term) was abolition of the Unification Committee."<sup>104</sup> According to Cha, "Russian observers note that among the core principles that have made up the *juche* (self-reliant) ideology, emphasis has shifted recently from universal 'communization' to 'self-dependency' as the ultimate revolutionary goal."<sup>105</sup> Also, North Korea's limited economic capability cannot support a successful invasion of the South. To maintain political power based on *juche* (self-reliant) ideology is Kim Jong-Il's primary goal.

North Korea has provoked skirmishes to create tension and take advantage of the consequences for political reason. This is "coercive bargaining" strategy. If North Korea

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<sup>103</sup> Chanlett-Avery and Squassoni, 7.

<sup>104</sup> Cha and Kang, 20.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 21.

has nuclear weapons, “coercive bargaining” strategy after skirmishes would be more effective and advantageous to North Korea. According to Victor D. Cha, coercive strategy “derives from the preemptive/preventive logic.”<sup>106</sup> He says that “This strategy does not advocate all-out war. Rather it utilizes deliberate, limited acts of violence to create small crises and then negotiate down from the heightened state of tension to a bargaining outcome more to the North’s advantage than the status quo.”<sup>107</sup> If coercive bargaining is North Korea’s intention, then there is a high chance of violence resulting. Based on this strategy, Kim Jong-Il can maximize the internal unity and pressure any internal opposite movements.

South Korea and North Korea made a “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in 1992 after the agreement on “Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchange and Cooperation.”<sup>108</sup> After the establishment of that 1992 Basic Agreement, there have been three skirmishes between South Korea and North Korea. First, in September 1996, there was a submarine incursion on the east coast of South Korea. A South Korean cab driver noticed a group of men and a strange object and reported it to local police. The strange object was a thirty-seven-yard-long North Korean submarine of the Shark class.<sup>109</sup> Eleven North Korean infiltrators committed suicide to avoid being captured and thirteen were killed in firefights.<sup>110</sup> One of the North Koreans, Lee Kwang-su was captured. Second, on 14 June 1999, there was an exchange of gunfire in the West Sea and one North Korean patrol boat was sunk and another one was badly damaged by South Korean warships.<sup>111</sup> Third, on 29 June 2002, there was a naval skirmish near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea. There were scores of casualties on both sides; six South Koreans died and 18 were injured.<sup>112</sup> The sea border

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<sup>106</sup> Cha and Kang, 24

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Harrison, 206.

<sup>109</sup> Oberdorfer, 387.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., 388.

<sup>111</sup> “Two North Korean Navy Boats Sunk,” *The Korea Times*, 15 June 1999, <http://times.hankooki.com> (accessed on 25 August 2006).

<sup>112</sup> Jung, Sung-ki, “S. Korea Marks 4th Anniversary of Bloody Naval Clash,” *The Korea Times*, 28 June 2006, <http://times.hankooki.com> (accessed on 26 August 2006).

was not clearly delineated at the end of the Korean War and North Korea refuses to recognize the NLL drawn by the US-led UN command.<sup>113</sup> Mutual trust is impossible after these bloody conflicts.

North Korea did not get any benefit from these skirmishes except more solidified and isolated state of North Korea, which helps Kim Jong-Il remain in power. Therefore, one possible reason for low-level conflicts might be found in domestic politics. Kim Jong-Il must have the loyalty of the North Korean military in order to maintain his power. Low-level conflict under the nuclear umbrella could be used as a means to pursue “strong and great nation (*kangsong taeguk*)” and “military first” policy. However, it is very vague how much benefit North Korea would gain from low-level conflict.

## 2. Economic Difficulty

In the 1990s, millions died in North Korea from its collapsing economy and resulting serious food shortages. People had to check with neighbors to see who was still alive. There were many refugees along the North Korea-China border. Estimates of the numbers of refugees are from 10,000 to 300,000. The U.S. State Department estimated from 30,000 to 50,000 in June 2005.<sup>114</sup> Becker’s anecdote in his book, *Rogue State: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea*, show the horrific reality in North Korea,

A year earlier, in 1996, I stopped at one border village where everyone spoke of the pitiful letters that arrived pleading for aid. A man, who had just returned from DPRK, pulled from his pocket dozens of tiny pieces of paper rolled up, or folded small enough to be swallowed in an emergency. Strangers on the other side had begged him to deliver them to their relatives. He unrolled one at random: “The children are fine. Grandfather and grandmother are alive but we spend a lot of money on grain. Since February some relatives have died. On March 19, your uncle died. On April 15, cousin Choi died because even retired soldiers do not get anything to eat. In May, we will go to Namyang [a border town] and wait for you. We need 220 pounds of wheat and 440 pounds of corn. We have no choice but to beg for your help.”<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Jung, Sung-ki, “S. Korea Marks 4th Anniversary of Bloody Naval Clash,” *The Korea Times*, 28 June 2006, <http://times.hankooki.com> (accessed on 26 August 2006).

<sup>114</sup> Larry A. Nicksch, “Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations-Issues for Congress,” *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, 17 Jan 2006 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress), 9.

<sup>115</sup> Jasper Becker, *Rogue State: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 22.

Oberdorfer explains the different economic conditions between South Korea and North Korea by comparing the food conditions,

The UN agency reported that the DPRK government had reduced rations under its public distribution program to 300 grams (10.5 ounces) of grain per person per day, about 1,000 calories. The UN minimum standard for refugees was 1,900 calories per day. In South Korea, by contrast, food was so plentiful that the National Institute of Health and Social Affairs reported after an extensive survey that one in every four adults was on a diet to avoid putting on excess weight.<sup>116</sup>

Growth in estimated real gross domestic product (GDP) in North Korea was negative for most of the 1990s. In 2002 and 2003, growth was about 1.2% and 1.8% respectively.<sup>117</sup> North Korea's strategy is to exchange the nuclear program for impressive economic inducements. The most urgent need to avoid economic collapse is the acquisition of food for the starving population. The 1993 and 1994 nuclear crises were related to economic problems.

### **3. Competition with South Korea in International Recognition**

South Korea and North Korea have claimed their legitimacy as the true government of the Korean people. North Korea has been losing in most competing areas, especially international recognition. The 1988 Seoul Olympics was a turning point in South and North Competition. Also, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon's inauguration as UN Secretary General on 14 December 2006 means South Korea is winning the legitimacy competition of the Korean people.<sup>118</sup> The disadvantageous position of North Korea in competition with South Korea might have led to the nuclear weapons program.

#### ***a. 1988 Seoul Olympic***

After South Korea's Olympic victory over Japan in 1981, North Korea expressed its concern about the development of South Korea. *Nodong Sinmun* said,

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<sup>116</sup> Oberdorfer, 386.

<sup>117</sup> Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, "The North Korean Economy: Background and Policy Analysis," 9 February 2005, *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress), 3.

<sup>118</sup> Warren Hoge, "New U.N. Leader is Sworn In and Promises to Rebuild Trust," 15 December 2006, *New York Times*, <http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F70910FC39550C768DDDAB0994DE404482> (accessed on 20 February 2007)

“Recently South Korean military fascists have been mobilizing high-ranking officials and related staff of the puppet government as well as pro-government trumpeters to raise a ridiculous hullabaloo every day about the Olympics, which are said to be going to be held in Seoul in 1988. Now the puppets of South Korea are approaching socialist nations and nonaligned countries in the hope of establishing diplomatic and official relations in order to have their ‘state’ recognized as a legitimate one.”<sup>119</sup> It shows that North Korea worried about its fading claims of legitimacy as the true Korean government.

North Korea tried to halt the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games in an extreme way. North Korean espionage agents, Kim Seung Il and Kim Hyun Hui, destroyed Korean Air Lines flight 858 on 29 November 1987.<sup>120</sup> They said that “the order came directly from Kim Jong-Il, son of the North Korean president, and that its aim was to dissuade the nations of the world from participating in the Seoul Olympics.”<sup>121</sup> Despite North Korea’s interruption, the 1988 Seoul Olympics were a tremendous success story. 160 nations participated in the games and all games were broadcasting worldwide except to North Korea. The 1988 Seoul Olympics were a total victory of South Korea over North Korea.

***b. Status in the United Nations***

North Korea declared its nuclear test plan when the South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade topped informal polls for the next U.N. Secretary General in September 2006. North Korea announced its nuclear test on 9 October 2006 several days before the United Nations’ General Assembly appointed Ban Ki Moon to that body’s highest post on 13 October 2006.<sup>122</sup> This might be a coincidence, but it is symbolic to show that North Korea has lost in competition with South Korea in the United Nations. Ban Ki Moon will have to play a leading role in imposing U.N. sanctions on North Korea and preventing proliferation. On 14 October 2006, the United Nations Security Council

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<sup>119</sup> Oberdorfer, 181.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 183.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> “South Korean Foreign Minister Named Next U.N. Leader,” *CNN*, 13 October 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/10/13/un.secretary.general/index.html> (accessed on 25 October 2006).



passed a resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear test.<sup>123</sup> North Korea's degraded status in the United Nations shows the failure of North Korea in competition with South Korea.

#### **4. A Substitute for Conventional Forces**

Even though there are many arguments about North Korea's capability, it is clear that North Korean leaders felt the necessity of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence and substitute for conventional forces. South Korea's developing military capability and upgrade of USFK might have led North Korea to consider nuclear weapons.

##### **a. *The Cost of the Military***

The problem with maintaining conventional forces is cost. Nuclear deterrence was used as the only way to reduce those costs. According to North Korea's news service, Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), "The intention to build up a nuclear deterrent is not aimed to threaten and blackmail others but to reduce conventional weapons...to channel manpower resources and funds into economic construction and the betterment of people's living."<sup>124</sup> Lawrence Freeman explains the problem with conventional forces and substitution of nuclear power for conventional firepower.

The only way to reduce costs without renegeing on commitments was to relax the inhibitions surrounding nuclear use and to substitute nuclear for conventional firepower. In 1952, the British government had already concluded that the best bet for the West in its confrontation with the East was to rely on nuclear deterrence.<sup>125</sup>

Because of the expense to expand the army, North Korea might have intended to substitute nuclear for conventional power. Victor Cha said, "they fear the growing disparity in the balance of forces on the peninsula in favor of the United States and South Korea."<sup>126</sup> North Korea appears to have opted to purchase a nuclear deterrence

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<sup>123</sup> "UN Imposes Sanctions on North Korea for Nuclear Test," *The Korea Times*, 15 October 2006, <http://times.hankooki.com> (accessed on 20 October 2006).

<sup>124</sup> Barbara Demick, "N. Korea: Nuclear Weapons Cut Costs; Pyoungyang says atomic arms program aims to reduce regime's reliance on conventional forces," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 June 2003, A3.

<sup>125</sup> Lawrence Freeman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 740.

<sup>126</sup> Cha and Kang, 84.

capability after the end of the Cold War.<sup>127</sup> North Korea must have shifted from the offensive orientation of the 1980s to a deterrence and defense-oriented doctrine and North Korea leaders would have thought nuclear weapons posed a firm deterrent measure with low cost in the 1990s.

***b. The Deterioration of North Korea's Military Capabilities in the 1990s***

However, North Korea's massive conventional warfare capability might be a credible threat. The warning time for a North Korean artillery shell attacking Seoul, which is the fifth largest city in the world with more than ten million people would be less than a minute. North Korea's midrange missiles can be delivered to South Korea and to the bases of the United States Forces in Korea and Japan. A nuclear attack on Seoul would create total chaos. The July 4 2006 missile test suggested that the threat to the American homeland remains unclear because of the failure of Taepodong-2. In the 1980s, North Korea signaled an immediate offensive invasion threat by mechanization and changes in structure and organization.<sup>128</sup>

North Korea's conventional warfighting capability had been the clear threat, but North Korea has developed its nuclear program because of the deterioration of its conventional military capability. The threat posed by North Korea in the 1980s diminished in the 1990s because North Korea's military capabilities deteriorated as "a result of severe resource constraints."<sup>129</sup> Victor D. Cha introduces a Defense Intelligence Agency study on North Korean conventional warfighting capabilities, "North Korea's capability to successfully conduct complex, multi-echelon, large-scale operations to reunify the Korean peninsula declined in the 1990s. This was, in large measure, the result of severe resource constraints, including widespread food and energy shortages."<sup>130</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, North Korean leaders have not considered that its conventional warfighting capabilities are enough to deter the United States and

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<sup>127</sup> C. Kenneth Quinones, "Reconciling Nuclear Standoff and Economic Shortfalls: Pyongyang's perspective," in *North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival*, ed. Kihl, Young Whan and Kim, Hong Nack (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 81.

<sup>128</sup> Cha and Kang, 78.

<sup>129</sup> Cha and Kang, 78-79.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid*, 79.

South Korea. North Korea's military capability has declined since the 1990s. During the Gulf War in 1991, North Korea was stunned by the use of the superior conventional weapons of the United States. North Korea's weaponry was very similar to that of Iraq at the time. Lacking military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union and China, North Korea could not modernize its conventional forces. Several scholars support the idea that North Korea uses its nuclear program to offset its degraded military capability. Selig S. Harrison summarizes North Korea's change,

Pyongyang has responded with nuclear and missile programs designed both to deter any United States use of nuclear weapons in Korea and to neutralize the superiority of South Korean airpower over its aging Mig force. Unless the United States joins in a denuclearization of Korea and in arms-control agreements that reduce or remove the threat of a preemptive strike by United States aircraft, North Korea is unlikely to foreclose the development of its nuclear and missile capabilities.

John Pike, a defense analyst at GlobalSecurity.org, argues that the North Korean army is not the main threat, "As long as the war was conventional, I don't think North Korea would do much better than Iraq did."<sup>131</sup> North Korea has felt the disparity in conventional forces and has focused on its nuclear program.

*c. A Case of Substitution for Conventional Forces: Pakistan*

North Korea has placed a high priority on developing missiles to offset the conventional military advantages of South Korea and the United States. A main goal of this effort is to ensure the reliable delivery of nuclear weapons. North Korea has not been able to update most of its military assets for the past decade, but its missiles development continues. Pakistan has pursued a similar nuclear strategy, which may be instructive. Peter R. Lavoy and Stephen A. Smith said, "Although the Pakistan Air Force F-16 and Mirage 5 aircraft probably are capable of nuclear delivery, the liquid-fuel Ghauri 1 and 2 missiles developed with North Korean assistance, and the solid-fuel Shaheen 1 and 2 missiles developed with Chinese help, are more likely choices."<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> John Pike quoted in Sappenfield, "For US Military, Few Options to Defang; Any US Action Risks Nuclear Reprisals against American Troops and Allies in the Region and a Renewed Korean Conflict," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 7 July 2006. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0707/p04s01-usmi.htm> (accessed on 25 August 2006).

<sup>132</sup> Peter R. Lavoy and Maj. Stephen A. Smith, "The Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear Use Between India and Pakistan," *Strategic Insights*, Vol. II, Issue 2, February 2003, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/feb03/southAsia2.asp#references> (accessed on 30 August 2006).

## **B. EXTERNAL ROOTS**

### **1. Deterrence and Defense-Oriented Doctrine for Regime Survival from the United States' Threat**

First of all, from a North Korean perspective, North Korea's nuclear program is a matter of regime survival. North Korea has requested security assurance and a bilateral peace treaty with the United States as a precondition of no nuclear weapons development. North Korea has been threatened by the United States, especially since the end of the Cold War and the "Axis of Evil" statement after 9/11. North Korea would consider regime survival as a primary nuclear strategy as long as the United States maintains this hard-line policy.

#### *a. North Korea's Request for a Security Guarantee*

North Korean leaders repeatedly state that they are willing to restrict their nuclear program if the United States guarantees the country's security. When James Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State, visited Pyongyang in October 2002, Kang Sok-ju, first vice-minister for foreign affairs acknowledged the nuclear program and requested security assurance. Kang said, "If the United States recognized North Korea's system of government, concluded a peace agreement pledging non-aggression and did not interfere in his country's economic development, Pyongyang would seriously discuss U.S. concerns about the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program."<sup>133</sup> Charles L. Pritchard introduces an interesting discussion between Kim Jong-Il and Madeleine Albright, former US secretary state in October 2000:

He told her that in the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, was able to conclude that China faced no external security threat and could accordingly refocus its resources on economic development. With the appropriate security assurances, Mr. Kim said, he would be able to convince his military that the US was no longer a threat and then be in a similar position to refocus his country's resources.<sup>134</sup>

Two weeks after North Korea's admission about having an HEU program in October 2002. North Korea's Foreign Ministry spokesman explained that the United

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<sup>133</sup> Charles L. Pritchard, "A Guarantee to Bring Kim into Line," *The Financial Times*, 10 October 2003, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/pritchard/20031010.htm> (accessed on 25 August 2006).

<sup>134</sup> Pritchard.

States' hostile policy was the cause of their nuclear program and requested a non-aggression treaty between North Korea and the United States:

As far as the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is concerned, it cropped up as the United States has massively stockpiled nuclear weapons in South Korea and its vicinity and threatened the DPRK, a small country, with those weapons for nearly half a century, pursuing a hostile policy toward it in accordance with the strategy for world supremacy.... If the United States legally assures the DPRK of nonaggression, including the nonuse of nuclear weapons against it by concluding such treaty, the DPRK will be ready to clear the former of its security concerns.<sup>135</sup>

Based on North Korea's request for the security assurance, regime survival seems to be the primary motive of the nuclear program.

***b. Response to the United States' Threat***

According to Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow, North Korea's nuclear program is a response to the foreign policy of the United States since the end of the Cold War. Interestingly, based on major military operations, they concluded that the United States has been very belligerent:

Consider the extent of U.S. military coercion since the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The United States:

- invaded Panama and overthrew the government of Manuel Noriega.
- devastated Iraq in the first Persian Gulf war
- occupied Somalia
- forced the government of Haiti from power by threatening to invade the country
- bombed the Bosnian Serbs into accepting a peace agreement
- bombed Yugoslavia into relinquishing control over its province of Kosovo
- invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban government
- attacked and occupied Iraq in the second Persian Gulf war.

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<sup>135</sup> "Conclusion of Non-aggression Treaty between DPRK and U.S. Called for," Korean News from Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) of DPRK, 25 October 2006, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm> (accessed on 3 September 2006).

In all, the United States has conducted eight major military operations in fourteen years. That is an extraordinary record of belligerence.<sup>136</sup>

They say that it was rational to pursue nuclear weapons to deter an attack by the United States, “It is hardly surprising if Pyongyang concluded that it might be next on Washington’s hit list unless it could effectively deter an attack.”<sup>137</sup>

President Bush, in his 2002 State of the Union address, reinforce this impression when he described North Korea as part of an Axis of Evil,

North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.... States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic....I will not wait on events, while dangers gather, I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer.”<sup>138</sup>

The Washington Post’s Bob Woodward, in his book *Bush at War*, introduces his interview at the President’s ranch in Crawford, Texas in August 2002, and explains Bush’s feeling about North Korea, “The President sat forward in his chair. I thought he might jump up he became so emotional about the North Korean leader. ‘I loathe Kim, Jong Il’ Bush shouted, waving his finger in his air. ‘I’ve got a visceral reaction to this guy, because he is starving his people.’”<sup>139</sup>

From a possible North Korean perspective, these statements might be a serious threat to its regime’s survival. North Korea might feel so threatened by the Iraq War that it has developed nuclear weapons to prevent the United States from attacking it.

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<sup>136</sup> Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow, *The Korean Conundrum* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 72-3.

<sup>137</sup> Carpenter and Bandow, 73.

<sup>138</sup> “The President’s State of the Union Address,” *The White House*, 29 January 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (accessed on 15 August 2006).

<sup>139</sup> Bill Powell, “Nuclear Blackmail North Korea is no Iraq. There’s no military option. So how do you get a defiant Kim Jong Il to give up his nukes?” [http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune\\_archive/2003/01/20/335652/index.htm](http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/01/20/335652/index.htm) (accessed on 20 August 2006) quoted in Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2002), 340.

*c. Balance of Power against North Korea in the Post-Cold War Era*

South Korea rushed to normalize ties with China and the Soviet Union in 1991. The Soviet Union established full diplomatic relationships with South Korea on 1 January 1991 after Gorbachev's meeting with the former South Korean president, Roh Taewoo.<sup>140</sup> Even though it was suggested that a special envoy be sent to do a "distasteful job," Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, felt obligated to go himself to Pyongyang because he knew that it would be very difficult to convince North Korea to accept normalization with South Korea.<sup>141</sup> Shevardnadze argued that "North Korea would benefit from Moscow's diplomatic relations with Seoul because Soviet officials would be able to talk directly with the South on North-South issues, the problem of the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons, and any other topics of importance to Pyongyang."<sup>142</sup>

The North Korean foreign minister, Kim Young Nam replied that "it would reinforce the division of the country and severely aggravate relations between Moscow and Pyongyang." North Korean leaders might have realized that there was a change in the balance of power in the post-cold war era. They might have started considering a self-reliant nuclear weapon, too.

China followed the Soviet Union's lead in moving toward a normal relationship with South Korea<sup>143</sup> The trade between China and South Korea grew after China opened to market economics and came to be seven times larger than its trade with North Korea.<sup>144</sup> China pushed North Korea to accept the concept of the two Koreas being admitted to the United Nations. South and North Korea joined the UN General Assembly in 1991. North Korea announced, "It had no choice but to apply for UN membership—even though dual membership would be an obstacle to

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<sup>140</sup> Oberdorfer, 214.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Edward A. Olsen, *Korea: The Divided Nation* (Westpoint, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005), 142.

<sup>144</sup> Oberdorfer, 231.

unification—because, otherwise, the South would join the United Nations alone.”<sup>145</sup> North Korea’s new relationship with the Soviet Union and China might have made North Korea think about its security.

Considering the balance of power in Northeast Asia, neorealists would argue that “the end of the Cold War left North Korea with no choice but to internally counteract the sharp deterioration of the external balance of power.”<sup>146</sup> North Korea has become more isolated and now relied on its own defense. This change of the relationship between China and North Korea has been shown recently. For example, after North Korea’s missile test on 4 July 2006, the Chinese leaders were frustrated. The United States Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said, “I think the Chinese are as baffled as we are by North Korea’s actions. China has done so much for that country and that country just seems intent on taking all of China’s generosity and giving nothing back.”<sup>147</sup> Yan Xuetong, a professor of international relations at Beijing’s Tsinghua University, stated “I think that China is very unhappy with North Korea, which put it in a very awkward position. China now feels it is trapped in a game it can’t win.”<sup>148</sup>

Sandip Kumar Mishra, a professor in the Department of East Asian studies, University of Delhi, India, argues “After the North Korean missile tests, it has become more obvious that Pyongyang is not ready to listen to anybody in its resolution to get direct to talks with the United States at any cost.”<sup>149</sup> Also, North Korea’s refusal to participate in the six-party talks between the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States throws doubt on whether China can play a key role in persuading North Korea.<sup>150</sup> Paik Hak-soon, a scholar at the Sejong Institute, a North Korea think-tank

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<sup>145</sup> Oberdorfer , 232.

<sup>146</sup> C.S. Eliot Kang., “North Korea’s Engagement Motives,” in *The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers*, ed. Kwak, Tae-Hwan and Joo, Seung-Ho (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 20.

<sup>147</sup> Simon Elegant, “The Worst of Friends,” in *Time International* (Asia ed.), Vol. 168, 24 July 2006. <http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501060724-1215009,00.html> (accessed on 26 July 2006).

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Sandip Kumar Mishra, “Does China Still have Leverage?” *The Korea Times*, 14 August 2006, [http://search.hankooki.com/times/times\\_view.php?term=north+korea+china++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/opinion/200608/kt2006081418530754060.htm&media=kt](http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=north+korea+china++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/opinion/200608/kt2006081418530754060.htm&media=kt) (accessed on 26 August 2006).

<sup>150</sup> Mishra.



based in Seoul, said, “Chinese policy is striking a very fine balance between North Korea and the United States. If China does not help, the North Korean leadership is determined to go in its own way.”<sup>151</sup>

Consequently, the end of the Cold War has changed the balance of power against North Korea. The changed situations such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic development of China, South Korea’s normalization with China and the Soviet Union in 1991, explain why North Korea seems to have decided to develop a self-reliant nuclear deterrence without help from its two Cold War patrons—China and Russia.

*d. Evidence of North Korea’s Intention – The 1993-1994 Crisis*

As explained previously, North Korea seems to have been using the nuclear program as a means of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. The 1993-1994 North Korean nuclear crisis shows North Korea’s intention. In January 1993, North Korea refused the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to two suspected waste depositories. The 1993 Joint Statement by North Korea and the United States shows that North Korea’s nuclear strategy is related to regime survival and will be similar in the future. From North Korea’s perspective, its main concern has been how to counter what it perceives as its greatest external threat—the United States.

Therefore, North Korea responded positively when the United States demonstrated sensitivity to its regime survival. The first U.S.-North Korea Joint Statement of 11 June 1993 says, “its purpose is assurance against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons, and peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.”<sup>152</sup> This can be interpreted as a U.S. promise not to take military action against North Korea and led to North Korea’s agreement not to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Paik, Hak-soon quoted in Chistoper Carpenter, , “China Walks a Fine Line With North,” *The Korea Times*, 4 August 2006, [http://search.hankooki.com/times/times\\_view.php?term=north+korea+china++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/nation/200608/kt2006080418104111990.htm&media=kt](http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=north+korea+china++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/nation/200608/kt2006080418104111990.htm&media=kt) (accessed on 26 August 2006).

<sup>152</sup> Quinones, 77.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

## **2. Economic Benefits under Bargaining Strategy**

North Korea has experienced economic difficulty since the mid-1990s. Based on economic perspectives, North Korea is using its nuclear program as a bargaining chip to get economic aid from outside.

### ***a. The Worsening Situation after the End of the Cold War***

North Korea has used its nuclear program as leverage in asking for help from the United States, South Korea and Japan since the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War and termination of aid from the Soviet Union and China worsened economic conditions in North Korea. Several economic figures show the significant changes after the collapse of the communist bloc. For example, after the termination of Soviet subsidized sales, North Korea's petroleum imports from the Soviet Union decreased by more than half between 1988 (3.4 million tons) and 1992 (1.5 million tons).<sup>154</sup> Similarly, even though three-fifths of North Korea's overall trade took place with Warsaw Pact countries, it dropped by nearly 33 percent between 1988 and 1991 "after hard currency terms of customs settlement became required for most transactions."<sup>155</sup>

Selig S. Harrison introduces the argument of pragmatists in the North:

The negative economic impact of the nuclear weapons effort became increasingly clear when the end of the cold war led to the end of the Soviet and Chinese food and petroleum subsidies. Pragmatists in the North argued that the only way to avert an economic collapse was to turn to the United States, Japan, and South Korea for help.<sup>156</sup>

North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons is related to the economic constraints after the end of the Cold War.

### ***b. Evidence – 1994 Agreed Framework***

The 1994 Agreed Framework shows that North Korea will use its nuclear arsenal as a bargaining chip during negotiations with the United States. The former President, Jimmy Carter, visited North Korea to mediate the nuclear crisis in 1993. He summarized North Korea's intentions. According to Carter, Kim Il-sung said, "if the

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<sup>154</sup> Cha and Kang, 38.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Harrison, 218.

United States had helped North Korea then to acquire a light water reactor, even from a third country, the current problems could have been avoided. If the U.S. would now agree to a third round of talks and help North Korea to get light water reactors, there would be no problems. If a commitment is made to furnish us with a light water reactor, then we will immediately freeze all our nuclear activities.”<sup>157</sup> The 1994 Agreed Framework was signed in Geneva on 21 October 1994. The main provisions are as follows:

- The United States would organize an international consortium to provide light-water reactors, with a total generating capacity of 2,000 megawatts, by a target date of 2003. In return, North Korea would freeze all activity on its existing nuclear reactors and related facilities, and permit them to be continuously monitored by IAEA inspectors. The eight thousand fuel rods unloaded from the first reactor would be shipped out of the country.
- North Korea would come into full compliance with the IAEA—which meant accepting the “special inspections”—before the delivery of key nuclear components of the LWR project, estimated to be within five years. The DPRK’s existing nuclear facilities would be completely dismantled by the time the LWR project was completed, estimated in ten years.
- The United States would arrange to supply 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually to make up for energy forgone by North Korea before the LWRs came into operation.
- The two states would reduce existing barriers to trade and investment and open diplomatic liaison offices in each other’s capitals as initial steps toward eventual full normalization of relations.<sup>158</sup>

North Korea opted to take full advantage of the economic benefits from the agreement.

### **C. SUMMARY OF NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM**

In the final analysis, one clear North Korean nuclear strategy does not exist with absolute certainty. Any one of many internal and external motivations is plausible. The various motivations increase and decrease in importance, depending on how North Korea assesses the situation at a particular point. This changeability is a unique characteristic of North Korea’s nuclear strategy and is expected to continue. This shows why it is difficult to solve the North Korean nuclear problem and why unification is not easy to achieve.

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<sup>157</sup> Harrison, 218.

<sup>158</sup> Oberdorfer, 357.

A country's nuclear motivation is important for defense-decision making and future unification. There could be some contradictions and differences between strategies. According to William E. Berry, Jr., "if regime survival is the predominant motivation, then there is little chance of meaningful negotiations. On the other hand, if the motivation is to create bargaining chips, it may be possible for negotiations to succeed. The divisions within the Bush administration make this determination more difficult."<sup>159</sup> It is difficult to analyze and predict the future of North Korea's nuclear strategy and possibility of Korean unification because North Korea has multiple strategies and changes are dependent on circumstances. From North Korea's perspective, the nuclear program is not only a matter of internal power maintenance but also a matter of regime survival from external threats and consistent with economic strategies to get more economic aid from outside.

Based on North Korea's multiple internal and external motivations, the circumstances will lead North Korea to rely more on one or another of the motivations discussed previously. The current circumstances related to North Korea's nuclear issue are stalemated as well as complicated. Six party talks have not been easy. Depending on the U.S. policies, North Korea seems to be switching between its two strategies—regime survival and bargaining leverage. The reason is because it might be difficult for the United States to wage war both in Iraq and Korea.

The Bush administration would like to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear program at six-party talks instead of through any military action. Presumably, North Korea would have been more threatened by the short and successful end of the Iraq War. However, economic sanctions have not been lifted, in order to keep the pressure on North Korea. It might be a matter of power maintenance and regime survival to North Korea. At the same time, North Korea still needs economic help from outside because of its economic difficulties. The economic conditions remain very poor, but are better than in the 1990s. If the economic conditions continue to improve, a bargaining chip strategy might be not as necessary as that of the 1990s.

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<sup>159</sup> William E. Berry, Jr., "The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program: A Comparison of the Negotiating Strategies of the Clinton and Bush Administrations," in *Perspectives on U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Stalemate or Checkmate?* ed. Richardson, Sharon (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 19.

Therefore, it can be concluded that North Korea's nuclear strategy is multifaceted, flexible and unpredictable. This reflects the fact that motivations for North Korea's nuclear program have both internal and external roots. However, it is necessary to predict its complex motivation based on the current circumstances, because each motivation is dependant on those circumstances. Also, they give answers for Korean unification.

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#### **IV. THE PROACTIVE GRAND STRATEGY FOR CONSENSUAL AND PEACEFUL KOREAN UNIFICATION: THE COMBINATION OF THREE POLICIES (MILITARY CONTAINMENT AND NEGOTIATIONS, POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT)**

Peaceful Korean unification is the best scenario for the two Koreas and for international society. The grand strategy recommended in this thesis is for consensual and peaceful Korean unification. Proactive implementation of the grand strategy can bring consensual and peaceful unification and prevent unstable situations like military conflict or the collapse of North Korea.

##### **A. REASONS FOR CONSENSUAL AND PEACEFUL UNIFICATION**

###### **1. Peaceful Northeast Asia**

Northeast Asia (NEA) is one of the world's most sensitive regions. The Korean peninsula is located in a very strategic place, which is the only international region where the world's four major powers—the United States, China, Japan and Russia are directly interested. There were many wars among those great powers on the Korean peninsula. Several factors show that NEA is very important militarily and economically, as the home (or area of significant presence) of: “the world's three largest nuclear weapons states (the United States, Russia, and China), one seminuclear state (North Korea), three threshold nuclear weapons states (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), the world's three largest economies on a purchasing power parity basis (the U.S, China, and Japan), three of the world's five largest trading countries (the United States, Germany, Japan, France, and China), and Asia's three largest economies (Japan, China, and South Korea).”<sup>160</sup>

A number of events in the last several years illustrate the simmering tensions in NEA, not just between North and South Korea, but among all the nations of the area. For example, Japan has historically claimed sovereignty over South Korea's Dokdo islets (called Takeshima in Japanese). In 2005, South Korean demonstrators cut off their fingers in protest over this Japanese claims. Meanwhile, in June 2006 Ishibashi Mikio,

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<sup>160</sup> Samuel Kim, “Northeast Asia in the Local-Regional-Global Nexus: Multiple Challenges and Contending Explanations,” in *The International Relations of Northeast Asia*, ed. Kim, Samuel (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2004), 5.

director general of the Guard and Rescue Department of the Japan Coast Guard, said in a parliamentary hearing, “If South Korea is found to be operating in Japan’s EEZ, we will take necessary measures to call for a halt to the activity by sending our patrol boats there.”<sup>161</sup> While meeting with about 200 maritime police officers over lunch at Chong Wa Dae on 22 June 2006, South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun said that the nation should have enough military power to cope with any emergency situation in the East Sea.<sup>162</sup> It is the first time that a president directly mentioned the nation’s combat potential.

China and Japan have longstanding differences, as well. In April 2005, Chinese demonstrators attacked Japanese businesses over a Japanese history textbook’s interpretation of Japan’s military actions in China and Korea over the past century. In September 2005, China began drilling for oil in the East China Sea and Japan protested. The former Japanese Prime Minister, Koizumi, visited the Yasukuni Shrine (for Japanese soldiers who died fighting for the Emperor—many of them in China) and Chinese President Hu Jintao refused to have a meeting with Koizumi during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.

None of these situations help the Korean peninsula become peaceful, and show that there are many issues to be resolved. South Koreans will try to increase their military capability not only to protect against North Korean attack but also to stand up to their other neighbors.

Nuclear proliferation in NEA is a persistent problem. Proliferation on the Korean peninsula will have “a potentially devastating impact on peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and throughout the region.”<sup>163</sup> For this reason, North Korean efforts to perfect delivery vehicle for its nuclear weapons provoke particular alarm among its neighbors. For example, according to U.S. officials in June 2006, North Korea had completed fueling the missile at the Musudan-ri facility in North Hamgyoung

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<sup>161</sup> “Japan Threatens to Send Patrol Boats Near Dokdo,” in *The Korea Times*, 7 Jun 2006 [http://search.hankooki.com/times/times\\_view.php?term=dokdo++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/nation/200606/kt2006060720541411990.htm&media=kt](http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=dokdo++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/nation/200606/kt2006060720541411990.htm&media=kt) (accessed on 10 Jun 2006).

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> Quinones, 75.



province.<sup>164</sup> Jung Tae-ho, a spokesman at the South Korean president's office, told the Associated Press that "there are signs of a missile launch" and security officials were "closely watching the situation."<sup>165</sup> Though this was a test launch, and not actually aimed at another country, the instant concern it caused is emblematic of the state of hair-trigger tension that exists in the area. All the efforts of nations with keen interest in NEA – South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia – to prevent nuclear proliferation in the region have failed.<sup>166</sup> A peace treaty on the Korean peninsula is the first step to release all these tensions.

## **2. High Cost of War on the Korean Peninsula**

Military action might be the most direct way to unify Korea. Successful military operations will lead to the obliteration of the North Korean regime and Korean unification on the terms of South Korea and the United States. However, the cost of war on the Korean peninsula will be very high.

Even though South Korea can win the war, the damage could be tremendous and restoration would be very difficult. The most vulnerable aspect of military operation is the location of Seoul, the capital of South Korea. South Koreans who watched the news on 19 March 1994 were shocked by a "sea of fire" threat from North Korean representative, Park Yong-su. He threatened South Korean counterpart, Song Young Dae and walked out of the final South-North working level meeting at Panmunjom: "Seoul is not far from here. If a war breaks out, it will be a sea of fire. Mr. Song, it will probably be difficult for you to survive."<sup>167</sup> Seoul is only 25 miles away from the DMZ and the North Korean artillery and missile attack will devastate and panic Seoul.<sup>168</sup> WMD attack against Seoul would be horrible. Bruce Bennett, a policy analyst at Rand, predicted the tremendous threat of North Korea:

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<sup>164</sup> Burt Herman, "North Korea Promises to Deter U.S.," in *The Washington Times*, 19 Jun 2006. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20060619-014052-5539r.htm> (accessed on 28 Jun 2006).

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> Oberdorfer, 304.

<sup>168</sup> Edward F. Bruner, "North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options," *CRS Report for Congress*, 29 July 2003 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress), [http://www.openers.com/rpts/RS21582\\_20030729.pdf](http://www.openers.com/rpts/RS21582_20030729.pdf) (accessed on 28 Sep 2006).

One battery of North Korean 240-mm multiple rocket launchers fired into Seoul can deliver roughly a ton of chemical weapons, which, according to various accounts, could kill or injure thousands or tens of thousands. North Korea has many such batteries. In addition, North Korean special forces teams might each spray several kilograms of anthrax in Seoul, leaving tens to hundreds of thousands of people infected, many of whom would die unless properly treated.

A North Korean nuclear weapon fired into Seoul might cause damage similar to that of the nuclear weapon detonated on Hiroshima in World War II, which left some 70,000 dead and 75,000 injured.<sup>169</sup>

During the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program in the spring of 1994, General Luck estimated the possible result of a war on the Korean peninsula:

...on the basis of the experience in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, that due to the colossal lethality of modern weapons in the urban environments of Korea, as many as 1 million people would be killed in the resumption of full-scale war on the peninsula, including 80,000 to 100,000 Americans, that the out-of-pocket costs to the United States would exceed \$100 billion, and that the destruction of property and interruption of business activity would cost more than \$1,000 billion (one trillion) dollars to the countries involved and their immediate neighbors.<sup>170</sup>

David C. Kang introduced estimated calculations of a war on the Korean peninsula, which "would cost the United States more than \$60 billion and result in 3 million casualties, including 52,000 U.S. military casualties."<sup>171</sup> Any war on the Korean peninsula would be a disaster for the two Koreas and the United States.

After a visit to Pyongyang in July 2003, a Russian specialist in East Asian studies predicted North Korea's response to a preemptive strike would be prompt, "After studying this matter for a long time, the North Korean leadership reached the conclusion that since a limited attack could lead to an even more lethal attack, they must respond immediately with all their strength before their military strength becomes ineffective. The

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<sup>169</sup> Bruce Bennett, "N. Korea's Threat to S. Korea," *Rand Corporation*, 7 March 2003, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/030703UPI.html> (accessed on 22 November 2006)

<sup>170</sup> Oberdorfer, 324.

<sup>171</sup> Cha, and Kang, 55.

target of their retaliatory attack could be Seoul.”<sup>172</sup> Phillip C. Saunders explains three tactical issues that are important to consider before a military strike against North Korea:

Three key issues would be involved in successful military strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities:

- 1) locating all facilities and fissile material stocks that could be used in a nuclear weapons program;
- 2) possessing the capability to destroy these targets; and
- 3) preventing North Korea from retaliating with artillery fire, missile strikes, chemical or biological weapons use, escalation to a full-scale conventional war, or nuclear weapons<sup>173</sup>

According to his analysis, the hardest problem is to prevent or limit North Korean retaliation.

Also, Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow argue that “those who embrace optimistic scenarios regarding North Korean caution fail to explain why the North Korean elite would assume that a passive response to a U.S. preemptive strike would enhance prospects for regime survival. Given the way that United States treated Iraq, the North Koreans would more likely conclude that an attack on the country’s nuclear installations would be merely a prelude to a larger military offensive to achieve regime change.”<sup>174</sup>

One of the problems of military action is the difficulty of getting support from South Korea. South Korea would not support any military action on the Korean peninsula. South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun has expressed that he would oppose a military attack on the North, “It is impossible not to have difference (with the United States), and I cannot agree to attacking North Korea.”<sup>175</sup> The Clinton administration had unilaterally

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<sup>172</sup> Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*, 676, quoted in Boronchov, “Pyongyang Residents Carry Cellular Phones.”

<sup>173</sup> Phillip C. Saunders, “Military Options for Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” *Center for Nonproliferation Studies*, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/korea/dprkmil.htm#fn7> (accessed on 20 October 2006).

<sup>174</sup> Carpenter and Bandow, 88.

<sup>175</sup> David R. Sands, “S. Korea Opposes Attack on North,” *Washington Times*, 14 February 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtontimes.com/archive/long\\_term.php](http://www.washingtontimes.com/archive/long_term.php) (accessed on 28 November 2006).

prepared for military actions against North Korea in 1993.<sup>176</sup> The South Korean President argued, “We almost went to the brink of war in 1993 with North Korea, and at the time we didn’t even know it.” South Korean Prime Minister Han Myung-sook said at an interpellation session in the National Assembly, “We must oppose Article 42 (of Chapter 7) to be quoted in the resolution as it is very sensitive and may inflict damage (on the Korean Peninsula).”<sup>177</sup> Article 42 of Chapter 7 in the U.N. Charter allows the use of military forces of U.N. members. South Korea has not joined PSI because of fear of provoking military escalation between the two Koreas.

**B. REASONS FOR THE COMBINATION OF THREE POLICIES (MILITARY CONTAINMENT AND NEGOTIATIONS, POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT)**

**1. No Perfect Policy**

No policy option for Korean unification has ever succeeded because of North Korea’s position as a unification actor. North Korea has claimed that they are the legitimate government of the Korean people and reactions to the unification policies of South Korea have changed depending on domestic and international situations. Just like motivations for the nuclear program, North Korea has had multiple strategies and has switched among them for its own benefit. Therefore, unification policy toward North Korea should be comprehensive and multifaceted by combining three policies—military containment and negotiations, political negotiations, and economic and social engagement.

Military containment will be fundamental to deter any military action of North Korea. However, containment alone will only bring on a more unstable situation on the Korean peninsula. At the same time, military negotiations should be initiated to release tensions. Pursuing political negotiations toward a peace treaty and deciding upon the type of government would not be successful in a short time and would need confidence building measures. Economic engagement alone will provide an initiative to North Korea

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<sup>176</sup> Doug Bandow, “Wrong War, Wrong Place, Wrong time: Why Military Action Should Not Be Used to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” *CATO Institute*, 12 May 2006 [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=1600](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1600) (accessed on 15 November 2006).

<sup>177</sup> Park Song-wu, “Seoul Opposes Military Action Against North,” *The Korea Times*, 10 October 2006, <http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200610/kt2006101017354511990.htm> (accessed on 12 October 2006).

to start negotiations, but will not guarantee peaceful unification. Therefore, the combination of the three policies is necessary to achieve consensual and peaceful Korean unification.

Proactive and synchronous implementation of the three policies is a pivotal point. “Military containment and negotiations,” “political negotiations,” and “economic engagement,” should be pursued together. Each policy is interdependent, but it can be implemented exclusively in order to deal with North Korea because each policy can be implemented in different fields. Militarily, strong defense is critical because it can support any other policy implementation. Without robust defense, political negotiation and economic engagement would be uncertain and insecure. Based on reliable defense, military negotiations for arms control may begin. Politically, a peace treaty can be made because North Korea has requested a nonaggression declaration from the United States and the United States is not willing to use military action to achieve unification on the Korean peninsula. Economically, engagement policy should be maintained to open North Korea and provide humanitarian aid.

## **2. Benefits for Peaceful Unification and after Unification**

South Korea and the four major powers prefer a peaceful unification option. Diplomatic recognition, a non-aggression treaty, and a peace treaty would be necessary steps for gradual and peaceful unification. Robust defense capability is necessary for stability after unification. South Korea’s reliable independent defense forces to lead stability and reconstruction operations are indispensable. Without political negotiations such as a peace treaty, peaceful unification is impractical. Also, economic engagement would be an investment for the economic development after unification. William Lewis, founding director of the McKinsey Global Institute thinks Korean unification would be a lot more difficult than German Unification:

North Korea’s GDP per capita is only 5 percent of that of the South, yet its population is about half. The corresponding ratios for East Germany were 50 percent of West Germany’s GDP per capita and only 25 percent of the population. The difficulties of German reunification look like a piece of cake next to the difficulties of Korean unification.<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>178</sup> William W. Lewis, *The Power of Productivity: Wealth, Poverty, and the Threat to Global Stability* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 131.

It would be difficult to introduce the free market concept to North Koreans. Economic engagement will give them a chance to experience capitalism and a free market economy. In order to implement political negotiations and economic engagement, military containment is important. The United States and South Korea should prop up political negotiation and economic engagement with strong military containment. The strong military support will decrease the possibility of any military action by North Korea. Also, it will help earn the people's consensus and support for implementing political and economic policies. Also, a more self-dependant military capability of South Korean forces is necessary for stability in Northeast Asia after the Korean unification.

### **3. Three Inevitable Indicators of Peaceful Unification**

For peaceful Korean unification, the following indicators (from three perspectives) are inevitable. They are essential steps on the path of Korean unification. Potential indicators are outlined by Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee in *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications*. Therefore, the efforts for unification in the following three fields are required.

#### **a. Military and Security Indicators**

Cessation of all hostile military activities would be the first step of consensual and peaceful unification. This can be achieved through confidence building measures. Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee summarized the indicators and several indicators are valid:

- Cessation of diplomatic competition between the two Koreas and establishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and North Korea and Japan and North Korea.
- Replacement of the Armistice Agreement (1953) with a permanent peace treaty.
- Maintenance of all KEDO provisions and conditions.
- Full North Korean compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and NPT provisions.
- Significant progress in military CBMs, including prenotification of military exercises, establishment of a military hotline, mutual observation of military exercises and other command post exercises, and step-by-step, fully verifiable force reductions.

- Cessation of all military activities constructed as provocative or offensive.<sup>179</sup>

**b. Political Indicators**

Political compromises and negotiations are required. A peace treaty can be signed not only from a military perspective but also a political perspective. There are also many other potential political indicators:

- Mutual recognition across political institutions.
- Cessation of all political propaganda by both sides.
- Routinized high-level exchanges, including summit meetings.
- Release of all political prisoners in the North and South.
- Abrogation of national security and espionage laws (as they apply to the two Koreas).
- Extensive exchange between political parties.
- Ability to engage in political activities in the South and North.<sup>180</sup>

**c. Economic and Social Indicators**

Some of the economic and social indicators have already been seen on the Korean peninsula. These fields can be initiated at the beginning of a consensual and peaceful unification process and solidify Korean unification at the end. Potential economic and social indicators are as follows:

- More freedom of movement and travel within and between the two Koreas, as well as abroad.
- Cessation of government censorship.
- Removal of restrictions on dissemination of print and electronic media.
- Ability to enroll freely in schools and educational institutions.
- Decoupling of economic exchange from reciprocal political measures.
- Constitutional and legislative changes that allow for unconstrained economic activities between the South and North, including the flow of people, goods, services, capital and technologies.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> Jonathan D. Pollack and Lee Chung Min, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), 54.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*

All indicators are not required for peaceful unification. However, it shows that military, political, and economic approaches are three fundamental factors in consensual and peaceful unification process. Pollack and Lee explain the difficulty of the peaceful unification scenario:

The major distinguishing characteristic of the peaceful unification scenario compared to other scenarios is that agreement and compliance must be in place before, during, and after unification and that agreement must be reached at all levels of both systems in order to create a functioning, unified government. This last requirement is probably the most difficult part of the peaceful unification scenario.<sup>182</sup>

Another difficulty of peaceful unification is the necessity of both domestic and international efforts for success. As discussed in the previous chapters, any changes on the Korean peninsula can be explained not only by internal roots but also by external roots. The international context should be considered in consensual and peaceful unification. Therefore, each policy can be divided into internal and external efforts. Those efforts are outlined in Table 2: The Grand Strategy for Consensual and Peaceful Unification: The Combination of Military, Political and Economic Approaches.

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<sup>182</sup> Jonathan D. Pollack and Lee Chung Min, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), 54.



Table 2. The Grand Strategy for Consensual and Peaceful Unification: the Combination of Military, Political, and Economic Approaches

	Internal Efforts	External Efforts	Essential Indicators for peaceful Unification
Military Containment and Negotiations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Modernization of South Korean forces</li> <li>▪ Military-to-Military Negotiations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Strong US-South Korean Alliance</li> <li>▪ Reciprocal Modification of Mutual Defense Treaties</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cessation of offensive military activities</li> </ul>
Political Negotiations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Political stability on the Korean peninsula through another Summit Meeting</li> <li>▪ Peace Treaty between South Korea and North Korea by reaffirmation of three previous agreements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Four Party Talks</li> <li>▪ Endorsement of the UN</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Peace Treaty</li> <li>▪ Cessation of all political propaganda</li> </ul>
Economic and Social Engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Expansion of Economic Engagement</li> <li>▪ The Formation of a free trade area</li> <li>▪ Sports/Tourism Interchanges</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Energy and food</li> <li>▪ Supporting South Korea and North Korea Economic Cooperation</li> <li>▪ Multilateral Economic Approach with North Korea</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The flow of people, goods, services, capital and technologies</li> </ul>

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## V. UNIFICATION STRATEGY ONE: MILITARY CONTAINMENT AND NEGOTIATIONS

The most important strategy for peaceful unification is to build a strong military against North Korea. National security is not a negotiable subject. As explained earlier, one of the internal roots of the Korean War was Kim Il-Sung's misjudgment and North Korea still has an offense doctrine to unify Korea under its control. To deter any North Korean military attempts and implement the following two other strategies—political negotiations and economic engagement—strong defense capabilities are indispensable conditions. There are critiques that military containment and engagement policy cannot coexist. However, military containment provides the foundations for successful implementation of political negotiations and economic engagement.

Even though Victor D. Cha is more skeptical about the prospects of North Korea and David C. Kang is less skeptical about them, they agree that engagement only works when robust military capability upholds the policy:

First, and critical to any engagement policy, is the maintenance of robust defense and deterrence capabilities on the peninsula against the threat of a second DPRK invasion or other forms of military adventurism. Such capabilities would require maintaining even as the U.S.-ROK alliance undergoes imminent change. The United States contemplates a change in a nature of its military presence on the peninsula, moving from a heavy, ground troops-based tripwire presence to one focused on more recessed forces and a larger air and naval component. If North Korea views this readjustment of forces within the alliances as a diminishing of the U.S. commitment rather than as a natural maturation of the alliance given domestic politics in South Korea and changing military technology, then not only deterrence, but also engagement would be undercut. Engagement only works when it is undergirded by such capabilities and communicates to the target state that engagement is a choice of the strong and not an expediency of the weak<sup>183</sup>

The improvement of military capability as well as strengthening military alliances is important to deter any military attempts by North Korea. Robust defense capabilities remain the cornerstone of any efforts for unification and solutions toward North Korea's nuclear program. Victor D. Cha explains the importance of "containment" in policy making:

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<sup>183</sup> Cha and Kang, 162.

The policy choice is therefore not between containment and some other policy, but now this military capability should be complemented diplomatically. In other words, should the policy be containment-plus-diplomatic isolation (i.e., benign neglect); containment-plus-coercion; or containment-plus-engagement?<sup>184</sup>

For successful deterrence, modernization of South Korean forces and maintenance of strong U.S.–ROK alliance system are necessary.

#### **A. INTERNAL EFFORTS**

South Korea should develop stronger forces to deter the North Korean threat on its own. This gives a power to negotiate with North Korea militarily. Military-to-military negotiations are inevitable for peaceful Korean unification and a confidence-building process should be initiated.

##### **1. Modernization of South Korean forces**

South Korean forces should be modernized to deter a North Korean attack. North Korea has requested the withdrawal of the USFK from the Korean peninsula because they think the military capability of the U.S.-ROK alliance is superior to its own military. Modernization of South Korean forces will make North Korea reconsider the military capability of South Korean forces without USFK. Strong South Korean military forces will be a certain means of deterrence

South Korea has declared its intention to pursue “cooperative self-reliant defense” in the *2004 Defense White Paper*,

In an effort to establish a firm security posture that serves peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, the Participatory Government seeks to establish a cooperative self-reliant defense wherein it endeavors to secure self-reliant defense capabilities and promote security cooperation among various nations. In other words, the government is endeavoring to develop capabilities and system by which it can take the initiative in deterring war provocations by the North, while promoting the ROK-US alliance from a future-oriented perspective and proactively taking advantage of multilateral security cooperation.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Cha and Kang, 162.

<sup>185</sup> The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, *2004 Defense White Paper*, 50.

Cooperative self-reliant defense comprises two important concepts: the South Korea–U.S. alliance taking the leading role in deterring a North Korean attack and balanced development of a self-reliant defense posture.<sup>186</sup>

The former Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld made a speech during his visit to Korea in 2003 about the role of the South Korean military. He understood South Korea’s position and perspective:

The Republic of Korea is today probably the 12th largest growing domestic product on the face of the earth. It has a population that’s probably twice as large as North Korea’s. It has a vibrant, energetic economy. And as the President of Korea said within the last month or two, it is time for them to set a goal to become somewhat more self-reliant. They suggested they would do that over a decade’s period. And as they do that, which is I believe a sound approach from their standpoint, as they do that one would think we would be able to work with them to assure that the deterrent and the ability to defend remains effective. Because we do not want to inject any instability into this peninsula, this is an enormously important part of the world for us and for, needless to say, the people here.<sup>187</sup>

South Korean military transformation should be carried out under the phased change of the USFK and South Korea should take a leading role in its own defense with the close cooperation and mutual understanding of the United States.

In a couple of fields, the assistance of the United States is necessary. First, a huge investment of military resources in the modernization of the forces such as Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and precision weapons is required. This modernization is necessary to deter the North Korean nuclear capability and achieve the South Korean military reform objectives, which are to make an “advanced, elite, and strong force of the 21st century” and “a state-of-the art information-science based force that sees further, moves faster and strikes more

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<sup>186</sup> Cha, Du-Hyeon. *The Future of the ROK-US Alliances: Toward the Evolution of a Strategic Cooperation Alliance*, No. 7, December 2004 (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 2004), 11.

<sup>187</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Rumsfeld in Korea,” US DOD: DoD news briefing, M2 Presswire Conventry: 21 Nov 2003, <http://libproxy.nps.navy.mil/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=456670751&Fmt=3&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed on 23 September 2006).

precisely.”<sup>188</sup> The first chapter of *Defense Reform 2020* states for “building up strong forces capable of defending Korea in the 21st century, we must start now.”

Second, the most important capability that South Korea needs to prepare for self-reliant defense is operations planning capability. The United States has war planning capability and experience. The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea points out that the South Korean military does not have sufficient operational planning capability in *Defense Reform 2020*:

3. Lack of cultivating our armed forces’ operational planning and execution capability under the ROK-US combined defense posture.

The ROK-US alliance is moving forward to the future with more emphasis on the role of the ROK military in its national defense, recognizing that development of independent ROK strategy and military doctrines as well as operational capabilities are still insufficient. It is our urgent need to enhance our armed forces’ operational planning and execution capability. It is our urgent need to enhance our armed forces’ operational planning and execution capability.<sup>189</sup>

Noh specifically explained the necessity of operational planning capability for South Korea,

Since the Korean War, OPLAN has been designated by the United States – and, accordingly, the ROK – U.S. Combined Operation has been susceptible to America’s military strategy. South Korea’s efforts to coordinate its own strategy with the OPLAN have been obfuscated in many ways. There is thus a pressing need for South Korea to develop an operational plan to realize the independent use of military force.<sup>190</sup>

South Korea will recover wartime operational control of its military from the United States. The modernization of South Korean forces by developing Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) and precision attack capability and war planning capability is necessary for successful transfer to wartime operational control as well as for successful deterrence of North Korean military action.

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<sup>188</sup> The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, “Defense Reform 2020,” <http://www.mnd.go.kr/policyFocus/mndReform/Bookview/index.jsp>, 4-5. (accessed on 21 October 2006).

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>190</sup> Noh, Hoon, *South Korea’s “Cooperative Self-reliant Defense”: Goals and Directions*, No.10, April 2005 (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 2004), 8.

## 2. Military-to-Military Negotiations

It would be the most difficult problem to build a new unified military force because there is no trust between the two military forces. However, it is critical to combine forces during the unification process because the combined forces of South Korea and North Korea are large and could be a major obstacle to peaceful unification.<sup>191</sup> The way to handle the North Korean military will be the crucial problem and a strong South Korean military will make the negotiations process easier.

Military-to-military negotiations between South Korea and North Korea have been very rare. In 2005, there was the first military negotiation after the Korean War. They agreed to open roads and railways, reduce maritime tension, and to stop DMZ propaganda.<sup>192</sup> Any kind of military-to-military talks should help to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula because the role of the military in North Korea is important in its policy making process. For example, Edward A. Olsen recommends that joint South Korean and North Korean armed forces units to participate in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (PKO):

Moreover, drawing on past ROK participation in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), joint ROK-DPRK armed-forces units would likely serve in PKO roles for the United Nations as part of the inter-Korean confidence-building process, it is very likely that a United Korea would continue to use some of its armed forces in that manner. Given the heritage of a United Korea's PKO forces, they would present a particularly symbolic message on behalf of preserving peace.<sup>193</sup>

The military structure of a unified Korea after a peaceful Korean unification process is a very complicated problem. The size and capability of military forces and the role and status of American forces are not easy problems to solve. According to Victor D. Cha, the military forces of a unified Korea would number about 650,000 because the total population of a unified Korea would be 65 million and the traditional benchmark of

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191 Bruce William Bennett, "Conventional Arms Control in Korea: A Lever for Peace," in ed. Henry D. Sokolski, *Planning for a Peaceful Korea* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB65.pdf> (accessed on 10 October 2006).

192 Olsen, *Korea: The Divided Nation*, 161.

193 *Ibid.*, 179.

military forces is approximately one percent of total population.<sup>194</sup> The current total number of the two Korean militaries is around 1.8 million, which will be adjusted during a peaceful unification process.

## **B. EXTERNAL EFFORTS**

### **1. The U.S.-South Korea Alliance**

There have been concerns about the future U.S.-ROK alliance. The main concerns in South Korea relating to the U.S. military transformation are as follows: What will the impact of U.S. Defense Transformation on the Korean peninsula be? Is there a contradiction between U.S. Defense Transformation and the U.S-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty? What should South Korea do to prepare to adapt to the new U.S. transformation? All these concerns should be alleviated by showing that the U.S.-ROK alliance is a strong system.

The main goal of the alliance should be to make North Korea believe that any military challenge against South Korea means the end of North Korea. The United States and South Korea should do more to clarify how much they have prepared for a potential war and develop their advantages in military capability against North Korea. More joint exercises and training are necessary to show the strong alliance system. However, these exercises should not be politically influenced. North Korea has continuously requested a stop to joint military exercises and has used them as an excuse to put off inter-Korean talks. Also, the Unification Ministry of South Korea reportedly asked the Defense Ministry in January 2006 if it could delay the annual joint military drills in order not to provoke North Korea at a time when the two Koreas would hold minister-level talks in Pyongyang.<sup>195</sup> This request was rejected by the Defense Ministry. Joint military drills in the Korean peninsula are inevitable to deter any North Korean military action. Deterrence “tries to prevent attacks by threatening to respond in a way that would cause the other side to end up worse off, thereby convincing it not to launch an attack in the first

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<sup>194</sup> Victor D. Cha, “Japan’s Grand Strategy on the Korean peninsula: Optimistic Realism,” in ed. Henry D. Sokolski, *Planning for a Peaceful Korea* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001), 231, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB65.pdf> (accessed on 10 October 2006).

<sup>195</sup> Jung, Sung-Ki, “S. Korea, US to Hold Military Drill in March,” *The Korea Times*, 1 February 2006 <http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/200602/kt2006020117351053460.htm> (accessed on 2 February 2006)



place.”<sup>196</sup> For example, joint exercises like RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration) and FE (Foal Eagle) should provide strong deterrence.

## **2. Reciprocal Modification of Mutual Defense Treaties**

With maintenance of the strong U.S.-South Korean alliance, modification of mutual defense treaties is necessary for unification. All mutual defense treaties concerning the Korean peninsula show the influence of the great powers. They must be modified together. That is, even though the relationships between South Korea and Russia or China have been developed, the treaties between North Korea and Russia or China still exist. Two treaties—the DPRK’s Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance with China, and the North’s Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Russia—would be modified or abrogated when the U.S. and South Korea modify their Defense Treaty.

### **a. The U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty**

The United States negotiated a defense treaty with South Korea after the Korean War. Even though South Korean president Rhee did not sign the 1953 Armistice Agreement, he requested “the agreement which the United States used to mollify his dissatisfaction with the war’s indecisive outcome.”<sup>197</sup> The United States increased its support by formally signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty on 1 October 1953 in Washington, which went into effect on 18 November 1954.<sup>198</sup> Interestingly, as Bandow mentions, “the Mutual Defense Treaty does not explicitly guarantee U.S. military assistance to South Korea; rather, it states in Article 3 that each party would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes,” which later caused South Korea to request a strengthening of the clause.<sup>199</sup> Therefore, the U.S. military presence in South Korea is flexibly based on the U.S. and South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty.

### **b. The U.S. Military Presence in Korea**

Even though there are two distinguishable groups against troop withdrawal and for troop withdrawal—the goal of these two groups should be the same,

<sup>196</sup> Jefferey W. Knopf, “Deterrence or Preemption?” *Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs*, Vol. 105, No. 694, November 2006, 395.

<sup>197</sup> Doug Bandow, *Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World* (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 1996), 23.

<sup>198</sup> Edward A. Olsen, *Toward Normalizing U.S.-KOREA relations: In due course?*, 18.

<sup>199</sup> Bandow, *Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World*, 23.

not for the exclusive interest of the great powers but for stability in Northeast Asia and for the Korean people. As mentioned earlier, the most important issue of the policies toward Korea is the U.S. presence in South Korea. Therefore, arguments against troop presence and for troop presence need to be considered. As a matter fact, the United States has begun to scale down its overseas troop levels. However, the U.S. military presence in Korea remains a vexing question.

(1) Argument against troop withdrawal. There are several reasons to support the U.S. presence in South Korea. One advantage is economic prosperity. Also, the U.S. military presence has contributed to political democratization of the ROK as well as to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

The growth of the South Korean economy has been spectacular. Between 1963 and 1983, the economy grew at a rate exceeding 9.5 percent annually, boosting per capita GNP from \$100 in 1963 to over \$1500 in 1983, as the government guided capital investment.<sup>200</sup> South Korea was able to invest the capital for economic development rather than for its defense budget.

Security is another main factor of the U.S presence in South Korea. Graves summarizes the ROK-U.S security cooperation very well:

The alliance between the ROK and the United States has been one of the most successful examples of security cooperation in modern times. This is especially noteworthy given the great distance separating the two countries and the great differences in their heritage and ways of life when they first joined forces to defeat aggression from the North. The alliance has served both countries extremely well. It enabled the ROK to survive a potentially fatal war and grow into a modern industrial nation. And it enabled the United States to maintain a secure forward position in one of the strategic crossroads of the world.<sup>201</sup>

It would be very difficult to pull troops out of South Korea unless the security concern is solved.

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<sup>200</sup> Richard T Detrio, *Strategic Partners: South Korea and the United States* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), 41.

<sup>201</sup> Graves, Ernest. "ROK-US Security Cooperation: Current Status" in *The Future of South Korean-U.S. Security Relations*. edited by William J. Taylor and others (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 13.

(2) Argument for troop withdrawal. According to the U.S. plan for the realignment of its overseas forces, the U.S. forces in Korea will be reduced from 32,500 to 25,000 by 2008.<sup>202</sup> 12,500 American troops deployed to Iraq from South Korea in 2005 may not come back to South Korea.<sup>203</sup> In *the Economist: The World in 2006*, predicts the withdrawal of American troops,

Over the next decade 60,000-70,000 American troops, almost a third of the total based overseas, will be withdrawn from their former cold-war stations, principally in Germany and South Korea, to America, where they may be more quickly-and more cheaply-launched against the country's new security threats.<sup>204</sup>

What would be the benefits of U.S. troop withdrawal? Dong Bandow explains three benefits of American disengagement for the United States:.

One is simply reducing the likelihood of U.S. involvement in a war by dismantling a trip-wire designed to make military intervention automatic...Another advantage is economic. Although the precise budgetary savings would depend on what was done with the withdrawal..., the Pentagon would save several billion dollars...Finally, disengagement would have political benefits. Admittedly, without its 43,000 troops stationed in the ROK, Washington would not have as much leverage on particular political or economic issues...<sup>205</sup>

The United States will withdraw its troops gradually. But, with little sign that North Korea is changing, the withdrawal would be very slow. Harrison proposed a guideline that is related to the U.S. policies on the Korean peninsula. It could be one option to be considered seriously by other scholars and decision makers:

I conclude that the goal of the United States should be to disengage most of its forces from Korea gradually during a transition period of roughly ten years while seeking to encourage a confederation diplomatically by shifting to a new role as an honest broker. The eventual withdrawal of all U.S. forces would promote stability in Northeast Asia if it could be combined with a regional neutralization agreement in which China, Russia, the U.S. and Japan would all pledge to keep out of the peninsula militarily.

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<sup>202</sup> Jung, Sung-Ki "S. Korea, US will Discuss Wartime Command Transfer," *The Korea Times*, 12 Oct 2005 <http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200510/kt2005101217334211950.htm> (accessed on 29 February 05).

<sup>203</sup> James Astill, "Troops Out," in *the Economist: The World in 2006*, 20th ed. November 2005, 35.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid.

<sup>205</sup> Doug and Carpenter, 90.

The United States would agree to end its security treaty with South Korea if China would terminate its treaty with Pyongyang and Russia would pledge not to restore its former treaty commitment. Pending such a neutralization agreement, the U.S. - South Korean security treaty would remain in force, and a limited, noncombat U.S. force presence would stay in the South to facilitate the reintroduction of U.S. combat forces in a crisis.<sup>206</sup>

In sum, as scholars and policymakers weigh the pros and cons of the U.S. military presence in South Korea, some moderate and reasonable policy can be made because one main goal is to be achieved, which is stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Also, we should consider rising domestic demands—both from the ROK and the U.S.—for more comprehensive cooperation in regard to the future role of the U.S. forces in Korea should be taken into consideration. Olsen summarized the future U.S.-Korean relationship:

...It is important for the broad spectrum of U.S. society and Koreans to explore well in advance—bilaterally and multilaterally—as many as possible of the ramifications that the future may hold. Nonetheless, it is a course of action that should be followed with enthusiasm and confidence—albeit belatedly.<sup>207</sup>

*c. North Korea and China Treaty*

China has historically had influence on the Korean peninsula. Even though it is difficult to measure China's influence on North Korea, it is clear that China is willing to be a main actor in the peace process. Also, if China helps North Korea economically and militarily, North Korea will remain in its present status and the possibility of Korean unification will be low. David Kang analyzed China's intention,

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said that "Dialogue is vital to maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula and China is willing to work with all parties toward an early, peaceful solution to the issue." Without Chinese support, sanctions or other hardline policies are unlikely to become effective. One key question is the extent of Chinese influence on North Korea.<sup>208</sup>

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<sup>206</sup> Harrison, xxiii.

<sup>207</sup> Olsen, *Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations: In Due Course?* 138.

<sup>208</sup> Cha and Kang, 124.

On the other hand, there is still a strong mutual defense treaty between North Korea and China. Harrison explained the treaty between North Korea and China, “while China has shifted to a more symmetrical posture in its dealing with the two Koreas, its new posture remains conspicuously asymmetrical in one critical aspect. Article 2 of the Sino-North Korean “Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty” declares that the two signatory nations guarantee to adopt immediately all necessary measures to oppose any country or coalition of countries that might attack either nation”<sup>209</sup> This statement in the treaty very obviously shows the relationship between North Korea and China.

However, there will be some change depending on the political situation. Pollack and Lee predict and explain China’s role:

Though the Chinese have increased their energy and food aid in recent years, leaders in Beijing seem disinclined to undertake heroic measures on behalf of the North. But there appear to be three circumstances under which the Chinese might weigh such a course of action: (1) if the North (despite a clear aversion to dependence on China) signals its readiness to “tilt” toward Beijing in exchange for enhanced economic and political support; (2) if the indicators of instability in the North and its repercussions for stability and security in contiguous border areas convince the Chinese that they need to act to manage the risks to their security and ensure their long-term interests; or (3) if the ROK and the United States embark on unilateral actions to counter instability in the North that China believes would undermine its long-term political and security interests.<sup>210</sup>

*d. North Korea and Russia Treaty*

The relationship between North Korea and Russia is different because there is no longer a Soviet Union. Even though there was a security treaty between North Korea and the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation said in 1996 that the clause was inoperative and a revised treaty was adopted in 1999.<sup>211</sup> The revised treaty provided “only for consultation in the event of external threat to the security of either country.”<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> Pollack and Lee, 54.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., xvi.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., 322.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid.

The relationship between South Korea and Russia has changed since 1990 and has influenced the relationship between North Korea and Russia. The Soviets requested economic aid from South Korea and wanted to open a diplomatic relationship with South Korea in September 1990.<sup>213</sup> On 13-16 December 1990, a “Declaration of General Principles of Relations” was signed by South Korean President Roh Tae Woo and Gorbachev.<sup>214</sup> The Declaration has a sentence concerning North Korea’s response, “the development of these links and contacts between South Korea and the USSR must not in any way affect their relationships with third countries or undermine obligations they assume under multilateral or bilateral treaties and agreements.”<sup>215</sup> Perhaps, South Korea wanted to include the statement that because there are mutual treaties with the United States. Russia is also selling military equipment and technology to South Korea. Oberdorfer introduces an interesting episode to show the relationship between North Korea and the USSR.

In a private meeting, Roh asked Gorbachev to “exert an appropriate influence” on North Korea to develop a more cooperative relationship. The Soviet leader said he was doing what he could—which wasn’t much, in view of Pyongyang’s angry reaction to his new friendship with Seoul.<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>213</sup> Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, 464.

<sup>214</sup> Oberdorfer, 226.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

## VI. UNIFICATION STRATEGY TWO: POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS

The Bush administration has been skeptical about negotiation with North Korea. On the other hand, North Korea wants bilateral talks with the United States. According to Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly, North Korea wants three things: “a nonaggression declaration from the United States, a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War, and Washington’s diplomatic recognition of the DPRK government.”<sup>217</sup> Kelly said, “North Koreans suggested that when all of these wonderful things were done, then we might be able to talk about their uranium enrichment program.”<sup>218</sup> The replacement of the Armistice Agreement by a peace treaty would be a first step to solve the animosity with North Korea.

There have been many attempts to make a peaceful environment on the Korean peninsula since the Korean War. However, there has been no solution for a successful peace treaty. The reason can be found in the geopolitical characteristics of the Korean peninsula. Korea is surrounded and influenced by the great powers. Korea is located among four great powers and remains divided due to their influence. Therefore, a successful peace treaty can not only be made by the two Koreas but also the great powers. The United States cannot sign a peace treaty by itself. A peace treaty must go through a step-by-step process. First, the United States should help South Korea and North Korea initiate steps to make a peace treaty. There are three agreements between South Korea and North Korea that can help prepare a peace treaty. Second, four-party talks, including the United States and China, can replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. Third, the U.N. Security Council should make a resolution to support a peace treaty. The U.N. General Assembly will endorse a peace treaty that would lead to a peaceful Northeast Asia as well as a peaceful world. The United States can help encourage the UN to endorse a peace treaty with strong support from all over the world.

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<sup>217</sup> Carpenter and Bandow, 78, quoted in Mark Magnier, “U.S. Works to Pressure North Korea Over Arms,” *Los Angeles Times*, 20 October 2002, A5.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*

## **A. INTERNAL EFFORTS**

### **1. Political Stability through Another Summit Meeting**

North Korea should not repeat its misjudgment. The lack of foresight of the North Korean leader led to the Korean War and resulted in the death of 3,000,000 people and the permanent division of Korea. Before the Korean War, the lack of political consensus and compromise was a general characteristic of Korean politics. Without political stability, it is impossible to prevent war. It is extremely difficult to convert different ideologies without force. However, step-by-step agreements are necessary for consensual and peaceful unification.

A Kim Jong-Il visit to Seoul will help stabilize the political situation on the Korean peninsula. One of the agreements at the 2000 South Korea and North Korea summit meeting was a Kim Jong-Il visit to Seoul:

5. The South and North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the near future to implement the above agreement expeditiously.

President Kim Dae Jung cordially invited National Defense Commission chairman Kim Jong Il to visit Seoul, and Chairman Kim Jong Il decided to visit Seoul at an appropriate time.<sup>219</sup>

### **2. Peace Treaty between South Korea and North Korea by Reaffirmation of Three Agreements (The July 4 Joint Statement, The Base Agreement on 12 December 1991, and a Joint Declaration on 15 June 2000)**

South Korea and North Korea should reaffirm three agreements—the July 4 Joint Statement, the Basic Agreement on 12 December 1991, and The Joint Declaration on 15 June 2000. The common thread of those three agreements is that South Korea and North Korea want to achieve peace on the Korean peninsula through an independent and peaceful process.

For example, the first two principles of the July 4 Joint Statement declared the independent unification goal and peaceful relationship between the two Koreas “First, unification shall be achieved through independent efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference. Second, unification shall be achieved through

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<sup>219</sup> Oberforfer, 431.



peaceful means, and not through use of force against one another.”<sup>220</sup> The 1991 the Basic Agreement reconfirmed the July 4 Joint statement in Preamble and Chapter One.<sup>221</sup> In the Joint Declaration on 15 June 2000, the first article mentions the two Korea’s status in the reunification process, “The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification on their own initiative and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country.”<sup>222</sup> South Korea and North Korea already have a basic agreement that can be the cornerstone of a peace treaty. It is important to figure out how to implement those agreements with trust.

Without the agreement of the two Koreas, which are the main parties to a peaceful unification, conclusion of a peace treaty is an unattainable goal on the Korean peninsula. On 13 June 2006, 16 South Korean Assembly members and 231 people from 92 NGO groups turned in a written petition to the Assembly to request ratification of the 1992 Basic agreement.<sup>223</sup> Even though the 1992 Basic Agreement was adopted and initiated on 13 December 1991, it was not ratified by the Assembly. After the Basic Agreement was signed by the Prime Ministers of both Koreas in 1991, it was not discussed by the Assembly.

Jeong Se-Hyun, vice president of the Research Institute for National Unification in 1992 and later the Minister of Unification during the Roh Administration, mentions the importance of the legal status of the Basic Agreement, “In order for the Basic Agreement to be fulfilled and practiced with national consensus and support, its legal status and the political meaning of the Basic Agreement must first be clarified. Recently, whether or not

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<sup>220</sup>Oberforfer, 24.

<sup>221</sup> “Inter-Korean Basic Agreement,” <http://www.peace21.net> (accessed on 25 June 2006).

<sup>222</sup> Oberdorfer, 431.

<sup>223</sup> Lee, Chul-woo, “‘*Nambuk Kibonhabeuiseo*’ Kukhoeibijoondongeuian Jechul chokku cheongwon [A petition to request ratification of ‘Inter-Korean Basic Agreement,’]” *Oh My News*, 13 June 2006, [http://www.ohmynews.com/articleview/article\\_view.asp?at\\_code=338159](http://www.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?at_code=338159) (accessed on 20 September 2006).

presidential ratification requires the National Assembly's agreement has become the subject of debate in South Korea."<sup>224</sup> It is necessary to forge a national consensus at the beginning of a peace treaty process.

That is, the National Assembly should be one of the main actors of implementation. The President and the Ministry of Unification should also review all of the former agreements and start negotiations with North Korea to reaffirm an agreement.

## **B. EXTERNAL EFFORTS**

The international political situation on the Korean peninsula has changed since the end of the Cold War. The roles of the United States and China have been important. The United States has been unwilling to discuss a peace treaty with North Korea and called North Korea a terrorist nation. The policy of the United States has heavily influenced the stability of the Korean peninsula. It is impossible to have a peace treaty without U.S. involvement. Also, China as one of the signatories of the Armistice Agreement needs to be involved in the discussion to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty.

Finally, the endorsement and support of the U.N. is important because the United States led the U.N. forces and fifteen other countries who fought during the Korean War. Also, Russia and Japan, which have interests on the Korean peninsula, can be included during the endorsement process. The establishment of a peace treaty through international support will bring peace and prosperity to the Korean peninsula as well as to Northeast Asia. It will be a first symbolic step to move forward to a more peaceful world in the twenty-first century.

### **1. Four-Party Talks**

The United States has not discussed a peace treaty with North Korea. On the other hand, South Korea concluded an "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchange and Cooperation" with North Korea on 19 February 1992.<sup>225</sup> The United States should encourage the two Koreas to initiate a peace treaty process. The White House and the Department of State can help South Korea prepare a peace treaty. They should

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<sup>224</sup> Jeong, Se-Hyun, "Legal Status and Political Meaning of the Basic Agreement between the South and North," *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Spring 1992 (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea), 5.

<sup>225</sup> Harrison, 206.

discuss this matter with China and ask for four-party talks to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. The members of the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate can give South Korea advice and prepare for ratification.

There are two defense treaties—“the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty” and “the North Korea’s Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance with China”—related to a peace treaty on the Korean peninsula. The United States and China need to participate in the negotiations to revise these treaties for the successful establishment of a peace treaty. North Korea always argues that the withdrawal of the USFK should be the primary issue of any talks related to a peace treaty. The U.S. military presence in Korea is such a hot topic for a peace treaty that the four parties should be involved in a peace treaty process. Furthermore, even though there are two distinguishable groups – against troop withdrawal and for troop withdrawal—the goal of these two groups should be the same, not for the exclusive interest of the great powers but for stability in Northeast Asia and for the Korean people. As mentioned earlier, the most important issue of the policies toward Korea is the U.S. presence in South Korea. Therefore, arguments against troop presence and for troop presence on the Korean peninsula need to be considered during the peaceful unification process. As a matter of fact, the United States has already begun its withdrawal. However, the U.S. military presence in Korea remain a vexing question.

## **2. Endorsement of the UN**

The United Nations played a significant role in the Korean War. Fortunately, the Soviet Union had boycotted the Security Council meeting in 1950 because they insisted that the People’s Republic of China was the appropriate entity to be a member of the Council rather than the Republic of China.<sup>226</sup> The Korean War was the first international conflict in which the U.N. intervened.<sup>227</sup> Fifteen countries joined forces with the United States and South Korea to fight against the North Korean invasion under the United Nations Command in Korea.<sup>228</sup> “Although the U.S. military dominated the coalition effort, thousands of other soldiers fought under the U.N. flag, including troops from

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<sup>226</sup> Harrison, 125.

<sup>227</sup> Larry M. Wortzel, “Why North Korea Should Sign a Peace Treaty with the U.N., Not the U.S.,” *The Heritage Foundation*, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/EM748.cfm> (accessed on 30 Jan 2007).

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*

Ethiopia, Columbia, and Luxumbourg. A total of 150,000 foreign servicemen fought in the Korean War, with over 11,000 wounded and 5,000 either killed or listed as missing in action”.<sup>229</sup>

However, the United Nations has not played an active role in Korea since the Korean War. In order to achieve the U.N.’s objective to protect South Korea from the communist threat and end the Korean War honorably, the U.N. should make an effort to accelerate the peace talks on the Korean peninsula. The influence of the U.N. in Korea has been weakening. For example, the U.N. command in Korea has never reported to the U.N. secretary general.<sup>230</sup> One of the reasons why the U.N. cannot play an active role in Korea is that “the United States has the right to act on behalf of the United Nations.”<sup>231</sup> When North Korea asked U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to initiate steps for the termination of the U.N. command, the response of Boutros Boutros-Ghali to North Korea explained the status of the U.N. command in fact. Harrison quotes how he responded,

Boutros Boutros-Ghali replied categorically on June 24 that the United States alone has the authority to “decide on the continued existence or the dissolution of the United Nations Command.” He recalled that Security Council Resolution 84 of 7 July 1950, “limited itself to recommending that all Members providing military forces and other assistance to the Republic of Korea ‘make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States of America.’”<sup>232</sup>

Even though the U.N. command in Korea is under U.S. control, it is important that the U.N. play a role in improving peace in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) is necessary because the Armistice Agreement was signed by the U.N. and a peace treaty is the official end to the Armistice Agreement. The peace treaty on the Korean peninsula may need to follow the treaty process—“negotiation, signature, ratification, reservation, entry into force and

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<sup>229</sup> Larry M. Wortzel, “Why North Korea Should Sign a Peace Treaty with the U.N., Not the U.S.,” *The Heritage Foundation*, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/EM748.cfm> (accessed on 30 Jan 2007).

<sup>230</sup> Harrison, 161.

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, 163.

registration.”<sup>233</sup> However, a solution to the legal problem over how to finally end the Korean War will clearly require a more flexible formula.<sup>234</sup> That is, the two Koreas can initiate the negotiations. The United States and China would like to join the negotiations. Also, several unique conditions on the Korean peninsula, such as the signatories, the status of the Armistice Agreement, and a treaty between South Korea and North Korea should be considered in the legal process. In the end, endorsement of the UNSC would constitute the definitive end of the Korean War.<sup>235</sup> The endorsement of the U.N. would honor the United Nations’ efforts and contributions.

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<sup>233</sup> William R. Slomanson, *Fundamental Perspective on International Law*, 4th ed. (Balmont, CA: Thomson West, 2003), 348.

<sup>234</sup> Harrison, 190.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*,

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## VII. UNIFICATION STRATEGY THREE: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT

The economic gap between the two Koreas is dramatic. Economic data such as the volume of trade, real per capita incomes and growth rates are much higher in South Korea.<sup>236</sup> North Korea's economy is almost a total failure. Economic engagement is necessary to influence North Korean society. Also, it will prevent North Korea from collapsing suddenly. Radical change such as North Korean collapse will lead to serious instability on the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, by blocking economic aid to North Korea, the harsh state of the economy will make North Korean people more belligerent and anti-American. Economic aid will be continuously requested by North Korea, making economic incentives an effective way to engage that country. According to Marcus Noland, there are three scenarios in terms of economics:

...in the first, the North Koreans see the error of their ways, and undertake fundamental economic reform. Although this would be highly desirable, it is also highly unlikely...At the other extreme, the state could simply collapse and be absorbed by South Korea, much like East Germany was absorbed by West Germany. Although this would arguably be an improvement from the status quo, this, too, is *not* particularly likely...The third, and most likely, alternative, is that North Korea continues to muddle along, making ad hoc policy changes as circumstances dictate, and relying on its neighbors for support...In the case of North Korea, whether the regime is willing and able to make the necessary changes to ensure its own survival is still uncertain.<sup>237</sup>

### A. INTERNAL EFFORTS

Despite the obvious economic difference, economic cooperation between the two Koreas would be the driving force for successful peaceful unification. The motive power can be found in common characteristic such as hard work and teamwork tradition, respect for education, and nationalism. J. Barkly Rosser, Jr. and Marina V. Rosser predict the optimistic outcome of economic engagement between the two Koreas:

Despite these contrasts, the two Koreas have much in common economically, a fact that may yet be important if they unify. They share a strong Confucian tradition and the competitive spirit of *Hahn*, the latter

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<sup>236</sup> J. Barkly Rosser, Jr. and Marina V. Rosser, *Comparative Economics in a Transforming World Economy*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004), 564.

<sup>237</sup> Noland, "The Economics of Korean Unification."

stimulated by the decades-long competition between them as well as their shared resentment of Japan. They possess the two hardest-working labor forces in the world, as measured by the average length of the work week. They also share a respect for education that has led to nearly universal literacy, as well as very rapid growth rates of high-tech education among their populations.<sup>238</sup>

### **1. Expansion of Economic Engagement**

The Gaesung Industrial Complex is located one hour's distance from Seoul. The Gaesung Industrial Complex Development Project which combined South Korean capital and North Korean labor will help businesses reestablish their competitiveness, as well as serve "as a testing ground for inter-Korean economic cooperation."<sup>239</sup> An official at the Unification Ministry of South Korea said that "The Kaesung complex is expected to churn out products worth a record high of \$6 million this month, despite security concerns on the Korean peninsula caused by the North's missile launches on 5 July."<sup>240</sup> South Korea and North Korea should develop more economic relations because trade has been a major route for opening relations and will reduce the tensions by changing the self-reliant and closed economic system to an open and dependent economy. Economic relations would be one of the main factors in a peace treaty process. The ROK Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the two Koreas should help increase trade between South Korea and North Korea.

### **2. Sports/Tourism Interchanges**

The two Koreas will send one team to the 2008 Beijing Olympics in China.<sup>241</sup> South Korea will support athletes from North Korea and vice versa. The preparation

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<sup>238</sup> Rosser Jr. and Rosser, 565. According to Selig S. Harrison in *Korean Endgame*, 73, "Life in both the North and South is suffused with deep feelings of national grievance and mourning as *han*." He introduces several other definitions of *Hahn*. The South Korean theologian C.H.S. Moon defined *han* as "the accumulated anger and resentment felt by the people of a small and weak nation who hate and resent the wrongs done to them by surrounding nations whose might they cannot overcome." Sociologist Roy Grinker described *han* as "a complex of suppressed emotion."

<sup>239</sup> Jung, Sung-ki, "S. Korea Marks 4th Anniversary of Bloody Naval Clash," *The Korea Times*, 28 June 2006, <http://times.hankooki.com> (accessed on 26 August 2006).

<sup>240</sup> Park, Song-wu, and Lee, Jin-woo, "Inter-Korean Economic Projects Not Worrisome," *The Korea Times*, 26 July 2006, <http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/200607/kt2006072618081953460.htm> (accessed on 26 July 2006)

<sup>241</sup> Donald Kirk, "Two Koreas' Dream: One Olympic Team; the North and South have Agreed in Principle to Field One Team for the 2008 Games in Beijing," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov 3, 2005, 5. <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=920488521&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed 1 February 2005).



period will give more opportunities to communicate and build confidence. This unrelated event will make the peace treaty negotiation process easier.

In 2005, there were 88,341 people who traveled between South Korea and North Korea. That number is almost as big as the total of 85,400 people traveling during the 60 years since the end of the Korean War. This major change is because of tours to Mt. Geumgang and the Gaesung Industrial Complex. From November 1998 when the tours to Mt. Geumgang first began, until June 2005, a total of 1,000,000 people have participated in these tours.<sup>242</sup>

In 2006, in spite of unstable conditions from the missile launch and nuclear test on the Korean peninsula, the number of inter-Korean exchanges of people increased 15.1 percent from that of last year and reached 101,708 in addition to the tourists to Mt. Geumgang.<sup>243</sup> Also, those who visited North Korea by road exceeded one million.<sup>244</sup> The Ministry of Unification of South Korea said that “The South Korean government will continuously devise measures such as opening of railroads and improving the overland transit system so that the inter-Korean cooperation and exchange become more active.”<sup>245</sup> As the Ministry of Unification expresses, this interchange should be continued. The Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of South Korea should play a leading role in this process.

### **3. Economic Cooperation in the Industrial Complex**

The Gaesung Industrial Complex is located one hour’s distance from Seoul. The Gaesung Industrial Complex Development Project combines South Korean capital with North Korean labor and will help businesses reestablish their competitiveness, as well as serving “as a testing ground for inter-Korean economic cooperation.”<sup>246</sup> The two Koreas have agreed to build the 16,337 acre complex and an accompanying city through in three

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<sup>242</sup> The Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, “Frequently Asked Question: what kind of economic cooperation projects is the South pursuing with the North?” <http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.jsp> (accessed on 27 February 2006).

<sup>243</sup> The Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, “The Number of Inter-Korean Exchange of People Exceeded 100,000 in 2006,” [http://www.unikorea.go.kr/english/EPA/EPA0201R.jsp?main\\_uid=1954](http://www.unikorea.go.kr/english/EPA/EPA0201R.jsp?main_uid=1954) (accessed on 6 January 2007).

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid.

stages plan by 2012.<sup>247</sup> The first stage was planned to develop 817 acres by the end of 2007 and more than 70 percent of the planned site has been completed by January 2006.<sup>248</sup> According to the Ministry of Unification of South Korea, the number of North Korean workers in the Gaesung Industrial Complex exceeded 10,000 on 21 November 2006 and reached 11,189 as of 31 December 2006.<sup>249</sup> The second and third stages of the project will be completed in 2012 and the South Korean government expects that a total of 350,000 workers will be employed and some \$15 billion worth products will be produced in the Gaesung Industrial Complex by 2012.<sup>250</sup>

These Gaesung Industrial Complex projects and agreements between South Korea and North Korea show that the two Koreas are willing to cooperate economically and that their plans are progressing. The Gaesung Industrial Complex provides a model of economic cooperation after unification, which is the combination of South Korea's finance and technologies and North Korea's land and labor. The success of Gaesung Industrial Complex will show the possible economic integration of the two Koreas. The two Koreas should implement all agreements without regard to political influence. Also, the incomes of the two Koreas should be transparently used not for the military purpose but for the economic and social purpose. After North Korea's nuclear test, the Gaesung Industrial Complex project has been a subject of debate in South Korea and the United States. It is important to clarify that the Gaesung Industrial Complex is not for North Korea's military preparation but for economic integration between the two Koreas.

## **B. EXTERNAL EFFORTS**

Compared to the costs of German unification, the costs of Korean unification are expected to be more than \$2 trillion.<sup>251</sup> It is impossible for South Korea alone to provide this money.

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<sup>247</sup> Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States of America, "The Gaesung Industrial Complex: Engine for Northeast Asia's Industrial Development," 5, [http://www.koreaembassy.org/han\\_links/multimedia/gaesung\\_web.pdf](http://www.koreaembassy.org/han_links/multimedia/gaesung_web.pdf) (accessed on 6 January 2007).

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

<sup>249</sup> The Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, "The Number of Inter-Korean Exchange of People Exceeded 100,000 in 2006."

<sup>250</sup> Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States of America, "The Gaesung Industrial Complex: Engine for Northeast Asia's Industrial Development," 5.

<sup>251</sup> Olsen, *Korea: The Divided Nation*, 163.

## 1. Economic Incentives and Trade

North Korea has experienced serious economic decline since the end of the Cold War and recorded negative gross domestic product (GDP) for most of 1990s.<sup>252</sup> Far from providing economic development, North Korea can hardly keep its people alive. The 1994 Agreed Framework was one example that economic incentives like energy worked to a certain degree in developing peaceful environments. Marcus Noland says, “The North Korean economy desperately needs two things to meet the minimum survival requirements of its population: food and energy.”<sup>253</sup>

Because of the desperate need of energy and food for survival, economic aid would be a good incentive to make North Korea move toward the negotiating table. Many hydroelectric plants and thermal power plants are not operating efficiently or to capacity in North Korea. Bradley O. Babson said that “There is no question that the highest priority sector for economic engagement with the DPRK will be energy, both because it is essential for economic recovery and because it is linked to the security guarantees and economic assistance commitments that will be integral to any agreement that results in the dismantling of the DPRK’s nuclear program.”<sup>254</sup>

According to Marcus Noland, the 1994 Agreed Framework was not efficient and repair of existing plants is a better alternative:

The 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States provides for the construction of two light water reactors and the provision of oil in the interim. The problem is that this is essentially a diplomatic agreement over North Korea's nuclear program, and does not really address the true needs of the North Korean economy. From an economics standpoint, it would be better to renegotiate the Agreed Framework, scrapping the costly light water reactors, and instead building more cost-effective electrical generating systems, refurbishing the existing electrical grid, and building the necessary infrastructure that would allow North Korea to export electricity to South Korea and China, and thereby earn foreign exchange.<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, 3.

<sup>253</sup> Noland, “The Economics of Korean Unification”

<sup>254</sup> Bradley Babson, “Future Multilateral Economic Cooperation With the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: An Exploration of Issues and Options,” *The Stanley Foundation*, 15 June 2005, 7, <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/initiatives/eenk/papers/Babson.pdf> (accessed on 25 November 2006).

<sup>255</sup> Noland. “The Economics of Korean Unification.”

Also, the conference report published by the Stanley Foundation recommends an energy conservation program and renovation of existing power plants:

...the DPRK also is not maximizing the energy resources available to it. Energy efficiency is extremely poor due to bad management and deteriorated infrastructure, so conservation is an immediate imperative...Current political and economic realities make it unlikely that the development of light water nuclear power will continue. But other projects may be more pressing in the near future. The restoration and repair of existing power plants and the upgrading of the transmission and distribution infrastructure are required to operate the system already existing or to make practical use of energy provided from outside sources.<sup>256</sup>

Another approach would be trade with North Korea. David Kang argues that North Korea wants to trade with other countries:

The collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2002 was disappointing because North Korea, unlike Iraq, has been actively seeking accommodation with the international community in a number of areas. We should encourage this trend, not hinder it. It makes no sense to criticize North Korea for being isolationist and then refuse to trade with them.<sup>257</sup>

Whether it is economic aid or trade, economic engagement is an important factor to open North Korea and prepare for a healthy economy of a unified Korea.

## **2. Supporting Economic Cooperation between South Korea and North Korea**

The United States, China and Japan can help inter-Korean economic cooperation.

### ***a. The United States***

The United States has not been proactive about the South Korean economic engagement policy toward to North Korea. The different perspectives on economic engagement policy between South Korea and the United States have been a problem in the economic cooperation between the two Koreas. Four U.S. Congressmen

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<sup>256</sup> Conference Report, "Future Multilateral Economic Cooperation With the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," *The Stanley Foundation*, 15-17 June 2005, <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/reports/EENK05.pdf> (accessed on 20 November 2006), 20.

<sup>257</sup> Cha and Kang, 102.

visited the Gaesung Industrial Complex on 1 December 2006.<sup>258</sup> This was the first visit of U.S. Congressman to the Gaesung Industrial Complex. It is important for the United States to understand the economic cooperation between South Korea and North Korea.

During the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) meeting in 2006 between South Korea and the United States, both governments have expressed their different perspectives about the GIC. Products made in the GIC have been the big issue. The South Korean government has claimed that products made in the GIC should be treated as Korean-made products in the FTA. The report of Institute for International Economics (IIE), entitled “Negotiating the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement” said that “the United States has never entered into an FTA with a country that is the target of US economic sanctions.”<sup>259</sup> South Korea and The United States should try to bridge a gap in the attitude toward the economic cooperation with North Korea.

**b. China**

North Korea attempted to build the Sinuiju Free trade zone (FTZ) on the northeastern border with China in 2000. However, the development plan of the Sinuiju FTZ has been stopped since China arrested Yang Bin who was assigned as the head of the development project for tax dodging.<sup>260</sup> China can teach its know-how about the development of an economic zone or help South Korean business people use its border to access and develop the Sinuiju area. Without China’s official assistance, the Sinuiju FTZ development project can not start again.

Lee Dong Wook, a Korean China analyst said that the failure of Sinuiju was due to the stupidity of North Korean leaders and the lack of China’s help:

They should have not believed that big talk of the Chinese northerner. Although overgeneralization is always dangerous, my experience tells me something about people from that region. Many of them love to say that they are “defang” (big-minded). Thanks to their defang spirit and valor,

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<sup>258</sup> “The Fifth Tri-National Meeting among South Korean, U.S. and Japanese lawmakers to be held”, *National Assembly of the Republic of Korea*, [http://korea.assembly.go.kr/abo/zin\\_read.jsp?cha=21&boarditemid=1000005758](http://korea.assembly.go.kr/abo/zin_read.jsp?cha=21&boarditemid=1000005758) (accessed on 10 December 2006).

<sup>259</sup> Jeffrey J. Schott, Scott C. Bradford, and Thomas Moll, “Negotiating the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement” *Institute for International Economics*, Jung 2006, <http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb06-4.pdf> (accessed on 7 January 2007), 12.

<sup>260</sup> Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, 9.

many northerners succeed in becoming military brass...Yang went abroad in an area where even real professionals are reluctant to comment...North Korean leaders should have considered international eco-politics with their neighbors before they announced such an ambitious plan. China did not welcome the idea of developing Sinuiju at the expense of other neighboring cities in its northern provinces.<sup>261</sup>

Sinuiju is located at the North Korea and China northwest border. It faces the city of Dandong, Liaoning province in China across the Yalu River. This area became known after the Ryongchun train explosion in April 2004.<sup>262</sup> Sinuiju is advantageously for economic cooperation with China. The Sinuiju Railway can connect Europe and Asia. It can start from Japan and connect with Seoul, Pyongyang, Beijing, Ulaanbaatar, Moscow, Istanbul, Paris, and other European cities. The flow of people, goods, capital and culture by train will bring tremendous change.

*c. Japan*

After the North Korean missile launch and nuclear test in 2006, Japan has imposed sanctions and led the United States Security Council to issue a resolution against North Korea.<sup>263</sup> Japan is believed to have dropped from North Korea's second largest trading partner to its fifth largest partner (behind China, South Korea, Thailand, and Russia) after imposing Japan's sanctions.<sup>264</sup> Economic sanctions and decrease of trade have not solved the North Korean nuclear problem, but they do send a direct message to North Korea that its nuclear weapons program is the primary concern of Japan.

However, its success depends on support from other countries, especially China. It takes a long time and great efforts to implement sanctions successfully. China has hesitated imposing sanctions that would lead to a collapse of North Korea because it would send millions of refugees across the border.<sup>265</sup> According to a congressional

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<sup>261</sup> Lee Dong-Wook, "What Next After Shinuiju?" *The Korea Times*, 16 October 2006, <http://times.hankooki.com> (accessed on 4 January 2007).

<sup>262</sup> "New Theory on N Korea Rail Blast," *BBC*, 23 April 2004., <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3651705.stm> (accessed on 4 January 2007).

<sup>263</sup> Chanlett-Avery and Squassoni, 5.

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>265</sup> Tony Karon, "What North Korea Wants from the Nuke Standoff," *Time*, 10 Oct 2006, <http://www.time.com/time/world/printout/0,8816,1544790,00.html> (accessed on 29 November 2006).

report, China refused to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and raised questions about whether it will cooperate in a United Nations embargo.<sup>266</sup>

Also, South Korea has expressed dissent about the unilateral sanctions of Japan because there are differences in South Korea's engagement policy. During the APEC meeting in November 2006 after North Korea's nuclear test, the leaders of South Korea, the United States and Japan agreed to use sanctions and dialogue in parallel to lead North Korea into dismantling its nuclear program.<sup>267</sup> However, there was no coordination in economic policy between South Korean and Japan. Therefore, unilateral economic sanctions toward North Korea would not be successful without cooperation with South Korea and China. Coordination is vital. Japanese assistance toward a unified Korea during the unification process will influence the economic relationship between Japan and a unified Korea.

In order to achieve peaceful unification under South Korea's lead, Japan's economic policy toward North Korea needs to adjust to South Korea and China as well as the United States. Any unilateral economic policy like economic sanctions would not be effective and will not be beneficial for Japan with a unified Korea in the long term. Japan needs to consider introducing a market economy and promoting trade with North Korea. It will not only reduce North Korea's threat but also contribute to the close relationship with a unified Korea in the future.

### **3. Multilateral Economic Approach with North Korea**

South Korea cannot provide all the economic needs for North Korea during the unification process. Through the peaceful unification process, the optimum economic unification scenario is North Korea's change in economic system. Gradual integration into the international economic system and transition to a free market economic system are ideal in a unified Korea. Collective efforts by international organizations in economic restructuring and development in North Korea area are critical. International organizations can provide "objectivity, neutrality, experience, and mobilization of

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<sup>266</sup> Bill Gertz, "China Cited As a N. Korea Supplier," *Washington Times*, 31 October, 2006.

<sup>267</sup> "Sanctions and Dialogue," *The Korea Times*, 19 November 2006, <http://times.hankooki.com> (accessed on 18 December 2006).

financial resources to support the transition to a market economy that is integrated in the regional and international economic system.”<sup>268</sup>

The United States, Japan and South Korea can encourage multilateral organizations to facilitate economic cooperation and consultations with North Korea. For example, multilateral organizations such as the UN, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) can provide a mechanism for providing more information and knowledge about North Korean administrative structures and procedures.<sup>269</sup> These organizations can request more transparent information by providing capital for economic development. The assistance of the United States and Japan is necessary for implementation in these organizations because they play main roles.

Even though North Korea has expressed interest in joining the multilateral organizations, no progress has been made. Marcus Noland said, “Membership talks have never made much progress, for they have snagged on economic data and information required for membership in these organizations and Japanese opposition relating to unresolved political issues, most notably the alleged kidnapping of Japanese citizens.”<sup>270</sup>

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268 Babson, 2.

269 Conference Report, 14.

270 Marcus Noland, “Economic Alternatives for Unification,” in ed. Henry D. Sokolski, *Planning for a Peaceful Korea* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB65.pdf> (accessed on 10 October 2006).



## VIII. CONCLUSION

Two major ideas are discussed in this thesis. First, Korean unification is only possible with internal and external efforts working together. Second, internal and external efforts in military, political, and economic areas should be implemented in proactive and comprehensive ways. The two Koreas and four powers—China, Japan, Russia and the United States—need to be more proactive in working toward Korean unification and should introduce policy measures aimed at shaping more favorable domestic and international environments for consensual and peaceful unification. According to Edward A. Olsen, the influence of neighboring countries on the Korean peninsula is not favorable for Korean unification:

For better or worse, the superpower backers of both Koreas during the Cold War readily adjusted to dealing with Korean issues in the context of the divided nation being part of the geopolitical status quo that was best coped with by seeking to preserve its stability. In other words, neither the U.S. nor the USSR had much reason to be proactive with respect to bringing the two Koreas back together as one nation state. As time passed, both Koreas developed conflicting interests that reinforced their division and confirmed the conventional strategic thinking in Washington and Moscow. The two Koreas' Chinese and Japanese neighbors exacerbated this situation by cultivating international politics throughout the Cold War that gave them reason to value the stability of the Korean status quo.<sup>271</sup>

These kinds of approaches and attitudes based in Cold War thinking should be changed. All positive aspects of and proactive support for Korean unification should be considered.

For the policy implementation for Korean unification, military containment and negotiation cannot be emphasized enough as the fundamental condition for successful security. Military backing for implementation of political and economic policies is required. A strong military will weaken North Korea's ability to employ threats and bring North Korea to the negotiating table. Political negotiations over a peace treaty should be included in domestic and international efforts. Finally, economic and social engagement efforts are also necessary to provide support for successful unification and stability after

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<sup>271</sup> Edward A. Olsen, "The United States and the Korean Peace Process," in *The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers*, ed. Kwak Tae-Hwan and Joo Seung-ho (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 79.

unification. Through the proactive implementation of Korean unification by the two Koreas and four powers, the world will be more stable and peaceful. Korean unification is not only unification of the two Koreas but also integration of the great powers for peace and prosperity in international politics. Peaceful Korean unification will be a first symbolic step on the road to a more peaceful world in the twenty first century.

The 1943 Cairo conference by the United States, China, and Great Britain promised an independent Korea “in due course.”<sup>272</sup> The great powers did not expect Korea’s long division and intended to “help foster the reemergence of a single, independent, sovereign Korean nation-state.”<sup>273</sup> The impact of the Cold War was to consolidate the separation of the two Koreas. It is time to think about a “free and independent one Korea in due course.” South Korea has shown the capability to be a free and independent state since the Korean War. South Korea has bested North Korea in political, economic, and diplomatic competition since the Korean War. The last five decades form the history of competition in the Cold War context. The next century should be the history of coexistence in the international context after the Cold War. South Korea as a winner should lead the peaceful Korean unification process by recognizing North Korea as a counterpart and introducing the ways of an economic and diplomatic success story. The support of neighboring countries will foster the consensual and peaceful unification process.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Korea was a place of conflict among the great powers. Korea lost its sovereignty and was divided into two countries. The end of the Cold War has changed the balance of power against North Korea. Changes in the international situation such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic development of China, and South Korea’s normalization of relations with China and the Soviet Union in the early 1990s explain why North Korea has persisted in seeking to develop a self-reliant nuclear deterrent without help from its two Cold War patrons—China and Russia. More hostile policies toward North Korea will only make the situation worse.

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<sup>272</sup> Olsen, *Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations: In Due Course?* 1.

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

In the twenty-first century, if Korea unifies peacefully through domestic and international efforts, North Korea's nuclear standoff can be solved. Furthermore, Korea will be a "peace bridge" to connect the United States, Japan, China, and all other countries in Asia and Europe economically, politically and strategically. This will lead to the most prosperous period in history. Consequently, consensual and peaceful Korean unification through the proactive implementation of military, economic and political policies by the two Koreas and international community is essential for world peace. The rivalries of the two Koreas and their neighbors will not lead to peace and prosperity—for the Korean peninsula or the world. Therefore, the two Koreas and four powers should consider adopting a more proactive policy for peaceful Korean unification.

Finally, consensual and peaceful Korean unification is not an easy goal to achieve. However, without Korean unification, peace and security throughout the region remain a remote goal. Success in peaceful Korean unification will have the tremendous benefit of laying the foundations for peace and security in northeast Asia and around the world. Korean unification means the eventual complete end of the Cold War and the start of a new peaceful era in history. Therefore, more proactive policy implementation should be considered. There is a most famous song in Korea, "Uriui Sowoneun Tong-II" (Our heartfelt wish is unification). The Korean dream of peaceful unification will come true and be beneficial when unification becomes the heartfelt wish not only of the two Koreas, but of neighboring countries as well.

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