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14. ABSTRACT Joint Doctrine provides inadequate planning guidance for closing the critical seam between combat operations and post-hostilities security and reconstruction. While the importance of linking military objectives to the desired end-state has been addressed through recent updates, a review of current joint planning doctrine still indicates critical deficiencies. First, the guidance provided in Joint Publications for planning joint operations lacks continuity. Second, the deliberate planning process and Crisis Action Planning process outlined in JOPES lags the requirements implied in the National Security Strategy. Third, JOPES should be adjusted to delineate a regressive approach to planning joint operations. Finally, joint planning doctrine lags institutional changes and growth within DoD and DoS. Through an examination of the results of phase IV operations to date during OIF, it will be apparent that recent changes made to joint doctrine have been insufficient in changing the actual planning process. Additionally, without cooperative, interagency planning, post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations will continue to hold high costs in terms of US lives and treasure.					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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**JOINT DOCTRINE FOR STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION
OPERATIONS**

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Joint Doctrine provides inadequate planning guidance for closing the critical seam between combat operations and post-hostilities security and reconstruction. While the importance of linking military objectives to the desired end-state has been addressed through recent updates, a review of current joint planning doctrine still indicates critical deficiencies. First, the guidance provided in Joint Publications (JP) for planning joint operations—JP 3-0, JP 3-08 series, JP 5-00 series, and the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES)—lacks continuity. Second, the deliberate planning process and Crisis Action Planning process outlined in JOPES lags the requirements implied in the National Security Strategy. Third, JOPES should be adjusted to delineate a regressive approach to planning joint operations. Finally, JOPES—indeed all joint planning doctrine—also lags institutional changes and growth within the DoD and DoS.

Through an examination of the results of post-conflict, or phase IV, operations to date during OIF, it will be apparent that recent changes made to joint doctrine have been insufficient in changing the actual planning process. Additionally, without cooperative, interagency planning, post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations will continue to hold high costs in terms of US lives and treasure.

INTRODUCTION

Joint Doctrine provides inadequate planning guidance for closing the critical seam between combat operations and post-hostilities security and reconstruction. Given that Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) is the sixth major nation-building endeavor the United States has pursued in twelve years,¹ this should not necessarily be the case. More importantly, the military can ill afford to ignore the existing disconnect between planning doctrine and the requirements in order to meet the objectives of the National Security Strategy (NSS).²

While the importance of linking military objectives to the desired end-state has been addressed through recent updates, a review of current joint planning doctrine still indicates critical deficiencies. First, the guidance provided in Joint Publications (JP) for planning joint operations—JP 3-0, JP 3-08 series, JP 5-00 series, and the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES)—lacks continuity. Second, the deliberate planning process and Crisis Action Planning process outlined in JOPES lags the requirements implied in the NSS. Third, JOPES should be adjusted to delineate a regressive approach to planning Courses of Action (COAs) for joint operations. Finally, JOPES—indeed all joint planning doctrine—also lags institutional changes and growth within the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS).

Through an examination of the results of post-conflict, or phase IV, operations to date during OIF, it will be apparent that recent changes made to joint doctrine, vis-à-vis the

¹ Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

² The goals of the NSS “are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.” NSS, 1. The NSS also states that the US reserves the right to act preemptively, if required. Preemptive action coupled with the offensive implication of “opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy” will require significant tools, skill-sets, capabilities, and organizational expertise of all instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. NSS, 2.

importance of a complete understanding by operational planners of end-state, were insufficient in changing the actual planning process. Additionally, without cooperative, interagency planning, post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations will continue to hold high costs in terms of US lives and treasure.

WHAT IS NATION-BUILDING?

There is a critical distinction between what has come to be known as “nation-building” and the more appropriate term, “state-building.” Fukuyama points out that a nation is “a community bound together by shared history and culture.”³ He further points out that any intervening power lacks the tools to build a nation. Indeed, tools are only a part of the recipe, so to speak; time is also needed. Outside powers do, however, have tools for “state-building,”⁴ which is “the creation of new government institutions and[/or] the strengthening of old ones.”⁵

This confusion of terms is more than simply a matter of semantics. Use of the “nation-building” label throughout all levels of the US government, media, the military, and even academics, indicates the root problem faced in the pursuit of stability and reconstruction operations—a lack of understanding. The expected and realistic timeline of effort and cooperation rises exponentially between creating or improving state institutions and the complete development of a nation.

Clausewitz hinted at realistic expectations when he wrote “...even the ultimate outcome of war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at

³ Francis Fukuyama, *State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2004), 99.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., ix.

some later date.”⁶ This fact should be a central consideration for planners in defining a timeline for stability and reconstruction efforts.

WHO DOES STATE-BUILDING?

“So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world...All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for liberty, we will stand with you.”⁷

Clearly, the US should be prepared for stability and reconstruction operations. However, both DoD and DoS find the pursuit of state- or nation-building a bit unpalatable. Per the current NSS and the above comments from President Bush, the intent has been identified to both actively seek opportunity for developing democratic governments and to support those groups who will fight or are fighting against tyrannical leadership. DoD and DoS can waste no further time in developing cooperative, interagency planning doctrine.

During a recent conference sponsored, in part, by the US Army War College, Col. David Ozolek⁸ argued that “security can be achieved through military action; stability cannot.”⁹ Certainly, the military is not equipped to improve or create many of the governmental institutions required in order to achieve long-term stability: the rule of law, a central bank, political freedom, infrastructure, education, and health care.¹⁰

⁶ Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 1984), 80.

⁷ President George W. Bush, “2005 Inaugural Address,” President Bush’s Second Inaugural Address, 20 January 2005. <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-01-20-bush-transcript_x.htm> [22 January 2005].

⁸ Col. Ozolek is the Executive Director of the Joint Futures Laboratory at the US Joint Forces Command.

⁹ “Women in International Security Conference Addresses the Role of the Military in Stabilization and Post-Conflict Operations,” Conference, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.: 17 November 2004. <http://wiis.georgetown.edu/events/summaries/wiis_awc_conf.htm> [15 January 2005].

¹⁰ Robert Rotberg, “Failed States,” Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 26 January 2005.

However, “armed nation-building requires continuing US military and security efforts as well as civil and economic aid programs.”¹¹ Thus, it is critical to approach any conflict with an organized plan for stability and reconstruction, incorporating cooperative efforts from all instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.

There has certainly been no shortage in the last two years of recommendations for ameliorating organizational deficiencies within DoD and DoS. Legislation has been presented to establish an office within the DoS to monitor the status of unstable states and organize interagency planning and response.¹² Additionally, DoS has already established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (OCRS), which is designed to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize US Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”¹³

DoD has created Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG),¹⁴ which are advisory elements representing civilian agencies, working as a liaison between the Combatant

¹¹ Anthony Cordesman, The War After the War: Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004), 40.

¹² The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act (sponsored by Senators Richard Lugar and Joseph Biden) was introduced based on recommendations from the CSIS study “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols.” It intends to 1) provide for the development, as a core mission of the DoS and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), of an expert civilian response capability to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities in a country or region that is in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife, and 2) to establish within the DoS an Office of International Stabilization and Reconstruction (OISR), to be headed by a Coordinator. OISR functions would include: (1) monitoring political and economic instability, and planning for stabilization and reconstruction responses; (2) developing interagency coordination; (3) identifying appropriate State, local, and private sector personnel; and (4) coordinating joint military-civilian planning. This legislation is pending. <<http://www.congress.org/congressorg/issues/bills/?bill=5805791>>

¹³ Department of State, “About [the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization] S/CRS,” Department of State Website, <<http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm>> [22 January 2005].

¹⁴ JIACGs “seek to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies that will improve planning and coordination within the government. By providing regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day working relationships between civilian and military operational planners, the JIACGs are the mechanism to plan the best mix of capabilities to achieve the desired effects that include the full range of diplomatic, information, and economic interagency activities.” <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiacg.htm>

Commands, the Joint Staff, and civilian agencies in the coordinated use of all instruments of national power.¹⁵

However, no joint doctrine exists to integrate these offices into the planning process. Certainly, “any policy, no matter how well conceived, depends on adequate government institutions to implement it.”¹⁶ Conversely, any institutional change, simply for change’s sake, is meaningless without buy-in and a plan for integration and utilization.

Moreover, institutional change without cultural, doctrinal, and policy change will create more tension, thereby increasing the level of difficulty in solving the issue at hand. In the case of stability and reconstruction operations, increased tension will be translated into ineffective efforts, loss of legitimacy, and increased level or time of commitment.

REACHING THE OBJECTIVE—WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE *JOINT*?

“The nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups, it is fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between national security strategy, NMS, and end state goals — the desired outcome. This principle holds true for both war and MOOTW.”¹⁷

“The ‘jointness’ that helped the United States win the war [in Iraq] was almost totally lacking during the conflict termination and peacemaking stage.”¹⁸

An article in the Summer 1995 Joint Force Quarterly recognized, based on lessons learned from an exercise called “CERTAIN CHALLENGE” undertaken at the Armed Forces Staff College, several deficiencies in the Joint planning process. Based on these lessons learned,

¹⁵ United States Joint Forces Command, “Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) Fact Sheet,” January 2005, < http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiacg.htm > [3 February 2005].

¹⁶ Stuart E. Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy M Weinstein, “Rebuilding Weak States,” *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2005): 143.

¹⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: 10 September 2001), ix.

¹⁸ Anthony Cordesman, *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies 2003), 502.

recommendations were made to improve JOPES.¹⁹ These recommendations detailed the importance of focusing all planning efforts around a clearly defined end-state from the National Command Authority (NCA), now referred to as POTUS/SECDEF, throughout all six phases of Crisis Action Planning (CAP).²⁰

End State is defined in joint doctrine as “what the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude —both military operations as well as those in which the military is in support of other instruments of national power.”²¹ In order to effectively and efficiently reach the desired end-state, all these instruments of national power must be focused—unity of effort. Military power is, of course, a quarter of the equation. Therefore, without civilian-military coordination and cooperation during planning, there exists the possibility—*or probability*—for agencies duplicating effort, nullifying effort, or increasing the effort required along with the cost.

More significantly, in order to formulate military objectives toward achieving a desired end-state as far-reaching as creating a stable and democratic government from the remnants of a dictatorship requires input, recommendations, cooperation, council, and active participation from all instruments of power, both governmental and civilian.

So, what guidance is actually provided by joint doctrine? In JP 5-00.2, for instance, there are many items listed in the Joint Task Force Checklist for the CAP process which simply

¹⁹ Robert R. Soucy, II, Kevin A. Shwedo, and John S. Haven II, “War Termination and Joint Planning,” Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1995): 99-100.

²⁰ JOPES defines a Crisis as an “INCIDENT or SITUATION involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.” JOPES, E-1. CAP is intended to be supported by the Deliberate Planning process, which is done for potential or predicted crises based on intelligence and assumptions. The six phase CAP process includes: 1) Situation development; 2) Crisis assessment; 3) Course of Action (COA) development; 4) COA selection; 5) Execution planning; and 6) Execution. JOPES, E-7-E-15.

²¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Joint Publication 5-00.2 (Washington, D.C., 13 January 1999), IX-27.

cannot be sufficiently addressed without close interagency coordination and cooperation. For instance, how well can DoD planners completely answer the following questions, taken directly from the checklist:

- *What is the nature of the conflict or crisis that might require military resources to resolve it?*
- *Can other elements of National Power (economic, diplomatic, informational) be used to influence the outcome? If so, what type of military support will they need? What type of support can they provide to the JTF?*
- *How will the adversary conceptualize the situation?*
- *What are the goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, methods of operation, vulnerabilities, and sense of value and loss?*²²

Some of these questions can certainly be answered through existing DoD intelligence tools. However, military intelligence is most likely focused on enemy hardware, capabilities, doctrine, forces, and tactics. Foreign Service Officers (FSO), coalition partners, and/or NGOs can be invaluable for answering questions related to the host nation or enemy.

NGOs will have most likely already been involved in operations in the area and FSOs, having the area expertise, will be able to provide needed insight into the fundamental nature of the conflict. For example, critical intelligence pertaining to host nation capabilities; cultural knowledge; elements or individuals in political leadership positions; elements or individuals leading or participating in criminal activities; and other practical intelligence can only be supplied by these individuals, agencies, or organizations. Answers to these questions should be the foundation of the operational planning.

With these and many more examples from current joint doctrine, why does DoD continue to demonstrate a hesitance to conduct—or unwillingness to conduct—meaningful and effective interagency planning? For example, interagency planning began just two months

²² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Joint Pub 5-00.2 (Washington, D.C.: 13 January 1999), IX-30.

prior to the kickoff of OIF and the recommendations detailed in the State Department's "Future of Iraq" project, "which had anticipated many of the problems that emerged after the invasion," were largely ignored.²³

It can be argued that current joint doctrine sufficiently addresses the importance of formulating military objectives and courses of action directly related and in support of the desired end-state—the issue is that it is simply not being followed. Certainly, a review of joint planning doctrinal publications reveals extensive coverage of early interagency planning and the importance of an understanding of the desired end-state.²⁴

Additionally, JP 3-08 is a two-volume publication dedicated to interagency coordination and planning, with organizational information planning at the operational level, steps to developing and maintaining interagency coordination, and an appendix which describes US government agencies.²⁵ However, these publications were last updated from two to nine years ago; JP 3-08 was last updated in October, 1996. None of these publications reflect recent organizational changes within DoD or DoS.

Furthermore, if the issue is that guidance is simply not being followed, this would indicate either 1) DoD planners are ignoring requirements, 2) planners are unable to see—or refuse to see—the requirements for a stability and reconstruction commitment from the military, or 3) doctrinal planning guidance is so vague that it is at once all and nothing in terms of providing useful direction for planners. The latter two seem to be valid in combination. Thus, cultural, organizational, and doctrinal change is essential.

²³ Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2004): 36.

²⁴ See JP 3-0, 3-08, 5-00 series, and JOPES.

²⁵ See JP 3-08, Volumes I and II.

BUILDING THE STATE OF IRAQ

The lack of planning for phase IV operations has been well documented.²⁶ Planning that took place was based, in large part, on faulty assumptions. An examination of state institutional requirements reveals myriad potential lessons learned. These lessons clearly indicate a need for planning doctrinal changes.

First, without security, all other attempts at state-building soon “grind to a halt.”²⁷ Post-conflict security challenges in Iraq were grossly underestimated. Iraq military and police forces did not remain intact for use in phase IV law enforcement and security. One of the first steps taken by Paul Bremer as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was to disband the Iraqi army. Had there been unity of effort among the CPA and coalition forces, this action would not have been the surprise it, in fact, was to coalition forces. Coalition forces had actually co-opted much of the Iraqi armed forces in an agreement for the Iraqis to put down their arms. The result of the CPA’s action, as we have seen, has been many thousands of unemployed young men available for recruitment by insurgents.

Additionally, the military protects workers who travel with the armed forces or who work on military projects. However, there are many contractors working for nonmilitary agencies (such as USAID), any of the thousands of NGOs, or on their own. As these agencies or groups hire their own security forces, the coalition has been faced with not only the problem of how to integrate or coordinate these private security forces with military forces, but also distinguishing “friend” from “foe.”

Many questions arise with this particular security issue. What level of coordination is needed? Who are the points of contact? What level of communication intra-theater is

²⁶ See Crocker. See also Cordesman, The Iraq War and The War After the War.

²⁷ Diamond, 37.

needed? Also, if the contractor lacks knowledge of the society or lacks the ability to communicate with local leaders, how will the procurement of local workers take place? If the specific contractor lacks any of these skills, this tasking, by default, will fall on the military. In fact, it did during OIF; communication with local tribal leaders, in many cases, was done by coalition forces.

As a final security issue, the “massive looting spree [which took place] in the first few weeks after Baghdad fell”²⁸ seemed to catch the military by surprise. This unpreparedness was a critical error which resulted in the loss of priceless antiquities, damaged coalition legitimacy, further destruction of valuable infrastructure, and empowerment to criminal elements and enterprises.

Second, the rule of law implies that courts must be formed under a constitution; courts must be empowered to settle disputes over articles of constitution, electoral issues, and civil/criminal matters; and a legal framework for monitoring economy is established and enforced. “The United States was too slow to bring in civilian experts, relying for too long on coalition military forces to restart Iraq’s justice system,” even though experts had recommended a rapid reaction “justice package,” which would “include lawyers, judges, police officers and prison officials.”²⁹ Criminals had also been released from jails by Saddam before OIF, yet another event catching the coalition off-guard.

Several options were available to potentially prevent the legitimacy-sapping events at the Abu Ghraib prison, as well. While it cannot be certain that abuse could have completely been prevented, having on hand professional corrections officers in large numbers would

²⁸ Bathsbeba N. Crocker, “Iraq: Going It Alone, Gone Wrong,” in Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 268.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 279-280.

have reduced the opportunity for the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners. A more aggressive approach could have been to raze the prison and build, in its place, a more modern facility. This could have been used as a symbol to the Iraqi populous to gain credibility for the coalition. Without prior planning and knowledge of the cultural meaning and impact of Abu Ghraib, or other prisons like it, neither of these potentially positive possibilities took place.

Third, while an Iraqi central bank was established, as well as new currency, economic activity was suppressed by insecurity due to the insurgency. Furthermore, the aforementioned disbanding of the Iraqi army resulted in hundreds of thousands of unemployed former soldiers, further depressing an already depressed economy. Additionally, “at the CPA’s direction, the Iraqi Governing council decided to implement a series of sweeping economic reforms, including allowing for the direct foreign ownership of Iraq’s assets.”³⁰ While the intent was to provide a jump-start to the Iraqi economy, this attempt further indicated a lack of cultural understanding in that there is a traditional “resistance to outside ownership of Iraqi property and enterprises.”³¹

Fourth, there was much disagreement as to the question of the shape of the new Iraqi government following the removal of Saddam. Disagreements among DoS and DoD and a lack of direction of the CPA “resulted in a widespread belief—in Iraq and elsewhere—that the United States had no plans for post-war Iraq.”³² The only reason for this confusion to have been the case is lack of prior planning and coordination. The intent of the operation was to remove Saddam and create a democratic government in its place. If this is a desired end-state, the plan must contain processes for establishing electoral rules; ensuring political

³⁰ Crocker, 279.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., 273.

freedom of the populous; establishing a system for over-seeing actions of political parties and civil organizations; and developing a truly free press and other media outlets.

Finally, the so-called de-Ba'athification has resulted in the loss of all local experience with operating and maintaining infrastructure. This effort to completely dissolve the Saddam regime was conducted too rigidly. "Senior officials and officers were excluded from the nation-building effort simply because of rank and Ba'ath membership, rather than screening on a person-by-person basis."³³ Indeed, the coalition is recognizing—nearly two years into the operation—that there is a distinct difference between those who are now being referred to as "Former Regime Elements" and simply a former member of the Ba'ath party. This profound error has not only increased the level of difficulty for shoring up Iraqi infrastructure but increases the timeline for coalition involvement.

There are many unique characteristics of OIF: the sheer scale of effort required; the choice to act "virtually unilaterally" during conflict as well as stability and reconstruction operations; near total reliance on the military for all phases of the operation; and the level of use of private contractors during the "postwar phase...rather than the usual assortment of U.S. and foreign government agencies, international organizations, [and] NGOs..."³⁴ These characteristics indicated a need for a unique level of interagency planning.

Some would argue interagency coordination was sufficient and effective prior to OIF. For instance, by late 2002, the number of no-strike areas on the military's target list had grown to "thousands" through the coordination between USAID, UN agencies, NGOs, and DoD

³³ Cordesman, *The Iraq War*, p. 503.

³⁴ Crocker, 263-265.

planners. Indeed, President Bush is quoted to have stated that “[t]here are a lot of things that could go wrong [with the humanitarian aid], but not for want of planning.”³⁵

Although an unarguably critical step to enable efficient and effective humanitarian aid efforts—a crisis which, in fact, did not occur—this particular planning was simply to mitigate the danger of blue-on-blue attacks. However, this was accomplished by distributing contact information to relief agencies for their use in submitting nominations for the no-strike list.³⁶ While the result of these particular efforts was the successful avoidance of friendly areas during strikes, stand-off coordination and planning cannot be expected to result in smooth or effective execution throughout all phases of the operation. Indeed, operational execution has been anything but smooth; the level of effectiveness remains to be seen.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Without concurrent improvements in joint planning doctrine, the advantages envisaged through organizational changes within DoS and DoD can not be realized. While joint planning doctrine does address the importance of interagency involvement and coordination as well as the established (although some would say idealized) interagency relationships, much of this guidance is vague. Additionally, and indeed more importantly, the coordinating structures do not currently exist to maximize the level of agency interaction required for stability and reconstruction operations. Several changes are recommended.

First, the guidance provided in joint publications for planning joint operations—JP 3-0, JP 3-08 series, JP 5-00 series, and JOPES—lacks continuity. Update periods for these publications range from 1995 to 2002. All planning related publications require guidance continuity, accuracy of information, and should reflect current organizational realities. While

³⁵ Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster 2004), 278.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 277.

it may indeed be difficult to update these publications in concert, this is required in order to achieve continuity among the planning effort, not to mention continuity throughout execution.

Second, the deliberate planning process and Crisis Action Planning process outlined in JOPES lags the requirements implied in the NSS. The current JOPES deliberate planning process culminates with the creation of supporting plans. It is at this time that political-military plans are produced to be used in interagency planning. This flow should be immediately adjusted to reflect the development of the political-military plan during phase three, the plan development phase.³⁷

Additionally, the six-phase CAP process does not reflect the use and importance of interagency mechanisms. Recommended action requirements include:

- Phase 1 (Situation Development) – Coordinate via JIACG with appropriate civilian agencies in establishing cultural and conflict background knowledge and information.
- Phase 2 (Crisis Assessment) – Expand coordination to ensure unity of effort between COCOM planners and OCRS, establish a clear and understandable desired end-state, and gather intelligence to understand the potential level of stability and reconstruction effort required, detailed by state institution.
- Phase 3 (Course of Action (COA) Development) – Course of action development should be undertaken “regressively.” That is, through civilian-military coordination, 1) Identify the desired effect or problem, 2) Identify the needed skill-set, 3) Identify agency possessing the particular skill-set, and 4) Integrate agency representative into planning process.

³⁷ See JOPES.

- Phase 4 (Course of Action Selection) – Provide complete political-military plan to POTUS/SECDEF for use in COA selection. Maintain interagency coordination via JIACG, OCRS, and identified civilian/NGO representatives.
- Phase 5 (Execution Planning) – Incorporate civilian movement into movement requirements for coordination purposes. Continue to monitor situation to ensure desired end-state remains achievable through selected COA.
- Phase 6 (Execution) – Maintain interagency coordination; re-locate JIACG for use intra-theater; expand JIACG to include contracting agency NGO representatives.

Third, JOPES should be adjusted to delineate a regressive approach to planning joint operations, specifically during the development of courses of action, as outlined above. Leadership and planners should expect at least some level of stability and reconstruction requirement for every conflict. A detailed, civil-military examination of all state institutional elements should be conducted at the outset of planning. Therefore, JIACGs must be integrated into joint planning doctrine. Utilization of these groups for civilian-military coordination should be the central theme throughout JOPES, beginning at the initial stages of planning.

Finally, JOPES—indeed all joint planning doctrine—also lags institutional changes and growth within the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS). This requires a thorough review and development of doctrine for maintaining unity of effort through the three phases of nation-building—development and deterrence, combat operations, and stability and reconstruction. The role of the military has expanded beyond “simply” fighting and winning our nation’s wars. The view of conflict should be expanded to include, as a core mission, stability and reconstruction.

Joint Vision 2020 describes the focus of DoD as full spectrum dominance throughout fighting and winning the nation's wars, peacetime engagement, and deterrence and conflict prevention.³⁸ Confusion in how to conduct and who should be tasked to conduct post-conflict hostilities can be cleared, in part, by expanding this triad to include stability and reconstruction operations.

CONCLUSION

There is a common thread among the aforementioned six nation-building efforts undertaken by the US in the last twelve years: the collapse of central state authority and thus security institutions, with the resulting vacuum filled by extremist elements. A recent Washington Quarterly article pointed out that “the highest risk of political crisis lies...in autocracies with some political competition and in nominal democracies with factional competition and/or dominant chief executives. These types of regimes appear most vulnerable to the outbreak of large-scale violence, anti-democratic coups, and state collapse.”³⁹ *This is what is created through regime change, at least in the short term.* If we choose to undertake operations in support of the spread of democracy, this “vulnerability” should be planned for and should not catch anyone by surprise.

Integral to the plan is managing or harnessing the tension created through the inherent cultural differences of personnel within DoS and DoD. Certainly, neither organization can plan or operate in a vacuum, ignoring the council of the experience based exactly in these cultural differences. The military should continue to get lighter, faster, more lethal, and more accurate—for use during combat. However, along with this is a need for a capability to

³⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, D.C., 2000), 2.

³⁹ Jack A. Goldstone and Jay Ulfelder, “How to Construct Stable Democracies,” The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2004/05): 17.

effectively operate during the long period following “combat.” Improved doctrinal guidance, along with the current adjustments to force structure and capability, will meet this need.

In Iraq, the expected large-scale humanitarian emergency never materialized; coalition forces were not greeted with “flowers and sweets”⁴⁰ as expected; through dissolution on their own as well as the coalition, Iraqi military and police forces did not remain intact for “use in post-conflict law enforcement, security, and rebuilding needs”;⁴¹ and the level of degradation of basic service infrastructure and petroleum production was severely underestimated. This gaping seam between combat and reconstruction could well have been mitigated through cooperative civilian-military planning via solid joint planning doctrine.

⁴⁰ Woodward, 259.

⁴¹ Crocker, 267.

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