

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) (14-02-2005)		2. REPORT TYPE <p style="text-align: center;">FINAL</p>		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Role of Islam in Winning Hearts and Minds in Iraq				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) LCDR James M. Edwards, Jr. CHC, USNR Paper Advisor (if Any): CDR Peter Dutton, JAGC, USN				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT The United States is involved in a counter insurgency effort in Iraq. The commander should understand concepts of warfare within Islamic tradition, and be able to identify similarities and differences to the way Americans carry out military operations. Rules of Engagement, actions taken in accordance to the Law of War, and even the rationale for taking action can all be framed in terms that achieve United States Operational and Strategic objectives, but still reflect Islamic values and culture. The commander must find ways to communicate this information to the Iraqi people relying on a variety of means in order to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. In order to win the battle for the support of the population, the commander must communicate in a manner that resonates culturally and especially religiously with the Iraqi people.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Islam, insurgency, Law of War, Iraq					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 16	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI**

THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS IN IRAQ

By

**James M. Edwards, Jr.
LCDR, CHC, USNR**

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

(14 February 2005)

**Commander Peter Dutton, JAGC. USN
Faculty Advisor**

Abstract

THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS IN IRAQ

The United States is involved in a counter insurgency effort in Iraq. The commander should understand concepts of warfare within Islamic tradition, and be able to identify similarities and differences to the way Americans carry out military operations. Rules of Engagement, actions taken in accordance to the Law of War, and even the rationale for taking action can all be framed in terms that achieve United States operational and strategic objectives, but still reflect Islamic values and culture. The commander must find ways to communicate this information to the Iraqi people relying on a variety of means in order to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. In order to win the battle for the support of the population, the commander must communicate in a manner that resonates culturally and especially religiously with the Iraqi people.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Public Opinion, the Center of Gravity	2
Islam and <i>Jihad</i>	3
Law of War and Islamic Teaching	5
Democratic Motives and Islam	8
Islam Friendly Information Operations	9
Counter-arguments	11
Recommendations to the Commander	13
Conclusion	16
Endnotes	17
Bibliography	20

The Role of Islam in Winning Hearts and Minds in Iraq

Cultural and religious ignorance of allies and enemies negatively impact coalition coherence, mask enemy and expose friendly centers of gravity, delay or deter operational success, and influence conflict termination...

-Colonel Calvin M. Swain Jr., USMC¹

Introduction

Whether or not United States forces were prepared for an insurgency in Iraq, they have been dealing with one since the summer of 2003 to a greater or lesser degree. When dealing with insurgents it is crucial that the forces utilized have a solid understanding of the culture in which the insurgency exists. “The center of gravity in counterinsurgency warfare is the target nation’s population, not the insurgent forces. Key to defeating an insurgent movement is winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population.”² In fighting the war for hearts and minds the commander needs to be aware of public opinion and deny public support for the insurgents while gaining support for coalition forces. The United States has not been winning the war for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. One of the reasons for this is a lack of knowledge of the culture.

A major component of Iraqi culture is the religion Islam. Lieutenant Colonel William Wunderle US Army, Middle East Foreign Area Officer, argues that “we need to improve our capacity to understand foreign cultures and societies.”³ The commander should understand concepts of warfare within Islamic tradition and be able to identify similarities to the way Americans carry out military operations. Rules of Engagement, actions taken in accordance to the Law of War, and even the rationale for taking action can all be framed in terms that achieve United States operational and strategic objectives, but still reflect Islamic values and culture. The commander must use a variety of resources to

communicate the similarities between the American methods and any relevant Islamic teaching in order to have a greater impact on the local population and gain support for coalition forces. In order to win the battle for the support of the population, the commander must communicate in a manner that resonates culturally and especially religiously with the Iraqi people.

Public Opinion, the Center of Gravity

The public opinion of the Iraqi people was critical to the mission of the Combined Joint Task Force 7. Public opinion in Iraq in early 2004 was reflected in a poll which had found “that 78.8 percent of Iraqis have little or no confidence in US and British forces.”⁴ One author concluded that “not only have coalition forces gained the title of being one of the most mistrusted institutions in Iraq, but they have failed in the summer, fall and winter of 2003 to rectify this precarious condition.”⁵ Another article from mid 2004 reported that “overall attitudes toward the United States and the Coalition Provisional Authority are extremely negative. Only 27 percent have a favorable opinion of the CPA, and just 23 percent have a favorable opinion of the United States.”⁶ While public opinion polls do vary and are not consistent throughout the 2003-2005 time period, a fair assessment of these various indices indicate that United States forces have not had a great deal of public support.

Winning the hearts and minds of the people is crucial for the Task Force Commander. The popular support of the Iraqis is the operational center of gravity of the insurgency. To attack the center of gravity, the commander needs to communicate to the Iraqi people in a way that resonates with the Islamic culture. Whether it is considered operational fires using Psychological Operations or it is considered Information Operations makes little difference if the popular support of the Iraqis can be gained. As long as the center of gravity is attacked

making full use of Islamic culture and tradition, popular support for the insurgents can be undermined. In order to accomplish this, Islamic teachings especially as they apply to warfare, need to be understood.

Islam and *Jihad*

Prior to discussing warfare in terms of Islam, it must be noted that Islam is not a monolithic religion. There is an extremely wide diversity of viewpoints held by Muslims concerning warfare and *jihad*. Exponents of a variety of viewpoints may all seek to base their arguments on the Quran and the historic teachings of Islam, but may arrive at very different conclusions. There are some within the extremist segments of Islam who do not hold many of the interpretations put forward in the following sections, but would instead use Islam to justify terrorism.⁷ The sources quoted below represent more moderate views, but these views are most appropriate when finding similarities with views held by the United States, and for use in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.

When discussing warfare in Islamic terms it is necessary to understand the historical context out of which the teachings come. Islam experienced warfare almost from its inception when the prophet was forced to leave Mecca. “Of the 27 battles in which Prophet Muhammad played a direct or indirect role, the first 18 defended the Muslims against the Meccans and the other nine he initiated against the Meccans and tribes in Arabia.”⁸ Following the death of the prophet Mohammed there were wars for the control of Islam between different sects. There were then the Crusades by the Europeans, and invasion by the Mongols, and further wars between Muslim leaders and their neighbors. In the 19th and 20th centuries there were wars against European colonial powers. There is disagreement among scholars as to whether or not warfare is endemic to Islam. Bernard Lewis argues that Islam is

perpetually in a “canonically obligatory state of war”⁹ with brief moments of truce. Hilmi Zawati differs from Lewis and argues that “peace is the rule and war is the exception in Islam.”¹⁰ Whether the exception or the rule, warfare has been prominent throughout the history of Islam.

In order to understand the Islamic framework for war and peace one must have at least a cursory knowledge of the term *jihad* and its various meanings. *Jihad* has been translated as “holy war” of which James Turner Johnson writes: “the term has the power to fire the blood, to cause passions to surge, to pump new life into otherwise dormant causes; conversely, the foreboding instilled by a threat of holy war can make the blood run cold and render the prudent timid.”¹¹ There is little doubt as to the volatility of the term *jihad*, but the problem lies in the various usages of the term. While the term has been used by Al-Qaeda as well as Saddam¹² as a rally cry against the United States, it is a complex term with a variety of meanings derived largely from the context in which it is used.

Jihad literally means struggle and can refer to a spiritual struggle as well as to warfare. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein gives an accurate and succinct discussion of *jihad*. “The requirement to participate in a *jihad* could be met in several ways: by waging war a) with the heart, b) with the tongue, c) with the hands, and d) with the sword. *Jihad* also means a personal struggle to live as a true Muslim.”¹³ Context is everything in discussions that relate to *jihad*.

With regard to warfare, there are teachings within the Quran, the hadiths (sayings of the prophet Mohammad), and the writings of important Islamic jurists that regulate the conduct of warfare in the Islamic context. Zawati writes:

Islamic international law recognizes that war, by its nature, implies violence and suffering. Therefore, as a highly practical and realistic law, it does not require

Muslim jihadists to love their enemies nor to receive them with damask roses, but, strictly, lays down humane rules governing the conduct of war, and the treatment of enemy persons and property. Limiting violence to the necessities of war, Islamic international law differentiates between combatants and civilians, as well as between military and civilian objects in time of war.¹⁴

These teachings can be important to the commander on the ground in Iraq. If the commander can apply these teachings to communicate the way in which the United States forces operate, the commander's words may carry more weight with the population. This is not to say that the commander should describe the forces as being part of Islam or that he seeks to justify all actions with quotations from the Quran. The commander can merely point out the actions of the forces are in accordance with United States law, International law, and may even be consistent with standards held within Islam. The commander should use images and language that reflect the cultural attitudes of the audience.

Law of War and Islamic Teaching

The United States military avoids causing unnecessary suffering in its use of force following established Rules of Engagement and in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict. The Law of War describes it in this way:

It is especially forbidden . . . to employ arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.” (HR, art. 23e.) This principle applies to the legality of weapons. Combatants may not use arms that are per se calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, sometimes referred to as superfluous injury (e.g., projectiles filled with glass, irregularly shaped bullets, dum-dum rounds, lances with barbed heads).¹⁵

Within Islamic teaching a parallel might be found in the prohibition of the use of poisoned weapons and certain prohibitions regarding beheading.¹⁶

A major focus for United States forces is the principle of discrimination and distinction in the use of force. This principle requires that combatants be distinguished from noncombatants, and that military objectives be distinguished from protected property or

protected places. Parties to a conflict shall direct their operations only against combatants and military objectives.¹⁷ Not only is it spelled out in the Law of War, but it was part of the Rules of Engagement during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM:

- c. Do not strike any of the following except in self-defense to protect yourself, your unit, friendly forces, and designated persons or property under your control:
 - Civilians
 - Hospitals, mosques, churches, shrines, schools, museums, national monuments, and any other historical and cultural sites.
- d. Do not fire into civilian populated areas or buildings unless the enemy is using them for military purposes or if necessary for your self-defense. Minimize collateral damage.¹⁸

Islamic teachings on the principle of discrimination are not significantly different from those used by the United States. There are prohibitions against the following:

- "• No killing of women, children, and innocents—these might include hermits, monks, or other religious leaders who were deemed noncombatants;
- No wanton killing of livestock and animals;
- No burning or destruction of trees and orchards; and,
- No destruction of wells."¹⁹

There were also protections in place for churches as Islam spread. Churches were usually respected as Islam spread into formerly Christian lands.²⁰ Again a parallel could be made in the way that mosques were not intentionally targeted as the United States' forces moved into Iraq (see the Rules of Engagement above).

A more complicated subject in terms of the Law of War has to do with Prisoners of War and enemy combatants. The Operational Law Handbook states that a legal combatant:

- (6) If captured, must be treated humanely; and
 - (7) If captured, is entitled to prisoner of war status.
- b. 1949 Geneva Conventions criteria (GPW, art. 4; GWS, art. 13.) Combatants include: the regular armed forces of a State Party to the conflict; militia, volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements belonging to a State Party to the conflict

that are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the laws of war; and members of armed forces of a government not recognized by a detaining authority or occupying power. This list is a summary, but is not intended to be comprehensive or complete. c. Unprivileged belligerents. Unprivileged belligerents may include spies, saboteurs, or civilians who are participating in the hostilities or who otherwise engage in unauthorized attacks or other combatant acts. Unprivileged belligerents are not entitled to prisoner of war status, and may be prosecuted under the domestic law of the captor.²¹

In light of Abu Ghraib, it may be a hard sell for the commander that the United States has consistently treated its prisoners according to United States laws let alone the parallels found within Islam. The best that can be done is to indicate that those responsible for the past abuses have been tried and punished, and show how today the detainees are being treated according to the Law of War and the teachings of Islam. Zawati describes the treatment of prisoners based on a modern Islamic document:

Article 7 (of the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights) also emphasized the right to protection against torture. It states that 'No person shall be subjected to torture in mind or body, or degraded, or threatened with injury either to himself or to anyone related to or held dear by him, or forcibly made to confess to the commission of a crime, or forced to consent to an act which is injurious to his interests.'²²

Islam Online, an Islamic website cites the teaching of modern Islamic jurists who write:

In Islam, manners and morals are part and parcel of the Islamic creed. It is for this reason that Islam **TOTALLY PROHIBITS** abusing, insulting and reviling any prisoner of war, let alone slaying him like a sheep! This is what is clarified by the late Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahrah, in his book *Concept of War in Islam*; it reads: 'Islam advocates clemency with captives. History has never known warriors so merciful to their captives as the early Muslims who followed the teachings of their religion. Numerous religious texts demand clemency with captives. Prisoners are usually taken when a battle is at its height and there is danger that rage may lead the victorious warriors to harm those who have been defeated in order to take revenge. The Prophet, however urged his followers to treat their captives with clemency. He said to them 'You are recommended to treat your captives kindly.'²³

Democratic Motives and Islam

For most of the ethical rules that govern the use of operational forces within the United States' context there are parallels to be found within Islam teachings, either in traditional teachings or in more modern documents. Even discussions of freedom and democracy can be discussed in language that might resonate with Muslims better than using an American model. Language regarding freedom can be found in the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights where the second right discussed is the right to freedom:

- a) Man is born free. No inroads shall be made on his right to liberty except under the authority and in due process of the Law.
- b) Every individual and every people has the inalienable right to freedom in all its forms-physical, cultural, economic, and political-and shall be entitled to struggle by all available means against any infringement or abrogation of this right; and every oppressed individual or people has a legitimate claim to the support of other individuals and/or peoples in such a struggle.²⁴

While this statement does have differences from United States concepts and in the 21st century, "struggle by all available means" may not accurately reflect western political thought, there are enough similarities that could allow for it to be useful at least in part.

Even one of the reasons for *jihad* is seen as the removal of an evil ruler following the precept that "no obedience to any creature is disobedience to the Creator."²⁵ Most Muslims are in agreement as to the character of Saddam Hussein and the need to remove him from power. Again, not only can the commander characterize the regime change in terms of self-defense of the United States and the security of the region, but can agree with Muslims as to the injustice of his reign in terms of any religion. The next task is how to put forth the message.

Islam Friendly Information Operations

The first course of action is to train the Iraqi police and military not only according to the International Law of Armed Conflict but also develop training that is culturally relevant to the Muslim soldiers and police. The Coalition Military Assistance Training Teams are training the soldiers “in human rights and the law of land warfare.”²⁶ If they incorporate Islamic sources along with traditional United States and International sources in the training, this might reflect positively on the United States’ effort.

Insights into how coalition forces conduct themselves consistent with Islamic culture are crucial. The troops on the ground who have daily contact with Iraqis need to receive training including the nuances of Islamic culture, and be able to show respect for that culture in both word and deed.

Psychological Operations produce information for distribution in all phases of an operation. One commentator wrote recently regarding psychological operations in post-combat Iraq, “The end result is that, regardless of who wins the firefights, our enemies win one psychological victory after another. In a type of war where the moral and mental levels far outweigh the physical level, it is not hard to see where that road ends.”²⁷ Psychological Operations that resonate with the people because the images and language are from their Islamic tradition are key. The Psychological Operations component has used newspaper and radio to get the word out. “Trust is vital to accomplishing our mission. We do not want to break the trust between the people and us”, said Capt. Ian Clunies-Ross Commander of the portable radio station outside of Fallujah.²⁸ Trust would come faster if the truth that they put forward was framed within the Islamic culture.

Along with the Psychological Warfare communications, the commander may utilize the Iraqi media and even Aljazeera to communicate to the Iraqis. This is not without pitfalls, since Aljazeera has historically had an anti-American bias. Despite the bias, Aljazeera is a powerful news source throughout the Muslim world and any viewpoint that a commander could disseminate that resonated with a Muslim audience could be effective assuming that it was not too badly edited.

The internet is another way of putting forth a positive message in a culturally relevant manner. Aljazeera has a website that gives a less than favorable view of the United States. Islam Online quotes Muslim leaders and news sources, most of whom are openly antagonistic to the actions of the United States. Many of the Islamic radicals also have their own websites. New websites could be used or existing sites might be influenced if the message was culturally relevant. If done using Psychological Operations as operational fires or viewed as Information Warfare, all media resources can be exploited.

The most effective method of describing our action in terms of Islamic culture would be to have moderate Imams or Mullahs speak out in favor of the conduct of United States' forces. If an Imam described the United States treatment of prisoners as being consistent with Islam, that would go a long way to move beyond the Abu Ghraib fiasco and help coalition forces gain legitimacy in the Muslim world. One Muslim religious leader, Sheikh Faysal Mawlawi, Deputy Chairman of the European Council for Fatwa and Research wrote "This (removing the dictator) may be possible if we are really convinced that the American invaders will help the Iraqis remove the ruling regime and that they will give freedom to the Iraqis."²⁹ Unfortunately this Sheikh was not convinced and doubted the motives of the United States. If several Iraqi religious leaders would speak out in favor of United States military

actions, that would be a major step toward winning popular support. This is especially important since the religious leaders are trusted more than any other group in Iraq.³⁰

Counter-arguments

There are several potential counter arguments to why framing United States military operations in a style that might appeal to Muslims may not be effective. One possible reason is that some view modern Islamic thought to be inherently anti-American. While this may be true of “Islamist” sects and some Islamic fundamentalists, there are within Islam moderate positions with viewpoints that are favorable to the United States. There are some voices giving some support to the United States even from within Iraq. “Iraqi President, Ghazi al-Yawer, a Sunni Muslim, said while coalition forces had made some mistakes during their tenure in Iraq, their contribution to Iraq has been positive. “...to be fair...I think all in all it was positive, the contribution of the foreign forces in Iraq”, al-Yawer said. “It was worth it.”³¹ There has also been at least one *fatwa* (teaching by a religious leader) by the Ayatollah Ali Sistani of Najaf that was favorable to the United States.³² While there are a majority of voices coming out of Islam who are opposed to the United States, it is not inherent to Islam itself. Building on small successes in the popular opinion of Iraqi Muslims may even help to gain popular support and undermine support for the insurgents.

Some might argue that focusing on religion is not relevant to winning the hearts and minds. This argument is very ethnocentric and assumes that the role of religion is the same in the Muslim world as it is in the United States. Too often United States personnel are guilty of mirror imaging in terms of the role of religion in their own culture where the separation of church and state has been a major factor especially during the last 40 years.³³

Studying Islam presents an intellectual challenge to Americans. Muslims generally regard unity of politics and religion as the ideal and, therefore, mix faith

and war together. American political tradition, on the other hand, enshrines the clear separation of church and state. Americans are by nature skeptical of religion intruding into politics.³⁴

For most Muslims today and throughout their history this has not been the case. In

Lieutenant Colonel William Wunderle's cultural brief he explains:

The West: The basic unit of human organization is the nation. In American usage, this is virtually synonymous with country. This is then subdivided in various ways, one of which is by religion.

Muslims: Tend to see not a nation subdivided into religious groups, but a religion subdivided into nations. Islam is not so much a religion as a form of life, not so much a theological system as a pattern for personal and social conduct based on an active consciousness of God.³⁵

Ninety-seven percent of the Iraqi people are Muslim,³⁶ and while religion is not the only cultural factor that the commander must take into consideration in order to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, it is a dominant cultural factor in Iraq.

One of the dangers in using quotes from Islamic tradition is that the commander may be perceived as veiling imperialism in the shroud of Islam. This has the potential of offending people and giving support to the insurgents. In order to avoid giving offense, the commander must have Iraqi Muslims, including some clerics, who will give the necessary feedback to the commander. It would be better yet if they would make the statements instead of the commander.

Some might argue that there is no reason to appeal to the religious aspect of the Iraqi culture because Iraq has been one of the most secular nations in the Middle East. Iraq is still 97% Muslim³⁷ and even Saddam Hussein who was known as a secularist, framed his call to arms in Islamic terms.³⁸ Because the Iraqis may appear more "western" than other nations in the Middle East is no reason to believe that Islam is any less a part of the culture. The popularity of the Shiite political parties indicates the religious sentiment of a large portion of

the population. Descriptions of events by average Iraqis are often put in a religious context such as this statement. "It's not the man who exploded himself who's a martyr," Mr. Jasim said as the body washer wiped away dried blood. "He wasn't a true Muslim. This is the martyr. What religion asks people to blow themselves up? It's not written in the Koran."³⁹ While it may be correct to say that Iraq is more “western” than some other Middle East countries, it is no less Muslim.

A final criticism of the premise of this paper is that there are no reliable metrics to measure the effects of the above mentioned Information Operations that use Islamic images and language. One could look to public opinion polls, but those have many variables that could influence the results. This criticism is valid in that there are no established metrics to measure the effectiveness of such operations; however, it is obvious what happens when the United States forces conduct operations in a manner which is offensive to Islamic culture. The Abu-Ghraib fiasco is the most obvious example of this. Still, this criticism has validity and some type of metrics will have to be established, probably using some type of polling procedures.

Recommendations to the Commander

1. *Locate experts on Islamic culture, history and law.* It is easy to move forward in operations that make complete sense within the American framework but that may deeply offend Muslims. An example of this might be the treatment of detainees. While nothing that the United States troops have done is in any way comparable to the treatment of prisoners under Hussein or the treatment of prisoners by the insurgents, they may still be treating detainees in ways that are demeaning to Muslims, especially regarding nudity in the presence

of females. While nudity is not uncommon in United States prisons, an expert on Islamic culture might be able to inform the commander as to how this would be viewed by Iraqis.

2. *Train the troops on the ground.* While classes in culture are part of the briefs that United States military forces receive prior to entering Iraq, much more could be done with forces who will have contact with Iraqis. A hundred positive acts can be offset in public opinion by one culturally insensitive act. Many unit Chaplains have received some training in the Muslim religion and culture and may augment the local experts in order to provide the appropriate level of training.

3. *Use all media outlets available to engender the support of the Iraqi people.* As mentioned above, Psychological Operations, Information Warfare, or just Public Affairs need to be used to communicate the good that the United States forces are doing in a culturally relevant manner. News that counters the support of the insurgency locally or Islamist fundamentalism regionally, must be disseminated. Lieutenant Colonel McClanahan argues: “Infrequently there are useful editorials written by respected clerics and liberal Muslim intellectuals that are pro-US and/or anti-bin Laden. It would be in the US’ best interests to ensure these articles get maximum visibility by passing the editorials on to other Muslim web pages and newspapers.”⁴⁰ The Islamic fundamentalists make great use of the media in order to spread anti-American information and undermine the United States forces’ public support in Iraq and throughout the Islamic world. The commander must wage warfare via the media if the enemy’s center of gravity, popular support, is to be attacked.

4. *Develop relationships with Imams, Ayatollahs, and other respected Islamic scholars and media personnel who will speak out in favor of the United States actions when appropriate.* Lieutenant Colonel McClanahan suggests that “the most influential Muslim

opinion shapers are media spokespersons, religious leaders and scholars.”⁴¹ These people can give legitimacy to the policies and actions of the United States forces, and help to gain the support of the local population. They will naturally communicate to the people within the Islamic framework.

5. *Highlight when possible the just actions of the United States in contrast to the unjust actions of the insurgents.* Take note when the insurgents blatantly violate Islamic teachings and tradition as they carry out their attacks, and in the way they treat prisoners. Take special note of how they treat women, fellow Muslims, and children since there are clear prohibitions against their mistreatment. Without saying that United States’ personnel are better Muslims than the insurgents, discuss the actions in terms of justice being sensitive to Islamic teaching in this area. Again rely on local experts to help formulate such statements, and it would be better yet if a Muslim spokesperson could disseminate such information.

6. *Emphasize that most of the American forces are “people of the book” and by tradition are not the same as “infidels” due to the similarities between Islam and Christianity.* This may be uncomfortable for many military personnel since the United States by tradition seeks to keep religion out of the governmental arena. Lieutenant Commander Aboul-Ennein writes

It is crucial that Muslims defuse modern radical efforts to categorize Christians and Jews as enemies who are essentially no different than polytheists. It is most important to address and revise the presence of such ideas in educational materials, lectures and sermons, and in fact, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s efforts to rein in and reform these products hopefully will ameliorate these attitudes as a part of the reformation of *jihadi* worldviews.⁴²

Any way that the commander can build on the similarities between Iraqis and the United States forces can help in the arena of public opinion.

Conclusion

Within the context of military operations other than war, such as counter insurgency and stabilization operations, military might is not always the most important factor. While security is necessary for the reconstruction of Iraqi society, it may not be the highest priority even for the military commander. In order for the insurgency to be defeated, public support for the insurgents must be denied and undercut. Public support is the center of gravity that must be “attacked” in order to destroy the insurgency. Without the Maoist pond of public support, the insurgency will wither in the desert sun. This center of gravity is not attacked with tanks and mortars, but by good works and good words. The words used to explain the conduct of United States military personnel must be culturally relevant for there to be understanding and trust with the Iraqi people. United States personnel must have some understanding of the Islamic context in which they serve. This applies not only in Iraq, but throughout the Muslim world. Their language and actions must reflect a respect for and knowledge of Islam.

The way in which the United States conducts itself in war is consistent with many Islamic teachings. It must therefore be explained in those terms as well as in more traditional ways such as the Law of War and Rules of Engagement. If these concepts as well as other concepts related to the motives of the United States can be expressed within the Islamic framework, then Iraqi public support may be won leaving the insurgents vulnerable. United States’ forces can build on the good will generated by the Iraqi elections. By avoiding further incidents like Abu Ghraib, they will gain public support as they continue to respect the rich Islamic traditions of the Iraqi people.

ENDNOTES

¹ Wunderle, William, powerpoint presentation "Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: Planning Requirements in Wielding the Instruments of National Power," prepared for a brief given 17 November 2004 sent by Captain David Kornatz on 11 January 2005, slide 74.

² Krepinavich, Andrew, "First in a Series The War in Iraq: The Nature of Insurgency Warfare," 2 June 2004, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, <<http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/B.20040602.NatofInsurge/B.20040602.NatofInsurge.pdf>> [10 February 2005], 1.

³ Wunderle, William, powerpoint presentation "Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: Planning Requirements in Wielding the Instruments of National Power," prepared for a brief given 17 November 2004 sent by Captain David Kornatz on 11 January 2005, slide 15.

⁴ Marquardt, Erich, "Iraq in Transition," Iraqis' Hearts and Minds, 28 January 2004. <http://www.islamonline.net/english/In_Depth/Iraq_Aftermath/2004/01/article_17.shtml> [8 February 2005]

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Carpenter, Ted Galen, "More Iraq Hawk Myths Bite the Dust," 18 May 2004, The Cato Institute, <<http://www.cato.org/dailys/05-18-04.html>> [8 February 2005].

⁷ Gawrych, George W, "Jihad, War, and Terrorism," 9 April 2004, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, <<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/csi/research/writing/JihadGawrych.asp>> [1 February 2005].

⁸ Aboul-Enein, Youssef H. and Sherifa Zuhur, "Islamic Rulings on Warfare," (Monograph, U. S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA: 2004), Received electronically from Commander Peter Dutton on 7 December 2004, 16.

⁹ Lewis, Bernard, "The Revolt of Islam," The New Yorker. 19 November 2001, Vol.77, Iss. 36. ProQuest, New York, (1 February 2005).

¹⁰ Zawati, Hilmi M, Is Jihad a Just War?: War, Peace, and Human Rights under Islamic and Public Law, (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen, 2001), 12.

¹¹ Johnson, James T, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 29.

¹² Gawrych.

¹³ Aboul-Enein and Zuhur, 4.

¹⁴ Zawati, Hilmi M, Is Jihad a Just War?: War, Peace, and Human Rights under Islamic and Public Law, (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen, 2001), 41.

¹⁵ Berger, Joseph B. III, Derek Grimes, and Eric T. Jensen, eds., Operational Law Handbook (2004), <<http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/law2004.pdf>> [1 December 2004], 14.

¹⁶ Zawati, 43.

¹⁷ Berger, Grimes, and Jensen, 15.

¹⁸ Berger, Joseph B. III, Derek Grimes, and Eric T. Jensen, eds., Operational Law Handbook (2004), <<http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/law2004.pdf>> [1 December 2004], 96.

¹⁹ Aboul-Enein and Zuhur, 22.

²⁰ Zawati, Hilmi M, Is Jihad a Just War?: War, Peace, and Human Rights under Islamic and Public Law, (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen, 2001), 99.

²¹ Berger, Grimes, and Jensen, 16-17.

²² Zawati, 92.

²³ Islam Online: Bank of Fatwas, "Islam's Stance on Prisoners of War," 1 June 2003, <<http://www.islamonline.net/fatwa/english/FatwaDisplay.asp?hFatwaID=55158>> [28 January 2005].

²⁴ Zawati, Hilmi M, Is Jihad a Just War?: War, Peace, and Human Rights under Islamic and Public Law, (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen, 2001), 135.

²⁵ Zawati, 30.

²⁶ Eaton, Paul, "Department of Defense Briefing," 21 January 2004, <<http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2004/tr20040121-1181.html>> [1 December 2004].

²⁷ Lind, William S, "Psyops In Fourth Generation War," 25 May 2004, <http://www.Military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Lind_052504,00.html> [1 February 2005]

²⁸ Carmack, Justin, "Psyop Begins Broadcast in Al Fallujah," Desert Rifles, 15 August 2003, Issue 15, 350th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, <www.3acr.com/DR%20Issue%2015.pdf> [1 February 2005], 1.

²⁹ Islam Online: Bank of Fatwas, "Overthrowing an Oppressive Ruler," 29 April 2003, <<http://www.islamonline.net/fatwa/english/FatwaDisplay.asp?hFatwaID=97509>> [28 January 2005].

³⁰ Dunnigan, James, "Shocking Results of Iraqi Public Opinion Poll," 19 March 2004, <<http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/2004319.asp>> [8 February 2005].

³¹ Hunter, Melanie, "News This Hour," 1 February 2005, <<http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewFlash.asp?=%5CthisHour%5Carchive%5CNTH20050201z.html>> [8 February 2005].

³² Kurzman, Charles, "EXCERPT: Pro-U.S. Fatwas," Middle East Policy Council Journal Volume X, Fall 2003, Number 3, <http://www.mepc.org/public_asp/journal_vol10/0309_kurzman.asp> [12 February 2005].

³³ Robinson, B. A., "Introduction to the Principle of Separation of Church and State," 15 January 2005, <http://www.religioustolerance.org/scs_intr.htm> [1 February 2005].

³⁴ Gawrych.

³⁵ Wunderle, slide 25.

³⁶ Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2002: Iraq, 7 October 2002, <<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/RIs/irf/2002/13996.htm>> [8 February 2005].

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Gawrych.

³⁹ Wong, Edward, "Iraqis Who Died While Daring to Vote Are Mourned as Martyrs," 2 February 2005, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/02/international/middleeast/02najaf.html?ex=1265086800&en=b646ee12bb20d3bd&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt>> [8 February 2005].

⁴⁰ McClanahan, Jack R, "America's Information War on Terrorism: Winning Hearts and Minds In the Muslim World," (Strategic Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: 2002), 25.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Aboul-Enein and Zuhur, 21.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aboul-Enein, Youssef H. and Sherifa Zuhur. "Islamic Rulings on Warfare." Monograph, U. S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA. 2004. Received electronically from Commander Peter Dutton on 7 December 2004.
- Berger, Joseph B. III, Derek Grimes, and Eric T. Jensen, eds., Operational Law Handbook (2004). <<http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/law2004.pdf>> [1 December 2004].
- Carmack, Justin. "Psyop Begins Broadcast in Al Fallujah." Desert Rifles. 15 August 2003. Issue 15. 350th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment. <www.3acr.com/DR%20Issue%2015.pdf> [1 February 2005]
- Carpenter, Ted Galen. "More Iraq Hawk Myths Bite the Dust." 18 May 2004. The Cato Institute. <<http://www.cato.org/dailys/05-18-04.html>> [8 February 2005].
- Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. International Religious Freedom Report 2002: Iraq. 7 October 2002. <<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/RIs/irf/2002/13996.htm>> [8 February 2005].
- Dunnigan, James. "Shocking Results of Iraqi Public Opinion Poll." 19 March 2004. <<http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/2004319.asp>> [8 February 2005].
- Eaton, Paul. "Department of Defense Briefing." 21 January 2004. <<http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2004/tr20040121-1181.html>> [1 December 2004].
- Gawrych, George W. "Jihad, War, and Terrorism." 9 April 2004. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Combat Studies Institute. <<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/csi/research/writing/JihadGawrych.asp>> [1 February 2005].
- Hunter, Melanie. "News This Hour." 1 February 2005. <<http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewFlash.asp?=%5CthisHour%5Carchive%5CNTH20050201z.html>> [8 February 2005].
- Islam Online: Bank of Fatwas. "Islam's Stance on Prisoners of War." 1 June 2003. <<http://www.islamonline.net/fatwa/english/FatwaDisplay.asp?hFatwaID=55158>> [28 January 2005].
- Islam Online: Bank of Fatwas. "Overthrowing an Oppressive Ruler." 29 April 2003. <<http://www.islamonline.net/fatwa/english/FatwaDisplay.asp?hFatwaID=97509>> [28 January 2005].

- Johnson, James T. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.
- Krepinavich, Andrew. "First in a Series The War in Iraq: The Nature of Insurgency Warfare." 2 June 2004. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. <<http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/B.20040602.NatofInsurge/B.20040602.NatofInsurge.pdf>> [10 February 2005].
- Kurzman, Charles. "EXCERPT: Pro-U.S. Fatwas." Middle East Policy Council Journal Volume X, Fall 2003, Number 3. <http://www.mepec.org/public_asp/journal_vol10/0309_kurzman.asp> [12 February 2005].
- Lewis, Bernard. "The Revolt of Islam." The New Yorker. 19 November 2001, Vol.77, Iss. 36. ProQuest. New York. (1 February 2005)
- Lind, William S. "Psyops In Fourth Generation War." 25 May 2004. <http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Lind_052504,00.html> [1 February 2005]
- Marquardt, Erich. "Iraq in Transition." Iraqis' Hearts and Minds. 28 January 2004. <http://www.islamonline.net/english/In_Depth/Iraq_Aftermath/2004/01/article_17.shtml> [8 February 2005]
- McClanahan, Jack R. "America's Information War on Terrorism: Winning Hearts and Minds In the Muslim World." Strategic Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: 2002
- Robinson, B. A. "Introduction to the Principle of Separation of Church and State." 15 January 2005. <http://www.religioustolerance.org/scs_intr.htm> [1 February 2005]
- Wong, Edward. Iraqis Who Died While Daring to Vote Are Mourned as Martyrs. 2 February 2005. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/02/international/middleeast/02najaf.html?ex=1265086800&en=b646ee12bb20d3bd&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt>> [8 February 2005]
- Wunderle, William powerpoint presentation "Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: Planning Requirements in Wielding the Instruments of National Power" prepared for a brief given 17 November 2004.
- Zawati, Hilmi M. Is Jihad a Just War?: War, Peace, and Human Rights under Islamic and Public Law. Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen, 2001.