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**Operational Art in Transition:**  
**Engagement Recommendations for Stabilization Activities**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## **Abstract**

The recent publication of Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Joint Operating Concept was designed to establish the framework for the successful transition of military combat operations to the establishment of a viable civil government. This paper addresses the physical and social challenges which may be encountered during this phase of military operations by contrasting historical and current operational examples to anticipate changes required to military force structure and identify the requirements for effective engagement with the other elements of U.S. Government Agencies, Non-Government Organizations and the International Community.

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## **Introduction**

There are many multifaceted difficulties encountered during the transition of military operations from kinetic combat to post hostilities stabilization activities. Fundamentally, peace-building is more than the mere re-establishment of a physical infrastructure damaged by war. Although buildings and facilities may be the icons of hope for a defeated population, they will not be other than inanimate structures until they are occupied by an active citizenry. The entire population itself must rise from the rubble and convert to playing a leading role in the national reconstruction drama. Only then will the nation regain the trust and confidence in the civil institutions represented by the infrastructure and begin to establish a new and viable civil state.

Every successful military operation ultimately will confront the challenges of building a new nation. However, there is a very real and significant gap between the amount of post conflict civil-government reconstruction required and the capabilities of military service support units available to accomplish the goal. Nevertheless, there are several specific military units that are key assets in the starting the transition: Civil Affairs, Military Police, and Engineering to name three. While the military units can and should start the stabilization process, it is only when the other agencies of the U.S. Government are unilaterally engaged can the process be facilitated, ideally in concert with the international community in a multinational effort.

This paper attempts to address the physical and social challenges which may be encountered during this phase of military operations by contrasting historical and current operational examples to anticipate changes required for the successful resolution of future

conflicts as envisioned in the Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Joint Operating Concept.<sup>1</sup>

### **Current Planning Process**

Successful combat operations utilize a combination of diplomacy and military might. The transition to post conflict operations begins when the original mission has been accomplished or as the National Command Authority directs. Although the battle for the peace cannot be fully won by force alone, it most certainly can be lost by the inappropriate use of military means.<sup>2</sup> SSTR military operations must be coordinated and synchronized with other aspects of national power.<sup>3</sup>

Doctrinally, military campaign planning begins by focusing on the “desired end state.”<sup>4</sup> The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations establishes the process in terms of six phases: 0. Shape, I. Deter, II. Seize the Initiative, III. Dominate, IV. Stabilize, and V. Enable Civil Authority.<sup>5</sup> Each phase has desired end states or “triggers” that initiate the advancement of operations between stages of the campaign. In the case of most Phase III operations, the end state is simply “cessation of hostilities.” Parochially, once the military operation reaches that point, the tendency of many commanders is proceed to redeployment activities.

However, in the national view, the final strategic goal has not yet been achieved. Post hostilities SSTR operations are complex in both concept and execution and are difficult, because in no small measure, the end state also changes from a military objective to one of political or economic design. This requires an entirely different set of skills than the individual soldier typically possesses. It must be emphasized that it is not possible to be successful in the SSTR part of the campaign using only the military arm of

national power. Other agencies of the U.S. Government and international community must be engaged. Further, the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 requires the military to move from a leading role to one supporting Secretary of State actions.<sup>6</sup>

The 2006 National Strategic Strategy also takes a different approach to the recent historical view of international conflict. Rather than large battlefields occupied by superpowers, future wars are envisioned to be multiple, potentially simultaneous, small regional conflicts where failing or failed states present the largest threat to national security<sup>7</sup>. With this essential shift in focus of strategic enemies, military planners will be required to include the transition from direct combat actions to SSTR in their conceptual planning of all future operations.

Historically, the efforts placed on stability and reconstruction functions were not considered an essential skill in the military operational art. As the focus of future military operations shifts to operations in failing or failed states, the end state becomes one of establishing functional institutions of government, i.e. representative government, functioning judicial system in the form of police, courts, correctional facilities, and public and private sector infrastructure enabling public health and economic prosperity.<sup>8</sup>

This vision of future conflicts identifies an increased focus on planning for transition from combat to non-military activities and functions. In order to adequately anticipate the Phase IV political or economic end state, military planners will need to engage their counterparts in the other agencies of the U.S. Government. In addition, military planners and field personnel will need to include and work with their counterparts in the various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) and International

Organizations (IO's) through the Combatant Commander's standing Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG).<sup>9</sup> The goal should be for these groups to participate in operational planning teams and regional exercises. However, at present, few civilian organizations have been staffed for this level of participation resulting in partial or ad hoc actions during crises.

Future conflicts will also require a different set of skills on the part of the military commander. Joint Publication 5-0 suggests that "the 'stabilize' phase is required when there is no functioning, legitimate civil governing entity present."<sup>10</sup> The reality of intervention in failed or failing states is that by definition, there will not be a legitimate or functioning government, and the military commander must be prepared to assume this function until one can be installed. This difficult situation includes providing security while simultaneously providing for health and welfare of the population until the physical infrastructure can be rebuilt and the institutions of government established.<sup>11</sup>

All societies have human needs for survival; food, water, shelter, security. Without addressing the population's basic needs the number of individuals acting alone will increase and will soon resent any potential benefits associated with the campaign. Refugees who fled, or citizens displaced by the fighting, will return and need shelter, food, and medical aid. An example of this situation occurred simultaneously with the fighting during Operation Just Cause in Panama.

In Panama City... up to 10,000 Panamanians were forced to flee their homes... well in excess of the most liberal predictions made during the planning phase. ... were heading straight for U.S. combat lines at the PDF headquarters while the battle there--the most fierce in Just Cause--was still in progress. The U.S. task force commander ... [who correctly created a temporary facility to protect the refugees]...was soon confronted with backed-up toilets; an insufficient food supply; the intermingling of mothers and children with drug dealers; armed criminals, and PDF members who had shed their uniforms.<sup>12</sup> (emphasis added)



Engineer units, while representing a critical capability for accomplishing some of the physical reconstruction, are not the only forces that are required. Other Civil-Military capable units, such as Military Police, Civil Affairs, and Medical Detachments, are needed to establish initial fundamental government services. Failure of the “conquering forces” to establish the essential functions of government rapidly and provide the basic elements of civilization soon leads to frustration and lawlessness within the population. Despair over survival challenges including joblessness, changes even the most timid population to one actively participating in post hostilities insurrection.<sup>13</sup>

For example, the description of post conflict conditions following Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1991 mirrors operations in Baghdad in 2003 and even the deteriorating non combat situation in New Orleans in 2005 following Hurricane Katrina.

In some battles... the force ratio...was a mere 1 to 1. Furthermore, troops that would have been ideally positioned for stability operations...had been redirected,...Thus, looting in the capital... that began on 20 December went unchecked for several days, ..., U.S. MPs were stretched too thin to stop the looting. They found themselves running a detention center, guarding convoys, and performing other security tasks instead. There simply were not enough MPs to cover all the law and order problems that needed to be addressed in the first days of the operation.<sup>14</sup> (emphasis added)

### **Historical Post Combat Reconstruction Plans**

For much of the past 20 years stabilization operations have been given little attention at exercises and war games. In many cases this part of the planning has been ignored in its entirety. One example preceding combat operations in Panama is:

The mission statement... contained the words "prepare to restore law and order, and support the installation of a U.S.-recognized government..... minimize collateral damage..." Yet, despite these references and allusions to stability operations, little in OPLAN 90-2 dealt with the necessary tasks involved... (Since taking over as SOUTHCOM commander, Thurman had not even received a briefing on Blind Logic) [SSTR operations]...In planning sessions little more than lip service was paid to the Blue Spoon CMO mission.<sup>15</sup> (emphasis added)

Military plans for Operation Iraqi Freedom have had similar reviews. Douglas Feith USD for Policy said, “The U.S. Occupation of Iraq is a debacle not because the government did no planning but because the vast amount of expert planning was willfully ignored by the people in charge.”<sup>16</sup> The situation was also criticized in U.S. Army After Action Reports: “There was no Phase IV plan... In the two to three months of ambiguous transition, U.S. forces slowly lost the momentum and initiative...and have been playing catch up ever sense.”<sup>17</sup>

**a. World War II Marshall Plan and the Reconstruction of Europe**

From an historical perspective, wars prior to World War II were initiated to occupy or colonize conquered lands and “reconstruction” was more about creating colonies in a mirror image of the mother country. Following the near total devastation of World War II, General George Marshall recognized that without direct involvement in reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, lands devastated by war in Europe would revert to conflict again. Also, without direct involvement they would be consumed by the spread of communism. As part of his testimony before Congress in 1947, then Secretary of State Marshall said:

There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization... Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.<sup>18</sup> (emphasis added)

The Marshall plan was instrumental in the effective reconstruction efforts in war torn Europe. Additionally, the principles of the Marshall plan satisfied both those in the United States who wanted foreign policy to be generous as well as those who demanded

realpolitik. The success of activities conducted under the umbrella led to economically sustainable nations in Europe and in time elsewhere around the world.

**b. Korean War**

Perhaps the clearest example of the coordinated efforts required and performed by U.S. and international governments is found in the reconstruction of South Korea. With U.S. support United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), the Civil Assistance Command of the United Nations Forces Korea and the Government of Korea collaborated on the priorities and oversaw the process of reestablishment of a viable country south of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. Monetary relief from the world community was used for food, clothing, medical supplies, and consumer goods for the humanitarian relief of the displaced population.<sup>19</sup> However, all of the international effort ultimately supported the Government of Korea directed actions.

In “Korea-The Next Stage” Sir Arthur Rucker said it plainly: “If the economy of Korea is not quickly restored, if the country does not soon become again self-supporting and able to give her people a reasonable standard of life, there will be discontent and no peace, and the fighting will have been in vain. Reconstruction is primarily a task for the Koreans themselves.”<sup>20</sup> (emphasis added)

**c. Cold War, Defense of the Homeland**

Within the United States, Civil Defense programs designed around the general concept of community self rescue/reestablishment were discussed as early as the 1920’s but were not institutionalized until after the development of nuclear weapons. A nationwide program was formally established in 1950 and provided individual citizens first aid and fire fighting training, as well as articulating procedures for immediate actions

to be taken to re-establish local government, law and order and community aid following an enemy attack or natural disaster. All able body citizens were expected to participate, have current training and a family sized stock of emergency supplies.<sup>21</sup>

During the Cold War, specifically from 1946 through the mid 1970's, the U.S. Civil Defense program grew to be one of the most robust in the world. City or regional units provide emergency training to the citizenry as well as maintaining local emergency shelters, water and food supplies. The U.S. program declined in the 1970's following détente with the Soviet Union and The People's Republic of China and following the break up of the Soviet Union, the U.S. program was cut to the point of extinction. Today, only a few examples of national shelters for key government officials and Disaster Mortuary Operations Response Teams (DMORT) remain.<sup>22</sup> Several states, notably California, retain an active Civil Defense Corps for civil response to earthquakes<sup>23</sup> and several countries, such as Switzerland, continue to maintain active Civil Defense Corps.<sup>24</sup>

Since the 9-11 terrorist attack and more recently Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, there has been a nationwide urban response and various U.S. cities have begun to hold formal training and exercises.<sup>25</sup> In 2002, President Bush created the "Presidential Task Force on Citizen Preparedness in the War Against Terrorism." The task force was chartered to "make recommendations to help prepare Americans in their homes, neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, places of worship and public places from the potential consequences of terrorist attacks."<sup>26</sup>

#### **d. Afghanistan and Iraq, Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom**

In spite of the smaller total number of military forces used for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as compared to previous conflicts, at \$252 Billion, the conflict in South

West Asia is the fourth most costly U.S. war, behind World War II, Vietnam, and Korea. Much of this is due to the prolific use of expensive technology and equipment on the part of the military and the extensive use of contractor workforce, particularly in the form of contracted security forces.<sup>27</sup>

The total costs for reconstruction of infrastructure is estimated to be between \$24 and \$73 Billion or about 30% of the total.<sup>28</sup> This cost includes the effect of construction accomplished in parallel with insurrection actions which invariably requires significant amounts of “re-rework”: construction of facilities while simultaneously being destroyed in a sort of reverse battle of attrition.<sup>29</sup> Additionally, there has been extensive work performed on infrastructure not “broken” by the war actions but by years of neglect by Saddam Hussein’s regime and in some cases services established for the first time.<sup>30</sup>

Some of the change in the post hostilities SSTR focus has been due to developments in weaponry. In World War II many large city centers were reduced to rubble by massive and inaccurate aerial bombing resulting in catastrophic demolition of infrastructure and large numbers of civilian casualties. By contrast, many of the targets engaged with smart munitions during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in precise and limited destruction while minimizing damage to surrounding structures. For example, specified sections of bridges were destroyed but the main bridge left undamaged. This prevented Iraqi forces from using these key avenues of mobility but did not stop the advancing Coalition forces from re-opening them at will.<sup>31</sup> Nearby civilian communities were left undamaged resulting in significantly fewer civilian casualties than in previous wars. Likewise when Iraqi forces positioned their military forces, caches and command and control centers in the vicinity of mosques or other

protected sites, Coalition forces engaged these illegal positions with lethal precision munitions while minimizing damage to the protected sites.<sup>32</sup>

In one interview, General Franks said, “I think you have seen, time and time again, military targets fall while the civilian infrastructure remains in place...Bombs did sometimes malfunction, or go long and miss targets, but the coalition’s ability to adjust its attacks to minimize collateral damage was remarkable.”<sup>33</sup>

Innocent civilians were likewise protected from inaccurate and indiscriminate bombing as noted by Human Rights Watch:

Coalition forces took significant steps to protect civilians during the air war, including increased use of precision-guided munitions when attacking targets situated in populated areas ... recognized that employment of precision-guided munitions alone was not enough to provide civilians with adequate protection. They employed other methods to help minimize civilian casualties... most blast and fragmentation damage was kept within the impact area, and ...took into account the locations of civilian facilities such as schools and hospitals.<sup>34</sup> (emphasis added)

### **The Role of the Engineer in Joint Military Operations**

It is clear that if combat operations are not successful in winning the war, transition to peace is not possible. In the past year, the U.S. leadership has recognized the importance of planning for SSTR actions and that this phase was not adequately addressed in recent operations. Based on guidance in the 2006 NSS, the Secretary of Defense signed Directive 3000.05 identifying SSTR operations as a “core U.S. Military mission...that shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities...”<sup>35</sup>

The success of military operations past, present and future depends on how effectively commanders employ all of the resources available to them. Engineer units can act as force multipliers when properly tasked and employed. Engineers can affect

operational factors of space, force and time.<sup>36</sup> By shaping the physical conditions of the battle field engineers can define the parameters of mobility and countermobility, and to a certain degree by transforming forward bases from austere survival camps to morale boosting regeneration posts, the work of engineers can multiply the combat effectiveness of a small force.<sup>37</sup>

In peacetime, engineer units participate in operational planning, wargaming and field war game exercises. Many of these exercises should be tied to specific Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) activities in the form of shaping and deterrence operations. Engineer and civil affairs units should deploy and interface directly with the populations of friendly states in a targeted effort to capture hearts and minds.<sup>38</sup> Typical TSCP activities applicable during Phases O and I are Exercise Related Construction, Special Engineering or Environmental Actions, and Humanitarian related construction such as water wells, irrigation systems, and construction of schools or remote village community centers. These operations are critical to regional security initiatives and in many cases are successful at winning the battles before they erupt.<sup>39</sup>

During Phase II Seize the Initiative operations, engineer units are typically employed creating forward operating bases, constructing defensive obstacles and transportation corridors. However, engineers are also particularly useful in Joint Targeting Boards identifying potential targets and more importantly, how best to deny the targets usefulness to the enemy while retaining its use by friendly forces.

During Phase III kinetic combat operations, engineer units are critical to the rapid support of unit mobility, counter mobility and clearing obstacles in support of forced entry. Additional engineer tasking involves enabling sustainment of operational logistics

movement in the form of main supply routes (MSR), forward operating bases (FOB), forward arming and refueling points (FARP). Establishing, maintaining and operating the military infrastructure are vital tasks required to sustain the pace of the operations. Even among the units that may be charged with follow on SSTR efforts, little thought can be given to post hostilities planning while in the middle of the battle.

In every scenario there is a common denominator, after the fighting is done and hostilities have ended comes the difficult task of transition to Phase IV and ultimately winning the peace. Viable physical infrastructure that is essential for a region to develop internal economic vitality and internal security must be rebuilt. Instantly, the role of the military changes from that of a belligerent to interim ruler. From soldier to leader, each person in the Task Force must somehow make a radical transformation: stop shooting, get off the tank and start feeding the people who may have been the enemy only moments before.<sup>40</sup>

In Panama as in Baghdad (and even in New Orleans), U.S. combat troops have had to assume such civil government activities as: attempting to restore law and order; apprehending enemy forces (while somehow managing to keep them separate from criminal suspects); guarding facilities and critical infrastructure; searching out arms caches; and providing essential governmental functions in towns and villages. The transition to stabilization requires soldiers trained for combat roles to begin serving as police officers, city engineers, social workers, civil affairs, municipal governments.

For some units, the adjustment from warrior to police officer or mayor caused serious problems, especially when restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) for combat were replaced by even more highly restrictive ROE for the stability operations that followed... That most U.S. combat units had not been prepared to conduct stability operations was seen as a shortcoming in the planning and preparation for the invasion...<sup>41</sup>(emphasis added)



Not everyone in uniform is prepared to make this leap. The traditional role of the military has been “to kill people and break things.”<sup>42</sup> But history has shown that if we do not transition to SSTR operations correctly, the military will have to deal with widespread lawlessness or insurrection and will have to fight the war again.

In nearly every conflict since World War II and for most of the disaster relief operations, the initial reconstruction problem has been left to the military arm of the U.S. Government. Reconstruction operations, while they may have certain military facets, are not limited to the building trades and invariably require the other elements of national power. The military units capable of Civil Military led stabilization operations are Civil Affairs, Engineers and Military police. While these units certainly have some inherent capabilities to begin working the stabilization requirements, there is a large gap between the limits of military led infrastructure reconstruction and the beginning of post conflict civilian led infrastructure reconstruction.<sup>43</sup>

Moreover, the immediate problem is that although U.S. Military forces are already in theater, they do not have the legal authority to execute large post conflict civil works reconstruction under their UN mandate.<sup>44</sup> If US commanders attempt to gain the authority (or under the best intentions execute without it) they will be accused of “nation building” or colonization. Legitimate military led reconstruction activities are restricted to those that support the population’s immediate needs for survival and to establish security. Reestablishing the damaged infrastructure and the agencies that occupy it is an economic, political and social activity that requires the application of other elements of national power, the international community supporting the host nation’s agencies.<sup>45</sup> NSPD-44 assigns responsibility of reconstruction and stabilization to the Secretary of

State. The Secretaries of State and Defense are required to “integrate stabilization and reconstruction plans with military contingency plans...fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels.”<sup>46</sup>

### **Interagency Planning and Responses Required to Achieve National Strategic Goals.**

In the past 15 years, military forces have been deployed more than 81 times in support of national objectives.<sup>47</sup> Many of these operations have been to help stabilize failing states and all of them have resulted in complex post conflict peace operations SSTR actions. In many cases, years after the original operation was concluded, SSTR actions are still underway. Several lessons that have been relearned are: 1) Determine who will lead the operation with particular clarity on command and control, 2) Build strong domestic public support, 3) Tailor the military forces for the mission,<sup>48</sup> and 4) Successful post conflict operations require an engaged civil military leadership team.<sup>49</sup>

Perhaps the most important lesson is that every military operation ultimately ends in a handoff, either to an international body or to a new national government.<sup>50</sup> Ultimately, the measure of success for the military mission will be the manner it is handed off to a civilian led government.<sup>51</sup>

The post hostilities period is ripe for dissent and resentment of the new regime. At the end of combat operations and through the handoff point, there will always be large numbers of displaced persons, many of whom are demoralized. There will probably be national economic difficulties and large sections of civil infrastructure that has been damaged or put out of commission. There will also tend to be large numbers of recently unemployed men – predominantly former soldiers ready and willing to engage in insurrection activities.<sup>52</sup> This scenario has been played time and again throughout history

and must be addressed by early civil military planning and engaged inter agency or NGO leadership focused on long term national stabilization and economic recovery.<sup>53</sup>

Commanders of successful conflict termination and transition to SSTR operations must be prepared to execute a list of “non military” humanitarian functions simultaneously with security and policing operations.<sup>54</sup> Many of these actions have been relatively constant throughout the historical context and will be similar to those identified in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan Guidelines found in Appendix 1.

As the stabilization period progresses however, necessary “functions of government” will be required which are significantly different than the issues of human survival outlined above and when fully implemented represent the essence of a working civil society. Conversely, the absence of working government services is a primary definition of a failed state.<sup>55</sup> Paradoxically then, engagement in a failed state implies establishment of a physical infrastructure and government systems that previously may not have existed in that country. This in turn may bring about the social changes that accompany modernization which are unwanted.<sup>56</sup>

Whether building from scratch or reestablishing, it is critical that at a minimum the pre-conflict systems of government be brought into working order rapidly. While, the widely believed story about post World War II Italians reminiscing that even under Mussolini “the trains ran on time” is actually a myth.<sup>57</sup> This kind of erroneous perception on the part of the population can become a real problem during the SSTR effort, the “what have you done for me lately” complex.<sup>58</sup> To overcome this perception, the people need to see an active government working with them towards the common goal, re-establishment of services and a rapid return to normalcy.

Essential government services include the ability to enforce law and order, protection of the population from fire and disease, provision for medical care and orderly distribution of water and food supplies. Based on current census figures, stable cities within the United States and Europe have a peacetime police force of 23 officers for an urban civilian population of 10,000.<sup>59</sup> However, establishing a police force to bring law and order to the chaos can take as many as 20 police for every 1000 civilians.<sup>60</sup> Similarly, other essential personnel will be required in larger numbers than normal to re-establish the other facilities and services required of government.<sup>61</sup>

National and regional recovery is not a short term process. “For about one year after cessation of hostilities, the host nation is in limbo.”<sup>62</sup> The total time required to recover depends on a number of factors including; status of the national and local infrastructure, health of the population, ability to restart the national economy, and even the time of year when hostilities end. Once the one to two year “limbo” period has passed, long term recovery may take a decade or more.<sup>63</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The U.S. Government, as the world’s only remaining superpower, has become the world’s stabilization force. The 2006 National Security Strategy and supporting directives clearly identify the main engagements of the future: failing states and global operations involving Security, Stabilization Transformation and Reconstruction actions.

The end state of each phase in the range of military operations is different and requires different actions and types of forces. Every military operation will ultimately transition from kinetic combat operations to post-combat stabilization actions. Winning the peace is achievable only through thoughtful and coordinated application of all aspects

of national power. In order to achieve the ultimate national-strategic goals, the military must fully utilize its Civil Military Operations capable units and moreover, it must learn how better to engage with partners for peace and stability: the Non-Governmental Organizations, International Organizations, and the Agencies of the U.S. Government.

**Recommendations:**

1) As discussed in the section “The Role of the Engineer,” regional Theater Security Cooperation Plans should include specifically targeted activities to assist nations struggling to maintain control. Some of the suggested activities are:

Category	Activity
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Combined Exercises</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Bilateral and Multilateral Joint Training Plan Exercises</li> <li>○ Exercise Related Construction</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Humanitarian assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Assessment</li> <li>○ Other Humanitarian Assistance</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Counter Narcotics Assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Counter drug training</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Other Programs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Engineering Project Activities</li> <li>○ Environmental Activities</li> </ul>

2) As discussed in “Interagency Planning,” military units that specifically support Civil Military Operations including Military Police, Civil Affairs, Engineers and Medical Teams should be increased in terms of both numbers of active and reserve service members and units available.

3) As discussed throughout this paper, military commanders at all levels must develop relationships with their counterparts in NGOs and IOs and other U.S. Government Agencies working towards the coordination of these organizations’ actions with military operations planning and the goal of active participation in joint / multinational exercises and other regionally focused TSCP activities.

*Appendix 1: United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan Guidelines List<sup>64</sup>*

<p><b>Emergency Shelter:</b> provide basic materials for the construction of emergency shelters and the establishment of managed camps for those rendered homeless</p>	<p><b>Health and Nutrition:</b> assist overloaded hospitals and provide key medical supplies such as drugs, kits for operations, and tents for field hospitals and families of patients</p>
<p><b>Water and Sanitation:</b> provide alternative sources of clean water while urgent repairs are made to damaged treatment facilities and sewage systems</p>	<p><b>Food:</b> provide food and supplementary nutrition, and establish food kitchens where necessary, until affected populations are able to begin working and markets become functional</p>
<p><b>Protection and Education:</b> provide psycho-social support to affected population, establish child-friendly spaces, and help prevent abuse and exploitation of children and of other vulnerable groups</p>	<p><b>Agriculture:</b> address food and nutrition insecurity with the aim of assisting affected farmers to resume their immediate livelihoods and reduce their overall dependency on external food aid</p>
<p><b>Information and Telecommunications:</b> provide enhanced telecommunications support to enable efficient delivery of assistance to rural areas</p>	<p><b>Logistics:</b> provide transportation, storage, communication and coordination support for the distribution of aid to affected areas</p>
<p><b>Early Recovery:</b> provide cash-for-work to clear rubble and recycle building materials. Provision of transitional shelter and equipping communities to rehabilitate housing. Efforts also include restarting micro-enterprises in the informal economy and provision of environmental advice for recovery</p>	<p><b>Coordination and Security:</b> support the Government's relief and recovery efforts (particularly in coordinating the international relief and recovery effort) and support monitoring, reporting and analysis of the needs and delivery of assistance</p>

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## Notes:

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Joint Operating Concept v2.0 August, 2006 Pg. 1*

<sup>2</sup> General Anthony Zinni USMC, “The Military’s Role in a Changing World: Conversation with General Anthony C. Zinni,” Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, March 6, 2001. <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Zinni/zinni-con2.html> .

<sup>3</sup> Field Manual 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations Appendix E Transition Planning and Coordination Activities.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP-3.0 Chapter III paragraph 1.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Version 2.0, August 2005, D-2

<sup>6</sup> The White House National Security Presidential Directive NSPD – 44 December 7, 2005. Section “‘Coordination’: The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government

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efforts...and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such activities with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. Military operations across the spectrum of conflict.” “Section ““Cordination between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense’: The secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.”

<sup>7</sup> 2006 National Security Strategy.

<sup>8</sup> Department of Defense Directive NO. 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Nov 28, 2005.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Joint Operating Concept v2.0 August, 2006 Pg. 27*

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Operations Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 Paragraph (5).

<sup>11</sup> Adaptive Planning Extract 14 Dec 2005 Draft JP 5-0 Section IV Paragraph (5).

<sup>12</sup> Operation Just Cause/Blind Logic.

[http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0PBZ/is\\_3\\_85/ai\\_n14695893/pg\\_7](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_3_85/ai_n14695893/pg_7)

<sup>13</sup> Kalev I Sepp, Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, Military Review May/June 2005

<sup>14</sup> IBID

<sup>15</sup> IBID

<sup>16</sup> James Fallows, “Blind Into Baghdad”, The Atlantic Online, January/February 2004.

<sup>17</sup> Thomas Ricks, “Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan” Washington Post, December 25, 2004.

<sup>18</sup> General George C. Marshall, The Marshall Plan Address delivered at Harvard University, June 5, 1947.

<sup>19</sup> Gene M Lyons, "American Policy and the United Nations' Program for Korean Reconstruction",

*International Organization* 12 (2), 180-192.

<sup>20</sup> Sir Arthur Rucker, “Korea the Next Stage” Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944. Pg 313-317

<sup>21</sup> Britannica Concise Encyclopedia <http://www.answers.com/topic/civil-defense>.

<sup>22</sup> IBID.

<sup>23</sup> Office of Emergency Services, California Civil Defense Corps,

<http://www.oes.ca.gov/Operational/OESHome.nsf/1?OpenForm>.

<sup>24</sup> IBID

<sup>25</sup> The American Civil Defense Association, <http://www.tacda.org>.

<sup>26</sup> Jim Bensen, “It’s Time for a Revival of American Civil Defense” Backwoods Home Magazine

<http://www.backwoodshome.com/columns/benson0201.html> .

<sup>27</sup> David R Francis, “More Costly Than the War to End All Wars” Christian Science Monitor .

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0829/p15s01-cogn.html> .

<sup>28</sup> U.S. House of Representatives, The Cost of War and Reconstruction,

[http://www.house.gov/budget\\_democrats/analyses/iraq\\_cost\\_update.pdf](http://www.house.gov/budget_democrats/analyses/iraq_cost_update.pdf) pg 2

<sup>29</sup> After Action Report, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Engineer Group, FIRST Naval Construction Division Report. Spring 2004.

<sup>30</sup> Major General Peter Chiarelli, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations,”

Military Review July/August, 2005.

<sup>31</sup> Lessons Learned, Engineer Participation on Joint Targeting Board, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Engineer Group After Action Report. Discussions with Engineering Operations Center, Norfolk, VA.

<sup>32</sup> Dr Paul Rexton Kan, “What Sould We Bomb? Axiological Targeting and the Abiding Limits of Airpower Theory,” Air and Space Power Journal, Spring, 2004. The minimal collateral effects of precision munitions on historic and protected sites during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, stands in stark contrast to the massive destruction of historic sites in World War II. For example, as a result of massive air and artillery strikes on Nazi positions within the Abbey on Monte Cassino Italy in World War II, the historic Abbey was completely destroyed.

<sup>33</sup> Rebecca Grant, “The Redefinition of Strategic Airpower”, Air Force Association, Oct 2003 Vol 86 No.10

<http://www.afa.org/magazine/oct2003/1003strategic.asp>.

<sup>34</sup> Human Rights Watch, “Conduct of the Air War,” <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203/4.htm>.

<sup>35</sup> DoD NO. 3000.05. Paragraph 4.

<sup>36</sup> Joint Publication 3-34 Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations, Chapter I, Unified Action and Role of Engineers. Engineers are a supporting unit that when used across the entire range of military operations have a critical role in unified action. Engineers shape the physical conditions of the battlefield and when used in concert with the military force help shape the operational factors multiplying the effects of the force available through all 6 phases of the campaign.

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<sup>37</sup> IBID

<sup>38</sup> Marc Leepson, "The Heart and Mind of USAID's Vietnam Mission", American Foreign Service Association <http://www.afsa.org/fsj/apr00/leepson.cfm> .

<sup>39</sup> IBID. During the Vietnam war it was specifically recognized that the war would not be won or lost on the battlefield but in the struggle for the loyalty of the South Vietnamese.

<sup>40</sup> Paraphrased statement from briefing by LtCOL Lee Quinta, US Army, "Leadership Challenges of Command in Iraq." Presented to the Student Leadership Forum, Naval War College Joint Military Operations Course Fall 2006.

<sup>41</sup> Operation Just Cause/Blind Logic.

[http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0PBZ/is\\_3\\_85/ai\\_n14695893/pg\\_7](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_3_85/ai_n14695893/pg_7).

<sup>42</sup> General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret), "Address by General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret), Delivered at the Naval Institute Forum," Sept 4, 2003.

<sup>43</sup> Col Garland Williams, Engineering the Peace. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C. 2005. pg xv.

<sup>44</sup> IBID Pg 6. Also UN Resolution 1645. The legal authority of Military commanders to perform reconstruction is limited by UN Resolution. Initial reestablishment of humanitarian type functions is required under international law. But these functions are shelter, food, water and security. Civil Works and reconstruction projects are reserved for an United Nations "Intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission"

<sup>45</sup> United Nations Resolution 1645, December 20, 2005. This Security Council Resolution discusses the need for International Community and Civic Leaders to assist in the re-establishment of government functions following conflict.

<sup>46</sup> The White House National Security Presidential Directive NSPD – 44 December 7, 2005.

<sup>47</sup> Completed Post Cold War Operations Global Security.org.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/recent-ops.htm> .

<sup>48</sup> Michele A. Flournoy, "Historical Lessons Learned and Unlearned", SAIS Conference, April 13, 2004

<sup>49</sup> William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post Conflict Success," Parameters, Autumn, 2003.

<sup>50</sup> United Nations Resolution 1645

<sup>51</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Joint Operating Concept v2.0 August, 2006*. Pg 3. "In some cases, there will be two leadership transitions, the first between external military forces and external civilian agencies, and the second between the external civilian agencies and the new host nation government. However, in other cases the military will be in support of a civilian lead and the first transition will hand off responsibility from civilian to host nation agencies and organizations."

<sup>52</sup> Kalev I Sepp, Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, Military Review May/June 2005

<sup>53</sup> William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post Conflict Success," Parameters, Autumn, 2003

<sup>54</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Joint Operating Concept v2.0 August, 2006*. pg iii D. The Solution - The Central Idea: "Whether responding to a devastating natural disaster or assisting in rebuilding a new domestic order, U.S. military efforts in SSTR operations will be focused on effectively combining the efforts of the U.S. and coalition militaries with those of USG agencies and multi-national partners to provide direct assistance to stabilize the situation and build self-sufficient host nation capability and capacity in several key areas. These efforts, which are called "major mission elements (MMEs)" or "lines of operation" are executed in a concurrent manner and are integrated and tailored to the specific situation. Additionally, most of the MMEs represent desired end states within the overall SSTR operation. The six MMEs are: Establish and maintain a safe, secure environment; Deliver humanitarian assistance; Reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services; Support economic development; Establish representative, effective governance and the rule of law; and Conduct strategic communication."

<sup>55</sup> 2006 National Security Strategy.

<sup>56</sup> Thomas Sowell, Conquest and Culture, In Chapter 1 the author discusses the social changes that come with conquest of lands and the melding of societies that result. Often there is a long standing but hidden resistance to the new or imposed societal norms.

<sup>57</sup> Ashley Montagu and Edward Darling. "The Prevalence of Nonsense". New York: Harper & Row, 1967. "Mussolini may have done many brutal and tyrannical things; he may have destroyed human freedom in Italy; he may have murdered and tortured citizens whose only crime was to oppose Mussolini; but 'one had to admit' one thing about the Dictator: he 'made the trains run on time.'" This is a popular urban legend that is in fact a

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myth, the trains ran on time well before Mussolini came to power and he had little effect on the system. However this illustrates the power of perception on the part of the people.

<sup>58</sup> Following Operation Iraqi Freedom, frustrated Iraqi citizens told forward deployed engineers that “Things were better under Saddam.” This discussion was passed on between forward deployed Engineers/Contracting Officer and the Officer in Charge of Construction, Engineer Operations Center Norfolk VA. Additionally, in Major General Peter Chiarelli, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations,” Military Review July-August 2005 pg 10. MGen Chiarelli discusses the Iraqi citizen view of “What have you done for me in the past 12 Months?”

<sup>59</sup> US Census Bureau 2005 <http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes05stlus.txt>. Based on an average of established municipalities within the United States and Europe, the number of government personnel required are identified in parentheses by function for civilian populations in increments of 10,000: Police (23); Judicial and legal (14), correction officers (24), fire fighters (10), emergency medical personnel (17), hospitals (31) and municipal workers i.e. water (6), wastewater (4), and electrical distribution (3). United Nations guidelines indicate that as many as 10 times these numbers are required to establish municipal services.

<sup>60</sup> Kalev I Sepp, Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, Military Review May/June 2005 pg 9.

<sup>61</sup> United Nations “Likely Humanitarian Scenarios” and United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan Guidance indicate that most government services personnel should be between 8 and 10 times the normal range of an established municipality in order to initiate restoration of local governance.

<sup>62</sup> Williams, pg 10. “For about one year after cessation of hostilities, the host nation is in limbo. There is not enough infrastructure to facilitate economic recovery, and there is no external entity that can legally provide the infrastructure help...”

<sup>63</sup> Frohn Deifendorf, American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany 1945-1955. Publications of the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C. 1993. This publication represents a series of scholarly works on the American policy towards Germany. The overarching theme of these works centered on the fact that re-establishment of a viable economy has taken more than a decade in the case of the European theater.

<sup>64</sup> United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan Guidance.

<http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Page=1375>.