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14. ABSTRACT Military Operations Other Than War is a growth industry for the United States' military which is engaged around the world to assist in bringing about regional stability through national assistance efforts and by assisting governments with installation of democratic practices. Military forces may find themselves having to deal with looting, lack of indigenous police forces, lack of governance, damaged or destroyed infrastructure, human migration, health and sanitation issues and a degraded human condition of the population which the forces were deployed to liberate or protect. How operational commanders plan for these outcomes will determine the difference between success and failure. New principles or fundamentals of planning operations and new methodology have been proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to mitigate these negative characteristics in operational planning and execution. One such fundamental, "understanding", will be the linchpin in the success of future Military Operations Other Than War involving stability and national assistance efforts. The Joint Chiefs are also changing the phasing construct of operations and urging changes in the language of Military Operations Other Than War. This paper serves to illustrate that despite recent failures to fully achieve the desired end state in U.S. Military Operations Other Than War, the historic example of MacArthur's leadership in administering the Occupation of Japan demonstrates the importance of this fundamental. Because of MacArthur's experience and understanding of the Japanese demography, political and economic institutions, and overall post conflict condition of Japan at the end of World War II, he was able to craft and administer a successful occupation that met the strategic and operational end state. Understanding as a future fundamental for planning will force commanders and their staffs to better examine the pieces of information that make up the whole; to synergize intelligence from the standpoint of the people and cultures in the operational areas, and balance these things against desired objectives.					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**UNDERSTANDING – THE NEW PRINCIPLE FOR THE JOINT COMMANDER
IN POST CONFLICT OPERATIONS**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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16 May 2006

Abstract of

Understanding – The New Principle for the Joint Commander in Post Conflict Operations

Military Operations Other Than War is a growth industry for the United States' military which is engaged around the world to assist in bringing about regional stability through national assistance efforts and by assisting governments with installation of democratic practices. Military forces may find themselves having to deal with looting, lack of indigenous police forces, lack of governance, damaged or destroyed infrastructure, human migration, health and sanitation issues and a degraded human condition of the population which the forces were deployed to liberate or protect. How operational commanders plan for these outcomes will determine the difference between success and failure. New principles or fundamentals of planning operations and new methodology have been proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to mitigate these negative characteristics in operational planning and execution. One such fundamental, "understanding," will be the linchpin in the success of future Military Operations Other Than War involving stability and national assistance efforts. The Joint Chiefs are also changing the phasing construct of operations and urging changes in the language of Military Operations Other Than War.

This paper serves to illustrate that despite recent failures to fully achieve the desired end state in U.S. Military Operations Other Than War, the historic example of MacArthur's leadership in administering the Occupation of Japan demonstrates the importance of this fundamental. Because of MacArthur's experience and understanding of the Japanese demography, political and economic institutions, and overall post conflict condition of Japan at the end of World War II, he was able to craft and administer a successful occupation that met the strategic and operational end state. Understanding as a future fundamental for planning will force commanders and their staffs to better examine the pieces of information that make up the whole; to synergize intelligence from the standpoint of the people and cultures in the operational areas, and balance these things against desired objectives.

Understanding – The New Principle for the Joint Commander in Post Conflict Operations

Military Operations Other Than War is a growth industry for the United States' military which is engaged around the world to assist in bringing about regional stability through national assistance efforts and by assisting governments with installation of democratic practices. In his comprehensive analysis of the U.S. military's experience in stability operations since 1989, Dr. Lawrence Yates, a scholar at the Army's Fort Leavenworth Combat Studies Institute, discovered recurring themes common to each post conflict situation, that operational commanders were placed into roles of politicians and diplomats, that operational and tactical actions had strategic effects, and that traditional planning for such operations has been ill integrated, if integrated at all, with plans involving the combat operations.¹ Military forces may find themselves having to deal with looting, lack of indigenous police forces, lack of governance, damaged or destroyed infrastructure, human migration, health and sanitation issues and a degraded human condition of the population which the forces were deployed to liberate or protect. How operational commanders plan for these outcomes will mean the difference between success and failure.

In "The American Way of War" author Colin S. Gray describes twelve characteristics indicative of the U. S. military approach to war fighting. Of these, the characteristics of "Culturally ignorant" and "Impatient" stand out as needing immediate attention.² New principles or fundamentals of planning operations and new methodology have been proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to mitigate these negative characteristics in operational planning and execution. One such fundamental, "understanding",³ will be the linchpin in the success of future Military Operations Other Than War involving stability and national assistance efforts. Despite recent failures to fully achieve the desired end state in U.S. Military Operations Other Than War, the historic example of MacArthur's leadership in administering the Occupation of Japan

demonstrates the importance of this fundamental. Because of MacArthur's experience and understanding of the Japanese demography, political and economic institutions, and overall post conflict condition of Japan at the end of World War II, he was able to craft and administer a successful occupation that met the strategic and operational end state.

Understanding does not mean intelligence. Intelligence related to Military Operations Other Than War is described by Joint Publication 2-0: "Intelligence develops knowledge of the environment in relation to the JFC's questions concerning actual and potential threats, terrain, climate and weather, infrastructure, cultural characteristics, medical conditions, population, leadership and many other issues concerning the operational area."⁴ This may provide the basics needed to plan the best approach to resolving a commander's operational problem, but it does not provide the needed context required for its proper use. Understanding as a future fundamental for planning will force commanders and their staffs to better pull the pieces of information that make up the whole; to synergize intelligence from the standpoint of the people and cultures in the operational areas, and balance these things against desired objectives. It fits readily into the planning process as a governing factor used in evaluating the efficacy of any course of action. Understanding as a principle of Military Operations Other Than War requires that the operational commander's plans take into account all aspects of the culture within the operational area. Understanding will temper decisions and help best interpret higher direction.

The beliefs, political systems, behaviors, value systems, lifestyles, tolerance, flexibility and the historical contexts from which a population acts are critical components in crafting and implementing policies sought to ameliorate problems and provide for human security.

Understanding means knowing the effects of joint force actions on these components and characteristics and more accurately applying varying degrees of attention to the right areas when

needed. The commanders' ability to conduct and reassess the conditions in the operating environment through repeated mission analysis will go far toward converting intelligence to understanding of the effects generated through the joint force actions. Jomini's statement regarding forces occupying terrain of an enemy remains applicable to the need for understanding in today's operations other than war: "Make a display of a mass of troops proportioned to the obstacles and resistance likely to be encountered, calm the popular passions in every possible way, exhaust them by time and patience, display courtesy, gentleness, and severity united, and (particularly) deal justly." ⁵

In an examination of America's past attempts at nation building, foreign policy scholars Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace determined that of 200 military interventions in America's history, 16 would qualify as nation building attempts, and of those, only efforts in Japan, Germany, Grenada, and Panama resulted in functioning long term democracies. To qualify as characterizing nation-building attempts, these operations shared three common characteristics: they involved regime change or the assistance to national governance; they involved large numbers of American troops; and involved the use of military and civilian personnel in administering the new government.⁶ These nation-state successes shared common characteristics, including an understanding of: "The target nation's internal characteristics, a convergence of the geopolitical interests of the outside power and the target nation, and a commitment to economic development in the target nation."⁷

The range of military operations is moving further from the traditional conventional conflict U.S. forces trained for during the Cold War. Today, there is a preference toward using the military in operations where disciplined forces, effective hardware, command and control and responsiveness to emergency situations make it the ideal tool to promote security and stability

operations and bolster national assistance efforts. *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (MOOTW) provides a context for operations in which the military repeatedly finds itself engaged, and one in which MacArthur found himself as the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in 1945. One component of MOOTW for which MacArthur's staff had to plan is now called "Peace Building" which "consists of post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."⁸ One other which applied to MacArthur's situation is now termed "National Assistance Operations" and defined as "civil or military assistance rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation."⁹

The U.S. military is in the process of transformation to enable enough flexibility to handle the wider range of operations likely to occur now that many nations are no longer supported by the economic and political incentives extant during the Cold War. Our track record demonstrates that the military remains the most effective deployable tool which a strategic leader can use to help shape a theater environment and set the conditions desired. Thus National Assistance Operations and Peace Building are terms with which operational commanders will become thoroughly familiar. The 2006 *National Security Strategy* emphasizes the importance of U.S. commitment to other nations by "three levels of engagement: conflict prevention and resolution; conflict intervention; and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction."¹⁰ This strategy is as much a response to recent failures in stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as it is a restatement of the U.S. perception of the global environment we find ourselves operating in. In an effort to fill a perceived capability gap in the U.S. experience in National Assistance Operations and Peace Building, the *National Security Strategy* mentions that the Department of

State is forming a genesis organization which will attempt to husband some of these coordination tasks, called the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. This may be a step in the right direction, although this new office hasn't the years of experience in operations that the military can claim.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are also taking note of the requirement to be better prepared for post conflict operations and Military Operations Other Than War. Consequently, there are new changes to the circulating Draft Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning*, the cornerstone doctrine for the Joint Commander's staff in the undertaking of the deliberate planning process. These changes reflect needed shifts in language to more realistically accommodate today and tomorrow's operating environments. Planners will conduct "Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Area" rather than of the "Battle Space" when preparing to merge into a commander's mission analysis. Additionally, the traditional phases of a joint operation have been modified, and two new phases particularly germane to this discussion are the phases of "Stabilize" and "Enable Civil Authority."¹¹ Such changes add phases to the old model and a mechanical break that will allow planners to add fidelity to the differing requirements these evolutions may call for.

More importantly, the Draft Joint Publication 5-0 highlights the value of the Joint Commander in using various principles as a means to energize planners to develop various courses of action for the operational area that will meet objectives and arrive at the operational and strategic end states. Where these principles are often used or discussed is in the war game process, where courses of action are judged and tested against other aspects of the operational area, be they enemy forces or factors of time and space. Traditionally, they have been Principles of War or some variation of these principles, to include Principles of War for Military

Operations Other Than War. The Draft Joint Publication 5-0 calls these principles “governing factors.” These governing factors are an assembly of fundamentals, traits or other factors the commander uses to judge actions. “Potential Influencing factors include elements of the commander’s intent and planning guidance, selected principles of war, external constraints, or any criteria the commander desires.”¹²

But structural changes alone won’t solve our problems. Future success also will include how we select the right people for the task at hand. History’s greatest operational commanders have been those who have demonstrated talents in conducting warfare. According to military scholar Robert H. Scales “They have the ability to think in time, to sense events they cannot see, to orchestrate disparate actions such that the symphony of war is played out in exquisite harmony.”¹³ When considering National Assistance Operations or Peace Building, it may be difficult to grasp all of the elements of a nation state which must be addressed or repaired to achieve “exquisite harmony,” but history has shown that with the right support, persistence and understanding of the operational area, it can be done. MacArthur’s conduct as the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) in oversight of the occupation of Japan is an example of how the right commander and staff worked together with the fundamental of understanding to better plan and execute amelioration of the situation in Japan. After the capitulation of Nazi forces in Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned both Nimitz and MacArthur to coordinate an invasion plan for Japan. Although they were to work together, MacArthur directed his G-3 planners to also develop his own plan for a post conflict occupation of Japan; one which had the Army as the leading role in establishing the conditions for a successful occupation. The product, Operation BLACKLIST, out-competed Nimitz’s alternative plans and placed MacArthur squarely in charge of the future of the Japanese Islands and populations.¹⁴

Even before the Japanese surrender, MacArthur's plan "BLACKLIST" highlighted the need to ameliorate certain characteristics and limitations in the operations area that demanded priority. These included massive military and civilian disarmament and repatriation goals, shipment of food and sheltering supplies to the island to limit starvation and exposure, control of lines of communication and supply distribution with a massive, distributed army force on the ground, using disarmed military for occupation and rebuilding labor, and using local commerce systems in place to assist the economy.¹⁵

With the right understanding of the desired end state and the operational environment the joint commander can leverage the capabilities of military forces to provide timely services to the affected population, leverage other elements of national power through the interagency approach and evaluate the effectiveness of actions in order to keep pace with the changes as infrastructure, security and governance are restored. In the case of Japan, MacArthur derived the end state from the Potsdam Declaration. In summary, this declaration mandated that Japan would have to rid itself of militarism; would suffer occupation until war stocks and war making ability is destroyed; would adopt democratic principles of freedom of speech, religion, thought and respect for human rights; and would divest itself of heavy industries that could be used for war-making by transferring them to allies as reparations.¹⁶

Having formed the plan which later took effect, MacArthur formulated actions to rebuild Japanese society with democratic principles almost immediately after being assigned Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP)¹⁷ MacArthur's understanding of the Japanese demographic is best indicated by his decision to retain Emperor Hirohito as the symbolic head of the Japanese nation, despite a September 1945 Congressional resolution and arguments by Eisenhower to try Hirohito for war crimes. This decision was significant in preserving Japanese support for the

occupation.¹⁸ This action did not engender great favor among war veterans and the 11 allied nations that fought Japanese, and some of who had been victimized during Japan's occupation of their own territory.

Providing for the human element of the immediate post-war operational area perhaps did more to engender the Japanese people to the United States forces and MacArthur himself than could have been imagined from such simple but effective actions. MacArthur pioneered efforts to bring outside food supplies to help relive rampant starvation, although progress was slow and thousands suffered death or prolonged starvation. He brought in a system of land reform as an alternative to landlord farming and feudalism. He allocated priority logistics toward completing the repatriation of soldiers mandated by the Potsdam Declaration, but not only soldiers back to Japan, he repatriated civilians held in Japan during the war to their home countries. His most difficult effort was in repatriating the over 1.3 million Japanese soldiers and civilians taken from Chinese and Korean territory.¹⁹

He worked through the Japanese government, termed the "Diet" to ensure that all laws were removed in Japan that restricted basic freedoms, such as speech, religion, thought and assembly. He assured implementation of these measures and while directly confronting an embedded system of coercion and fear of past government oversight through the use of secret police.²⁰ He gave women the right to vote, changed voting standards and eliminated former Japanese ideological teaching in school classrooms and textbooks. MacArthur's objective was to remove the restrictions that an extremist nationalism had imposed upon the people for years ultimately leading to the fomenting of war.²¹

Initiatives in economics and business made startling progress. He pressured the Diet to craft and promulgate fourteen labor relations bills to protect workers, ensure redress of

grievances, allow such unknown luxuries as vacations and overtime pay, and eliminate the forced labor conditions which were a normal part of Japanese life in the war years. Although this was a difficult societal transition, between 1945 and 1949 Japan went from having five unions with 707 total members to 34,688 unions with 6,655,483.²²

MacArthur understood the need to keep knowledgeable people in the Japanese economic and political system. Although many former regime elements were arrested and tried for war crimes, MacArthur had to balance the U.S. desire to purge Japanese government and economic leadership of all former Japanese war staff against the goal of growing a new, albeit fragile system operating with minimal resources. Occupation historian and Professor Takemae Eiji notes that there was great pressure to purge society of the old regime militarists, and that of 717,415 persons screened by MacArthur's staff, 201,815 were excluded from significant positions in office.²³ "After the occupation, many of these disgraced elements of the old regime regained their political rights; in the first post-occupation Diet election, they accounted for 42 percent of the winning candidates."²⁴

The effects of MacArthur's operational leadership were profoundly strategic. There were a number of Japanese who were likely following a model posed by Clausewitz and were waiting for failure of the U.S. led occupation to regain power: "The defeated side often considers the outcome merely as transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date."²⁵ There were opportunities for suicide attacks, and an insurgency for liberation was at any time possible. In a recent article in *Military Review*, scholar Kavel Sepp analyzed 53 insurgencies and offered best counterinsurgency practices. Of these MacArthur demonstrated Sepp's recommendations for success including his "Focus on population, their needs and security; and Single authority (charismatic, dynamic leader)."²⁶ As one

correspondent in country noted, the mix of MacArthur's policies and the soft power draw of the Japanese toward American values brought into their country by first soldiers and then later civilian service personnel ultimately defeated communist propaganda campaigns.²⁷

It is important to note that the MacArthur's administration would never see the final results of its pure policy efforts and its having ceded most of the occupation governance to the Diet. This included supporting the Diet in their liberalization and deconstruction of large businesses owned by only a few families, known as the *Zaibatsu*, as monopolies that suppressed the distribution of wealth to the Japanese peoples. As Supreme Commander Allied Powers, his policies were often crafted by strategic leadership in Washington. But the key to MacArthur's success rested in his understanding of how best to implement policy, of an understanding of what would work best to reach the desired end state of a peaceful and economically self-sufficient Japan. Yet in 1947, while China was exhibiting signs that the ongoing Communist revolution might succeed, U.S. policy toward Japan changed again. This change brought with it goals of assisting Japan's rapid rebuilding of a military capability and later allowing U.S. forces to establish bases of operations for use in support of the Korean War years later. The military-industrial capability of Japan was renewed; most of it having been slated for reparations to other nations, and heavy industrial capability grew the economy. The Korean War enabled large infusions of U.S. dollars into industrialization and accelerated economic recovery. As the strategic end state for Japan was changed, so did MacArthur's plans and policy. Huge sums were poured into Japanese heavy industry and war production capability, former military were brought into service in both Japan and Korea, and growth industries sprouted in support of the large troop levels reintroduced into the country for the war.²⁸

Our current and perceived future problems in planning for our involvement in stabilization and national assistance operations have not gone unnoticed. Help is on the way. In *An Evolving Joint Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century* the Joint Chiefs of Staff have demonstrated their grasp of the importance of shifting the military's focus from traditional concepts (such as the Principles of War) toward new perspectives which will harness the military's on going transformation and capabilities. This document offers an acceptance by senior leadership that the United States will be involved in not only war in the future, but certainly Military Operations Other Than War. It offers a look at the U.S. military's future operating environment where "religious extremism and intolerance, failing states, competition over natural resources and greater economic disparity among populations" will be the operational environment joint commanders must effectively plan for to achieve desired end states.²⁹ To succeed in future engagements involving the full range of military operations, they have crafted changes to the traditional concepts or core fundamentals planners use when evaluating operations. In this new context, they have added "understanding" as a fundamental to replace the principle formerly called "Simplicity." "Understanding is described as – Know, comprehend, and share common relevant knowledge of the global battle space to facilitate operational execution."³⁰

The current insurgency in post-conflict Iraq and the difficulty the operational commander has in providing security for the military and overall Iraqi population illustrate the requirement to continue to streamline a useful, flexible approach to planning for stability operations. When a regime is expelled, the task of securing and running a nation falls upon the victors. Its difficulty includes: acceptance of the defeated population, security for infrastructure and population, and the provision of basic needs until new governance and systems are capable

of autonomous operations.³¹ This seems obvious, but providing the right amount of security and input to political and economic systems will be hard to accomplish without a comprehensive understanding of the actions and reactions of the people and systems in place at the time of regime change.

The role of understanding in planning and analysis would be to determine if assumptions in planning regarding accepted practices, systems and policies would be effective in the joint commander's operational area. Understanding as a tool with which one can apply or leverage might assist in bringing the right types of military and civilian efforts to the region. The Iraq model illustrates the challenges when complex command and control arrangements are shared by the Joint Commander and civil authority both tasked with restoring a state and its function. The turnover of nation building tasks to civil authority did not provide for unity of effort. The lack of execution of, or more likely, the decision not to execute plans which would have provided a more robust military security presence in post-conflict urban areas to inhibit crimes such as looting demonstrated a deficit of needed understanding of the culture and the complexities of the human condition extant. Nor did strategic or operational leadership provide the more experienced military force leaders the span of control necessary to set the conditions for security that ultimately were needed.³²

Despite recent failures to fully achieve the desired end state in U.S. Military Operations Other Than War, the historic example of MacArthur's leadership in administering the Occupation of Japan demonstrates the importance of this fundamental from two distinct lenses – that choosing an operational commander who demonstrates this ability is critical, and that operations in the Stabilize and Enable Civil Authority phases should use it as a governing factor. Because of MacArthur's experience and understanding of the Japanese demography, political

and economic institutions, and infrastructure conditions in Japan toward the end of World War II, he was able to craft and administer a successful occupation that met the strategic and operational end state.

Was this a singular event forged by the timing of the occupation and the temperament of the Japanese people? It is unlikely that success for MacArthur would not have occurred had he or his staff not demonstrated the capacity to understand which policies and actions would be needed in Japan. MacArthur was the right person at the right time for the desired end state. He understood the changes that would be necessary and the requirement to continually reassess the commander's estimate as the occupation progressed. "My professional military knowledge was no longer a major factor. I had to be an economist, a political scientist, and engineer, a manufacturing executive, a teacher, even a theologian of sorts."³³

Will operational commanders be fully in charge of Peace Building and National Assistance efforts in the future? With the new office of Reconstruction forming at the Department of State, it is likely that the future holds an interagency approach. However, this is a new office that does not have the means yet to be fully engaged in operations to the degree that the Joint Force Commander will be. This is not a convincing case that the solution is at hand. In any operation involving the use of military personnel, the Joint Commander must be prepared to execute any of the needed phases of the operation. The following paragraphs below prescribe recommendations that will help the military achieve the desired operational and strategic end state.

When contingency or crisis planning allows, military leaders should consider selecting and a Joint Force Commander whom has the capacity to understand the operational environment, particularly in the Stabilize and Enable Civil Authority phases promulgated in the recent draft

Joint Publication 5-0. This commander would through past actions and experience have demonstrated a combination of experience in theater, cultural awareness and contacts in the region that would act with synergy in the commander's approach to planning and execution. In "War and the Art of Governance," military scholar Nadia Schadlow argues that political and economic restructuring of a post conflict state will and should fall into the hands of the military victors. She contends that failures ongoing in post-conflict Iraq, such as the active insurgency, delays in achieving self-governance and national infrastructure repair, *inter alia*, illustrate the requirement for Joint Force Commanders to consider managing political and economic factors as an integral component of planning, command and control and implementation.³⁴ This might involve changing the concept of how senior officers are selected to lead these efforts and change the duration of tour lengths in order to bring the experienced regional understanding and operational expertise to bear where needed. Area tour lengths should be lengthened to allow persistent exposure, learning and understanding, and strengthening of relationships key to cooperation and acceptance.³⁵

Operational Commanders, Joint Task Force Commanders, components and operational planning staffs should support and promulgate the Joint Chief's recommendations for new fundamentals for the Twenty First century, particularly when developing operational plans for Military Operations Other Than War involving National Assistance, Stability Operations and Enabling Civil Control of the operational area. Plans should be tested and discussed using the most accurate measures and principles, not just the most convenient. Selection of the appropriate governing factors in evaluating courses of action and themes for these phases is paramount. Using understanding as a metric, a governing factor, or a new principle of Military Operations

Other Than War might serve to allow planners and commanders to fully realize the impact of their courses of action on the operational area's regional demographics and cultures.

For the long term, the military must continue to embark on recent initiatives to educate military personnel in areas of cultural awareness and regional language training for military positions far beyond Foreign Area Officers and analysts. Although it will be impossible to master all aspects of any society merely through academic work and brief in-country periods, there has to be a foundation from which military leaders can benefit from their experiences and perform more accurate analysis in planning considerations for operations. It has yet to be proven that it is impossible to have a military in which personnel are resident experts who garner years of in country experience. The traditional career enhancement models for officer promotion, for example, usually require transfers every two or three years, a variety of perceived career enhancing experiences and a more generalist approach to the art of leadership and conducting operations. It may be possible to geographically regionalize these tours and experiences and still grow superior military operational leaders if the perception of what constitutes career enhancement is altered to set the conditions for better cultural and regional understanding.

When future operations for the Joint Force Commander involve Military Operations Other Than War, the capacity to harness understanding will serve the interests of the planning staff and the commander in developing and executing actions which best support reaching objectives and the desired end state. Through the lens of understanding, the Joint Force Commander can best interpret and implement direction from higher authority and implement plans and policy that will have a greater probability of success.

Notes

¹ Lawrence A. Yates, "The U.S. Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1989-2005," Global War on Terrorism Occasional paper. (Ft Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 26-34. Available on line at: <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/yates.pdf>.

² Colin S. Gray, "The American Way of War: Critique and Implications," in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 27.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *An Evolving Joint Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century*, (Washington, D.C.: JCS) 28 January 2003. Reprint from Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College. These new fundamentals, which are designed to synergize the Principles of War and principles of Military Operations Other Than War are; End State; Initiative; Application of Combat Power; Joint Maneuver; Tempo; Unity of Effort; Safeguarding the Force; Shock; Understanding; Will; Legitimacy; Sustainability; Adaptability.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 2-0 (Washington, D.C.: JCS 2000), I-6.

⁵ J. D. Little, ed., *Jomini and His Summary of The Art of War*, (Harrisburg, PA: The Telegraph Press 1947), 51.

⁶ Mixin Pei and Sara Kasper, "Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief 24*, 1-3. Available on line at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm>.

⁷ Ibid. 4.

⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 1995), Joint Electronic Library on [CD-ROM], August 2004. III-14.

⁹ Ibid, III-9.

¹⁰ Office of The President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2006). Available on line at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006>.

¹¹ Joint Chief of Staff, *Joint Operational Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0, Revision Final Coordination Draft of 11 April 2006 (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 2006), II-17, IV-36. Available on line at: <https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dftpubs/planning.htm>. Current planning phases consist of "Deter/Engage, Seize Initiative, Decisive Operations, and Transition." The Draft JP 5-0 proposes the following new phases: "Shape, Deter, Seize Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize, and Enable Civil Authority."

¹² Ibid., III-26. "Governing Factors are those aspects of the situation (or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems critical to the accomplishment of the mission."

¹³ Robert H. Scales, "The Second Learning Revolution," in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 50.

¹⁴ Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy*, (New York, N.Y.: Continuum Books, 2002), 39-40.

¹⁵ General Headquarters, United States Army Pacific, *Operation BLACKLIST*, 3rd ed., 8 August 1945. Available on line at: <http://stinet.dtic.mil/>.

¹⁶ *The Potsdam Declaration*, (Potsdam, Germany, 26 July 1945). Available on line at: <http://www.army.mil/postwarJapan/downloads/Potsdam%20Declaration.pdf>. 1-2.

¹⁷ Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History*, (New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 213. "First destroy the military power...Then build the structure of representative government...Enfranchise the women...Free the political prisoners...Liberate the farmers...Establish a free labor movement...Encourage a free economy...Abolish police repression...Develop a free and responsible press...Liberalize education...Decentralize the political power."

¹⁸ D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster*, Vol III, (Boston, Mass., Houghton Mifflin Co: 1985), 108.

¹⁹ Ibid., 90.

²⁰ Ibid., 110-111.

²¹ Ibid., 115-118.

²² Ibid., 175-176.

²³ Takemae Eiji., 269.

²⁴ Mixin Pei and Sara Kasper., 1-3.

²⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1976), 80.

²⁶ Kavel I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, (May/June 2005): 10.

²⁷ Russell Brines, *MacArthur's Japan*, (New York, N.Y.: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1948), 263-267.

²⁸ D. Clayton James., 330-332.

²⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *An Evolving Joint Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century*, (Washington, D.C.: JCS 28 January 2003), Naval War College Reprint.

These new fundamentals, which are designed to synergize the Principles of War and principles of Military Operations Other Than War are; End State; Initiative; Application of Combat Power; Joint Maneuver; Tempo; Unity of Effort; Safeguarding the Force; Shock; Understanding; Will; Legitimacy; Sustainability; Adaptability.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 54.

³¹ Fredrick W. Kagan, "War and Aftermath," In *Strategy and Force Planning*, ed. by the Security, Strategy, Forces faculty of the Naval War College. 4th ed., (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press 2004), 630.

³² Nadia Schadlow, "War and the Art of Governance," in *Strategy and Force Planning*, ed. by the Security, Strategy, Forces faculty of the Naval War College. 4th ed. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press 2004), 650.

³³ Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, (New York, N.Y.: McGraw Hill Book Company 1964), 281-282.

³⁴ Schadlow., 647.

³⁵ Anthony Cordesman, "Iraq's Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War," (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies 2006), xxvi. Available on line at <http://www.csis.org/csis/pubs/060322-iraqinsurgency.pdf>. Cordesman recommends, *inter alia*, that concerning the U.S. military in stability operations and nation building: "It needs to improve both their area and language skills, create the added specialized forces it needs for stability and nation building operations, and rethink tour length for military who work in critical positions and with allied forces. Personal relationships are absolutely critical in the countries where the US is most likely to fight counterinsurgency wars. So is area expertise and continuity in intelligence."

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