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**Interagency Cooperation, Is It Enough to Achieve Unity of Effort?:  
Command and Control Concepts for the Homeland Maritime Domain.**

**by**

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

**10 October 2006**

## **Abstract**

*Interagency Cooperation, Is It Enough to Achieve Unity of Effort?:  
Command and Control Concepts for the Homeland Maritime Domain.*

Protection of the Homeland Maritime Domain from terrorist attacks presents unique and complex difficulties for interagency coordination. Cooperation alone is not sufficient enough to allow U.S. Armed Forces and Domestic Agencies to function with the unity of effort that is required to operate within a decision cycle that is sufficiently fast enough to defeat a highly adaptive terrorist threat. Maritime Homeland Defense and Security need to be married with operational command and control concepts that ensure unity of effort, that are in keeping with the principle of unity of command, and that allow a seamless transition between security and defense. This paper draws on lessons from the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to identify operational command and control principles that can be applied to the task of organizing the defense and security of the Maritime Domain. Finally, this paper proposes that the Joint Interagency Task Force, which was created to fight the War on Drugs, serves as an ideal Command and Control structure to model.

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*“The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between their two departments.”*

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5  
28 February 2003

## **Introduction**

The terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 were the most devastating surprise attacks against America since the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. America was left in a state of shock wondering, “How could such an attack happen?” and, more importantly, “How do we prevent it from happening again?” The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States compiled the *9/11 Commission Report*. In it, the Commission recognized that the terrorist tactics exploited multiple seams between the government agencies which had been constructed and organized to win the Cold War.<sup>1</sup> Today’s threat in the Global War on Terror comes from less visible non-state actors that “call for quick, imaginative responses.”<sup>2</sup>

While multiple failures contributed to the enemy being able to achieve almost complete surprise in the case of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, a vast number of the failures can be directly attributed to seams in interagency command and control (C2). The 9/11 Commission concluded that “no one was firmly in charge of managing the case and able to draw relevant intelligence from anywhere in the government, assign responsibilities across the agencies (foreign or domestic), track progress, and quickly bring obstacles up to the level where they could be resolved.”<sup>3</sup> Prior to 9/11, coordination between agencies was largely a product of cooperation rather than the product of unity of command. And the 9/11

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<sup>1</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, Authorized Edition, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc , 2002), 399.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 400.

Commission concluded that, “The agencies cooperated, some of the time. But even such cooperation as there was is not the same thing as joint action.”<sup>4</sup> At the operational level, defending against hijacked civilian airliners required rapid decisions that command coordinated through cooperation was not able to provide.

Although the lessons of 9/11 have been thoroughly reviewed and largely corrected, many of the seams that were exploited in our Nation’s domestic airspace domain on September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 still remain in the Maritime Domain. The creation of both the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command represented huge advances in developing unity of command, yet the Maritime Domain still suffers from multiple agencies with overlapping responsibilities. It has been noted that, “The missions of homeland defense and homeland security in the maritime realm are anything but clear and distinct.”<sup>5</sup> In the absence of clear and directed unity of effort, maritime agencies faced with an unpredicted threat could find themselves unable to react rapidly enough against an enemy that is not constrained by traditional rules of warfare.

**Ultimately, cooperation alone is not sufficient enough to allow U.S. Armed Forces and Domestic Agencies to function with the unity of effort that is required to operate within a decision cycle that is sufficiently fast enough to defeat a highly adaptive terrorist threat. Maritime Homeland Defense and Security need to be married with operational command and control concepts that ensure unity of effort, that are in keeping with the principle of unity of command, and that allow a seamless transition between security and defense.**

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<sup>4</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 400.

<sup>5</sup> Ivan T. Luke, “DoD’s Role in Maritime Homeland Defense & Security” (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2006), 5.

## The Maritime Interagency Players

There are a vast number of agencies now responsible for executing the *National Strategy for Maritime Security*. The strategic concepts for maritime security are addressed in *The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) for the National Strategy for Maritime Security*.<sup>6</sup> As an indication of the incredible interagency coordination required for the maritime environment, MOTR defines agency roles for the Departments of: Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Energy, and Transportation.<sup>7</sup> Currently, two of those massive federal agencies, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are both assigned primary responsibilities for protecting the United States from a terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security is designated to “prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation.”<sup>8</sup> Likewise, the Department of Defense has designated United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to “conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States.”<sup>9</sup>

At the operational level in the homeland maritime environment, both the DHS and USNORTHCOM have multiple agencies participating in maritime defense and security. Agencies involved in Maritime Security include the U.S. Coast Guard, the FBI, the CIA,

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<sup>6</sup> Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee, *Maritime Operational Threat Response for the National Strategy for Maritime Security*, (October 2005), 1. For Official Use Only (FOUO).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, ii.

<sup>8</sup> U. S. Department of Homeland Security’s full mission statement: “We will lead the unified national effort to secure America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security Homepage, “DHS Organization,” [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial\\_0413.xml](http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0413.xml) (accessed 04 September 2006).

<sup>9</sup> USNORTHCOM’s mission is to “Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide defense support of civil authorities including incident management operations.” United States Northern Command Homepage, “U.S. Northern Command: Our Vision,” [http://www.northcom.mil/about\\_us/vision.htm](http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/vision.htm) (accessed 04 September 2006).

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Customs and Border Protection, just to name a few. DoD and its Combatant Command organization and Joint structure has much less division than DHS but nonetheless, includes the four main branches of the Armed Forces, and the Coast Guard when it is shifted from DHS to DoD. With such a vast number of agencies, effective Operational Command and Control is essential for mission success.

### **Operational Command and Control**

Operational C2 is the “principle means by which a theater commander sequences and synchronizes joint force activities in peacetime and orchestrates the use of military and non-military sources of power to accomplish assigned strategic objectives.”<sup>10</sup> Although, this statement comes from a study on operational joint warfare, the principles are also applicable to interagency efforts to combat terrorist attacks. The ‘principles of war’ in general serve as a guide to fighting the Global War on Terror, around the world, in our backyard, and in our maritime domain.

One of the main tenets of effective command and control is unity of command. “A divided command invariably has been the source of great weakness, often yielding fatal consequences.”<sup>11</sup> Lack of unity of command greatly contributed to both of the most successful surprise attacks against America in history. At Pearl Harbor, lack of a joint force commander in Hawaii was a major contributing factor as to why the United States was unable to offer any coordinated resistance to the Japanese attack.<sup>12</sup> On September 11<sup>th</sup> the diverse and uncoordinated domestic agencies were unable to effect a military response in time to defeat the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, although with

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<sup>10</sup> Milan N. Vego, *Operational Warfare* (Newport, RI: U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2000), 187.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

effective command and control there would have been time to do so. It is worth noting that the decision to take any defensive military action against the terrorist piloted airliners was not made until it rose to the level where unity of command could be found. Unfortunately, this level was at the Office of the President of the United States, and interagency ‘cooperation’ did not allow the critical information to flow rapidly enough to make a timely decision.<sup>13</sup>

One of the key lessons learned from examination of the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> was that cooperation cannot be relied upon as a substitute for the organized coordination that is the hallmark of unity of command. The 9/11 Commission Report criticized that, “When agencies cooperate, (only) one defines the problem and seeks help with it.”<sup>14</sup> The value of having multiple agencies working together to define the problem is lost when cooperation is the sole means of coordination. The Commission observed that ‘joint action’ is preferable to ‘cooperation.’ The Commission also, “mentioned two reasons for joint action—the virtue of joint planning and the advantage of having someone in charge to ensure a unified effort.”<sup>15</sup>

Joint doctrine explains that “the purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort.”<sup>16</sup> However, just having unity of effort is not enough to provide a more seamless defense against terrorist attacks, especially when considering that multiple agencies at numerous points could have foiled the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>. Although, ‘unity of command’ and ‘unity of effort’ both start with “unity of” the two are not synonymous. Nor is unity of effort a substitute for unity of command. Unity of effort may be “one of the prerequisites of successful performance by a command,”<sup>17</sup> but is also a result of effective

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<sup>13</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, Authorized Edition, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc , 2002), 40-41.

<sup>14</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 400.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 401.

<sup>16</sup> Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 10 September 2001), A-2.

<sup>17</sup> Vego, 187.

command and control. Unity of effort is essentially created by leadership. The Administration certainly recognized that effective command and control stem from a unity of command which can ensure a unity of effort in defeating future terrorist attacks. When DHS was created, it represented “the most significant reorganization of the federal government in more than a half-century,” and was designed to “serve as the unifying core of the vast national network of organizations and institutions involved in homeland security.”<sup>18</sup> The creation of DHS was an effort to establish a much needed unity of command for the domestic agencies responsible for the protection of the Nation.

However, complete unity of command is generally considered unsuitable for protection of the American Homeland. This is because of the basic principles upon which this country was founded. Military command of domestic agencies in the name of unity of command could violate Constitutional principles as well as the Nation’s tradition of refraining from employing the military in domestic affairs. To avoid many of the conflicts in responsibility, DoD and DHS strive to define the fundamental difference between their roles of defense and security.

### **Maritime ‘Defensesecurity’**

To Department of Defense (DoD) personnel “defense” and “security” are often used interchangeably as synonyms for protection. Even the DoD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, notes that “the Department of Defense is the traditional vanguard of American’s ‘security’.”<sup>19</sup> “The military has traditionally secured the United States by

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<sup>18</sup> *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, 11.

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, (Washington, DC: June 2005), iii.

projecting power overseas,”<sup>20</sup> where conducting the roles of ‘security’ and ‘defense’ do not threaten America’s Constitutional principles. However, the importance of distinguishing between Maritime Defense and Security when operating in the United States is a matter of obeying the Nation’s laws and thus adhering to the U.S. Constitution which military members take an oath to defend.

The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) of 1878 places limits on DoD personnel when participating in the homeland security mission. The PCA’s provisions were enacted to generally restrict U.S. military personnel from conducting law enforcement activities such as interdicting vessels, making arrests, conducting surveillance, searches, or seizures within the United States unless directed by the President to do so.<sup>21</sup> These missions are the primary responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security. USNORTHCOM’s website notes that, “Prohibiting direct military involvement in law enforcement is in keeping with long-standing U.S. law and policy limiting the military’s role in domestic affairs.”<sup>22</sup> The difference between Homeland Defense and Homeland Security roughly breaks down to differentiating between external and internal threats respectively. DHS defines Homeland security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States,”<sup>23</sup> while DOD defines Homeland defense as “protection... against external threats and aggression.”<sup>24</sup> The difficulty arises when the nature and origin of the threat is not immediately clear.

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<sup>20</sup> U.S. President, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, Office of Homeland Security, (Washington, DC: White House, July 2002), iii.

<sup>21</sup> J.R. Wilson, “A Single Game Plan: Federal Agencies Sorting Out Homeland Responsibilities,” *Armed Forces Journal*, (May 2004): 48- 52.

<sup>22</sup> USNORTHCOM Website, [http://www.northcom.mil/about\\_us/posse\\_comitatus.htm](http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/posse_comitatus.htm) (accessed 17 September 2006).

<sup>23</sup> *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, 2.

<sup>24</sup> *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, 5.

## Maritime Scenario

For the sake of analysis, imagine the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> in a maritime scenario.<sup>25</sup> The Coast Guard, conducting routine surveillance near a major port, comes across a typical foreign flag tanker that is suspiciously unresponsive. Its course and speed indicate normal movement into port, but the tanker's contents being liquefied natural gas (LNG) require immediate reaction. Disabling the ship may be an option, but in our case the interceptor is a small unit that does not have the fire power onboard to stop a tanker that is simply not communicating. The tanker and its corresponding potential blast radius will quickly become a threat to the port and its surrounding population. The Command and Control structure's capabilities and the expeditious execution of its response rapidly become the determining factor between success and disaster. Space and time both quickly run out as they did on September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 in the airliner scenario.

Is this scenario beyond possibility? Maybe, an LNG tanker is a bit conspicuous but one need only replace the image with an inconspicuous cargo ship carrying WMD to get the same effect.<sup>26</sup> It has been noted that, "In fact for most conceivable threat scenarios, the missions overlap considerably and one may well morph into the other as circumstances develop."<sup>27</sup> Of course, this scenario paints a picture where rapid decisions are based on the detection of one suspect ship in a sea of largely unregulated shipping. The problems and difficulties in Maritime Domain Awareness that are also inherent in this scenario are important topics and merit further investigation, but are beyond the scope of this paper.

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<sup>25</sup> Luke, 5.

<sup>26</sup> *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, 4. The Maritime scenario in this paper is just one possibly derived from a striking list of potential terrorist capabilities outline in *The National Strategy for Maritime Security*.

<sup>27</sup> Luke, 5.

The threat posed by this scenario would trigger the Maritime Operational Threat Response Protocols. The MOTR Protocols were developed by the Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee, which layouts “guiding principles” for interagency coordination in response to a maritime threat.<sup>28</sup> The MOTR Protocols mitigate the danger of merely allowing a maritime threat to be dealt with by ad hoc cooperation. The Protocols are an effort to improve interagency coordination but are limited because they are reactive in nature. Coordination in response to a threat occurs only after one of the listed ‘triggers’ is met.<sup>29</sup> Example triggers that activate the Protocols include when more than one agency has become substantially involved in a response, or when an agency determines that it “lacks the capability, capacity, or jurisdiction to address the threat.”<sup>30</sup> Although the Protocols move the maritime response beyond ad hoc cooperation, they fail to set forth a plan that is more than merely reactionary. The MOTR plan applied to our analysis threat scenario offers little in the way of ensuring a positive outcome through proactive measures. A small determined terrorist threat has the opportunity to work inside of the decision loop of combined interagency forces involved in the maritime domain if defensive action is predicated on waiting for detectable triggers.

### **C2 and Factor Time**

COL John Boyd, Air Force fighter pilot and military strategist, developed the OODA Loop decision model which offers an explanation of how seemingly superior forces can be defeated by seemingly inferior ones. Boyd’s model is effective for explaining the success of terrorist attacks against the United States and can lead to insights on how to defeat future

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<sup>28</sup> Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee, *Maritime Operational Threat Response Protocols*, (5 March 2006), 1-5. (For Official Use Only).

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

attacks. The basic premise behind Boyd's theory is that "the key to success in conflict is to operate inside the opponent's decision cycle."<sup>31</sup> Boyd's decision cycle consists of four elements which are observation, orientation, decision, and action (OODA).<sup>32</sup> These four elements arranged in a circle, or loop, depict the repetitive decision cycle which adversaries operate in.<sup>33</sup>

The OODA Loop is relevant to a terrorist threat scenario in that, "Advantages in observation and orientation enable a tempo in decision-making and execution that outpaces the ability of the foe to react effectively in time."<sup>34</sup> Command and Control is the thinking and adapting operational function that allows an agency or organization to react to emerging threats. The 9/11 Commission realized that, "When agencies act jointly, the problem and options for action is defined differently from the start. Individuals from different backgrounds come together in analyzing a case and planning how to manage it."<sup>35</sup> In other words, effective command and control can provide advantages in orientation and observation which can limit terrorist threats from operating inside the Nations' maritime OODA Loop.

## **C2 Recommendations**

An outstanding example of effective and adaptive interagency command and control structure has been in place since long before our homeland was attacked by terrorists. Created in 1989 to fight the War on Drugs, the Joint Interagency Task Force pioneered interagency coordination. Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) – West under U.S. Pacific Command and JIATF- South under U.S. Southern Command are currently America's

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<sup>31</sup> Colin S. Gray, "Modern Strategy," in *The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security*, ed. Grant T. Hammond (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 5.

<sup>32</sup> Grant T. Hammond, *The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security*, (Washington D. C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 5.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Gray, 5.

<sup>35</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 401.

frontline interagency forces to counter illegal trafficking. JIATF West's mission is representative of both organizations and states that their task is:

To conduct activities to detect, disrupt and dismantle drug-related transnational threats in Asia and the Pacific by **providing interagency intelligence fusion**, supporting U.S. law enforcement, and developing partner nation capacity in order to protect U.S. security interests at home and abroad. To accomplish this mission, JIATF West provides U.S. and foreign law enforcement with fused interagency information and intelligence analysis, and with counterdrug training and infrastructure development support.<sup>36</sup>

The JIATF concept has been applying "interagency fusion" for over 17 years, executing a mission that would potentially have multiple responsibility overlaps and inefficiencies in the unity of effort. JIATFs are also a particularly good example of interagency coordination in the Maritime Domain because most of their drug interdiction efforts occur along the United States' massive maritime border.

The interagency coordination that occurs at the JIATFs is highly in keeping with the principle of unity of command. A recent Joint Forces Quarterly article explained how representatives from the broad spectrum of DoD and DHS were organized to carry out a mission that covered a potential broad range of interagency seams. The article noted in JIATF- South:

The top command structure demonstrates total integration, with the Director being a Coast Guard rear admiral and the Vice Director coming from the Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Integration also exists through the lower levels of the command: both the Directors for Intelligence and Operations are military officers, but their Deputies are from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Customs and Border Protection.<sup>37</sup>

This command structure is truly unique in that it crosses beyond the strict construct of DoD units remaining under DoD command. With little public notice, DoD and multiple elements of DHS work in a fully integrated command and control structure. It should be emphasized

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<sup>36</sup> U.S. Pacific Command Website, "JIAFT West Page," <http://www.pacom.mil/staff/jiatfwest/index.shtml> (accessed 25 September 2006).

<sup>37</sup> Richard M. Yeatman, "JIATF-South: Blueprint for Success," JFQ Forum, *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 42, (3rd Quarter 2006): 26-27.

that the leader of the entire Task Force is not a Navy Rear Admiral but a Coast Guard Rear Admiral and his Vice Director is not a member of the Armed Services, but rather a Customs and Border Protection GS-15. The article goes on to list multiple agencies such as the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) which are included in this interagency command.<sup>38</sup> The JIATF concept is an exceptional model for what is possible in interagency coordination.

The JIATF concept also has developed coalition partners to fight illegal trafficking. In JIATF-South alone, there are eleven permanent foreign staff officers.<sup>39</sup> The JIATF serves as an example of successful coalition integration as well as successful interagency fusion. One of the main contributors to that success is the unity of effort that is created as the result of a C2 structure that is very close to the principle of unity of command. The ‘unity of command’ that makes a JIATF’s operational C2, may not be unity of command in the strictest military sense, but it is an adaptable command structure that focuses efforts of a vast number of agencies.

JIATF South and West must constantly adapt to stay inside of the narcotrafficker’s decision loop because the illegal drug trade by its very nature is highly adaptive. There are many parallels between the tactics of narcotraffickers and terrorists. Both narcotraffickers and terrorists attempt to take advantage of the U.S.’s extensive borders to avoid detection, both are constantly changing and adapting tactics to accomplish their mission and both threats require a coordinated interagency effort to defeat. Army GEN Bantz J. Craddock of U.S. Southern Command commented on the adaptability of narcotraffickers saying, “That because of our effectiveness in the maritime arena, they (narcotraffickers) may be going back

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Kathleen T. Rhem, “Joint Interagency Working to Stop Flow of Drugs Into U.S.,” U.S. Department of Defense Information, 22 September 2006, <http://www.proquest.umi.com> (accessed 25 September 2006).

to more air transport.”<sup>40</sup> This same logic applied to terrorists means that based on the effective counter terrorist measures to protect the Nations airlines and airspace; terrorists may very well use the maritime environment to carry out their next devastating attack.

So if JIATF South and West are already in place and succeeding, why not just add counterterrorism to their missions? There are several significant reasons. JIATF South and West fall under the command of USSOCOM and USPACCOM respectively, and the Defense of the Homeland is undisputedly a USNORTHCOM mission. Another argument against simply adding the counterterrorism mission is it would be a massive broadening of a task force’s mission. For all their similarities, the aims of narcotraffickers and terrorists are very different. Narcotraffickers smuggling for profit seek a very different end state than suicidal terrorists. While both are highly adaptive, their changes in tactics will undoubtedly be as different as their aims. Expecting one task force to maintain situational awareness about two very different groups would very possibly set the stage for failure. Unfortunately, the limitations of assigning a ‘JIATF North’ the dual mission of counterterrorism and counter drugs have gone unrecognized by USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM has in fact taken what was Joint Task Force (JTF) 6 and redesignated it as Joint Task Force – North. Joint Task Force 6, like JIATF South and West, was established “to serve as the planning and coordinating operational headquarters to support local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies within the Southwest border region to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.”<sup>41</sup> Now as Joint Task Force – North, its mission has morphed into deterring and preventing transnational threats within and along the approaches to the continental

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<sup>40</sup> Rhem.

<sup>41</sup> Joint Task Force North Website, “History,” <http://www.jtfn.northcom.mil/subpages/history.html> (accessed on 02 October 2006).

United States.<sup>42</sup> Ultimately, Joint Task Force North is tasked with fighting the War on Drugs, and the Global War on Terror, while coordinating military support for an unprecedented number of Federal Agencies.

A more feasible recommendation would be for USNORTHCOM to use the JIATF concept as a model to create a maritime focused JIATF. The Maritime JIATF would facilitate command and control of the vast number of agencies now responsible for executing the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR).<sup>43</sup> A Maritime JIATF would focus on seaborne threats and be complementary to the North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) focus on airborne threats. Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, NORAD has adapted to smoothly transition from supporting Homeland Security to executing the mission of Homeland Defense.<sup>44</sup> The Maritime JIATF could likewise transition rapidly from supporting DHS agencies, like the Coast Guard, to providing Homeland Defense.

At the operational level of maritime security, a Maritime JIATF would be responsible for continuously monitoring the Homeland Maritime Defense requirements of numerous agencies in the CONUS maritime environment. However, the Maritime JIATF would not just be a Maritime NORAD. The Nation's current monitoring capability of the CONUS Maritime Domain is technologically limited. It has been noted that, "leaders... recognize that the maritime domain is fundamentally different than the air domain and that a maritime version of the NORAD C4ISR concept doesn't adequately address the challenge."<sup>45</sup> Yet, a

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<sup>42</sup>Joint Task Force North Website, "Mission," <http://www.jtfn.northcom.mil/subpages/mission.html> (accessed on 02 October 2006).

<sup>43</sup> Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee, *Maritime Operational Threat Response for the National Strategy for Maritime Security*, (October 2005), 1. For Official Use Only (FOUO).

<sup>44</sup> North American Aerospace Defense Command Website, "NORAD Vision," [http://www.norad.mil/about\\_us/vision.htm](http://www.norad.mil/about_us/vision.htm) (accessed 10 September 2006).

<sup>45</sup> Luke, 2. In his paper Professor Ivan T. Luke directs the reader to Donna Miles, "Planning Group Weighs Value of a Maritime NORAD," *American Forces Press Service*, Washington DC., 3 November 2004 for more information on the concept.

Maritime JIATF would be responsible for developing new concepts that would address the challenges. While the new concepts are being developed, the Maritime JIATF would be responsible for monitoring the triggers set forth in the MOTR Protocols. By vigilantly observing and orientating the threats in the Homeland Maritime Domain, the Maritime JIATF would become more proactive and be in a position to rapidly decide and act.

### **Conclusion**

Protection of the Homeland Maritime Domain from terrorist attacks presents unique and complex difficulties for interagency coordination. Lessons learned from the 9/11 attacks revealed seams in the command and control of the agencies responsible for protecting America's Homeland. Much has been done to correct the shortcomings of our nation's layered defense since those attacks, but the Maritime Domain remains vulnerable to many of the gaps in interagency coordination that were exploited on September 11<sup>th</sup>.

Interagency cooperation is reactive and does not allow U.S. Armed Forces and Domestic Agencies to function with the unity of effort that is required to operate with a decision cycle that is sufficiently fast enough to defeat a highly adaptive terrorist threat. Maritime Homeland Defense and Security can be married with operational command and control concepts that ensure unity of effort, that are in keeping with the principle of unity of command, and that allow a seamless transition between security and defense. The Joint Interagency Task Force serves as an excellent model of a successful command and control concept. The JIATF has unity of command at the operational level and therefore has the means to ensure a unity of effort in securing the Nation's extensive Maritime Domain.

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