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**From the Warehouse to the Battlefield: The Important Role of the Joint Logistician in
Operational Planning**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

From the Warehouse to the Battlefield: The Important Role of the Joint Logistician in Operational Planning

Logistics is a key component of a successful campaign or major operation. It is an integral part of operational planning and tactical execution. While it cannot be the sole focus of an operational commander, it is imperative that they appoint logisticians proficient in joint logistics to their staffs to ensure the integration of logistics into every phase of operational planning. Transformation efforts within the Department of Defense have given way to several logistics process improvements; however, there are still areas where improvement will lead to a more agile and fully sustained force. The individual services must not overlook the value of joint training and experience and institute processes to cultivate logisticians who are not only proficient in intra-service logistical requirements, but are also able to effectively function in a joint operational environment. This paper explores current initiatives in developing a corps of joint qualified logisticians and explains what is working and where improvement can be made. Finally, it draws the conclusion that effective transformation is only as good as the people employed to manage its implementation.

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“The supported JFC expects joint logistics to give him freedom of action, so he is able to execute his mission effectively and according to his timetable. Sustained operational readiness gives the JFC the freedom of action he needs to respond effectively to operational objectives. Sustained operational readiness is the result of the cumulative efforts of logistics players across the entire joint logistics environment.”ⁱ

-- LTG C.V. Christianson

INTRODUCTION

Successful military engagements, both past and present, have highlighted the importance of coordinated, effective and efficient sustainment of forces. While the intricacies of logistics may not be as intriguing as other operational functions, it remains critical to the efficiency and effectiveness of any operational plan. Although it is a key component in operational planning, the logistics process and infrastructure associated with it must be efficient, expedient, flexible, adaptable and responsive to the needs of the operational commander. Most of all it must be responsive to the men and women on the battlefield whose lives literally depend on it.

The functional areas of logistical support as defined in the Doctrine for Logistical Support of Joint Operations (Joint Publication 4-0) include: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services, and other services. The individual services in conjunction with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), U. S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and U. S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) are charged with the responsibility of being the supporting entities for the joint force.ⁱⁱ The joint force commander exercises the authority to coordinate and synchronize support from these entities to provide for the logistical needs of the joint force. The scope and complexity of this responsibility requires a staff with a thorough understanding of force requirements and foresight to avoid critical bottlenecks that may jeopardize operational success.

Today's dynamic and sometime volatile global environment has demanded a need to employ forces around the world in different roles to maintain our national security, ensure the rights of our global neighbors are not compromised and bolster our national interests. Whether in war or military operations other than war, the real-time situational awareness of operational logistics is essential to successfully employing the principles of operational art. Effective command and control of critical logistics functions has been and will continue to be a key component of a successful operation or campaign.

Logistics cannot be the exclusive focus of an operational commander. However, it cannot be overlooked. Logistical planning at the operational level defines the success or failure of a campaign or major operation. In light of the critical role logistics has in operational planning and execution, it is imperative that the Operational Commander appoint logisticians proficient in joint logistics to their staffs to actively monitor and ensure the integration of logistics into every phase of operational planning.

BACKGROUND

Qualified joint logisticians reach proficiency through a combination of education and experience. Proficiency in one area of logistics or within a particular branch of service does not ensure proficiency in the joint logistics arena. A joint logistician must be knowledgeable of critical elements within the joint environment, for example, service unique requirements and planning tools such as the joint planning and execution systems (JOPES). *The 2004 National Military Strategy's* description of a joint force for mission success identifies deploying and sustaining military capability as an essential function and capability and highlights force generation as key to its success. It specifically says, "Force generation includes recruiting, training, educating and retaining highly qualified people in the Active

and Reserve components as well as within the DoD civilian and contracted workforce. These personnel must include planning programming, acquisition, maintenance, repair and recapitalization of equipment and infrastructure to maintain readiness.”ⁱⁱⁱ

The dynamics of today’s global environment often requires coordination and cooperation between joint force commanders in different geographic locations. Lieutenant General Christianson, the current Director for Logistics, J-4 on the Joint Staff, feels that this new multi-national and complex environment along with the ability to sustain a joint force in the midst of this ever changing environment is one of the greatest logistics challenges we face. “The operational level is where the joint logistician must bridge service, coalition, agency, and other organizational elements and capabilities, linking national and tactical systems to achieve the freedom of action that the JFC expects. The essence of joint logistics is found at the operational level, and it is at the operational level that the joint logistics community should focus its efforts.”^{iv}

In light of the new operational environment, the need for joint logistics professionals is greater today than we have seen before. A great amount of emphasis has been recently placed on the need for transformation within the Department of Defense. The desired end state for military transformation as prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a joint interoperable force that is flexible, modular, and combines the strengths of each individual service.^v This direction has led the services, agencies, and field activities of the Department of Defense to develop roadmaps for transformation. In broad terms, these roadmaps are similar in nature and tend to focus on process improvements that will lead to greater efficiencies within the individual organizations, have the ability to be more agile and responsive to force requirements, while reducing the cost to the taxpayer. These are

ambitious objectives and if effectively implemented can result in a great deal of economy and efficiency within the Department of Defense.

The difficulty with transformation of this nature lies in the transition from conception to implementation. An essential component in this transformation is the ability to place qualified and experienced people in key positions; in other words, a human capital strategy that enhances joint transformational efforts. While each service has a human capital strategy delineated in its transformation efforts, there has not been much effort, until recently, that focused on joint interaction. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 sought to improve inter-service cooperation and has made great strides in bringing the services closer together. Nevertheless, some services have been slow to fully embrace the concept of a truly joint military.

History is replete with examples where major military operations were constrained at the tactical level by a lack of coordination and poor planning among the services and operational components. This disconnect between the strategic level conceptualization and operational planning has an impact on readiness and the effectiveness of the joint force leading to stagnation of supplies and material needed at the tactical level as well as a secondary effect on the cost of operations. Often, in past campaigns and major operations, the logistics pipeline has ensured that materials and supplies consistently reached the theater of operations. Most problems tend to arise in the staging and distribution phase of the process. Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Otey in a recent *Air Force Journal of Logistics* article said that Operation Overlord of World War II was successful; however, critically needed supplies could not reach lead echelons and brought the operation at Normandy to a halt. He further stated that “iron mountains” of supplies were created in Vietnam by the logistics

system which also restricted the flow of material and supplies to troops in theater.^{vi} Almost getting it there does not count.

The lack of an effective transportation system prevents forces at the tactical level from receiving sustainment essential to the effectiveness of their mission and is also an incredible waste of taxpayer's dollars. A basic responsibility of any serviceman, and particularly a logistician, is to be a steward of taxpayer dollars. Budget constraints make it imperative that joint theater logistics focus on improving our ability to get the right part to the right place at the right time in accordance with policy established in joint doctrine. History has also shown that we have been slow to adapt lessons learned from previous campaigns and apply them to current and future operational scenarios and scenario planning. If we are unable to learn and progress, the "iron mountains" of Vietnam, Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom will continue.

DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS

The question remains how to deliver the best logistical support to the joint force commander. Fundamental to this need is the ability to understand and employ the four functions: scale, operational reach, command and control, and synchronization into the planning process to enable the Operational Commander to, as Milan Vego describes, "generate the maximum possible combat power with the resources available."^{vii} The answer lies in the quality and composition of the logisticians assigned to the J4 staff of the operational commander and the organizational structure of theater logistics. The assignment of quality people to the staff is a given, the real question is how should the career progression of the individual branches of the military be augmented to foster the experience and expertise needed to develop a pool of joint logisticians at the O5 and O6 level? There is another theory

paramount to ensuring optimal support to the joint force commander for which there are differing schools of thought among senior logisticians, current combatant commanders and past combatant commanders. The discussion concerns whether or not the command and control function is more effective inside or outside the J4 staff of the operational commander. Proponents of the outside option favor the establishment of a separate theater command for logistics, leaving the J4 staff to planning responsibilities only.

The joint organization currently in place has been effective in delivering support and sustainment to the current joint force; however, there is measurable room for improvement driven by recent lessons learned and the push for transformation. Challenges such as:

- intra-theater visibility
- robust intra-theater distribution
- proactive forward stocking initiatives
- establishment and strategic positioning of distribution depots
- analysis and validation of current and future pre-positioned stocks
- facilitation of host nation support and cooperation

These and other challenges have revealed the need for a joint military profession of logisticians to address and manage these challenges. These joint professional logisticians should be a corps of military officers with specialized training, knowledge and experience in joint military logistics operations, who have been in a career path that enhances their professional knowledge in these areas.

The search for the answer must start first with the individual services and their approach to joint education. As mentioned earlier, some services are further along than others. The Navy, in particular, has shifted its focus and placed a greater emphasis on joint professional military education. Future requirements for initiatives such as sea basing mandate that navy officers be more adept in joint operations. In a paper entitled *Logistics Transformation – Restarting a Stalled Process*, Lieutenant Colonel Victor Maccagnan, Jr. discusses the army

logistics transformation process. In an excerpt where he focuses on the transformation of logistics leaders, he says, “Transformation is as much about soldiers, and the way they think and act in a new operational framework as it is about material, systems and processes. This is a well-recognized and well publicized idea that has routinely made its way into DoD, Joint, and Army transformation publications; usually in the foreword or the very first paragraphs. It, like many other transformational concepts, has been written about more than it has been implemented.”^{viii} Lieutenant Colonel Maccagnan’s comments are not just specific to the Army and its transformation efforts, but can be equally applicable to the efforts of all the branches of the military.

Finding a pool of joint qualified candidates has and still presents a challenge. In an interview with Vice Admiral James Perkins, a former Deputy Commander-In-Chief of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), he said, “Having a robust and capable J4 shop is obviously the goal of every CINC, but it's tough to pull off. At SOUTHCOM, our loggies were more junior, fewer in number, less promotable /selectable, and with less JOINT tickets than their J2/3/5 counterparts. The best we could do was to search out good guys as reliefs; demanding joint qualified and experienced loggies was a mission that was too hard.”^{ix} Admiral Perkins’ comments accentuate the fact that historically, the best qualified candidates for joint logistics assignment were selected based on the quality of their fitness reports, officer evaluation reports, performance evaluation system, or officer performance reports instead of the officer’s experience and performance in a joint assignment. This forces the reporting senior or operational commander to often speculate whether a candidate’s intra-service performance is sufficient to perform in a joint environment. While sustained superior performance is an excellent indicator of a person’s potential and work ethic, there is no

substitute for experience. Experience shortens the learning curve associated with joint operations. General MacArthur once said, “Skilled officers, like all other professional men are products of continuous and laborious study, training, and experience. There is no shortcut to the peculiar type of knowledge and ability they must possess. Trained officers constitute the most vitally essential element in modern war, and the only one that under no circumstance can be improvised or extemporized.”^x

Services may be hesitant to embrace this concept based on a belief that adequate training and experience coupled with their individual logistics infrastructure is adequate to support their needs and those of the joint force commander. While in the short term this ideology may meet immediate requirements, it is not a panacea. In our current environment, junior Navy officers are serving in individual augmentation (IA) billets and provisional reconstruction team (PRT) billets which require daily joint and interagency interaction. These new requirements underscore the need to introduce officers to joint operations earlier in their careers.

The civilian workforce has been invaluable to the operation of the services and this is particularly true in the military staff professions where a majority of the infrastructure is not found on the front lines of an exercise, operation or campaign. They provide the continuity that is the foundation of any organization. They are also frequently the subject matter experts in the most intricate and critical matters that drive the performance of an organization. The organizational structures of these military organizations rely heavily upon civilian and military relationships for their effectiveness, mission accomplishment and overall survival.

In an organization such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the military component is primarily logisticians, typically field-grade officers and above who hold leadership

positions throughout the agency. The transient nature of the military billets, coupled with the fact that a majority of these officers are in their first tour at a joint command, contributes to a learning curve that the joint professional military education pipeline alone cannot shorten. While the basic functions of acquisition and inventory management are the same, the joint environment brings with it a different: culture, set of acronyms, business practices, and operating systems that can only be mastered through experience and on the job training. There are attempts at standardizing these factors which will facilitate improved alignment among the services and joint agencies. Still, the preparation of the officer in these key assignments must begin earlier in order to reduce the learning curve and to create a corps of officers with the training, experience, and competency at the senior level to effectively execute their duties as joint logisticians. This is not to say that the officers currently assigned to these jobs are not being effective because they do bring with them valuable experience and a wealth of knowledge gathered through serving successfully within their own branches of service. Nonetheless, the current challenge for the military is to be joint, flexible, and agile to support a rapidly deploying joint force. Therefore, the pipeline to joint qualification must become more than a ticket to be punched to enhance an officer's resume. It must be a true career path and core competency within the military. Only then can it be said that the operational commander is receiving the most qualified officer to effectively manage logistics operations.

The problems with today's systems are due in large part to the lack of commitment to the establishment of a true joint profession. This is the result of many situational factors that impact each service; among these factors is the desire of the service to retain the best and brightest to manage intra service responsibilities. The Navy in particular has lagged behind

other services in this area. Dr. Don Snider in his article, *Jointness, Defense Transformation, and the Need for a New Joint Warfare Profession*, states that there has been no progress toward the establishment or evolution of a joint warfare profession. He says, “Instead, such evolution has been constrained by the intent and language of the original Goldwater- Nichols Act: ‘to establish policies, procedures and practices for the effective management of officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps on active duty who are particularly educated, trained and oriented toward joint matters.’ Thus the joint community has not evolved, at any point in time beyond a collection of ‘borrowed military manpower’ determined by bureaucratic selection and assignment procedures.”^{xi} Dr. Snider’s thoughts echo Admiral Perkins’ comments on the selection of J4 staff officers. Dr. Snider also believes that these practices not only do not meet the objectives and spirit of the Goldwater – Nichols Act, but also they countermand current transformation initiatives within the Department of Defense.^{xii}

The traditional approach to joint staffing has resulted in many officers viewing joint assignments as a means to an end with the end being joint qualification and designation as a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). Maintaining a competency in joint operations has often in the past and even still today, conflicts with maintaining intra-service competency and upward mobility. Dr. Snider in his article points to the fact that an officer generally serves an average of 2.6 years in a joint tour to earn qualification as a joint specialty officer.^{xiii} This is only 13 percent of a 20 year career. This begs the question of whether a person can be considered a true professional in an area in which they have spent a little more than one eighth of their time engaged. As mentioned earlier, one of the strengths of a joint environment is the ability of an individual to bring in expertise from their own service to

apply to the planning process. Yet, periodic involvement within the joint arena is essential to remaining current with evolving joint processes and procedures.

The idea of a joint commander for theater logistics has gained momentum during recent years. The principle driver of this idea is a need for efficiency in the logistics process to reduce redundancy among the services and supporting entities. Additionally, there has been a historical need to translate strategic planning and guidance into operational level planning and execution. The thought is that a single theater commander will maximize unity of effort and by virtue of their position will avoid the “stovepipes” of individual service supply chains and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of operational logistics and support to the joint force commander. This debate has spawned discussions of a merger of DLA and TRANSCOM. It appears that although there may be efficiencies gained by this merger; DLA and TRANCOM will remain separate entities.

There have been discussions on the need for a single logistics system. These discussions tend to focus on the leadership at the 3 and 4-star level. Lieutenant General Richard Hack, who once served as the deputy commander of Army Material Command (AMC), once said, “Do we need a joint four-star like command? I think it needs to be explored. There are a lot of pros. Each service unique logistics requirement adds complexity. The head of such an organization would have to be a trained logistician, the likes of which we haven’t seen. I don’t know how you would train someone to command that.”^{xiv} General Hack’s views are shared by a number of leaders within the military and particularly in the logistics field. General Anthony Zinni, a former commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), was a proponent of a joint theater logistics command and regretted that he was not able to establish a theater-wide logistics command while at CENTCOM.^{xv} General

Hack's and General Zinni's solutions are directed toward breaking through the parochialism of the individual services that has historically hampered the effectiveness of the joint force commander in the past. This approach may be more of a regional solution than one with global applications and efficiencies. An article in the November / December 2005 edition of *Army Logistician* asserts that recent events in Operation Iraqi Freedom exposed shortcomings in operational effectiveness caused by a lack of coordination and synchronization. Randy Kendrick, the author, proposed that a joint theater logistics command be established to provide command and control to optimize logistics capabilities and minimize inefficiencies and delays caused by a redundancy in effort that results from service stovepipes.^{xvi} Kendrick also feels that logistical command and control should not be exercised by the J4 staff of the combatant commander because it is important that the J4 be free to plan and coordinate long range issues.^{xvii}

Few would argue that logistical command and control is paramount to the operational and tactical success in the theater of operational; however, debate exists over where the command and control should reside. Lieutenant General Christianson, who previously served as the logistics officer for the combined forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, agrees that the command and control is needed but is not sure that a separate organization is the answer. He is quoted in a 2004 *Defense Daily* article saying, "My personal view is there needs to be a control element that executes joint theater logistics. Whether it needs to be a standing headquarters I'm not convinced."^{xviii}

The Goldwater Nichols Act and the authority granted by Title 10 of the U.S. Code gives the combatant commander the authority to exercise command authority over forces assigned to his or her geographic area of responsibility. This includes the authority to direct the

services to provide logistical support to these forces. This authority coupled with the doctrinal responsibilities of the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J4) is more than adequate to address, plan, coordinate, and execute theater logistics at the strategic and operational level. Title 10 of the U. S. Code specifically states, “Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the commander of a combatant command with respect to the commands and forces assigned to that command include the command functions of giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.”^{xix}

Adding another command will only increase the amount of bureaucracy in a joint environment where simplicity and flexibility is essential to effective operational leadership. Such an organization could not exist without duplicating much of the supporting logistical infrastructure that is currently in place and straining resources that are already in limited quantity – people and funding in particular.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Today, intra-theater distribution and in-transit visibility remain a challenge. Technology such as radio frequency identification (RFID) similar to those used in the commercial sector and web-based tracking tools such as the Global Tracking Network developed by TRANSCOM are making it easier to give the operational commander a picture of where supplies are and how long it will take to get them to the forces; however, they are not a universal remedy. Initiatives such as Performance Based Logistics allow the Department of Defense to reduce the amount of material in storage or on the ground in theater through using collaboration to give a defense contractor a more defined estimate of requirements. Such

initiatives are being used in an attempt to anticipate force requirements, reduce manufacturing lead times, and ensure that material is available when needed. It also ensures the incorporation of other private sector best practices to make the system more agile and responsive.

Competent logisticians are now required more than ever to:

- manage these systems
- monitor effectiveness through the monitoring and re-evaluating of metrics and performance indicators
- collaborate with the customer and supplier to anticipate future requirements
- incorporate feedback for process improvement
- and most importantly, manually intercede to prevent costly bottlenecks in the supply chain.

As the joint distribution process owner, TRANSCOM established the intra-theater deployment and distribution operations centers (DDOC) whose mission was to ensure material and supplies were effectively delivered to forces in the theater of operations. The DDOC's are composed of personnel from the DLA and TRANSCOM. They have been a success story and have made tremendous strides in increasing intra-theater visibility and improving intra-theater distribution of material and supplies to the forces.

Optimal support for the joint force commander requires the J4 focus on applying lessons learned to move forward in the transformation of our logistics infrastructure. This will facilitate rapid deployment, distribution and agile sustainment that are essential to supporting flexible and mobile forces operating in a new environment.

Improvement can and should start with people. The focus on creating a Joint Specialty Officer should extend beyond the goal of joint professional military education coupled with one joint tour to meet the minimum requirements for promotion opportunity. Transitioning to a military where greater focus is placed on joint inter-operability requires the development

of a corps of joint logistics professionals with the knowledge and experience to take ownership in the J4 organization and its processes. As mentioned earlier, we as a military have not been great at employing logistical lessons learned from previous campaigns and major operations. It can be said that the temporary nature of our joint assignments and the expertise that comes and goes with it could be attributable to the inability to incorporate the lessons learned. In an effort to create a pool of fully qualified joint logisticians, the Navy Supply Corps has developed organizations such as the Navy Operational Logistics Support Center (NOLSC) to focus on operational logistics. In addition, joint professional military education (JPME) is mandatory for all navy supply corps officers. Eventually JPME will be mandatory for promotion to Commander in the supply corps. There is currently no separate joint career path for supply corps Officers; however, there are joint assignments associated with each career path. This is a start and the benefit of these efforts will be seen a few years in the future. To be a leader in the joint logistics arena, thought should be given in the Navy Supply Corps as well as other services to the establishment of a joint career path to O-6. This will create and maintain the joint expertise essential to maintaining a core competency in this area and provide the maximum benefit to the joint force commander. Services can also assist in the joint process through standardizing logistics processes and procedures that will enhance joint inter-operability, improve command and control and ease the transition of the joint logistician into and out of the joint world.

A joint theater logistics command would not own any infrastructure, material, equipment, or inventory. Establishment of this sort of command would inherently lead to redundancy in the supply chains and generate bureaucracy and friction with the entities that are responsible for these elements. This will ultimately become counter-productive to the original intent of

supporting the operational commander with a more agile and flexible organization. A more effective solution is to augment the existing J4 staff with liaison officers (LNO) from the process owners such as DLA and TRANSCOM, and from each of the services. These liaison officers would be officers at the senior O5 and O6 level deemed as legitimate experts in their fields who can effectively interact with their individual process or service components, add value to the operational planning process, and strengthen the effectiveness of logistical command and control at the operational level. These billets should be permanent and not taken out of the inventory of the command providing the LNO. Additionally, officers serving in these billets should be joint specialty officers and given joint credit for the assignment. As an example, NOLSC is currently staffed with experts in Navy operational logistics and provides support to joint operations, but the support provided is not a permanent arrangement. Currently the DDOC is the closest example of this recommendation. They have had success in increasing the efficiency of theater distribution and visibility. Yet, they are typically an ad hoc group whose expertise is cyclical based on the deployment schedule of those officers assigned. The DDOC's are valuable and should remain in place, but continue in a supporting role to the J4. Their greatest value is in their ability to bridge the gap between operational planning and tactical movement of equipment and supplies to the forces.

The J4 staff has doctrinal authority based on the joint force commander's directive authority for logistics as described in Joint Publication 1-02 and Joint Publication 4-0. The answer is to improve and refine the current structure and associated processes to enable the J4 staff of the combatant commander to become more effective in bridging the gap between the strategic and operational level of war and to enhance its ability to provide command and

control over theater logistics. Standing up a joint commander for theater logistics will only add another layer of bureaucracy to the logistics equation.

CONCLUSION

It is important to establish that the objective of this paper is not to imply that the current system is broken and ineffective. The role of the logistician cannot afford to be marginalized in this dynamic age where transformation at all levels of the military is underway. In an environment such as this it is vital that the role of the logistician transforms to meet the new challenges. The basic responsibility of the logistician to provide the best support to the operational commander has not changed, nor will it ever change. What has changed is that the conventional form of warfare is no longer the norm. Asymmetric threats and the military's increasing engagement in operations other than war require joint experienced logisticians and a joint logistics infrastructure that is more flexible, agile, and most importantly timely to support the joint force commander. No longer is getting materials and supplies from the warehouse to the battlefield good enough, as proven by the "iron mountains" in Vietnam and Operation Desert Storm. Today's challenge is sustaining a more mobile and agile force. Efforts are underway to streamline processes and organizational structure. However, transformation should not overlook the proper preparation of the people to manage these processes nor leave them in its wake. As Milan Vego wrote, "The lessons from war experiences influence not only one's technological innovations and force planning, but also the education of officers, as well as the entire spectrum of the employment of one's combat forces."^{xx}

NOTES

ⁱ Christianson, C.V.. "Joint Logistics -- Shaping Our Future: A Personal Perspective." *Army Logistician*, Jul/Aug 2006, 2.

ⁱⁱ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JCS PUB 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 April 2000), I-2 – I-3

ⁱⁱⁱ Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The National Military Strategy Of The United States of America" (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), Richard B. Myers, 2006, 16.

^{iv} Christianson, C.V.. "Joint Logistics -- Shaping Our Future: A Personal Perspective." *Army Logistician*, Jul/Aug 2006, 2.

^v Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The National Military Strategy Of The United States of America" (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), Richard B. Myers, 2006, 13.

^{vi} Otey, Gregory. "Mending a Seam: Joint Theater Logistics." *Air Force Journal of Logistics*, Summer, 2006, 10.

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^{viii} Maccagnan, Victor. "Logistics Transformation -- Restarting a Stalled Process." Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005, p. 29

^{ix} Perkins, James B. Vice Admiral (retired). interview by author, 26 September, 2006, Newport, e-mail.

^x Snider, Don. "Jointness, Defense Transformation, and the Need for a New Joint Warfare Profession." *Parameters*, Autumn, 2003, 17.

^{xi} Ibid., p.19

^{xii} Ibid.

^{xiii} Ibid.

^{xiv} Erwin, Sandra. "Commanders Ponder How Best To Mend Battlefield Logistics." *National Defense*, May, 2004, 13.

^{xv} Tom Clancy, General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and Tony Koltz. *Battle Ready*. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), p. 315.

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^{xvii} Ibid.

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