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**JOINT DOCTRINE: ARE WE THERE YET?**

by

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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## **Abstract**

### ***Joint Doctrine: Are We There Yet?***

The Joint Staff develops joint doctrine to improve the U.S. military's capability and build a joint warfighting culture. Unfortunately after twenty years joint doctrine is not completely ingrained into our culture because doctrine constantly changes. This paper identifies major factors driving doctrinal change and performs analysis to quantify the last two decades of change to identify future joint doctrine trends. The analysis showed the total number of joint publications and the number of changes per year remained relatively constant after 1997. Based on this stabilized trend, the military can expect 20 percent of joint publications to change each year in the future. Using an organizational change model, the paper describes what specific improvements the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) could make to facilitate the adoption of constantly changing joint warfighting doctrine into the U.S. military's culture. The recommendations include identifying champions for major publication changes, creating opportunities to talk about and market the changes, as well as visibly rewarding organizations that quickly and successfully implement new joint doctrine. These recommendations will accelerate adoption of joint warfighting doctrine into the U.S. military's culture.

## INTRODUCTION

Clearly much progress has been made...in improving the joint warfighting posture of our military forces. But much remains to be done...we must give joint doctrine the attention it deserves and we must get it right.<sup>1</sup>

General John M. Shalikashvili, USA

In 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Act not only served to centralize power with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but also aimed to push the services to adopt an overriding joint war fighting culture. Previously, the Army, Navy, and Air Force had their uniquely individual doctrines, service cultures, and interests that reinforced their preferences for autonomous organizations and operations.<sup>2</sup> Although today, after twenty years, the armed forces have achieved considerable success toward the goal of becoming “joint.” In part this has occurred by amassing an entire library of new joint doctrine to guide the military’s thoughts and actions. However, the doctrine is not completely ingrained in our military’s culture. In other words, it has not become second nature. The lack of cultural adoption is due to the fact that our joint doctrine has been in a state of constant flux since it was mandated in 1986 by Congress.

Because our joint doctrine changes frequently; sailors, soldiers, marines, and airman have been unable to consistently learn, understand, and execute joint doctrine. As a result, our military has not achieved its full warfighting potential. Will our U.S. joint doctrine ever mature? After all, it has been in development for twenty years. If doctrine does not stabilize,

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<sup>1</sup> Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Compendium of Joint Publications, Joint Publication (JP) 1-01.1 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 23 April 1999), 6.

<sup>2</sup> Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, “Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness,” *Political Science Quarterly* 113, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 91.

what can the military do differently to improve the chance it will become the basis of our inherent joint warfighting culture?

This paper will initially research factors that have affected U.S. joint doctrine development, explaining why it changes so frequently. The analysis will then evaluate historical data to quantify how frequently and to what degree U.S. joint doctrine has changed in the last two decades. The paper will then summarize the analysis in an attempt to foreshadow future doctrinal development trends. Finally, the paper will provide recommendations, based on a Harvard Business School change model, in an attempt to improve the development of a joint military culture by changing the way the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff implements major doctrinal changes.

## **BACKGROUND**

In the early 1990s, General Colin Powell “believed that instilling a genuine joint perspective in the future leaders of the Armed Forces would require at least ten to fifteen years to develop.”<sup>3</sup> He wanted to start a gradual process of acculturation targeted at majors and lieutenant commanders.<sup>4</sup> To this end the Joint Staff developed joint doctrine. Our war colleges incorporated this doctrine into professional military education and military trainers stressed its concepts and methodologies in joint training exercises. However, the most important element of the cultural conversion process was the routine employment of joint war fighting principles during war and day-to-day military operations. Given the military’s accomplishments, it appears as if the Department Of Defense (DOD) is very close to meeting the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols’ vision and can declare victory! We are close, yet it seems every time our military reflects back on past joint operations we can point to failures

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<sup>3</sup> Peter F. Herrly, “The Plight of Joint Doctrine After Kosovo,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 22, (Summer 1999): 100.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 100.

where doctrine was not followed. From this perspective, it is obvious joint doctrine has not become a part of our military's culture to the degree it could. Perhaps, one reason is that joint doctrine has constantly changed over the last twenty years. Almost every joint publication has changed three or four times and new ones are being added all the time. Other than having a general awareness military services must work together to accomplish common objectives; the details of who, how, and what actions should be completed, from a joint process perspective, are unknown to most in our military.

Joint doctrine should provide the U.S. military a common cultural perspective, describing how we are to think about war. It should be the authoritative source of our military's current joint warfighting principles and practices. Doctrine is written to be timeless and enduring, but "in reality it must be responsive to current policies, resources, strategy, campaign concepts, doctrine, threats, and fielded and emerging technology—none of which are timeless and enduring."<sup>5</sup> Joint Publication 3-0 states, "joint operations doctrine should change to reflect the nature of modern warfare and the strategic requirements of the Nation."<sup>6</sup> So even though doctrine is built upon a solid foundation of warfighting theory and well-earned practical experience, doctrine must evolve to keep pace with many influential factors that drive it to change.

Since joint doctrine was first published, the Joint Staff has extensively revised the publications to incorporate new lessons learned. For example, following Operation Desert Storm, General Colin Powell identified a major problem with deep battle doctrine. He noted the Army and the Air Force had completely different definitions of what deep battle was and

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<sup>5</sup> James T. Tritten, "Naval Perspectives for Military Doctrine Development," (research paper, Norfolk, VA: Naval Doctrine Command, September 2005), 18.

<sup>6</sup> Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 10 September 2001), II-1.

drove changes in doctrine to address the issue.<sup>7</sup> Then again after Operation Allied Force ended in 1999, the doctrine experts debated the validity of the air campaign and its role in strategic attack.<sup>8</sup> Later, Special Operations Command Central or SOCCENT learned painful joint fires lessons in Afghanistan and Iraq. They found no one at HQ could handle incorporating joint fires requests in the campaign planning. HQ and SOCCENT did solve the integration problem through teamwork and innovative thinking, but they knew their next challenge was to institutionalize solutions learned the hard way into joint special operations doctrine.<sup>9</sup> These examples demonstrate how U.S. joint doctrine changes are driven by operational lessons learned that must be factored into doctrinal updates for the next conflict.

Our top joint leaders have also influenced the development of new joint doctrine. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell said, “we learned a lot during Just Cause and during Desert Storm....We have been hard at work in the two years since Desert Storm to embed new techniques of jointness...we cannot afford not to seek common doctrine...”<sup>10</sup> His successor, General Shalikashvili, also placed great emphasis on joint doctrine development. He approved development of 97 joint doctrine publications and increased production from two per year in 1993 to four per month in 1995.<sup>11</sup> Both General Powell and General Shalikashvili successfully made development of joint doctrine a priority during their chairmanship and ultimately it became a part of their legacy.

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<sup>7</sup> Herrly, “Plight of Joint Doctrine After Kosovo,” 100-101.

<sup>8</sup> Herrly, “Plight of Joint Doctrine After Kosovo,” 99-102.

<sup>9</sup> Braganca Eric Braganca, “The Evolution of Special Operations Joint Fires,” *Special Warfare* 17, no. 4 (April 2005): 3-6.

<sup>10</sup> General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Transcript, Defense Writers’ Group Breakfast Meeting, Washington, DC, 23 September 1993), <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/> (accessed 11 October 2006).

<sup>11</sup> Roman and Tarr, “Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness,” 107.

There are other even larger factors driving doctrinal change that are likely to continue well into the future. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the military transformation approach driven by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld have and will continue to shape the environment in which war is conducted. In fact, transformation acknowledges that “new military technologies can revolutionize the form of military competition and the nature of armed conflict in ways that render military forces and doctrines of the industrial age obsolete.”<sup>12</sup> In 1992 Secretary Rumsfeld stated, “...a revolution in military affairs is about more than building new high tech weapons, though that is certainly part of it. It’s also about new ways of thinking, and new ways of fighting.”<sup>13</sup> Whether or not we are still in the midst of an RMA or not, it is obvious these new ways of thinking and fighting have caused considerable re-write of our joint publications over the last decade and a half. When the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) published their approach to military transformation in 2003 they said,

The emerging way of war is a unique approach to the conduct of joint warfare in the information age. Constructed around the fundamental tenants of network-centric warfare (NCW) and emphasizing high-quality shared awareness, dispersed forces, speed of command, and flexibility in planning and execution, it will result in U.S. forces conducting immensely powerful effects-based operations to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives across the full range of military operations.<sup>14</sup>

It is exceptionally clear from an OSD perspective that joint U.S. forces are discovering new ways and means to achieve the political ends and that this emerging way of war may yet again completely alter our understanding of doctrine. These words are not hollow words

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<sup>12</sup> Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, “Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Fall 2003), 12.

<sup>13</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, secretary of defense (address, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 31 January 2002).

<sup>14</sup> Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, “Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,” 28.



from a politically motivated OSD organization. During confirmation hearings, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Commander, General Lance Smith, clearly explained that JFCOM has two missions, one of which is “transforming the U.S. military’s forces to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.”<sup>15</sup> As such, he and JFCOM are responsible for leading joint concept development and experimentation, leading joint force integration, and recommending changes in doctrine.<sup>16</sup>

Today’s Joint Staff recognizes the warfighting importance of quickly moving successful new technologies and warfighting concepts from experimentation into formal joint doctrine publications that can be adopted across the military. As a result the Joint Staff and JFCOM are streamlining the joint doctrine development process to reduce publication cycle time from 46 months to 21 months or less.<sup>17</sup> It is evident the U.S. military not only has an overarching vision for transformation and a mandate for enhanced joint military operations, but the DOD is building organizations and processes to more quickly investigate and mature transformational ideas into joint doctrine.

Clearly a combination of factors including operational lessons learned, military and political leadership influences, fast-paced ever-changing technology, organizational changes, and process transformations will continue to increase and potentially accelerate the pace at which future joint doctrine is developed and revised.

## **DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS**

Further analysis of joint doctrine change at a macro level will help quantify historical trends and potentially bound future expectations. Appendix A contains a list of all the joint

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<sup>15</sup> Senate, Statement of Lance L. Smith, Nominee to be Commander, United States Joint Forces Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 2005.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Brian Bender, “Audit Gives Developer of Joint Doctrine High Marks,” *Defense Daily* 196, no. 22 (31 July 1997):

publications, approval dates, and subsequent changes that were issued by the Joint Staff from January 1985 through September 2006. The data was compiled from the Joint Staff historical status data and joint publication status reporting data maintained by the J7 directorate. The data was analyzed to determine the yearly frequency of change and the total number of joint publications effective during any given year between 1985 and present.

Figure 1 below summarizes the data in Appendix A.




Figure 1. Number of joint publication changes and total number of joint publications (January 1985 to September 2006)

It is interesting to note the steady increase in the total number of joint publications from 1986 when the Goldwater-Nichols Act was initially created to its peak in 1995 of over 120 joint publications. During this time doctrine development took longer to produce than the 43 months it was designed to take.<sup>18</sup> It is, therefore, not unreasonable to think that many of the publications delivered between 1994 and 1995 were actually initiated in the 1991 and 1992 timeframe following Operation Desert Storm and during the period General Powell was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (1989-1993). Compared to General Powell’s ramp up period, it was actually during Gen Shalikashvili’s chairmanship (1993-1997) when the number of joint

<sup>18</sup> William F. Furr, “Joint Doctrine Progress, Prospects, and Problems,” *Airpower Journal* 5, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 38.

publications hit its all time high and then decreased dramatically as publications were canceled in favor of less descriptive and less prescriptive joint doctrine. A review of Appendix A shows there was also an effort to move a significant number of the Communication Systems Support (Joint Publication 6-XX) publications to Military Standards (Mil-Stds). Clearly, during this time there was a philosophy shift attempting to find the right balance between providing too much joint doctrine detail that becomes restrictive versus too little detail that becomes meaningless and ethereal. Fortunately since 1997, the factors influencing joint doctrine development and the process itself appeared to mature and stabilize since the total number of joint publications and the number of total publication changes remained relatively constant. This offers hope joint doctrine will continue on a similar path in the future.

Figure 2 depicts the amount of joint publication change in terms of percentages over time. The number of joint publication changes in a given year was divided by the total number of publications in that year to provide the graphic below.




Figure 2. Number of joint publication changes per total number of joint publications shown as a percentage over time from January 1985 to September 2006. Overlay shows Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tenure.

This analysis is important to determine how much relative change occurred in any given year or group of years and aids in projecting a future change trend. Analysis of Figure 2 shows generally increasing levels of change during the first three chairmanships after implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. During this time, it is apparent there was a concerted effort on the part of the Joint Staff to build a solid foundation of joint doctrine as Congress mandated. It would appear the Joint Staff took approximately ten years to document and revise joint doctrine before the rate of change began to decrease and stabilize at a level below 20 percent (since 2002). This could be an indication that joint doctrine, in spite of the many factors that have influenced change through this period, has actually stabilized after a twenty year development period and will continue to remain at a relatively stable 20 percent rate in the future. Only time will tell.

Further analysis of Appendix A data shows, as of September 2006, there are currently 53 joint publications in development, revision, or being consolidated. Given the lengthy development cycles, not all of these 53 new joint doctrine changes will be issued this year. Even so, the rate of change in 2006 is higher than the previous two years and may prove to be significantly higher if the development cycles are indeed shortened and the factors previously mentioned (i.e., transformation) do accelerate the need to revise joint doctrine.

When analyzed, the data in Appendix A also shows the average age of publications when they are changed or retired. Age was defined as the duration of time, in months, from the date the joint publication was issued to the date it was superseded or canceled. This analysis is summarized in Table 1 below which shows that for the years between 1990 and 2004, joint publications generally have an average shelf life between 79 and 90 months or an average age of just over 7 years.

Table 1. Average age of joint publications (2006 data is incomplete)

Period (Years)	Average Age of Pub at the time they were changed or retired during the period (months)
85-89	24
90-94	89
95-99	90
00-04	79
05-06	92

During this time the doctrine is formally incorporated into professional military training, joint exercises, and generally absorbed into the military's culture. Certainly, seven years is a sufficient amount of time to incorporate a new joint doctrine publication into the practices and processes of our military. However, considering the total amount of change during the first twenty years and especially during peak change years in 1987, 1991, 1992, 1995, and 1996 (Figure 2 shows the change rate hovering around 40%), doctrinal changes were not likely incorporated into individual military members behavior as a unifying cultural theme.

Overall, this analysis shows joint doctrine initially went through a ten year maturation cycle which peaked in 1995 and 1996. Joint doctrine then experienced a philosophical shift which reduced the number of joint doctrine publications by almost half over the next three year period. Since 1997, the rate of change, the age of joint publications, and the total number of publications have been relatively constant. It is not clear what specific impact the revolution in military affairs had on joint doctrine development, but it added to the amount of doctrinal debate during the 1990s. Similarly, it is not clear to what extent the ongoing DOD transformation, which began after 9/11, will specifically have on future joint doctrine development. Undoubtedly, it has and will continue to rally new champions for change and achieve success when the new ways of fighting are incorporated into doctrine. A slight uptick in 2006's change rate could be the start of an upward trend to incorporate

transformational ideas that have gone through extensive experimentation, validation, and the doctrinal development processes. Additionally, there is a major effort underway by joint doctrine developers at JFCOM to consolidate joint publications and reduce their numbers.<sup>19</sup> While perhaps a worthy cause, this will also drive additional doctrinal changes.

In summary, it is clear joint doctrine will absolutely continue to evolve over time as a result of rapid advances in technology, leadership philosophy, constantly changing world dynamics, and DOD's continual efforts to improve and reshape itself. The rate at which joint doctrine changes has hopefully stabilized at or below 20 percent turnover in any given year. However, there are at least three ongoing initiatives (transformation, consolidation, and joint doctrine development process improvements) that have the potential to drive even higher levels of change. Given this, what can be done to facilitate the acceptance of ever-changing joint doctrine into the military's collective joint warfighting culture?

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

In 1995 Captain Wayne Hughes, Chair of Applied Systems Analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, observed that "across the whole spectrum of military operations, doctrine's power is measured by the degree to which its stipulations are believed and followed."<sup>20</sup> While the Joint Staff, JFCOM, the services, and military commanders around the world spend considerable time and resources perfecting new joint doctrine, they spend far too little time and fanfare implementing the doctrinal changes into the joint warfighting culture. Certainly, professional military education and training centers study the new doctrine to understand how it impacts their curriculum and inspectors go about measuring

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<sup>19</sup> Jon A Gallinetti, "Message From the Commander, USJFCOM JWFC," *A Common Perspective, US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Group's Newsletter* 14, no. 1 (May 2006): 3, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/comm\\_per/common\\_perspective.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/comm_per/common_perspective.htm) (accessed 1 Oct 06).

<sup>20</sup> Wayne P. Hughes, "The Power in Doctrine," *Naval War College Review* XLVIII, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 15.

how well joint doctrine has been incorporated into exercises. However, the transition from publication time to when the doctrine becomes part of the military's culture is largely unmanaged by the Joint Staff. It would appear the chairman, Joint Staff, and JFCOM have been so concerned about creating and publishing joint doctrine they have forgotten why it is published. They have forgotten that they are fostering a new joint warfighting culture each time they issue a publication. The process cannot stop when a new publication is posted to the Joint Electronic Library web site. Publishing the document is no easy task; but the real effort, altering the military's culture, requires considerably more emphasis. The Joint Staff needs to manage the cultural change process itself.

In the business world, there are many examples of self help books which describe how CEOs and organizational leaders can effectively lead organizations through change. The DOD should consider implementing change management theory as new doctrinal principles are published. After all, the DOD spends years developing and debating the content. A few more hours dedicated to championing the change would likely go a long way toward acceptance and rapid adoption within the military community.

John P. Kotter is a renowned professor of leadership at the Harvard Business School. In his book, *Leading Change*, he describes an eight-stage process for creating major changes within organizations. The process phases are:<sup>21</sup>

1. Establishing A Sense Of Urgency
2. Creating The Guiding Coalition
3. Developing A Vision And Strategy
4. Communicating The Change Vision
5. Empowering Broad-Based Action
6. Generating Short Term Wins
7. Consolidating Gains And Producing More Change
8. Anchoring New Approaches In The Culture

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<sup>21</sup> John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*, (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 21.

While the Joint Staff may not have used these specific steps to bring joint warfighting principles into our culture, in the early years of development the chairmen and Joint Staffs effectively hit several of the highlights contained within this strategy. Initially, Goldwater-Nichols created the sense of urgency and the chairman established the J7 and JFCOM staffs as the guiding coalition. The Joint Staff gathered service experts and empowered them to develop joint doctrine as the foundation of the new joint warfighting culture. Because our joint doctrine proved incredibly dynamic, it required all personnel to continually renew and re-implement the latest joint doctrine principles. Unfortunately the level of personal and organizational commitment necessary to repeatedly re-adopt the numerous doctrinal changes has never been sustained over the years.

Kotter recognized this type of environment and identified the challenge of grafting new practices onto the old cultural roots while killing off the inconsistent pieces. He suggests that in order to succeed in shifting the culture, leaders must recognize and support a continuous cycle of limited cultural modifications.<sup>22</sup> In the U.S. military's dynamic environment, Kotter's eight step model is actually a continuous process that should be repeated every time major changes are made. Unfortunately, our Joint Staff is not recognizing that they need to champion new cultural changes every time the chairman approves new doctrine.

It is no coincidence we find ourselves looking back on history and asking ourselves why our military forces didn't follow the joint doctrine in a given situation. It is because we have not fully made it a part of our culture, in part because our leaders are not giving it the emphasis necessary to graft it into our existing culture. If the chairman, Joint Staff, or JFCOM would use a cultural change model, like Kotter's, to implement major changes to our

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<sup>22</sup> Kotter, *Leading Change*, 151-154.



joint publications, our leadership would find much quicker and more widespread understanding, implementation, and adoption within our joint military organizations. Today our leaders do little to establish the sense of urgency, communicate the change vision, empower action, identify short-term wins, or anchor the new approaches.

What is missing is an overt effort to market the joint doctrine in a manner which will improve its believability and rapid adoption into the military mainstream culture. The Joint Staff should develop a communications plan for showcasing new doctrine and explaining how and why this new doctrine should be adopted. Today, there are no speeches and there are no articles written. The joint publication is simply pushed out on the Joint Electronic Library web site to become official doctrine. This practice was evident during the recent release of Joint Pub 3-0 on 17 September 2006. On the chairman's page of the new publication he appropriately states Joint Pub 3-0 is a linchpin document and a "vital keystone publication [which] forms the very core of joint warfighting doctrine and establishes the framework for our forces' ability to fight as a joint team."<sup>23</sup> He goes on to "encourage all commanders to study and understand the guidance contained in this publication and to teach these principles to their subordinates."<sup>24</sup> In other words, this is an important document, but its just business as usual. It has become too easy to hang the joint publication on the web, checking the box complete, and press on to the next task.

A closer review of Joint Pub 3-0 Summary of Changes reveals significant modifications to the military's existing culture that should not be taken lightly. Changes include: discontinuing the use of the term and acronym military operations other than war (MOOTW); introduces DOD's support to homeland security; establishes twelve principles of

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<sup>23</sup> Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Chairman's Page.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

joint operations by adding three other principles—restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy to the traditional nine principles of war; establishes six joint functions—command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment; establishes the relationship between tasks, effects, and objectives; revises the definition of center of gravity; and makes several other noteworthy changes found in a complete list in Appendix B<sup>25</sup>. All together Joint Publication 3-0 is an enormous shift in many of the major concepts taught to all joint commissioned and non-commissioned officers over the last decade.

The U.S. could increase its military power if DOD’s leaders would spend more time effectively implementing doctrinal changes in a way that would improve how well the military adopts new doctrine. The Joint Staff should implement a process, based on change management theory, which recognizes the Joint Staff’s attempt to change military culture every time it issues a major joint publication. They could use Kotter’s or any other well-founded change management paradigm. Clearly, the Joint Staff is ignoring many important organizational behavior issues which Kotter addresses in his eight step change implementation process.

For example, step four of Kotter’s model shows leaders how important it is to use “every vehicle possible to constantly communicate the new vision and strategies.”<sup>26</sup> To satisfy this phase, for example, the J7 could ensure a *Joint Forces Quarterly* article is written annually to explain the new paradigms and their connections to the necessary doctrinal changes. J7 could also engage journalists to communicate the change vision to the entire joint military population in publications like *Defense News*. Senior leaders from JFCOM and

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., iii-iv.

<sup>26</sup> Kotter, *Leading Change*, 21.

other joint service organizations should talk about the joint publication changes at every opportunity--or at least more than they are doing now which is almost non-existent.

During the cultural change process, our leaders need to reinforce to our military members that in spite of the fact that doctrine is constantly changing, doctrinal changes are not experimental. They have been validated through a rigorous vetting process to produce the best joint doctrine necessary to fight and win wars using the latest concepts and technology. The military needs to understand that the old doctrine was not wrong at the time it was conceived, but that it has evolved to take better advantage of new surrounding environmental conditions. Today's leaders have to shorten the time it takes old habits to die by vigorously rationalizing the doctrinal changes for every military member. Champions have to be identified as the new releases are published to drive change into the military's culture. In essence, the Joint Staff needs to engage in a strategic marketing plan to increase awareness and drive new doctrine into the daily lives of the military.

Kotter's sixth step emphasizes how leaders should identify and publicly reward groups of people who have implemented the change and achieved measured success. This reward could be formalized in the way joint service ribbons are awarded or in new organizational awards from the chairman which recognize outstanding adoption of joint warfighting principles. Step eight in Kotter's change process suggests our leaders should aid in anchoring the new doctrine in joint culture by identifying and communicating the connectivity between the new joint warfighting behaviors and organizational success. This would be especially essential during exercises or joint military operations when the changed behavior can be observed and results measured. Currently major commands fail to quickly drive the changes into operational and tactical level policy, regulations, and instructions. It is

important leaders, middle managers, and individuals at the lowest levels of the military organization observe the new desired behaviors being incorporated into the military's day-in and day-out norms. Until this can be observed, Kotter argues, the new changes have not been sufficiently anchored into the culture.

Overall, Kotter's simple eight phase model points to several steps, which if considered and adopted by the Joint Staff, would likely result in increased joint warfighting performance. Ultimately we know doctrine will continue to change frequently and there are simple methods that could be used to more effectively incorporate changing doctrine into our armed service's joint warfighting culture.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

Whether you are involved in a commercial business or the DOD, it will take a long time and much energy to develop a common culture. An extensive field of study called change management recognizes the difficulties and offers straight-forward solutions when organizations are trying to change their culture. The Joint Staff should recognize the U.S. military has not yet fully adopted a joint warfighting culture. Our military has failed because the vision of what is joint and the processes needed to be joint are constantly changing to reflect the world around us and the direction our leaders want us to go. If our environment changed minimally over the twenty year period since Goldwater-Nichols, we should expect phenomenal success by now because our joint doctrine would have been stable. However, the last two decades have been extremely turbulent and the number of joint publications issued, reissued, changed, updated, consolidated, canceled, and revised has made the path to achieve a common joint culture much more difficult.

Based on the analysis presented, it does not appear the military's future joint doctrine environment is going to be significantly different from the recent past. We can expect to see 20 percent of our joint publications changed annually as we move through an era of rapid technology improvement, new threats, real-world lessons learned, and dynamic leadership, as well as significant organizational and process changes. The Joint Staff and other organizations like JFCOM continue to manage the development and refinement of our military's joint publications to reflect approved joint warfighting doctrine, but no one is managing the associated cultural change process.

Our leaders need to step back and recognize that every major doctrinal change issued in a joint publication should be managed as a change to our military's cultural foundation. There are many academic and practical methods for managing change within an organization that offer sound advice for implementing changes and driving cultural acceptance. This paper considered an eight step model developed by Kotter which showed clear deficiencies in the methodology the Joint Staff is utilizing to implement doctrinal changes. In the end, doctrine does not change culture in the military, leaders do. Our leaders must have sustained joint doctrine conversations, backed up by visible action, to reach the level of success our military is expected to achieve. It is evident the Joint Staff should reevaluate the joint doctrinal change process and include cultural change methods. This would better serve our military by ultimately anchoring doctrine changes in our joint warfighting culture.

## Appendix A

### JOINT PUBLICATION CHANGE HISTORY

The table below is a list of joint publications including changes, revisions, canceled, and combined documents. To the greatest extent possible the information includes the publication's number, publication date, cancellation date, and a brief statement concerning the reason for the revision.<sup>27</sup> This data was analyzed to create the tables and figures contained within the research paper.

DIRECTIVE	Short Title	PUB DATE	CNX	REASON AND/OR AUTHORITY
<i>JT ADM Pub 1-1</i>		<i>1-Aug-92</i>	<i>31-Dec-96</i>	<i>Superseded by JSM 5100.01, 31 Dec 96</i>
<i>JT ADM Pub 1-2</i>		<i>30-Jun-89</i>	<i>16-Jun-98</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 1101, 16 Jun 98</i>
JT PUB 0-2		1-Dec-86	11-Aug-94	Superseded by JT PUB 0-2, 11 Aug 94
JT PUB 0-2		11-Aug-94	24-Feb-95	Superseded by JT PUB 0-2, 24 Feb 95
JT PUB 0-2		24-Feb-95	10-Jul-01	Superseded by JT PUB 0-2, 10 Jul 01
JT PUB 0-2		10-Jul-01		consolidating w/ JP 1
JT PUB 1		11-Nov-91	10-Jan-95	Superseded by JT PUB 1, 10 Jan 95
JT PUB 1		10-Jan-95	14-Nov-00	Superseded by JT PUB 1, 14 Nov 00
JP PUB 1	Join Warfare of the Armed Forces	14-Nov-00		in revision
JP 1-0	Joint Personnel	19-Nov-98		in revision
<i>JT PUB 1-01</i>		<i>30-Jul-92</i>	<i>14-Sep-93</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-01, CHI, 14 Sep 93</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-01</i>		<i>14-Sep-93</i>	<i>5-Jul-00</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-01, 5 Jul 00</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-01</i>		<i>5-Jul-00</i>	<i>29-Jun-01</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-01, 29 Jun 01</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-01</i>		<i>29-Jun-01</i>	<i>unk</i>	<i>Expanded maintenance stage, establishes new format</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-01.1</i>		<i>14-Jul-93</i>	<i>29-Mar-94</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-01.1, CHI 29 Mar 94</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-01.1</i>		<i>29-Mar-94</i>	<i>25-Apr-95</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-01.1, 25 Apr 95</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-01.1</i>		<i>25-Apr-95</i>	<i>23-Apr-99</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-01.1, 23 Apr 99</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-01.1</i>		<i>23-Apr-99</i>	<i>unk</i>	<i>Unknown status...but still in JEL as compendium</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-01.2</i>		<i>24-Nov-93</i>	<i>1-Apr-97</i>	<i>Canceled by JS J7, Apr 97</i>
JT PUB 1-02		1-Dec-89	23-Mar-94	Superseded by JT PUB 1-02, 23 Mar 94
JT PUB 1-02		23-Mar-94	24-Jan-00	Superseded by JT PUB 1-02, 24 Jan 00
JT PUB 1-02		24-Jan-00	1-Sep-00	Superseded by JT PUB 1-02, 1 Sep 00
JT PUB 1-02		1-Sep-00	12-Apr-01	Superseded by JT PUB 1-02, 12 Apr 01
JT PUB 1-02	Dictionary	12-Sep-01		
<i>JT PUB 1-03</i>		<i>30-Jun-77</i>	<i>10-Jan-94</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03, 10 Jan 94</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03</i>	<i>Joint Reporting Structure</i>	<i>10-Jan-94</i>		
<i>JT PUB 1-03</i>		<i>10-Jan-94</i>	<i>30-Jun-99</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSM 3150.01, 30 Jun 99</i>

<sup>27</sup> This table was created from three sources: (1) Joint Education and Doctrine Division (J7), Joint Staff, "Joint Publication Revision Status Tracker," Powerpoint, 14 September 2006, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/pubstat/pubstatus.pdf> (accessed 20 September 2006). (2) Joint Staff, "LIST OF DELETED CJCS Msgs, MOPs, CJCSGs, CJCSIs, CJCSMs, CJCSNs, CMs, DJSMs, J-3 Documents, JS MOPs, JCSMs, JCS PUBs, JT PUBs, MCEBs, MCMs, MJCSs, SJSs, and SMs," (working paper, Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 15 August 2006), 31-39, [www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/support/cjcs/docstatu.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/support/cjcs/docstatu.pdf) (accessed 20 September 2006). (3) Joint Education and Doctrine Division (J7), Joint Staff, "Joint Publication Revision Status Tracker," PowerPoint, 14 September 2006, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/pubstat/pubstatus.pdf> (accessed 20 September 2006).

<b>DIRECTIVE</b>	<b>Short Title</b>	<b>PUB DATE</b>	<b>CNX</b>	<b>REASON AND/OR AUTHORITY</b>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.1</i>		<i>1-Oct-85</i>	<i>1-Nov-91</i>	<i>Canceled by J-3M 0269-91, 1 Nov 91</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.2</i>		<i>1-Oct-87</i>	<i>1-Nov-91</i>	<i>Canceled by J-3M 0269091, 1 Nov 91</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.3</i>		<i>1-Oct-90</i>	<i>10-Aug-93</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.3, 10 Aug 93</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.3</i>		<i>10-Aug-93</i>	<i>15-Apr-00</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSM 3150.02, 15 Apr 00</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.4</i>		<i>30-Jul-76</i>	<i>1-Nov-91</i>	<i>Canceled by J-3M 0269-91, 1 Nov 91</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.5</i>		<i>1-May-74</i>	<i>1-Nov-91</i>	<i>Canceled by J-3M 0269-91, 1 Nov 91</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.6</i>		<i>7-Nov-80</i>	<i>1-Dec-93</i>	<i>Cnx 24 Apr 81; Superseded by CJCSI 3150.03, 1 Dec 93</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.7</i>		<i>1-May-90</i>	<i>30-Apr-96</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 3150.04 CH 1, 30 Apr 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.8</i>		<i>1-Feb-88</i>	<i>1-Apr-96</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 3150.05, 1 Apr 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.9</i>		<i>1-Oct-85</i>	<i>15-Apr-88</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.9 CH1, 15 Apr 88</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.9 CH 1</i>		<i>15-Apr-88</i>	<i>1-Dec-98</i>	<i>Canceled by OPR, Dec 98</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.10</i>		<i>15-Jun-77</i>	<i>15-Jan-93</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.10, 15 Jan 93</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.10</i>		<i>15-Jan-93</i>	<i>1-Oct-98</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSM 3150.07, 1 Oct 98</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.11</i>		<i>1-Nov-76</i>	<i>10-May-96</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6207, 10 May 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.12</i>		<i>11-Apr-83</i>	<i>17-Aug-87</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03 CH 1 17 Aug 87</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.12 CH1</i>		<i>17-Aug-87</i>	<i>15-Mar-99</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSM 3150.09, 15 Mar 99</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.13</i>		<i>11-Apr-83</i>	<i>17-Aug-87</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.13 CH1, 17 Aug 87</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.13 CH1</i>		<i>17-Aug-87</i>	<i>15-Mar-99</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSM 3150.09, 15 Mar 99</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.14</i>		<i>11-Apr-83</i>	<i>21-May-84</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.14, 21 May 84</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.14 CH1</i>		<i>21-May-84</i>	<i>unk</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.14, unknown</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.14 CH 2</i>		<i>unk</i>	<i>17-Aug-87</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.14, 17 Aug 87</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.14 CH 3</i>		<i>17-Aug-87</i>	<i>17-Aug-89</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.14, 17 Aug 89</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.14 CH 4</i>		<i>17-Aug-89</i>	<i>1-Dec-92</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.14, 1 Dec 92</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.14 CH 5</i>		<i>1-Dec-92</i>	<i>15-Mar-99</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSM 3150.09, 15 Mar 99</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.15</i>		<i>15-Mar-85</i>	<i>1-Dec-90</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.15, 1 Dec 90</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.15</i>		<i>1-Dec-90</i>	<i>29-Jan-96</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 3302, 29 Jan 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.16 CH 14</i>		<i>1-Jun-85</i>	<i>1-Mar-86</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1.03.16 1 Mar 86</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.16 CH 15</i>		<i>1-Mar-86</i>	<i>2-Jun-88</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1.03.16 2 Jun 88</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.16 CH 16</i>		<i>1-Jun-88</i>	<i>25-Mar-96</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 3150.20, 25 Mar 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.17</i>		<i>14-Jun-94</i>	<i>1-Aug-99</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSM 3150.13, 1 Aug 99</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.18</i>		<i>13-Aug-79</i>	<i>15-Jul-80</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1.03.18 CH 1 15 Jul 80</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.18 CH 1</i>		<i>15-Jul-80</i>	<i>22-Mar-82</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1.03.18 CH 2, 22 Mar 82</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.18 CH 2</i>		<i>22-Mar-82</i>	<i>5-May-86</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1.03.18 CH 3, 5 May 86</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.18 CH 3</i>		<i>5-May-86</i>	<i>21-May-87</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1.03.18 CH 4, 21 May 87</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.18 CH 4</i>		<i>21-May-87</i>	<i>1-Mar-90</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1.03.18 CH 5, 1 Mar 90</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.18 CH 5</i>		<i>1-Mar-90</i>	<i>21-Oct-94</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSI 3150.14, 21 Oct 94</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.19</i>		<i>1-Oct-76</i>	<i>2-May-77</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 1 31 Jan 78</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 1</i>		<i>2-May-77</i>	<i>31-Jan-78</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 2, 1 Feb 80</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 2</i>		<i>31-Jan-78</i>	<i>1-Feb-80</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 3, 2 May 83</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 3</i>		<i>1-Feb-80</i>	<i>2-May-83</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 4, 8 May 84</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 4</i>		<i>2-May-83</i>	<i>8-May-84</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 5, 15 Mar 85</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 5</i>		<i>8-May-84</i>	<i>15-Mar-85</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 6, 1 Mar 86</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 6</i>		<i>15-Mar-85</i>	<i>1-Mar-86</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 7 1 Mar 86</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 7</i>		<i>1-Mar-86</i>	<i>1-Jun-86</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 8, 1 Jun 86</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 8</i>		<i>1-Jun-86</i>	<i>27-Jul-87</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 9, 27 Jul 87</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 9</i>		<i>27-Jul-87</i>	<i>1-Jun-89</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 10 1 Jun 89</i>

DIRECTIVE	Short Title	PUB DATE	CNX	REASON AND/OR AUTHORITY
<i>JT PUB 1-03.19 CH 10</i>		<i>1-Jun-89</i>	<i>25-Jun-96</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 3150.15, 25 Jun 1996 and CJCSM 3150.29, 1 Feb 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.21</i>		<i>1-Feb-89</i>	<i>24-May-94</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.21, 24 May 94</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.21</i>		<i>24-May-94</i>	<i>15-Mar-96</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 3150.16, 15 Mar 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.23</i>		<i>1-Jun-93</i>	<i>6-Dec-96</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 4204, 6 Dec 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.24</i>		<i>9-Apr-93</i>	<i>6-Dec-96</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 4204, 6 Dec 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.30</i>		<i>15-Apr-91</i>	<i>30-Apr-93</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-03.30, CH 1, 30 Apr 93</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.30 CHI</i>		<i>30-Apr-93</i>	<i>25-Aug-97</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSI 3150.25, 25 Aug 97</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.31</i>		<i>28-Jan-93</i>	<i>6-Mar-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCS MSG 062234Z MAR 95</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-03.32</i>		<i>29-Jan-93</i>	<i>14-Feb-97</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 3304, 14 Feb 97</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-04</i>		<i>1-Aug-90</i>	<i>26-Oct-92</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 1-04, 26 Oct 92</i>
<i>JT PUB 1-04</i>		<i>26-Oct-92</i>	<i>31-Jul-95</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSI 3260.01, 31 Jul 95</i>
JT PUB 1-04	Legal Support			in development
<i>JT PUB 1-04.1</i>		<i>1-Jan-81</i>	<i>20-Mar-91</i>	<i>Supersede by CJCS MOP 53, 20 Mar 91</i>
JT PUB 1-05		3-Aug-93	26-Aug-96	Superseded by JT PUB 1-05, 26 Aug 96
JT PUB 1-05		26-Aug-96	9-Jun-04	Superseded by JP1-05, 9 Jun 04
JT PUB 1-05	Religious Support	9-Jun-04		
JT PUB 1-06	Financial Mgt	22-Dec-99		
<i>JT PUB 1-07</i>		<i>Unk</i>		<i>Replaced by JT PUB 3-61, 14 May 97</i>
JT PUB 2-0		12-Oct-93	5-May-95	Superseded by JT PUB 2-0, 5 May 95
JT PUB 2-0		5-May-95	9-Mar-00	Superseded by JT PUB 2-0, 9 Mar 00
JT PUB 2-0	Joint Intelligence	9-Mar-00		in revision
JT PUB 2-01	Joint Intel Support to Ops	7-Oct-04		
JT PUB 2-01.1	Intel support to targeting	9-Jan-03		consolidation w/3-60
JT PUB 2-01.2	CI and HUMINT support	13-Jun-06		
JT PUB 2-01.3	Intel preparation of battle space	24-May-00		
JT PUB 2-03	Geospatial Information	31-Mar-99		in revision
JT PUB 3-0		9-Sep-93	1-Feb-95	Superseded by JT PUB 3-0, 1 Feb 95
JT PUB 3-0		1-Feb-95	10-Sep-01	Superseded by JT PUB 3-0, 10 Sep 01
JT PUB 3-0		10-Sep-01	17-Dec-06	Superseded by JT PUB 3-0, 17 Dec 06
JT PUB 3-0	Joint Operations	17-Dec-06		
JP PUB 3-01	Countering Air and Missile	19-Oct-99		in revision
JT PUB 3-01.1		1-Feb-82	1-Nov-96	Superseded by JT PUB 3-01.1, 1 Nov 96
JT PUB 3-01.1	Aerospace Defense of America	1-Nov-96		Will be canceled w/ new revision of 3-01
JT PUB 3-01.2		1-Apr-86	19-Oct-99	Incorporated into JT PUB 3-01, 19 Oct 99
JT PUB 3-01.2	Offensive Counterair	19-Oct-99		Will be canceled w/ new revision of 3-01
JT PUB 3-01.3		23-May-64	19-Oct-99	Incorporated into JT PUB 3-01, 19 Oct 99
JT PUB 3-01.3	Defensive Counter Air	19-Oct-99		Will be canceled w/ new revision of 3-01
JT PUB 3-01.4		3-Dec-93	25-Jul-95	Superseded by JT PUB 3-01.4, 25 Jul 95
JT PUB 3-01.4	Joint SEAD	25-Jul-95		to be consolidated
JT PUB 3-01.5		30-Mar-94	22-Feb-96	Superseded by JT PUB 3-01.5, 22 Feb 96
JT PUB 3-01.5	Theater Missile Defense	22-Feb-96		to be consolidated
JT PUB 3-02		1-Nov-86	8-Oct-92	Superseded by JT PUB 3-02, 8 Oct 92



DIRECTIVE	Short Title	PUB DATE	CNX	REASON AND/OR AUTHORITY
JT PUB 3-02		8-Oct-92	19-Sep-01	Superseded by JT PUB 3-02, 19 Sep 01
JT PUB 3-02	Amphib Ops	19-Sep-01		
JT PUB 3-02.2	Amphibious Embarkation	1-May-90	16-Apr-93	Superseded by JT PUB 3-02.2, 16 Apr 93
JT PUB 3-03	Interdiction	10-Apr-97		in revision
<i>JT PUB 3-04</i>		<i>31-Jul-91</i>	<i>1-Oct-97</i>	<i>Canceled by JS J7, Oct 97</i>
JT PUB 3-04.1		28-Jun-93	10-Dec-97	Superseded by JT PUB 3-04.1, 10 Dec 97
JT PUB 3-04.1	Shipboard Helo Ops	10-Dec-97		in revision
JT PUB 3-05		1-Jan-86	28-Oct-92	Superseded by JT PUB 3-05, 28 Oct 92
JT PUB 3-05		28-Oct-92	17-Apr-98	Superseded by JT PUB 3-05, 17 Apr 98
JT PUB 3-05		17-Apr-98	17-Dec-03	Superseded by JT PUB 3-05, 17 Dec 03
JT PUB 3-05	Joint Special Ops	17-Dec-03		
JT PUB 3-05.1	Joint Special Ops Task Force Ops	19-Dec-01		in revision
JT PUB 3-05.2	SO Targeting and Mission Planning	21-May-03		to be consolidate into 3-05
<i>JT PUB 3-05.3</i>		<i>25-Aug-93</i>	<i>11-Feb-02</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 3120, 11 Feb 02</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-05.3</i>		<i>25-Aug-93</i>	<i>19-Dec-01</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 3-05.1, 19 Dec 01</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-05.5</i>	<i>Jt Spec Ops Trgt &amp; MP procedures</i>	<i>10-Aug-93</i>	<i>23-May-03</i>	<i>Canceled by JT PUB 3-05.2, 23 May 03</i>
JT Pub 3-06	Urban Operations	16-Sep-02		
JT PUB 3-07.1		30-Dec-93	26-Jun-96	Superseded by JT PUB 3-07.1, 26 Jun 96
JT PUB 3-07.1	Foreign Internal Defense	26-Jun-96		
JT PUB 3-07.2		25-Jun-93	17-Mar-98	Superseded by JT PUB 3-07.2, 17 Mar 98
JT PUB 3-07.2	Antiterrorism	17-Mar-98		
JT PUB 3-07.3		29-Apr-94	12-Feb-99	Superseded by JT PUB 3-07.3, 12 Feb 99
JT PUB 3-07.3	Peace Operations	12-Feb-99		in revision
JT PUB 3-07.4		9-Aug-94	17-Feb-98	Superseded by JT PUB 3-07.4, 17 Feb 98
JT PUB 3-07.4	Counter Drug Ops	17-Feb-98		in revision
JT PUB 3-07.5	NEO	30-Sep-97		in revision
JT PUB 3-07.6	Humanitarian Assistance	15-Aug-01		
JT Pub 3-08	Interagency Coordination	17-Mar-06		
JT PUB 3-09	Fires Support	12-May-98		in revision
JT PUB 3-09.1		1-Jun-91	28-May-99	Superseded by JT PUB 3-09.1, 28 May 99
JT PUB 3-09.1	Laser Designator Ops	28-May-99		
<i>JT PUB 3-09.2</i>	<i>JTTP for Radar Beacon Ops</i>	<i>23-Apr-93</i>	<i>1-Apr-97</i>	<i>Canceled by JS J7, Apr 97</i>
JT PUB 3-09.3		1-Dec-95	3-Sep-03	Superseded by JT PUB 3-09.3, 3 Sep 03
JT PUB 3-09.3		3-Sep-03	2-Sep-05	Superseded by JT PUB 3-09.3, 2 Sep 05
JT PUB 3-09.3	Close Air Support	2-Sep-05		
JT PUB 3-10		26-Feb-93	28-May-96	Superseded by JT PUB 3-10, 28 May 96
JT PUB 3-10		28-May-96	1-Aug-06	Superseded by JT PUB 3-10, 1 Aug 06
JT PUB 3-10	Security In theater	1-Aug-06		
JT PUB 3-10.1	JTTP for Base Defense	15-Mar-93	23-Jul-96	Superseded by JT PUB 3-10.1, 23 Jul 96
JT PUB 3-10.1	JTTP for Base Defense	23-Jul-96		
JT PUB 3-11		15-Apr-94	10-Jul-95	Superseded by JT PUB 3-11, 10 Jul 95
JT PUB 3-11		10-Jul-95	11-Jul-00	Superseded by JT PUB 3-11, 11 Jul 00

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JT PUB 3-11	NBC Defense	11-Jul-00		
JT PUB 3-12		29-Apr-93	15-Dec-95	Superseded by JT PUB 3-12, 15 Dec 95
JT PUB 3-12	Joint Nuclear Operations	15-Dec-95		in revision
JT PUB 3-13		10-Sep-87	7-Feb-96	Superseded by JT PUB 3-13.1, 7 Feb 96
JT PUB 3-13	Information Operations	29-Jun-06		
JT PUB 3-13.1		1-Sep-87	7-Feb-96	Superseded by JT PUB 3-13.1, 7 Feb 96
JT PUB 3-13.1	EW	7-Feb-96	7-Apr-00	note: renamed JP3-51
JT PUB 3-13.1	EW	7-Apr-00		in revision
JT PUB 3-13.2	PSYOP	unk		
JT PUB 3-13.3	OPSEC	29-Jun-06		
JT PUB 3-13.4	Military Deception	13-Jul-06		
JT PUB 3-14	Space Operations	9-Aug-02		in revision
JT PUB 3-15		30-Jun-93	24-Feb-99	Superseded by JT PUB 3-15, 24 Feb 99
JT PUB 3-15	Barriers and Mines	24-Feb-99		in revision
JT PUB 3-16	Multinational Operations	5-Apr-00		in revision
JT PUB 3-17		18-Jul-95	14-Aug-02	Superseded by JT PUB 3-17, 14 Aug 02
JT PUB 3-17	Air Mobility Operations	14-Aug-02		
JT PUB 3-18	Forcible Entry Ops	16-Jul-01		
JT PUB 3-26	Homeland Security	2-Aug-05		
JT PUB 3-27	Homeland Defense	4-Nov-96		in development
JT PUB 3-28	Civil Support			in development
JT PUB 3-30	C2 Joint Air Ops	5-Jun-03		
JT PUB 3-31	Joint Land Ops	23-Mar-04		
JT PUB 3-32	JFMCC	8-Aug-06		
JT PUB 3-33	JTF HQ	13-Jan-99		in revision
JT PUB 3-34	Engineer Doctrine	5-Jul-00		in revision
JT PUB 3-35	Deployment and Re-deployment	7-Sep-99		in revision
JT PUB 3-40	Combating WMD	8-Jul-04		
JT PUB 3-41	CBRNE CM			in development
<i>JT PUB 3-50</i>	<i>Personnel Recovery</i>	<i>1-Feb-91</i>	<i>7-Jun-01</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 3306, 7 Jun 01</i>
JT PUB 3-50	Personnel Recovery			In Development
<i>JT PUB 3-50.1</i>	<i>Search and Rescue</i>	<i>1-Feb-91</i>	<i>7-Jun-01</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 3307, 7 Jun 01</i>
JT PUB 3-50.2		12-Jul-94	26-Jan-96	Superseded by JT PUB 3-50.2, 26 Jan 96
JT PUB 3-50.2	CSAR	26-Jan-96		consolidation w/ JP 3-50
JT PUB 3-50.21	CSAR JTTP	23-Mar-98		consolidation w/ JP 3-50
JT PUB 3-50.3	Evasion & Rescue	6-Sep-96		consolidation w/ JP 3-50
JT PUB 3-51		22-Jan-79	30-Jun-91	Superseded by JT PUB 3-51, 30 Jun 91
JT PUB 3-51		30-Jun-91	7-Apr-00	Superseded by JT PUB 3-51, 7 Apr 00
JT PUB 3-51	EW	7-Apr-00		
<i>JT PUB 3-51.1</i>	<i>EW</i>	<i>24-Dec-86</i>	<i>30-Jun-91</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 3-51, 30 Jun 91</i>
JT PUB 3-52		3-Dec-93	22-Jul-95	Superseded by JT PUB 3-52, 22 Jul 95
JT PUB 3-52		22-Jul-95	30-Aug-06	Superseded by JT PUB 3-52, 30 Aug 06
JT PUB 3-52	Airspace Control	30-Aug-04		
JT PUB 3-53		30-Jul-93	10-Jul-96	Superseded by JT PUB 3-53, 10 Jul 96

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JT PUB 3-53		10-Jul-96	5-Sep-03	Superseded by JT PUB 3-53, 5 Sep 03
JT PUB 3-53	PSYOP	5-Sep-03		
<i>JT PUB 3-54</i>		<i>15-Dec-82</i>	<i>22-Aug-91</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 3-54, 22 Aug 91</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-54</i>		<i>22-Aug-91</i>	<i>15-Apr-94</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 3-54, 15 apr 94</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-54</i>		<i>15-Apr-94</i>	<i>24-Jan-97</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 3-54, 24 Jan 97</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-54</i>	<i>Operations Security</i>	<i>24-Jan-97</i>		
<i>JT PUB 3-55</i>		<i>14-Apr-93</i>	<i>3-Dec-06</i>	<i>Canceled by JS J7, Dec 03</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-55.1</i>		<i>27-Aug-93</i>	<i>7-Jun-02</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 3255, 7 Jun 02</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-56</i>		<i>1-Apr-74</i>	<i>1-Apr-99</i>	<i>Canceled by JDWP Apr 99</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-56.1</i>		<i>1-Dec-72</i>	<i>14-Nov-94</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 3-56.1, 14 Nov 94</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-56.1</i>		<i>14-Nov-94</i>	<i>5-Jun-03</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 3-30, 5 Jun 03</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-56.20</i>		<i>1-May-87</i>	<i>24-Oct-97</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6120.01A, 24 Oct 97</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-56.21</i>		<i>1-May-87</i>	<i>24-Oct-97</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6120.01A, 24 Oct 97</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-56.22</i>		<i>1-May-87</i>	<i>24-Oct-97</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6120.01A, 24 Oct 97</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-56.23</i>		<i>1-Dec-82</i>	<i>24-Oct-97</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6120.01A, 24 Oct 97</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-56.24</i>		<i>1-Aug-86</i>	<i>1-Oct-91</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 3-56.24, 1 Oct 91</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-56.24</i>		<i>1-Oct-91</i>	<i>15-May-95</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6120.05, 15 May 95</i>
JT PUB 3-57		21-Jun-95	8-Feb-01	Superseded by JT PUB 3-57, 8 Feb 01
JT PUB 3-57	Civil-Military Ops	8-Feb-01		
JT PUB 3-57.1	Civil Affairs	14-Apr-03		Being consolidated w/ 3-57
<i>JT PUB 3-58</i>		<i>6-Jun-94</i>	<i>31-May-96</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 3-58, 31 May 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 3-58</i>	<i>Operational Deception</i>	<i>31-May-96</i>		<i>Cnx - date unk</i>
JT PUB 3-59		22-Dec-93	23-Mar-99	Superseded by JT PUB 3-59, 23 Mar 99
JT PUB 3-59	Meteorological & Oceanographic	23-Mar-99		in revision
JT PUB 3-60	Targeting	17-Jan-02		in revision
JT PUB 3-61	Public Affairs	9-May-05		
JT PUB 3-63	Detainee Ops			In development
JT PUB 4-0		25-Sep-92	27-Jan-95	Superseded by JT PUB 4-0, 27 Jan 95
JT PUB 4-0		27-Jan-95	6-Apr-00	Superseded by JT PUB 4-0, 6 Apr 00
JT PUB 4-0	Joint Logistics	6-Apr-00		in revision
JT PUB 4-01, CH2		30-Sep-86	17-Jun-97	Superseded by JT PUB 4-01, 17 Jun 97
JT PUB 4-01		17-Jun-97	19-Mar-03	Superseded by JT PUB 4-01, 19 Mar 03
JT PUB 4-01	Defense Transportation Sys	19-Mar-03		
<i>JT PUB 4-01.1</i>	<i>Airlift Support</i>	<i>20-Jul-96</i>	<i>14-Aug-02</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 3-17, 14 Aug 02</i>
JT PUB 4-01.2	Sealift Support	31-Aug-05		
JT PUB 4-01.3		26-Jan-94	21-Jun-96	Superseded by JT PUB 4-01.3, 21 Jun 96
JT PUB 4-01.3		21-Jun-96	9-Apr-02	Superseded by JT PUB 4-01.3, 9 Apr 02
JT PUB 4-01.3	Movement Control	9-Apr-02		Being consolidated
JT PUB 4-01.4	Theater Distribution	22-Aug-00		Being Consolidated
JT PUB 4-01.5		16-Jun-93	21-Jun-96	Superseded by JT PUB 4-01.5, 21 Jun 96
JT PUB 4-01.5		21-Jun-96	9-Apr-02	Superseded by JT PUB 4-01.5, 9 Apr 02
JT PUB 4-01.5	Terminal Ops	9-Apr-02		
JT PUB 4-01.6		22-Aug-91	12-Nov-98	Superseded by JT PUB 4-01.6, 12 Nov 98
JT PUB 4-01.6		12-Nov-98	5-Aug-05	Superseded by JT PUB 4-01.6, 5 Aug 05
JT PUB 4-01.6	JLOTS	5-Aug-05		

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JT PUB 4-01.7	Intermodal Containers	7-Jan-97		Being consolidated w/4-09
JT PUB 4-01.8	JRSOI	13-Jun-00		Being consolidated w/ 3-35
JT PUB 4-02		26-Apr-95	30-Jul-01	Superseded by JT PUB 4-02, 30 Jul 01
JT PUB 4-02	Health Support	30-Jul-01		in revision
JT PUB 4-02.1	Health Logistics	6-Oct-97		Being consolidated w/4-02
JT PUB 4-02.2	Patient Movement	30-Dec-06		Being consolidated w/4-02
JP PUB 4-03		25-Jul-95	23-May-03	Superseded by JT PUB 4-03, 23 May 03
JP PUB 4-03	Petroleum and Water	23-May-03		
JT PUB 4-04		24-Feb-95	26-Sep-95	Superseded by JT PUB 4-04, 26 Sep 95
JT PUB 4-04		26-Sep-95	27-Sep-01	Superseded by JT PUB 4-04, 27 Sep 01
JT PUB 4-04	Civil Engineering	27-Sep-01		Consolidating into JP 3-34
JT PUB 4-05		3-Aug-87	22-Jun-95	Superseded by JT PUB 4-05, 22 Jun 95
JT PUB 4-05	Mobilization Plng	11-Jan-06		
JT PUB 4-05.1	Reserve Component Callup	11-Nov-98		in revision
JT PUB 4-06	Mortuary Affairs	5-Jun-06		
JT PUB 4-07	Common User Logistics	11-Jun-01		
JT PUB 4-08	Logistics in multi-national ops	25-Sep-02		
JT PUB 4-09	Global Distribution	14-Dec-01		in revision
JT PUB 4-10	Contractor Mgt			In development
JT PUB 5-0		15-Aug-94	13-Apr-95	Superseded by JT PUB 5-0, 13 Apr 95
JT PUB 5-0	Joint Plans	13-Apr-05		in revision
JT PUB 5-00.1	Campaign Planning	25-Jan-02		Consolidating w/ JP 5-0
<i>JT PUB 5-00.2</i>		<i>3-Sep-91</i>	<i>13-Jan-99</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 5-00.2, 13 Jan 99</i>
<i>JT PUB 5-00.2</i>		<i>13-Jan-99</i>		<i>Cnx</i>
<i>JT PUB 5-01</i>		<i>3-Aug-87</i>	<i>3-Aug-87</i>	<i>Renumbered a JT PUB 4-05, 3 Aug 87</i>
<i>JT PUB 5-02.1</i>		<i>6-Jul-88</i>	<i>4-Aug-93</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 5-03.1, 4 Aug 93</i>
<i>JT PUB 5-02.2</i>		<i>30-Mar-90</i>	<i>10-Mar-92</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 5-03.2, 10 Mar 92</i>
<i>JT PUB 5-02.4</i>		<i>8-Jul-88</i>	<i>4-Aug-93</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 5-03.1, 4 Aug 93</i>
<i>JT PUB 5-02.21</i>		<i>10-Mar-92</i>	<i>10-Mar-92</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 5-03.1, 10 Mar 92</i>
<i>JT PUB 5-03.1</i>		<i>4-Aug-93</i>	<i>14-Jul-00</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSM 3122.01, 14 Jul 00</i>
<i>JT PUB 5-03.11</i>		<i>unk</i>	<i>9-Dec-94</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 3122.02, 9 Dec 94</i>
<i>JT PUB 5-03.2</i>		<i>10-Mar-92</i>	<i>1-Jun-96</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 3122.03, 1 Jun 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 5-03.21</i>		<i>10-Mar-92</i>	<i>1-Jun-96</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 3122.04, 1 Jun 96</i>
JT PUB 6-0		3-Jun-92	30-May-95	Superseded by JT PUB 6-0, 30 May 95
JT PUB 6-0		30-May-95	20-Mar-06	Superseded by JT PUB 6-0, 20 Mar 06
JT PUB 6-0	Comm System Support	20-Mar-06		
<i>JT PUB 6-01.1</i>		<i>1-Oct-89</i>	<i>unk</i>	<i>Converted to MIL-STDs 6011/6004 by CJCSI 6610.01</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-01.3</i>		<i>29-Oct-93</i>	<i>unk</i>	<i>Converted to MIL-STD 6013 by CJCSI 6610.01</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-02</i>	<i>Operational and Tactical C4 employm</i>	<i>1-Apr-68</i>	<i>1-Oct-96</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 6-02, 1 Oct 96 - CNX date unk</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-02.3</i>		<i>unk</i>	<i>21-Mar-95</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSI 6230.03, 21 Mar 95</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.2</i>		<i>16-May-77</i>	<i>8-Jan-90</i>	<i>Canceled by MJCS 3-90, 8 Jan 90</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.3</i>		<i>2-May-77</i>	<i>10-Jan-91</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 6-03.3, 10 Jan 91</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.3</i>		<i>1-Jan-91</i>	<i>22-Oct-96</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6209, 22 Oct 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.4</i>		<i>4-Oct-82</i>	<i>22-Oct-96</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6209, 22 Oct 96</i>

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<i>JT PUB 6-03.5</i>		<i>1-Jun-84</i>	<i>13-Sep-91</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 6-03.3, 13 Sep 91</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.5</i>		<i>13-Sep-91</i>	<i>13-Sep-96</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6209, 13 Sep 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.6</i>		<i>1-Oct-76</i>	<i>13-Sep-91</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6209, 13 Sep 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.7</i>		<i>14-Jan-93</i>	<i>13-Sep-96</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6209, 13 Sep 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.10</i>		<i>28-Feb-78</i>	<i>20-May-91</i>	<i>Canceled by JT PUB 6-0, 20 May 91</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.11</i>		<i>1-May-87</i>	<i>13-Sep-91</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSI 6721.02, 13 Dec 1996</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.12</i>		<i>30-Sep-81</i>	<i>22-Oct-96</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6209, 22 Oct 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.13</i>		<i>1-Feb-83</i>	<i>13-Sep-91</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCS MOP 50, 13 Dec 90</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.14</i>		<i>29-Jan-82</i>	<i>15-Apr-91</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 6-03.14, 15 Apr 91</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.14</i>		<i>15-Apr-91</i>	<i>22-Oct-96</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6209, 22 Oct 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.15</i>		<i>31-Mar-86</i>	<i>22-Oct-96</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6209, 22 Oct 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.16</i>		<i>1-Jul-76</i>	<i>15-Jun-92</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 6-03.16, 15 Jun 92</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.16</i>		<i>15-Jun-92</i>	<i>22-Oct-96</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6209, 22 Oct 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-03.17</i>		<i>25-Feb-82</i>	<i>22-Oct-96</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6209, 22 Oct 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.1</i>		<i>1-Dec-87</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.3</i>		<i>1-Dec-87</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.5</i>		<i>1-Dec-87</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.7</i>		<i>1-May-89</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.10</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.11</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.20</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.21</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.21</i>		<i>1-Dec-87</i>	<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 6-04.22, 1 Oct 92</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.22</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.23</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.31</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.32</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.41</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.42</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.43</i>		<i>1-Dec-87</i>	<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 6-04.43, 1 Oct 92</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.43</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.44</i>		<i>1-Dec-87</i>	<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 6-04.44, 1 Oct 92</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.44</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.45</i>		<i>1-Dec-87</i>	<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 6-04.45, 1 Oct 92</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.45</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.46</i>		<i>1-Dec-87</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.50</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>

<b>DIRECTIVE</b>	<b>Short Title</b>	<b>PUB DATE</b>	<b>CNX</b>	<b>REASON AND/OR AUTHORITY</b>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.61</i>		<i>1-Dec-87</i>	<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 6-04.61, 1 Oct 92</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.61</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.62</i>		<i>1-Dec-87</i>	<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 6-04.62, 1 Oct 92</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.62</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.63</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.80</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.81</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.90</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-04.91</i>		<i>1-Oct-92</i>	<i>15-Dec-95</i>	<i>Canceled by CJCSN 6204, 15 Dec 95/ Replaced by MILSTD 6040</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-05.1</i>		<i>24-Apr-92</i>	<i>17-Mar-95</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6231.01, 17 Mar 95</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-05.2</i>		<i>1-Mar-89</i>	<i>24-Sep-93</i>	<i>Superseded by JT PUB 6-05.2, 24 Sep 93</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-05.2</i>		<i>24-Sep-93</i>	<i>29-Dec-95</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6231.02, 29 Dec 95</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-05.3</i>		<i>15-Oct-90</i>	<i>15-Aug-97</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6231.03A, 15 Aug 97</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-05.4</i>		<i>1-Jul-90</i>	<i>29-Dec-95</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6231.04, 29 Dec 95</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-05.5</i>		<i>1-Nov-89</i>	<i>13-Oct-95</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6231.05, 13 Oct 95</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-05.6</i>		<i>15-Oct-87</i>	<i>14-Aug-95</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6231.06, 14 Aug 95</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-05.7</i>		<i>31-Aug-92</i>	<i>1-May-95</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6231.07, 1 May 95</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-06.1</i>		<i>21-Jun-91</i>	<i>15-May-96</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6230.05, 15 May 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-06.1A</i>		<i>21-Jun-91</i>	<i>15-May-96</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6230.05, 15 May 96</i>
<i>JT PUB 6-06.1B</i>		<i>21-Jun-91</i>	<i>15-May-96</i>	<i>Superseded by CJCSM 6230.05, 15 May 96</i>

Color Key

Red Text/Italics = canceled  
Light Grey fill = consolidation  
Green (Dark Gray) fill = Active

## Appendix B

### JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0, SUMMARY OF CHANGES<sup>28</sup>

Revision Dated 10 September 2001

- Consolidates JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, and JP 3-0 formally titled Doctrine for Joint Operations
- Discontinues use of the term and acronym “military operations other than war (MOOTW)”
- Introduces Department of Defense support to homeland security (i.e., homeland defense, civil support)
- Revises the range of military operations
- Establishes 12 “principles of joint operations” by adding three “other principles” — restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy — to the traditional nine “principles of war”
- Updates the terms and discussions for various operational areas
- Replaces the term “battlespace” with the term “operational environment”
- Establishes six joint functions — command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment
- Revises the definitions and relationship between “operational art” and “operational design”
- Introduces a “systems perspective of the operational environment”
- Introduces the application of “effects” in operational design and assessment
- Establishes the relationship between tasks, effects, and objectives, i.e., tasks are executed to create effects to achieve objectives to attain an end state
- Establishes 17 operational design (formerly operational art) elements and revises the order, scope, and description of several
  - Adds new operational design elements of “end state and objectives” and “effects”
  - Revises the definition of “center of gravity” and includes a discussion of its “critical factors”
  - Expands “lines of operations” to include logical lines

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<sup>28</sup> Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 10 September 2001), iii-iv.

- Expands the “phasing model” to six phases, i.e., shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority
- Revises the “commander’s critical information requirements” discussion and provides a process to develop them
- Establishes the construct of “assessment”
- Establishes a “stability operations” construct and military support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR)
- Adds the application of “flexible deterrent options”
- Discusses the integration of special operations forces and conventional forces
- Establishes the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information Environment
- Discusses the “combat identification” construct
- Discusses “crisis response and limited contingency operations”
  - Updates the discussion on “peace operations” and “consequence management”
  - Establishes a distinction between “strikes” and “raids”
  - Adds discussions on homeland defense and civil support operations
- Discusses “military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence”
  - Introduces “emergency preparedness”
  - Updates the discussion on “DOD support to counterdrug operations”
- Establishes new definitions for the terms “adversary,” “combat identification,” “effect,” “friendly force information requirement,” “measure of performance,” “stability operations,” “standing joint force headquarters,” “system,” and “termination criteria”
- Modifies significantly the definitions for “assessment,” “fires,” “line of operations,” “link,” “node,” “operational art,” “operational design,” and “strategy determination”



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