Unit Cohesion

Cross Leveling and Readiness

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14. ABSTRACT

As the Army transforms and the force is restructured it becomes incumbent on the Army to extend the utility of its most vital resource, Army personnel. It further became evident that in today's volatile, dynamic environment, Army Transformation must consider unit cohesion as a key element in its force development strategies. To that end, the study team adopted the following definition for Unit Cohesion: The bonding together of members of an organization in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit and the mission, as quoted from a 1995 Naval Postgraduate School study by Earnest G. Cunningham. It addresses both the group dynamics of an organization and the unit effectiveness in terms of the will and commitment of its members to sustain through a binding relationship of those members. This definition was used throughout the study as the foundation as guiding principle for the study. It is the overall conclusion of this study that most reserve component soldiers have a positive perception of their deployment and the unit in which they served. They predominately agreed that the unit was cohesive and they would want to deploy in that unit again. The Army Transformation through the ARFORGEN model will have serious challenges in achieving the Reset-Ready-Available construct for reserve component forces given the current process of cross leveling, not necessarily because of the impact on unit-cohesion but because of the widespread deficiencies it creates in those units being cannibalized to produce the personnel to fill the other units requiring the cross leveling. There are areas of concern which could have lasting impacts on the ability to maintain the All Volunteer Force with specific concerns about recruiting and retention. There are also some areas for policy development in the areas of leadership, training, and equipping the reserve components.

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Preface

In the Spring of 2006, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) decided to investigate the impact on unit cohesion and readiness resulting from the practice of cross leveling soldiers between units to achieve deployment personnel readiness requirements.

The ASA(M&RA) identified the need to take a more comprehensive view of the cross leveling process and impacts of that practice on the reserve components of the Army to better understand the history of the practice, its short and long term impacts, and how cross leveling has impacted unit cohesion. This study will potentially affect Army policy and strategy in building and supporting deployable units.

The contract was awarded to BCP International Limited on March 29, 2006 with an initial goal to complete the study by 28 September 2006. The contract was modified to better align the study to achieve the desired goals by incorporating a unit level personnel survey and extending the contract date to 28 November 2006 in order to allow sufficient time for unit members to complete the survey.

BCP Internal Limited was contracted to conduct this study and submits this report in compliance with the requirement.

Executive Summary

The challenges of today's volatile geo-political environment with the combined affects of the transition to and maintenance of an all volunteer force (AVF), full adoption of the Total Force Policy, post Cold-War downsizing of the military, the lessons learned during Operation Desert Storm, and the stresses of the Global War on Terror(GWOT) have all have contributed to an acceleration of the need for Transformation and fundamental change in the Army. Included in these changes is not only how we build and organize forces but also how we man the force with quality personnel and then retain those personnel throughout a career in order to field ready, deployable units. The nation faces what could be the most significant challenge to the All Volunteer Force since its' inception in the 1970's, and we are doing it while we are a nation at war.

It became readily evident through the course of this study that if the Army is to execute the National Military Strategy and those missions established in US Code Title 10, there is an absolute requirement is to maintain personnel readiness. As the Army transforms and the force is restructured it becomes incumbent on the Army to extend the utility of its' most vital resource, Army personnel. It further became evident that in today's volatile, dynamic environment, Army Transformation must consider unit cohesion as a key element in its force development strategies. To that end, the study team adopted the following definition for Unit Cohesion, "*The bonding together of members of an organization in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit and the mission,*" as quoted from a 1995 Naval Postgraduate School study by Earnest G. Cunningham.[1] It addresses both the group dynamics of an organization and the unit effectiveness in terms of the will and commitment of its members to sustain through a

[1] Ernest G. Cunningham, *Peacekeeping and U.N. Operational Control: A Study of their Effect on Unit Cohesion* (California: Naval Postgraduate School, 1995),

binding relationship of those members. This definition was used throughout the study as the foundation as guiding principle for the study.

The study methodology began with a broad based literature review which then defined a study the rest of the methodology to utilize focus groups and surveys to identify issues and secure soldier evaluations that would be corroborated through data calls with empirical data on the units surveyed. The survey results and data calls were integrated for analysis and validation. This taxonomy of analysis, reflected throughout the study, provided a well framed basis for the findings, and recommendations.

Six factors were identified and evaluated which provided a sound basis for policy considerations to enhance unit readiness through improved unit cohesion. Cross-leveling was one of those factors with Training & Equipping as another of those factors and the remaining four factors, Discipline, Communications, Respect, and Tactical Leadership, were all related to leadership.

There were some important findings across each of those areas of evaluation. Several of those findings are noteworthy and warrant consideration. The impact of cross-leveling appeared to have less impact on unit-cohesion than the other factors for those units receiving those cross-leveled personnel. However, it appears to have a great impact on the parent units of those personnel in terms of their personnel readiness. Personnel readiness in the units receiving those personnel clearly went up but for every unit fixed there were multiple units broken. This factor alone has major implications for Army Transformation, ARFORGEN, and the ability of the Army to build and maintain ready, deployable units.

Specific recommendations for policy development all dealt with personnel turbulence issues with the most significant recommending that the Army establish a robust individuals account to minimize the overall effect of cross leveling and other personnel turbulence.

The literature review exposed a deficiency in research with regard to unit cohesion, unit effectiveness, and ultimately unit readiness in the reserve components. There is a broad literature base on the active force but that research may or may not have any meaning given the differences between a full-time force and a part-time force. A number of recommendations for future research were provided to support these and other policy decisions for Army Transformation and its ARFORGEN model.

It is the overall conclusion of this study that most reserve component soldiers have a positive perception of their deployment and the unit in which they served. They predominately agreed that the unit was cohesive and they would want to deploy in that unit again. The Army Transformation through the ARFORGEN model will have serious challenges in achieving the Reset-Ready-Available construct for reserve component forces given the current process of cross leveling, not necessarily because of the impact on unit-cohesion but because of the widespread deficiencies it creates in those units being cannibalized to produce the personnel to fill the other units requiring the cross leveling. There are areas of concern which could have lasting impacts on the ability to maintain the All Volunteer Force with specific concerns about recruiting and retention. There are also some areas for policy development in the areas of leadership, training, and equipping the reserve components.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the numerous individuals who provided invaluable input into this study. The efforts of Reserve Affairs Integration ASA-M&RA, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve are greatly appreciated. We are especially indebted to those soldiers who participated in this effort by honestly and forthrightly providing their insights and professional opinions on key issues affecting Army unit effectiveness and readiness by completing surveys, participating in focus groups, and interviews. We are also indebted to the many former soldiers and other key personnel who provided their professional expertise and valuable background information.

The Study Team

Kenneth R. Powell – Study Lead and Principal Investigator
Christine D'Angelo – Research Assistant & Staff Editor
BJ Thornburg – Senior Operations Research Analyst
Mike Nowak – Team Chief

1. Introduction

On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, the world changed. The Army is now engaged in transforming itself while at war. This challenge of transformation while at war in the dangerous, dynamic environment of sustained engagement sets today apart from the preceding history of this nation.

COHESION

Generally speaking, the need for military virtues becomes greater the more the theater of operations and other factors tend to complicate the war and disperse the forces.

—Carl von Clausewitz

Cohesion is the art of command.

—BG (ret.) Eran Dolev

Figure 1 - RAND MG191: Steeling the Mind

The Global War on Terror with operations spread across multiple theaters and extensive other factors, to include Army Transformation, give rise to the most extreme of environments envisioned by Clausewitz.[2] BG (ret.) Eran Dolev, the surgeon general of the Israeli Defense Forces during the 1982 Lebanon War, noted that commanders must view cohesion as a mission in and of itself and must foster the idea that "we all

[2] Steeling the Mind Combat Stress Reactions and Their Implications for Urban Warfare, by Todd C. Helmus and Russell W. Glenn, The Rand Corporation MG-191, 2004

depend on each other."[3] It became readily evident in the course of this study that in today's volatile, dynamic environment, Army Transformation must consider unit cohesion as a key element in its force development strategies. To that end, the study team adopted the following definition of Unit Cohesion, see Figure 2 below, identified in a 1995 Naval Postgraduate School study.[4]

COHESION

"The bonding together of members of an organization in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit and the mission"

Earnest G. Cunningham

Figure 2 - Definition of Unit Cohesion

Transformation initiatives across the Army encompass fundamental changes in the Total Force with dramatic impacts on every aspect of the Army. The centerpiece of Army Transformation is a fundamental change in how it stations, prepares, and allocates units ready for combat. This new process, known as the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, dictates change across the Army enterprise with changes in the human resource (HR) environment encompassing policies, procedures, and processes within the holistic "cradle to grave" construct, with changes across all HR domains from recruiting and accessioning new personnel to changes in training, education, doctrine, leadership development, equipment-human interface

[3] IBID
[4] Ernest G. Cunningham, *Peacekeeping and U.N. Operational Control: A Study of their Effect on Unit Cohesion* (California: Naval Postgraduate School, 1995),

modernization, personnel logistics support, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation, mobilization, demobilization, health affairs and those most overlooked, yet vitally important personnel services, such as military burial and family support. It is especially important to preserve and hoard the most vital of resources, the Soldiers, both Active and Reserve.

The transition to and maintenance of an all volunteer force (AVF), full adoption of the Total Force Policy, post Cold-War downsizing of the military, the lessons learned during Operation Desert Storm, and the stresses of the Global War on Terror have all have contributed to an acceleration of the need for Transformation and fundamental changes. Included in these changes is not only how we build and organize forces but also how we man the force with quality personnel and then retain those personnel throughout a career. The nation faces what could be the most significant challenge to the All Volunteer Force since its' inception in the 1970's.

Complicating this Transformation are not only the ever-growing resource pressures and long held historical cultural traditions, but also the absolute requirement to maintain the personnel readiness of America's Army. As this Transformation continues to evolve and the force is restructured under ARFORGEN, it becomes incumbent on the Army to extend the utility of its' most vital resource, personnel, with minimum risk and with resource conservative approaches. The Army must evaluate these approaches, and other new policies that leverage the best of best practices across the DoD, public sector, and private industry and, within a military construct, find optimal ways to provide the manpower needed in all components in a way to create, generate, and maintain combat effective units ready to deploy. The DoD is *not* United Parcel Service, so while policies, practices, and applications from the private commercial sector can and should inform DoD approaches, it must be understood that they may not be perfect matches and the Army must be careful to identify the differences. The Army must leverage the power of computational analysis and systems integration available today to maximize its

precious resources in the pursuit of trained and ready units. Streamlined methods to support the utilization of personnel across components and functional areas to generate ready units are critical but must include unit cohesion as a key planning factor. The Army must leverage all personnel and provide them the opportunity to serve where they are needed and where they can best contribute to the essential missions supporting our national security.

Almost daily news articles like the extract in Figure 3 below hit the news media in print,

CNN.com

Purported Iraq al Qaeda tape to U.S.: Jihad not over

POSTED: 12:55 a.m. EST, November 11, 2006

BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- A purported audio recording by the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq vows to step up the group's fight against the United States, saying, "We haven't had enough of your blood yet."

The recording was posted Friday on an Islamist Web site and the speaker is identified as Abu Hamza al-Muhajer, successor to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Muhajer is also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri.

"Come down to the battlefield, you coward," the speaker says on the recording, which CNN cannot independently confirm as the voice of al-Muhajer.

Calling President Bush a "lame duck" the speaker tells Bush not to "run away as your lame defense secretary ran away," referring to Donald Rumsfeld, who resigned Wednesday.

Critics of the U.S.-led war in Iraq have placed much of the blame for its problems on Rumsfeld. The war's growing unpopularity contributed to toppling the majority Republican Party in both chambers of Congress in Tuesday's election. (Watch Rumsfeld acknowledge what's going wrong -- 2:23)

Much of the Iraqi insurgency has been blamed on al Qaeda in Iraq, whose former chief al-Zarqawi was killed in a U.S.-led airstrike in June.

The speaker on the tape vows that al Qaeda in Iraq will not stop its jihad "until we sit under the olive trees in Rumiya after we blow up the wicked house known as the White House." He says the first phase of the jihad is now over, and that the next phase -- building an Islamic nation -- has begun.

"The victory day has come faster than we expected," he says. "Here is the Islamic nation in Iraq victorious against the tyrant. The enemy is incapable of fighting on and has no choice but to run away."

The speaker claims his al Qaeda army has 12,000 soldiers -- with 10,000 more waiting in the wings to join them.

And he pledges those troops to the service of the Mujahedeen Shura Council and the Islamic Nation of Iraq. He calls on other insurgent groups in Iraq to join with them.

"We have to be unified by the sword, even though disagreements exist between us," al-Muhajer said.

"Go where God has ordered you to go and know that we are with you. We are your soldiers and your men," he says.

Figure 3 – CNN.com Article 11 Nov 2006

radio, and television. The Army's challenge in this environment is even more significant given the need to recruit and retain quality personnel across the Total Force. The Army has taken the challenge and has directed wide scale transformation initiatives to better utilize the total force across all components.

Complicating this Transformation are resource pressures, long held historical practices, and the absolute requirement to maintain the personnel readiness of America's Army. As this Transformation continues to evolve and the force is restructured, it becomes incumbent on the Army to extend the utility of its' most vital resource, personnel.

The Reserve Component forces of the United States began a major transformation prior to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of 11 September 2001. The role of the reserves, how they are mobilized, employed, deployed, and demobilized in support of missions traditionally the responsibility of the active component were increasing before 9-11. Following 9-11, utilization of the RC became nearly geometric. This is dramatically captured in the Time Magazine September 1st, 2003 graphic[5], in Figure 4 below, addressing the impact on the Army alone since 9/11.



Figure 4 - Army Overseas Deployments

[5] Is The Army Stretched Too Thin? By Mark Thompson and Michael Duffy, Time Magazine September 1, 2003.

The requirement to review how DoD utilizes its' Reserve Component resources has been widely recognized at multiple levels of the government for some time as documented in the following:

- *The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* directed the Department of Defense to provide Congress a comprehensive review of its' Active and Reserve force alignment, organization, priority missions, and associated resources to fully meet force transformation.[6]

- The Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense in September of 2002 detailed how demands on the RC of all the services have geometrically increased. The operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the Reserve Components, measured in days of active duty, increased over tenfold between 1989 and 2001.

- The Rand Corporation identified in a 1996 study that even though cross leveling can be a cost-effective means to ensure unit deployability, it is not the ideal solution to reserve readiness problems. The greater the reliance on cross leveling, the less the likelihood that units will have had peacetime individual and collective training adequate to permit cohesive performance of their wartime mission.[7]

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[6] Quadrennial Defense Review Report dated September 30th, 2001, Pages 16 and 23.
[7] Ensuring Personnel Readiness in the Army Reserve Components, by Bruce R. Orvis, Herbert J. Shukiar, Laurie L. McDonald, Michael Mattock, M. Rebecca Kilburn, Michael G. Shanley, The Rand Corporation,1996 http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR659/

- GAO noted in an August 2003 report[8] and reiterated again in a September 2004[9] report that many of DOD's policies that affect mobilized reserve component personnel were implemented in a piecemeal manner and were not linked within the context of a strategic framework to meet the organizational goals. Both these reports went on to document the lack of predictability that resulted from the volunteer and IRR policies. These policies were disruptive to the integrity of Army units because there was a steady flow of personnel among units. Personnel were transferred from non-mobilizing units to mobilizing units that were short of personnel, and when the units that had supplied the personnel were later mobilized, they in turn were short of personnel and had to draw personnel from still other units.

Winning the Global War on Terrorism and achieving force transformation remain the Army's top priorities. All force generation and manning initiatives, priorities and actions are designed to support these two priorities. Currently the Army is developing and implementing the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model with policies and procedures to achieve those priorities, while working to enhance the overall readiness and predictability for its soldiers, civilians, and families. As previously noted, the study team came to the conclusion throughout the course of this study that in order to better enable and support these types of actions, the Army must consider and fully utilize its' most vital of resources, personnel, and can best accomplish this by moving to a personnel environment that accounts for unit cohesion as a key factor in all force generation strategies with a full appreciation and understanding of the value of the Total Force.

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[8] Military Personnel, DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO 03-921, August 2003

[9] Military Personnel, DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues, GAO 04-1031, September 2004

1.1 Background

The United States has long held the belief that the military services during times of crises could be expanded as needed through utilization of conscription and its' reserve component forces. A new paradigm was put in place in the 1970's that established the reserve components as a more vibrant and integral element of the total force. This paradigm developed while still in a Cold War environment. Although it has been slow to evolve, the events of September 11, 2001 have dramatically changed the world. The resultant Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has put a significant emphasis on force transformation while at War. The new article in Figure 5 below dated 5 November 2006, is indicative of the nature, subtlety and depth of the kind of challenges found across the force created by the GWOT and ongoing Army Transformation.

Army reserves brace for more call-ups

Leaders say stress on soldiers, families mounts with more frequent deployments

By ANN SCOTT TYSON
Washington Post

WASHINGTON — The Army's National Guard and Reserves are bracing for possible new and accelerated call-ups — spurred by high demand for U.S. troops in Iraq — that reserve leaders caution could undermine the citizen-soldier force as it struggles to rebuild.

Two Army National Guard combat brigades with about 7,000 troops have been identified recently in classified rotational plans for possible special deployment to Iraq, according to senior Army and Pentagon officials, who asked that the specific units not be named.

One brigade could be diverted to Iraq next year from another assignment, and the other could be sent there in 2008, a year ahead of schedule.

Next year, the number of Army guard soldiers providing security in Iraq will surge to more than 6,000 in about 50 companies, compared with 20 companies two years ago, guard officials said.

"We thought we'd see a downturn in operational tempo, but that hasn't happened," said one guard official.

Figure 5 - Washington Post Article 5 Nov 2006

The challenge of force integration and building and supporting deployable units manned with the right soldiers, with the right skills, at the right time must include considerations for unit cohesion. It is the purpose of this study to provide insights and

recommendations to the ASA(M&RA) to contribute to the development of a force generation strategy to support those goals.

1.1.1 Total Force Evolution

To better understand how the Army got to where it is today, it can be beneficial to review that evolution and a few of the major initiatives that influenced it. Based upon the final report of The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force in 1970, President Nixon decided to end the draft and implement the AVF in 1972.[10] At this same time the concept of the Total Force was beginning to take on significance, as the cost of a large standing military was becoming increasingly less attractive, and affordable, to the country. The resulting Total Force Policy, established in the early 1970s, was based on an increased reliance on Reserve Component (RC) forces.

In 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird directed the Military Departments to apply a total force concept to all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping, and employing Reserve and National Guard forces.[11] In 1973, the Department of Defense adopted the concept as the Total Force Policy, recognizing that all of America's military forces—Active, Guard, and Reserve—should be trained, ready, and available for the common defense.[12] The intent of the policy was to develop a cost effective force structure in which the Active, Guard, and Reserve were mutually dependent on each other within their respective service. Under the Total Force Policy, the reserve components, not a draft, were to serve as the primary augmentation of the active force.

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[10] *Professionals on the Front Line*: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force, 1996, Freedman, Gilroy, Little & Sellman, p100
[11] Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Support for Guard and Reserve Forces, Department of Defense Memorandum, August 21, 1970.
[12] Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, Department of Defense Memorandum, August 23, 1973.

The intended effects of the Total Force Policy have been to necessitate the use of reserve components in response to emergencies; to modernize the forces in a "first-to-fight" priority, regardless of component; to link reserve component readiness levels to deployment timeline requirements; and to elevate the relevance of the reserve components to the National Security Strategy.

1.1.2 Manning the Force and Achieving Personnel Readiness

The transition to and maintenance of an AVF, the full adoption of the Total Force Policy, the post Cold-War downsizing of the total force, and the lessons learned during Operation Desert Storm all contributed to an acceleration of the integration of the components. None of these would have as dramatic an impact as the attack on our homeland and the ongoing Global War on Terrorism. The Reserve Forces today are an integral and key element of the Joint Force capabilities fighting terror around the world. Required to deploy overseas and to conduct and sustain combat operations, respond to contingencies, or other ongoing operations, the Department of Defense considers the Reserve Component Forces as a vital element in its' ability to conduct full spectrum operations. Because deployments and OPTEMPO are up for all units and PERSTEMPO is up across all services, it is more important now than ever to have the flexibility to migrate between the components through a seamless and transparent process in order to maintain personnel and force readiness.

Personnel readiness, in all its' aspects, and manpower strength readiness for the DoD have long been elusive goals, often masked by the insular and static world of the pre-Cold War periods through the Cold War era characterized by a pervasive belief that the DoD would always have access to human resources. The complexities of the post cold war environment further exacerbated by globalization and today's volatile environment and continuum of engagement, require a thorough understanding of the overall HR paradigm and the manpower policies that are used by all the services across DoD. It

requires an understanding of military history, traditions, culture, human values and the absolute need to ensure the generation of combat ready, deployable units. Equally challenging and important is an understanding of the diverse differences between components of the human resource domain, active-reserve, civilian-soldier, families and individuals. From a personnel utilization perspective, some of the primary challenges are the manpower models developed during the Cold War that were based on sufficient time for training of reserve component units, during which unit cohesion would be effected.

These complexities between component models result from the "part-time" nature of the reserve force and the geographical characteristics of the reserve, and its' reliance on the local labor market. The added complexities created by a reserve manpower paradigm based on geographic distribution, local part-time labor trends, local unit markets, and local unit force structures that often don't match the aggregate force structure will require a dedicated commitment to unit cohesion unencumbered by age old paradigms. The complexity and challenges of the geographic and civilian employment constraints on the reserve are significant, and not well understood, especially across the active components of the force. It creates a mandate for policies, procedures, manpower models, and personnel practices that are well designed and effectively implemented to address the full range of complexities. Shortfalls in critically needed personnel in all Army components create unacceptable risk to the Army's ability to fulfill its' role in the National Security Strategy.

1.2 Purpose & Objectives

This study will review and assess those policies, procedures, and practices across the Army that affect the unit cohesion, mobilization and readiness of Army Reserve Component units during the GWOT with an emphasis on the impacts of the practice of cross leveling of personnel on unit cohesion and readiness. It will provide

recommendations for change and considerations for future research on this and related issues. First it will identify and offer recommendations for changes that will affect existing statutory and/or regulatory guidance; second it will identify potential systemic changes, and finally, it will address initiatives for changing policies and practices most often embedded in service and component cultures. The overall objective of this study is to identify actions that can be taken to better facilitate the strategy in building and supporting deployable units that can execute the mission with the lowest risk.

1.3 Study Methodology

In order to fulfill the requirements of the study and achieve the objectives outlined above, BCP International Limited pulled together a multi-disciplinary team of experts into an integrated research team. Each team member was assigned a primary area of concentration with the requirement to contribute and inform other areas of the study. The team was led by Mr. Kenneth Powell, with over 29 years of extensive experience in planning, operations, finance and budget management. As the Commander, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) Pay Support Center, United States Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAC), he developed and implemented pay procedures for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard during the mobilization for Operation Joint Endeavor/Joint Guard. Mr. Powell was a principal staff officer at the Headquarters, Department of the Army Mobilization Division where he was responsible for developing and coordinating the Army policies for pre-trained manpower and Reserve Component (RC) programs. Additionally, he planned, coordinated and reviewed numerous mobilization exercises, completed the Army's Mobilization and Deployment Course, the Professional Military Comptroller Course, and is a graduate of the Army War College.

While the Army has evolved to meet the dynamics of a changing world through aggressively embracing transformation and new technology to enhance existing

processes, the framework remains the same. Technology has become a powerful enabler for the Army to more effectively identify RC assets required by Active Component Combatant Commanders. Nonetheless the procedures to reallocate personnel across units have remained relatively unchanged. Public law has long provided for the call-up of RC units; within this framework, units have been created, comprised of the skills the Active Component Combatant Commanders require, less the command infrastructure to support the newly formed unit. The viability of the Reserve Component 'Citizen Soldier' concept, which has been a cornerstone of our nation's defense for over two hundred years, is now being called into question.

It is from this perspective that the study team, through a detailed review of existing policies and procedures (literature review), the use of interviews and focus groups, and the use of surveys and matching data calls, conducted research into the phenomenon of unit cohesion and the impacts of cross leveling and other significant factors on unit cohesion.

Throughout our research phase, the focus was on identifying those factors, to include cross leveling, that most impact unit cohesion and unit readiness and conducting surveys to evaluate those factors and corroborate/validate the findings of that more subjective based research with empirical evidence generated through the data calls to the components and selected units. It is vital to understand, at least from the Team perspective, that findings were both real and perceived, and the more problematical to deal with are those that are perceived. Nevertheless for a policy strategy development, validated findings were used as the basis for policy recommendations while the non-corroborated findings were used to identify research and data gaps for future considerations. The study methodology consisted of the following:

1. Literature Review: Identify most likely factors affecting Unit Cohesion specifically inclusive of cross leveling. Conduct a comprehensive literature review and complete a historical analysis.

2. Issues Development: Determine from focus groups and interviews which of those factors are important - to guide the development of the larger scale survey.

3. Survey Evaluation of Issues: Conduct larger scale survey to collect subjective assessments of Unit Cohesion and those factors identified, inclusive of cross leveling

4. Survey Data Calls: Collect objective data as an empirical basis to validate subjective assessments, e.g., the number article 15's issued in a unit versus assessment of discipline problems. Collect objective readiness data to validate subjective assessments.

5. Integration, Analysis & Validation: Integrate all data collected to evaluate effect of cross leveling on unit cohesion, as compared to other factors identified, e.g., does cross leveling appear to be an important consideration in unit cohesion?

This taxonomy of analysis will be reflected throughout the study from the interviews, through the findings, and recommendations. Different from previous studies, the Team documented impacts based upon the potential effect to achieve the desired change in those specific areas, and more significantly, linked those impacts to empirical evidence in order to offer recommended changes. Consideration was given to current commercial best practices in the civil sector, where personnel reallocations have been made to meet shifting market demands and employees transition seamlessly from part time to full time employment, as well as how employee compensation and benefits have been altered to effect their desired change. This consideration was found to be of minimal utility given the extensive differences in magnitude of impacts – the difference

between life and death/mission success of military operations far outweighs bottom line profit of commercial operations.

2. Literature Review

The team conducted an extensive literature review consisting of the collection and review of statutory, regulatory, and other guidance documents as specified in the PWS, along with a number of other regulatory and guidance documents used across the Army and finally a wide range of existing reports, studies, papers, and pertinent news articles and other media.

2.1 Review Process and Methodology

The review was conducted in a manner to provide a basis and foundation for the conduct of the study, to better inform the study team, and to ensure compliance with the government requirements.

1. Conduct a comprehensive literature review (i.e. regulations, instructions, policies, studies, etc.). The focus of the literature review is to gather existing cross leveling and related policies and procedures to use as a baseline for issue identification and current process documentation.

2. During the literature review the study team conducted a comprehensive historical overview of mobilization and cross leveling since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. This historical review, as required by the PWS, was designed to provide an audit trail of specific instances and lessons learned from prior uses of cross leveling both prior to and during the current GWOT environment.

The first step in this examination was to initiate the collection of the complete list of applicable policies and procedures at each level, to include those specified in the PWS. Simultaneously, the process was initiated to collect the open source studies, reports, articles and other available literature. Requests for applicable government controlled

literature, documentation, studies and reports were negotiated with appropriate government contacts.

2.2 Studies, Reports, and other Reference Material

As the collection and compilation of government statutory and regulatory resources were ongoing, a review of open source information was begun with the review of several high level major defense reviews and DoD wide studies and reports. These major defense reviews included the 1997 and 2001 Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR), the Bottom Up Review (BUR), the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) and the DoD Reserve Component Employment 2005 (RCE-05) Study directed by Secretary of Defense in the FY 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance. The studies and reports included the background and follow-on studies for the major reviews, Defense Science Board reports, and other studies and reports. These were then augmented with articles, white papers, reference materials and, where available, other media such as radio, television, and web based news and other commentaries.

The RCE-05 study reviewed employment of the Reserve Component (RC), and developed several recommendations to enhance the role of the RC in the full range of military missions from homeland defense to major theater wars (MTW). The study examined how to make the RC easier to access and use, and how to better train, equip, and manage it to ensure effective mission fulfillment. The basic thesis of the RCE-05 study was that with increased utilization of reserve forces would come increased interaction between the components and the result would be a more integrated force. What it failed to address are the inherent and ongoing barriers that exist between the components that will continue to serve as impediments to migration between the components. The basic RCE-05 study spawned a number of follow-on studies and reports, many of which were reviewed for this study and, along with the basic study, were used to develop and refine the study team's focus, scope, and direction.

The Defense Science Board report[13] on a DoD Human Resources Strategy made one of the more profound impacts on the study team approach when it noted *"The human resources strategic plan should identify the tools necessary to size and shape the force – to influence the quality, commitment, skills, training, and quality of life of the workforce. Such shaping requires tools for recruiting, attrition, retention, professional development, utilization, transition, and separation as well as for balancing and integrating all elements of the new "total force.""* This comment identified the range of areas where the study team would focus to identify policies, practices, procedures, and established customs and courtesies that could serve as impediments to migration. Of the nine specific recommendations made by the Board, seven of those nine were directly related to issues that could be improved with enhanced capabilities to migrate between components.

Each of the major reviews covered areas relevant to this study; several areas of particular relevance are worth noting. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994 established the independent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) to review the appropriateness of the current allocations of roles, missions and functions among the Armed Forces; evaluate and report on alternative allocations; and make recommendations for changes in the current definition and distribution of those roles, missions and functions. In preparation for and during the conduct of the CORM, additional studies were conducted and background papers were provided to the CORM, including a report by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) entitled, "Reserve Component Roles, Mix, and Employment,"[14] which addressed the reserve component practices in other countries. One particular recommendation called for more effective integration of active and reserve units and personnel. Of note was that one of the

[13] "The Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy" for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Washington, D.C. 20301-3140, February 2000.
[14] "RESERVE COMPONENT ROLES, MIX, AND EMPLOYMENT," IDA DOCUMENT D-1708, May 1995, John C.F. Tillson, Project Leader

countries, Canada, assigns the top 10 graduates from their Land Defense College to reserve units. The study went on to recommend that DoD consider implementing similar polices, with follow-on reserve assignment from top graduates of Officer Advance Courses or Command and General Staff College (Army school named but recommended for all services). The derived benefits from such a policy would be a better understanding across the components. By providing a reserve assignment in an accelerated active career path as well as improved reserve unit preparedness gained from that full time leadership, the readiness of the total force would be enhanced. While we know that there are cross component assignments already in existence in the services today, this recommendation led the team to a more in-depth review and research of what we believe to be one of the most critical impediments to migration, i.e., the lack of understanding of service and force paradigms between the components.

The most recent and noteworthy study was the "Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense" conducted by Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs at the direction of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review[15]. This report proposed a concept referred to as "Continuum of Service," depicted in the graph, Figure 9, which sets aside the traditional definitions of Active and Reserve components. It recognizes that service may range from full-time duty to availability in the event of mobilization without participation in military training, or performance of duty on a regular basis. In addressing this concept, there were numerous sections and references to the systemic challenges that would be encountered from differences between the active and reserve personnel and pay systems, as individuals moved toward the full-time end of the continuum. Of particular interest to this study was the range of areas identified under the heading of "Personnel Policies" of differences

[15] "Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 1500 Defense Pentagon, Room 2E220 Washington, DC 20301- 1500, 20 December 2002

between the components, and while resolution of those differences would be critical if such a concept were implemented, there was little discussion of the need for understanding the basis, the force management paradigm, and benefits of these differences under the current paradigm. For example the following is a quote from the sub-section on Career Development, "Career development programs, education, and assignments differ between the Active and Reserve components. It is important to recognize that reservists have commitments to a civilian employer and other constraints that control the time they are available for military service." The report appropriately noted that *"it is important to recognize that reservists have commitment…"* yet at no point in the study was there reference to any mechanism to facilitate that recognition across all components. This finding further corroborated the team's commitment to a more in-depth review and research into the lack of understanding of service and force paradigms between the components.

2.3 Historical Overview of Mobilization and Cross leveling

It is a well-known fact that as late as 1990 no American president since the Vietnam conflict had activated a single Reservist (involuntarily) for an armed conflict. Prior to 1990, a limited number of volunteers had served in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989-90; but strong doubts remained among the uniformed Active Force leadership about both the readiness of the Reserve Components, and the willingness of political leaders to rely upon them.

In 1973 the Department of Defense (DoD) adopted the Total Force Policy which directed the services to consider the reserve components as part of the total force available to meet national security needs. Its intent was to make the Active, Reserve and National Guard mutually dependent on each other and for the Active Component to be reinforced by a well trained, well equipped Reserve Component. However, even

though this policy was adopted in 1973, hesitancy to mobilize and deploy Reserve Components with the Active Component continued until 1990.

During this seventeen year period, the Reserve Component activated for Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada) and Operation Just Cause (Panama) was comprised entirely of company level volunteers with specific operational expertise, e.g., civil affairs and military police units.

2.3.1 Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S)

The reluctance to use the Reserve Components ended when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Beginning in August 1990, and continuing into early 1991, the Pentagon mobilized the Selected Reserves in three different call-ups.

The first call-up for the Army's Reserve Components occurred on 22 August 1990. Under, Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) section 673b, (recoded to Section 12304 in 1994), the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) was signed by President Bush. This was the first involuntary call to active duty of Reserve forces since the adoption of the "Total Force" concept in the early 1970s.[16] At that time, the Department of the Army ordered combat service support units to active duty to flesh out the mobilization base and to support Active Component combat unit deployments. This action was needed because many necessary services were not readily available in the active force. In addition to stevedores, communications specialists, and medical technicians, the

[16] *Gulf War was a Test of Reserve Components and They Passed*, Stephen M. Duncan, The Officer, June 1991, p 6.

Army mobilized transportation, quartermaster, judge advocate general, and public affairs units, to name just a few.[17]

On the 8th of November, 1990, the President made the decision to reinforce the offensive forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. As a result, the secretary of Defensive expanded the Reserve Component's involvement with the second call-up. He authorized ordering reserve combat units onto active duty for as long as 180 days with an extension of another 180 days if necessary.[18]

On 18 January 1991, the President authorized partial mobilization, under Section 673, U.S.C.(recoded in 1994 to Section 12302), which widened the call-up from a maximum of 200,000 selected reservists to not more than a million reserve component members. This action included the mobilization of Selected Reserve units and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers and simultaneously permitted the retention of all Reserve Component personnel on active duty for as long as one year.[19] By 13 January 1991, three days before Operation Desert Storm began, the Army had mobilized almost 103,000 Selected Reservists. As of 24 February 1991, almost 140,000 reservists, including IRR soldiers, had been called up. Of these, forty-one thousand served in the theater of operations.

During the mobilization process, the personnel process known as cross leveling became a common practice. Fundamentally, cross leveling is the process of moving soldiers from one unit to another to ensure that each has enough qualified soldiers for the required jobs. It is used to optimize unit readiness. The cross leveled soldier is either attached to, or deployed with, a unit other than the unit he or she is assigned to for a

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[17] *The Come-As-You-Are War: Fort Sill and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm*, Boyd L Dastrup, US Army Field Artillery Center and School Monograph Series, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 1997, p 71.
[18] IBID
[19] IBID

period of time and then returned to their original unit when the mission is completed. It's usually done when a unit can not fill its personnel requirements for a mission.

During ODS/S, the Army cross leveled personnel voluntarily and involuntarily from units not scheduled for initial activation or deployment. Although cross leveling satisfied the immediate requirement for personnel, it reduced the readiness of units that were left behind and might be activated or deployed at a later date.[20]

This need to cross level for ODS/S was mandated by the fact that many units arrived at their mobilization stations either below their wartime strength level, below their peacetime approved operating levels or, at times, had personnel in them that were not deployable. Additionally, several units arrived at the mobilization stations with their personnel lacking the required level of Duty Military Occupational Skill Qualification levels (DMOSQ).[21]

2.3.1.1 Rand Study

A comprehensive quantitative analysis of cross leveling throughout the Army Reserve Component was undertaken by the Rand Corporation and published in 1996. This project was designed to examine the extent of cross leveling during (ODS/S); the reasons for it; and the likelihood of serious personnel shortfalls in future deployments.

The main justification for substantial cross leveling taking place was a shortage of Duty Military Occupational Skill Qualification personnel. The Army's policy was to fill a typical unit with enough qualified soldiers to allow movement to the mobilization station at 85 percent of required strength (C-1 readiness rating). This figure was chosen

[20] IBID
[21] IBID

to improve readiness to a wartime level and to ensure that the units would maintain at least a 65 percent DMOSQ level (C-3 rating) after the potential loss of deployability status for some members upon further verification actions at the mobilization station.[22]

Through acquiring, validating and analyzing RC personnel assignments and requirements, the Rand Study found that the typical unit eventually activated for ODS/S with 63 percent of the required positions filled with soldiers who had completed training and were DMOSQ. The 37 percent shortfall was divided as follows:

- Positions not filled with soldiers (11 percent)
- Positions that were filled with soldiers undergoing initial training to become qualified for their Duty MOS (13 percent)
- Positions that were filled with soldiers who were qualified in a different MOS but had to be retrained to become qualified for their DMOS (13 percent) [23]

The Study further illustrated that while cross leveling can be a cost-effective means to help ensure unit deployability, it is not the ideal solution to reserve readiness problems. The greater the reliance on cross leveling to offset unit readiness shortfalls, the less likelihood that units will have had adequate peacetime individual and collective training to permit cohesive performance of their wartime mission.[24] It was not then, nor will it ever be, a practice that can go on over an unlimited period of time without eventually weakening the force structure. Ultimately, as more individuals are robbed

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[22] *Ensuring Personnel Readiness in the Army Reserve Components*, Bruce R. Orvis, Herbert J. Shukiar, Laurie L. McDonald, Michael Mattock, M. Rebecca Kilburn, and Michael G. Shanley, The Rand Corporation,1996, p xii.
[23] IBID
[24] *Ensuring Personnel Readiness in the Army Reserve Components*, Bruce R. Orvis, Herbert J. Shukiar, Laurie L. McDonald, Michael Mattock, M. Rebecca Kilburn, and Michael G. Shanley, The Rand Corporation, 1996, p xi.

from donor units to make deployable units, more follow-on donor units have their DMOSQ's fall below the 85 percent DMOSQ goal and readiness drops.

The Study recommended four methods of increasing the DMOSQ ratings in order to lower the need for cross leveling in future mobilizations. Each of these four recommendations was what "Rand" considered a readiness enhancer. These enhancers are: increase the Army Reserve Components' inventory of soldiers with prior active duty experience; increase the match rate between entering soldiers' prior Active Component MOS and their Reserve Component DMOS; decreasing job turbulence in the Army Reserve Component; and decreasing attrition.[25]

Furthermore, based on the above data, the Rand study recommended several strategies to enhance personnel readiness and lower the need for cross leveling for future mobilizations. The research findings indicated that the cause of the personnel readiness shortfalls fell into two main categories. First, the reserve components may not utilize experience gained in the Active Component as fully as they might be able to once they enter a Guard or Reserve unit. The study found that approximately one third of the Active Duty soldiers joining the Guard or Reserve fill a DMOS other than the one they had on active duty. Second, the high rate of turbulence, moving from one job to another (job turnover) or leaving the Guard or Reserve altogether, lowers the DMOSQ rate and causes a substantial increase to accession and training requirements.[26]

To resolve the above two shortfall concerns, Rand recommended that by cutting personnel turnover (attrition and job turnover) by fifty percent each, the DMOSQ level

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[25] *Ensuring Personnel Readiness in the Army Reserve Components*, Bruce R. Orvis, Herbert J. Shukiar, Laurie L. McDonald, Michael Mattock, M. Rebecca Kilburn, and Michael G. Shanley, The Rand Corporation, 1996, p xiv.
[26] *Ensuring Personnel Readiness in the Army Reserve Components*, Bruce R. Orvis, Herbert J. Shukiar, Laurie L. McDonald, Michael Mattock, M. Rebecca Kilburn, and Michael G. Shanley, The Rand Corporation, 1996, p xviii.

could possibly increase by approximately 17 percent.[27] Lowering the personnel turnover would be accomplished by instituting a set of retention bonuses and skill bonuses that would entice the Reserve Component soldier to stay in certain MOSs and to remain in the Guard and Reserve. Policies aimed at lowering personnel turnover through instituting various bonus programs may have looked expensive, but in terms of lowering the need for retraining soldiers and recruiting costs, Rand showed that significant money could be saved.

However, since cross leveling is cost effective and since contingencies, so far, were relatively short in duration, the "robbing Peter to pay Paul" technique to make deployable units became a necessary mobilization practice.

2.3.2 Operation Joint Endeavor

In 1994, action by Congress extended the limits of the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) for individuals and units from 90 days to 270 days with no extensions. Under PSRC authority, the president could now involuntarily mobilize up to 200,000 Selected Reserve soldiers. This new authority was first used in 1995 when the president invoked the PSRC to complement active force requirements to support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[28]

Beginning in December 1995, U.S. and allied nations deployed peacekeeping forces to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. Task Force Eagle, comprised of 20,000 American soldiers, began implementing the military elements of the Dayton Peace

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[27] IBID
[28] *NG*, Maj. Gen. David L. Grange and Lt. Col. Phillip D. Telander, Soliders Online http://www.army.mil/soldiers, edited by LTC John E. Suttle, June 1997.

Accords in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. As of June 1997, more than 340 units and 12,000 Guard and Reserve soldiers had been mobilized.

It is important to note that during this PSRC, the reserve component units could not be mobilized twice under the same authority. In 1996, a second iteration of Reserve Component units was activated to replace those completing their first Joint Endeavor deployment. As our commitment to the Bosnia-Herzegovina operations became more drawn out, there were growing concerns whether we would have sufficient personnel to deploy high demand units such as civil affairs, public affairs, medical and postal units. However, before this concern could become a reality, security issues began to improve and a Joint Endeavor draw down began.

Between 1996 and 2001 the reserve contributions to ongoing Department of Defense missions maintained a relatively consistent rate that did little to stress the units of the Reserve Components.

2.3.3 Operation Noble Eagle/Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom

President George W. Bush authorized a partial mobilization of the reserve components September 14, 2001 for homeland defense and civil support missions in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 at the New York World Trade Center and the Pentagon (Operation Noble Eagle). Initially, this partial mobilization requested a call-up of a total of 35,000 reserve members. Out of this total, 10,000 consisted of Army Reserve and Army National Guard Soldiers. During a Pentagon press briefing on September 25, 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld announced that, outside the United States, the war against terrorism will now be known as Operation Enduring Freedom.

This was the first time a president issued an executive order skipping the Presidential Reserve Call-up phase of mobilization and went directly to a partial mobilization order. Under Title 10, U.S.C., Section 12302, the Service Secretary concerned may order to

active duty units and individuals for up to 24 consecutive months if they are needed to meet operational or other requirements.

On 20 September 2001, The Undersecretary Secretary of Defense, under Title 10, U.S.C. Section 12302, amended the section to read, "that although the service members may be required to serve up to 24 months, that the time need not be served consecutively, and that the duty period would be accounted for by the cumulative amount of time spent on active duty." Reserve Component members who had involuntarily served less than 24 months could theoretically be recalled at a later date to serve the remainder of their 24 month period. It should be noted that DoD's policy capping reserve service at 24 cumulative months is more restrictive to the services than the 24 consecutive month cap specified by law. If DoD were to change its policy to mirror the law, reservists could be mobilized multiple times for tours of 24 consecutive months apiece.[29]

As of September 2004, as shown in the charts below in Figure 6, even after major



Figure 6 - Army RC Percent Mobilized

combat operations were over in 2003, the percentage of Reserve and Guard soldiers mobilized for ONE/OEF & OIF was nearly fifty percent. This percentage includes

[29] *Addendum to Memorandum: Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks*, 20 September 2001.

approximately 5,500 individuals who, more than once, volunteered for these operations and 8,400 Individual Ready Reserve soldiers (IRR.) The high operational tempo and extended duration of these operations have begun to stress the Reserve force in certain specialties. Law enforcement, transportation, civil affairs, special forces, and other career specialties that have experienced repeated mobilizations are being examined and assessed for signs of stress.[30]

Since September 14, 2001 through September 2005, as noted in the table in Figure 7,

Mobilized: 144,492 **Demobilized**: 380,983 **Total**: 525,475

Reserve Components	ARNG	USAR	ANG	USAFR	USNR	USMCR	USCGR	TOTAL
Currently Mobilized (10 USC 12302)	86,772	41,263	1,791	3,431	4,364	6,416	455	144,492
Demobilized To Date *	152,920	101,644	35,261	28,428	25,022	29,286	8,422	380,983
Total Mobilized To Date *	239,692	142,907	37,052	31,859	29,386	35,702	8,877	525,475

* Includes RC mobilized and demobilized more than once.

Mobilized: Involuntary Active Duty in a Federal Status (10 USC 12302) that authorizes the use of Reserve Forces for up to 24 months.

Source: Services Daily Mobilization Report As of: 14 Nov 2005, 0800 hours

Figure 7 - Army RC Mobilized Soldiers

more than 500,000 military personnel have been mobilized for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). More than half, approximately 375 thousand of these, being Army Guard and Reserve soldiers. This mobilization is clearly much different in terms of "numbers mobilized" and "duration of conflict" when compared to past mobilizations. What could have formerly been termed a "Strategic Reserve", (to be used prior to 2001 only in dire emergencies), has now become an "Operational Reserve" and is well integrated with the Active Component.[31]

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[30] *Power Point Presentation on Utilization of the Reserve Components*, Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/docs/aug2005/Utilization.ppt#269.

[31] *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2007*, prepared by Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, edited by COL E. Stan Wilson, Reserve Affairs Publications, February 2006.

Three factors have been identified that can be measured that give a good assessment of stress which may negatively influence the performance of Reserve and Guard forces. They are: frequency that reserve component members are called up for mobilization; percentage of inventory used compared to the target usage rate and, finally, the duration of the reservists tour.[32]

A review of the deployment frequency for Selected Reserve members serving in ONE/OEF/OIF and previous contingencies such as Bosnia has shown that approximately 16,000 Reserve component members (including volunteers) in a overall Reserve force of around 880,000 have been called up more than once for various intervals of time to support current operations. This fairly low frequency rate does not seem to impose much stress to the force.[33]

With the possible negative effect stress poses on the Reserve component force, the Department of Defense established planning guidelines for the services to follow in building future Reserve force structures. One of the considerations established is that the future forces limit involuntary mobilizations to be a reasonable and sustainable rate using a metric of one involuntary mobilization every six years.

The services then examined the percentage of the unit force structure inventory used during ONE/OEF & OIF and compared it to a target usage rate of one involuntary mobilization every six years. To limit involuntary mobilizations to one out of every six, the Services would have to maintain a Reserve component base force that is large enough and with the appropriate skill mix so that no more than 17 percent of the force, in any particular functional area or career field , is used per year.[34]

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[32] *Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve*, prepared by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Reserve Affairs Publications, January 15 2004, p 6.
[33] IBID
[34] IBID

When current operations are compared with the one in six future force planning metric some specialties do begin to show stress. Based on two years of operations and therefore a 34 percent usage (target) rate when compared to the inventory, shown in Figure 8, are the higher stressed specialties.

High Stressed Specialties					
Officer			Enlisted		
Specialties include:	% of RC Inventory Called-Up	RC % of Total Force Inventory	Specialties include:	% of RC Inventory Called-up	RC % of Total Force Inventory
Civil Affairs	54%	72%	Special Forces	76%	30%
Military Police	51%	45%	Installation Security	65%	24%

Figure 8 - High Stressed Specialties

The duration, the amount of time for which Reserve component soldiers are called for a mobilization tour, has steadily risen since 1996. From 1996 through 2003, most mobilizations lasted approximately 200 days. For operations in Afghanistan tours had risen to 300 days or more with approximately 10 percent of these tours being extended from one to two-year tours.[35]

As of March 2004, the average deployment time for reservists mobilized since 9/11 is 342 days and rising fast.[36]

2.3.4 Current Initiatives

Thus, as the above data suggests, stress on the Reserve component force structure is beginning to rise. To ease the stress on Reserve component units, soldiers and their

[35] *Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve*, prepared by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Reserve Affairs Publications, January 15 2004, p 8.
[36] *Transforming the Reserve Component*, P.J Crowley, September 20 2004, p 1.

families and civilian employers, the Department of Defense has directed the Services to rebalance the force structure while keeping the following three approaches in mind:[37]

- Enhance early responsiveness
- Resolve stressed career fields
- Employ innovative management processes

The Army, to enhance responsiveness and lessen the immediate need for the involuntary call-up of the Reserve components at the beginning of a contingency, has converted approximately 5,600 spaces of lower priority active structure to higher priority active structure that would be deployed at the beginning of a conflict. Career fields in military police, transportation specialties and medical are but a few of the specialties being converted. In addition, the active component is currently undertaking a complex restructuring process of building interchangeable modular units that are capable of meeting the combatant commanders' immediate needs.[38] These two active initiatives should lessen the need for hasty mobilizations of Guard and Reserve units at the beginning of future contingencies.

To ease the pressure on highly stressed Reserve component career fields, the Army has begun an extensive force structure rebalancing initiative. In the Army National Guard, conversion of field artillery spaces to much needed military police spaces and the transformation of thousands of heavy combat brigade forces to more agile, Light

[37] *Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve*, prepared by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Reserve Affairs Publications, January 15 2004, p 8.
[38] *Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve*, prepared by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Reserve Affairs Publications, January 15 2004, p 10.

Brigade forces are but a few of the ongoing actions to relieve the pressure on the reserve forces.[39]

The third approach to rebalance the force structure and ease the stress of Reserve Components, that of employing innovative management processes, features paradigms that were never considered prior to the acceptance of the Reserve Components into the Total Force. What is referred to as "continuum of service" is an example of such a process. Continuum of service allows individual service members greater flexibility in becoming involved in their mission across a continuum of participation levels and allows for the seamless movement of personnel between these participation levels



Figure 9 – Continuum of Service

beginning on the low end with today's drilling reservists and increasing with participation up to and including full time active duty or full time reservists. This new management practice sets aside the traditional definition of reserve training (as shown in Figure 9 above) and allows the service member to decide on his participation at all

[39] *Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve*, prepared by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Reserve Affairs Publications, January 15 2004, p 14.

the various levels of service throughout a career life-cycle. Movement along the continuum would be seamless and supported by a continuum of benefits that match the service member's contributions.[40]

One of the most encouraging force structure processes evolving in the Army Reserve is a concept know as the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF). Similar to the



Figure 10 – AREF Concept

Active Component three year operational cycle whereby the unit will have one operational deployment every three years, the Army Reserve model, see Figure 10 above, is based on one operational deployment every five years. This allows Army Reserve units to spend one year in reconstitution after a deployment, two years to train, a fourth year to be tested and evaluated and the fifth year in a deployment mode, if needed. This in turn lowers the need for major cross leveling prior to deployment gives the soldier, his/her family and employer, advance planning and preparation time prior to a scheduled deployment.[41] It is important to note at this point that the study team is convinced that continuing the practice of using donor units for cross leveling will break this important new concept.

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[40] *Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve*, prepared by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Reserve Affairs Publications, January 15 2004, p 18.
[41] *Reserve Components of the United States Military*, the Army Force Management School, updated July 2006, p 42.

2.4 Statutory & Regulatory Guidance, Policies, Directives & Regulations

The flow of governmental directives begins with Public Laws that have been enacted by Congress as the United States Code (USC). Title 10 USC Sections 12301a, 12302, and 12304 are the applicable laws that provide the statutory policy and guidance on mobilization and utilization for reserve component forces and personnel. The second level is the regulatory policies and guidance that begins with the Department of Defense Directives and Instructions. This regulatory policy and guidance, promulgated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), is applicable across all the services and DoD organizations. These include Department of Defense Directives (DODD) and Instructions (DODI). This study reviewed DODD 1235.10 Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve as well as DoDI 1235.12 Accessing the Ready Reserves. The study also reviewed the Executive Orders identified by the government and the USD PERSGUIDE Memos. Finally, there are the Army Regulations and other policy guidance documents that stipulate implementation for their reserve components.

2.5 Literature Review Summary

The literature search also examined numerous other studies, reports, news commentaries and other research papers to explore the general DoD and Congressional perspective on the issue of mobilizing and deploying reserve component units. Those reports that could be obtained in electronic form are provided in appendices to this study. There were, however, numerous reports that were not available in electronic form that were also examined. Some of these were reviewed on secure DoD web sites that limit the ability to download the document. Others were only available in hard copy. An index of web sites examined and documents reviewed is also included.

In summary, there were large amounts of literature on the subject of active and reserve component forces, however, little of that material was specifically targeted at the basis of this study, never the less there was more than ample material that could be used to

guide the focus, scope, and direction of this study. A more thorough effort to review in more detail the best practices and personnel paradigms of the full-time and part-time workforce of the private sector, other parts of the public sector and other active-reserve force constructs in other countries should be considered. Additionally, with the limited amount of available research on this subject, a more rigorous evaluation over a prolonged period should be implemented.

3. Issues Development – Interviews & Focus Groups

During the period 29 March – 30 June 2006 the team conducted an initial literature search; completed a number of interviews with Army reserve component personnel, members of the Army Staff, and a variety of subject matter experts; facilitated focus groups with the overall goal of this process to identify and isolate pertinent factors that affect unit cohesion and readiness to be studied in more detail during the remaining phases of the study.

3.1 Interview & Focus Group Process

The literature search along with initial interviews provided insight into the various perspectives on the issue affecting unit cohesion and unit readiness, and provided the information necessary to document the range of issues/factors affecting unit cohesion and readiness, to include gathering expert opinions on the impacts of cross leveling as well as other factors. From these interviews and the insights gained from the literature search, the study team developed a baseline set of factors to be considered in the study. This list of baseline factors was then refined through the facilitation of two separate focus groups comprised of officer and enlisted subject matter experts. Using standard DELPHI techniques, the focus groups independently developed their own list which was integrated with each other and modified and refined by the study team into a final agreed upon list of factors to be studied in more detail. Additional follow-on interviews were then conducted with selected previously deployed reserve component personnel as a validation and to secure their reaction and opinions on this final list of factors.

3.2 Issues/Factors Identified

The study team identified early on through subject matter expert discussions, team experience and the literature search that factors from three general areas needed to be considered during the study. Those three: leadership, training, and retention,

augmented with the considerations of cross leveling formed the basis for the rest of the identification process with the exception that later in the process issues related to availability of wartime equipment surfaced as an important consideration. That initial list of factors with more detailed criteria is in Figure 11 below.

Leadership

1. Good Leaders: The unit commander and primary leadership are well trained in the unit mission, working within their trained specialties, and work well together as a team. They lead by example, have great rapport with the soldiers in the unit, and have earned the respect of seniors and subordinates as good leaders who know their unit capabilities and will accomplish the mission.
2. Fair Leaders: The unit commander and primary leadership need more training in their unit mission and the required skill-sets. There are some cracks in the team dynamics but not to the point of causing major risk to unit effectiveness. They try to lead by example but make mistakes and while they have reasonably good rapport with the soldiers, they do not have their total trust and respect.
3. Poor Leaders: The unit commander and primary leadership are not trained in the unit mission. The leadership team has not been effective as a team and often are at odds causing risk to mission effectiveness and evident to the soldiers. They have poor rapport with the soldiers and are not trusted or respected.

Training

1. Good Unit Training: The unit trains hard with meaningful and effective training. The unit has done well on AT training evaluations, mobilization training, and fully utilizes training time during IDT with well organized and thoroughly prepared training plans and exercises. The unit is fully trained to accomplish its designated mobilization mission.
2. Fair Unit Training: The unit trains hard but it is not as effective as it could be with better planning and preparation. The unit AT training evaluations are mediocre with some excellent ratings, some poor ratings, but mostly fair ratings. The unit achieved mobilization training standards but the unit IDT training is not as well organized as it could be barely meeting minimum standards.
3. Poor Unit Training: The unit training program is ineffective, poorly planned, organized and executed. The unit does not receive favorable AT training evaluations. The required extra training during mobilization training to achieve standards. IDT training is poorly planned and does not meet minimum standards in many mission areas.

Retention

1. Good Retention: The unit retention is considered to be very high with numerous soldiers having been in the unit for extended periods of time. Soldiers that do leave the unit are not related to job satisfaction but rather are due to civilian life moves, promotion opportunities, or personal family issues. This unit is perceived by those in the unit and outside the unit to be a “good” unit to serve in regardless of the unit mission and/or unit location.
2. Fair Retention: The unit retention is considered to be within standard but some soldiers have been in the unit for extended periods of time. Some soldiers leaving the unit are known to have left due to dissatisfaction with the unit but it is not

Figure 11 - Initial Factors

Using that list as an organizing basis, the study team facilitated a focus group event with two separate groups who then came together to develop a consolidated list. These groups independently developed their own list of factors and then were combined into one large group for reconciliation. The following is the initial list of factors identified by Focus Group A and is representative of the types of issues identified during the literature search, initial interviews, and Focus Group B.

- Leadership
- Mutual Respect
- Attitude
- Trust
- Confidence in chain of command
- Well-defined limits
- Well-defined purpose
- Esprit de corps
- Common stressful experience
- Commitment
- Consistency
- Communication
- Similar values-family values
- Training
- Teamwork/teambuilding
- Sense of family
- Having basic needs met
- Genuine concern for others
- Equality
- Selflessness
- Knowing your people (strengths and weaknesses)
- Adaptability/agility
- Compassion

- Integration
- Responsibility
- Empowerment
- Mentorship

Focus Group A selected the following as their top 5 issues:

1. Leadership
2. Communication
3. Consistency
4. Teamwork/teambuilding
5. Mutual respect

Focus Group B selected the following as their top 5 issues:

1. Shared experiences
2. Maintain discipline and standards
3. Communication
4. Cross level and integrate early at all echelons
5. Train and equip like you are going to war

The two Focus Groups in combined session settled on the following 5 issues/factors as their recommended final list:

1. Communication—up, down, laterally, within and outside organization
2. Maintain consistent discipline and standards
3. Build trust and mutual respect through teamwork and shared experience
4. Cross level and integrate early (to spend 30 days together at MOB)
5. Train and equip like you are going to war (adequate training and equip at MOB site)

It should be noted that both groups actually considered cross leveling to negatively impact unit cohesion but they acknowledged that at best it may be a necessary evil but

recommended that it be avoided to the maximum extent possible. If it were unavoidable and some amount of cross leveling was required to achieve full personnel readiness, it should be early in the process and policies and practices should be developed to ensure all cross leveled soldiers are fully integrated into a unit prior to mobilization. This would ensure that effective bonds and unit cohesion could be established prior to deployment.

3.3 Issues/Factors for Evaluation

This final list was merged with the study team's developed list, and a final set of issues to be evaluated was generated. The final list was made up of the following:

1. Discipline
2. Communications
3. Respect
4. Training & Equipping
5. Leadership Tactical
6. Cross leveling

This was consolidated and reconciled internally in early June and became the organizing basis for the remainder of the study. This list was used to formulate surveys, data calls, and a more extensive literature search of possible studies, reports, articles, and papers relative to these topics. Two separate surveys were developed to capture soldier and subject matter expert opinions related to these factors and data calls were designed to capture related quantifiable, documented data that could be used to corroborate/validate the findings of the survey data, for example, the number of UCMJ actions effected during the deployment was collected to corroborate the opinion data

submitted with regard to discipline. Readiness data was also collected to support the opinions on personnel cross leveling, training, and equipment.

Four of the six factors identified deal with leadership with the other two being training/equipping and cross leveling. Even in those last two issues/factors, the study team considers leadership to be critical in the final outcome of the impact of shortcomings in those two areas. Emphasis and future study should be directed at implications for leadership development given today's volatile transformational environment. It is the opinion of the study team that Army Transformation must encompass providing development, training, and tools to all levels of leadership but must especially focus on the squad, platoon, and company levels.

4. Survey Evaluation of Issues

Two separate surveys were developed to support the analysis of factors impacting unit cohesion and readiness. The first survey was a conjoint analysis survey to investigate the priority and importance of the factors identified and established on the final list compiled by the study team. The soldier survey was guided by the results of the conjoint analysis in order to best design a large sample survey that would be short, simple, and user friendly but would have sufficient cross checks to meet more rigorous analytical standards.

4.1 Conjoint Analysis Survey

A conjoint analysis study was designed to identify and prioritize which of these factors were considered to be more important and thereby have the most impact on unit cohesion. This survey was administered to over 60 soldiers, with a distribution of officers and enlisted, senior grades and junior grades (see Figure 12) and all but four, two junior enlisted and two junior officers had been deployed at some time in the last six years.

GRADE					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	E1-E5	32	51.6	51.6	51.6
	E6-E7	10	16.1	16.1	67.7
	E8-E9	5	8.1	8.1	75.8
	O1-O3	7	11.3	11.3	87.1
	O4-O6	8	12.9	12.9	100.0
	Total	62	100.0	100.0	

Figure 12 - Conjoint Grade Distribution

A conjoint analysis, also called a multiattribute compositional model, is a statistical technique that originated in mathematical psychology to better target marketing efforts.

Today it is used in many of the social sciences and applied sciences including marketing, product management, and operations research. It is becoming more widely used across the public sector and in the Department of Defense and as early as 1977 it was used in the Youth Attitude Tracking Study, Fall 1977, to better measure youth propensity to serve.[42] The basic objective of a conjoint analysis is to determine what combination of a limited number of attributes or factors is most important to or preferred by a body of respondents.

Typically, a conjoint analysis serves to better understand the relative impact or importance that different product or service features have on individual's choices. Conjoint analysis is sometimes referred to as "trade-off" analysis because individuals are forced to make trade-offs among different features when they complete the conjoint questions. Through these trade-offs, researchers are able to infer how important or valuable different features are and how they influence individuals' decision-making processes. Respondents are shown different product/service scenarios whose features, or attributes, vary according to an experimental design -- actually the specific levels of the attributes vary. Respondents are typically asked to rate or rank the product/service scenarios. Once data is collected, analysis reveals the relative importance, called utility, of each of the different levels of each attribute. These utilities can then be used to understand the importance of the attributes, can be used as the basis for segmentation analysis (e.g., to understand whether different segments vary in terms of the attributes that are most important to them), and, as was the case in this study, it can be used to develop and inform broader based market research.

[42] Youth Attitude Tracking Study. Fall 1977. Supplement. Conjoint Analysis of Values of Reserve Component Attributes. By J.T. Heisler, MARKET FACTS INC CHICAGO IL PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH CORP, November 1977 (DTIC Accession Number ADA143110)

The conjoint survey developed by the study team was designed to determine the relative impact each factor of unit cohesion had on each survey respondent's choices. An environmental landscape was established within the context of an ongoing GWOT and continuing reliance on the reserve components to meet the operational force requirements of the Army. Respondents were asked to rank order eight (8) different unit scenarios in terms of their unit cohesion. Within an environmental landscape portraying unit effectiveness as a high priority, in order to achieve maximum effectiveness there is a continuing and growing reliance on unit cohesion as a primary measure of unit effectiveness. Those eight unit scenarios portrayed two different levels for each of the six factors previously identified. For example, the survey assumed some amount of cross leveling would occur so the two choices incorporated into the scenarios were cross leveling early or cross leveling late. Each of the other five factors had discrete criteria for two separate levels. A complete list of those factors is in Figure 13.

Discipline
1. Consistent Discipline: The unit commander and primary leadership establish and maintain consistent discipline.
2. Inconsistent Discipline: There is a lack of consistent discipline in the unit.

Communications
1. Good Communications: There are effective, open lines of communications, up and down the chain of command and laterally within the unit and externally.
2. Poor Communications: Communication within the unit is limited and ineffective.

Respect
1. Mutual Respect: There is mutual respect up and down the chain of command between leaders and led.
2. Lack of Respect: There is a lack of respect throughout the unit between leaders and between leaders and led.

Training & Equipping
1. Good Unit Training: The unit trains hard with meaningful and effective training. The unit has done well on AT training evaluations, mobilization training, and fully utilizes training time during IDT with well organized and thoroughly prepared training plans and exercises. The unit is fully trained and equipped to accomplish its designated mobilization mission.
2. Poor Unit Training: The unit training program is ineffective, poorly planned, organized and executed. The unit does not receive favorable AT training evaluations. The required extra training during mobilization training to achieve standards. IDT training is poorly planned and does not meet minimum standards in many mission areas.

Leadership Tactical
1. Leaders Trained: The unit commander and primary leadership are well trained in the unit mission and are working within their designated occupational specialties.
2. Leaders not Trained: The unit commander and primary leadership are not trained in the unit mission and are not working in their designated occupational specialties.

Cross Leveling
1. Early: Unit cross leveling occurred early in the train up process for mobilization during pre-mobilization training period.
2. Late: Unit cross leveling occurred late in the post-mobilization process just prior to deployment.

Figure 13 - Final List of Study Factors

Each unit scenario consisted of some combination of the twelve criteria from the list. For example below is scenario #7:

Card 7

Captain Easley, commander Charlie 2/360th Medium Truck Company, all of the platoon leaders and senior NCOs are fully qualified in transportation specialties. They have received training in the unit mission and communicate well with each other and the unit members. Unit discipline is consistent with well defined and communicated standards and there is a high degree of mutual respect within the unit. The unit trains hard with meaningful and effective training fully utilizing training time during IDT with well organized and thoroughly prepared training plans and exercises mostly the result of coordination between the training officer, 1LT Jones and the senior NCOs. During the last AT, the unit received excellent training evaluations for accomplishment of all unit mission essential tasks. Early in the pre-mobilization process the unit received new personnel to achieve deployment strength and was able to complete all post-mobilization mission essential tasks without any delays or additional training.

This scenario corresponded to the following set of criteria:

Card 7

Discipline: Consistent Discipline
Communications: Good Communications
Respect: Mutual Respect
Train & Equip: Good Training
Leadership Training: Trained
Cross Leveling: Early

This "deck" of unit scenario cards was pre-shuffled and survey respondents were asked to rank order them in terms of which units they would consider to be the most cohesive. Figure 14 at right shows an importance summary of the factors. As can be seen from this chart alone, cross leveling when given only two choices of cross leveling early or late was not as important as



Figure 14 - Factor Importance Chart

four of the other factors. It is important to note that respondents were not given an option to not cross level but rather given that it was going to happen it was not as important as training and equipping, respect, leadership training, and discipline. Additionally this basic relative importance held across all grades and components with very little variance; senior officers and NCOs gave more importance to leadership factors but cross leveling was a distant 5th across all grades. The utility of each of the factors and their criteria sub-factor is in Figure 15 below:



SUBFILE SUMMARY

Averaged Importance	Utility	Factor	
		LDRDISC	Discipline
14.33	.2917		Consistent Disciplin
	-.2917		Inconsistent Discipl
		COMMS	Communications
8.39	.3042		Good Communications
	-.3042		Poor Communications
		RESPECT	Respect
21.00	.8250		Mutual Respect
	-.8250		Lack of Respect
		TRAIN	Train & Equip
29.33	1.1542		Good Training
	-1.1542		Poor Unit Training
		LDRTACT	Leadership Training
16.50	.2167		Trained
	-.2167		Not Trained
		XLEVEL	Cross Leveling
10.45	.1958		Early
	-.1958		Late
	4.4917	CONSTANT	

Figure 15 - Factor Utilities

More robust surveys were examined with more than two criteria per factor, however, adding additional criteria would have at least doubled the number of scenarios each respondent would have to consider and rank order. For example, the study team strongly considered adding a third criterion to cross leveling as "none – unit cross leveling was not required as the unit had sufficient personnel to achieve deployment readiness standards" but, to have added that third criteria for cross leveling would have

resulted in at least sixteen (16) scenarios which was considered unacceptable as it would likely have resulted in inconsistent and invalid results.

A full copy of the scenarios, criteria, and cards, along with a complete copy of the conjoint survey administered, and a complete copy of the analysis results are provided in the appendices to this study.

4.2 Previously Deployed Soldier Survey

The results of the conjoint analysis along with ongoing interviews and the literature search were used to frame and guide the development of the soldier survey. This soldier survey was used as the primary data collection effort for gathering soldier opinions and evaluations on a larger scale across a broad base of previously deployed soldiers in Army reserve component units. The conjoint analysis was used to focus collection efforts more on the prioritized factors while continuing to gather information from those survey respondents on the impacts of cross leveling. This survey was administered via a non-attribution web survey tool targeted at the individual unit level to forty different Army Reserve Component units, 20 Army National Guard (ARNG) and 20 Army Reserve (USAR), with some 5,000 soldiers from each component who were involved in the deployment. Each unit had a unique login password to allow identification of the respondents unit. Additionally, selected demographics were collected on respondents to support the analysis. These demographics consisted of grade, component, prior deployments, leadership roles, primary and duty occupational specialties, and cross leveled status (Were you a cross leveled soldier?). Initial responses were limited but after discussions with unit technicians and unit leadership it became evident that for many of the units significant time had elapsed since their deployment and few of those original soldiers were left in the unit. Further compounding the collection effort was that most of the soldiers who had been cross leveled into the selected units had returned to their original unit after demobilization

and were not available. The final survey results had a total of 801 respondents with 200 of those missing grade and other demographic data, see Figure 16.

Please check grade/rank

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	E1-E4	189	23.6	31.4	31.4
	E5-E6	262	32.7	43.6	75.0
	E7-E8-E9	86	10.7	14.3	89.4
	O1-O3	52	6.5	8.7	98.0
	O4-O6	12	1.5	2.0	100.0
	Total	601	75.0	100.0	
Missing	System	200	25.0		
Total		801	100.0		

Figure 16 – Distribution by Grade

Another 26 cases were discounted for a variety of other data inconsistencies thereby resulting in 575 valid survey responses in 27 different units, see Figure 17.

Unit ID Code

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	W2N5AA	2	.3	.3	.3
	WP29AA	74	12.9	12.9	13.2
	WP4BAA	8	1.4	1.4	14.6
	WPAQT0	8	1.4	1.4	16.0
	WPC2T2	38	6.6	6.6	22.6
	WPGRT0	18	3.1	3.1	25.7
	WPJDT0	7	1.2	1.2	27.0
	WPJZAA	15	2.6	2.6	29.6
	WPS3T0	18	3.1	3.1	32.7
	WPYCAA	2	.3	.3	33.0
	WQP2AA	96	16.7	16.7	49.7
	WQV3T2	29	5.0	5.0	54.8
	WRJ5AA	18	3.1	3.1	57.9
	WRYAAA	2	.3	.3	58.3
	WS5NAA	24	4.2	4.2	62.4
	WSM3AA	19	3.3	3.3	65.7
	WSR8AA	13	2.3	2.3	68.0
	WSS4AA	24	4.2	4.2	72.2
	WSZTAA	37	6.4	6.4	78.6
	WTLRAA	9	1.6	1.6	80.2
	WTNCAA	32	5.6	5.6	85.7
	WTQ3T0	29	5.0	5.0	90.8
	WTULAA	3	.5	.5	91.3
	WXBLAA	10	1.7	1.7	93.0
	WZNQAA	12	2.1	2.1	95.1
	WZPGAA	12	2.1	2.1	97.2
	WZPNAA	16	2.8	2.8	100.0
	Total	575	100.0	100.0	

Figure 17 - Valid responses by UIC

Of those 575 valid responses a reasonable distribution was available to support a variety of demographics, to include unit level (13 units had 18 or more responses), military personnel category, officer and enlisted, grade level (see Figure 18 at right), component, and selected military occupational specialties (enlisted and officer duty specialties). Although there were considerably fewer responses of those who were cross leveled than those who were not, 133 cross leveled while 442 indicated they were not cross leveled, there were still sufficient numbers of responses for statistically valid assessments.



Figure 18 - Cross leveled by Grade

In addition to the demographic data, respondents were asked to provide their assessments on a variety of questions some of which were targeted to the specific factors previously identified and used to guide design of this survey vehicle.

The survey was designed to solicit responses using a 5-level Likert scale, a type of psychometric response scale often used in questionnaires, and is the most widely used scale in survey research. When responding to a Likert questionnaire item, respondents specify their level of agreement to a statement.

The Likert scale was used because it lends itself to a wide range of analytical techniques. Responses to a single Likert item are normally treated as ordinal data, because, especially when using only five levels, one cannot assume that respondents perceive the difference between adjacent levels as equidistant. When treated as ordinal

data, Likert responses can be analyzed using non-parametric tests. When responses to several Likert items are summed, they may be treated as interval data and if the summed responses are normally distributed, parametric statistical tests such as the analysis of variance can be applied. Data from Likert scales are sometimes reduced to the nominal level by combining all agree and disagree responses into two categories of "accept" and "reject". All of these techniques were used to analyze the results of the soldier survey. All survey respondents were asked to evaluate each of the following statements using the 5-level Likert scale:

- Long before pre-deployment training we received a number of new individuals in our unit.
- Our unit commander maintained consistent and fair discipline while we were deployed.
- Unit members were fully trained in their MOS prior to deployment.
- Our unit received a number of new individuals shortly before deployment.
- Our unit maintained effective, open lines of communication up and down the chain of command.
- Mutual respect was established between officers and enlisted prior to deployment.
- Once deployed, our unit had more than our share of injuries.
- The NCOs worked as a leadership team through mobilization and deployment.
- There were numerous article 15's or higher levels of punishment in our unit while we were deployed.
- Our unit was more cohesive during mobilization and deployment than we were at home station.
- The specialties we trained for at home station and at the mobilization station were well utilized once we deployed.
- During our stay at the mobilization station, and while deployed, our unit had few, if any cliques.
- The members of our unit began building a special bond towards each other during mobilization that continued throughout deployment.
- We had few, if any, Inspector General (IG) complaints while our unit was deployed.
- We had the majority of organic wartime equipment to successfully complete our mission prior to mobilization.

- I was confident that the unit leadership had the best interests of all the unit members as their top priority.
- Our IDT training at home station was well planned and effective; we needed minimal training at the MOB site.
- Our unit received a number of new individuals due to cross leveling at MOB Station pre-deployment training.
- During deployment we had few disciplinary problems.
- After returning to home station, our unit cohesion began to break down.
- Few changes in unit leadership occurred from 6 months before deployment until 6 months after.
- My primary job specialty (PMOS/Branch/etc.) matched the unit duty specialty required for the position I held.
- If I were to be deployed again, I would want to deploy with this unit.
- Our unit was a cohesive team during our deployment.
- Numerous members of our unit received unit level punishment while we were deployed.

Additionally some specific questions were asked of those respondents who indicated they had been cross leveled and those who had not been cross leveled. Cross leveled soldiers were asked the following:

- Within thirty days after I cross leveled to my new unit, I felt accepted and a member of the unit.
- The training I received at my home unit was useful and valuable to me when I cross leveled to my new unit.
- The unit leadership worked hard to integrate cross leveled soldiers into the unit prior to deployment.
- I felt better trained and more a part of the unit I cross leveled into than my home station unit.

Those who were not cross leveled were asked to scale the following:

- Cross leveled soldiers joining our unit were quickly assimilated.
- Cross leveled soldiers joining our unit became part of our team prior to deployment.

- Our unit retention rate has remained high once we returned from theater.
- Our unit cohesion did not suffer when new cross leveled soldiers became members of our unit.

The first order of survey analysis was to get an initial look at the potential impact of cross leveling on unit cohesion and while attitudinal data such as this survey by itself without additional corroboration may not warrant major policy changes, it is sufficient to indicate areas of concern and consideration. This was accomplished by looking at the data collected on unit cohesion and cross leveling. The first look was at the specific question posed to soldiers who were not cross leveled about the direct impact of cross leveling on unit cohesion. Figure 19 below shows overwhelmingly that soldiers who

18q: Our unit cohesion did not suffer when new cross-leveled soldiers became members of our unit

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	17	3.8	3.9	3.9
	2	41	9.3	9.4	13.3
	3	113	25.6	25.9	39.2
	4	227	51.4	52.1	91.3
	5	38	8.6	8.7	100.0
	Total	436	98.6	100.0	
Missing	System	6	1.4		
Total		442	100.0		

Figure 19 - Cross leveling impact on unit cohesion

were not cross leveled did not agree that cross leveling had a significant impact on unit cohesion with only 58 of the 436 valid responses being disagree or strongly disagree. Yet, that single statistic is somewhat misleading and should not be construed as a strong endorsement for cross leveling.

First it is evident that the deployment experience was a positive experience for most of the respondents of this survey which leads to a concern that those who did not have a positive experience did not respond to the survey and while often in commercial environment surveys those who are dissatisfied respond there is a different

environment in the military. In any case, there was a very strong positive bias in the survey as evidenced by most responses to most questions being positively skewed. For example when asked to respond to the statement "Our unit was a cohesive team during our deployment", almost 65% of all respondents either agreed or strongly agreed, see Figure 20 at left. Additionally, when we began to dig into the numbers several disconcerting patterns began to appear. First junior soldiers below the grade of E5 had a significantly different perception than did senior NCOs and officers, and differences of opinion exist between those who were cross leveled and those who did not. A comparison of the mean ratings by grade for this same question shows the difference in perception of junior enlisted, see Figure 21 at right.



While the mean ratings of E5-E9 and O1-O3's are very close to the same, the ratings for senior officers and for junior enlisted are sufficiently different to be statistically significant in an analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparison. When the survey dataset is filtered to compare the ratings of junior enlisted against those of senior officers, the means are significantly different with the junior enlisted average score of about 3.4 and the senior officer score at 4.2. Junior enlisted did not consider the unit to be as cohesive as anyone else in the unit. Similarly when looking at the scores of those junior enlisted soldiers who did not cross level for the question on the impact of cross leveling on unit cohesion we find that



Figure 21 - Comparison by Grade

the their scores, while still high, are considerably lower than the scores of officers and NCOs.

The second area of differences in scores occurs between those soldiers who were cross leveled versus those who were not cross leveled. A review ANOVA table in Figure 22 below shows an F statistic considerably larger than 1 leading to the conclusion that the difference between the mean scores of those who were cross leveled versus those who

ANOVA

Our unit was a cohesive team during our deployment

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2.901	1	2.901	2.389	.123
Within Groups	689.688	568	1.214		
Total	692.589	569			

Figure 22 - Unit Cohesion ANOVA Table

were not cross leveled cannot just be attributed to random variance and therefore must be attributable to differences between the two groups.

Given that there was such a strong opinion among the survey respondents that their unit was a cohesive unit and given that significantly large numbers of soldiers who were not cross leveled did not think that the cross leveling impacted unit cohesion, that raised the question of what do the respondents think impacts unit cohesion. Referring back to the conjoint analysis which was used as the guide for the design of the survey, the analysis focused on the other factors affecting unit cohesion, discipline, respect, training & equipping, communications, and leadership training. A new variable was computed to more discretely look at unit cohesion based upon whether the respondent agreed, disagreed, or had no opinion that the unit was a cohesive team during the deployment. With that new variable, it became evident that the survey respondents identified a direct correlation between unit cohesion and the other primary factors

identified in the conjoint analysis. An analysis of variance was conducted with the other factors and as seen in dramatically large F statistics highlighted in yellow in Figure 23 there were statistically significant differences between the mean scores of the three groups.

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
During deployment we had few disciplinary problems.	Between Groups	127.121	2	63.561	57.166	.000
	Within Groups	631.541	568	1.112		
	Total	758.662	570			
Numerous members of our unit received "unit level punishment " while we were deployed	Between Groups	30.098	2	15.049	13.338	.000
	Within Groups	640.851	568	1.128		
	Total	670.949	570			
IDT training was well planned and effective; minimal training needed at the MOB site	Between Groups	61.484	2	30.742	26.862	.000
	Within Groups	650.044	568	1.144		
	Total	711.527	570			
We had the majority of organic wartime equipment to successfully complete our mission prior to mobilization.	Between Groups	32.517	2	16.258	13.056	.000
	Within Groups	708.579	569	1.245		
	Total	741.096	571			
There were numerous article 15's or higher levels of punishment in our unit	Between Groups	23.233	2	11.616	8.248	.000
	Within Groups	802.767	570	1.408		
	Total	826.000	572			
Mutual respect was established between officers and enlisted prior to deployment	Between Groups	146.968	2	73.484	70.050	.000
	Within Groups	597.943	570	1.049		
	Total	744.911	572			
Our unit maintained effective, open lines of communication up and down the chain of command	Between Groups	154.971	2	77.486	71.968	.000
	Within Groups	615.853	572	1.077		
	Total	770.824	574			
Unit members were fully trained in their MOS prior to deployment	Between Groups	69.784	2	34.892	32.419	.000
	Within Groups	615.635	572	1.076		
	Total	685.419	574			
unit commander maintained consistent and fair discipline during deployment	Between Groups	139.458	2	69.729	53.558	.000
	Within Groups	743.407	571	1.302		
	Total	882.864	573			

Figure 23 - Unit Cohesion ANOVA Factors

More importantly, not only is there a significant difference between the mean scores, but those mean scores are different in the direction of scale one would intuitively consider to be the appropriate direction. For example, with regard to the question about availability of organic wartime equipment, those who did not agree that the unit

was a cohesive unit also did not agree that the unit had the majority of its organic wartime equipment prior to mobilization, whereas those who did agree that the unit was cohesive also agreed that the unit had its necessary equipment. Figure 24 provides the mean scores for each of the factors with the equipment row highlighted in yellow.

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
During deployment we had few disciplinary problems.	Disagree Cohesive Unit	102	1.9510	1.01842	.10084	1.7509	2.1510	1.00	5.00
	No Opinion Cohesion	105	2.6952	.98179	.09581	2.5052	2.8852	1.00	5.00
	Agree Cohesive Unit	364	3.1923	1.08399	.05682	3.0806	3.3040	1.00	5.00
	Total	571	2.8792	1.15368	.04828	2.7843	2.9740	1.00	5.00
Numerous members of our unit received "unit level punishment " while we were deployed	Disagree Cohesive Unit	102	3.6569	1.10351	.10926	3.4401	3.8736	1.00	5.00
	No Opinion Cohesion	106	3.2264	.85393	.08294	3.0620	3.3909	1.00	5.00
	Agree Cohesive Unit	363	3.0441	1.10410	.05795	2.9301	3.1580	1.00	5.00
	Total	571	3.1874	1.08494	.04540	3.0982	3.2766	1.00	5.00
IDT training was well planned and effective; minimal training needed at the MOB site	Disagree Cohesive Unit	101	2.3267	1.17566	.11698	2.0946	2.5588	1.00	5.00
	No Opinion Cohesion	105	2.7619	.88278	.08615	2.5911	2.9327	1.00	5.00
	Agree Cohesive Unit	365	3.1753	1.08787	.05694	3.0634	3.2873	1.00	5.00
	Total	571	2.9492	1.11727	.04676	2.8574	3.0410	1.00	5.00
We had the majority of organic wartime equipment to successfully complete our mission prior to mobilization.	Disagree Cohesive Unit	101	2.6040	1.25761	.12514	2.3557	2.8522	1.00	5.00
	No Opinion Cohesion	106	2.9245	.92271	.08962	2.7468	3.1022	1.00	5.00
	Agree Cohesive Unit	365	3.2219	1.12541	.05891	3.1061	3.3378	1.00	5.00
	Total	572	3.0577	1.13925	.04763	2.9641	3.1513	1.00	5.00
There were numerous article 15's or higher levels of punishment in our unit	Disagree Cohesive Unit	101	3.3564	1.30831	.13018	3.0982	3.6147	1.00	5.00
	No Opinion Cohesion	106	3.1604	1.04323	.10133	2.9595	3.3613	1.00	5.00
	Agree Cohesive Unit	366	2.8552	1.19052	.06223	2.7328	2.9776	1.00	5.00
	Total	573	3.0000	1.20169	.05020	2.9014	3.0986	1.00	5.00
Mutual respect was established between officers and enlisted prior to deployment	Disagree Cohesive Unit	102	2.0882	1.02545	.10153	1.8868	2.2897	1.00	5.00
	No Opinion Cohesion	105	2.9143	.94171	.09190	2.7320	3.0965	1.00	5.00
	Agree Cohesive Unit	366	3.4262	1.04620	.05469	3.3187	3.5338	1.00	5.00
	Total	573	3.0942	1.14118	.04767	3.0006	3.1879	1.00	5.00
Our unit maintained effective, open lines of communication up and down the chain of command	Disagree Cohesive Unit	102	1.9118	.91308	.09041	1.7324	2.0911	1.00	4.00
	No Opinion Cohesion	107	2.6636	1.08978	.10535	2.4547	2.8724	1.00	5.00
	Agree Cohesive Unit	366	3.2678	1.05436	.05511	3.1594	3.3761	1.00	5.00
	Total	575	2.9148	1.15884	.04833	2.8199	3.0097	1.00	5.00
Unit members were fully trained in their MOS prior to deployment	Disagree Cohesive Unit	102	2.6863	1.21035	.11984	2.4485	2.9240	1.00	5.00
	No Opinion Cohesion	107	2.9159	1.01052	.09769	2.7222	3.1096	1.00	5.00
	Agree Cohesive Unit	366	3.5137	.99234	.05187	3.4117	3.6157	1.00	5.00
	Total	575	3.2557	1.09275	.04557	3.1661	3.3452	1.00	5.00
unit commander maintained consistent and fair discipline during deployment	Disagree Cohesive Unit	102	2.2059	1.21328	.12013	1.9676	2.4442	1.00	5.00
	No Opinion Cohesion	107	2.7850	1.10768	.10708	2.5727	2.9973	1.00	5.00
	Agree Cohesive Unit	365	3.4603	1.12986	.05914	3.3440	3.5766	1.00	5.00
	Total	574	3.1115	1.24128	.05181	3.0097	3.2133	1.00	5.00

Figure 24 - Unit Cohesion Factors Means

The mean score for those who disagreed that the unit was cohesive was 2.6 which indicates they also disagreed that the unit had the necessary equipment prior to mobilization while the score of those who agreed that the unit was cohesive had a mean

score 3.2 indicating that they slightly agreed that the unit had its equipment. It should be noted that while the conjoint analysis did not identify communications as being as important as any of the other factors, it was evident that the respondents of this larger survey still scored communications in direct correlation to how they scored unit cohesion. Using a stepwise discriminant analysis to classify responses into the new unit cohesion variable based upon all of 9 factors listed in Figure 24, only four of those factors entered the model resulting in a 69.1% correct classification, figures 25 and 26:

Classification Function Coefficients

	Unit Cohesion - Agree/Disagree		
	Disagree Cohesive Unit	No Opinion Cohesion	Agree Cohesive Unit
During deployment we had few disciplinary problems.	1.084	1.525	1.802
Mutual respect was established between officers and enlisted prior to deployment	1.097	1.637	1.828
Our unit maintained effective, open lines of communication up and down the chain of command	.496	.794	1.101
Unit members were fully trained in their MOS prior to deployment	2.094	2.107	2.541
(Constant)	-7.200	-10.252	-12.726

Fisher's linear discriminant functions

Figure 25 - Classification Coefficients

Classification Results[a]

			Predicted Group Membership			
		Unit Cohesion - Agree/Disagree	Disagree Cohesive Unit	No Opinion Cohesion	Agree Cohesive Unit	Total
Original	Count	Disagree Cohesive Unit	57	1	44	102
		No Opinion Cohesion	20	2	82	104
		Agree Cohesive Unit	28	0	336	364
	%	Disagree Cohesive Unit	55.9	1.0	43.1	100.0
		No Opinion Cohesion	19.2	1.9	78.8	100.0
		Agree Cohesive Unit	7.7	.0	92.3	100.0

a. 69.3% of original grouped cases correctly classified.

Figure 26 - Discriminant Classification Table

Finally, soldiers who were cross leveled were less likely to consider their unit a cohesive team than those soldiers who were not cross leveled. While there is a statistical difference in their mean scores of their level of agreement on unit cohesion, it is only marginally different. What is significant is the difference between the mean scores for whether they were trained in the position duty MOS (DMOS) and whether their DMOS matched their PMOS. The chart in Figure 27 shows the ANOVA analysis for unit cohesion and the two factors dealing with duty MOS training and match to the soldiers

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Our unit was a cohesive team during our deployment	Between Groups	2.901	1	2.901	2.389	.123
	Within Groups	689.688	568	1.214		
	Total	692.589	569			
PMOS matched the unit DMOS required for my position	Between Groups	17.950	1	17.950	11.351	.001
	Within Groups	901.351	570	1.581		
	Total	919.301	571			
Unit members were fully trained in their MOS prior to deployment	Between Groups	4.735	1	4.735	3.986	.046
	Within Groups	680.684	573	1.188		
	Total	685.419	574			

Figure 27 – PMOS vs DMOS Match

PMOS. This shows directly that, at least in the perception of soldiers who were cross leveled, that cross leveling has a negative impact on unit effectiveness and unit readiness. Most importantly there is a clear perception that cross leveled soldiers are being asked to serve in positions outside their primary job specialty for which the Army has invested significant time and resources to train.

Other comparisons, tests, and analyses were conducted and the complete set of statistical outputs for all tests and analyses are included in Appendix 3.

4.3 Survey Findings of Note

It is important to understand that survey data such as this is attitudinal research, not necessarily a statement of fact but rather a statement of the perceptions of the respondents. It is also important to understand that for many situations perceptions are the reality for those difficult to measure issues that don't lend themselves to quantitative measurement such as the concept of unit cohesion. The sample sizes of these two surveys would be statistically large enough to be representative of the entire population of previously deployed soldiers unless there was a bias generated by the selection of units and/or respondents. Further, it is very important to note that many soldiers were not available to complete a survey because they are no longer in the unit or as was noted by several unit technicians, they are no longer in active participation in the Army, either due to separation from service or transfer to the Individual Ready Reserve. However, even so, several of the findings of these surveys are significant and should be used to inform policy decisions and Army Transformation strategies. The findings of note are:

1. *Cross leveling is not a significant factor affecting unit cohesion.* The conjoint analysis and the soldier survey both indicated that cross leveling was not a significant factor affecting unit cohesion. In the conjoint analysis the rating only considered cross leveling early or late so it was not rated for choices of whether to cross level or not. In the soldier survey cross leveling was not perceived to have any significant impact on unit cohesion.

2. *Of all factors evaluated, discipline, mutual respect, training, and communications have the most effect on unit cohesion.* While the conjoint analysis respondents rated the first three of those as high in importance and they rated communications lowest in importance in relation to other factors. It does not mean they do not think it would have an effect, only that it would not be as significant as the others. The

soldier survey on the other hand found communications to be one of the four most important factors affecting their perception of unit cohesion and in that survey there is a direct correlation between respondent perceptions of unit cohesion and communications.

3. *Cross leveled soldier perceptions are significantly different from those soldiers who were not cross leveled.* While all soldiers had a positive perception of their unit cohesion, the cross leveled soldiers are being asked to serve in duty positions outside their primary MOS and for which they don't consider themselves to be well trained in their duty position. This has implications for the ARFORGEN model to ensure that soldiers in all components are serving in positions for which they are well trained.

4. *Junior enlisted soldier perceptions of the cohesiveness of their deployed unit is significantly lower than NCOs and officers.* Of the junior enlisted personnel, 48% would chose to deploy with the same unit again whereas 66% of the NCOs and officers would prefer to deploy with the same unit. When an ANOVA was conducted on the mean scores between these two groups there was a significant difference with an 8.2 F statistic which would be significant at about the 99% probability level. Similarly, only 57% of the junior enlisted personnel agreed that their unit was cohesive during the deployment whereas almost 67% of the NCOs and officers perceived the unit as cohesive. There were also significant differences in their perceptions of the leadership, which is not inconsistent with most other research. Leaders tend to think more highly of their performance than their junior soldiers. This should lead the Army to review policies and conduct more research on junior enlisted soldier attitudes of the deployment. In this survey they clearly do not see things in the same positive perception as their NCOs and officers. This less than positive perception could result in lower retention rates.

5. *Differences between Reserve Components.* While there were differences in the ratings of respondents based upon their unit's component, they were not as different as would be expected given the different nature of the types of units and home station environmental differences between the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. For example almost 62% of Army Reserve respondents agreed that their unit was cohesive during the deployment as compared to 66% of the ARNG soldiers. Yet, those who disagreed that the unit was cohesive from the Army Reserve were almost 25% versus only about 15% in the ARNG. The one area of difference to note is the soldiers' response to statement that if they were to be deployed again would they want to deploy in the same unit. The Army Reserve soldiers' responses were less positive than the ARNG, see the ANOVA table in Figure 27, again, this could have retention implications.

ANOVA

If I were to be deployed again, I would want to deploy with this unit.

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	13.108	1	13.108	8.450	.004
Within Groups	887.319	572	1.551		
Total	900.427	573			

Figure 28 - ANOVA Deploy Same Unit by Compo

This should lead to policy reviews and further research, especially focused on those Army Reserve soldiers who did not consider their unit to be cohesive and the potential recruiting and retention implications.

5. Data Calls

Several data calls were conducted to collect unit level data as validation of the survey results. These data were used to both corroborate the findings and to establish the validity of individual responses.

Two separate data calls were issued, one to collect complete unit level readiness data and reports prior to, during, and after the mobilization, deployment, and demobilization. Readiness reports were provided by the Army Staff. These reports are classified so they were reviewed in a secure room and pseudo, non-classified, general status categories were developed for use in the analysis to validate opinions on the status of unit readiness with regard to personnel, equipment, and training. A copy of the pseudo data is attached at Appendix 2. Actual classified readiness reports can be provided under separate cover in accordance with Army security regulations.

The other data call was issued to collect the following data elements on each unit:

- Retention Rates – prior to mobilization and Post mobilization
- Deployment Casualty Rates
- Deployment Injury Rates
- UCMJ Actions – Mobilization through deployment
- UIC and contact information for all cross leveled (kluged) soldiers

Separate memorandums requesting these data were issued by ASA-MRA to the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Both reserve components also provided other unit level data to include unit size, location, and unit name. Copies of these memorandums along with the data collected are attached at Appendix 2.

6. Integration, Analysis & Validation

The data from the two data calls were integrated into the analysis file matched on the unit identification code (UIC). New variables created from these data allowed them to be used for both analysis corroboration and for case by case survey validation.

The data collected on UCMJ actions was used to derive a UCMJ rate by dividing the number of UCMJ actions by the total number of in the deployed unit (it was unclear whether this number was authorized or assigned, but given that all units deployed at or near wartime required strength, it is essentially not of concern to the analysis). These UCMJ rates were then codified into 5 categories defined as follows:

1. Minimal –UCMJ less than 5%
2. Moderate – UCMJ rate between 5% and 10%
3. High – UCMJ rate between 10% and 15%
4. Very High – UCMJ rate between 15% and 25%
5. Extreme – UCMJ rate above 25%

None of the units evaluated were categorized at the Extreme level and only one unit had a UCMJ rate above 20%. The table in Figure 28 at right provides the UCMJ rate for all units evaluated along with the number of survey respondents for that unit.

One of the questions on the survey asked the respondents opinion on the numbers of Article 15 or higher level punishment. When compared to the UCMJ categories using an ANOVA analysis there are significant differences in the opinions of soldiers based upon the

Case Summaries

N

Unit ID Code	UCMJ Rate	Counter
W2N5AA	3.96	2
WP29AA	4.12	74
WP4BAA	3.80	8
WPC2T2	1.30	38
WPGRT0	18.18	18
WPJDT0	9.72	7
WPJZAA	5.02	15
WPS3T0	20.19	18
WPYCAA	9.04	2
WQP2AA	5.43	96
WQV3T2	1.96	29
WS5NAA	2.38	24
WSM3AA	7.38	19
WSR8AA	6.67	13
WSS4AA	2.38	24
WSZTAA	3.01	37
WTLRAA	10.19	9
WTNCAA	4.63	32
WTQ3T0	6.86	29
WTULAA	12.25	3
WXBLAA	13.41	10
WZNQAA	1.68	12
WZPGAA	5.19	12

Figure 29 - UCMJ Rate by UIC

UCMJ categories. The review of the means plot in Figure 29 shows some disconnect in the ratings since one would expect those respondents in units with higher levels of UCMJ rates to have a higher level of agreement with the statement that there were higher numbers of Article 15s or above. After further review, this one inconsistency could well be attributed to the fact that there were only 3 units in the High category and each of those units had a small number of respondents with 10 or fewer.



Figure 30 - UCMJ Rate Means

Similarly, there is a significant difference in the response means to the question on availability of wartime equipment prior to mobilization between the equipment status as reported on readiness reports, see Figure 30. The mean scores for those units that reflected available equipment on their readiness reports was significantly higher than those whose readiness reports showed some deficiency in availability of their equipment.



Figure 31 - Equipment Availability

The result of these kinds of comparisons leads to an overall validation of the survey and corroborates the responses. It was not in sufficient detail to discount any of the specific

survey responses but rather was used to ensure the overall validity of the survey vehicle. Further these data were used corroborate the findings of the survey analysis on specific questions related to the data.

7. Findings & Conclusions

Every means available was used, within contractual restraints, to collect and document real, perceived, and potential considerations for policies, procedures, attitudes, traditions, biases, regulations, and laws, to mitigate the impacts of cross leveling and other factors affecting unit cohesion and readiness.

7.1 Analysis Findings

One of the more important findings of the analysis is that the factors evaluated were the right factors to evaluate. That is not to say there may be other factors, but this list of factors provided a sound basis for policy considerations designed to better support and reinforce that status of unit cohesion.

1. Discipline
2. Communications
3. Respect
4. Training & Equipping
5. Leadership Tactical
6. Cross leveling

There were some important findings across each of those areas of evaluation and specific recommendations for policy considerations and future research are provided in Section 8 of this report.

7.2 ARFORGEN Considerations

The Army Transformation is built around the ARFORGEN model with a cyclical construct of Reset – Ready – Available. Under this construct, during the Reset Phase,

units are to be manned, equipped, and trained so that at the end of that phase they migrate to the Ready Phase as a fully capable unit. The chart below, Figure 32, addressing the reserve components is taken from an HQDA briefing on ARFORGEN and it highlights the need for assured predictable access to those units.



Figure 32 - ARFORGEN Model RC Assumptions

The most significant shortfall to this concept is the effect cross leveling has on those units that are cannibalized to provide the fillers for those units being cross leveled. Discussions were held with HQDA Readiness Division and Mobilization division referencing the tracking of cross leveled soldiers that return to their home unit after being deployed. Those discussions verified that their home unit, the one they deployed from, is still eligible to be activated and mobilized even if 90% of the unit previously cross leveled and mobilized with another unit. They also confirmed that should another conflict arise, that unit plus those previously mobilized, could all be mobilized for conflict number two. Regarding tracking these cross leveled individuals after they

return to their home unit, there was no means of tracking previously deployed soldiers. Once the unit has been alerted, no matter how many eligible soldiers who have not previously deployed in the unit, cross leveling continues at the home station. The current planning basis requires mobilizing a battalion in order to fill a company. Additionally, as was previously noted, cross leveled soldiers do not perceive that they are serving in positions for which they are trained. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) was established to provide fillers and a casualty shelf for wartime operations. The Army should re-look the utility of the IRR and find ways to use it to cross level instead of the current practice of cannibalizing other reserve component units.

7.3 Unit Cohesion

Coupled closely to the concern cross leveling has on unit readiness is the effect it may have on unit cohesion. Cohesion "The bonding together of members of an organization in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit and the mission" is but one of numerous definitions of a bond of trust that develops between members of a small group.[43] A central requirement for cohesion to grow in a unit is personnel stability and while the results of the survey did not directly correlate unit cohesion and cross leveling it did effectively correlate unit cohesion to a number of other factors that are closely tied to personnel stability. Conversely, personnel turbulence e.g., cross leveling is one method of destroying unit cohesion.

There is a highly held belief that cohesive units fight better, suffer fewer battle and non-

[43] *Peacekeeping and U.N. Operational Control: A Study of their Effect on Unit Cohesion*, Ernest G. Cunningham, California Naval Postgraduate School, 1995, p13.

battle casualties, train to higher standards and do not disintegrate under stress.[44] This belief, however, has generally been in consideration of full-time Active Component units that, for the most part, train and work side by side each other and have the ability to build trust over long periods of time. Guard and Reserve units train together approximately 39 days each year (two days per month plus 15 days annual training). This allows for some cohesion, but it is not nearly as strong as the cohesion found in active units. During the mobilization process, any cohesion that has developed in well led Reserve and Guard units often falls apart when the units undergo cross leveling.

The personnel turbulence that occurs during cross leveling is not always a destabilizing process. While at home station and then at the mobilization station, training and various unit activities are planned and implemented to help the new cross leveled soldiers become part of their new unit. During the approximate thirty days or more the unit remains at the mobilization station, cohesion again begins to build within the unit. This occurs because of the extended period of time the unit and cross leveled soldiers now have to work together towards the objectives and goals necessary to ensure success on the battlefield.

It is often thought that long periods of personnel stability are required to build unit cohesion. However, an interesting Israeli study proposes that effective cohesive units can be built on temporary frameworks and built within a short time-frame.

This Israeli study contends that on the modern battlefield many operational task forces are now being formed that consist of a blend of active and reserve component personnel. Often these temporary units are torn apart and are regrouped for specially

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[44] *Improving Unit Cohesion: The First Step in Improving Marine Corps Infantry Battalion Capabilities*, Major Brendan B. McBreen, presented as partial requirement for The Commandant of the Marine Corps National Fellowship Program, May 2002, Section 5.3.

tailored missions.[45] This is especially true when the organizational structures and functions are shifted from strictly combat to include other operations such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance roles.[46] These "instant units" sometimes last only weeks, days, and sometimes hours, and do not have the luxury of spending months together building cohesion in the typical sense.

The mission of these "instant units" becomes the stimulus that sets up the dynamics of what is called "swift trust" between the unit members. Depending on the time constraints of the mission and the skills of each member, trust and strong bonds can cohere members of small units in a matter of days or hours. Examples of units such as these are cockpit crews, film crews, concert and music performers and medical crews on theater.[47]

Such temporary groups constitute and organizational equivalent of a "one night stand": "They have a finite life span, form around a shared and relatively clear goal or purpose, and their success depends on a tight and coordinated coupling of activity." In such frames, the soldiers do not necessarily know each other, but the very variety of capabilities, skills, equipment, and perspectives may actually allow much flexibility and the use of the lethal potential of the military to its fullest extent possible.[48]

The findings of the Israeli study are consistent with the findings of this report. Survey respondents did not consider cross leveling to be detrimental to unit cohesion.

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[45] *Cohesion during Military Operations: A Field Study on Combat Units in the Al-Aqsa Intifada*, Uzi Ben-Shalom, Zeev Lehrer, Eyal Ben-Ari, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No.1, 2005, 63-69, p 76.
[46] IBID
[47] *Cohesion during Military Operations: A Field Study on Combat Units in the Al-Aqsa Intifada*, Uzi Ben-Shalom, Zeev Lehrer, Eyal Ben-Ari, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No.1, 2005, 63-69, p 73.
[48] *Cohesion during Military Operations: A Field Study on Combat Units in the Al-Aqsa Intifada*, Uzi Ben-Shalom, Zeev Lehrer, Eyal Ben-Ari, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No.1, 2005, 63-69, p 77.

7.4 Conclusions

It is the overall conclusion of this study that most reserve component soldiers have a positive perception of their deployment and the unit in which they served. They predominately agreed that the unit was cohesive and they would want to deploy in that unit again. The Army Transformation through the ARFORGEN model will have serious challenges in achieving the Reset-Ready-Available construct for reserve component forces given the current process of cross leveling, not necessarily because of the impact on unit-cohesion but because of the widespread deficiencies it creates in those units being cannibalized to produce the personnel to fill the other units requiring the cross leveling. There are areas of concern which could have lasting impacts on the ability to maintain the All Volunteer Force with specific concerns about recruiting and retention. There are also some areas for policy development in the areas of leadership, training, and equipping the reserve components.

8. Recommendations:

8.1 Recommendations for policy development

The following recommendations are submitted for consideration. They are all directly attributable to one or more of the study findings.

1. Individuals Account: The Army requires a robust individuals account to minimize the overall effect of cross leveling
    a. Recommend the Army revisit the IRR with the goal to re-establish the IRR as a viable individuals account. This will require funding and management but it would be a cost effective alternative to the continued use of destroying units by using their personnel as fillers.
    b. Recommend the Army consider using a system similar to the Army Medical Department's Professional Filler System (PROFIS) Program to allocate non deployable/non-TOE personnel against TOE positions as a dedicated fill requirement. At the minimum, soldiers would know what their wartime requirement might be and units would have a known resource available.
2. Personnel Tracking System: Recommend the Army develop and field a system to account for and track soldiers who have previously deployed and may not be eligible to re-deploy. Unit readiness systems do not identify nor do they have visibility of these soldiers. Today's practice is to mobilize a battalion in order to field a company.
3. Fill Early: Recommend the Army adopt a policy of providing personnel fillers, whether from cross-leveling or another source, early in the pre-mobilization process to allow for effective training of those new personnel in their duty MOS.

4. Personnel Turbulence: Recommend the Army minimize personnel turbulence through whatever means available, including incentives and dual slotting.

8.2 Recommendations for future research

The literature review exposed a deficiency in research with regard to unit cohesion, unit effectiveness, and ultimately unit readiness in the reserve components. There is a broad literature base on the active force but that research may or may not have any meaning given the differences between a full-time force and a part-time force. The following recommendations are topics for future research that would provide vital information necessary to support policy decisions for Army Transformation and its ARFORGEN model:

1. PROFIS Concept: The Army should consider the AMEDD PROFIS program as a possible construct for dedicated filler personnel but it would require an in-depth analysis at the MOS level of detail to include a cost-benefit analysis to identify the potential benefits to be gained.
2. GWOT Impact on long term recruiting and retention: The study identified significant differences in evaluations of junior enlisted below the rank of Sergeant and those in ranks of Sergeant and above. This has the potential for long term and lasting negative impacts on future generations' outlook on Army service.
3. Factors affecting Unit Cohesion: The study identified that cross-leveling was not seen as critical as the other factors. There is little research on those other factors with regard to how best to develop policy to reinforce positive practices. This research would need to identify what is a positive practice, a negative practice, and include recommendations for policy development.

4. Statutory & Regulatory Changes: The study identified policy recommendations based upon survey and data analysis. There may be required changes to regulatory and statutory guidance.
5. RC ARFORGEN: There are differences between the manpower models a part-time geographically distributed reserve force and a full-time active force. Those differences are not well understood but the active model is often described as Recruit-Train-Distribute whereas the reserve model is Distribute-Recruit-Train. This study would need to include the development of a computer model to test and evaluate an RC ARFORGEN construct.

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Appendix 2: Survey and Data Documents

1. Conjoint Survey:

Unit Cohesion

"Unit Cohesion is the bonding together of members of an organization/unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit and the mission."

The above definition establishes a framework for evaluating a wide range of impacts on a unit's ability to effectively execute its mission as gauged by it cohesiveness. As part of an effort to better understand this relationship, this survey is designed to collect professional expert insights about the range of factors and what may be the most significant influences affecting unit cohesion.

This survey is non-attributional and attempts to be unbiased. It is designed to gather professional expert insights. Respondents are not asked for names, organization, nor other personal identifying information. Individual information is requested to better categorize professional expertise of respondents.

SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS:

Rank Order the attached eight unit descriptions from the perspective the above description of unit cohesion. Rank Order as number 1 that unit description that you believe is most likely to have the best unit cohesion. Continue to rank order until all eight units have been rank ordered with the number 8 being that unit that you this likely to be the least cohesive.

Please complete the following individual profile:

Check the Appropriate Boxes

☐ MIL ☐ CIV
☐ Retired

Please Check Grade/Rank

Enlisted	Officer
☐ E1-E5	☐ O1-O3
☐ E6-E7	☐ O4-O6
☐ E8-E9	

If military or prior military check the Appropriate Box

☐ Active Army
☐ Army National Guard ☐ AGR
☐ Army Reserve ☐ AGR

Leadership Roles Held

☐ Platoon Leader/Platoon Sergeant
☐ Company Commander/First Sergeant
☐ Company Staff Officer/NCO (eg Training NCO)
☐ Bn/Bde/or Higher Staff
☐ Bn/Bde/or Higher Leader (CMDR/CSM)

Please check appropriate boxes

☐ Deployed in unit within last 2 years
☐ Deployed in unit within last 6 years
☐ Deployed more than once in last 10 years
☐ Leader in a deployed RC unit
☐ Leader in a deployed AC unit
☐ Never deployed

Landscape: Through the year 2006, the United States has been engaged in the Global War on Terror and faces a global security environment in transformation with evolving complexity and unpredictability. U.S. foreign policy will continue to emphasize promoting stability, pluralistic political systems and market-oriented economic institutions. Instabilities emanating from troubled states and transnational problems, such as terrorism, will continue to pose challenges. The United States domestic environment will remain stable with moderate economic growth. U.S. policy will continue to promote domestic prosperity with emphasis on domestic programs, expansion of U.S. foreign trade and achieving a balanced budget. Defense force structuring considerations are consistent with current capabilities and evolving operational theater requirements, with a continuing reliance on Reserve Component forces as a key element of the operating forces.

It is imperative in this environment that unit effectiveness is a high priority and to achieve maximum effectiveness there is a continuing and growing reliance on the concept of unit cohesion as a primary factor. Rank order the following units in terms of their unit cohesion with the unit you consider to have the most cohesion being ranked as number 1 and the least as number 8.

Unit 1
Rank Order _____

Captain Allen, Commander Bravo 1/360th Medium Truck Company, and all of the company officers and senior NCOs are qualified transportation officers and NCOs. They are well trained in the unit mission and are working within their trained specialties. Unit discipline is consistent with well defined standards and there is a high level of mutual respect throughout the unit. The primary leadership challenge is the poor communications channels within the unit. The unit training program is ineffective, poorly planned, organized and executed. IDT training does not meet minimum standards in mission areas further exacerbated by the lack of organic wartime equipment and waiting for guidance to be communicated. The unit did not receive a favorable evaluation during their last AT and required extra training during mobilization to achieve standards. Just after completing mobilization training the unit received additional fillers from other non-affiliated units to reach deployment strength.

Unit 2
Rank Order _____

Captain Jones, Commander Alpha 1/360th Medium Truck Company, and his three truck platoon leaders are not transportation officers and lack training in the unit's primary mission tasks. Unit discipline is inconsistent with poorly defined standards but even so a high degree of mutual respect exists in the unit. The primary leadership challenge beyond the lack of tactical expertise is the poor communications within the unit. The unit training program is ineffective, poorly planned, organized and executed, and training guidance is not well communicated. IDT training does not meet minimum standards in mission areas partially due to the lack of organic wartime equipment and waiting for guidance to be communicated. The unit did not receive a favorable evaluation during their last AT. Just after mobilization alert, the unit received additional personnel to achieve deployment strength levels. As a result of the new personnel, the unit required extra training during mobilization to achieve standards.

Unit 3
Rank Order _____

Captain Hansen, Commander Charlie 1/360th Medium Truck Company, and all platoon leaders are not transportation officers and lack training in the unit's primary mission tasks. The leadership team has not been effective as a team often in open disagreement between the officers and senior NCOs on priorities resulting in poor rapport with the soldiers and a lack of trust and mutual respect. Even with these divisions between the leadership, unit discipline is consistent with well defined standards and communications within the unit are good. The unit training program is ineffective, poorly planned, organized and executed. IDT training does not meet minimum standards in mission areas partially due to the lack of organic wartime equipment and lack of leadership training. The unit did not receive a favorable evaluation during their last AT and required extra training during mobilization to achieve standards. Just after completing mobilization training the unit received additional fillers to reach deployment strength.

Unit 4
Rank Order _____

Captain Thomas, commander Delta 1/360th Medium Truck Company, and all of the company officers and senior NCOs are assigned to duties outside their primary branch and occupational specialty. They are not well trained in the unit mission and communications in the unit are poor. Unit discipline is consistently enforced even though not well communicated and there is a lack of mutual respect throughout the unit. The unit trains hard with meaningful and effective training fully utilizing training time during IDT with well organized and thoroughly prepared training plans and exercises mostly the result of coordination between the training officer, 1LT Rose and the senior NCOs who work hard to overcome their lack of transportation background. During the last AT, the unit received excellent training evaluations for accomplishment of all unit mission essential tasks. Early in the mobilization process the unit received additional personnel to achieve deployment strength but due to their excellent prior training still did not require additional mobilization training.

Unit 5
Rank Order _____

Captain Baker, Commander Alpha 2/360th Medium Truck Company, and two of the platoon leaders and most of the senior NCOs are not qualified in transportation unit requirements. They have received minimal training in the unit mission and while there are some cracks in the team dynamics there are good, open lines of communications in the unit. Unit discipline is inconsistent with ill defined standards but there is still a high degree of mutual respect between all unit members and the leadership. This respect is positively affected by a sound, effective training program. IDT training is well organized and thoroughly prepared training plans and exercises are executed on a consistent basis. The unit is fully equipped for its wartime mission and received the most favorable evaluations during their last AT. After having successfully completed post-mobilization training, the unit received additional personnel to achieve deployment strength.

Unit 6
Rank Order _____

Captain Suarez, Commander Bravo 2/360th Medium Truck Company, and all platoon officers/NCOs are fully qualified in their transportation specialties and are well trained in the unit's primary mission tasks. The leadership team has not been effective as a team often in open disagreement between the officers and senior NCOs on priorities with poor communications within the unit. Unit discipline is inconsistent with ill defined standards resulting in poor rapport with the soldiers and a further degrading mutual respect. Even with these leadership challenges, the unit trains hard with meaningful and effective training during IDT with well organized and thoroughly prepared training plans and exercises mostly the result of the training officer, 1LT Nowak and the units full-up wartime equipment status. The unit fully achieved mobilization training standards and even though new personnel were assigned to achieve deployment strength just after completion of post-mobilization training, the unit deployed on schedule.

Unit 7
Rank Order _____

Captain Easley, commander Charlie 2/360th Medium Truck Company, all of the platoon leaders and senior NCOs are fully qualified in transportation specialties. They have received training in the unit mission and communicate well with each other and the unit members. Unit discipline is consistent with well defined and communicated standards and there is a high degree of mutual respect within the unit. The unit trains hard with meaningful and effective training fully utilizing training time during IDT with well organized and thoroughly prepared training plans and exercises mostly the result of coordination between the training officer, 1LT Powell and the senior NCOs. During the last AT, the unit received excellent training evaluations for accomplishment of all unit mission essential tasks. Early in the pre-mobilization process the unit received new personnel to achieve deployment strength and was able to complete all post-mobilization mission essential tasks without any delays or additional training.

Unit 8
Rank Order _____

Captain Wickes, Commander Delta 2/360th Medium Truck Company, and two of the platoon leaders and most of the senior NCOs are fully qualified in transportation unit requirements. They have received all necessary training in the unit mission and while there are good lines of communications, discipline is inconsistent and not well defined. There is a lack of mutual respect between the leadership and unit members. The unit training program is ineffective, poorly planned, organized and executed and is negatively impacted by the lack of effective discipline. IDT training does not meet minimum standards in mission areas partially due to the lack of organic wartime equipment, the lack of effective discipline, and the lack of mutual respect within the unit. Early in the pre-mobilization process the unit received additional fillers to reach deployment strength. The unit did not receive a favorable evaluation during their last AT and required extra training during mobilization to achieve standards.

2. Conjoint Factors and Cards:

Discipline

1. Consistent Discipline: The unit commander and primary leadership establish and maintain consistent discipline.
2. Inconsistent Discipline: There is a lack of consistent discipline in the unit.

Communications

1. Good Communications: There are effective, open lines of communications, up and down the chain of command and laterally within the unit and externally.
2. Poor Communications: Communication within the unit is limited and ineffective.

Respect

1. Mutual Respect: There is mutual respect up and down the chain of command between leaders and led.
2. Lack of Respect: There is a lack of respect throughout the unit between leaders and between leaders and led.

Training & Equipping

1. Good Unit Training: The unit trains hard with meaningful and effective training. The unit has done well on AT training evaluations, mobilization training, and fully utilizes training time during IDT with well organized and thoroughly prepared training plans and exercises. The unit is fully trained and equipped to accomplish its designated mobilization mission.
2. Poor Unit Training: The unit training program is ineffective, poorly planned, organized and executed. The unit does not receive favorable AT training evaluations. The required extra training during mobilization training to achieve standards. IDT training is poorly planned and does not meet minimum standards in many mission areas.

Leadership Tactical

1. Leaders Trained: The unit commander and primary leadership are well trained in the unit mission and are working within their designated occupational specialties.
2. Leaders not Trained: The unit commander and primary leadership are not trained in the unit mission and are not working in their designated occupational specialties.

Cross Leveling

1. Early: Unit cross leveling occurred early in the train up process for mobilization during pre-mobilization training period.
2. Late: Unit cross leveling occurred late in the post-mobilization process just prior to deployment.

Card 1
Discipline Consistent Discipline
Communications Poor
Respect Mutual Respect
Train & Equip Poor Unit Training
Leadership Training Trained
Cross Leveling Late

Card 2
Discipline Inconsistent Discipline
Communications Poor
Respect Mutual Respect
Train & Equip Poor Unit Training
Leadership Training Not Trained
Cross Leveling Early

Card 3
Discipline Consistent Discipline
Communications Good
Respect Lack of Respect
Train & Equip Poor Unit Training
Leadership Training Not Trained
Cross Leveling Late

Card 4
Discipline Consistent Discipline
Communications Poor
Respect Lack of Respect
Train & Equip Good Training
Leadership Training Not Trained
Cross Leveling Early

Card 5
Discipline Inconsistent Discipline
Communications Good
Respect Mutual Respect
Train & Equip Good Training
Leadership Training Not Trained
Cross Leveling Late

Card 6
Discipline Inconsistent Discipline
Communications Poor
Respect Lack of Respect
Train & Equip Good Training
Leadership Training Trained
Cross Leveling Late

Card 7
Discipline Consistent Discipline
Communications Good
Respect Mutual Respect
Train & Equip Good Training
Leadership Training Trained
Cross Leveling Early

Card 8
Discipline Inconsistent Discipline
Communications Good
Respect Lack of Respect
Train & Equip Poor Unit Training
Leadership Training Trained
Cross Leveling Early

3. Unit Cohesion Survey Cover

COHESION SURVEY

INSTRUCTIONS

Please complete the following individual profile:

Were you a cross leveled soldier? Yes ☐ No ☐

Check the appropriate boxes
Military Personnel Category
☐ MIL ☐ CIV
☐ Retired

If military, please check grade/rank
Enlisted
☐ E1-E4
☐ E5-E6
☐ E7-E8-E9
Officer
☐ O1-O3
☐ O4-O6

If military or prior military, check the Appropriate Boxes
☐ Active Army
☐ Army National Guard ☐ AGR
☐ Army Reserve ☐ AGR
☐ Other Service

Duty Position Specialty: _____ (e.g. 77F)
Primary Job Specialty: _____ (e.g. 11B)

Leadership Roles Held During Deployment
☐ No leadership roles
☐ Squad/Team Leader
☐ Platoon Leader/Platoon Sergeant
☐ Company Commander/First Sergeant
☐ Company Staff (e.g. Training NCO)
☐ Bn/Bde/or Higher Staff
☐ Bn/Bde/or Higher Leader (CMDR/CSM)

Please check appropriate boxes

☐ Deployed in unit within last 2 years
☐ Deployed in unit within last 6 years
☐ Deployed more than once in last 10 years
☐ Leader in a deployed RC unit
☐ Leader in a deployed AC unit
☐ never deployed

INSTRUCTIONS

YOUR OPEN, HONEST RESPONSES ARE NEEDED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR DECISIONS, THAT MAY IN THE FUTURE, AFFECT YOUR UNIT

This survey is anonymous.
Only group statistics will be reported
Circle the number to indicate your response for each question

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS FOUND ON THE NEXT PAGE **(WITH 1 REPRESENTING STRONG DISAGREEMENT AND 5 REPRESENTING STRONG AGREEMENT)?**

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION

4. Unit Survey Questions

COHESION SURVEY

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree	
1	2	3	4	5	1. Prior to reporting for our pre-deployment training we received a number of new individuals due to cross leveling.
1	2	3	4	5	2. Our unit commander maintained consistent and fair discipline while we were deployed.
1	2	3	4	5	2. Unit members were fully trained in their respective specialties prior to deployment.
1	2	3	4	5	3. Even though our unit received a number of new individuals due to cross leveling, we formed a cohesive team before we deployed.
1	2	3	4	5	4. Our unit maintained effective, open lines of communication up and down the chain of command.
1	2	3	4	5	5. Mutual respect was established between officers and enlisted prior to deployment.
1	2	3	4	5	6. Once deployed, our unit had more than our share of injuries.
1	2	3	4	5	7a. Cross-leveled soldiers joining our unit were quickly assimilated.
1	2	3	4	5	7b. Within thirty days after I cross-leveled to my new unit, I felt accepted and a member of the team.
1	2	3	4	5	8. The NCO's worked as a leadership team through mobilization and deployment.
1	2	3	4	5	9a. Cross-leveled soldiers joining our unit became part of our team prior to deployment.
1	2	3	4	5	9b. The training I received at my home unit was useful and valuable to me when I cross-leveled to my new unit.
1	2	3	4	5	10. Our unit was more cohesive during mobilization and deployment than we were at home station.
1	2	3	4	5	11. The specialties we trained for at home station and at the mobilization station were well utilized once we deployed.
1	2	3	4	5	12a. Our unit retention rate has remained high once we returned from theater.
1	2	3	4	5	12b. The unit leadership worked hard to integrate cross-leveled soldiers into the unit prior to deployment.

Page 1

Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree	
1	2	3	4	5	**13. During our stay at the mobilization station, and while deployed, our unit had few, if any, cliques (separate groups).**
1	2	3	4	5	**14. The members of our unit began building a special bond towards each other during mobilization that continued throughout deployment.**
1	2	3	4	5	**15a. Our unit cohesion did not suffer when new cross-leveled soldiers became members of our unit.**
1	2	3	4	5	**15b. I felt better trained and more a part of the unit I cross-leveled into than my home station unit.**
1	2	3	4	5	**16. We had few, if any, Inspector General (IG) complaints while our unit was deployed.**
1	2	3	4	5	**17. We had the majority of organic wartime equipment to successfully complete our mission prior to mobilization.**
1	2	3	4	5	**18. I was confident that the unit leadership had the best interests of all the unit members as their top priority.**
1	2	3	4	5	**19. Our IDT training at home station was well planned and effective; we needed minimal training at the MOB site.**
1	2	3	4	5	**20. Our unit received a number of new individuals due to cross leveling at MOB Station pre-deployment training.**
1	2	3	4	5	**21. During deployment we had few disciplinary problems.**
1	2	3	4	5	**22. After returning to home station, our unit cohesion began to break down.**
1	2	3	4	5	**23. Few changes in unit leadership occurred from 6 months before deployment until 6 months after.**
1	2	3	4	5	**24. My primary job specialty (PMOS/Branch/etc.) matched the unit duty specialty required for the position I held.**
1	2	3	4	5	**25. If I were to be deployed again, I would want to deploy with this unit.**

26. My primary job specialty (PMOS/Branch/etc.) matched the unit duty specialty required for the position I held.

27. If I were to be deployed again, I would want to deploy with this unit.

6. ASA Memo directing ARNG Survey Units

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
111 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0111

SAMR-TRM

31 July 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, 111 S. GEORGE MASON DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VA 22204-1382

SUBJECT: Request to Survey ARNG Units

1. Reference memorandum, ASA (M&RA), SAMR-TRM, 20 Apr 06, subject: Request for Study Support (Encl 1).

2. As part of this study, request your organization assist BCP International, Limited by notifying the units identified at Encl 2 that the members of each have been selected to take part in a survey. Request each notified unit provide an email and telephone number of a full time support point of contact at the unit to the following email address: ken.powell@bcpiltd.com.

3. This survey will be web based and will take approximately ten minutes to complete. Upon responding to the above email, each unit will be given a complete set of survey instructions, a log-in name and address to access the survey via the world wide web. This survey will commence on 14 August and terminate on 22 September 2006.

4. Your assistance in helping to make this study a success is sincerely appreciated. My Point of Contact for this Study is COL John Foster, (703) 697-5291, email: john.foster@hqda.army.mil.

ROBERT H. SMILEY
Director, Reserve Affairs Integration

2 Encls
1. Memo, 20 Apr 06
2. ARNG Unit Listing

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
111 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0111

SAMR-TRM

20 April 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, 111 S. GEORGE MASON DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VA 22204-1382

SUBJECT: Request for Study Support

1. This Office has recently contracted BCP International, Limited, located in Alexandria, Virginia, to conduct a study/analysis and assessment of cross leveling and its effects on Guard and Reserve unit cohesion. The end result of this effort will be used to develop the Army's strategy in building and supporting future deployable units.

2. The study will focus on the cross leveling of Guard and Reserve units mobilized and deployed from the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) to present. In order to meet the desired outcome expected by this study, the acquisition of mobilization, personnel and unit data will be necessary. Most of the required data elements for analysis and assessment have been captured in the existing databases of the Army National Guard.

3. Request your organization assist BCP International, Limited by providing their analysts the data they request throughout the duration of this study.

4. Your assistance in helping to make this study a success is sincerely appreciated. My Point of Contact for this Study is Mr. Kenneth R. Powell, BCP International, Limited (703-575-7382).

"Original signed"

ROBERT H. SMILEY
Director, Reserve Affairs Integration

Encl 1

UNITS TO BE SURVEYED

ARNG UNITS

WQP2AA	BATON ROUGE G1	LA	497	0769 EN BN CBT HVY
WP4BAA	SIOUX FALLS	SD	395	0147 FA BN 01 MLRS
WPJZAA	WINSTON SALEM G1	NC	299	1452 TC CO CBT HET
WQJWAA	DOYLINE	LA	275	1083 TC CO COMBAT HET
WV71AA	GRAND PRAIRIE G1	TX	189	0149 AV CO CO G MEDIUM HEL
WVHSAA	BLACKSTONE G1	VA	178	3647 OD CO MAINT NONDIV DS
WTVTAA	MELROSE G1	MA	180	0972 MP CO CBT SPT
WPS3T0	OKMULGEE G1	OK	208	0120 EN BN HSC COMBAT HVY
WPAQT0	NEW YORK G1	NY	152	0069 IN BN 01 HHC
WP29AA	WATERTOWN G1	SD	364	0147 FA BN 02 MLRS
WPC2T2	CALHOUN G1	GA	154	0108 AR BN 01 HHC TANK FWD
WQV3T2	SAVANNAH	GA	153	0118 FA BN 01 HHB FWD
WXBLAA	JACKSON	AL	164	0778 OD CO MAINT NONDIV DS
WPKQT0	AMORY G1	MS	201	0198 AR BN 01 HHC TANK
WPRVT0	KENT	WA	235	0303 AR BN 01 HHC TANK
WPJDT0	CHARLOTTE	NC	144	0113 FA BN 01 HHB
WPYCAA	KANSAS CITY	KS	166	0778 TC CO COMBAT HET
WTQ3T0	RUSTON G1	LA	204	0527 EN BN HHS HVY
WQV9AA	PANAMA CITY G1	FL	478	0124 IN BN 03 AASLT
WPGRT0	SCRANTON	PA	121	0109 IN BN 01 HHC MECH

Encl 2

7. ASA Memo directing ARNG Unit Data Call

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
111 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0111

SAMR-TRM

31 July 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, 111 S. GEORGE MASON DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VA 22204-1382

SUBJECT: Request for Study Data

1. Reference memorandum, ASA(M&RA), SAMR-TRM, 20 Apr 06, subject: Request for Study Support (Encl 1).

2. As part of this study, unit data from previously deployed Army National Guard and Army Reserve units are necessary to validate the study. In order to complete this study in a timely manner, it is requested that the following information from each ARNG unit at Encl 2 be provided to the contractor NLT 1 September 2006.

a. Retention rates – Prior to mobilization and Post mobilization

b. Deployment casualty rates

c. Deployment injury rates

d. UCMJ actions – Mobilization through deployment

e. UIC and contact information for all cross-leveled (kluged) soldiers

3. Request each unit listed at Encl 2 provide a Point of Contact and phone number to the following email address: ken.powell@bcpitld.com.

4. Your assistance in helping to make this study a success is sincerely appreciated. My Point of Contact for this Study is COL John Foster, (703) 697-5291, email: John.Foster@hqda.army.mil.

ROBERT H. SMILEY
Director, Reserve Affairs Integration

2 Encls
1. Memo, 20 Apr 06
2. ARNG Unit Listing

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
111 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0111

SAMR-TRM

20 April 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, 111 S. GEORGE MASON DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VA 22204-1382

SUBJECT: Request for Study Support

1. This Office has recently contracted BCP International, Limited, located in Alexandria, Virginia, to conduct a study/analysis and assessment of cross leveling and its effects on Guard and Reserve unit cohesion. The end result of this effort will be used to develop the Army's strategy in building and supporting future deployable units.

2. The study will focus on the cross leveling of Guard and Reserve units mobilized and deployed from the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) to present. In order to meet the desired outcome expected by this study, the acquisition of mobilization, personnel and unit data will be necessary. Most of the required data elements for analysis and assessment have been captured in the existing databases of the Army National Guard.

3. Request your organization assist BCP International, Limited by providing their analysts the data they request throughout the duration of this study.

4. Your assistance in helping to make this study a success is sincerely appreciated. My Point of Contact for this Study is Mr. Kenneth R. Powell, BCP International, Limited (703-575-7382).

"Original signed"

ROBERT H. SMILEY
Director, Reserve Affairs Integration

Encl 1

UNITS TO BE SURVEYED

ARNG UNITS

WQP2AA	BATON ROUGE G1	LA	497	0769 EN BN CBT HVY
WP4BAA	SIOUX FALLS	SD	395	0147 FA BN 01 MLRS
WPJZAA	WINSTON SALEM G1	NC	299	1452 TC CO CBT HET
WQJWAA	DOYLINE	LA	275	1083 TC CO COMBAT HET
WV71AA	GRAND PRAIRIE G1	TX	189	0149 AV CO CO G MEDIUM HEL
WVHSAA	BLACKSTONE G1	VA	178	3647 OD CO MAINT NONDIV DS
WTVTAA	MELROSE G1	MA	180	0972 MP CO CBT SPT
WPS3T0	OKMULGEE G1	OK	208	0120 EN BN HSC COMBAT HVY
WPAQT0	NEW YORK G1	NY	152	0069 IN BN 01 HHC
WP29AA	WATERTOWN G1	SD	364	0147 FA BN 02 MLRS
WPC2T2	CALHOUN G1	GA	154	0108 AR BN 01 HHC TANK FWD
WQV3T2	SAVANNAH	GA	153	0118 FA BN 01 HHB FWD
WXBLAA	JACKSON	AL	164	0778 OD CO MAINT NONDIV DS
WPKQT0	AMORY G1	MS	201	0198 AR BN 01 HHC TANK
WPRVT0	KENT	WA	235	0303 AR BN 01 HHC TANK
WPJDT0	CHARLOTTE	NC	144	0113 FA BN 01 HHB
WPYCAA	KANSAS CITY	KS	166	0778 TC CO COMBAT HET
WTQ3T0	RUSTON G1	LA	204	0527 EN BN HHS HVY
WQV9AA	PANAMA CITY G1	FL	478	0124 IN BN 03 AASLT
WPGRT0	SCRANTON	PA	121	0109 IN BN 01 HHC MECH

Encl 2

8. ASA Memo directing USAR Survey Units

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
111 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0111

SAMR-TRM

31 July 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND, 1401 DESHLER STREET SW, FORT MCPHERSON, GA 30330-2000

SUBJECT: Request to Survey USAR Units

1. Reference memorandum, ASA (M&RA), SAMR-TRM, 20 Apr 06, subject: Request for Study Support (Encl 1).

2. As part of this study, request your organization assist BCP International, Limited by notifying the units identified at Encl 2 that the members of each unit have been selected to take part in a survey. Request each notified unit provide an email and telephone number of a full time support point of contact to the following email address: ken.powell@bcpiltd.com.

3. This survey will be web based and will take approximately ten minutes to complete. Upon responding to the above email, each unit will be given a complete set of survey instructions, a log-in name and address to access the survey via the world wide web. This survey will commence on 14 August and terminate on 22 September 2006.

4. Your assistance in helping to make this study a success is sincerely appreciated. My Point of Contact for this Study is COL John Foster, (703) 697-5291, email: john.foster@hqda.army.mil.

ROBERT H. SMILEY
Director, Reserve Affairs Integration

2 Encls
1. Memo, 20 Apr 06
2. USAR Unit Listing

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
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111 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0111

SAMR-TRM

20 April 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND, 1401 DESHLER STREET SW, FORT MCPHERSON, GA 30330-2000

SUBJECT: Request for Study Support

1. This Office has recently contracted BCP International, Limited, located in Alexandria, Virginia, to conduct a study/analysis and assessment of cross leveling and its effects on Guard and Reserve unit cohesion. The end result of this effort will be used to develop the Army's strategy in building and supporting future deployable units.

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3. Request your Command assist BCP International, Limited by providing their analysts the data they request throughout the duration of this study.

4. Your assistance in helping to make this study a success is sincerely appreciated. My Point of Contact for this Study is Mr. Kenneth R. Powell, BCP International, Limited (703-575-7382).

"Original signed"

ROBERT H. SMILEY
Director, Reserve Affairs Integration

Encl 1

UNITS TO BE SURVEYED

USAR UNITS

DUIC	HOMESTATION CITY	STATE	PAX	ANAME
WSKBAA	CHAMBERSBURG	PA	149	324 MP BN IR EPW CI
WSZ9AA	FRANKLIN	PA	170	298 TC CO MDM TRK 5K GAL
WZPNAA	CLEVELAND	OH	167	0428 TC CO LT MDM TR
WSKMAA	HEMPSTEAD	NY	174	310 MP BN HHD
WQZXAA	GREENSBURG	PA	194	1004 CS CO GS SUPPLY
WTLRAA	NEW ORLEANS	LA	216	117 CS CO NON DIV DS
WTNCAA	GAINESVILLE	FL	216	0323 CS CO MNT DS NON DIV
WSM2AA	CADIZ	OH	218	0245 CS CO MAINT NON DIV
WTULAA	ORLANDO	FL	253	0302 TC CO CARGO TRANSFER
WZNQAA	STATEN ISLAND	NY	119	0485 QM CO SUPPLY DS
WRJ5AA	JOHNSTOWN	PA	481	0458 EN BN CBT CORPS WHEEL
WSCCAA	MOBILE	AL	551	344 MD HSP CMBT SPT HOSP
WS5NAA	SIOUX CITY	IA	630	0980 EN BN CBT HVY
WRYAAA	FORT BUCHANAN	PR	633	448 EN BN CBT HVY
WSZTAA	CADIZ	OH	166	0660 TC CO MDM TRK 7.5 GAL
WSM3AA	YORK	PA	122	254 QM
WZPGAA	FORT JACKSON	SC	154	0655 TC CO MED TRK 75K

Encl 2

9. ASA Memo directing USAR Unit Data Call

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
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SAMR-TRM

31 July 2006

MEMORANDUM THRU CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND, 1401 DESHLER STREET SW, FORT MCPHERSON, GA 30330-2000

FOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G1, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND, 1401 DESHLER STREET SW, FORT MCPHERSON, GA 30330-2000

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF G3, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND, 1401 DESHLER STREET SW, FORT MCPHERSON, GA 30330-2000

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WSM3AA	YORK	PA	122	254 QM
WZPGAA	FORT JACKSON	SC	154	0655 TC CO MED TRK 75K

Encl 2

Appendix 3: Analysis & Outputs

Files and ouputs are provided in electronic version on separate CD. There are over 100 pages of outputs and 28 pages of file descriptions. It was more prudent to provide in electronic format. Included below is an abbreviated file information sheet with variable names and descriptions:

File Information

Notes		
Output Created		27-NOV-2006 12:24:03
Comments		
Input	**Data**	C:\Documents and Settings\BJ Thornburg\My Documents\AD - MAT\A - Projects\51 - BCPI Survey\SPSS1\UCoh_FIN1 14NOV06.sav
	File Label	Aggregated File
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
Syntax		DISPLAY DICTIONARY.
Resources	**Elapsed Time**	0:00:00.03

List of variables on the working file

Name		Position
ID	Case ID#	1
UIC	Unit ID Code	2
UNIT_NUM	Number code of unit	3
COMPO	Component	4
UIC_CNTR	cases per uic	5
CNTR	Counter	6
DPSTAT	Deployment Status	7
XLVL	Were you a cross leveled soldier?	8
MPC	Military Personnel Category	9
OFF_DMOS	Officer MOS's	10
ENL_DMOS	Enlisted MOS's	11
FA_DMOS	Functional Areas	12
TRN_B4_D	Trained in the above MOS prior to deployment?	13
OFF_PMOS	Officer MOS's	14
ENL_PMOS	Enlisted MOS's	15
FA_PMOS	Functional Areas	16
ICOMPO	Soldier component prior to deployment.	17
GRD_CAT	Grade/rank category	18
JR_SR	Junior Enlisted vs NCOs/Officers	19
LDR_A	Leadership Roles Held During Deployment - Response 1	20
LDR_B	Leadership Roles Held During Deployment - Response 2	21
LDR_C	Leadership Roles Held During Deployment - Response 3	22
LDR_D	Leadership Roles Held During Deployment - Response 4	23
LDR_E	Leadership Roles Held During Deployment - Response 5	24
UN_LDR	Leader Role & Unit Compo	25
Q17H	17h: Within thirty days after I cross-leveled to my new unit	26
Q17K	17k: The training I received at my home unit was useful and	27
Q17N	17n: The unit leadership worked hard to integrate cross-leve	28
Q17Q	17q: I felt better trained and more a part of the unit I cro	29
Q18H	18h: Cross-leveled soldiers joining our unit were quickly as	30

Q18K	18k: Cross-leveled soldiers joining our unit became part of	31
Q18N	18n: Our unit retention rate has remained high once we retur	32
Q18Q	18q: Our unit cohesion did not suffer when new cross-leveled	33
XLVL_ER	Long before pre-deployment training we received a number of	34
FAIRDISC	unit commander maintained consistent and fair discipline dur	35
TRN_MOS	Unit members were fully trained in their MOS prior to deploy	36
XLVL_LT	Our unit received a number of new individuals shortly before	37
O_COMMS	Our unit maintained effective, open lines of communication u	38
MUT_RSPT	Mutual respect was established between officers and enlisted	39
INJ_HI	Once deployed, our unit had more than our share of injuries	40
NCO_LDRS	The NCO's worked as a leadership team through mobilization a	41
HI_UCMJ	There were numerous article 15's or higher levels of punishm	42
UCOH_MD	Our unit was more cohesive during mobilization and deploymen	43
HOMETRN	specialties trained for at home station and mobilization sta	44
FEW_CLQ	During mobilization deployment, our unit had few, if any, cl	45
UCOH_MOB	Unit began building a special bond during mobilization conti	46
FEW_IG	We had few, if any, Inspector General (IG) complaints during	47
EOH_HI	We had the majority of organic wartime equipment to successf	48
GD_LDR	I was confident that the unit leadership had the best intere	49
IDT_TRN	IDT training was well planned and effective; minimal trainin	50
XLVL_MOB	Our unit received a number of new individuals due to cross l	51
LO_UCMJ	During deployment we had few disciplinary problems.	52
UCOH_PM	After returning to home station, our unit cohesion began to	53
LDR_STAB	Few changes in unit leadership occurred from 6 months before	54
PMOS_MAT	PMOS matched the unit DMOS required for my position	55
DEPL_AGN	If I were to be deployed again, I would want to deploy with	56
UCOH_HI	Our unit was a cohesive team during our deployment	57
UCOH	Unit Cohesion - Agree/Disagree	58
UN_DISC	Numerous members of our unit received "unit level punishment	59
XLEVEL	Cross-Leveled Unit	60
LOCATION	Location	61
STATE	State	63
PAX	PAX Authorized	64
UNNAME	Unit Name	65
PRMOBRRT	Pre-MOB Retention Rate	69
DEMOBRRT	Post-DMOB Retention Rate	70
CASRATE	Casualty Rate	71
INJRATE	Injury Rate	72
UCMJACT	UCMJ Actions	73
UCMJ_RAT	UCMJ Rate	74
UCMJ_LVL	Level of UCMJ Actions	75
XLVLPCT	Cross-Level Percent	76
PRE_PLVL	PreDeploy PERS	77
PRE_TLVL	PreDeploy TRAIN	78
PRE_ELVL	PreDeploy EQUIP	79
DMB_RLVL	Post DMOB PERS	80
DMB_ELVL	Post DMOB EQUIP	81
COMMENTS		82

Appendix 4: Performance Work Statement – Extract

PWS - Extract

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

4. **Scope.** This task order requires that the contractor conduct study and analysis support services for the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). Specifically, the ASA(M&RA) requires that the contractor study, analyze, and assess the viability and the effects of cross leveling on unit readiness and the impacts on unit cohesion. The results of this effort will be used to develop the Army's strategy in building and supporting deployable units. Attachment 3 describes key issues/concerns that the contractor shall consider in conducting the study and in developing the deliverables. The desired outcomes of this study are:

- A quantifiable/verifiable history on the use of cross leveling to build deployable units to meet Combatant Commander GWOT requirements
- Quantifiable short and long term impacts of manning units by employing a cross leveling strategy to meet requirements
- A quantifiable impact statement on the value of unit cohesion and how cross leveling has impacted attaining cohesion.
- A proposed role for individuals within a unit based manning strategy.

This is within the scope of the basic contract, Section C., paragraph 4.5 Workforce Analysis, " Perform workforce analysis to assist in supporting the Army organization and force structure", and paragraph 4.4 that provides for policy development and implementation support related to Human resources, reserve affairs, manpower and personnel integration, personnel readiness, programming, etc.

5. **Background**. To man Reserve unit requirements needed to support the Global War on Terror, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have had to cross level soldiers between and into units in order to man units to the required level necessary to meet the combatant commander's validated requirement. At the start of the war, cross leveling was necessary because over structure in the Reserve forces diminished the ability to fill units to 100% of required TOE strengths. High post-mobilization attrition rates and low DMOSQ rates contributed to cross leveling as well. OSD's practiced prohibition on remobilizing previously mobilized Soldiers who are assigned to units being called for each subsequent rotation of forces to support the war, forced the Army to expand cross leveling to a practice that kluges individuals into units as opposed to mobilizing and deploying cohesive units of Soldiers. Cross leveling today transcends skill sets and frequently requires the cross level soldier to be retrained to fill the billet he is being cross leveled into. The true quantifiable short and long term impacts of manning units by employing a cross leveling strategy to meet requirements must be determined in order to formulate sound manpower strategies to Support the Army Force Generation

Page 1 of 5

model and to inform Senior Department of Defense leaders on the risks associated with kluging to form units so as to preclude mobilizing any Soldier twice until all have been used once.

6. **Applicable Documents**. The following documents provide the framework and background information relative to this requirement.

- Title 10 U.S. Code Sections 12301a, 12302 and 12304
- DODD 1235.10 Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve
- DoDI 1235.12 Accessing the Ready Reserves
- Executive Order 13223 dated 18 Sep 2001
- Executive Order 13239 dated 14 Dec 2001
- Executive Order 13253 dated 18 Jan 2002
- Under Secretary of Defense PERSGUIDE Memos dated 20 Sep 01, 30 Oct 01, and 19 Jul 02 SUBJECT: Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to World Trade and Pentagon Attacks

7. **Tasks.** The contractor shall perform studies and analysis support services in accordance with the referenced Army documents and policy directives and any portion of the contractor's proposed processes that are incorporated into this order. Attachment 2 describes the Governments key issues/concerns that the contractor shall consider in conducting this study and in completing the deliverables.

7.1 **Performance Objective**	**Standard**
Thorough, timely, and effective project management support	Documents developed IAW Government approved POA&M Products fully vetted and accepted by the ASA(M&RA) Functional Representative

7.1.1 Develop and submit a draft *Plan of Actions and Milestone (POA&M)* document for approval within 15 days of award

7.1.2 POA&M shall establish well-defined milestones in meeting the objectives of this requirement

7.2 **Performance Objective**	**Standard**
Comprehensive, detailed, and accurate research and analysis products	Developed IAW Government approved POA&M Accepted in first iteration by the functional representative

PWS - Extract

7.2.1 Design and develop data gathering tools (e.g. questionnaires, surveys, materials for interviews, workshops/discussion groups, etc.) with sufficient detail to clearly identify the objectives and issues relative to this study (see Attachment 2) that will garner the most detailed information for analysis purposes

7.2.2 Identify target audiences and coordinate visits as appropriate. The Government will provide contact information and assist the contractor as needed.

7.2.3 Administer the Government-approved tools and conduct interviews, workshops, discussion groups, etc. as appropriate.

7.3 Analyze the data collected and provide draft report documenting the findings and recommendations. Findings must include a defined set of metrics that quantify the conclusions of the study (e.g., casualty rates, mission completion rates, on time completion rates etc.).

7.4 Participate in In-Progress Reviews (IPR) at least monthly or as agreed to between the Government and the contractor.

7.6 Prepare briefing materials.

7.7 Prepare final report to incorporate the Government's comments/changes.

7.8 Provide a Monthly Status Report to the COR and the Functional Representative.

7.9 Performance Requirements Summary:

Objectives	Measures	Standards
Thorough and effective project management support PWS 7.1	Deliverables reviewed against POA&M and governing documents	Documents developed IAW approved POA&M Products fully vetted and accepted by the ASA(M&RA) Functional Representative
Thorough, comprehensive, and detailed research and analysis products PWS 7.2	Deliverables reviewed against POA&M and governing documents	Developed IAW Government approved POA&M Accepted in first iteration by the functional representative

PWS - Extract

Cross Leveling and Unit Cohesion – Attachment 3

The contractor shall consider the following in conducting this study and in developing the deliverables identified in Sections 7 and 9 of the PWS:

- Effect that cross leveling has on Army unit readiness.
- Effect that cross leveling has had on the time it takes to deliver trained units to the CENTCOM areas of operation.
- Positive and negative aspects of building deployable units using a cross leveling strategy.
- If cross leveling has negatively affected unit readiness how long will it take to mitigate or cycle past these negative affects
- Effects, if any, that cross leveling has on a deployed unit's combat effectiveness.
- Effects, if any, that the practice of cross leveling has had on recruiting and retention.
- Does the practice of cross leveling to build units place the individual Soldier at greater risk for injury during the mobilization and deployment? Has cross leveling increased the individual Soldiers risk of death or injury?
- How does the practice of cross leveling to build deployable units affect the institutional Army?
  - Are there resource implications?
  - Are there infrastructure implications?
  - Does the utilization of a cross leveling strategy impact the Army's training strategy?
  - Identify the associated workload to cross level personnel for both the AC and RC in order to provide unit capability.
  - Quantify the workload associated with fielding RC units for OIF I and compare that to the level of work associated with providing similar capabilities from the RC for OIF/OEF V/VII.
  - Project the workloads for future OIF / OEFs.
  - Recommend mitigation techniques in order to decrease workload to the Institutional Army with regard to cross leveling.
- Does cross leveling impact the amount of time it takes to deliver a unit to a combatant commander? Does the cross leveling strategy increase or decrease the time combatant commanders have access to an RC unit?
- How has cross leveling impacted the long term capability of the Army to meet its manpower requirements?
- Does the practice of cross leveling increase risk the Army's ability to respond to contingencies?
- Does the practice of cross leveling have an affect the Army's ability to respond to or meet homeland defense or support requirements?
- To what extent can cross leveling be used to meet requirements before it begins to create problems?
- Does the value derived from cross leveling out weigh the problems associated with this strategy?

- Since 9/11 for the execution of GWOT?
- If executed in a deliberative / controlled manner?

- Are the challenges and benefits associated with a cross leveling strategy the same or different for each component, if different how?
- Considering the geographic nature of the RC with regard to life cycle management (recruitment / pre AIT to retirement), determine whether cross leveling will remain a necessary task in order to produce units in the future to include the ARFORGEN model.
  - Discuss options to limit associated work.
  - Discuss value of distributing a combatant commander's requirement across several units/commands in order to provide the capability.
  - Provide benefits and shortfalls with the ARNG and USAR ARFORGEN execution strategies with regard to cross leveling considering geographic nature of their distribution of force structure.
- Effect that cross leveling has on attaining unit cohesion.
  - How is cohesion attained?
  - What is the value of Unit Cohesion?