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**MILITARY INTEGRATION AS A FACTOR FOR POST-
CONFLICT STABILITY AND RECONCILIATION:
RWANDA, 1994-2005**

by

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September 2006

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STABILITY AND RECONCILIATION: RWANDA, 1994-2005**

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ABSTRACT

The international community adopted DDR programs at the end of the Cold War in 1989 as a means to end violent conflicts in various parts of world. The traditional DDR programs were designed either to disband the defeated enemy forces, or to integrate ex-combatants where the fighting has not been conclusive. Exclusion of ex-combatants has resulted in renewed conflict. This thesis argues that conventional DDR has neglected two important aspects that are crucial for sustainable stability and societal reconciliation: military integration and a sensitization program. In contrast, an approach that integrates former enemy forces and equally reintegrates ex-combatants and government forces into civilian society not only ends violent conflict, but also bridges the social gap among ethnic groups and, consequently, enhances societal reconciliation. The Rwandan DDRI program considers integration/reintegration of ex-combatants that precedes the sensitization phase that takes 3-4 months; this has led to stability and reconciliation after the 1994 genocide. *Ingando* is a reconciliation tool that transforms negative perceptions that cause ethnic hatred; mitigates conflict influence factors; and manages defeat, shame, and remorse on the part of the loser. Therefore DDRI programs that integrate a sensitization program and exit strategy lead to sustainable stability and reconciliation.

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I. CONCEPTUALIZING THE DDRI IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

A. INTRODUCTION

Civil wars, insurgency, and ethnic conflict continue to plague countries around the world. Unfortunately, neither the “victory” of one group nor “negotiated” settlement of the conflict necessarily results in an end to violence. Violence may resurface if losing factions or minority groups conclude that they have lost power or have been excluded from the political process. One method of reaching a lasting peace is to ensure participation by all competing factions in a new government. One aspect of this participation is to make certain that the new government’s military forces fully integrate members from all parties in the previous conflict. Therefore, a properly conducted program of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and integration (DDRI) of warring factions is a major aspect of post-conflict security building that ensures sustainable stability and reconciliation in societies divested by civil war. This thesis will analyze conditions under which the Rwandan case of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and integration (DDRI) was a success, and covers the period from 1994 to 2005.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Reconciliation and Military Integration

Reconciliation forms the basis for societal/state reconstruction in post-conflict situations. The main goal of post-conflict reconciliation is to bring together a divided society or nation in a way that avoids retribution for all but war criminals. Reconciliation promotes the open examination of a painful past and articulates a vision for the future based on the interdependence of diverse social, racial, ethnic, or religious groups.¹ The process of reconciliation provides a mechanism for exploration of truth (acknowledgement, transparency, revelation, and clarity) and mercy (acceptance, forgiveness, support, compassion, and healing). The purpose of this thesis is to

¹ Ken Win K. Smith and David N. Berg, *Paradoxes of Group Life* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989), 2.

investigate attempts to reconcile hitherto adversarial groups. Reconciliation also recognizes the need to gain time for both justice (equality before the law, making things right, and restitution) and peace (harmony, unity, well being, security and respect) to occur. Redressing past wrongs should promote social stability anchored in a sense of an interconnected future. According to American political scientist John Lederach, reconciliation focuses on the point where the past and future meet. He argues that acknowledging the past and envisioning the future are necessary to reframe the present.²

Although reconciliation embraces the whole society, the current models disregard the importance of military integration. This thesis will argue that military integration is a major tool to foster reconciliation in post-conflict situations, and that the lack of attention to the role of military integration in reconciliation and stabilization represents a critical gap in the literature. I will fill this gap by integrating the DDR literature into reconciliation literature.

The literature on reconciliation divides into two conceptual models: the individual reconciliation model and the national unity and reconciliation model (NUR). The individual reconciliation model involves two individuals, a victim and a perpetrator, coming together to discuss crimes committed against the former. Also known as the Truth and Reconciliation model, this model operates on a religious paradigm, which emphasizes a religious conversion mode of confession, repentance, and forgiveness.³ According to Lederach, the hatred and prejudice of racial xenophobia are primary factors and motivators of conflict. Thus, their transformation must be rooted in social-psychological and spiritual dimensions that traditionally have been seen as either irrelevant or outside of the competency of international diplomacy.⁴ Borer argues that post-conflict reconstruction requires individual reconciliation, a bottom-up approach or grassroots mechanism to foster peace-building and reconciliation.

² John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (United States Institute of Peace: Washington, DC, 1999), 29.

³ Tristan A. Borer, "Reconciliation in South Africa: Defining Success," *Kroc Institute Occasional Paper* 20: op: 1 (2001), ProQuest; ADDRESS: <http://proquest.umi.com/> (October 29, 2005).

⁴ Lederach, 29.

This approach to peace-building targets local political leaders, NGOs, community activists, and health officials, who are enlisted to settle disputes at the local level between sub-clans and within clans. Their major concern is to satisfy basic human needs: food, shelter, safety, and the need to build new post-conflict relationships. If the grassroots population is reconciled, then the popular desire for “normalcy” will filter up to national political leaders. American political scientist Edward Garcia notes that transitions towards peace in El Salvador, Ethiopia, and in the Philippines emanated from grassroots pressure for change.⁵ Also, peace negotiations in Somalia started as grassroots reconciliation conferences, which were adopted by individuals with high government profiles and sponsored by the United Nations.⁶ Nelson Mandela noted that more than fifteen truth commissions existed in 1994, including commissions organized during democratization in the 1970s in Latin America, Eastern Europe in 1980s and 1990s, and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1994.⁷ Because reconciliation commissions have worked well in those countries, according to Mandela, he recommends adopting the individual reconciliation model. However Eugenia Zorbas offers the opposing view that the reconciliation model is a vague concept, if not an impossible goal: to forgive and reconcile with someone who destroyed everything that makes life worth living, who wiped out family and property, is a pipe dream.⁸

The second model of reconciliation is that of national unity and reconciliation. Borer argues that the unit of analysis in NUR is not an individual acceptance but rather is anchored in social-political institutions and processes, termed as political paradigm.⁹ This model calls for the commitment of victims and perpetrators to respect the law,

⁵ Ed Garcia, *Participative Approaches to Peacemaking in the Philippines* (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1993).

⁶ Adebayo Adedeji, “Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts,” *the Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance* (1999): 249-251.

⁷ Lyn S. Graybill, *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracles or Model?* (USA: Lynne Rienner publishers, Inc., 2002), 1.

⁸ Eugenia Zorbas, “Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” *African Journal of legal Studies* vol.1 (2004), ProQuest; ADDRESS: <http://proquest.umi.com/> (October 30, 2005).

⁹ Borer, 13.

procedures, and processes that are laid down by the country's constitution. The process is a top-down approach to reconciliation and peace building, involving senior military, political and religious leaders.

The success of this model depends on the ability of peacemakers, often seen as intermediaries or mediators, normally backed by supporting governments or the United Nations. The mediator's role is to encourage communities to accept reconciliation. This model is hierarchical, and requires a functional power structure. It assumes that the accomplishments at the high level will be accepted by the rest of the population, as was the case in Ethiopia, El Salvador, and Cambodia.¹⁰

Lederach also argues the benefits of what he calls a "middle-out" approach to peace-building that appeals to ethnic and religious leaders as well as to NGOs, academics, and intellectuals. The middle range leaders occupy a determinant position in the society and, if properly integrated, might provide legitimacy for the process of reconciliation and sustainable peace. This approach argues that theories and strategies be focused on the middle range leadership that can be influential in attempts to end internal, protracted conflicts. This approach was also applied to negotiations in Northern Ireland in the mid-1990s. Rwanda also adopted the national unity and reconciliation model and established a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission to oversee the reconciliation process. The government is responsible for calming ethnic hatred, eradicating the culture of impunity, and uniting Rwandan society.¹¹

In seeking post-conflict reconciliation, whether adopting an individual or national reconciliation model, countries need to determine what sort of justice they will seek: retributive or restorative. The retributive model is a typical system of justice based on retaliation for a crime. Theophus Smith argues that this is not a type of justice applicable in post-conflict situations where many people have been killed and the entire country

¹⁰ Lederach, 45.

¹¹ "Report on the National Summit of Unity and Reconciliation," *National Unity and Reconciliation Commission* (18-20 October 2000): 5.

devastated.¹² His reasoning is that, as the aim of reconstruction is to rebuild the nation politically, socially, and economically, punitive justice is not the best way to secure these goals. This is why southerners were not prosecuted for treason in post Civil War United States. If the punishment were to fit the crime in the Rwandan genocide where one million people were massacred by hundreds of thousands of the Hutu population then this human capital would be tied up in prison, thus defeating the main purpose of post-conflict reconstruction. This would make the goal of reconciliation unattainable.

For post-conflict situations, Smith recommends a restorative model that seeks the restoration of relationships between the victims and perpetrators. A restorative model seeks the integration of the whole society at all levels, which will restore the integrity of a society torn apart by a devastating civil war. In seeking both vertical and horizontal integration, this type of justice seeks to cut across the different structures or strata within the state, while bringing together different cultures and ethnic groups within the society.

Whether discussing the choice between individual and national reconciliation, or between punitive or restorative justice, all these discussions fail to consider the most important custodian of violence among the state structures: the military. Military integration is not considered as part of the reconciliation process, yet leaving the military out of this process is a critical oversight. This thesis will argue that it is fundamental to the success of post-conflict reconciliation and stability, for two reasons. First, whether defeated or not, ex-combatants still remain a group capable of prolonging violence. Leaving them outside of state control perpetuates their potential to threaten the peace, while integrating them into a new military structure defuses their potential to independently re-engage in violence against the state. Second, in ethnic conflicts, different parties or groups feel more comfortable and secure when represented in the military of the new government force. Hence, military integration/re-integration is important for other negotiations and for the integration in the civilian sector.

¹² Theophus Smith, "Vengeance Is Never Enough: Alternative Visions of Justice," *In Roads to Reconciliation*, Amy Benson Brown and Karen M. Poremski. ed. (United States Institute of Peace: Washington, DC, 1999), 35-52.

In the initial efforts at reconciliation in South Africa, for example, military integration was not given due consideration. For this reason, desertion rates skyrocketed, which impacted the process of reconciliation in the civilian sector.¹³ In post-apartheid South Africa, within a matter of months the government integrated South African Defense Forces (SADF) and 34,000 ANC guerrilla forces, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), Pan African Congress, Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), and homeland armies, forming a new South African National Defense Force (SANDF). By the first week of November, 5,000 troops had deserted.¹⁴ The reason was that the process of military integration was not given due attention. Even demobilized soldiers had neither proper accountability (government follow-up) nor given a civil education package to enable them to fit in the civilian society. The process was revisited after it had caused significant instability in the country, thus hindering the smooth process of reconciliation.

Military integration in Bosnia also failed, prolonging tensions within the civilian population. The Bosnian defense force is composed, in effect, of three separate armies, each representing one of the ethnic groups, and answering to one of the two defense ministers.¹⁵ With no unified command structure, each "army" serves the interest of its ethnic group with little central control and accountability.

In Mozambique, the factor that contributed to increased instability since 1992 was the fact that UN operations in Mozambique failed to undertake a comprehensive disarmament process, leaving a large number of weapons in the hands of demobilized soldiers of RENAMO and FRELIMO.¹⁶ The NGOs do not have a tradition of giving priority to integration/re-integration of ex-combatants. They see this group as "spoilers" rather than victims in need. Mozambique's re-integration process failed in 1992 and this caused instability, not only in the country, but also in the region. Jaremev Mc Mullin

¹³ Report on "South Africa: Military Integration," *Journal Global Strategic Studies*, Oxford (1994): 1. <http://proquest.umi.com/> (October 30, 2005).

¹⁴ Report on South Africa Military Integration, 1.

¹⁵ Peter C. Alexa, et al, "The Democratic Warrior: The future of Bosnia Military," *Baltic Defense Review* 9 vol. 1 (2003): 148.

¹⁶ Martinho Chachiua, "Internal Security in Mozambique: Concerns Versus Policies," *Institute of Security Studies: Africa Security Review* vol 9 no 1 (2000), <http://www.Internalsecurity-mozambique.htm>

asserts that Mozambique failed to address two main issues that emanate from poor conduct of integration/re-integration: the involvement of certain combatants in organized crimes, and political instability caused by re-integration issues.¹⁷ Mc Mullin argues that instability has hurt Mozambique and has repercussions for South Africa and the international community. Michael, F Stephan also believes that, to gain stability and reconciliation in Mozambique, its neighbors and fellow members of Southern Africa Development Conference (SADC) must pool their collective resources and influence to restore and support Mozambique's re-integration.¹⁸ A factious military causes a security threat to the entire country, and hinders reconciliation.

A senior researcher on central Africa in the arms management program, Nelson Alusala, stated that, in 1997, the Rwandan government transformed its counterinsurgency strategy into a political and social effort that, within a year, broke the back of an insurgency of former Forces Armées Rwandaise (FAR) operating out of eastern Congo.¹⁹ He argues that a key element which undermined the insurgency in northwest Rwanda was the integration of ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (EX-FAR) into the Rwandan Army. Insurgents were turned into soldiers; they were given new uniforms, a modest salary, and a stake in the country's future. Rwanda has now integrated and reintegrated 39,000 EX-FAR and resisters (youngsters recruited to join the rebels in 1997-1998 from the ethnic Hutu population). According to Alusala, insurgencies survive when they have popular support. By integrating the insurgents into the army, the government cuts the link between the insurgents and the population that supports them and gave a boost to reconciliation and security in the region.

If this strategy works in Rwanda, then surely it is transferable elsewhere. In other words, the reconciliation within the military was a tangible move towards reconciliation of the entire population. However, this strategy does not offer a satisfactory explanation

¹⁷ Jareme Mc Mullin, "Reintegration of combatants: were the right lessons learned in Mozambique," *International Relations at New College Oxford* vol 11 no 4 (Winter 2004): 625-643, [http://www.taylorandfrancis.meapress.com/\(wvinj445zhobquj4cgwqiviy\)/app/home/contribution...](http://www.taylorandfrancis.meapress.com/(wvinj445zhobquj4cgwqiviy)/app/home/contribution...)

¹⁸ Michael F. Stephan, "Demobilization in Mozambique," (1995): 66, <http://www.Iss.co.za/pubs/Books/Dismissed/4ms.pdf>

¹⁹ Nelson Alusala, "Disarmament and reconciliation: Rwanda's concern," *Occasional Paper* 108, (June, 2005). <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/papers/108/papers108.htm> (October 24, 2005).

of conditions under which DDRI becomes a success. Thus, DDRI models and approaches highlight different situations under which each model is conducted.

2. DDRI Models and Approaches

The aspects of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and integration (DDRI) of ex-combatants are major components of DDRI program. A DDRI program has different models designed for different situations. Those models are conducted in two main phases: the short-medium phase that focuses on the disarmament, demobilization and integration process of ex-combatants, and the long-term phase that deals with reintegration process of ex-combatants into civilian life.

The first DDRI model is the consent based model.²⁰ This model is based on a comprehensive negotiated settlement of conflict between two parties, and is usually conducted under third party supervision. The government forces may absorb some guerrilla forces or they merge the two warring factions to form a single national military force. This concept has been applied in Mozambique, South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Guatemala and El Salvador. It is important to note here that although this model of DDRI is conducted out of hostilities, the security situation is usually still fragile. This model seems to be the most recommended since it includes former enemies in the government forces; nevertheless, the poor conduct of DDRI has left these countries with high levels of crime carried out by ex-combatants.

The second case is where the government decides to downsize its military, through normal channels of (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) DDR, but the model disregards inclusion of the former enemy force. For instance, in 1991, Ethiopia demobilized 412,000 former government forces of the Derg regime following the defeat of Mengistu Haile Mariam, along with only 88,000 forces of the incumbent regime.²¹ The demobilization of all former government forces in Ethiopia created resentment among ex-combatants, and then this group decided to join the opposition parties.

²⁰ Mats Berdel, R. *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflicts*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi paper. 303, (Oxford University Press: August 1996): 9.

²¹ Kess Kingma. *Demobilization in Sub-saharan Africa*, Bonn International Centre of Conversion, (New York, 2000): 85.

According to the Ethiopian case, the military victory led to an end to large scale violence; however, neither total stability nor societal reconciliation was achieved in the post-war period. Similar although a bit different situation was the disbanding of former Iraq forces in 2003, which led to the outbreak of insurgency,²² and the disbanding of the former Uganda army (UA) following the defeat of President Milton Obote, this has caused an endless war in western and northern parts of Uganda since 1986.

The last is the coercive model of DDR. It involves forced disarmament of insurgents and is carried out by external intervention under a United Nations mandate. The most recent case was the disarmament of Somalia factions in 1993. In the first phase of this operation, the U.S. forces managed to capture a large number of weapons, nevertheless, the operation ended in a disaster. So, the intended objectives were not achieved in Somalia, that is, to secure the environment for humanitarian operations, national reconciliation, and economic reconstruction.²³

Although these dimensions of DDRI have not been properly carried out in the past, they form an integral part of the overall post-conflict security building program. Failure to effectively conduct DDRI has resulted in a return to hostilities because ex-combatants are less likely to relinquish their weapons since there is no hope of future welfare and survival of individuals and their families.²⁴ For example, the renewed conflict in 1992 in Angola was due to poorly conducted DDRI. The other negative aspects of poorly conducted DDRI are that there are risks of increased crime, banditry and other forms of violence carried out by ex-combatants, as well as small arms proliferation, such as in post-apartheid war in South Africa in 1994 and in the post-civil war period in Mozambique. Additionally, these negative aspects of poor conduct of DDRI not only increase instability and renewed conflict as seen above, but they also degrade environment, disrupt economic prosperity and destroy social networks – social capital, thus dividing the entire society even more. For instance, the disbanding of former

²² George Packer. *The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq* (United States of America: New York, 2005), 193.

²³ Berdel, 11.

²⁴ Mason, Peggy, and Selin Shann, "Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measure," *Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade*, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, (April 1998): 2.

Iraqi forces not only created insurgency, but also increased the ethnic divide among long-standing enemies: the Sunni and Shiite. Bernard Mayer states that parties involved in a conflict resolution process focus on the behavior dimension and do not address emotional and cognitive dimensions of reconciliation. He argues that unless cognitive and emotional aspects are addressed in a conflict, it is unlikely that fundamental changes in the relationship among conflicting parties will occur.²⁵

In the models of DDRI mentioned above, none of the approaches has really achieved total stability nor provided a powerful explanation for conditions under which a DDR program becomes a success in a post-conflict situation. Despite the poor conduct of DDRI that has resulted in renewed conflict and related crimes, this thesis argues an alternate Rwandan model of *ingando* that incorporates a comprehensive and intensive sensitization program (*ingando*) in a DDRI program, which is in part a viable approach to stability and societal reconciliation. The thesis explores this study in the next chapters. Chapter II analyses DDRI in the overall framework of the peace process, by identifying benefits and challenges involved. The chapter also shows the anticipated outcomes of a well conducted DDRI. Chapter III presents the historical background of ethnic conflict in Rwanda, ethnic composition of the military prior to 1994, and also analyzes factors that led to an unprofessional military in Rwanda and their impact on the 1994 genocide. Chapter IV discusses political, social and military challenges of post-conflict 1994 Rwanda, and the role of different reconciliation approaches used to address those challenges. The chapter lays much emphasis on Rwandan model of DDRI: *ingando*. Lastly, Chapter V links the *ingando* model of DDRI to reconciliation, stability, military professionalism, and societal reconciliation, and then offers recommendations.

²⁵ Bernard Mayer. *The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: A practitioner Guide* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), 231.

II. THE DDRI AS PART OF A VIABLE PEACE PROCESS: BENEFITS AND OBSTACLES

.... the legacy of wounded societies and failing states as they emerge from years of destructive conflict ... the unleashed surplus of war personnel and material that is flooding the global market, fueling organized crime, and feeding the emerging global security problematique... challenges not only the limited capacity of states and international organizations to manage conflicts but, also, the ability to monitor and analyze conflict trends.²⁶

Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the role of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and integration (DDRI) in a viable peace process. It analyzes the principal beneficial outcomes of applying DDRI as a priority component in a peace process, and then highlights some of the constraints that inhibit the success of a DDRI program. To explain the concept of DDRI, the chapter first highlights key aspects such as the origin of DDRI programs as well as partially successful DDRI cases and challenges.

1. The Origin of DDR Program

The concept of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program appeared in the academic literature towards the end of the Cold War in 1989. This program is a brainchild of the international community's efforts to end protracted wars in parts of the world, especially in Africa, Central America, and Southeast Asia.²⁷ The international efforts to end civil wars involved programs of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating soldiers, who have been fighting for a long period of time, into civilian life. In cases where fighting has been long and inconclusive, the amalgamation of warring factions was an option to end civil war and create a legitimate and locally acceptable

²⁶ Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, "Peace and Conflict: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy," *Center for International Development & Conflict Management* (University of Maryland: College Park, 2005): 14.

²⁷ Mats Berdel, R., "Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflicts," *The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi paper*. 303, (Oxford University Press: August 1996): 1.

force.²⁸ This aspect, however, of either integrating enemy forces that have only resisted defeat or not integrating defeated forces, as well as the failure to consider DDR as part of reconciliation, is a critical, frequently neglected dimension in the efforts of the international community to restore peace and stability in post-conflict environments. For instance, if it is a civil war that is motivated by ethnic marginalization of one group such as in Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan, then disbanding any of the defeated military forces may lead to retaliation and ignite another vicious cycle of conflict. The main objectives of any DDR program must be to free up large sums of money hitherto used to support the war effort and the human resources involved in fighting, to be used in the social and economic development of the war ravaged states. In some cases, DDR programs have been partially successful as indicated in the previous chapter. In other cases, however, these programs have failed due to dynamics presented by the international system in general and also by the parties to the conflicts themselves.

2. Partially Successful DDR Cases

Some cases of DDR have been successful, such as the Rwandan case that will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV under DDRI and *ingando*-solidarity camps. This thesis argues that a successful DDR program results in stability in every part of the nation, allowing individuals to enjoy freedom of movement without restrictions, and consequently facilitating reconciliation through social networking as in the of Rwandan case. Other cases have only partially succeeded. By this I mean that the program managed to end the large-scale violent conflict, but instability still reigned in some parts of the country. Thus, such a situation has made reconciliation either difficult or untenable. Although DDR programs were successful to some extent in places such as Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala, and South Africa, there are some cases where a DDR program has failed miserably, notably in Angola in 1992 and in Somalia in 1993.

3. Challenges

The failure of a DDR program can be partly attributed to challenges presented by the fluid structure of an international system in which critical issues necessary for the success of the program, such as funding and coordinating DDR activities, become

²⁸ Berdel, 1.

problems. I argue, however, that the most critical challenges emanate from the physical and psychological effects of war on the local population, effects that the international system is often poorly positioned to deal with. Regardless of the cause of a war, be it civil war that is either politically motivated or economic resource driven, the effects on the population are identical. The destruction of social infrastructure, the loss of life, trauma, hatred, destruction of social networks, and a desire for revenge are common to all wars. Certainly, not all of these problems can be addressed by a DDR program. An integrated approach to conflict resolution which focuses on cognitive and emotional issues of reconciliation, however, forms an essential characteristic of the reconciliation process. This is especially the case where the enemy's image is deeply rooted in the society, as in Rwanda, Burundi and, in other societies devastated by war.

Currently, the DDR program forms an essential component of the security pillar of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Those pillars cover four key areas; security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation.²⁹ The essential tasks in each pillar are executed in three phase of reconstruction: the initial phase, the transformation phase, and the fostering sustainability phase.³⁰ In the quest for a viable peace and an attempt to address the challenges faced by DDR, it is imperative to discuss the beneficial outcomes of applying a DDRI program.

B. BENEFICIAL OUTCOMES FROM APPLYING DDRI

The DDRI model is a useful model to apply when addressing fundamental issues that might have caused the war in states formerly weakened or fractured by sectarian violence. This is because DDRI possesses the capability to yield stability and reconciliation, and military professionalism and representation. In the realm of stability, DDRI converts the conflict war resources into economic development tools. It also develops human capital (ex-combatants) and regulates conflict influence factors, thus

²⁹ Robert C. "The United States as a Nation Builder: Facing the Challenges of Post-Conflict Reconciliation," in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (U.S.A: Washington, D.C.2006, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 11-12.

³⁰ "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization," *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Essential Tasks*, United States Department of State, April 2005.

providing suitable conditions for societal reconciliation. From the perspective of military professionalism, DDRI has many benefits. It promotes healthy civil-military relations. By doing so, it has the potential to significantly reduce the occurrence of further internal strife in states previously afflicted by violent inter-communal conflicts. Furthermore, it enhances combat capability and efficiency to protect the nation against external aggression. Consequently it encourages representation in the military which gradually translates into societal reconciliation. Therefore, in the effort to foster reconciliation between former adversaries, DDRI is useful because it enhances social capital and it puts a human face on former enemies.

1. DDRI Promoting Stability and Initial Reconciliation

DDRI functions as a stabilizing force for the other pillars of reconstruction. Integration of ex-combatants into the national military is an affirmative action towards initial reconciliation in the institution that possesses the legitimacy to own firearms and to use violence in suppressing the real or perceived enemy. Mayer argues that unless the ongoing sources of stress that keep people from feeling safe and secure are addressed, post-conflict societal reconciliation and reconstruction will not work.³¹ Thus, initial efforts towards peace-building should be geared towards addressing fundamental issues of survival and security first. Partly, this may be the only way to guarantee individual or group safety and survival which are the fundamental aspect of reconciliation regardless of the nature of the war.

Therefore, stability in post-conflict situations can be achieved through conversion of tools of violence into developmental assets. Ex-combatants must be encouraged and equipped to cope with and integrate freely into the nation's developmental economic activities. Finally, DDRI helps to address issues related to sources of conflict, such as exclusion.

a. From Tools of Violence to Economic Assets

The DDRI process converts the ex-combatants who were regarded as spoilers into productive economic actors; removes weapons, ammunition and mines from

³¹ Bernard Mayer. *The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: A Practitioner Guide* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), 231.

circulation, and redirects resources that have been used to support the war effort towards the peacetime economy. Demobilization removes a large number of fighting personnel and converts them into a useful economic resource.

During war, many combatants are engaged in killing innocent civilians, raping, and plundering resources. For instance Human Rights reports that in the Darfur region in the Sudan, government forces and *Janjaweed* militia have killed several thousands of *Fur*, *Zaghawa*, and *Massalit* civilians, and routinely raped women and girls, abducted children, and looted tens of thousands cattle and other property.³² Removing fighters from the battlefield would reduce human suffering in areas devastated by war. In cases where disarmament and demobilization have taken place, these approaches to conflict resolution have effectively alleviated human suffering. For instance, in Liberia, the UN Mission (UNMIL) disarmed and demobilized 102,000 ex-combatants from different factions in 2004.³³ The fact, however, is that destruction done by such forces, who do not observe the rule of law, is great. Likewise, if this large number of fighters is converted into useful economic tools then the economy of the country could rise and killings of innocent civilians should stop. Consequently, this would mitigate economic causes of conflict, such as scarcity of resources, and hence lay a basis for societal reconciliation.

In Liberia, 28,000 weapons and six million different rounds of ammunition were collected from ex-combatants during the DDR process.³⁴ Berdal states that the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) collected 300,000 weapons and 80 million rounds of ammunition. According to him, over ninety percent of deaths and injuries in ninety armed conflicts were caused by small arms. He indicates that during Mozambique's civil war in the 1980s, FRELIMO randomly distributed one million AK-47 rifles to the civilian population, of which a large number remain

³² Human Rights Watch, "Massive Atrocities in Darfur: Almost One Million Civilians Forcibly Displaced in Government's Scorched-Earth Campaign," *Human Rights News*, (New York, April 12, 2004), <http://hrw.org> accessed on August 21, 2006.

³³ Wolf-Christian Peas, "Eyewitness: The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Liberia," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 12, No 2, (Summer 2005), 255.

³⁴ Peas, 256.

unaccounted for, even sixteen years after the conflict's end. Also a DDR program addresses the problem of land mines – the UN forces provide de-mining services. Landmines and antipersonnel mines slow down developmental programs, such as cultivation of land and grazing of animals. An estimated 80-110 million mines are believed to be planted in sixty countries, mines that cause an estimated 26,000 casualties every year.³⁵ All these unleashed war resources cause the deaths of many people and heavy casualties of combatants and innocent civilians. If those weapons and mines are not controlled, they not only cause severe human suffering, but also make post-conflict societal reconstruction difficult. However, this chapter argues that a well conducted DDR process sucks all those uncontrolled war resources from the war theatre and restores peace and stability in the troubled regions, which creates conditions for possible societal reconciliation.

The other aspect of resource conversion is the release of economic resources held in the war fighting zones and of the funds that were used to support and sustain the war effort. During civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, a large percentage of diamond mine areas were occupied by rebel forces. In Angola, UNITA controlled the rich diamond valley of Cuango which yields about 80% of Angola's total output.³⁶ This partly indicates that if those war resources are freed, then they would not only contribute to economic development of government structures and institutions, but would also be distributed within the population to build social services, create jobs, alleviate poor living conditions of individuals, and aid young people to go to school, thus mitigating effects of social-economic conditions that may persist, and enhance societal interaction and integration.³⁷

Lastly, DDRI amalgamates warring factions into a single national force. This approach promotes security in that all the different ethnic groups should be represented in the military, as was the case of Mozambique, South Africa, and Rwanda.

³⁵ Berdel, 18-46.

³⁶ Ibid, 15.

³⁷ Sarah Kenyon Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*, (United States of America: Cornell University Press, 2005), 9.

The military personnel are not only respectful of the society but also form part of the top-level group in peace building. John Paul Lederach argues that the military and top politicians comprise the top-level leadership in the approaches to peace building and are highly visible members of society and by the virtual of their high public status, they can have significant power and influence on the conflict resolution and prevention.³⁸ Whether defeated or not, however, neglecting the integration of former enemy forces may lead in part to the resumption of violent conflict or sophisticated organized crimes. Whereas their inclusion into the new military would lead to stability and eventually build social bonds and consequently leading societal reconciliation. This aspect of integrating warring factions into national forces has been lacking in situations where the former government forces have been defeated such as in 1991 in Ethiopia, in Uganda in 1986, and in Iraq in 2003. The disbanding of former forces not only creates endless instability, but also divides the society.

To be properly carried out, the DDR process should involve the following components:

- selection and preparation of assembly area;
- planning of logistics, including transport and basic needs supply;
- resource mobilization (domestic and foreign);
- selection of those who will be demobilized;
- cantonment, registration, and disarmament;
- needs assessment;
- provision of services, such as health care;
- pre-discharge orientation and counseling;
- discharge and transport ex-combatants in areas of their choice.³⁹

The design of demobilization exercises, as shown above, is a conventional setting of DDR, however, it considers neither the issue of sensitization nor military

³⁸ John Paul Lederach, "Identifying Key Actors in Conflict Situations: Levels of Leadership," in *Peace-Building: A Field Guide*, ed. Luc Reyckler and Thania Paffenholz (United States of America: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2001), 145-155.

³⁹ Kess Kingma, *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Bonn International Centre of Conversion, (New York, 2000), 26.

integration of ex-combatants. Sensitization is teaching and encouraging ex-combatants on aspects of reconciliation and other government programs before they are integrated in the national military and others reintegrated in the society as elaborated in Chapter IV. See also the DDRI model, Figure 2.

b. Human Capital Development and Reconciliation

The DDRI process also affects human and economic development. Collecting weapons and demobilizing fighters not only stops the killing and maiming of innocent civilians, it also stimulates economic development in particular, and stability and societal reconciliation in general. The conversion of the hostile situation into a stable environment is an important first step for other elements of sustainable stability to take place.

Personnel and weapons are resources that can be transformed into elements of economic value. Those ex-combatants are of less economic value because they lack skills and education. Their capabilities and skills, however, can be enhanced through education and vocational training. As Theodore Schultz argued in 1960, human capital is like any other type of capital and can be enhanced through education, training, and increased benefits that will lead to an improvement in the quality and level of production.⁴⁰ It is human resource development that enables members of the society to quickly learn and interpret reconciliation values for themselves, hence speeding up and entrenching reconciliation within the society. Therefore, one of the roles of DDRI is to ensure that ex-combatants' skills and capabilities are developed in order to cope with the social, economic, and political development of a post-conflict nation.

During civil war, insurgents or guerrilla forces conduct unselective recruitment of children (boys and girls), orphans, street boys, criminals, and prisoners. Recruiters go for mostly weak and vulnerable targets who have no alternative way of living or who enjoy handling a gun as a way to earn respect and a living. Most of those elements possess neither skills nor education. The post-conflict situation is characterized

⁴⁰ Theodore W. Schultz, "Capital Formation by Education," *Journal of Political Economy* (University of Chicago, 1960): 571-583, <http://www.jstor.org/view/00223808/di950873/95p0003t/0> accessed on May 30, 2006.

by ex-combatants most of whom have spent more than ten years fighting and possesses no other skills except killing. Some do not have relatives while others do not know where they came from because they joined the war when they were still young. Also among them are children, young women who are either pregnant or nursing, and old men and women.⁴¹ These categories of people present a great challenge in post conflict stability and societal reconciliation, and economic and political development as well.

One of the tasks of a DDR program is to transform the above mentioned groups of people into productive factors for economic development. Although the aim of DDR is to improve the welfare of the whole group, it has been noted that the programs often focus on male combatants and neglect children and women. Failure to attend to and address problems of female and young soldiers is as dangerous as ignoring the adult male combatants. During DDRI in Liberia in 2004, out of 102,193 who were registered, 22,400 were female adults, 8,792 were male children, and 2,561 were female children.⁴² This number is large enough that if not taken care of, it may equally hinder societal reconciliation and may also cause instability within communities. In 1995 Rwanda, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) assembled all children below eighteen years. Most of those were either victims of war or made orphans by the genocide in particular, and they were taken to school. The military provided for their welfare, studies, and school requirements, and some have completed their undergraduate studies and are now employed by the government. Women, some men, and disabled ex-combatants all went through the normal process of DDR. After disarmament and demobilization most of the ex-combatants including disabled ex-combatants joined Muvumba vocational training school in Nyagatere district of the eastern province. They were taught business management, carpentry and tailoring. Others joined high institutions of learning on government sponsorship. This emphasis on training/education accounts in part for the current stability in Rwanda.

Care must be taken during the reintegration process and actors should not show or treat ex-combatants differently from the rest of society where they are resettled.

⁴¹ Kingma, 231-235.

⁴² Peas, 255.

If not, this special treatment will create resentment in the civilian population and inhibit social integration. At times the ex-combatants are settled side by side next to their victims who blame their fate on those ex-combatants. So, special treatment of ex-combatants will be regarded as rewarding killers, and with time this would create instability and inhibit societal reconciliation. In this case, therefore, reintegration process should be synchronized with other stability operations and DDR should form an integral part of the overall stabilization and reconstruction operations of the local government.

A Dutch economist Kees Kingma indicates elements that constitute resettlement and reintegration support program. These are elements that range from “cash payment, health care, school fees for children ... to managerial and technical training.”⁴³ Kingma’s components of resettlement/reintegration are elements of an ideal case scenario, which may seem misleading if practitioners and donor communities perceive it as current reality on the ground. Yet, most of those elements have been regarded as shortfalls that may account for partial failure of DDR in general as seen in Chapter I and in reintegration in particular.

2. DDRI as a Facilitator of Military Professionalism

So far, this chapter has addressed issues that enhance stability in terms of those that deal with the conversion of tools of violence into economic assets and human capital development. For viable peace and sustainable reconciliation, however, a post-conflict government also needs to restructure and professionalize its military. Military professionalism is a hallmark of the military organizations of the world's great democracies. In a post-conflict situation, the government concerned needs to organize and restructure its military both qualitatively and quantitatively. The nation has to align those changes in order to suit the nation’s economic and security needs. It must also at least restructure its military in accordance with structures and norms of other militaries for ease of cooperation in terms of training and acquisition of equipment. In doing so, it embraces democratic values to include integration as well reconciliation in all state structures and institutions, rather than promoting either racial and ethnic, or regional military that has been the source of atrocities and society division in the underdeveloped

⁴³ Kingma, 29.

and developing nation as will be discussed in Chapter III. However, as DDRI promotes inclusion in the military, this enhances military professionalism. Consequently, the inclusion and cooperation within the military set a good example for the civilian population through social relations, hence facilitating reconciliation.

a. *Military Professionalism Enhances Military Effectiveness*

DDRI lays the foundation for military professionalism in post conflict situations because the newly integrated military is a representation of the entire society. Samuel Huntington suggests three prerequisites for developing and maintaining a professional military: 1) existing nation state; 2) a system of strong democratic structures and ideas; 3) existence of a single and widely accepted authority over the armed forces.⁴⁴ Although DDRI is one element in post conflict reconstruction, it has a profound impact on the three conditions necessary for military professionalism to take place. For instance, U.S. political scientist Herbert Howe argues that the most important necessary condition for a nation state is to discourage ethnic division in the military, in particular, as well as in other government structures. He states that sub-Saharan African states cannot be labeled nation states but nations, because they have been characterized by ethnic division and regionalism.⁴⁵ In contrast, Rwanda has developed both a nation state and a professional military after the 1994 genocide. These achievements are partly attributed to integration of former Hutu government forces (ex-FAR),⁴⁶ which in turn facilitated societal reconciliation. Now, the nation has minimized the negative tendencies that emanates from ethnic division.

Military professionalism is an essential factor for sustainable post-conflict stability and reconciliation; it facilitates development of an organized and combat efficient military, as well as promoting healthy civil-military relations. Post-conflict militaries should possess the capability to defend the nation from external and internal

⁴⁴ Samuel Huntington. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. (U.S: Harvard College, 1985), 32-35.

⁴⁵ Herbert M. Howe. *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*. (U.S: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc. 2001), 27.

⁴⁶ Ex-FAR was a former Rwanda government military, exclusively from the Hutu ethnic group. It was dominated by Hutus from northwestern and northern part of the Rwanda from 1959-1994.

aggression. Huntington offers three characteristics that distinguish a profession from other vocations: expertise, responsibility and corporateness.⁴⁷

According to Huntington, expertise is acquired through general learning and training for specialized knowledge and skills. This expertise is a function of regular theoretical instruction and practice. U.S. researcher on contemporary issues in Asia and Pacific Muthiah Alagappa states that: “professional expertise is acquired through prolonged education and experience.”⁴⁸ The only distinguishing factor between the military profession and other professions is the military’s skill of managing violence. In a post-conflict situation, these are required to defend the nation against external and internal aggression. Hence, a professional military will create a sustainable stability environment that will enable socio-economic development to take place as well as unity within a society.

The second characteristic of the military profession is its responsibility to protect the society and the state. A professional military man performs service to the society and his client is the society. Objectively, an ethnic oriented military cannot protect the entire society; instead, it protects the interests of the ethnic group it comes from. For example, the Rwandan military (ex-FAR), prior to 1994 protected the interests of the Hutu population and the government periodically used it to kill the Tutsi, up to the 1994 genocide. Likewise, the Burundi military was dominated by Tutsi, and was used to coerce the Hutu ethnic group.⁴⁹ Thus, military integration addresses those gray areas that would inhibit the military’s responsibility to protect the entire society. In this case a professional integrated military recruits from different groups of the society, they train and eat together, sleep in the same halls. This kind of interaction creates

⁴⁷ Huntington, 8-10.

⁴⁸ Muthiah Alagappa, “Military Professionalism: A Conceptual Perspective,” in *Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa. (United States: East-West Center, 2001), 1.

⁴⁹ Christian P. Scherrer, *Genocide in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War* (U.S.A: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2002), 124-125.

involuntary/unconscious reconciliation in the military. Because the military is a symbol for protection and representation of the society, its reconciliatory effects will influence the societal reconciliation.

The other aspect of military professionalism is that it concentrates on training in order to be efficient in carrying out duties, unlike all ethnic oriented military who train for domestic deployment. In this case a professional military generates the competence and efficiency in as far as providing security is concerned. For instance in only twelve years, the integrated military in Rwanda has developed a professional military that has provided sustainable stability along its borders and currently is assisting other countries in their efforts to attain peace and stability. The U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda Michael R. Arietti stated that, “....Rwanda is contributing to peace through its role in Darfur, where they have over 2,000 troops participating in AU (African Union) mission there. They [Rwandans] are very effective and highly regarded and have been an important force in stopping the Genocide in Darfur.”⁵⁰

Motivation, combined with a code of ethics grounded in custom and tradition, rather than financial compensation, constitute the driving force of the military officer's conduct and set the military professional apart from a mercenary.⁵¹ Those military values create a sense of responsibility to serve the entire society rather than one ethnic group, which filters to the populations through relatives and friends and this significantly impacts the social relations within the civilian population. This may in part account for the unifying effect of the military that translates into societal reconciliation. Also this may help to explain how an integrated professional military bridges social bonds of different ethnic groups within a society.

The last characteristic of a profession is corporateness. Huntington argues that members of a certain profession have a sense of organic unity and perceive themselves as a group different from laymen. In the military this commonality and esprit

⁵⁰ Ambassador Arietti, “US, Rwanda Relations Excellent,” *The New Times*, Friday, 26 May 2006, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id+5026&Itemid Accessed on Friday, May 26, 2006.

⁵¹ Agalappa, 2.

de corps originates from prolonged training and discipline necessary to make it competent. This sense of unity, esprit de corps, common duties and responsibilities, ethics and values are universal traits of the military that make it easier for two warring factions to integrate. However, this argument does not explain conditions under which a professional military integrates insurgents who are ill-trained and who do not possess characteristics of a professional military. Those traits, however, offer no guarantee that military integration is always possible in a post conflict situation. This thesis argues that reconciliation goes beyond normal criteria of integrating elements of similar qualities and makes it possible to integrate a professional military with insurgents. In some cases however, military integration may fail, not because of the hatred between the warring factions but due to the failure on the part of the politicians who want to further their interests and also their failure to understand these unique characteristics of military professionalism.

Despite those political constraints, however, military integration remains a strong catalyst for societal integration and reconciliation. Military professionalism creates an organized and efficient military that is capable of serving the society and the state by defending them from internal and external aggressors. For the military to be more effective and productive, however, there is a need to bridge the gap between the military and civilians in their endeavor to reconstruct the nation in a post-conflict situation, thus promoting healthy civil-military relations.

b. DDRI, Healthy Civil-Military Relations and Societal Reconciliation

Military integration builds a representative and professional military which is not easily manipulated by politicians for their own interests. In accomplishing this task, military integration and professionalism have the potential to significantly reduce the occurrence of further internal strife in states previously afflicted by violent inter-communal conflicts, and enhance a combat effective military that is able to protect the nation against external aggression.

Military professionalism is acquired through learning and, in turn, enhances military effectiveness. Civil-military relations signify the subordination of the

military leadership to a legitimately elected civilian rule. The military is an organization with a set of ethics and values, and specialized knowledge and skills that enable it to effectively carry out its roles. In the past, those characteristics and traits have been peculiar to military organizations and the civilian rule has been not fully aware of them. To effectively control or guide someone, demands a thorough knowledge of his/her tasks. The ignorance of civilian rule about military tasks and the military's expertise, coupled with its ignorance of civilian policies, has not only created a gap, that is, friction between the two organizations, but also superiority and inferiority complexes as well. As a result of those disparities, civilian rule has deliberately politicized the military, especially in African states, thus rendering the military unprofessional, as what Samuel P. Huntington terms as subjective civilian control.⁵² Therefore, the military focus shifted from its universal role and responsibility of protecting the nation against external aggression to an effective tool of killing innocent civilians that they are supposed to serve and protect.

This approach of civilian control of the military, however, has not bridged the civil-military gap, instead it paved the way to a series of military interventions in the 1970s in Nigeria, in Rwanda in 1973, in Burundi and Zaire, as well as parts of Latin America. Also, in the developed world, the civil-military relations' gap prevails because the civilian leadership has decided to militarize (professionalize) the military thus making it entirely a war machine, which is what Samuel P. Huntington describes as an objective civilian control of the military.⁵³ This inhibits free interaction and the sharing of knowledge by civilian and military on matters pertaining to civilian policies and military tasks.

The modern battlefield, however, increasingly demands that both the military and civilians know each other's tasks and how they can enhance military effectiveness, especially in stability operations. Also, the success of a military campaign is a function of synchronized national elements of power, so, the support of the civilian leadership and society are critical to this success.

⁵² Huntington, 80.

⁵³ Ibid, 83.

American political scientist Karen Guttieri argues that the current challenges facing the military in the conduct of stability operations suggests that military education has done little to military effectiveness in this field.⁵⁴ Her argument, however, contrasts with what Huntington contend is objective civilian control of the military, which achieves its aim by militarizing the military thus, insulating the civilian rule from military intervention.⁵⁵ Whereas Huntington's argument holds true in as far as the military's ability to defeat external aggression is concerned, nonetheless his argument shadows the reality of the contemporary issue of modern war whereby the military is required not only to have specialized knowledge and skills peculiar to it, but also general knowledge surrounding the conflict in particular as well. As Guttieri points out "Education implies the acquisition of general knowledge and skills required for effectiveness as opposed to training which implies preparations to perform specific functions, tasks or missions." She also argues that from the military perspective this general knowledge enhances civil-military relations as well as combat effectiveness.⁵⁶

Furthermore, since the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, most wars fought, especially in Africa, were "intra-state" wars rather than "inter-state" wars. As a result Huntington's argument does not fit the context of contemporary wars fought and stability operations in particular, in which the military has been increasingly involved. Consequently, a post-conflict environment demands a common understanding of civil-military relations' dynamics for both the military and civilians. Also, both civilian and military leadership should know how to cooperate in order to attain goals of post-conflict stability operations. Similarly, Guttieri suggests that developing a professional civil-military education mandatory for both civilian and

⁵⁴ Karen Guttieri, "Professional Military Education in Democracies," in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson. (U.S.A: University of Texas Press, 2006), 237.

⁵⁵ Huntington, 83.

⁵⁶ Guttieri, 235.

military leaders is essential for promoting good civil-military relations because it enables civilians to effectively manage national security matters and the military to implement the policies effectively.⁵⁷

In a post-conflict environment, however, some military personnel may be appointed to civilian posts in the government, especially in the initial and transformation phases of post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. The reason is that in such a fragile security situation, the military personnel are readily available, disciplined and constitutes a large number of the elite group at the time, as was the case in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. After the genocide, the military was employed in different sectors of the government including the cabinet and the parliament. By that time, capable people had died in the genocide, others were still in exile as either political refugees or normal refugees held in then Zaire by *interahamwe* militia and ex-FAR. However, as the transformation phase was approaching, the military personnel were withdrawn and replaced by civilians.

Also, the Rwanda civilian support of a military campaign in DRC (former Zaire) in 1996-1997 indicates good civil-military relations. Despite the combat effectiveness of the Rwanda Defense Forces, the support of the Rwandan civilian population legitimized the war and greatly contributed to the successful military intervention in the giant nation Zaire. The military campaign in the DRC destroyed *interahamwe* militia and ex-FAR and this eventually led to the ousting of President Mobutu. However, this did not guarantee consistently good civil-military relations in Rwanda because, as Michael C. Desch states, civil-military relations is a function of location and intensity of the threat. He argues that depending on the intensity of the threat and where that threat comes from, that is, either internal or external threat will rate civil-military relations as good, poor, mixed, or worst:⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Guttieri, 236.

⁵⁸ Michael C. Desch. *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*, (U.S.A: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 14.

		External threats	
		High	Low
Internal threats	High	Poor	Worst
	Low	Good	Mixed

Figure 1. Civilian Control of the Military as a Function of Location and Intensity of Threats

Also, Huntington supports this claim that “anti-governmental war encourages civil-military relations different from those simulated by interstate conflict. Other things being equal, the more a state achieves a system of objective control the more effective it is in providing for its external security and in conducting foreign wars.”⁵⁹

Finally, as General Fred F. Woerner (retired) notes, civil-military relations in emergent democracies has great challenges: 1) it signals the full integration of the military into democratic society; 2) it also signals the mutual development by the civilian and military authorities of the missions for armed forces that address the role of the military in peace and war within a democratic context; 3) lastly, it signals a break within a historical tradition of the military rule and replacement by a relatively new pattern in which the armed forces are subordinated to the democratically elected civilian control.⁶⁰ In sum, all these arguments are oriented at achieving stability in the nation as well as societal unity and inclusion.

In conclusion, a professional integrated military is a legitimate and widely acceptable military, and it is a representation of the entire society. Thus a professional

⁵⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, “Patterns of Violence in World Politics,” in *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, ed, Huntington. (U.S.A: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962), 20.

⁶⁰ General Fred F. Woerner (USA Ret.), “Civil-Military in Latin America: Pitfalls and Prospects, in the Role of the Armed Forces in Americas: Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century,” *Conference Report*, ed. Donald E. Schulz (U.S. Strategic Studies Institute, April 1998), 71-76.

integrated military has the potential to enhance good civil-military relations, unlike an ethnically recruited military which has, in the past, been a source of human rights abuse and serves interests of particular groups within the society. The Rwandan genocide is not only a clear manifestation of the dangers of an exclusive military, but also a hindrance to good civil-military relations as well as democratic values.

Therefore, DDRI not only promotes stability, military professionalism, and healthy civil-military relations but also encourages representation as well as societal reconciliation, a window of opportunity rarely exploited in DDR/I programs.

C. CONCLUSION

DDRI forms a central component of social reconciliation, that is, the integration of former enemies into a national forces and proper reintegration of ex-combatants in the civilian society is an initial affirmative action towards societal reconciliation. In post-conflict situations, such affirmative actions should be initiated primarily by the side that has more initiative: the victor.

In post-conflict environments, state structures enforce the rule of law within a divided society, that is, people are forced to respect the law and stop violence. Nevertheless, those national institutions can neither force victims and perpetrators to live side by side nor can they force social interaction within the society. In this case the conflict will remain latent. Military integration, however, is one way to lift latent tension and fear, and restore hope and unity within a divided society. Thus, military integration forms an essential means for building social capital and societal reconciliation in post-conflict situations.

Therefore, DDRI programs provide space for reconciliation, a window of opportunity rarely exploited in DDR programs, and this explains, in part, why there are some cases of renewed fighting after signing peace accords such as in Angola in 1992. In addition, reconciliation is a major factor for the success of post-conflict security building in general. However, those affirmative actions alone are not enough to ensure consistency and entrenchment of reconciliation values into the society. It calls for reconciliation to be

an integral part of the national constitution and sensitization program. Also a follow-up on implementation has to be made as well as periodic evaluations of impact of reconciliation on the unity of the society.

This chapter discussed DDRI in a search for a viable peace. It analyzed obstacles and benefits of DDRI programs. The chapter also discussed how DDRI promotes stability, military professionalism and inclusion. In sum, military integration is a force that overcomes fear and restores hope, builds societal cohesion, enhances social capital and ensures a sustainable peace and stability in a post-conflict situation. The next chapter will present a brief historical background of ethnic conflict in Rwanda. It will analyze ethnic composition of the Rwandan military prior to 1994 and factors that led to an unprofessional military in Rwanda in the same period. Also the chapter will discuss the impact of an exclusive military in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

III: THE MILITARY AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN RWANDA: WHO KILLED WHOM?

The previous chapter discussed disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and integration (DDRI) in a viable peace process. It also highlighted some of the constraints that can inhibit the success of DDRI programs. Lastly, the chapter analyzed the principle beneficial outcomes of applying DDRI in the search for a viable peace in a post-conflict situation. However, to understand the background of the successful military integration of warring factions and its impact on stability and societal reconciliation in the Rwandan case that will be discussed in Chapter IV, Chapter III will highlight the source and dynamics of the Rwandan conflict in general and the military's role in the Rwandan conflict in particular. Thus, this chapter will discuss the nature of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Rwanda. It will also assess the ethnic composition of the Rwandan military, as well as factors that led to the deterioration in military professionalism in Rwanda between 1959 and 1994. Lastly, the chapter will analyze the role of an ethnically homogeneous military in the 1994 genocide as well as its impact on post-conflict DDR in Rwanda.

This chapter does not intend to implicate any one ethnic group, but rather to clarify ambiguities underlying ethnic conflict in Rwanda. Furthermore, the chapter will answer questions that appear in the current discourse and general rhetoric surrounding the Rwandan conflict after the genocide: Specifically, who was responsible? And how and why can civilians engage in mass killings of their neighbors? This chapter argues, however, that the responsibility for genocide can be laid at the feet of an ethnically homogenous military that not only prepared and executed ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, but that also propagated ethnic hatred before, during, and after the genocide.

A. ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN RWANDA

In Rwanda, artificially contrived and nurtured notions of ethnicity are linked to past violent conflicts, as well as to the creation and utilization of an ethnic oriented military to preserve Hutu power. There were three social groups of people in pre-colonial

Rwanda: the Hutu, the Twa and the Tutsi. This chapter presents the typology of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Rwanda in three distinct periods: the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras.

1. Ethnicity in Pre-Colonial Rwanda: Myth or Reality?

The three social groups existed in pre-colonial Rwanda, but the question is whether these groups were cohesive ethnic groups or mythological constructs given to the Rwandan society during the colonial era. Pre-colonial Rwanda was characterized by a highly organized and centralized kingdom presided over by Tutsi kings. French political analyst Gerard Prunier argues that the king “was the apex of the three different levels of human actions which were deeply enmeshed and not praised apart, that is, it was an entangled system of political, cultural and economic relationships. This system was described as intertwined fingers.”⁶¹ The central government was manned by the *Abiru* through a complex and secret polity known as *ubwiru*. The *Abiru* were ritual loyalists who lived in the king’s palace. Their purpose was to explain occurrences and forecast the future. For instance, the *Abiru* alone could secretly determine the next king and define his mission during his reign.

These social, political, and economic actions in the kingdom were centrally controlled by the king through three different kinds of chiefs: the cattle chiefs, the military chiefs, and the chiefs of land. The chiefs of cattle and military were predominantly Tutsi, while the land chiefs were Hutu. The Twa were involved in pottery, hunting and gathering, and served as employees in the king’s palace and in the chiefs’ homes. Rene Lemarchand argues that the relationship between the king and the population was unequal and parasitic while the relationship among the ordinary Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa was symbiotic.⁶² Like any central government, however, the core part of the kingdom had to devise means of control and extraction of resources from the population for its survival. In turn, the central power provided protection against external aggression and prevented internal strife.

⁶¹ Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide*, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1995), 11-12.

⁶² Rene Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1970), 36-41.

The Rwandan kingdom in the pre-colonial period and even during the colonial era had a military recruited from among the three social groups. Prunier highlights three roles of the pre-colonial military in Rwanda: defending the kingdom against external enemies, extending the kingdom by conquest, and raiding cattle from neighboring kingdoms such as Ankore kingdom in Uganda.⁶³ Based on these roles, the military's mission in the pre-colonial period suggests that Rwanda's military shared some characteristics with the modern professional military, as it possessed both political responsibility to the nation and served the interests of the society.⁶⁴

American political scientist Christine P. Scherrer argues that in pre-colonial Rwanda the three social groups shared many things in common; the seventy largest clans in Rwanda were shared by the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa; there was intermarriage between the groups; there were also known cases of swapping of adherence as a means of social advancement. Lastly, the procedure of *kwi hutura* transformed the Hutu lineage into Tutsi; *kwi hutura* means rejection of Hutu-ness after acquiring a different social status; this turned many Hutu into Tutsi.⁶⁵ The classification of the three groups of people in pre-colonial Rwanda, however, remains a mystery because contemporary scholars on Rwandan history such as Rene Lemarchand, Gerard Prunier, Jan Vansina, and Christian P. Scherrer fail to explicitly categorize those groups into castes, tribes, or ethnic groups. Yet, the literature mentions of the change from one social status to the other which in turn determined where an individual belonged. Nonetheless, there is no historical record of the conflict between the three groups in pre-colonial Rwanda, which may justify the contemporary connotation or significance of ethnicity. Therefore, because of such admixture in the clan system, swapping of adherence, lineage shift, and no record of conflict among the three groups, partly may help to explain why these groups of people lacked an element of ethnicity.

⁶³ Prunier, 14.

⁶⁴ According to Huntington, the client of a professional military is the society, so a socially oriented military in pre-colonial Rwanda indicates some level of professionalism. See Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (U.S.A: Harvard University, 1985), 8-9.

⁶⁵ Christine P. Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War*, (United States of America: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2002), 25.

The inclusion of the three groups in the political structure of the kingdom, and the composition and the mission of the military in pre-colonial Rwanda, indicate not only an organized and coherent society, but also that the social group names of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa had no ethnic significance, since there was social mobility among the groups. Rather, they described social division of the means of production. Unlike the social mobility between the Hutu and the Tutsi, however, there is no situation where a Twa became either a Hutu or a Tutsi, or vice versa. Nevertheless there were some anomalies, where Twa married Tutsi and their siblings were called *Bashyete*. While it is unclear whether the *Bashyete* are Tutsi or Twa, what is known is that they were aligned more to the Tutsi than to the Twa.

2. Colonial Era

The colonial era in Rwanda was marked by three different periods: European advancement of the notion that the Tutsi were a superior race and the Hutu inferior, followed by a shift in this strategy to advancing the Hutu over the Tutsi, and finally the 1959 Hutu revolution.

The early Europeans who came to Rwanda, either as explorers like John Hanning Speke and Sir Samuel Baker, or as the missionaries such as Father van den Burgt, John Roscoe and Father Gorju, all created different but rather complementary hypotheses tracing the origin of the Tutsi from the north of Africa. They hypothesized that the Tutsi might have either come from Ethiopia, Egypt, Melanesia or Asia Minor. They also argued that the Hutu and Twa were indigenous peoples conquered by a superior race and the carrier of a superior civilization, the Tutsi.⁶⁶ Therefore, the Tutsi were inherent leaders and the Hutu were born to be ruled.

The Europeans also insisted that the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa had distinct anthropological features. For instance, Father van den Burgt, the first German missionary to arrive in Rwanda in 1894 reported that “we can see Caucasian skulls, and beautiful Greek profiles side by side with Semitic and Jewish features, elegant golden-red beauties in the heart of Ruanda,” the Tutsi.⁶⁷ In his report, however, Father Burgt possibly was

⁶⁶ Prunier, 9.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 7.

trying to fantasize the lost tribes from Europe as many Europeans were obsessed in differentiating people according to their ancestors, that is, from the three sons of Noah: Sham, Japheth and Ham.⁶⁸ The “Blacks” were believed to be descendants of Ham; their color was due to the curse on Ham’s descendants because he saw his father naked.⁶⁹

The policies of inclusion in the political and military structures in Rwanda, however, were manipulated by the colonialists to further their interests either unconsciously, by thinking that the Tutsi led kingdom would continue to cooperate with the colonial rule, or consciously, in anticipation of uncooperative Tutsi rule. In this case, praising the Tutsi as a superior race and downplaying the importance of the Hutu and Twa created major cracks in the social cohesion of Rwandan society as well as stereotyping ethnic identities. The early Europeans who saw the organized polities of the Rwandan kingdom led by a Tutsi king and the light skin of the Tutsi, thought that the Tutsi were different people who might have migrated from civilized cultures.⁷⁰ This theory with the subsequent theories of the origin of the Tutsi was manipulated by the colonial rule to create distinct division among the three social groups. Partly, this may help to explain the genesis of the distinction and ethnic awareness of the three social groups, as well as, the origin of “Hamitic myth and theory” in Rwanda.

Thus, praising and widely publicizing the Tutsi as a superior race coupled with the social constructs stereotyped by the colonial rule greatly impacted the social relations among the Rwandans as well as the subsequent rearrangement of the social and political organization of the Rwandan society. Prunier asserts that the stereotype identities and social constructs given to Rwandans and embraced by the colonial rule “ended up inflating the Tutsi cultural ego inordinately and crushing the Hutu feelings until they developed an aggressive resentful inferiority complex.”⁷¹

⁶⁸ Thomas Nelson, *The Holy Bible, New King James Version: Genesis*, (Thomas Nelson, Inc., 1982), 9: 18-25.

⁶⁹ Michael T. Williams, “The United States and the Prevention of Genocide: A Case Study of Rwanda,” (Master’s thesis, Troy State University, 2000), 35-36.

⁷⁰ Lemarchand, 18.

⁷¹ Prunier, 9.

In the 1930s, the colonial administration had conducted a census for the three ethnic groups based on alleged physical characteristics, such as length of nose and other angular features of the face, and the number of cows each person possessed. After the census, those who had ten cows were registered as Tutsi, while those with less than 10 cows became Hutu.⁷² The Twa were few and they were identified by their social occupation. Immediately, identity cards were issued indicating each person's ethnic group. On the basis of this ethnically charged and scientifically suspect survey, all Rwandans came to be registered at birth as belonging to a certain ethnic group. At this time, previously fluid ethnic boundaries became solid, social bonds among the Rwandans were destroyed, and social mobility halted.

At the same time, there was a shifting paradigm in the colonial administration between the 1930s and 1940s. The colonial rulers in Rwanda abandoned the strategy of supporting the Tutsi. Instead, they came to despise them, which translated into an open and intensive support of the Hutu in what was called Hutu emancipation. To Rwandan leaders, this was a major concern which prompted them to question the rule of a nation that encouraged ethnic division and the foreseeable consequences. As a result the Tutsi chiefs were replaced by a Hutu chief, and king Musinga was exiled and was replaced by his son Rudahigwa in 1931.⁷³

This situation signaled the beginning of change in the social relations of the Rwandans. In addition, Prunier points out that, by the 1940s, the lives, actions, and feelings of the Rwandans were following the logic of a script rather than that of their complex organic past, which by then was consigned to a distant historical memory.⁷⁴ As a result, the social fabric of Rwanda was destroyed; social mobility frozen, ethnic identity encouraged, and ethnic hatred created and entrenched. Concurrently, an ethnically homogenous military was instituted to preserve the Hutu status quo for the next thirty years.

⁷² Christine P. Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War*, (United States of America: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2002), 25.

⁷³ Lemarchand, 69.

⁷⁴ Prunier, 9.

Indeed, the end of the colonial rule and the beginning of the Hutu republics were periods of Tutsi exile and periodic massacres. This is to say that towards the end of colonial rule in Rwanda, the seeds of ethnic hatred had sprouted and yielded its first harvest: the 1959 Hutu revolution. This Hutu revolution killed many Tutsi and forced others into exile. The revolution marked the end of the monarchy in Rwanda and the beginning of the Hutu regime. Therefore, the national military was ousted and the new Hutu military was created in the midst of hatred and ethnic division.

3. Post-Colonial Rwanda

The Belgian administration granted Rwanda independence in 1962, and during the next two Republics, periodic massacres of the Tutsi indicated that a heritage of ethnic hatred had become one of the enduring legacies of colonial rule. The Tutsi diaspora that had been created in the aftermath of the 1959 revolution were not allowed to come back into the country, and those Tutsi who remained in the country were subjected to political, economic and social marginalization, and made second-class citizens. Tutsi elites in Rwanda were periodically checked by selective state-sponsored killings in 1963, 1973, 1982, and 1990.⁷⁵

At independence, the military had not been dominated by the Hutu. Lemarchand states that “within the army, a sense of national mission transcended regional or economic interests or kinship ties.”⁷⁶ Yet the post-colonial Hutu government that had come to power during the 1959 revolution systematically eliminated most Tutsi from the national military.

Yet when the Belgians withdrew, they left in place a Hutu-dominated government that reigned for thirty years, but which would not have survived for so long without the support of a Hutu-dominated military. Most officers and troops of the first Hutu military had been recruited from the northern part of Rwanda, especially *Bushiru*, because the colonial regime regarded the *Bashiru* taller and stronger than Hutu from other regions of the country. Later the military were denied incentive and their rights from president

⁷⁵ Christine P. Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War*, (United States of America: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2002), 36-40.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

Kayibanda and politicians who became a central part of Rwanda in Gitarama.⁷⁷ This created friction within the army between *Bashiru* and non-*Bashiru* military personnel, and between the *Bashiru* military officers and politicians who were predominantly from Gitarama. As those politicians continually sought civilian control over the military without providing them with their entitlements, such promotions and logistical supply, it resulted in military intervention in 1973 that brought Juvenal Habyarimana into power. Since then the Hutu exclusively dominated the political, economic as well as the military aspects of the government.⁷⁸ Thus, this ethnically homogenous military not only protected the Hutu government, but also formed a tool to plan and execute periodic killings of the Tutsi over the next thirty years such as in 1973, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and the 1994 genocide.⁷⁹

Thus, in order to preserve Hutu interests, the first and the second regimes of post-colonial Rwanda intentionally nurtured an ethnically oriented and unprofessional Hutu military whose major focus was domestic order and repression of 15% of the population.

B. FACTORS FOR UNPROFESSIONAL MILITARY IN RWANDA AND ITS IMPACT ON ETHNIC VIOLENCE: 1959-1994

The post-colonial regime in Africa inherited the colonial military posture. The colonial militaries were characterized by ethnic recruitment, domestic deployment, and lack of urgency.⁸⁰ American political scientist Herbert M. Howe argues that during the colonial era, African militaries were used to further colonial interests, and their duties were to suppress domestic unrest in Africa.⁸¹ African militaries also effectively aided colonial rule in extracting resources from different regions of their states. Thus, for the colonial administration, the military was only valued as a tool of political dominance and was oriented inward, rather than towards outward aggression. In particular, the Rwandan

⁷⁷ Lemarchand, 282.

⁷⁸ Scherrer, 38.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 9.

⁸⁰ Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, (U.S.A: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 28-31.

⁸¹ Ibid, 28.

military was recruited on both ethnic and regional bases. This indicates that such a military served the interests of the Hutu population and specifically the Hutu from *Bushiru* region.⁸²

In Rwanda, the mission of the colonial military, which was focused on ensuring domestic order, was laying the basis for future unprofessional military. In independent Rwanda, former colonial governments' maintained indirect control of the political system and the military, and dominated the extraction of resources.⁸³ Therefore, factors such as ethnic recruitment and sub-national favoritism, and formation of militia forces are some of the reasons that led to an unprofessional military in Rwanda.

In addition ethnic recruitment facilitates domestic deployment of armed forces against other ethnic groups. In Rwanda former military were recruited from the Hutu population and were used to coerce the perceived opposition groups in the country, most notably the Tutsi.⁸⁴

Furthermore, post-colonial Rwandan regimes lacked military training and professionalism. In particular, previous regimes in Rwanda relied on a guarantee of external protection from Belgium. Later on, this protection was provided by France. On the other hand the military posture in the post-colonial era was formed to suppress the ethnic groups, particularly the Tutsi. In this case they did not concentrate on acquiring combat efficiency and effectiveness since their perceived enemy was the Tutsi and less sophisticated. This in part explains the lack military professionalism. The lack of professional military ethics and values facilitated the carrying out of atrocities against its own people rather than serving them. This translated into the 1994 genocide.

Alongside this process of de-professionalization, the Hutu regime, especially during the second republic, created parallel forces to act as counterweight to the rest of the military. Herbert M. Howe states that in the 1990s, Rwandan rulers relied on militia forces such as *interahamwe* and presidential guards, rather than relying on less

⁸² Lemarchand, 282.

⁸³ Naomi Chazan, et al. *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, (U.S.A: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 1999), 454-455.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 279-283.

trustworthy national military. The reason was that the government did not trust the officer corps of the military even though it was a Hutu dominated armed forces.⁸⁵ For example, the presidential guards were recruited from the president's home area and formed the government death squads. The presidential guards initiated the killings of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu in Kigali to include the Prime Minister, Agath Uwilingiyimana. During the period immediately following the 1990 conflict in Rwanda, the government formed a more trusted and loyal militia group: the *interahamwe* militia. Although these tactics helped to preserve the Hutu government for thirty years, it also led to the planning, preparing, and executing of the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi.

C. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

The Rwandan military played a large role in the propagation of ethnic hatred, planning and execution of the 1994 genocide. In the spread of hatred, the military owned and influenced the media. During the preparatory phase of genocide, the military trained and organized killers, and also distributed weapons to militia. During the execution phase, the military participated directly by killing Tutsi, by raping and humiliating Tutsi women, pillaging, and directing and supervising the militia and civilians in the killing of men, women and children.

1. The Military and Propagation of Ethnic Hatred

The military played a significant role in the propagation of ethnic hatred in Rwanda from 1973 to 1994. This period may be termed an incubation phase of the genocide. Indeed, prior to the genocide, the military was the legitimate and widely accepted source of information not only to the Hutu masses, but also to Hutu elites as well.

The military influenced the media, among other things, to significantly entrench ethnic hatred in Rwandan society. For instance, some top, influential military officers owned a newspaper known as "*Kangura*." According to human rights watch, "*Kangura* was a news paper jointly owned by the state and former Rwanda strongman

⁸⁵ Herbert M. Howe, 44.

Habyarimana's aides like Col. Serubuga and the late Col. Sagatwa.”⁸⁶ American political scientist Peter Uvin argues that *Kangura* was a radical newspaper which exerted a more profound impact on ethnic division and hatred in Rwandan society than any other media or newspaper in Rwanda. *Kangura* frequently published ethnic related articles, such as periodic reviews of the typology of Rwandan society, origins of the different ethnic groups, and promoted the dehumanization of the Tutsi.⁸⁷

After the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) launched an attack on the Rwandan government in 1990, however, the newspaper shifted its strategy to include inflammatory news that radicalized the Hutu population more than ever before. For example, in December 1990 *Kangura* published an article titled the “ten Hutu commandments” that directly impacted the ruthless killings of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu in the 1994 genocide to include Hutu siblings who had Tutsi resemblance. The ten Hutu commandments were direct and simple for any one to interpret:

1. The Rwandese armed forces must be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October war has taught us a lesson. No military personnel should marry a Tutsi.
2. All strategic posts, be political, administrative, economic, military and security must be entrusted to Hutu.
3. Every Hutu should know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is to enhance the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result we shall consider a traitor any Hutu who forms alliance with the Tutsi in business, invests his money or the government's money in a Tutsi enterprise, lends or borrows money from a Tutsi, or gives favors to a Tutsi in business like obtaining import licenses, bank loans, construction plots, and public markets.
4. Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she is, works for the interests of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result we shall consider a traitor any Hutu who marries a Tutsi woman, makes a Tutsi woman his concubine, employs a Tutsi woman as secretary or makes her his dependant.
5. Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role of woman, spouses and family mothers. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest?

⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch, “Kenyan Democracy Project: Is the Leon Mugesera's Decision Relevant to Kenyan?” *Choosing War-the Ten Hutu Commandments*, (June 2005).
http://www.demokrasia_kenya.blogspot.com/2005/06/is-lon-mugesera-decision-relevant-to.html.
Accessed on June 17, 2006.

⁸⁷ Peter Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*, (United States of America: Kumarian Press, Inc., 1998), 64.

6. Hutu woman be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason.
7. The education sector (pupils, students, and teachers) must be majority Hutu.
8. The Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi.
9. The Hutu wherever you are must have unity, solidarity and be pre-occupied by the fate of their Hutu brothers. The Hutu both inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with our Hutu brothers; they must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda. The Hutu must be firm and vigilant against their common enemy who are Tutsi.
10. The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referendum and the Hutu ideology must be taught to every Hutu and at all levels. Every Hutu must spread this ideology.⁸⁸

These commandments made a significant impact on the ethnic hatred and on the subsequent genocide of the Tutsi. Since the newspaper belonged to the military, that in part determined the credibility of the source of information to the population. Thus, the ethnic hatred directed and propagated by the military had a devastating impact on the civil war.

Top military officials also controlled, directly or indirectly, an inflammatory Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). This radio station called for the solidarity of the Hutu and encouraged killing of the Tutsi.⁸⁹ To make sure that the RTLM news reached every Hutu, the government distributed free radios. Llezlie L. Green argues that in the period of 1990-1994 about 87.7% of Rwandan household had radios and that this percentage became higher during the genocide.⁹⁰ In addition the BBC estimates that the media saturation of radios in sub-Saharan Africa in 1992 was 13.5 per one hundred persons, while in Rwanda it was estimated to 25 per one hundred persons. Furthermore the United States Information Agency (USIA) reports that RTLM broadcasts of four a day in *Kinyarwanda* and French were relayed to other part of the country through a

⁸⁸ Human Rights Watch, (June 2005).

⁸⁹ Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, Human Rights Watch (U.S.A: New York, 1999), 4.

⁹⁰ Llezlie L. Green, "Race, Racism and the Law, Speaking Truth to Power: Sexual Violence and Genocide Against Tutsi Women," *International Law*, 33, *Colombia Human Rights Law Review* 733-776, 733-755 (Summer, 2002), 9.
<http://academic.udayton.edu/race/06hrights/GeoRegions/Africa/Rwanda01.htm> Accessed on June 17, 2006.

network of transmitters owned by the government.⁹¹ This greatly radicalized the Hutu masses and incited them to kill their neighbor and countrymen. These were strategic assets owned and protected directly or indirectly by the military.

2. The Role of the Military in Organizing the 1994 Genocide

In terms of concrete preparations, the military trained, organized and provided logistical support to the *interahamwe* militia. The military distributed weapons in preparation for genocide in a program disguised as self defense. Des Forges states that soldiers distributed firearms to militia and other supporters of president Habyarimana in 1993 and early 1994. Col. Theoneste Bagosora, however, advocated equipping the young men with local weapons such as machetes, spears and clubs. It is believed that these local weapons killed more people than firearms.⁹²

Col. Bagosora played a significant role in the preparation period by supplying small arms and hand grenades to civilians and creating an extremist military group known as “AMASASU.” Literally *amasasu* means bullets, but in this case, *AMASASU* meant “the Alliance of Soldiers Provoked by the Age-old Deceitful Acts of the Unarists.” Unarist refers to a political party that was dominated by Tutsi before the 1959 Hutu revolution. *Amasasu* was a group of hardline soldiers who were determined to exterminate the Tutsi. This group feared nobody, and according to Human Rights Watch they issued tracts and threats to president Habyarimana warning him of the impending task of killing the Tutsi and to stop attempts to build an inclusive government as was provided for in the 1993 Arusha accords.⁹³ Consequently, the intention of this group of soldiers was to exterminate anybody who sought a peaceful resolution to the Rwandan conflict. This may help explain the subsequent death of president Habyarimana in April, 1994.

⁹¹ Adelman Suhrke, *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, (United States of America, New Jersey: Transaction Publisher, 1999), 97.

⁹² Des Forges, 101.

⁹³ Unitarists [this isn't the actual name of the party,] was a political party formed shortly by the 1959 Hutu revolution and was dominated by Tutsi ethnic group.

3. Execution

Finally, the military fully participated in the massacre of the Tutsi in the 1994 genocide. Des Forge reports that “soldiers, whether on active duty or retired, killed civilians, gave permission, set example, and commanded others to kill.”⁹⁴ The report further argues that the participation of the military throughout the entire genocide indicates that the most powerful authorities at the national level ordered or approved their role in the slaughter.”⁹⁵ This report, however, obscures the role of the military indicated in the planning process at the national level. Yet, the military had the final say in the decision making process not only after the president’s death but in the incubation and preparation phases of the genocide. In other words, the military greatly determined the political course of the nation. For instance, there were senior military actors that were involved in the genocide and influenced the decisions in the political system of the government: General Bizimugu, the minister of defense; Col. Tharcisse Renzaho; Lieutenant Colonels Leonard Nkundiye and Anatole Nsengiyumva. Also military leaders like Maj. Protais Mpiranyi, Capt. Gaspard Hategekimana and Maj. Bernard Ntuyahaga of the elite units of the presidential guards and Para commandos decisively participated in the genocide.⁹⁶

Furthermore, shortly after president Habyarimana’s death, the military took charge of all aspects of security and directly or indirectly influenced political decisions. For instance, on different occasions military personnel chaired the provisional meetings in the presence of the Prefect (the leader of the province). For example Col. Simba took the chair of provisional meeting away from the Prefect of Gikongoro prefecture and authorized the attack on the Tutsi.⁹⁷

Lastly, the military was involved in several tasks, that is, they were involved in planning, preparing and executing genocide. In particular, they killed Tutsi and moderate Hutu and organized and commanded the Hutu militia and civilians to kill, rape Tutsi

⁹⁴ Des Forges, 223.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Des Forges, 224.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 222.

women, and pillage. As Green puts it, “the military and militia raped Tutsi women and girls, forced them into sexual slavery and mutilated them.”⁹⁸ These barbaric acts constituted the bulk of the military operations at the time, rather than engaging the RPF guerrilla forces on the battlefield. Partly this determined ex-FAR’s defeat on one hand, on the other it may help to explain why ex-FAR was successful in killing one million people in one hundred days.

The military’s strategy of killing all Tutsi and humiliating their women and children was intended to serve a dual purpose. First, the strategy was intended to deprive the RPF of support, thus, seeking a military victory against the RPF in due course. Second, they wanted to realize their long due dreams of wiping the Tutsi off the face of the Earth. In these ways, the former Hutu military played a significant role in the propagation of ethnic hatred, planning and conducting of genocide, more so than any other institution of the former Rwandan government. Therefore, this reveals the effect of an ethnically homogenous military before and during the conflict in Rwanda, but also has a direct impact on post-conflict DDR in particular, as well as subsequent stability and reconciliation in general.

D. CONCLUSION

It would seem naïve to state that people [Hutu and Tutsi] have been killing each other in Rwanda since the 1959 Hutu revolution, including the horrific genocide of 1994. Also, it would be unfair to claim that all Hutu killed Tutsi, since Hutu moderates were also victims of the 1994 genocides and some Hutu saved Tutsi during the genocide as well. Also the claim would not recognize those Hutu who pressured the government for change between 1992 and 1994, as well as those who participated in stopping the genocide. It is imperative, however, to appreciate the fact that some top military officials and few Hutu civilian elites, driven by greed, dragged the majority of the Hutu masses into systematic massacres of the Tutsi in the horrific genocide of 1994.

This chapter noted periodic killings of the Tutsi to include the genocide. However, the available literature neither offers satisfactory explanations for the collective

⁹⁸ Green, 20.

punishment of the Tutsi since 1959 nor a shared guilt on the part of the Hutu population for atrocities committed in the genocide. The literature as earlier seen in the chapter, however, acknowledges the responsibility of the Hutu masses led by Hutu elites and the military in the killing of more than one million Tutsi in the 1994 genocide. In this case, the military was an indispensable and responsible element of the cumulative atrocities committed against the Tutsi since 1959, including the 1994 genocide. This, in part may help to explain why reconciliation that starts in the military – integration and reintegration of ex-combatants – makes it possible for the rest of the society to reconcile in post-conflict Rwanda, in particular, and in other post-conflict cases, in general. Thus, reconciliation in the military directly resonates in civilian behavior, making it possible to attain societal reconciliation, in particular, and stability, in general.

In sum, the chapter discussed the role of the military and ethnic violence in pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods in Rwanda. It analyzed the origin of ethnic groups in Rwanda; it pointed out that ethnicity and ethnic identity were stereotyped and given to Rwandans by early explorers and missionaries and entrenched by colonialists. Also the chapter analyzed factors that led to an unprofessional military in Rwanda between 1959 and 1994: ethnic recruitment and sub-national favoritism, domestic deployment, lack of urgency, and creation of parallel forces. Lastly, the chapter assessed the role of an ethnically homogenous military in the series of massacres of the Tutsi, including the 1994 genocide, as well as its negative impact on post-conflict DDRI in Rwanda.

The next chapter will discuss DDRI in Rwanda. It will also emphasize the role of *ingando* in the Rwandan model of DDRI as an indispensable phase before military integration and reintegration of ex-combatants. It is also a factor that enhances stability and societal reconciliation. Also it will demonstrate that it is possible to change a stereotyped enemy image by applying affirmative actions, such as integrating former ex-combatants into the national defense forces, reintegration of ex-combatants into the national economic and social structures, building an inclusive government, and embracing reconciliation in all state structures.

IV. POST-CONFLICT RWANDA: DILEMMA OF PUNISHMENT VERSUS SOCIETAL RECONCILIATION

[E]thnicization of the military has not slackened in many countries and will likely continue as long as...countries continue to have personalized political rule as the foundation of their officer corps.⁹⁹

A. INTRODUCTION

Chapter III discussed the role of military and ethnic violence in pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods in Rwanda. It analyzed factors that led to an unprofessional military in post-colonial Rwanda and its impact on ethnic violence. Lastly, the chapter analyzed the role of an ethnically homogenous military in the 1994 genocide and its negative impacts on post-conflict DDR in Rwanda.

Chapter IV will discuss the impact of *ingando*, integration of ex-combatants into the national military, and the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society on the societal reconciliation using the case of post-1994 Rwanda. *Ingando* is a sensitization mechanism for ex-combatants that deconstructs the enemy image, promotes change in behavior, and analyzes the basis of ethnic prejudice before ex-combatants are either integrated into the military or reintegrated into civilian society. This is done through intensive educational programs on social, political, and economic aspects of government and society. Military integration refers to a tangible affirmative action that eliminates fear and builds trust and confidence between ex-combatants and their fellow ethnic groups. Reintegration acts as an agent of value transfer, and facilitates interaction because ex-combatants view themselves as Rwandan rather than Hutu or Tutsi – thus enhancing reconciliation.

The *ingando* model had to integrate a former rebel army now turned government force, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), and the army of the former government of Rwanda, the ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (ex-FAR). At the beginning of the war in 1990, the RPA was dominated by descendants of the Tutsi who fled the country in 1959.

⁹⁹ Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, (United States of America: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2001), 39.

Recruitment, however, was open to all ethnic groups in Rwanda, unlike the ex-FAR which was an exclusively Hutu military. The war raged between the ex-FAR and RPA for four years culminating in the 1994 genocide, where the ex-FAR and the Hutu masses exterminated one million Tutsi. The RPA brought that war and the genocide to an end in July 1994 when it forced the Hutu government to flee Rwanda. The RPA became the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF) in 2003 after integrating with the ex-FAR. Those not integrated into the new military force had to be reintegrated into society – a large task.

The origins of the RPA lie in Uganda: most of the Tutsis in the RPA had acquired their military skills by serving in the Ugandan military in the 1980s. The RPA was dominated by descendants of Tutsi exiled in 1959, who had been denied repatriation ever since. The previous Rwandan regime had consistently requested that neighboring countries naturalize them, refusing their claims to Rwandese citizenship. Perceiving that a military option was the only remaining means of bringing them back home, the exiled Tutsis in Uganda joined the National Resistance Army (NRA) guerrilla forces and aided Yoweri Museveni into power. In 1990, the Rwandese elements of the NRA split off to form the RPA and the RPF, and invaded Rwanda from the north. The ensuing civil war triggered the genocide of 1994.

In the aftermath of the civil war and genocide, three major challenges faced the government of national unity: 1) to defeat an insurgency rooted in ethnic ideology and restore security to the region; 2) re-build and unite Rwandan society; and 3) foster sustainability in political, social and economic development. One way to ensure reconciliation and stability was through military integration/reintegration. Rwanda initiated the “*ingando* model” of sensitization, which ex-combatants go through before integration into the military or reintegration into the civilian society.

B. *INGANDO* MODEL OF SOCIETAL SENSITIZATION AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

After the civil war, Rwandans returned home from refugee sanctuaries in neighboring countries. Waves of refugees had fled Rwanda during the crises of 1959, 1962, 1973, and 1994. At the same time, the new government also had to deal with internally displaced people. These groups of people had different political ideologies, backgrounds, doctrines, emotions, and suspicions, and had adopted cultures from

different nations. Also, the situation was characterized by fear and hate since among them was victims and perpetrators of genocide, including defeated ex-combatants. To address such a dilemma the national unity government introduced two rather effective cultural institutions: *Gacaca* and *ingando*. *Gacaca* is a traditional restorative justice system; it has constitutional powers and is linked to the Supreme Court, but is independent in action. *Ingando*, on the other hand, was instituted to reconcile groups of people by minimizing their differences.

In *kinyarwanda*, *ingando* refers to a convenient place where Rwandans used to retreat in order to discuss issues concerning national interests and strategies as well as emergencies such as a disaster, a natural catastrophe, or territorial expansion. *Ingando* offers a mechanism to analyze the causes of their past failures and find new strategies. *Ingando* comes from a *kinyarwanda* word, *kugandika*, which means a temporal halt to one's daily activities and the devotion of a certain amount of time – weeks or months – to addressing issues of greater concern facing the nation and the society in particular. Fatuma Ntangiza, the executive secretary of National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) regards *ingando* as men's retreat.¹⁰⁰

The main purpose of *ingando* is to create a peaceful forum to address social, political, and economic issues as well as ethnic division facing Rwandans today, for both military and civilian society. Furthermore, after having completed the *ingando* program, participants should be able to effectively practice and disseminate the values and tenets of unity and reconciliation. Consequently, *ingando* is meant for all Rwandans regardless of their social, economic and political status. Fatuma Ntangiza, the executive secretary of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) states that, “indeed gradually *ingando* eroded away suspicion and checked hatred as participants had to eat, sleep, and work together in *ingando*.”¹⁰¹ Thus, such an intensive sensitization program is an indispensable element of reconciliation in societies torn apart by ethnic violent conflicts and civil war in general.

¹⁰⁰ Fatuma Ntangiza, “Community Sensitization: Case of *Ingando* in Rwanda,” *Presented to the International Conference on Security and Lasting Peace in Great Lakes Region of Africa*, (Kigali: Hotel des Milles Collines, May 13-16, 2003), 7.

¹⁰¹ Fatuma Ntangiza, 7-8.

ingando may be seen as a catalyst for reconciliation despite earlier criticisms from scholars and genocidal forces. Harvard University researcher Chi Mgbako views *ingando* in contrasting and controversial ways. On the one hand, he argues that *ingando* camps were employed by RPF to plant the seed of reconciliation while, at same time, disseminating RPF political ideology as well as political indoctrination of participants. On the other hand Mgbako argues that an “*ingando*-like program that is free of pro-RPF spin and governmental bias, and that inspires an open and honest dialogue about history should be integrated into formal and informal school curricula.”¹⁰²

This chapter argues that *ingando* is a rehabilitation and reconciliation tool intended to accomplish several things: transform negative perceptions that cause ethnic hatred; mitigate conflict influence factors such as fear and exclusion; manage defeat, shame, and remorse for those who committed atrocities; and erase myths and erroneous theories of ethnic differences of the type discussed in Chapter III. Furthermore it eliminates fear and illusive perception, and consequently restores hope, instills confidence and creates a more responsible and patriotic citizen. The *ingando* curriculum in Table 1 is a benchmark for this assertion.

Table 1. Lessons and Other Activities Done in *ingando*: Mutobo Demobilization Center

S/No	Lessons and Activities	Presenters
1	DDR Program	RDRC
2	The role of Justice, rule of law & responsibility of national police	National Police
3	Security in Rwanda, causes and consequences, conflict in Great Lakes region, culture of patriotism, & refugee crisis and consequences	Ministry of Defense
4	Justice as a factor for stability and development, laws in Rwanda and new constitutional law	Ministry of Justice
5	The history of Rwanda in pre- and post-colonial rule	Ombudsman's office
6	Measures of fighting corruption and nepotism	Auditor General
7	Good governance and decentralization & the role of CDC development	Ministry of local government
8	Citizenship and Human Rights; International law on segregation & genocide	Human Rights Commission

¹⁰² Chi Migbako, “*Ingando* Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Conflict Rwanda,” *Harvard Law School, Class 2005, B.A., Vol. 18*, (Colombia University, 2001), 201-224.

9	Genocide Ideology	Member of Parliament
10	Resettlement, land, & environment protection	Ministry of Finance
11	Poverty reduction strategy, root cause of genocide, & role of tolerance in post-conflict	Senate
12	The role of women in development	HUGURA Association
13	Unity and reconciliation	National Unity & Reconciliation Commission
14	Investment & Tourism in Rwanda	Investment & Export Office
15	Associations & economic development; Natural resources & economic development; and Small industries & microfinance project	Ministry of Commerce
16	Government policy on vocational training	Ministry of Public Service
17	NEPAD & Regional integration	NEPAD advisor: President's office
18	Rwanda revenue authority: Policy & achievements	Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA)
19	<i>Gacaca</i> Judicial System	<i>Gacaca</i> courts
20	The role of religion in conflict resolution & the role of religious dominations in development	Eglise Episcopale au Rwanda (EER)- Church of Rwanda
21	Trauma symptoms and how they can be mitigated	Psycho-social consultation service
22	HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment & counseling of HIV/AIDS victims	Commission National de Lutte Control (CNLS)
23	Agriculture and animal husbandry	Ministry of Agriculture & Livestock
24	The role of youth and culture in national building & development	Ministry of Youth, Sport & Culture
25	The role of international community in Rwandan conflict	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
26	Government's policy on education	Ministry of Education
27	The role of media in Rwandan conflict, the role of media in development	Rwanda Information Office (ORINFOR)
28	Malaria prevention, hygiene, medical screening	Ministry of Health
29	Functions of Banks	Credit & Saving Scheme (CSS)
30	ID photos, closing ceremony, Issue certificates completion, & Issue of reinsertion funds and Basic Needs Kit	RDRC

Source: Rwanda Demobilization Reintegration Commission (RDRC) Office in Kigali

General Seraphin Bizimungu, the former chief of staff who had commanded the 1996-7 ex-FAR incursions into Rwanda from the DRC, confided to the author during an interview that his opinions before he joined *ingando* in December 2005 were slightly different from Chi Mgbako's and yet, more radical in substance. He stated that before joining *ingando*, "I viewed *ingando* not only as RPF's way of political indoctrination, but also a means of changing people's psychological equilibrium through a series of indoctrinations and eventually brainwashes the mind." Three months later, he had quite another perception: "I found it quite different from what I thought; in any case I didn't expect such good treatment, and socio-economic and political orientation from Rwandan government. I have all the rights as any Rwandan now; I have confidence, and hope for the future unlike the miserable life I was leading in Congo forests. From here I will join the national military."¹⁰³ Consequently, this testimony may assist in assessing the impact of *ingando* in transforming ex-combatants' way of thinking into a more hopeful one.


The *ingando* curriculum in Table 1 reflects the quality of lessons, calculated not only to register the expected behavioral change, but also to impart the knowledge and skills to equip ex-combatants to lead a normal life. Among other things, during *ingando* ex-combatants discuss the history of Rwandan society; the origin of ethnic division in Rwanda; unity and reconciliation issues to include *Gacaca* courts, social, economic and political aspects of the government; and the rule of law.

In this case, *ingando* may be regarded as a remarkable psychological breakthrough for Rwandans in addressing legacies of past regimes, including one of the most horrific genocides of the century. *Ingando* comes before integration of ex-combatants into national military force and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life (see Figure 1). It is a prerequisite for the success of a DDR program in general and integration/reintegration of ex-combatants in particular. Thus, *ingando* may be viewed as a viable and indispensable tool for peace building, human rights observance and sustainable unity and reconciliation, as well as social and economic development.

¹⁰³ Interview with General Seraphine Bizimungu, ex-combatant and participant of *Ingando*, Mutobo-Ruhengeri Province, (Mar. 25, 2006).

The government of Rwanda encourages citizens of different status to attend *ingando*: it is a prerequisite for any student joining an institution of higher learning in Rwanda, businessmen/women, politicians, church leaders, *genocidaires*, *Gacaca* judges, tax collectors, ex-RPA soldiers, and ex-combatants. These groups attend *ingando* for a duration ranging from two weeks to four months depending on the training needs for each group. The military is supposed to attend for three to four months. Because of the military's actions during the genocide and since they still possessed the capacity to cause instability, members of the ex-FAR were the first target group to attend *ingando*. This was done on the assumption that transforming the thinking of the military would have a direct impact on the civilian society and consequently facilitate reconciliation.

Figure 2. Post-conflict DDR: Reconciliation and Stability Model



C. MILITARY INTEGRATION AS A MODEL FOR SOCIETAL RECONCILIATION

After *ingando*, ex-combatants are integrated into the ranks of the Rwanda Defense Forces (see Figure 1), and they enjoy all privileges involved. Also while in *ingando*, ex-combatants dispel fear and build confidence; in this way, they integrate freely into the national force. Thus, *ingando* mechanism is a viable means of managing defeat, shame, and remorse on the part of the loser in post-conflict situations.

The international community has been involved in addressing nations' security in a global context. In particular, DDR has been a tool of security sector reform (SSR) that is meant to transform violent conflicts into a stable situation in order to allow for social and economic development as well as political stability. Although these efforts have mitigated, to some extent, the effects of violent conflicts, through disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating ex-combatants into the civilian society, the opportunity to ensure sustainable stability in divided societies has not been fully exploited: societal reconciliation through integration of ex-combatants into the national military.

1. Conceptualizing Military Integration in Conflict Transformation

Post-conflict DDR is a main component of security sector reform (SSR). "SSR involves political, social, and economic elements of national power that are engaged in providing human security. It also involves transformation of security forces such as the military, police, and paramilitary, as well as militia and other non-state actors or spoilers, in order to effectively provide internal and external security for the populace."¹⁰⁴ The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) presents security sector reform as "the transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens."¹⁰⁵

In this case, security sector reform/transformation is an integral part of a wide spectrum of the international security system in general. In particular, it involves interoperability of national elements of power and interagency as well as post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR) of ex-combatants into the

¹⁰⁴ United States Agency for International Development (USAID): From the American People, *A Framework for Approaching Security Sector Reform*, 31 July, 2006.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

civilian society. This description of DDR, however, reflects a conventional way of addressing post-conflict security challenges. The conventional setting entails disbanding the defeated military force as occurred in Ethiopia in 1992 whereby 412,000 former government forces were demobilized.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, former Iraq forces were disbanded following the defeat of Saddam Hussein, which contributed to the insurgency in Iraq.¹⁰⁷ Neither stability nor societal reconciliation was achieved in the two cases. Rather, instability and ethnic or religious division have been entrenched. Thus, the integration of ex-combatants into a national military is a factor that demands deviation from the conventional thinking and the ability to take some minimal risk in order to achieve stability and societal reconciliation.

As for Lt. General Charles Kayonga, the Chief of Staff Land Forces of RDF, integrating ex-combatants into the new Rwandan military was a risky undertaking. However, Rwandan leaders had to make a trade off. He states that

Indeed authorities considered the possibility of weakening the military as a result of integration of former ex-combatants and there were reasons behind such arguments. Firstly, the integrated force had been intoxicated over time with ideology of genocide and some had directly or indirectly participated in genocide. Secondly, the enemy forces in eastern DRC who had not surrendered to the government forces were poised to attack Rwanda and there were fears that the integrated force would be collaborators. Thirdly, the existence of popular support to genocidal forces immediately after genocide also raised concerns. Lastly, processes that were going on in the aftermath of genocide such as prosecutions and imprisonment of the suspects of genocide who were either relatives or at least had some connection with the integrated forces at first undermined RPF/A's legitimacy in the civilian population and reconciliation efforts as well.¹⁰⁸

Integrating the warring factions or defeated combatants into a single national military force is a risky undertaking. Yet, it offers an effective and indispensable strategy for sustainable stability and societal reconciliation if properly handled. The risks of not doing it may be even greater.

¹⁰⁶ Kess Kingma, *Demobilization of in Sub-saharan Africa*, Bonn International Centre of Conversion, (New York, 2000): 85.

¹⁰⁷ George Packer, *America in Iraq* (United States of America: New York, 2005), 193.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with General Charles Kayonga, the Army Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of General Staff of Rwanda Defense Forces, in Kigali, Rwanda (March 30, 2006).

A senior researcher on central Africa in the arms management program, Nelson Alusala, stated that, in 1997, the Rwandan government transformed its counterinsurgency strategy into a political and social effort that, within a year, broke the back of the insurgency. He argues that a key element in undermining the insurgency in northwest Rwanda was the integration of ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (EX-FAR) into the new Rwandan military. Insurgents were turned into soldiers; they were given new uniforms, a modest salary, and a stake in the country's future.¹⁰⁹

2. The Military as a Mirror of the Society

Some have argued that the endless violent conflicts in many parts of the world, especially in Africa, are a result of the ethnicization of militaries worldwide.¹¹⁰ Thus, militaries have been seen as the protectors of certain ethnic groups and used in a series of atrocities committed against other ethnic groups, rather than protectors of the entire country. In this case there is no distinction between the military actions and the ethnic groups they represent. As a result, a recurring ethnic conflict syndrome is created.

This in part helps to explain why an affirmative action focused on the military, such as integrating former enemy forces into the national military, may have a direct impact in stabilizing the civilian societies previously plagued by ethnic violence and might be able to interrupt the cycle of ethnic conflict and hatred. It is self explanatory that an inclusive military means that all ethnic groups of civilian society are represented. Therefore, from a moral point of view, an integrated military will not be used against its own people because they cannot be deployed to kill their parents and relatives. Rather such military induces links between different groups and consequently fosters societal reconciliation.

General Kayunga states that military integration was conceived with the objective of attaining societal reconciliation and indeed authorities expected it to be successful. Moreover, he argues that

¹⁰⁹Nelson Alusala, "Disarmament and reconciliation: Rwanda's concern," *Occasional Paper* 108, (June, 2005). <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/papers/108/papers108.htm> (October 24, 2005).

¹¹⁰ Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruit, eds., *Political Armies: The Military and National Building in the Age of Democracy* (UK-London: Zeb Books Ltd, and USA: New York, 2002), 3-7.

the ex-FAR was the major player in the atrocities committed in the country. On one hand there were RPA liberators who stopped genocide and on the other was the ex-FAR and *interahamwe* militia who directly or indirectly supported the genocide process. The continued confrontation of those groups, therefore, was bound to result in continued conflict. The leadership maintained moral high ground; they were convinced that a unified military would reflect the entire Rwandan society. Furthermore, the leadership knew that ex-combatants only had ideological bankruptcy of good citizenship and if given intensive training and integrate them into the national military there were reliable to change, which was the case. Consequently, this significantly impacted societal reconciliation.¹¹¹

The effect of military integration can also be analyzed on the basis of “law-context communication/individualistic cultures” versus “high-context communication/collectivistic cultures.” Ting-Toomey argues that in law-context communication cultures people possess individualistic values, whereby an effect on an individual does not affect in any way his group members such as in Germany, United States, and Sweden. On the other hand, in high-context communication cultures people have group-orientated values. Therefore whatever happens to a member of a collectivistic culture directly affects his family and subsequently his ethnic group, such as in Middle-east Arab and African countries.¹¹² The goodwill and incentives given to ex-combatants, especially integrating them into the national military force and allowing them to have a stake in the national security, not only diffuses the violence or latent conflict, but it also deconstructs the enemy image in the civilian society and makes it possible for societal reconciliation.

Therefore, unless elements of fear and personal security are addressed, reconciliation will not be possible and latent or violent conflict will smolder. The surest way to assure a divided society of their safety is to make sure that their ethnicity or religion is represented in the military, since militaries in underdeveloped and developing nations have been used as instruments of terror in their own societies. Thus, a

¹¹¹ Interview with General Charles Kayonga, in Kigali, Rwanda (March 30, 2006).

¹¹² Ting-Toomey, “Cross-Cultural Verbal Communication Styles, and Intercultural Conflict Management Skills,” *Handouts on Hofstede’s Research on Cultural Differences: Communication Across Cultures* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1999), 100-480.

representation of different ethnic groups in the military should eliminate fear and ensure personal security but also restore social harmony, and turn the culture of hate into a culture of hope and peace.

Integrating ex-combatants into the national force, however, does not guarantee stability. Such post-conflict situations require the political and military leadership to constantly monitor the situation and avoid divisions within the military. Military training, professionalism, and a focused curriculum in military schools that incorporate reconciliation values, will help suppress hatred in the military, since military personnel will be preoccupied with career development. General Kayunga states that ex-combatants were put in military professionalism programs and re-educated on the political history of Rwanda in *ingando* and the correct role of the military. That is why integration of ex-combatants did not affect military professionalism in the Rwanda Defense Forces.¹¹³

3. Military Integration as a Trust Builder

Ideally, the military comes from the civilian population and is supposed to serve the entire society. Therefore, it forms an integral part of the society. The peculiar aspect of the military, unlike other government institutions or professionals, is that it possesses a legitimate monopoly over weapons and has a unique characteristic of managing violence. However, this legitimacy has been abused and the military has been used by state actors in atrocities against part of its own population, as discussed in the previous chapter. This occurred not only in Rwanda, but in Uganda and other countries as well. For example during Milton Obote's rule in Uganda during the 1960s, Obote promoted military officers from his home area: Acholi and Langi. After Amin's military intervention in 1971, Amin hunted down and killed many Acholi military officers and politicians, and marginalized the rest. Subsequently, Amin recruited and promoted groups from the West Nile: the Kakwa, Lugbara, and Madi. When Obote came back to power after the 1979 Liberation War, he retaliated against Amin's people.¹¹⁴ In this case, it was a collective punishment of the entire ethnic group to include their members in the military.

¹¹³ Ting-Toomy, 100-280.

¹¹⁴ Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, (United States of America: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2001), 40.

When militaries have been ethnified and used as political pawns in such a manner, integrating ex-combatants into the ranks of the national military could break this cycle of revenge and collective punishment. If this integration is undertaken as a goodwill gesture driven by a sense of moral obligation on the part of the victor, and done without anticipation of reciprocity from the loser, the involuntary reciprocation that comes as a result of an affirmative action could yield sustainable and long lasting psychological change. As a result, this effect will resonate directly in their dependents, families, and relatives. Consequently, the entire society will change.

Partly this may assist in explaining how Rwanda managed to defeat the insurgency that originated in the eastern DRC forests and affected the northwestern part of Rwanda in 1998 and subsequently end the influx of Rwandan refugees that had plagued the entire region between 1994 and 2000. Integrating former Hutu combatants dispelled fears in the Hutu population initial confidence that encouraged the voluntary return of large number of refugees from neighboring countries in less than ten years.

In Rwanda, however, building trust is a two-part process for the victors: trust was built on the correct understanding of the political situation underlying events and the process that led to the division of Rwandan society and the genocide, such as the colonial legacy. General Kayunga argues that initial trust for inclusion in post-conflict Rwanda also emanated from the past experience where RPA would integrate captured enemy forces into its military. Those captured enemy forces would immediately shift allegiance.¹¹⁵

An important step in the reconciliation process occurred in November 2003, when General Paul Rwarakabije, the former overall commander of the rebel movement, the Force Démocratique Pour Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), and many others voluntarily returned to the country from the Congo forest.¹¹⁶ These were the very people who encouraged the remaining rebels in DRC to return home. On 15 December 2005, General Seraphin Bizimungu, the rebel leader who succeeded General Rwarakabije, voluntarily

¹¹⁵ Interview with General Charles Kayunga, in Kigali, Rwanda (March 30, 2006).

¹¹⁶ "General Rwarakabije reported to the country from DRC," (12 July 2005), <http://www.rwandagateway.org/article.php?id-article=735>. January 27, 2006.

returned home with 81 soldiers and 70 civilians from their bases in eastern DRC.¹¹⁷ This strategy of integrating ex-combatants into the national military broke the enemy's will to fight, and the remaining group of insurgents was willing to surrender to the Rwandan government. The act of voluntary repatriation and integration of ex-combatants has remarkably improved the security along the DRC – Rwanda border in the last five years.

Also the successful integration of ex-combatants into the military has encouraged integration in civilian society. For instance, it has encouraged a great number of refugees to return home voluntarily. According to UNHCR, Rwanda has the lowest number of refugees when compared to Angola, Burundi, DRC, Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, or Sudan. The UNHCR also reports that out of the remaining 48,000 Rwandan refugees, the voluntary repatriation rate is between 1000 and 2000 people per month.¹¹⁸

The amalgamation of warring factions has created a well-disciplined and combat effective military in Rwanda, the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF). Due to its military professionalism, the RDF has gained a good reputation on the international scene. Although the integration of ex-combatants into a unified military force was an important factor in the success of this strategy, the United Nations, African Union (AU), Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), and Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) still neglect military integration in post-conflict situations. Despite achievements registered by military integration in Rwanda, this program has not been fully integrated in the formal DDR program, nor is it supported by practitioners in peace-building. Nevertheless military integration relies on government initiative and support to foster reconciliation. Yet, this thesis has argued for and shown the importance of military integration in post-conflict stability and societal reconciliation. It further argues that if practitioners in conflict resolution would effectively integrate and equally support military integration as part of security sector transformation in general, and in DDR program in particular, this may assist in attaining societal reconciliation and could break the vicious cycle of ethnic

¹¹⁷ Steven Baguma, "Rwanda Rebels Back from DRC," (15 December 2005), http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2645&item. 12/16/2005.

¹¹⁸ "African Dialogue: Update of Main Voluntary Repatriation Operations in Africa," (October, 2005).

violence. This will not only ensure stability and reconciliation, but also enhance healthy civil-military relations and military professionalism as well.

Post-conflict situations following violent conflicts present windows of opportunity to reconcile the society; however, they are rarely exploited by parties to the conflict, partly because greed surpasses perceived or actual grievances. Thus, the cycle of conflict begins anew. In other cases where those windows of opportunity have been seized, such as the case of Rwanda, there was an element of risk taking at the expense of societal reconciliation. It required a strong and charismatic leader, President Paul Kagame, to convince victors and losers to accept change. In addition, integrating former enemy forces is a function of strong leadership with strong vision. The RPF/A leadership believed that their cause and war was just. Having analyzed the positive impact of military integration on societal reconciliation, the leadership had to explain it to people¹¹⁹ because some Tutsi, as well as moderate Hutu, were opposed to this integration.

Nevertheless, this undertaking demands patience, consistence, and that the entire society stays the course, as reconciliation is a process that takes a long time to yield tangible results. The configuration of the military forces significantly affects interaction within different groups of the society. The more coherent and professional the military is, the more likelihood that societal reconciliation will succeed and the region will subsequently stabilize.

D. REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS AND SOCIETAL RECONCILIATION

This chapter discussed in detail the role of *ingando* in the sensitization of ex-combatants and the impact it has on behavioral change, the lessening of social tension, and deconstruction of the enemy image. In addition the previous section discussed the interrelationship between the sensitization of ex-combatants and integration of ex-combatants into a national military and the subsequent effects on societal reconciliation. However, military integration alone may not guarantee a sustainable impact on societal reconciliation. Therefore, this demands direct interaction of ex-combatants, that is, a mixture of those warring factions into the civilian society. Thus, the DDR program reintegrates ex-combatants into the civilian society as well as into the military.

¹¹⁹ Interview with General Charles Kayonga, in Kigali, Rwanda (March 30, 2006).

The Rwandan DDR is part of the overall Arusha peace accord that was signed in Tanzania in 1993. The Arusha peace accord was adjusted to suit the situation after genocide as some members of former government forces had committed genocide. The protocol was based on the assumption that a negotiated peace agreement was possible between the Habyarimana government and RPF. Even though the protocol involved inclusion of members of RPA/RPF, it neither provided for support of ex-combatants to effectively transition into civilian society, nor did it provide for reconciliation in *ingando* as a prerequisite for an effective DDR program.¹²⁰ To better understand the links between DDR and the civilian society in Rwanda, the chapter discusses the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP).

1. The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP)

Rwanda created a two-way holistic program that equally reintegrates the defeated enemy combatants and victorious forces into the civilian society as well as integrating within ranks the former enemy forces into the national military as shown in Figure 2. Although DDR in Rwanda is a twin program that incorporates military integration and reintegration of ex-combatants into society, the bulk of the program lies with the latter.

The reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society is conducted after a thorough sensitization program in the *ingando* solidarity camps. After *ingando*, selected members of the ex-combatants are ready to integrate freely into the society and the national economic system, as well.

Furthermore, the Rwandan DDR is neither a consent-based approach, where the negotiated agreement is reached between parties to the conflict and no clear victor to the conflict is registered, nor a coercive-based approach where a third party, usually the UN, forces the parties to the conflict to disarm, demobilize and reintegrates them into the civilian society as was the case of Liberia between December 2003 and November

¹²⁰ Gilbert M. Khadigala, "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda," in *Ending civil Wars: The Implementation*, ed. Steven John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, A Project of the International Peace Academy and The Center for International Security and Cooperation, (U.S.A: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2002), 479.

2004.¹²¹ Rather the RDRP is deliberate, yet conciliatory, and aimed at achieving stability and societal reconciliation. To achieve these goals, RDRP has set objectives:

- to demobilize ex-combatants, that is, RPA, armed groups (insurgents from Congo forests), and ex-FAR, and support their transition to civilian life;
- to support social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants who remain socio-economically vulnerable;
- to facilitate the reallocation of the government expenditure from defense spending to social and economic programs;
- to enhance social capital which is an indispensable factor for societies to interact and consequently facilitates societal reconciliation.¹²²

2. Actors and Finance

The DDR project in Rwanda is owned by the indigenous people, whereas external actors, such as World Bank and other donors take part in assessment, financial support, and evaluation of the project. Initially the project was financed by the Rwandan government, but later the Bank and other donors decided to finance the project under a multinational demobilization and reintegration program, through International Development Association (IDA) and Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) (see Table 2). These funds are distributed in different component parts of RDRP, (see Table 3).¹²³

Table 2. Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program Finance Plan

Source	Amount (Million US \$)	Percent
Government of Rwanda	2.7	5
IDA	25.0	47
Bilateral	26.6	48
Total	53.3	100

Source: RDRC Office in Kigali

¹²¹ Joanna Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilization," in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Steven John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, A Project of the International Peace Academy and The Center for International Security and Cooperation, (U.S.A: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2002), 141-182.

¹²² "Technical Annex for a proposed credit of US \$ 25 million to the Republic of Rwanda for an emergency Demobilization and reintegration program," *Document of the World Bank, Report No. T7498-RW* (March 25, 2002), 13.

¹²³ *Ibid*, 25-26.

Table 3. Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program Costs (Stage II).

Component	Unit Cost (US \$)	Total Program Cost (million US\$)	Percent
Demobilization	78	3.3	6
Reinsertion	299	17.2	32
Reintegration	338	18.4	34
Special group	759	5.6	11
Technical Assistance	35	2.3	4
Program Management	60	4.0	7
Contingencies	38	2.5	5
Total Estimate	800	53.3	100

Source: RDRC Office in Kigali

The government of Rwanda contributed US \$2.7 million in the second phase of DDR, whereas its contribution in the first phase was US \$9.8 million. Furthermore, it pays all taxes involved in works, goods and services to the program.¹²⁴ This indigenous ownership may help to explain, in part, the success of the DDR program in Rwanda. The amount collected for RDRP funding in stage II exceeded the estimated amount. The program had estimated US \$ 25 million but donors contributed US 53.3 million as shown in Table 3. Donors were motivated by a viable and effective project as well as the political will on the part of the government. In fact, the international community was so interested in the Rwandan model of DDR that they decided to increase their funding to the program, allowed the government to increase the scope of stage II of the RDDR and exceeded the original budget estimates.¹²⁵ In this way, the World Bank and other donors are hoping to establish the Rwandan program as a model for the rest of the countries in the Great Lake region undergoing DDR and security sector reform.

These funds helped to properly reinsert ex-combatants into civilian life, and have enabled them to establish their own economic projects. The financial and technical

¹²⁴ Technical Annex, 25.

¹²⁵ Interview with Lt. John Zigira, Commissioner of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, (Kigali, July 20, 2006).

assistance for projects of ex-combatants, coupled with the corporate nature of the military of viewing themselves as Rwandan rather than Hutu and Tutsi, in part has created an environment of interaction between the Hutu and Tutsi in their communities. Thus, those attributes have considerably enhanced societal reconciliation.

3. The Success and Impact of DDR Program in Rwanda

In general the success of DDR program in Rwanda can be analyzed in terms of the levels of social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into the community, and in terms of security, as well. The social reintegration and economic reintegration are complementary aspects that determine the success of DDR in post-conflict situations. Social reintegration facilitates smooth reintegration of demobilized soldiers into their communities. It contributes to social cohesion and social networks as well as social interactions. These form part of the basic requirements for societal reconciliation. Economic reintegration supports and promotes productive self-employment projects. In addition it addresses issues related to social and psychological integration needs, thus, facilitating financial independence on the part of ex-combatants. As for security, it is a fundamental pillar for post-conflict reconstruction and a prerequisite for social and economic reintegration.¹²⁶ Furthermore, successful reintegration of ex-combatants into the society entails that ex-combatants live without fear, or unbearable psychological stress.¹²⁷ Therefore, a combination of social and economic reintegration not only facilitates social cohesion, networks and interaction as well as individual financial independence, but rather it has remarkably enhanced stability and societal reconciliation particularly in Rwanda.

The RDRP has demobilized and reintegrated a total of 55,582 ex-combatants into the civilian society (see Table 5). Upon discharge from ingando ex-combatants are allocated a basic needs kit (BNK) equivalent to FRW 50,000, and recognition of service allowance ranging from FRW 150,000 to FRW 500,000 depending on an individual's

¹²⁶ Amanuel Mehreteab, "Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Tracer Study," (Republic of Rwanda: Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, May 2005), 70.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 72.

rank.¹²⁸ Some of this money is pulled together by some members of ex-combatants to form a project. Thus, the program initiates expansion and support of those projects.

In Rwanda ex-combatants have established social networks and interaction through participation in communal activities: attending marriages, helping in case of emergencies, and attending rituals and funerals. In this case the program has taken this advantage to enhance and strengthen the relationship of ex-combatants and civilian population in their communities. In particular the program finances and supports 169 projects around the country such as burial sites, private parking lots and restaurants. These projects are jointly owned by the civilians and ex-combatants. In communities, for example, statistics indicate the levels of social-economic reintegration of ex-combatants: those who interact with fellow ex-combatants, 85.1%; good interaction within communities, 82.2%; trust within communities, 64.1%; ex-combatants involved in associations, 33.6%, others are involved in public works and causal labor. About 63% of these associations are based in provinces outside Kigali city.¹²⁹

These figures partly depict the effectiveness of these projects and associations in Rwanda, unlike other post-conflict situations where the majority of ex-combatants concentrate in the suburbs of the capital city as seen in cases of Liberia and South Africa. In addition the figures also indicate the level of acceptance on the part of the receiving community. Furthermore, because of effective deviation of war resources into social and economic assets, defense spending was reduced from 4.3% of GDP in 1998 to 2.1% of GDP in 2005, save to state total security within and along Rwandan borders.¹³⁰ Consequently, this indicates that the level of social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants is above average.

¹²⁸ "Technical Annex for a proposed credit of US \$ 25 million to the Republic of Rwanda for an emergency Demobilization and reintegration program," *Document of the World Bank, Report No. T7498-RW* (March 25, 2002), 17-18.

¹²⁹ Mehreteab, 72-76.

¹³⁰ "Technical Annex for a proposed credit of US \$ 25 million to the Republic of Rwanda for an emergency Demobilization and reintegration program," *Document of the World Bank, Report No. T7498-RW* (March 25, 2002), 3; "Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program World Bank/Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Secretariat Implementation and Support Mission Report," *Aide-memoire-IDA Credit # 3634, MPRP/MDTF # 52159*, (Kigali, February 3, 2006), 7.

In the event that ex-combatants are not employed or their welfare is not good, it may be attributed to an unemployment factor of 70% of all Rwandans in general. Also this may be attributed to individual social incompetence as well as disabilities due to sickness or war. Nevertheless, the program supports those groups through a vulnerable support window (VSW) as discussed in the section of exit strategy.

4. DDR Duration, Timeline vis-a-vis Reconciliation And Stability

The DDR model in Rwanda started in 1994 when members of ex-FAR who were either captured or had surrendered were integrated into the ranks of the RPA. The DDR process in Rwanda was not driven by time, but instead was created as a deliberate process to achieve unity and reconciliation. Promoting reconciliation is a process that requires patience and enough time in order to build trust among the victims and the perceived assailants. The program was also designed to produce gradual, rather than immediate, results because it would seem unrealistic for an ex-combatant who had spent 10-20 years fighting, and who had decided to kill, to be released after five days in cantonment camps to join the rest of the civilian society, as were the cases of Liberia, Angola, and, recently, Burundi. In these countries, ex-combatants were discharged without social, political, or economic orientation to civilian life. Without the expanded *ingango* training, ex-combatants are more likely to transfer all values and behaviors they possess into the civilian society. Large-scale violent conflict may end, but serious criminal activities will reign and no stability will be achieved within communities. By promoting DDR programs that promote rapid reintegration rather than education before reintegration, the practitioners will not have helped the ex-combatant to integrate into society, the nation, or the civilian population where the ex-combatant will be settled. Consequently, neither stability nor societal reconciliation will be achieved and efforts geared at achieving peace by the international community will be in vain.

5. Organization and Structure of the RDRP

The Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP) is coordinated by the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) which is the central organization that oversees all activities of the program and is answerable to the

Ministry of Finance.¹³¹ The Commission also has offices and representatives at provincial, district and community levels of the local government affiliated with the local administration at various levels. The organization is staffed with active military, ex-combatants, and civilians hired on the basis of competence, skills and experience in DDR and other related reintegration activities regardless of their nationality.¹³²

Funds and personnel are under the direct control of the provincial administration and other levels of the administrative governance. In addition finances, economic projects and small projects' associations of both civilians and ex-combatants are integral parts of the overall development plan of the local government. The Commission is responsible for technical assistance and skills development at different levels of the government in coordination with the local authorities. Thus, the ex-combatants become integrated in the national economic system from the strategic to local levels.

The intricacy of the RDRP organization and structure in part enables the integration of projects of ex-combatants into economic projects of civilians at various levels of the government. Also it indirectly mingles the ex-combatants with the civilians in the community, which in turn facilitates interaction and consequently enhances societal reconciliation.

Also the program has an informal link to the National Unity Reconciliation Commission (NURC). Why is the RDRC not formally under the office of the NURC? The reasons are that, first, the NURC oversees unity and reconciliation across government structures and society strata rather than focusing on the DDR program as one of its main components. Also, as Ltc. John Zigira argues, it is the task of RDRP to demilitarize ex-combatants, go through the process of demobilization and later release the ex-combatants to NURC in the communities where they will reside.¹³³ Third, the NURC consistently plays a major role during the sensitization phase, in *ingando*. Lastly, after demobilization and reintegration into society, the NURC conducts educational programs for ex-combatants. This time they are mixed with other civilians. This facilitates

¹³¹ Interview with Jean Siyinzoga; he is a civilian and one of the commissioners in the RDRC, and also the president of RDRP, (Kigali, March 28, 2006).

¹³² World Bank Report, 31.

¹³³ Interview with Ltc. John Zigira, (Kigali, July 20, 2006).

integration between ex-combatants and civilians. This may also, in part, assist in explaining why reconciliation values become entrenched into ex-combatants in their communities.¹³⁴

6. Facets of RDRP

The program is composed of three main phases that follow *ingando*: demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of ex-combatants. Each phase of the program carries out an intensive sensitization program on prevention and mitigation of HIV/AIDS. In addition the program caters to special and vulnerable groups, such as women and children, and those who are victims of HIV/AIDS.¹³⁵

The beneficiaries of the RDRP are the ex-Forces Armées Rwandaise (ex-FAR), armed groups (different armed factions that were formed in eastern DRC after genocide), and members of the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF). The RDF is an integrated government force of both former ex-FAR and RPA. So far, in stage II of the program 36,754 ex-combatants have been demobilized and reinserted into society (see Table 3)¹³⁶ and they are now being reintegrated into the national economic system. However, 60,000 ex-combatants have been demobilized and reintegrated in the civilian society in stages I & II of RDRP (see Table 5).

¹³⁴ Interview with Fatuma Ndagiza, the Executive Secretary of the Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, (Kigali, March 29, 2006).

¹³⁵ World Bank Report, 15-26.

¹³⁶ “Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program World Bank/Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Secretariat Implementation and Support Mission Report,” *Aide-memoire-IDA Credit # 3634, MPRP/MDTF # 52159*, (Kigali, February 3, 2006), 2.

Table 4. Number of Ex-combatants Demobilized in stage II: Dec. 2001 – Dec. 31, 2005

Demobilization (Stage II only)	Dec 2001 – Dec 2004	2005	Total
RDF: - Adult male	16,574	2,212	
- Adult female	17	2	
Sub-total	16,591	2,214	18,805
Armed groups:			
- Adult male	4,483	577	
- Adult female	26	1	
- Child male	543	25	
- Child female	2	0	
Sub-total	5,054	603	5,657
EX-FAR: - Adult male	12,085	0	
- Adult female	203	0	
Sub-total	12,290	0	12,290
Grand Total	33,937	2,817	36,754

Source: RDRC Office in Kigali

Table 5. Summary of Demobilization Phases in Stages I & II as of 23/3/2006

S/No	Category	Demobilised to-date	Balance	Total Planned	%age
A)	Stage 1 (Ex-RDF)				
1	Ex-RDF Nov. 1997 (Phase 1)*	7,419			
2	Ex-RDF Dec 1998 (Phase 2)	3,639			
3	Ex-RDF Feb 2001 (Phase 3)	7,634			
	Subtotal	18,692			
B)	Ex-RDF planned (Stage 2)			20,000	
1	Ex-RDF Apr/May 02 (phase 4)	4,660			
2	Ex-RDF Jul 02 (Phase 5)	2,208			
3	Ex-RDF Dec. 02 (phase 6)	1,780			
4	Ex-RDF Aug. 03 (phase 7)	2,065			
5	Ex-RDF Dec. 03 (Phase 8)	2,298			
6	Ex-RDF April 04 (Phase 9)	2,191			
7	Ex-RDF September 04 (Phase 10)	1,389			
8	Ex-RDF February 05 (Phase 11)	1,252			
9	Ex-RDF November 05 (Phase 12)	962			
	Subtotal	18,805	1,195		94
C)	Ex-FAR Planned			15,000	
1	Ex-FAR March 2003 (Phase 1)	9,841			
2	Ex-FAR November 2003 (Phase 2)	2,417			
3	Ex-FAR November 2004 (Phase 3)	32			
	Subtotal	12,290	2,710		82
D)	Ex-AG Adults Planned			22,500	
1	Ex-AG Nkumba-Mudende (phase 1)	1,758			
2	Ex-AG Mutobo 1 Aug 02 (phase 2)	265			
3	Ex-AG Mutobo 2 Nov 02 (phase 3)	110			
4	Ex-AG Mutobo 3 Dec 02 (phase 4)	394			
5	Ex-AG Mutobo 4 Mar 03 (phase 5)	207			
6	Ex-AG Mutobo 5 Jun 03 (phase 6)	294			
7	Ex-AG Mutobo 6 Sept 03 (phase 7)	161			
8	Ex-AG Mutobo 7 December 03 (phase 8)	225			
9	Ex-AG Mutobo 8 March 04 (phase 9)	665			
10	Ex-AG Mutobo 9 May 04 (phase 10)	239			
11	Ex-AG Mutobo 10 August 04 (phase 11)	128			
12	Ex-AG Mutobo 11 November 04 (phase 12)	63			
13	Ex-AG Mutobo 12 February 05 (phase 13)	92			
14	Ex-AG Mutobo 13 May 05 (phase 14)	70			
15	Ex-AG Mutobo 14 August 05 (phase 15)	100			
16	Ex-AG Mutobo 15 November 05 (phase 16)	116			
17	Ex-AG Mutobo 16 December 05 (phase 17)	200			
18	Ex-AG Mutobo 7 March 06 (phase 18)	138			
	Subtotal	5,225	17,275		23
E)	Ex-AG Child combatants Planned			2,500	
1	Ex-AG Child Gitagata (CICR 2001)	454			
2	Ex-AG Child Muhazi Reh. Centre (From May 18, 2004)	116			
	Subtotal	570	1,930		23
GRAND TOTAL (A+B+C+D+F)		55,582	23,110	60,000	

* Includes 2364 ex-child soldiers

Source: RDRC Office in Kigali

7. Exit Strategy

The RDRP provides an exit strategy for when the program finishes. For instance the program links ex-combatants in different fields to related ministries in the government. The exit strategy helps ex-combatants to fully integrate into the mainstream of the economic system of the country. This prevents the collapse of the already standing economic infrastructure and social relations. In this case ex-combatants with HIV/AIDS, chronic diseases and victims of the war with disabilities who have failed to cope with civilian life; the program gives them more financial assistance to start new projects within their capacities. So far the project takes care of 2,400 disabled ex-combatants; meanwhile they negotiate transition to related line ministries and commissions such as HIV/AIDS Commission and local government.¹³⁷

Among the vulnerable groups who are the beneficiaries of the vulnerable support window (VSW) are the ex-child soldiers and women. The VSW is a fund used to improve on the welfare and project support of vulnerable groups such as ex-child soldiers and women, the sick with chronic diseases, and victims of HIV/AIDS. So far the program has demobilized 570 child soldiers in stage II, who were found in the armed groups from the Congo forest. It currently provides reintegration support through vocational training (41%), income-generating activities such as farming and petty trade (32.5%), and formal education (26.5%).¹³⁸ As for gender, women ex-combatants are linked to relevant line ministries and civil society programs.¹³⁹ This guarantees continuity and sustainability of social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into normal life in civilian society.

However, exit strategies in conventional DDR programs have been neglected and yet, are a major issue in the endless post-conflict instability. For instance, practitioners at times set unrealistic timetables as mentioned earlier in this chapter. The program becomes time-driven rather than addressing the root cause of the conflict in a deliberate way that will allow for gradual reconciliation and demilitarization of the minds of ex-combatants. Partly, this may help explain the failure of the international organizations,

¹³⁷ Technical Annex, 21-25.

¹³⁸ “Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program World Bank/Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Secretariat Implementation and Support Mission Report,” *Aide-memoire-IDA Credit # 3634, MPRP/MDTF # 52159*, (Kigali, February 3, 2006), 6.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 7.

NGO's and other practitioners involved in post-conflict situations to effectively live up to the DDR program's expectations of sustainable peace.

Therefore, a comprehensive demobilization and reintegration program that takes place after a deliberate and thorough sensitization program for ex-combatants, when coupled with detailed and feasible exit strategies, will not only enhance societal reconciliation, but will also act as a mitigating factor for conflict influence factors in post-conflict situations.

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the dilemma of punishment versus societal reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. It analyzed the impact of *ingando*, military integration, and reintegration of ex-combatants into the civilian society in post-1994 Rwanda. Through this analysis, the chapter argued that the *ingando* model of sensitization is a prerequisite for successful military integration as well as reintegration of ex-combatants into the civilian society because it enhances behavioral change, demilitarizes the mind, and deconstructs enemy image. As far as integrating ex-combatants into the national military is concerned, the chapter concludes that this is an indispensable and a viable affirmative action that assures the society of group and individual safety, and eliminates fear thereby aiding reconciliation. Moreover, in ethnic conflicts, the military is viewed as the mirror of the society and a trust builder in a divided society. Whereas a comprehensive reintegration program for both ex-combatants and victor forces into the society acts as an agent of values transfer, such as reconciliation values learnt in *ingando* and ex-soldiers identifying themselves as Rwandan rather than Hutu or Tutsi. This facilitates interaction within the society, and hence makes it possible for societal reconciliation. Also a comprehensive program assures ex-combatants of a sustainable welfare through viable exit strategies that mitigates conflict influence factors such as lack of education for young men and unemployment.

Thus, military integration/reintegration of ex-combatants that precedes a deliberate sensitization program will not only enhance stability and societal reconciliation, but also changes the culture of hate and despair into a culture of hope and peace.

V. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

Civil wars continue to devastate countries around the world. However, neither the victory of one group nor negotiated settlement of the conflict has resulted in total stability. Conflict may resurface when the defeated group is marginalized or excluded from the political and economic structures and institutions of the new government. The fact is that, regardless of the cause of the conflict, the consequences of the war are the same: refugees, casualties, absence of rule of law, exclusion of certain ethnic groups and ethnic division. Thus, conflict resolution strategies should be geared toward achieving stability and unity within the society. One method of reaching a lasting peace is to ensure participation by all competing factions in a new government. One aspect of this participation is to make certain that the new government's military forces fully integrate members from all parties in the previous conflict. Therefore, a properly conducted program of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and integration (DDRI) of warring factions is a major aspect of post-conflict security building that ensures sustainable stability and reconciliation in societies devastated by civil war. Also, the success of DDRI is a function of an intensive and comprehensive sensitization program delivered to ex-combatants before reintegration into the society. It also incorporates integration into the nation's military as was the case of *ingando* in post-conflict DDRI in Rwanda.

B. FINDINGS

The DDR concept begun at the end of the Cold War in 1989 as an international community's effort to end violent conflicts in countries plagued by civil war, insurgency, and ethnic conflicts especially in Africa and Latin America. The conventional program of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is composed of three models. Those models are conducted in two main phases: the short-medium phase that focuses on the disarmament, demobilization, and integration process of ex-combatants, and the long-term phase that deals with the reintegration process of ex-combatants into civilian life.

The first DDRI model is the consent-based model. This model is based on a comprehensive negotiated settlement of conflict between two parties, and is usually

conducted under third party supervision. The government forces may absorb some guerrilla forces, or they may merge the two warring factions to form a single national military force. It is important to note here that, although this model of DDRI is conducted after the conclusion of hostilities, the security situation usually remains fragile.

The second case is complete demobilization: the government decides to downsize its military through normal channels of DDR, but does not include former enemy combatants in its forces. For instance, in 1991, Ethiopia completely demobilized former government forces of the Derg regime following the defeat of Mengistu Haile Mariam, and refused to include some members in their force.

The last is the coercive model of DDR. It involves forced disarmament of insurgents and is carried out by external intervention under a United Nations' mandate. The most recent case was the disarmament of Somalia factions in 1993. In the first phase of this operation, the U.S. forces managed to capture a large number of weapons. Nevertheless, the operation ended in a disaster. So, the intended objectives to secure the environment for humanitarian operations, national reconciliation, and economic reconstruction were not achieved in Somalia. Although these dimensions of DDRI have not been properly carried out in the past, they form an integral part of the overall post-conflict security building program. The failure of DDR programs may be attributed to challenges presented by the fluid structure of an international system in which critical issues necessary for the success of the program, such as funding and coordinating DDR activities become problems.

Despite the challenges mentioned above, the DDRI model is useful to apply when addressing fundamental issues that might have caused the war in states formerly weakened or fractured by sectarian violence. This is because DDRI possesses the capability to yield stability and reconciliation through proper integration and reintegration of ex-combatants. In the case of stability, DDRI converts the conflict war resources into economic development tools. It also develops human capital (ex-combatants) and regulates conflict influence factors, thus providing suitable conditions for societal reconciliation.

As far as military professionalism is concerned, DDRI has many benefits. It promotes healthy civil-military relations. By doing so, it has the potential to significantly

reduce the occurrence of further internal strife in states previously afflicted by violent inter-communal conflicts. Furthermore, it enhances combat capability and efficiency to protect the nation against external aggression. Consequently, it encourages representation in the military, which gradually translates into societal reconciliation. Therefore, in the effort to foster reconciliation between former adversaries, DDRI is useful because it enhances social, economic, and political reintegration of ex-combatants into the new regime.

In addition, the DDRI process converts the ex-combatants who were regarded as spoilers into productive economic actors. It removes weapons, ammunition and mines from circulation, and redirects resources that have been used to support the war effort towards the peacetime economy. Demobilization removes a large number of fighting personnel and converts them into productive members of the society. If these ex-combatants and weapons are not removed from circulation they not only cause severe damage to human life, but also make post-conflict societal reconstruction difficult. However, this chapter argues that a well conducted DDR process removes all those uncontrolled war resources from the theatre and restores peace and stability in the troubled regions, which creates conditions for possible societal reconciliation. As a result, DDRI amalgamates warring factions into a single national force. This approach promotes security in that all different ethnic groups should be represented in the military as was the case of Mozambique, South Africa, and Rwanda.

As for civil-military relations and societal reconciliation, military integration builds a representative, and professional military which is not easily manipulated by politicians for their own interests. In accomplishing this task, military integration and professionalism have the potential significantly to reduce the occurrence of further internal strife in states previously afflicted by ethnic violence, and enhance a combat effective military that is able to protect the nation against external aggression. Also, this thesis discussed the role of an ethnically homogenous military in propagating ethnic hatred and promoting ethnic division. In Rwanda, the Hutu military directly or indirectly participated in series of massacre of the Tutsi since 1959, to include the horrific 1994 genocide. Chapter III discussed the role of the military and ethnic violence in pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods in Rwanda. It analyzed the origin of ethnic

groups in Rwanda; it pointed out that ethnicity and ethnic identity were stereotyped and given to Rwandans by early explorers, missionaries, and entrenched by colonialists. Also the chapter analyzed factors that led to politicized military in Rwanda between 1959 and 1994: ethnic recruitment and sub-national favoritism, domestic deployment, lack of urgency, and creation of parallel forces. Lastly, in Rwanda, an ethnically homogenous military participated in the series of massacres of the Tutsi, including the 1994 genocide. Consequently, this impacted negatively on post-conflict DDRI in Rwanda.

The DDRI in Rwanda has been the one of the successful cases. In addition to components of the traditional disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, the Rwandan case firstly, incorporates reconciliation values of integrating defeated former enemy forces into the national military despite its direct or indirect role in the atrocities committed to the Tutsi since 1959 to include genocide. Second, DDRI in Rwanda conducts a comprehensive sensitization program in solidarity camps known as *ingando*. Lastly, the program has an elaborate exit strategy to support vulnerable groups when the program ends.

ingando is a sensitization mechanism for ex-combatants which deconstructs the enemy image, promotes behavior change, and analyses the basis of ethnic prejudice before ex-combatants are either integrated into the military or reintegrated into civilian society. This is done through intensive educational programs on social, political, and economic aspects of government and society. Military integration refers to a tangible affirmative action that eliminates fear, and builds trust and confidence between ex-combatants and their fellow ethnic groups. Reintegration acts as an agent of value transfer, and facilitates interaction because ex-combatants who are encouraged to view themselves as Rwandan rather than Hutu or Tutsi – thus enhancing reconciliation. This thesis, however, argues that *ingando* is a rehabilitation and reconciliation tool intended to accomplish several things: transform negative perceptions that cause ethnic hatred; mitigate conflict influence factors such as fear and exclusion; manage defeat, shame, and remorse for those who committed atrocities; and erase myths and erroneous theories of ethnic differences of the type discussed in Chapter III. Furthermore, it eliminates fear and illusive perception, and consequently restores hope, instills confidence, and creates a more responsible and patriotic Rwandan.

The thesis discussed the dilemma of punishment versus societal reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. It analyzed the impact of *ingando*, military integration, and reintegration of ex-combatants into the civilian society in post-1994 Rwanda. It pointed out that the *ingando* model of sensitization is a prerequisite for successful military integration as well as reintegration of ex-combatant. As far as integrating ex-combatants into the national military is concerned, the thesis concludes that this is an indispensable and a viable affirmative action that assures the security of ethnic groups and individual safety, and eliminates fear thereby aiding reconciliation. Moreover, in ethnic conflicts, the military is viewed as the mirror of the society and a trust builder in a divided society. This facilitates interaction within the society, and hence makes it possible for societal reconciliation. Also, a comprehensive DDRI program assures ex-combatants of a sustainable economic reintegration through viable exit strategies that mitigates conflict influence factors such as lack of education for young men, and unemployment. Thus, military integration/reintegration of ex-combatants that precedes a deliberate sensitization program will not only enhance stability and societal reconciliation, but also changes the culture of hate and despair into a culture of hope and peace.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNT

Every post-conflict situation is unique depending on the country's social, economic, and political features as well as the magnitude of the destruction in areas devastated by war. However, there are some basics that are applicable to all situations that might assist practitioners in their efforts to prevent or resolve conflicts in post-conflict situations in general and DDRI. They include:

- The DDRI program should be organized by the indigenous efforts and supported by the international community and by international financial institutions. This not only supports the indigenous nation financially, but it also promotes transparency and accountability;
- A sensitization program for ex-combatants in *ingando* before integration into the military and reintegration into the civilian society is an indispensable element that determines the success of DDRI program;
- The integration of ex-combatants into the military is an important factor that ensures representation and guarantees individual and group safety in post-conflict situation;

- The political will on the part of the leadership is also an essential aspect for the success of the DDRI program;
- During the reintegration program, economic projects of ex-combatants should form an integral part of developmental activities of the local government. The follow on support should be decentralized to province and district level;
- The exit strategy should be put into consideration earlier in the planning process for a complete transition from DDRI program to civilian life in case the program is terminated.

D. CONCLUSION

In sum, military integration is an important factor for stability and societal reconciliation in post-conflict situations. It ensures representation of different groups of society into the military, thus, dispelling fear and promoting confidence more especially on the part of the losers. In addition DDRI promotes military professionalism which in turn enhances combat capability and efficiency, as well as health civil-military relations. Furthermore, military integration and reintegration that precedes a comprehensive sensitization program of ex-combatants is an important aspect that leads to the success of DDRI program. Consequently, for sustainable stability and societal reconciliation, DDRI program should have a comprehensive exit strategy that will take care of some elements of ex-combatants who have failed economically to reintegrate into the society, such as victims of HIV/AIDS, disabled ex-combatants, former child soldiers and women.

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