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PERCEPTIONS OF REGIME LEGITIMACY IN MOZAMBIQUE: LEGITIMACY IN TRANSITION?

by

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The growth and development of democratic regimes across the globe has been of particular interest to political scientists over the last several decades. The question of what is an appropriate and relevant regime depends on various aspects of people's political ideals. Mozambique is one such nation wherein democratic developments have been recent and somewhat successful. This thesis focuses firstly on the views and political ideals of rural dwellers, and secondly on generational differences in political ideals and views on regime legitimacy at the local level. It suggests youth and the elders have different views concerning how they should be ruled and what constitutes a legitimate political regime. At the local level, there are manifestations of the central democratic regime and the historically traditional regime. Rural youth consider the democratic regime to be legitimate and the traditional regime to be incompatible with their ideals. In their opinion, the existing traditional regime is outdated and irrelevant. Older adults in rural areas, in contrast to the youth, are aware of the duality in regime-types at the local level, but believe there is a place in the community for both to exist. In the opinion of the adults, both regimes are compatible with their ideals and are thus legitimate. If these two significant segments of Mozambican society – rural youth and rural elders - hold strongly opposing views concerning what constitutes a legitimate regime, this would hold important implications for regime legitimacy in Mozambique.

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PERCEPTIONS OF REGIME LEGITIMACY IN MOZAMBIQUE: LEGITIMACY IN TRANSITION?

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ABSTRACT

The growth and development of democratic regimes across the globe has been of particular interest to political scientists over the last several decades. The question of what is an appropriate and relevant regime depends on various aspects of people's political ideals. Mozambique is one such nation wherein democratic developments have been recent and somewhat successful. This thesis focuses firstly on the views and political ideals of rural dwellers, and secondly on generational differences in political ideals and views on regime legitimacy at the local level. It suggests youth and the elders have different views concerning how they should be ruled and what constitutes a legitimate political regime. At the local level, there are manifestations of the central democratic regime and the historically traditional regime. Rural youth consider the democratic regime to be legitimate and the traditional regime to be incompatible with their ideals. In their opinion, the existing traditional regime is outdated and irrelevant. Older adults in rural areas, in contrast to the youth, are aware of the duality in regime-types at the local level, but believe there is a place in the community for both to exist. In the opinion of the adults, both regimes are compatible with their ideals and are thus legitimate. If these two significant segments of Mozambican society – rural youth and rural elders - hold strongly opposing views concerning what constitutes a legitimate regime, this would hold important implications for regime legitimacy in Mozambique.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION

The growth and development of democratic regimes across the globe has been of particular interest to political scientists over the last several decades. The question of what is an appropriate and relevant regime depends on various aspects of people's political ideals. Mozambique is one such nation wherein democratic developments have been recent and somewhat successful. However, like many African countries, economic underdevelopment has isolated pockets of the country's citizens in rural areas. Considering that a vast majority of Mozambique's citizens live in rural areas, understanding their opinions and political ideals concerning how they should be governed is essential in developing and maintaining a legitimate democratic regime. Historically, Mozambicans have been governed by a variety of means including authoritarian, traditional, colonial and communist regimes. Their history and experience have shaped their political ideals and views today.

This thesis focuses firstly on the views and political ideals of rural dwellers, and secondly on generational differences in political ideals and views on regime legitimacy. Many factors influence people's political ideals. The formation of those political ideals is not the primary focus of this thesis – what those political ideals *are*, however, is the focus. Research suggests youth and the elders have different views concerning how they should be ruled and what constitutes a legitimate political authority and legitimate regime at the local level. Older members of Mozambican society have lived through civil war and poverty and deprivation while today's youth have lived in peace and the beginnings of steady economic growth. If these two significant segments of Mozambican society hold strongly opposing views concerning what constitutes a legitimate regime, this would hold important implications for regime legitimacy in Mozambique.

B. SUMMARY OF CURRENT LITERATURE

1. Survey of Prior Work on the Question

Volumes of literature have been written on democratization in Africa. This is arguably the most pressing issue on the continent today.[1] Nevertheless, democratic reforms have been "tentative, partial, and incomplete, leaving Africa with hybrid regimes that awkwardly mix old and new principles of organization."[2] These hybrid systems mix the "old" and "new" principles of organization because Africans are still trying to reconcile traditional government methods with imported forms of democracy. Democratic development endeavors are often overshadowed by debates concerning the type of democracy Africans are adopting. However, the more important question may be whether or not the resulting hybrid regimes are truly legitimate in the eyes of the people throughout all levels of society.

In this thesis, a regime or regime type refers to how the government is organized and hence how the people are ruled. Regime types include liberal democratic types, communist types and military and civilian dictatorships. Two common regime types in Africa are, for example, the hegemonial exchange type and the bureaucratic centralist type.[3] The strength of the system lies in the acceptance of the legitimacy of the regime associated with the state. As Chabal notes, having accountable, legitimate leaders is even more important to Africans than going through the motions of multi-party democracy.[4] It is through the rules of the regime that these "accountable, legitimate leaders" are selected.

The concept of regime is often confused with the concepts of state and government, yet the terms are distinctly different in the context of this thesis and political

1 In *The Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa,* Mbaku and Ihonvbere argue that the "reconstruction of the African state to provide citizens with participatory, accountable, and transparent governance structures remains one of the most important issues in the continent's political adjustment in the "new" global era" (5).

2 Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 14.

3 Rothschild and Chazan explain in-depth the attributes of these types of regimes in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, ed., *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988) 248-252.

4 Patrick Chabal, "A Few Considerations on Democracy in Africa," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 74 (April 1998) 302.

science literature in general. There is consensus in literature that the term "state" refers to "the organized aggregate of relatively permanent institutions of governance."[5] The state is the most general term used to reference the organizations through which power is exercised. The primary components of the state are the "decision-making structures (executives, parties, parliaments), decision-enforcing institutions (bureaucracies, parastatal organizations, and security forces), and decision-mediating bodies (primarily courts, tribunals, and investigatory commissions)."[6] The state takes on different characteristics depending on the country in which it is organized. It often is used to reference the organization of instruments of domination. A regime, which was defined in the previous paragraph, is a less general concept than the state. The regime, in contrast to the state, is used to define the forms and procedures of rule. "If the idea of state is associated primarily with the organization of power, regime focuses on how state power is exercised and legitimated."[7] At the lowest level of generality, below the state and the regime, is the government. The government is the composed of the individuals who govern administratively. This thesis is not concerned with the legitimacy of the Mozambican state, but with a specific form of rule – the democratic regime type – and its institutional components.

Some scholars argue that, at independence, African countries adopted constitutions that held legal sway but lacked legitimacy.[8] "Constitution making was a *top-down, elite-driven and non-participatory* process in which the rules were designed externally and imposed on the people."[9] The adopted regimes "did not reflect the values of the people, nor their cultures and traditions."[10] Constitutions were based on European models that developed in the course of European history, and thus reflected European

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[5] Raymond Duvall and John R. Freeman, "The State and Dependent Capitalism," *International Studies Quarterly* 25, 1 (1981) 106.

[6] Naomi Chazan, et. al. *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* 3rd Ed (Boulder: Lynned Rienner Publishers, 1999) 39.

[7] Chazan, et. al. 39.

[8] Mbaku in John Mukum Mbaku and Julius O. Ihonvbere ed., *The Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa: The Continuing Struggle* (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2003) 110. See also U. Sundhaussen. "Democracy and the middle classes: reflections on political development" *The Australian Journal of Politics and History* 37 (1991) 100-117.

[9] Mbaku 110.

[10] Mbaku 110.

conceptions of legitimacy. The process was led by elites in the urban areas, neglecting the input of the large population that lived in rural areas. "The primary issue was that these models did not reflect the values of the people to be governed by the rules;" thus they lacked legitimacy.[11] Ultimately, lawmakers failed to "engage the population in the type of constitution making that would have provided each country with relevant and effective laws and institutions."[12] The regime types instituted by the constitutions were comprised of procedures and forms of rule that, if practiced as the constitutions stated, were foreign to the majority of the population.

In the 1990s, "constitutional engineering enjoyed quite a revival," with the wisdom of the time suggesting that constitutional documents "should conform to certain generally agreed upon principles of democratic governance in their various forms, while at the same time they should reflect national traditions and mores."[13] In many African countries, including Mozambique, national commissions or conferences were held in which the constitutions were redrafted, representing a broader base among the population than the original constitutions. While this process served to re-legitimize the states and their authority, major sectors of society, most notably rural populations, were left out of the process. This insight is important, because, as Ndulo argues, the "process of adopting a constitution is as important as its substance. The process must be legitimate and in order for it to be legitimate it must be inclusive. It should represent the interests of all the people in the country."[14] As a result of the exclusion of the rural population, the regime types that resulted from the new constitutions did not fully incorporate the ideals

[11] Mbaku 110.

[12] Ibid 111.

[13] Jorge Heine in Ursula J. van Beek, ed. *Democracy under constructions: Patterns from four continents* (Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, 2006) 75.

[14] Muno Ndulo, *Constitution Making in Africa* (Cornell University, Africa Notes, December 1996) 4. http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/AFRICA/outreach/pdf/Constitution_Making_in_Africa.pdf#search=%22Constitutions%20of%20Africa%22 Accessed 16 September 2006

of the rural population, particularly the role of traditional institutions in the regime.[15] As the regimes of African states further consolidate, this is an issue that they have begun to address.

For centuries, the dominant regime types in Africa have belonged to a family of regimes that were labeled "traditional" or "tribal," meaning that they were informal[16] systems, often hereditary and gerontocratic in nature. In some areas these traditional systems of rule encompassed hierarchical kingdoms, but in most places they were composed of a series of decentralized, loosely-associated local rulers, often called "kings" or "chiefs."[17] The colonial interlude created larger political units encompassing many precolonial societies. Despite attempts by the government to gradually "emasculate [local] rulers of all powers, leaving them with only their ceremonial functions,"[18] local kings and chiefs have persisted in many societies. The result was that two systems of rule, democratic and traditional, coexisted after independence. However, in most states the initial democratic regimes established after independence were short-lived in practice. At the local level traditional regimes persisted while, at the national level, the democratic regimes quickly evolved into authoritarian dictatorships for a variety of reasons. In the last fifteen years, through internal and international pressure, African states have slowly begun the process of re-democratization. In many rural areas, however, traditional regimes have persisted. These two regimes types co-exist within states, often based on different foundations of legitimacy.

In fact, Forrest suggests that in the post-colonial era there has been "a broad effort to reprioritize an indigenous African sense of legitimacy in regard to local and regional

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[15] Ndulo addresses this point in regards to constitutions and traditional authority in his essay entitled *Constitution Making in Africa:* "There is a need to accommodate traditional leaders in constitutional arrangements or, at least,, face up to their existence. For instance, traditional leaders could be iincorporated into the local government system and form the nucleus of that system. This could enhance the effectiveness of local government in the rural areas. If colonial powers were shred enough to use them in administering the colonial state, why should the modern African political systems not be able to involve the traditional systems in efforts to reach out to small communities and build national consensus and cohesion." 3.

[16] "Informal" in this context and throughout the thesis is defined as "not codified in written law."

[17] Chazan, et. al. 81-82.

[18] Austin Amissah in Dov Ronen, ed., *Democracy and Pluralism in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986) 44.

authority."[19] In some instances, without a specific government mandate, the chieftancy institutions have continued to exist, serving functions such as mediation and land allocation "that formal local government is not carrying out because it lacks the resources, capacity or understanding."[20] In many areas, particularly in rural regions, traditional leaders continue to effectively serve in social, political and religious leadership capacities. This reflects the view that chieftancy is a dynamic, adaptable institution that maintains relevancy today.[21]

The role of government in rural areas, where traditional and democratic regimes exist in duality, is crucial to overall state legitimacy. It is well known that historically the formal "states" in Africa often have had limited reach beyond the urbanized areas. The authority of the formal regimes – whether democratic or authoritarian - often competes with other legitimate authorities, such as traditional rulers. In many rural areas, for example, traditional authorities have more legitimacy and can exercise greater local control than the central government, regardless of national level regime type.[22] This is a result of a variety of historical, economic and political factors. Economic and political control was focused in urban areas, in a sense forcing the rural areas to fend for themselves.[23] The lack of state penetration into rural areas has placed greater importance on the role of traditional authorities, who were for many decades the only visible form of a political structure.[24] Understanding the role traditional authorities play in rural areas as well as the acceptance of the traditional regime is one of the primary endeavors of this thesis.

While it is generally accepted that traditional regimes, as manifested through the authority of traditional leaders, is a legitimate regime in many rural areas, advances in

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[19] Joshua B. Forrest, *Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances and Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004) 236.

[20] Donald I Ray in Donald R. Ray and P.S Reddy ed., *Grassroots Governance? Chiefs in Africa and the Afro-Caribbean* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2003) 18.

[21] See George B. Ayittey, *Africa Betrayed* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

[22] See Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 177.

[23] Francis M. Deng et al., *Sovereignty as Responsibility* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996) 105.

[24] See Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). He claims the state cannot penetrate rural areas because rural areas strongholds of traditional authority.

education, development and technology[25] have exposed rural-dwellers to other regime-types that are not consistent with the form of rule and systems within the traditional regimes. These developments in African society have undermined the foundations of the gerontocratic system in the eyes of young people.[26] Among young people, the most mobile group in society, ideas about authority and political organization are learned in school and in the cities, areas that older people have less access to, or are less inclined to go. Youth are more "receptive to the spread of western values, conveyed by the school system, the administration and the media."[27] It is not surprising that a significant gap seems to have developed in the perceptions and opinions about legitimate regimes between generations.

This thesis deals with conceptions of legitimate forms of rule – regime types - in rural areas among members of different generations. Many African countries are undergoing rapid social change, which means that younger generations often have significantly different life experiences from those of their elders. In Liberia, for example, the views and attitudes of the generation that came of age during Liberia's civil war in the 1990s differ significantly from those of the older generation that had already come of age during the war.[28] While examining the effects of war on the political views of legitimacy of youth is not the primary focus of this thesis, it is important to note that often the views of youth diverge from those in political leadership. War plays a role in this divergence of views. In some cases, an underlying cause of war is the incompatibility of political ideals between generations. In others, post-war social order and political organization may provide the environment for differing political ideals between generations to manifest themselves.

Independent of the circumstances, two notable aspects of youth attitudes are their lower level of respect for elders and greater acceptance of individualism.[29] Older

[25] Factors such as greater access to urban centers, increases in civic education and, perhaps the greatest factor, access to information via the radio have contributed to greater exposure of the rural population to different types of authority (i.e. the president, the governor, parliamentarians, etc). While some of these advances are limited, they are never the less influential.

[26] Codou Bop, "African youth makes a takeover bid," *The Unesco Courier* 52, 1 (Jan 1999) 32.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy* (New York: New York University Press, 1999).

[29] Ibid 285.

members of society tend to place a greater value the role of traditional leaders in the decision-making processes of government, particularly at the local level. Historically and culturally, age has been greatly respected and is sign of authority. For decades, youth have been more vocal and active in rejecting the authority of elders, a trend that continues across the continent.[30]

Urban youth organizations played a prominent role in African independence movements, and indeed, across the globe, youth "have been instrumental in the socio-economic and political reconstitution of their societies."[31] They also played a role in influencing popular political attitudes.[32] As the role of youth in politics increased in the 1950s and 1960s, their ideals began to have influence within the existing authority structures. Bayart suggests that their "acceptance onto the colonial scene led to conflicts between elders and minors."[33] To the young revolutionaries, "traditional authorities were seemingly the very antithesis of the modern revolution that they sought to lead."[34] As the first wave of independence youth became leaders in their countries, the regimes that took hold were centralized, authoritarian regimes. A duality between the centralized regimes and the local traditional regimes persisted. During the decades under which many African countries were under authoritarian regimes, political and administrative leaders were unwilling to devolve and decentralize state authority.[35] As Africa moves

[30] The proliferation of youth movements and parties from the immediate pre-independence era to the present is evidence of this trend. For example, the primary goals of the Somali Youth League in the 1940's were to "unite all Somalis generally, and the youth expecially with the consequent repudiation of all harmful old prejudices (such, for example, as tribal and clan distinction); to educate the youth in modern civilization by means of schools and by cultural propaganda circles." See I.M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali* (Oxford: James Currey, 2002) 124. A more general yet contemporary example of this trend are the youth organizations formed around student movements. "In many local communities small youth associations – often the successors of traditional constructs – have resurfaced in recent years. Some youth groups are attached to church groups and Muslim communities. Separate youth organizations have also been established to cater to the interests of elite youth in the cities (the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides are major examples). These associations, much like their students counterparts, represent certain interests and worldviews and help to define the individual member's social positions and standing." Naomi Chazan, et. al., *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 96.

[31] Zola Knowledge Saphetha, "Young Intellectuals in Action: Youth as Torch-bearers of the Future," *Ingede Journal of African Scholarship* 1, 2 (Dec 2004) 3.

[32] Claude E. Welch Jr., "Obstacles to 'Peasant War' in Africa," *African Studies Review* 20,3 (December 1977) 129.

[33] Jean-Francois Bayart, *The State in Africa: the politics of the belly* (London: Longman Publishers, 1996) 113.

[34] Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 174.

[35] Olowu and Wunsch 57.

beyond the immediate post-independence era and begins once again to attempt to liberalize regimes, the dynamic between youth and older members of society continues to evolve. As previously noted, rural areas are becoming more aware and involved in the activities of the state.[36]

Most studies of youth culture in Africa focus on youth roles in conflict and revolutions, while focusing less on their role in political activity.[37] Youth activity in contemporary politics is understudied, yet nevertheless extremely important. In societies where authority is associated with age, youth strive to gain status through alternative means such as accumulation of wealth or education. Ellis argues that the social marginalization of youth was a key element in Liberia's civil war, illustrating the lengths to which youth will go to gain status due to their age.[38] In other cases, the younger generation have had greater educational and economic opportunities, and now have access to more resources than their parents.[39] "Consequently, this has transformed power relations in the family in favour of the youth and against the elders, who hitherto relied on their control of land for the power they wielded over their children."[40] The crisis of legitimacy is exacerbated in rural areas, where land is valuable resource and tradition is still entrenched in society.

Bratton, et. al.'s *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform* finds that most Africans living in democracies do not wish to return to a traditional system of governance. However, it also finds opposition to traditional rulers is weakest in rural areas, suggesting a divergence between rural and urban understandings legitimate rule. (Bratton et al also considered the potential impact of age on political opinions, but their findings on this question were inconclusive.) This study includes only the most successful democracies in Africa. My study of Mozambique will address similar questions in the context of a regime that is still in transition to democracy.

[36] "More" is a distinctly relative term. They are able to be more involved due to greater access to media and urban centers than in the past. Their involvement and access is still, however, very small compared to more developed states.

[37] See Afua Twum-Danso in Angela McIntyre, ed., *Invisible Stakeholders: Children and War in Africa* (ISS publication, April 2004) 7-30.

[38] Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy* (New York: New York University Press, 2001) 289.

[39] Afua Twum-Danso in Angela McIntyre, *Invisible Stakeholders: Children and War in Africa.* 18.

[40] Ibid.

2. Major Debates

It is unclear as to what comprises a legitimate regime in the African context. Some academics argue that traditional structures of governance that have endured to the present in some derivation of their original form are legitimate and must be incorporated into formal structures of the regime.[41] Charles Crothers argues that while traditional authority may seem anachronistic, their value and legitimacy as political leaders should be taken seriously.[42] Mamdani argues, however, that what has remained of endogenous forms of government is a corruption of the original form of chieftancy, because colonial rulers exploited and modified this "traditional" form of government to suit their strategies of indirect rule or divide and rule.[43] Colonial governments undermined the traditional institutions, destroying the philosophical bases of duties and obligations "regulating the relationship between the governing and the governed."[44] Therefore, the chieftaincies that exist today bear little resemblance to the authentic and "indigenous" institutions that their proponents attribute to them. While Mamdani may be correct in claiming that traditional authority structures have been corrupted and should no longer be considered legitimate,[45] they have nevertheless persisted in many societies.

Von Trotha suggests that as states struggle to develop legitimate process and procedures – the essence of the regime - "the institution of chieftaincy could play a leading role, becoming the center of new political orders drawing on the experiences and the political, cultural and social resources of both precolonial and administrative

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41 Daniel T. Osabu-Kle, in *Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key to Development in Africa*, argues similarly that emerging democracies must incorporate cultural constructs of government to be effective. Political practices must be compatible with indigenous culture, not foreign imports of Western democratic practice that are alien to traditional culture.

42 See Charles Crothers, "Social Characteristics of Traditional Leaders and Public Views on their Political Roles" in Donald R. Ray and P.S. Reddy, ed., *Grassroots Governance? Chiefs in Africa and the Afro-Caribbean* (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 2003) 69-82.

43 See C. Keulder "Traditional leaders and rural development" in d'Engelbronner-Kolff , Hinz and Sindano ed., *Traditional Authority and Democracy in Southern Africa* (South Africa: New Namibia Books, 1998) 289-322. See also Richard Rathbone, *Nkrumah and the Chiefs*, where he shows that the institutions of chieftancy have changed dramatically since Ghanaian independence.

44 John A. A. Ayoade, "The African Search for Democracy," in Dov Ronen, ed. *Democracy and Pluralism in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986) 25.

45 This is one of the primary arguments in Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

chieftancy."[46] He argues that chiefs "defend local culture and social order as well as being 'at the center of local political life.'"[47] In support of Von Trotha's argument, Forrest asserts that a "re-Africanization" of political authority is taking place across the continent. Decaying state-society linkages have caused an increasing turn toward the formalization of traditional political linkages, particularly in rural areas.[48] Once state building began in Botswana, for example, the value of chiefs was immediately recognized and codified in the Chieftanship Act of 1956. After independence in 1966, traditional leaders were incorporated into the formal regime. While it was clear that their status, authority and jurisdiction decreased in comparison to the pre-colonial era, the significance of their role as legitimate authorities was formalized. The Botswana case study is just one of several wherein traditional authority continues to play a formal political role.[49]

The view that traditional authority should not be formally incorporated into the system has its supporters as well. Traditional leaders are sometimes appointed or selected to take their position without "mechanisms of accountability, let alone mechanisms to encourage good performance."[50] For those who propose that Africa's regimes should continue to move toward adopting liberal democratic ideals in practice, the issue of the legitimacy of these traditional rulers is pivotal. According to Joseph Egwurube's pioneering work on traditional governance in Nigeria, a dilemma is faced if traditional authority institutions are incorporated into the regime. "By definition, traditional rulerships are closed systems, characterized by stratification, heredity, legitimacy and personalism. These features are untenable in open, modern, local

46 Trutz von Trotha, "From Administrative to Civil Chieftaincy: Some Problems and Prospects of African Chieftancy" *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 37-38 (1996) 91.

47 Ibid.

48 Forrest 246.

49 Peirre du Toit touches on issues of traditional leadership in his case studies of state-building in Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa. See *State-Building and Democracy in Southern Africa* (Washington, DC: UNIP, 1995).

50 Charles Crothers in Donald R. Ray and P.S Reddy ed., *Grassroots Governance? Chiefs in Africa and the Afro-Caribbean* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2003) 70.

government systems involving local initiative, universalism, equality and change."[51] In many African states, the government can exploit and manipulate traditional leaders, interfering with their succession and appointment processes, calling into question claims of legitimacy. In Uganda, for example, local government based on the leadership of chiefs has come to symbolize an abusive state.[52] In many African states, however, traditional regimes are present more in rural areas than urban. Von Trotha maintains that strong urban-rural linkages in Africa require that regime reforms, most notably democratic regime reforms, be founded in rural reforms, particularly in regards to traditional political structures. Mamdani agrees that democratization requires rural reforms, but disagrees fundamentally about the nature of the required reforms. Any reforms in the form of rule, in Mamdani's view, need to consider that traditional rulers are "decentralized despots," and thus a primary obstacle to democratization and reform in rural Africa. In support of Mamdani's argument, van Kessel and Oomen maintain that the "institution of chieftanship is not in accord with the precepts of democracy in its late twentieth century form."[53] If these institutions do not coincide with the political ideals of the rural population, their legitimacy and ability to be integrated into the democratically developing regimes is in question. Ultimately, those opposed to recognizing the role of traditional rulers claim that doing so will undermine democratic progress. They argue that African societies must shift away from the chiefly order and embrace modern forms of rule.[54]

The final issue this thesis seeks to address concerns intergenerational variations in rural beliefs about legitimate authority. The role of youth in contemporary Africa has been studied from a number of different perspectives. Gable argues that Manjaco youth in

[51] Joseph Egwurube, "Traditional Rulers and Modern Local Government in Nigeria" in L. Adamolekun, D. Olowu, and M. Laleye, ed., *Local Government in West Africa Since Independence* (Lagos: Lagos University Press, 1988) 170.

[52] James S. Wunsch and Dan Ottemoeller in Dele Olowu and James S. Wunsch ed., *Local Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004) 193.

[53] Ineke van Kessel and Barbara Oomen, "'One Chief, One Vote': The Revival of Traditional Authorities in Post-Apartheid South Africa" *African Affairs* 96, 385 (Oct 1997) 573. See also page 51 of V. G. Simiyu in Walter O. Oyugi, ed., *Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa* (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1988) where he argues that Africa has diverse traditions of governance, some which incorporate elements of democracy and some that do not. In general, however, none are comparable to modern notions of true democracy.

[54] Basil Davidson is a strong proponent of this view. See *Which Way Africa? The Search for a New Society* 3rd Ed (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1971) 99.

Guinea-Bissau, as the most educated members of their communities, they seek to act as moral agents with no intention of encouraging revolution.[55] Nolte argues that, in the case of Nigerian politics, Yoruba youth have stronger ties to the government than their elders and have effectively weakened local Yoruba local elites and traditional rulers. Accordingly, their role in rural society is much more influential than the elders who traditionally held power within the community.[56] If Africa's young governments are seeking to establish relevant, functioning institutions that will maintain legitimacy for generations to come, the political ideals of youth, Africa's future, must be considered. Unfortunately, youth are often "neglected and overlooked by both scholarly and policy-oriented writings,"[57] a gap which this thesis attempts to narrow.

These debates raise important issues, but no compelling evidence is offered in support of arguments about the nature of political legitimacy in Africa. In many cases, no empirical evidence is expressed regarding how rural Africans view the legitimacy of the regimes that impact them. By extension, no studies discuss how rural perceptions of the legitimacy of alternative regimes and the institutions that make up those regimes might vary. This thesis represents an initial attempt to fill this gap by investigating what rural people actually say about political legitimacy in Mozambique. As Mamdani suggests, enfranchising and engaging citizens in rural areas is essential to democratization. However, understanding their attitudes about traditional regimes and democratic regimes be understood rather than assumed. As Jocelyn Alexander notes, "political practices in the rural areas where the majority of southern Africa's people live receive short shrift, while democratic aspirations are assumed rather than investigated."[58] While this thesis will by no means be comprehensive in engaging all sectors of rural society, it will provide insight into the attitudes and perceptions of the Mozambicans

[55] Eric Gable, "The Culture Development Club: Youth, Neo-Tradition, and the Construction of Society in Guinea-Bissau" *Anthropological Quarterly* 73,4 (October 2000) 195-203.

[56] Insa Nolte, "Identity and violence: the politics of youth in Ijebu-Remo, Nigeria" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 42, 1 (2004) 84.

[57] Afua Twum-Danso in Angela McIntyre, *Invisible Stakeholders: Children and War in Africa* (ISS Publication, April 2004).

[58] Jocelyn Alexander, "The Local State in Post-War Mozambique: Political Practice and Ideas About Authority" *Africa* 67, 1 (1997) 1.

living in a particular rural area – one that has likely not been engaged in such formal discussion before.

C. DEFINING LEGITIMACY

1. Definition

The issue of gaining and maintaining political legitimacy in Africa's states has been problematic.[59] While at times the consolidation of legitimate regimes on the continent has seemed like an impossible task, it is nevertheless a necessary and worthwhile endeavor. Weber found that stability and the effectiveness of authority is directly influenced by society's perceptions of its legitimacy. In order for authority to maintain social order and cohesion, it must maintain legitimacy.[60] According to Hayward,

> the nature of the relationship between those who lead and the people as a whole depends, in large part, on the notions of legitimacy which prevail in society, and these will determine the success of government in the long run. Citizens' perceptions of legitimacy shape expectations about the leaders and their anticipated policies, and also set standards for the validation or justification of a particular regime, including who has power, how it is attained, and who benefits. When the distance between these standards and the perceived reality becomes too great, citizens may withdraw the mantel of legitimacy from their government.[61]

Prospects for improving governance "depend on properly diagnosing and addressing public grievances," a process that will be most effective if the views and

[59] Fred M. Hayward and Ahmed R. Dumbuya offer evidence on different means by which several of Africa's leaders have tried to gain and maintain legitimacy in the post-independent era with various degrees of success, see "Political Legitimacy, Political Symbols, and National Leadership in West Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 21, 4 (Dec 1983). See also Paul R. Dettman, "Leaders and Structures in 'Third World' Politics: Contrasting Approaches to Legitimacy," *Comparative Politics* 6, 2 (Jan 1974). Both articles discuss the difficulties leaders encounter when they try to legitimize their rule when they are not consistent with the value patterns of society or, in contrast, the success the leaders have when their attempts are consistent with societal value patterns.

[60] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (Berkeley: Univeristy of California Press, 1978).

[61] Hayward and Dumbuya 650.

political ideals of society are clearly understood.[62] In other words, states can govern more easily and effectively if the basis on which they legitimate their use of force aligns with the concept of legitimate rule held by their citizens. It is in this instance that properly measuring the public's legitimacy orientation is most necessary, and this requires a strict definition of the concept itself. While many scholars have studied legitimacy, there is no universally accepted definition. It is one of "the oldest problems in the history of social thought."[63] For the purposes of this thesis, legitimacy is measured substantively.[64] Substantive legitimacy is based on the views of the citizenry, or acted upon by the leadership, "in terms of the dominant political ideals and beliefs in the political system."[65] Legitimacy can be measured on four basic levels – international, national, societal/group or individual.[66] Because the research for this thesis focused on interviews with individuals, the definition will be framed in the context of individual perceptions of legitimacy.[67] Societal groups will be based on age. Because the general concept of legitimacy is uniform across these levels, the same indices can be used to measure it. Peter G. Stillman definition is the most relevant and valuable one for the purposes of this thesis: "a government is legitimate if and only if the results of the governmental output are compatible with the value patterns of society."[68] Some elaboration is in order.

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[62] M. Stephen Weatherford, "Measuring Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 86, 1 (March 1992) 149. Richard M. Merelman also explains how and why legitimate regimes are more efficient than illegitimate regimes in "Learning and Legitimacy," *The American Political Science Review* 60, 3 (Sep 1966) 548-549.

[63] Morris Zelditch, "Processes of Legitimation: Recent Developments and New Directions," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 64, 1 (2001) 4.

[64] Three major focuses of legitimacy as described by Hayward and Dumbuya are personal, procedural and substantive. 650.

[65] Hayward and Dumbuya 650.

[66] See Peter G. Stillman, "The Concept of Legitimacy," *Polity* 7,1 (Autumn 1974) 32-56. He expands upon the four levels in "The Concept of Legitimacy." For reasons of relevance I did not expand upon each of them individually.

[67] Carl J. Friedrich in *Man and His Government* (New York: Graw-Hill, 1963) outlines this approach wherein there a various levels and one must decide how legitimacy will be evaluated for each respective level. As Peter Stillman notes in "The Concept of Legitimacy," *Polity* 7, 1 (Autumn 1974), this approach is similar to Lipset's approach in defining legitimacy in *Political Man* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963).

[68] Peter Stillman, "The Concept of Legitimacy," *Polity* 7, 1 (Autumn 1974) 39.

First, government actions affect individuals in society, be they the passing of a law, an act of war, extraction of resources, as does government inaction. Secondly, most definitions assume that a fundamental condition for legitimacy is consensus.[69] The term "consensus," however, implies that everyone has agreed or conceded to a directive or desired course of action. In contrast to the term consensus, Stillman's definition uses the term compatible. Compatibility implies that actions of the government are compatible with the political ideals of the individuals in question. One government action that is not compatible with an individual's views will not delegitimize it; successive and perpetual government actions that are not compatible with the political ideals of that individual will begin to erode legitimacy. Finally, a "value pattern" is the specification, ranking, and ordering of that which the individual "esteems and seeks, in a world of scarcity where there are limits and costs to what can be esteemed, sought, and obtained."[70] These value patterns, or political ideals, are based on individual notions of how authority is legitimately bestowed and executed. Thus, a legitimate regime is a *system of rule whose institutional forms and structures are compatible with the political ideals of individuals*.

2. Legitimacy in the Mozambican Context

The question of legitimacy in Mozambique is extremely relevant as the government continues to adopt democratic procedures. In the pre-colonial era, local chiefs ruled in cooperation with village elders. Their role in the post-colonial age beginning in 1974, however, has been through several transitions, including a period of marginalization and exclusion during the communist period in the 1970s and 80s, to the present, in which there has been a resurgence of traditional institution's inclusion in the government. The institution of chieftancy in Mozambique, as in many other parts of Africa, "has demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of dramatic social transformation."[71] The authority of chiefs and their ability to act decisively on behalf of the rural population stem largely from the fact that liberal democracy has yet to produce governments on the continent that penetrate rural areas effectively.[72] In the absence of

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[69] Zelditch 9.

[70] Stillman 40.

[71] Jude Fokwang, "Tribal Innovators? Traditional Leadership and Development in Africa." *CODESRIA Bulletin*, No 3 and 4 (2005) 43.

[72] Ibid.

other governing institutions, traditional authority persists as the only regime type that affects the lives of the people. During the nearly thirty-year long Mozambican civil war, traditional authority was the accepted regime in many areas.

D. METHODOLOGY

1. Methods

The primary research for this project takes the form of focus groups and individual interviews in rural Nampula Province. The goal of this project is to discern the political ideals of different generations in order to assess whether they converge on a common perception what constitutes a legitimate regime or whether they differ. Using within case comparison in a single region – Nampula Province – nine focus groups and one individual interview were conducted. Except for one focus group near Monapo district in which one female youth was present in a group with five other young men, focus groups were not mixed gender. The groups were organized according to age, with older adults defined as those around forty years of age or older. Youth are those between fifteen and thirty years of age, and adults are those over the age of 30. Individuals were assigned to the groups based on self-identification of their ages, which yielded reliable groups because in Mozambican society, individuals often self-identify as youth within the cultural norm. The term "youth" is not attached to any specific age group, though those identifying themselves as youth were rarely over 28 years of age. It is important to note that female youth and female "old" women were on average younger than the males that were self-identified under the same categories. For example, in Niapala, the "old" women were aged 35-40 and the "old" men were 40-46 years of age. In many cases the older women did not know their age and were estimating. The men always knew their exact age. Thus, while the age spreads based on gender are not consistent, the concepts of youth and older adult are still preserved. Table One shows the composition and location of focus groups and interviews.

Location	Gender	Ages	# in Group
Niapala	female	35-40	4
Barragem	female	15-21	5
ADA School	female	24-29	4
Barragem	female	40-65	5
Niapala	male	40-46	3
Rapale Cabo (int.)	male	42	1
Near Rapale	male	27-49*	7
Near Rapale	male	42-63	3
Near Monapo	male, 1 F	20-29	6
Near Monapo	male	18-28	6

Table 1. Focus groups (The * indicates the focus group that was not used for data purposes because, one, the age spread was to broad and, second, the *cabo*[73] was not present with the group but remained within earshot, causing the participants to be uncomfortable and not offer completely honest opinions.)

Other evidence is based on the primary research conducted and published in law student theses from the Law Faculty of the Catholic University in Nampula. The author also had first hand experience and informal interviews with individuals who have worked in the fields of anthropology, development, linguistics and church-related leadership development in Nampula Province and the rural north for many years.

The questionnaire (See Appendix A) used in the focus groups was divided into four sections. The first section, questions one through three, asked direct questions about individual history and background. The independent variable – age – was identified in Question One. Questions four through seven focused on government performance and opinions on its role and effectiveness, leading participants to express the priorities they thought the government should address. Their responses to questions four through eight elicited their ideals – the intervening variable. Question nine, the culturally relevant scenarios, narrowed the focus to what the individuals not only perceived to be the most effective form of authority, but also the most relevant and legitimate – those that coincided with their political ideals. Finally, questions ten through twelve explicitly

[73] For definition of term, see Appendix B.

address the role of traditional authorities and their relevance to the individual in a political sense. Responses to Questions Nine through Twelve caused respondents to express the degree of compatibility of ideals with the traditional regimes that exist at the local level and how they could be reformed to make them more compatible with their ideals, and thus more legitimate.

2. Terminology

Terms used to describe individual positions of authority and methods of selecting those authorities vary from community to community. While the government has defined the role of both appointed government officials and traditional authorities, in rural communities, terms used to describe those authorities are not uniform. For example, the term "leader" in English is translated into "lídere" in Portuguese. In the area near Rapale where some interviews were conducted, when translated into Mahkuwa (the local language) the term "lídere" only refers to traditional authority structures, not any other type of leader.

Methods of selection for leaders also have different meanings in the Makhuwa context than the direct translation of the terms. For example, in English the term "elected" refers to someone who has been voted into office. In Portuguese, this word is "eleito." When translated into Makhuwa, however, "eleito" only refers authorities who have been consensually selected by the appropriate body as, for example, when the family of the chief consensually selects his successor from within the immediate family. Thus, research interviews had to be carefully worded to avoid confusion based on the principles. A question such as "Are leaders elected in your community?" would be tautological because the answer would be yes by definition – traditional authorities are selected consensually. To evoke the meaning of the English word "elected," the correct word to use would be the Portuguese "votado." The information in these pages has been written to reflect the English definitions of words. For example, if an individual said "votado" in an interview, it will be written as "elected" in this thesis. In relevant cases where an individual said "eleito," it will be written as "consensually selected."

Defining the role and position of political authorities is also important. In many cases, leaders may hold specific positions but be selected differently based on the community. Secretaries, official representatives of the government in an area, are usually

appointed but in some cases elected by the people. *Régulos* and *cabos* are community leaders that have achieved their position through a traditional means of consensual selection based on the decision of their family. In most rural communities, the method of selecting the person for this position is the same. For further elaboration on government and traditional positions of authority and their respective roles in society, see Appendix B. It should also be noted that Parliament passed decree 15/2000 on 15 June 2000, which declared traditional authorities official members and representatives of the government, thereby theoretically incorporating them into the system that includes secretaries. However, to avoid confusion, this thesis will refer to secretaries and those appointed by the government as "the government" and *régulos* and their associated positions as "traditional authorities". Technically speaking, the state is comprised of both these institutions, but there nevertheless needs to be a means of differentiating between the two.

II. MOZAMBIQUE IN CONTEXT

A. INTRODUCTION

The manner in which the current political system has developed has shaped how the population of rural areas understands the workings of their government. Colonialism, independence, civil war, and the continuing efforts to establish a peaceful, functional democracy have all contributed to Mozambique's current condition. This chapter lays the historical foundation needed to understand the current state of affairs. Rural Mozambique is in a state of political transition. The government has slowly been taking steps to increase its power in non-urban areas. These actions have manifested themselves in various new laws and decrees, which, while they give the appearance of change on paper, are often not put into practice. Traditional authority institutions continue to persist and meet the needs of some people where the government falls short. A formalized dual political system has thus emerged in which traditional authority institutions and official government structures often co-exist by mandate from the government. The specific roles of traditional authorities are defined on paper, but in rural areas where individuals may never even hear of laws the parliament has passed, their official roles are not clearly understood. Even in areas where roles are defined, the dual system allows individuals to essentially "pick" who they want to be their authority. This situation provides a unique circumstance in which the question of legitimate authority can be studied.

Figure 1. Map of Mozambique

B. POLITICAL CONTEXT

1. Pre-colonial Mozambican Political Structure

Understanding the development of political structures in Mozambique provides a framework through which current political structures and beliefs can be more accurately interpreted. For this reason, a review of Mozambican political history and government structure is in order. Prior to the establishment of a central government by the Portuguese colonists, the territory of which Mozambique consists occupied by various indigenous

people groups concentrated along the fertile Zambezi River valley. These groups, mainly composed of Sena, Tawara, Zimba and Tonga speakers, were organized into independent chieftaincies. Most of the chieftaincies were ruled by individual *mambos* "who possessed important ritual powers and political functions."[74]

Kingdoms from present-day Zimbabwe and South Africa frequently threatened the region. Most notable are the conquests of the Karangan Mutota and his son, Mutapa. Their empire was at its height just before the expansion of the Portuguese into southern Africa in the fifteenth century. This empire penetrated deep into central Mozambique, with only the most northern and southern reaches untouched.[75] At the local level, Mutapa maintained the system of *mambos*. At provincial levels he appointed trusted family members as governors. With such a vast empire, cohesion and communication were difficult. Loyalty was maintained by sending sons of *mambos* to the king as ransom. When threatened by war, *mambos* recruited warriors to defend Mutapa as well as the local territory. In central Mozambique, this was the status quo when the Portuguese arrived.

Other regions of present-day Mozambique had different structures. The Undi ruled present-day Tete province. The *mambos* in that region had more responsibility for their people than Mutapa's empire afforded the *mambos.* Under the Undi, each *mambo* "was held responsible in his chieftaincy for settling disputes, directing rain and harvest ceremonies, and defending the Undi state."[76] They were also in charge of distributing land to followers and collecting tribute. Central Undi authority was weak due to the strength of the local authorities. Close to the time of the Portuguese arrival in the region, the Undi fell to the Chewa of present-day Malawi. Other chieftaincies existed in Mozambique further north in Nyasa, which had similar structures of *mambos* with no centralized governance. When the Portuguese arrived, "they were met not by cohesive states bent on unified resistance but by a hotchpotch of badly fragmented political units in various degrees of decline, some of them eager for a European alliance against covetous

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[74] Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History,* (London: Rex Collins, 1978) 4.

[75] Ibid 7. See also Henriksen footnote number 6, which suggests that some scholars believe the conquest was not as expansive as suggested by the Portuguese.

[76] Henriksen 14.

neighbours."[77] Portuguese policy from the beginning of the sixteenth century was less of a policy of settlement and conquest than a policy of influencing and controlling African chieftaincies, playing off their rivalries and weaknesses.[78]

2. Colonial Mozambican Political Structure

Vasco de Gama was the first European to set foot in Mozambique in 1498 in his pursuit of a trade route to the Far East. By this time Arab and Indian traders were already present along the coast and involved in trade. In Mozambique's Zambezi River valley, some Europeans and Indians completely integrated into the African societies, becoming chiefs and landholders. By the nineteenth century, the descendants of the Europeans and Indians, along with newly introduced Portuguese settlers, were powerful leaders in a feudal *prazo* system in which plantations or territory was ruled by individual *prazeiros.* The *prazeiros* maintained close ties with the local chiefs, often because their land was given to them by the chief, or because they were related by blood. When there was no chief in the locality of the prazo, the *prazeiro* was granted judicial rights over all the inhabitants of his land, ruling it like a small fiefdom. In fact, it is possible that the *prazeiro* "was expected to perform some of the ritual functions of chieftaincy."[79] Limited by the need for tribute and the freedom of inhabitants to move at any time, *prazeiros* were forced to adapt to and maintain traditional economic and political practices and adopt practices that were favorable to the indigenous people.

Between 1895 and 1930, the Portuguese government passed and enforced the Colonial Act with the intent of encouraging more Portuguese to go to Mozambique. Up to that time, settlers had only been arriving in small numbers and the colony was ruled by *prazeiros* in some regions, trade companies in others and essentially white chiefs loyal to the crown in others.[80] By 1914, the Portuguese attempts at subduing the indigenous population were for the most part successful and they began the more difficult task of

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[77] Henriksen 16.

[78] Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years* (London: Longman Group Limited, 1981) 54.

[79] Malyn D. D. Newitt, "The Portuguese on the Zambezi: An Historical Interpretation of the Prazo System," *The Journal of African History* 10, 1 (1969) 76. Newitt has written extensively on the history of Mozambique with particular emphasis on the Portuguese involvement. The information contained in this paragraph comes from "Portuguese on the Zambezi."

[80] James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961) 248.

administering the colony.[81] Unfortunately for Portugal, the colony was more of a drain on its finances instead of a wise investment. Each new Portuguese ruler sought to change the circumstance and make its colony profitable, but their efforts rarely succeeded, allowing Mozambique under the *prazeiros* and white chiefs more and more autonomy. This was Mozambique's first experience with the modern, albeit weak, state.

To more effectively rule the colony, the Portuguese divided rural Mozambican territory into divisions over which resided a pre-existing *régulo* or chief. Mozambican traditional authority institutions had persisted throughout the years of early colonization, and now they were legally incorporated into the colonial state. According to Portuguese colonial law in 1933, "in each of the local regions, authority over the native population [would] be exercised by an indigenous administrative authority (or *régulo*)."[82] The 1933 law and another law passed in 1954 declared that traditional authorities should be compensated for exercising their duties.[83] At the local level, traditional authorities functioned as the government. At this time, Jamal argues that the institution of traditional authority had three identifying characteristics – its authority on rules regarding inheritance of leadership positions and traditional culture/mythology; its persistence and entrenchment in society; and its universal acceptance.[84]

3. Post-independence Political Structures

When the Portuguese government gave Mozambique its independence in 1975, they passed governing responsibilities to the *Frente de Liberaçao de Moçambique* (Frelimo). Frelimo had fought the Portuguese for independence, after which it established an Afro-Marxist regime with a party-centered approach to societal reordering. Former institutions based on class or ethnicity were broken down and realigned into new institutions based on farmer cooperatives, collective villages and worker-controlled

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[81] Chris Alden, *Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State* (Chippenham, Great Britain: Palgrave, 2001) 2.

[82] Artigo 94 da Reforma Adminsitrativa Ultramarina (RAU), aprovada pelo Decreto –Lei n. ˚23229, de 15 de Novembro de 1933. "Em cada uma das regedorias, a autoridade sobre as populações gentílicas seria exercida por um regedor (or regulo) indena." English translation by author.

[83] Ibid and Decree n. °39666, 20 May 1954.

[84] Américo Alexandre Jamal. *O exercício de poder tradicional no distrito de Moma: impacto jurídico, hierarquização e legitimação* (Universidade Católica de Moçambique, Faculdade de Direito, Nampula 2004) 14-17.

enterprises.[85] Frelimo attempted to remove traditional authorities from their positions and replace them with party-appointed leaders called secretaries and leadership collectives called *Grupos Dinamizadors.* Renamo, the rebel militia that took form soon after independence in opposition to the ruling party, responded by propping up traditional authorities in the territory it controlled, empowering them as both local leaders and Renamo representatives. In these ways, Mozambique's centuries-old traditional authority structures became embroiled in civil war and subsequently party politics.

Unlike Frelimo's policy of breaking down traditional institutions and regrouping society around Marxist ideals, Renamo policy attempted to orchestrate a "revival of traditional authority" as well as to strengthen traditional institutions, using them to their advantage.[86] Research shows that in some areas of northern Mozambique, chiefs disgruntled by Frelimo's policy welcomed Renamo and facilitated their broader acceptance in society.[87] When the war ended and political and social reconstruction began, the position of traditional authorities was defined within the new regime. In 1990 the socialist constitution was replaced with a liberal democratic constitution. Nevertheless, "the underlying assumption, rarely articulated but even more rarely challenged, was that somewhere within newly created political spaces, 'traditional authority' would once more play a role in local governance. If people were permitted to elect local authorities, and if 'traditional authorities' were, indeed, considered 'legitimate' by local populations, people might then elect their chiefs to local office, repairing the divide between 'traditional' and modern forms of authority."[88] This unspoken arrangement is apparent in the way the government is organized at the local level.

Mozambique is divided into eleven provinces and within each province the system is broken down into districts, administrative posts and localities. Local

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[85] Naomi Chazan, et. al., *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* 3rd Ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 182.

[86] Harry G. West and Scott Kloeck-Jenson, "Betwixt and between: 'Traditional Authority' and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Mozambique," *African Affairs* 98, 393 (Oct 1999) 460.

[87] Christian Geffray, *La Cause des Armes au Mozambique: Anthropologie d'une Guerre Civile* (Paris: Karthala, 1990) as quoted in Harry G. West and Scott Kloeck-Jenson, "Betwixt and between: 'Traditional Authority' and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Mozambique," *African Affairs* 98, 393 (Oct 1999) 460.

[88] West and Kloek-Jensen 461.

government structures are present in only a portion of Mozambique, although under the policy of gradualism, as "capacity develops, further central government responsibilities are to be transferred to 'local organs of state'."[89] Under the Constitution there are two types of local authority – those in the city and those in rural areas. The task of the local authorities is to "organize the participation of citizens in finding a solution to the community problems, to promote local development, and to strengthen and consolidate democracy within the framework of Mozambican state unity."[90] The government has also defined the role of community authorities, not to be confused with *local* authorities. Community authorities are defined as "traditional chiefs and other leaders recognized by their respective local communities."[91] In 2000 the Mozambican parliament passed a law that formalized the role of community authorities and made them official members of the state apparatus. The government's purpose in formalizing the role of the community authorities is two-fold. First, they "are envisaged as functioning as 'civil society' or community representatives, giving voice to and catering for the needs of rural constituencies that have been relatively 'voiceless' so far."[92] Their secondary role is one of 'mediator,' providing assistance as an entry point into the community in rural or semi-urban areas for business, aid agencies and state functions.[93] These aggregate of the laws passed regarding traditional authority place them in positions of leadership as *both* members of civil society *and* members of the state apparatus – they have dual roles. Though government has delineated a role for the community authorities in rural areas, the laws are problematic, particularly in regards to defining who is a traditional authority and thus deserves the official title of community authority, and who is not.

During different periods in Mozambique's history and in different regions of the country, various terms have been used to describe individuals with some sort of

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89 *The Local Government System in Mozambique* Country Profile: Mozambique, www.clgf.org.uk/userfiles/CLGF/FileCountries/Mozambique.pdf Accessed 3 September 2006.

90 Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 25, August 2000. www.mozambique.mz/awepa/eawepa25/awepa25.htm Accessed 3 September 2006.

91 *The Local Government System in Mozambique.*

92 Lars Buur and Helene Maria Kyed, *State Recognition of Traditional Authority in Mozambique: The Nexus of Community Representation and State Assistance* (Discussion Paper 28, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2005) 6.

93 Ibid.

traditional authority role – *régulo, régulo verdadeiro, chefe, mambo,* and *autoridade gentilica* to name a few. The June 2000 law (Decree 15/2000) delineated how community authorities were to be identified. The objective of the decree was to strengthen state sovereignty "by extending administrative and territorial reach to rural areas with the recognition and delegation of tasks to localized forms of organization."[94] The decree outlined the process by which community authorities would be selected, with the intent of preserving local customs and political ideals.[95] Buur suggests that this law adheres to a strict communitarian perspective, which maintains "a view of community as based on solidarity, and as self-contained and structured around attachment to shared political ideals."[96] However, "such notions are unsuited for understanding social reality in general and the Mozambican case specifically. . . No serious thought is given to differences and potential conflicts within communities. . ."[97] The state, by incorporating traditional authorities into the government, is mixed regime-type that could alienate the youth. In time, this alienation could undermine the extent to which the youth support the current democratic regime. Over time, the lack of support for the dual regime, could result in resistance and perceptions of illegitimacy from the youth. This thesis will address one issue that could lead to future discord in society– disconnect between the political ideals of youth and the older generation in rural areas.

C. CONTEXT OF STUDY

1. Rural Areas

One of the defining features of the African political and social situation is the disparity between the development and political inclusion of rural areas compared to urban settings. Historically, African states have had difficulty extending authority from the center outward. Due to constraints such as geographical boundaries and limited infrastructure, the further away one is from the capital or an urban center, the less reach

94 Buur and Kyed 13.

95 For an overview of the roles of community authorities as delineated by Decree 15/2000, see Lars Buur and Helene Maria Kyed, *State Recognition of Traditional Authority in Mozambique* (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2005) 13,14.

96 Buur and Kyed 15.

97 Ibid.

and influence the government has on its population.[98] Decades of state incapacity to penetrate rural areas has led to a great divergence in the political developmental paths of rural and urban areas. This is the case in Mozambique.

Southern Mozambique is home to the capital, Maputo, and the most economically prosperous province in the country, Maputo Province. The country is divided informally into three regions, the South, Center and the North. The North, the subject of this thesis, is comprised of Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces. The North and North-Center of Mozambique is more rural and underdeveloped than the South.[99] The 1997 national census, over 70% of the population lived in rural areas.[100] It is currently estimated that over 80% of the population lives in rural areas.[101] Immediately following independence, the new Mozambican government comprised of the Frelimo party had very limited reach into North, particularly in the rural areas. In the 1990s, the Renamo political party still dominated the North and Center.[102] In these rural areas where the state is weak, opportunities to put democracy into practice have been limited. Rural inhabitants rely on other sources for political leadership such as religious or traditional authorities to address their needs rather than the state.[103]

2. Youth in Mozambican Society

Mozambican society is young. While current, accurate statistical data is difficult to ascertain, it is estimated that nearly forty-five percent of the population is under the

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[98] Jeffrey Herbst gives a detailed explanation of this phenomenon in Chapter 2 of his book *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[99] According to the 2001 Mozambique National Development Report the four northern-most provinces average about .24 in the human development index (HDI) while the average for Mozambique overall is .32, with Maputo province at .63. A perfect HDI score is 1.0 Mozambique: Gender, women, and human development: An agenda for the future. National Development Report 2001. UNDP, Maputo 2002. www.undp.org.mz/articlesfiles/15-english_final.pdf Accessed 3 September 2006

[100] Mozambique News Agency AIM Reports, No. 167, 18 October 1999.

< http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim167.html#story2 > Accessed 12 July 2006

[101] João Pereira, Ines Raimundo, Annie Chikwanha, Alda Saute and Robert Mattes, *Eight Years of Multiparty Democracy in Mozambique: The Public's View* (Afrobarometer Paper No. 30, August 2003).

[102] João Pereira, Yul Derek Davids and Robert Mattes, *Mozambicans' View of Democracy and Political Reform: A Comparative Perspective* (Afrobarometer Paper No. 22, November 2002) 10.

[103] Ibid 10.

age of fifteen (2002 data).[104] An equally large proportion of the population is between the ages of fifteen and fourty-nine (1997 data).[105] In 1997, the mean age of the Mozambican population was 17.5.[106] Thus youth, the focus of this study, comprise a large sector of society. The Portuguese term *jovem* is used to describe youth in Mozambique, though it often includes young adults up to age thirty. This study focuses on youth aged 18-30. Most studies of youth in Mozambique have focused on the child soldier, the effects of war on youth and issues relating to reintegration into society. Today's Mozambican youth were children and babies during the war and were raised in a country at peace. Today's youth have different characteristics from those studied in the immediate post-war years. Post-war youth were marked by gross inaccess to education, physical and/or mental trauma, physical relocation as Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) or refugees with disrupted family structures. Current issues related to Mozambican youth are the continued inaccess to education, unemployment and the growing concern of HIV/AIDS.[107] There is a notable gap in the information and literature available and readily accessible on the role of youth in Mozambican political society, particularly those in rural areas. UNICEF planned to publish in February 2005 extensive research on the "Situation Analysis of Youth and Adolescents in Mozambique: Focus on District and Rural Level." At the time of this writing, however, the publication had yet to be released.

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104 "Population, Health, and Human Well-being – Mozambique." Earth Trends Country Profiles. http://earthlinks.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/pop_cou_508.pdf Accessed 15 July 2006

105 Country Briefs: Mozambique. IIASA Population Project, February 2001. www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/pde/briefs/mz-pop.html Accessed 3 September 2006

106 Ibid.

107 See recent publications on youth and education: *Education to Fight Exclusion: The UNESCO special project for the enhancement of learning and training opportunities for youth,* (UNESCO education sector, April 1999); R. Badiani, et. al. *Out of School Youth: Although the majority, are we reaching them?* (Maputo, Mozambique: Pathfinder International UNFPA MYS, 2002) presented at 2002 International Aids Conference. Recent publications on youth and unemployment: F. Chigunta, *The Socio-Economic Situation of Youth in Africa: Problems, Prospects, and Options,* (July 2002) www.yesweb.org/gkr/res/bg.africa.reg.doc; Virat Divyakirti, *Rural Development: The Strategic Option of Youth Employment*,(Youth Employment Sumit, October 2002) www.fabi.it/giovani/congresso/DOCUMENTI/rural_dev.pdf. Recent publications on youth and AIDs: E.J. Marrima, *Youth on Board: Managing and delivering HIV/AIDS prevention programs to young people in Mozambique* (Maputo, Mozambique: AMODEFA, 2004) and L.M. Gujral and A. Barreto, *Knowledge about HIV/AIDS prevention and transmission methods among youth in Mozambique* (Maputo, Mozambique: Ministry of Health, 2004) presented at the International Conference on AIDs, Jul 11-16, 2004; Mozambique Program Overview of Pathfinder International, www.pathfind.org/site/PageServer?pagename=Programs_Africa_Mozambique.

III. LEGITIMATE POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN RURAL MOZAMBIQUE

A. INTRODUCTION

Rural Mozambique is in the process of slowly being integrated into formal government structures that are effective and do not exist on paper only. Historically rural dwellers have been excluded from formal government processes. As the state seeks to extend its authority into rural areas, it has incorporated traditional authorities into the state apparatus, *de jura,* by codifying their role in Mozambican law. In this instance, the government assumes that most rural dwellers consider the existing traditional regimes with the incorporation of traditional institutions to be legitimate. Before delving into the accuracy of these claims, the primary focus of thus project, it is important to recall that authority is pluralistic. Thus, all individuals in positions of authority derive their legitimacy from various sources. Individuals may identify the legitimacy of authority or, as in this case regime, based on more than one individually-held political ideal.

Foundational to the legitimacy of regimes is the extent to which the decisions that result from the processes within the regime and the regime's role in society correspond to the political ideals of individuals in that society. In this case, understanding the political ideals of youth and older adults provides insight into the extent to which some types of regimes are more legitimate than others. One of the main findings of this chapter is that both rural older adults and youth agree that government leaders at the local level should come from the community over which they have authority. Politically, the overall opinion is that the most qualified leaders are those who "know" the community and its needs the best. However, beliefs about the legitimate way for rural leaders to achieve and exercise their authority varies according to age group. The duality in regime-types at the local level – traditional and centrally democratic – is the environment in which individual political ideals can be studied. The values of individuals can be compared against those values manifested in the regime-types that exist at the local level.

The youth and older adults both place great political confidence and legitimacy in leaders who are familiar with their constituents and understand the needs of the people as opposed to those who are outsiders from a different province or, at the local level, from a

different locality. Both generations also suggest that leaders should be selected by those who know the qualifications necessary for the position and are familiar with the behavior of the individual who want the political positions. According to rural dwellers, the person most qualified for a position of leadership is one who is most familiar with the position's requirements and most closely knows the people with whom they will be working and directing, which, depending on the circumstances or level of responsibility, could be a leader's own constituents or other government officials.

While youth and older adults agree on this point, they differ in regards to who decides how "qualified," most "familiar" and most closely "knows" are defined. That is, they agree on the principles of what legitimacy is, but not the mechanics of how legitimate rulers are selected. In essence, they believe in different forms of rule: one through inheritance and one through election. The political ideals of youth lean toward control and choice – they are more concerned with the procedural elements of how their representatives are chosen. The application of democratic procedural elements makes a leader legitimate. If youth had choices presented to them in who should be a leader and then were able to have a measure of influence and control in the decision, the leader is more legitimate. At a broader level, youth believe a consistently democratic regime is the most legitimate regime.

Older adults, in contrast, place greater value in how much knowledge and power a leader possesses, and thus their perceptions of legitimacy are based on the qualifications of the leaders who inhabit positions, more so than the strict selection criteria in a formally meritorious and democratic system. In contrast to the youth, the leader's legitimacy is not based on whether or not they were elected, but that leader leads with authority and power once he has achieved a position. At the same time, however, there is an element of legitimacy inherent in the selection process. As the results reveal, part of what makes a ruler qualified is the training he received as a member of a family that traditionally rules, and which therefore trains its sons to exercise power from a young age. The emphasis, however, is that a tradition of coming to power through inheritances, with the weight of the legitimacy resting in beliefs about the legitimacy of the process and decisions of the ruling family, makes a leader better qualified. At the local level, the ideals of the older

generation manifest themselves in the acceptance of the legitimacy of traditional authorities.

B. PERCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY AMONG RURAL ADULTS

In rural areas of Mozambique, it is generally thought that the population considers traditional authorities the legitimate representatives of the local communities. "The people" consider the *régulo* a person of good faith who is generally accepted as a person in which much trust and confidence is placed. *Régulos* and traditional leaders, usually elders, are sought out directly to deal with conflicts relating to tradition or domestic issues. Pereira suggests that this is because traditional authorities are not supposed to be attached to any political party and therefore are the most neutral political institution at the local level.[108] These traditional institutions also have a long history of influential decision-making. It is suggested that the people only do what the traditional organs say

> because they were not appointed or elected, but their power comes from their inherited position or the trust of the people; the people see them as "God," because they are individuals that know the ways and customs of their area and also the traditions. When there is a conflict, only these [traditional] elements should resolve them.[109]

My research corroborates Pereira's primary research only in regards to older adults. However, younger members of rural society do not share these views.

My primary research found that older adults in rural areas highly regard and respect traditional authorities. According to the adult focus group participants, these authorities achieve their positions through the traditional means of being appointed by family members. The position of *régulo* usually stays in the same family. As a *régulo* ages and a new one needs to be selected, the older members of the family gather together and select the successor.[110] As the one appointed by the family to lead, the community

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[108] Januário João Pereira, "Estruturação e Funcionamento dos Órgãos Locais em Moçambique á Luz da Lei N. ˚08/2003, de 19 de Maio de Autoridades Gentilícas (Tradicionais)" Trabalho de Diploma Para a Licenciatura, (Nampula, Moçambique: Universidade Católica de Moçambique, Outubro 2003).

[109] Ibid 39. My translation.

[110] As one older man in Rapale explained, the family of the *régulo* is of the lineage of an ancient royal family. "There was a king and he had a family. When one person died, he was replaced by another. . . The family with the lineage would get together and decide who will be the capo. If the family appoints him and other people and families say 'Hey, look at who they chose [we don't like him.]' This happens. You just say, hey, this is the *régulo* and leave it at that."

feels free to approach him. A group of older women reported that they approach the *régulo* to resolve issues because "he is a respected person and the one responsible."[111] Because r*égulos* are native members of the community and understand the dynamics and specific traditions practiced therein, participants considered the *régulo* to be especially suited to govern.

The trust and confidence placed in traditional authority by adults is also demonstrated by the fact that older adults are more likely than youth to approach the *régulo* or *cabo* to resolve personal or community problems and issues. Regardless of whether or not an issue is under the legal jurisdiction of the secretary or *cabo,* there is a distinct difference in who each generation approaches to resolve those issues.[112] In a majority of the scenarios presented in the focus groups (See Question 9 of the interview questions), the older adults chose to approach the *cabo* first. "The *cabo* has knowledge"[113] and, in the rural areas, power.[114]

One particular group of older men near Rapale is noted for their awareness of the duality of the government system at the rural, local level. These men recognize that the *régulo* is an official member of the state. Therefore, by approaching him to resolve issues, they are not working outside the state apparatus. They also recognize the secretary as a member of the state, but are less willing to approach him with issues. The *régulo* is their leader of choice. They acknowledge that the *régulo* is not elected and the secretary is, but this *status quo* is preferred when faced with the decision of whether or not they would like to vote on who should be *régulo.* The regular is inherently legitimate because the older adults value the traditional regime type. Among all older adults with the exception of one group of women, none could conceive of the *régulo* or person with similar authority being elected by the people. Thus, even within the government apparatus, the older members of rural society did not desire the position of *régulo,* or a

[111] Author interview with rural older women, Niapala, 13 August 2006.

[112] Indeed, in rural Mozambican society the people are often unaware of laws regarding jurisdiction and leadership responsibility, which may cause them to be free of any obligation they may otherwise feel to approach the authorities that actually hold jurisdiction in certain matters.

[113] Author interview with rural older men, Niapala, 13 August 2006.

[114] Author interview with rural older women, Nampula Barragem, 6 August 2006.

leadership position that held similar responsibilities, to be contested through an election.[115]

The traditional authorities were considered legitimate because they belonged to a family that traditionally has held the leadership roles in the community. The adults perceived that the traditional authorities were selected by their family based on their leadership capability and competence. Even in cases where adults did not mention the leadership ability or competence of the traditional authority, they still stated that they would go to the traditional authority to address issues. A typical response from adults in regards to whether or not they think a traditional regimes in their area is preferable to a more democratic regimes type is as follows: "How it is now is an old tradition. This way is how it is."[116] After a group of older women in at the Barragem stated that they preferred to elect the secretary, they were asked the following question: "So, you said you preferred that the secretary was elected. Now, in regards to the cabo, would you prefer that he be elected or not?" They responded, **"**Here, with the cabo, there is a difference between the leaders. With the capo it has to do with his family." The older adults did not think the traditional regime was illegitimate.[117] Adults respected and honored the authorities that worked within the traditional regime. They saw those leaders as effective, as evidenced by the fact that they stated they habitually approach the traditional authority first, in lieu of the secretary, to address problems and issues within the community.

While Mozambique is not considered fully democratic, the institutional expression of the current democratic regime type is embodied in the positions of secretaries, post chiefs, provincial governors and other more local positions.[118] In Chapter Two it was noted that *régulos* and *cabos* are also official representatives of the

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[115] In Niapala, in contrast to the other areas, the older women stated that they would not mind if the position of *régulo* was contested through an election, "though there isn't a big problem [with how it is] now. . . We like how it is now." Author interview with rural older women, Niapala, 13 August 2006.

[116] Older men in Niapala, Author interview, 13 August 2006.

[117] "The family with the lineage would get together and decide who will be the capo. If the family appoints him and other people and families say "Hey, look at who they chose [we don't like him.]" This happens. You just say, hey, this is the regulo and leave it at that."

[118] According to the 2006 Freedom House index, Mozambique is considered partly free. It scored 3 for political rights and 4 for civil liberties, on a scale of one to seven with 1 being the most free and 7 being the least free. http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/Charts2006.pdf Accessed 18 September 2006

government, but in this context they have been referred to as traditional authorities to differentiate them from other government structures. Most local government positions are gained through appointment. The President of the Republic and national parliamentarians are the only officials that rural dwellers have the opportunity to elect.[119] Currently, most secretaries are members of the political party in power and are appointed by their district or higher authority.

Among focus group participants, the secretary was universally recognized as the official state representative in the community. As a leader appointed by the party or provincial government, he is not part of the traditional regime. Most older adults could not even conceive of an elected or government-appointed individual entitled to carry out the responsibilities of a traditional authority. The position of secretary was important, but its role was considered distinctly different than that of the traditional authority. In the opinion of the older adults, the position of secretary would best be selected by a local election. Members of their community should present themselves to be nominated for the position of secretary and the community would vote by a show of hands or on a ballot. The individual with the most votes would become the secretary. This assumes that the community knows the individuals seeking the position of leadership and will be a good judge of how powerful and knowledgeable that leader will be.

Under the current system, the participants expressed that they often did not know their secretary or the secretary was not from their community. Across the different focus groups, participants reiterated that they would like to vote because they would know the *comportamento* of the individual. *Comportamento* is the conduct or behavior of a person. Voting "is better because we can see his *comportamento*. If he's bad, we hear about it. We can know if that one there isn't good."[120] This is an understandable reaction to the current system in which appointments are made in return for political favor, often regardless of the individual's qualifications or prior experience.

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[119] Democracy is growing in the urban areas as local elections have begun to be held in some of Mozambique's municipalities. However, most rural areas do not fall under a municipality and thus in most cases rural citizens do not have the opportunity to elect their local leaders.

[120] Author interview with rural adult men near Rapale , 5 August 2006.

In some of the rural areas in which research was conducted, the participants stated that their secretaries were elected by the community. For the adults who were able to vote, they were pleased that they could express their personal choice. "[Voting for the secretary] is better [than appointment] because we can see his behavior." At the local level, the elders, like the youth, preferred to vote for their secretary. Democratically elected leaders at the local level were also legitimate. However, when the voting option was considered for the traditional authority or government officials at higher levels, its value decreased. The adults thought the family of the *régulo*, not the community, should appoint the traditional authority. The further detached a political authority was from the local community, the more inclined individuals were to default the selection process to someone else at a higher level. Thus the duality of regimes at the local level was acknowledged, with the democratic and traditional regimes interacting. The dual system was preferred over a system in which all leaders were democratically elected or only traditional leaders had authority at the local level.

C. PERCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY AMONG RURAL YOUTH

At the local level, youth have strong preferences on how the government should or should not continue to function.[121] In every rural community, traditional authorities are present. The extent to which these authorities exercise power and political authority varies, but is nevertheless influential. Little research has been conducted in the area of the interaction between youth and traditional authorities in the areas where the authorities function as formalized, government institutions. One NDI study conducted in 1996 offers some limited insight into rural youth perceptions of traditional authority. Youth participants in NDI focus groups did "not know this traditional authority or even its rules."[122] The sentiment of the youth was that traditional authority "belongs to old times."[123] Traditional authority was declared outdated and irrelevant. Thus, while the samples used for this research are small and the region in question relatively minute

[121] Youth participants often mentioned the role of governor, directors, administrators and other government posts at the local and provincial level. Though some were relatively uneducated, all youth stated that the government had some responsibility toward them.

[122] *On the Road to Local Elections,* (National Democratic Institute, February 1996) 5.

[123] Ibid.

compared to the vast rural areas of northern Mozambique, the results nevertheless provide valuable insight into the views and opinions of rural youth. All youth focus group participants were engaged in the discussion and willing to share their views and ideas. Most importantly, they were glad to know that someone actually cared what they think.

The opinions of rural youth concerning traditional authorities were similar across participants. With the exception of one individual female youth, all the twenty-one participants from four different regions favored approaching the secretary with all problems and issues in their community, including issues traditionally addressed by the *régulo* or *cabo.* These responses are consistent with the complaint of one older man in Rapale, who stated that the "youth don't go to the *cabo*. They go directly to the secretary or the police."[124] Youth explained that they prefer to go to the secretary because he has more authority, particularly in matters that must be referred to judiciary bodies or governing bodies in the city, where the secretary has ties and the *cabo* does not. The youth stated that the authority of the secretary was ultimately derived from the members of parliament and the president, who are elected. While the secretary was not directly elected, which would be preferable, he was still more legitimate than the traditional authorities. While in most communities the secretaries are not directly elected, the fact that they have been appointed by elected members of the government gives them more legitimacy that the traditional authorities, who are not elected or appointed by elected leaders. When asked how they would address an issue in which the secretary and *cabo* disagreed on a decision, one female participant stated that "[the *cabo*] only has a say in [his] family. He's not in accord with the government. He's not part of the government."[125] The youth were more willing to have someone they recognized as a authority, who achieved their position through some semblance of a democratic regime, address their grievances than a traditional authority. They recognized the legitimacy of the regime that appointed the local government representatives.

When questioned on the manner in which traditional authorities achieve their positions, youth respond with much disapproval. "For the *régulo* it would be better to

[124] Author interview with rural older men, Rapale district, 5 August 2006.

[125] Author interview with rural female youth, 10 August 2006.

vote, but the *régulo,* with his origins, he only gets power that way. . ."[126] Authority through lineage, in this instance, was seen as a shortcoming. Possessing a "royal" lineage and then being appointed by the "royal" family was not considered sufficient to grant an individual leadership authority.[127] To some youth, the *régulo* seemed distant and unapproachable. Nevertheless, the *régulos* was still considered an important figure with whom the secretary or government officials should consult of they desired or needed assistance. The traditional authorities were seen as honored members of society who could offer sound advice, but not leaders in society who, if part of the traditional regime, should have political power.

The primary concern youth had with leaders who were not directly elected, traditional leaders and local secretaries alike, is that they may be incapable or unwilling to lead the way the youth think they should lead. "Sometimes those who come into positions without being elected are not capable."[128] In some cases, the traditional authorities are seen as more than incapable – in the eyes of the youth they are corrupt. "If the *cabo* is selected by this family, he does not judge justly. If something [unjust is going on] in the family he will not resolve it. If he was elected he would see that his job is in the government and his word is second to the law."[129] Elected officials, in the opinion of the youth, would be more likely to obey the law and govern justly with the possibility that they may lose the next election. While the secretaries are often not directly elected, as previously noted, their leadership is preferable to that of the traditional authorities.

In regards to traditional authority then, youth do not perceive these authorities to be inherently legitimate. They perceive elected authorities, or those who have been appointed by the democratic regime, to be more legitimate because they have had a measure of choice and control in the process. Youth thought they themselves and the community at large could be a better judge of who should lead than a "royal" family or a higher government official unfamiliar with the locality. In regards to traditional

[126] Author interview with rural male youth, Monapo district, 3 August 2006.

[127] The term "royal" is used to describe the family that is originally descendent from kings and chiefs. While these families still possess this heritage and a certain amount of respect, they are not treated as royalty in the traditional sense of the word.

[128] Author interview with male youth near Monapo, 3 August 2006.

[129] Author interview with female youth near Nampula Barragem, 6 August 2006.

authority, these findings corroborate with the 1993 October Household Surveys statistical data in rural South Africa in which 30,000 households were visited. Of all age groups surveyed, youth were the "least supportive of an important role for traditional leaders, whereas the older age-group (seventy plus) is substantially more supportive."[130] The older adults who participated in the focus groups in Mozambique were significantly younger than the older age group accounted for in the South African census, and thus the Mozambican participants and their opinions represent a greater portion of the population than the opinions of the South Africans. In contrast to the views of the older generation, youth participants were more supportive of requiring an election for a position than older respondents.[131] Thus the situation of youth in rural Nampula Province appears to be similar to other areas of Africa.

The youth thought they should be the judge of who "knows" the community. Their judgment could then be expressed in the form of a vote. Like the older generation, the youth also believe that an individual seeking a position of authority should be the one most familiar with the position and have the most respectable behavior. In contrast to the view of the elders, however, they believe every individual should be able to make the judgment call of whether a person is qualified or not through a voting process. The privilege of determining who most is qualified and well-behaved is not deferred to those who "know him the best," as is the case with the elders. The youth, regardless of education level, gender, or location, desired that all local government officials be elected. They believed they had sense enough to elect the best person for the job. They would want to know about candidates and decide individually who should hold an office. In their own words, "everyone knows in their heart who they want in the position."

The youth universally desired to vote for their local authorities. "The person chosen to lead has to be a person the people validated and saw that he would be a good leader." In contrast to the *régulo,* who "takes the authority from his relatives that have died,"[132] youth considered the authority of elected leaders to be derived from the voting process. In the cases where the local secretary was elected, youth stated that he should be

[130] Crothers in Ray and Reddy 75.

[131] Ibid.

[132] Author interview with rural male youth near Monapo, 3 August 2006.

obeyed because "he was given authority by those who chose him."[133] Even non-directly elected government figures were considered more legitimate than the *régulo* because they were at least appointed by the party, which ultimately derives its power from the presidential vote.

D. CONCLUSION

Perceptions of what constitutes a legitimate political authority differ across generations in rural Nampula Province. Youth consider a political authority to be legitimate based on procedural elements of selection. If a leader at any level is elected, youth consider them to be the legitimate authority. If that person does not perform well, he will not win re-election and their authority will not be re-legitimized. This is the essence of a democratic regime, the regime-type youth prefer over the other alternative of a traditional regime at the local level. Older adults consider both the traditional regime and the democratic regime at the local levels to be legitimate and compatible. The traditional authorities continue to achieve their positions in a traditional manner because that has been, in the words of the elders, "effective and they know their job and the community the best." In regards to traditional authorities, it is how it has always been and should not be changed. The older adults would prefer that the secretaries be elected, however. Thus, the older adults accept the integration of dual regimes – traditional and democratic – at the local level, while the youth would prefer that only the democratic regime type be practiced.

In rural areas, where the role of traditional authorities is the most prominent, a generational disconnect in political ideals and understanding of legitimate regime types could undermine the future of currently established institutions of authority. The current institutions of traditional authority in rural areas are founded on political ideals that the current youth, who will assume leadership roles in society in the future, do not accept as their own. Youth do not accept the inherent legitimacy of traditional authority. Their political ideals do not include the ideal of authority being inherently legitimate. It is legitimate based on the procedural elements of freedom of choice and elections – political ideals youth highly value. For youth, the traditional regime type the institutions

[133] Author interview with rural male youth near Monapo, 3 August 2006.

invariably incorporated into that regime type should no longer have a role in local community politics or in the regime at large. The youth express their ideals by marginalizing traditional authorities in the political processes in which they participate.

Many members of the older generation accept the traditional regimes at the local level as inherently legitimate. They value the historical heritage traditional leaders possess and see it as relevant for today. However, they also value having a choice in the selection of leaders who will have influence in their communities – if those leaders are outside the realm of the traditional regime. Thus the alternative regime type – democracy – is also acceptable if it does not marginalize the traditional authority or discourage individuals from approaching them if they so desire. The existence of dual regimes at the local level is acceptable to the older generation and even preferable than the existence of only the democratic regime or the traditional regime.

IV. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

This project initially set out to interrogate an assumption that underlies many discussions of democracy, democratization and power in Africa: that rural people believe that traditional rulers are a legitimate form of rule. Most analyses of democracy and democratization assume that traditional rulers must be accommodated in state structures in order to maintain effectiveness and legitimacy, basically creating a hybrid regime that incorporates fundamentally different modes of legitimation: officially meritocratic election versus familial inheritance and selection. These ideas, however, rest on a relatively dated view of "rural people" that does not account for generational differences that may have emerged in the past decade or two. The thesis therefore set out to show that the youth, even in rural areas, tend not to consider traditional authority to be a legitimate regime type, and therefore to proffer an alternate claim that research and policies should not just assume that all rural people hold the same opinions of what constitutes legitimate rule. People in rural areas have different perceptions of what regime types are legitimate and which are not.

B. IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH

The assumption within African states that traditional authorities are inherently legitimate in rural areas has implications for the future of the development of government at the local level. In 2000 the government of Mozambique recognized that the traditional regimes were influential in rural areas. As a result, it declared that they would be transitionally incorporated into the democratic regime. However, the two regime types are distinctly different. One of the defining factors of the traditional regime is that its authorities are not elected, whereas within the democratic regime they are. The government is in practice promoting two different regime types within one state, which has implications for the way in which the state seeks to legitimate its rule and can exercise authority. Among the older adults, this duality is acceptable and legitimate. In the opinion of rural youth, however, it is not. Among youth, the majority of whom think traditional authorities are illegitimate as a regime-type within the state, there is the

potential for a rejection of the regime at the local level. The existence of dual regimes at the local level could lead to perceptions of illegitimacy of the regime overall. A growth in the perceptions of illegitimacy of the regime could lead to perceptions of the illegitimacy of the state.

Initially states argued that integration of traditional regimes was essential for rural areas to buy into the system. For older citizens in rural areas, this may have been an effective means to legitimize the regime and state overall. However, as youth adopt differing perceptions of legitimacy, the integration of traditional authorities may serve to de-legitimize the existing regime and the state. The system as it stands could weaken the state instead of strengthening it. Another implication of the divergence in perceptions of legitimacy between generations is the potential for disenfranchising the youth. Leaders in both regimes at the local level are adults, many of whom are working to promote the dual system Mozambique has established in law. If youth do not accept the legitimacy of the traditional regime, their present role as political actors at the local level could be limited, causing discontent and unease.

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR DIVERGENCE OF PERCEPTIONS

Because the literature on legitimate regime types in Africa to date has treated rural people as an undifferentiated cohort and has not investigated whether there are generational distinctions in what they perceive of as legitimate regime types, this thesis focused on proving that there is a divergence between the younger and older generations in Mozambique. The analysis demonstrated that these variations do exist and could potentially have far-reaching impacts on the legitimacy of local and even national government. Because it was concerned with proving that "rural people" should not be treated as one block, this thesis did not focus on the important question of *why* the generations diverge in what they consider to be legitimate regime types. Now that the thesis has shown that there is something to investigate, future research can now investigate why these divisions exist.

As the literature review in Chapter One suggests, there are many factors that should be investigated for their potential to cause the difference in political ideals of youth and older adults and, as a result, their perceptions of legitimate regimes and

institutions. In this section I lay out an agenda of possible sources that warrant future research. First, much like the individuals in other countries that have experienced civil war, the views of today's adults are probably framed by their experiences during Mozambique's civil war, while the youth did not experience the many of the harsh realities of the war. As a result, the older generation may value peace and stability more than democratic processes, which often involve competition and discord. The experience of adults may cause them to desire peace at all costs, including peace within their communities. If the current local state of affairs, which includes a dual system, is peaceful and functioning at a minimal level, adults may prefer it to a democratic regime which they have yet to experience in full - in which everyone has a voice, including those who may have radical ideas, and in which people compete with each other for positions of power. The youth, in contrast, have arrived at early adulthood in an era of peace when discord does not automatically lead to war, and therefore they might have more tolerance for the institutionalized uncertainty and competition of a democratic regime.

Second, the influence of global ideas of legitimacy and democracy on the youth, and the manner in which these ideas diffuse throughout society, should be considered in more depth. With greater access to media and education than the older generation, youth have been exposed to ideas that are becoming a reality across the continent.[134] The value of individuality the youth have begun to espouse is evident in their desire to have each voice count equally in the selection of a leader. Most often, these dynamics are assumed to operate among youths who have access to resources like cable and satellite television and the internet, i.e., youths in relatively urbanized locations. The fact that this thesis found attitudes among rural, relatively non-globalized youths that approximate what is expected of urban youths begs for more research on why the rural youths have attitudes similar to what is expected from urban youths. Because the diverging views of youth were the emphasis of this thesis, future research should evaluate the views of urban youth

[134] For a review of the impact of increased access to education, globalization, development on youth, see Francis Chigunta, *The Socio-Economic Situation of Youth in Africa: Problems, Prospects and Options Draft* (University of Zambia: July 2002), http://www.yesweb.org/gkr/res/bg.africa.reg.doc Accessed May 2006; see the essay written by CODESRIA's Ali B. Ali-Dinar on the upcoming Youth and Identity in Africa Symposium scheduled for November 2006, http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Current_Events/codes-youth1206.html Accessed 19 Sep 2006; see B. Nsamenang, "Adolescence in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Image constructed from Africa's triple inheritance," in B. B. Brown, R. Larson, and T.S. Saraswathi, eds. *The World's Youth: Adolescence in Eight Regions of the Globe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 61-104.

as well. The consistency of views among all Mozambican youth would have implications for the country as a whole, not just rural areas.

Third, researchers should analyze the impact of party politics on perceptions of legitimacy. During the civil war, Frelimo and Renamo controlled distinct areas fo the country, and, as discussed in Chapter Two, used traditional authorities as pawns in the larger conflict. Therefore, there could be enduring differences in the status of traditional rule and its legitimacy as a regime type that extend from the civil war era. This potential factor is not as universal as the first two potential sources of divergence, as it will apply mostly to post-conflict scenarios in which combatants controlled distinct territories in the national unit. The area in which the research was conducted was generally controlled by Renamo, and the party continues to be the party of preference for many citizens of the rural north. During the war Renamo's policy sought to support the role of traditional authorities in society. Today's older adults who were influenced by Renamo policy may continue to regard that as a reason to uphold traditional authority. Renamo supporters, who are in general more poor and rural than Frelimo supporters, may be clinging to the one institution that has remained historically consistent. Early Frelimo socialist policy imposed state farms and cooperatives and other collective institutions on the people that ultimately failed, giving the people no other alternative but to rely upon institutions that had functioned in the past. As the political regime in Mozambique continues to transition into a democratic society, individuals skeptical of the change may continue to rely upon traditional authority as the primary legitimate governing institution. Therefore, in order to investigate the impact of partisan attitudes, other localities in other provinces should be studied.

D. THE SHAPING OF FUTURE PERCEPTIONS

Much research also needs to be done to further elaborate the ideas presented in this thesis. Most importantly, understanding the political ideals today should help political scientists determine how these will shape the future. There are two primary possibilities in regards to how these perceptions of political authority will change with time. One possibility is that the attitudes of today's youth will evolve over time. When

they reach older adulthood, they could have the same political ideals as today's older adults in regards to the legitimacy of political authorities.

In contrast, perhaps none of these previously discussed reasons – distance from the civil war, connection to the "developed" world, access to education and urban ideas, cross-cultural influence from overseas and party politics – explain the divergence. Another reason for the different perceptions across generations could be that the youth are still developing their ideals and thus their conceptions of political legitimacy. The differences may purely be a function of their immature psychological development. David Easton and Jack Dennis have contributed significantly to the research on political socialization of children and youth. In their words, "the role attitudes and behavior patterns about support that [the youth] acquires may conform to the expectations among adults about what a person should know and how he should behave. Thereby his political awakening would contribute to the stability of the system."[135] In other words, youthful perceptions that initially diverge from the sentiments of adults come to approximate the views of their elders as the individuals mature. People begin to form their views of political authority as children. When they reach adulthood, those views may solidify and remain consistent. Thus, perhaps the perceptions of the youth involved in this study are still formulating their political ideals and, when they reach older adulthood, their ideals will have evolved into the same ideals of today's older adults.

If this is the case, the perceptions of legitimate political authority continue to change into adult life and as this group of Mozambican youth mature, their perceptions will come to approximate those of the elder groups in the study. The only way to know if this is truly the case would be to interview the same individuals who participated in this study periodically over the next two to three decades. If their ideals and the resulting perceptions of legitimate political authority do evolve teleologically, political authorities within the regime will retain their legitimacy. There is another possibility, however, in the political socialization process of youth.

It is possible that the ideals of today's youth have already been solidified. If carried into adulthood, their views could transform the system. The current system as it

[135] David Easton and Jack Dennis. "Children in the Political System." New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. 389.

stands, which incorporates traditional authorities in which the youth do place significant legitimacy, could be rendered obsolete within a generation. By formalizing and codifying the role of traditional authorities in society, the institution will be perpetuated, regardless of its relevance or perceived legitimacy. If the political ideals of the youth remain consistent into adulthood, they will have the opportunity to change laws regarding traditional authority as they assume positions of authority within society. If this occurs, society will look to today's dualist system as a transition of legitimacy. Therefore, additional research questions should address how perceptions change over time within the same group of people. For example, have older adults always held these views, or have their views changed over time? Similarly, will the views of today's youth remain consistent or change with time?

E. CONCLUSION

The current dual regime system at the local level is a result of legislative and constitutional engineering. The initial goal of the system was to incorporate the rural areas into the state and establish a regime, or regimes, that were acceptable and legitimate in the eyes of the rural population. As youth in rural areas, and in Mozambique at large, begin to play a greater role in the politics of the country as they come of age, the system may need to be re-evaluated. The laws passed that establish the system in the rural areas should be re-assessed. The Mozambican state needs to consider this crisis of legitimacy and how it will address the large portion of its population that may become disenfranchised as a result of its policy of integrating traditional authority into the regime.

Outside non-governmental organization (NGOs) and foreign government projects can also apply this research to the application of their programs. With the emphasis that many programs place on aiding African states to promote democratic regime consolidation, recognition must be made that the policies of the organizations may not always resonate with the people it is trying influence. Programs sponsored by United States are of note. In the context of perceptions of legitimacy, do U.S. policy and U.S.-sponsored programs promote democracy in a manner that is compatible with the held views of the population they are trying influence? After reviewing the primary evidence and research conducted in Mozambique, the answer is both yes and no. Democracy

promotion programs are designed in such a way that they may resonate with and influence youth because the issue of democracy is approached from the perspective of similar foundational political ideals– the assumption that western, democratic institutions are more legitimate than traditional institutions. In contrast, U.S.-sponsored programs will have more difficulty reaching and convincing older citizens of their value because older citizens place a greater relative value on traditional institutions.

Once the perceptions of legitimate regimes are correctly understood, they can be framed in the context of their relevance to democratization efforts. As Diamond has noted, "to be stable, democracy must be deemed legitimate by the people; they must view it as the best, most appropriate form of government for their society. Indeed, because it rests on the consent of the governed, democracy depends on the popular legitimacy much more than any other form of government."[136] In regards to consolidation, the rural areas are the most unreached and marginalized in the democratic process. This is an aspect of democratization that demands more attention in U.S. policy. Bratton et. al. note that "democratic regimes depend centrally on the creation and constant renewal of popular legitimacy."[137] Now that Mozambicans are living in peace, the government and organizations have the capacity to engage those in the rural areas who have been previously marginalized to gain a greater understanding of how popular legitimacy is created and renewed, which will further democratic consolidation efforts. It is vital for policy makers to understand that in states where democracy is in the consolidation phase, acknowledging a generational division in perceptions of legitimate political regimes and institutions is important. If the divide is recognized, policy and programs can be tailored to the appropriate audience.

Understanding perceptions of political legitimacy is foundational to the development of the regime in Mozambique at all levels of the state – national, provincial and local. While this thesis focuses on the local level, it provides a glimpse into the reality of how traditional institutions function as well as how deeply democracy has, or more realistically has not, penetrated rural society. The political situation will inevitably

136 Larry Diamond. "Three Paradoxes of Democracy." Journal of Democracy 1, 1 (1990) 56.

137 Michael Bratton et al. 30.

continue to evolve. The question remains: will the regime and the institutions therein grow in their perceived legitimacy or not? Only time will tell.

APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

[Note: Items in bold or italic were not verbalized during the interview. Bold items provide an explanation and reasoning the questions asked. Items in italics are for the interviewer only.]

1. How old are you?

2. Where were you born?

3. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

4. A. What is the name of the person who represents your area in the government in Maputo?

If they know the answer to this question, it may be a signal that they understand how the government functions at different levels and can differentiate between national, provincial and local government.

B. How was that person selected for that position?

If they answer "elected" ask if they voted and if they thought that was a good way to select someone to go to Maputo and represent then. Then ask if they feel different about the authority now than they did before they had been elected.

C. What is their primary job in Maputo?

5. A. In your opinion, what is the role of the government?

B. The people who perform that role, where are they located?

This question discerns who they consider the government (local, regional, national).

C. In your opinion, do you think they/it do a good job?

D. In this area, who works for the government?

These questions are to determine if they differentiate between those who in reality are employed by the government and those who serve in positions of authority but in reality do not represent the government.

6. A. What do you think the government in Maputo should do for you?

B. How well does it do that?

These two questions are to discern whether people's views of the government are performance-based. Ask the question again and change 'Maputo' to 'community.'

7. A. What are the biggest problems in your community?

B. Who do you think should address those issues? Why?

The answer to this question will help determine who the person believes is most effective at solving issues.

C. How are leaders chosen/selected in your community?

Region?

Maputo?

If the answer to any of these is 'vote,' ask if the interviewee voted. If they did not vote, ask why.

D. Do you think that's the best way to choose a leader for the community?

Region?

Maputo?

E. Are there other ways to choose a leader?

If the answer to these questions is 'not elected,' follow up with the following question.

F. Mozambique is considered a democracy. Most of the time in a democracy the leaders are elected. You said your leader is not elected. Does that mean there is not democracy in your area?

These questions help determine what they perceive to be a relevant type of democracy for them. Most interviewees were also asked "What does democracy mean to you?"

8. A. In your opinion, what is the best way to make someone a leader in your community?

B. In your opinion, what is the best way to make someone a leader for the province?

C. In your opinion, what is the best way to make someone a leader who works in the national government?

The aim of these questions is to discern whether people change their views of how people should be put into positions of authority when the position has greater or less impact on them.

9. In the following situations, who would you approach to address the issue?

Scenario 1 (economic issues):

A. You want to open up a new mashamba and have found some open, uncultivated land. Who would you go to make it your mashamba? Why?

How did that person achieve their position of authority?

Why should their decision be obeyed?

What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or community authority has made?

B. A man agrees to help cultivate a crop in return for a share of the grain. When the crop has been harvested, his partner refuses to give him a share of the grain. Who should he go to to help resolve the issue? Why?

How did that person achieve their position of authority?

Why should their decision be obeyed?

What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or community authority has made?

Scenario 2 (social issues):

A. A man has worked hard all his life, built a house for his wife and has land and he wants her to be able to stay in the house when he dies. But if he dies first, her family will come, sell all the land and possessions and divide the profit among the family and then forces her to come live with them while they financially support her the rest of her life. The widow wants to respect her husbands wishes and stay on they land he owed and continue living there. If you were the widow, what could you do? Why?

How did that person achieve their position of authority?

Why should their decision be obeyed?

What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or community authority has made?

B. Your neighbor gets drunk and beats his children. Once the child was beaten so bad he broke his leg and couldn't go to school or work in the mashamba. The relatives of the family live in another province. What can you do about it?

How did that person achieve their position of authority?

Why should their decision be obeyed?

What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or community authority has made?

Scenario 3 (crime issues):

A. Someone stripped your fields at night and you know who it is. What can/would you do about it? Why?

How did that person achieve their position of authority?

Why should their decision be obeyed?

What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or community authority has made?

B. Who would you go to if you found out your neighbor beat his wife to death for being with another man? Why?

How did that person achieve their position of authority?

Why should their decision be obeyed?

What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or community authority has made?

The purpose of these questions is to determine whether there is a plurality of authority figures they consider legitimate and why they are legitimate (i.e. they are effective, "we always go to them with issues like this", the government has appointed that person to deal with the issue, etc). For each scenario, they were asked to essentially go up the 'chain of command' of authorities/problem solving bodies until they reach a traditional authority and/or government figure.

If interviewees cannot respond to the question "How did that person achieve their position of authority," offer the following options.

a. They are a member of a family that has always had the responsibility of making those sorts of decisions.

b. My community decided that it would be their responsibility to address that issue and make the final decision.

c. The government said they are in charge of addressing those issues.

d. They were elected.

e. Don't know.

f. No response.

If there is no tension and the interviewee/interviewer is comfortable, ask the following question: What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or community authority has made?

10. Can community authorities be elected?

11. Do you think community authorities should be elected?

12. Did you know that the government has a law that gives community authorities governmental responsibilities such as taxation, justice enforcement, policing and land allocation?

'Community authority' is the government definition of what is commonly known as traditional authority. The point of this question is to help discern whether or not they perceive traditional authorities to be legitimate because the government has stated it is a formal structure of the state or if they perceive them to be legitimate because they believe traditional authorities are inherently legitimate. The answer to this question must be framed in response to questions directed at who solves the community's problems. It will also determine whether or not other traditional authorities aside from the official 'community authorities' are considered legitimate governing bodies.

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APPENDIX B. EXPLANATION OF TERMS

Bairro – areas where most residents of the city reside. Houses are generally constructed in the traditional manner on small plots of land close together. The roads are narrow and not paved.

Cabo - a traditional authority under the authority of the *régulo.* A *régulo*'s territory may be divided between several *cabos.*

Cidade cimento – literally "cement city." Section of the city, originally developed during colonial times, where all edifices are built of cement and roads are mostly paved.

Comportamento - Portuguese word for behavior, disposition, or conduct. Focus group participants frequently expressed that it was important for them to know the *comportamento* of their leaders.

Jovem – Portuguese word for youth. In Africa, it is used broadly to define those generally between the ages of 15-30.

Mambo – Term used mostly by Renamo to identify traditional authorities and chiefs.

Mashamba – garden or small farm cultivated by the family for subsistence.

Régulo – a traditional authority with a historically royal lineage; chief.

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