

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER

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ABSTRACT

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The Navy has been conducting joint warfare since its inception; further, joint warfare and the employment of sea power is an evolutionary process. The functional maritime component to the joint force is the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC). JFMCC doctrine is currently under development, and the Navy currently lacks a common framework for the establishment of a JFMCC. This SRP focuses on joint maritime operations and the key elements that are essential to its effectiveness. It provides historical examples of successful joint operations; it traces the evolution of naval joint warfare, describing the roles and capabilities the Maritime Component brings to the Joint Force. Using examples from the author's experience on the Seventh Fleet staff, it also describes the framework from which the Seventh Fleet JFMCC operated. The SRP concludes with recommendations to improve the JFMCC process and the development of doctrine.

JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER

Today, we often take the post-Cold war success of our Armed Forces for granted. From Haiti to Bosnia, to the Taiwan Strait, to Liberia, to the skies over Iraq, they have achieved great success at minimal cost.... Quality people, superior organization, unity of command, and considerable skill in joint and combined operations have been central to that achievement.¹

- General John M. Shalikashvili

The U.S. military has recognized and embraced the overarching superiority of joint warfare – harnessing the combined capabilities of our fighting forces: the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. The resulting synergistic effect provides this nation with an unmatched military force. As General Shalikashvili put it, “no other nation can match our ability to combine forces on the battlefield and fight jointly.”²

Admiral Vern Clark and General Hagee emphasize in their forward to the *Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations*, that “the Naval Services must continue to adapt to provide flexible, persistent, and decisive warfighting capabilities as part of the Joint Force.”³ The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) is the functional component within the Joint Force responsible for ensuring naval warfighting capabilities are used decisively in support of the joint force mission.

This SRP focuses on joint maritime operations and the key elements that are essential to its effectiveness. It examines historical examples of successful joint operations and traces the evolution of naval joint warfare, describing the roles and capabilities the maritime component brings to the Joint Force. It focuses primarily on operations and joint concepts being used in the Seventh Fleet area of operations. Finally, it will conclude with recommendations for the way ahead.

Examples of Joint Maritime Operations

While the term Joint Force Maritime Component Commander may be new, the concept of joint operations, during which naval forces operate alongside another service, is not new. Throughout U.S. history, naval warfare has combined land and sea forces in support of a common objective. That is not to say that operational tensions and inter-service rivalry have not at times impeded the process. The challenge remains to focus and develop Service capabilities which support joint and combined operations. Naval leadership has recognized the importance of the use of sea power in supporting joint warfare. Indeed naval support to the Joint Force is a priority.⁴ As the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mullen, stated in his guidance for 2006:

We are a nation and a Navy at war. Whether providing sovereign deck space from which to launch strikes in Afghanistan, continuing to support ground operations in Iraq, patrolling the seas to interdict terrorists, or shaping the maritime domain through swift humanitarian action in Indonesia and on our own Gulf Coast, **we are contributing to joint and combined operations in ways no one could have imagined a few short years ago** [emphasis added].⁵

Since the Revolutionary War, naval forces have participated in joint operations in support of land operations – transporting men and equipment, providing naval gunfire, and communication support. However, the first modern example of successful joint operations was the combined efforts of the U.S. Navy and Army during the Civil War. The complementary and synergistic capabilities that can be brought to bear against an opponent were exemplified by the spirit of cooperation and mutual support provided by Admiral David Porter and General Ulysses S. Grant during the Vicksburg Campaign. Through examination of past successful and unsuccessful concepts that were employed, we can continue to evolve. The following historical examples highlight successful tools for conducting Joint Operations; they also demonstrate the evolutionary aspect of Joint Warfare.

During the Civil War Battle of Vicksburg, General Ulysses S. Grant, Commander of the Army forces (Department of the Tennessee), and Rear Admiral David Porter, Naval Commander (Western Flotilla), were the Army and Navy commanders responsible for taking Vicksburg. Vicksburg was a central node on the Mississippi river occupying dominating high ground on the Mississippi river.⁶ From this location the Confederates were able to control the flow of commerce and traffic along the Mississippi. This flow of Mississippi traffic provided an essential line of communication as well as economic and military support to the Southern states. However, it was also essential to sustaining commerce in the Midwestern States of the North – providing for the transportation of goods and equipment.

In order to open the sea lines of communication to the Midwestern states and, more importantly, to close off the strategic support the Mississippi provided to the South, the Union needed to secure Vicksburg. To do this, the Union Army and Navy coordinated and supported each other, a shining example of the increased capability provided by joint operations. This joint operation led to the capture of Vicksburg and Union control of the Mississippi.

As Grant wrote in his personal Memoirs:

The navy under Porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign. **Without its [the navy's] assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged** [emphasis added]. It could not have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number of men without such assistance. The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the

service. There never was a request made, that I am aware of, either of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with. ⁷

Three key events highlight this joint Army-Navy operation:

- The expedition by Sherman and Porter along the Yazoo River to take Vicksburg.
- The “Running of the Batteries”
- Support to the siege of Vicksburg⁸

During the Sherman and Porter expedition, the Navy provided transportation, logistics support and naval gunfire support.⁹ As Grant stated in his orders to Sherman, “As soon as possible move with them [his troops] down river to the vicinity of Vicksburg, and with the cooperation of the gunboat fleet under command of Flag-officer Porter proceed to the reduction of that place in such manner as circumstance, and your judgment should dictate.”¹⁰

Sherman and Porter then coordinated on the conduct of the operation and proceeded toward a landing along the Yazoo in the vicinity of Vicksburg. Although this operation was unsuccessful, it demonstrates the coordination and integration between two components, the Army and the Navy.¹¹

The second key event of the Battle of Vicksburg was the “Running of the Batteries.” Unable to take Vicksburg directly, Grant needed to move his troops south and across the Mississippi. In order to accomplish this, he needed the Navy to reposition forces below the batteries protecting Vicksburg and transport his forces across the river.¹² Porter in consultation with Grant, agreed to run the batteries and position Grant’s forces south. Porter personally oversaw the preparations for the movement south; he directed his commanders to keep all lights extinguished and hug the Louisiana side of the river in order to avoid detection by the batteries on the opposite shore. Should the Confederates discover the flotilla moving south, his forces were to move to the Mississippi side of the river and take advantage of the inability of the Confederate’s heavy guns to engage vessels near the Vicksburg shore. During the movement south, most of the vessels were hit by the shore batteries. However, only twelve sailors were wounded; and, of the twelve vessels that began the journey, all but one made it south of the batteries.

Porter’s understanding of the operational and tactical environment, his commander’s guidance, risk assessment, and protective measures facilitated the successful movement of his forces south, past the batteries protecting Vicksburg. Porter’s actions provided Grant with the capability to move his forces across the Mississippi out of range of the Confederate guns.

The siege culminated in the capture of Vicksburg. During the siege, Porter provided support for the establishment of a supply base in the vicinity of Walnut Hills, naval gunfire,

equipment, and maritime superiority.¹³ These initiatives effectively cut confederate supply lines and denied avenues of escape.¹⁴ Naval equipment provided to the Union Army included 13 heavy guns and two gun crews. These guns were taken from Porter's own ships armament in order to provide Grant with heavy artillery. After the surrender of Vicksburg, in his official report Porter states, the "naval guns on the waters had fired eleven thousand five hundred shells and the naval guns on land forty-five hundred." The Navy, has "performed a less conspicuous part in the capture of Vicksburg than the Army; still it has been employed in a manner highly creditable to all concerned."¹⁵

The Vicksburg campaign dramatically illustrates the importance of joint operations, showing how the combined capabilities of the Army and the Navy provided overwhelming combat capability. By quickly transitioning between missions and with a clear understanding of the supporting requirements, Porter's naval force was able to support the evolving phases of the land campaign. The coordination between these two components enabled the Union forces to completely cut off Vicksburg and force its eventual surrender. This relationship between Porter and Grant demonstrates how effective lateral communication between components (land component and maritime component), situational awareness, a clear understanding of the mission, and supporting requirements can result in a successful operation. The combined operations between the Navy and the Army provided opportunities that would not have materialized if they operated separately and independently.

The Navy's participation in joint operations continued to evolve. During World War II the Navy operated in close coordination not only with the Army but also with coalition forces. From escort operations in the Atlantic to the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific, joint and combined operations were imperative to campaign success.

Supporting other components, as Vicksburg demonstrated, is one side of the JFMCC spectrum, while securing command of the sea and the maritime domain is the other side of the spectrum. The contest to gain and maintain control of the sea has been the challenge in almost all military conflicts. The opponent that can gain and hold control of the sea gains a significant strategic advantage, for the ocean highways are essential for the movement of troops, supplies, and equipment. These oceans highways also provide additional lines of operation and maneuver for land forces – through amphibious operations. Key to amphibious operations is the need to establish maritime superiority – control of the sea - to support seaborne operations ashore.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was intended to destroy the U.S. ability to contest their control of the sea. Establishing maritime superiority was vital to the success of Japanese

operations. The Japanese strategic loss at Coral Sea denied them maritime superiority; they were thus unable to secure Port Moresby. The Japanese then sought to reestablish control of the sea by invading Midway, where they planned to establish a base. The Battle of Midway again illustrates the importance of securing command of the sea. In this battle, the maritime component, leading the effort, was essential to success of the mission.

For the Americans, the Midway campaign was conducted under the overall command of Admiral Nimitz, who "...exercised strategic and broad tactical direction of all American forces, naval or military, deployed in the Pacific Ocean outside of General MacArthur's area."¹⁶ The U.S. Naval forces consisted of Task Force 16, commanded by Admiral Fletcher (Officer in Tactical Command), and Admiral Spruance's Task Force 17. Midway was defended "under close cooperation between Commander Cyril T. Simard, the atoll commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Harold Shannon USMC, commander ground forces."¹⁷ Naval patrol aircraft, Marine aircraft, and Army planes were positioned on Midway to support its defense. The Japanese fleet was under overall command of Admiral Yamamoto in the main body (First Fleet), and the Midway occupation force was under Vice Admiral Kondo, while the carrier striking force commanded by Admiral Nagumo.

Midway's defenses resided in its shore batteries, aircraft, and Fletcher's carrier aircraft; together, they would oppose the approaching Japanese fleet. On 3 June Midway aircraft were the first to detect and locate Japanese forces, reporting they had located the enemy carriers. "Captain Simard [on Midway] reacted immediately to the contact report, sending out nine B-17's from the Army Air Force."¹⁸ Midway B-17's attacked the Japanese occupation force; however, none of their bombs impacted the Japanese ships. The B-17's were followed by Catalinas armed with torpedoes, which damaged one Japanese oiler. "Admiral Fletcher had received the first reports of contact with the enemy in good season; and although they were reported to him as the Main Body of the Japanese Fleet, he correctly estimated that our planes had seen only a transport group with escort."¹⁹ Correctly deducing that the attacking force would approach from the Northwest and attack at dawn, he positioned his forces to intercept Nagumo's striking force.

Nagumo's aircraft launched at dawn on 4 June 1942, for their attack on Midway. They met a strong resistance. On their return to the Japanese carriers, having been unsuccessful in taking out the runways, the strike leader, Lieutenant Tomonago requested a second attack on Midway. Meanwhile, U.S. land-based aircraft which had launched prior to dawn that morning from Midway located and reported the position of the Japanese striking force. Having located

the enemy, Admiral Fletcher ordered Spruance to “proceed southwesterly and attack enemy carriers when definitely located.”²⁰

On hearing the enemy had been sighted, Nimitz ordered “Captain Simard to ‘go all out for the carrier.’”²¹ Midway aircraft then made futile attacks on the Japanese forces. None of their weapons impacted the enemy, and without fighter support they were easy pickings for the defending Japanese combat air patrol (CAP). “Thus these seaplane and land-based air attacks on the morning of 4 June resulted only in severe losses to the Midway-based groups and some dearly-bought experience.”²² However, these attacks “convinced Nagumo that Tomonago was right: Midway must be hit again.”²³ Nagumo had strike aircraft configured with torpedoes, in reserve, to attack the U.S. carriers. He now ordered them reconfigured with bombs to restrike Midway. The ensuing actions by the Midway Army, Navy, and Marine aircraft would provide the U.S. Navy the opportunity to catch the Japanese striking fleet in a vulnerable position.

Estimating that the distance between the two forces was just outside the radius of his forces, Spruance made a calculated decision to launch in hopes of catching the enemy carriers in the act of refueling their aircraft. He realized this decision could “hazard a loss of many planes and pilots through running out of gas.”²⁴ However, a delay could allow this opportunity to slip away. Spruance’s decision, to launch everything he had paid off. His torpedo aircraft were the first on scene. Although they were ineffective, they brought the Japanese CAP down low and forced the Japanese carriers to maneuver to avoid the torpedo attacks. The following wave of dive bombers found the “the Japanese carriers...making tight turns to avoid torpedoes” and their defensive CAP at low altitude. They rolled in unopposed on the Japanese fleet – ultimately sinking four Japanese carriers. Nimitz’s integration of Midway forces and U.S. carriers resulted in a decisive defeat for the Japanese navy. The Japanese failed to secure Midway and were handed a significant tactical defeat by the U.S. forces.

As the remaining Japanese fleet was withdrawing, Spruance made another calculated decision: “not to chase Admiral Nagumo’s battered force into the night [which] could hazard the victory he and Fletcher had won. [As he stated,] ‘I did not feel justified in risking a night encounter with possibly superior enemy force.’”²⁵ In *The Pacific War*, John Costello judges that “Although he faced later criticism for giving up the pursuit, Spruance’s tactical judgment proved absolutely correct. Had he continued westward, he would certainly have run into the trap that Yamamoto set and, with his carriers unable to operate their planes at night, would have fallen easy prey to the guns of Kondo’s battleships and Kurita’s heavy cruisers”²⁶ Spruance’s decision not to chase Admiral Nagumo was no doubt influenced heavily by Nimitz’s risk guidance provided by before the Battle of Midway:

In carrying out the task assigned ... you will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your forces without good prospect on inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage on the enemy.²⁷

As Eric Larrabee described in his book, *Commander In Chief*, "Spruance observed Nimitz's measured injection as to 'calculated risk' with scrupulous precision."²⁸ Warfare is not without risk and the Commander's ability to impart risk guidance and his subordinates understanding of that guidance is as important as integrating the forces.

The Battle of Midway was a turning point in the war; it "broke the back of the Japanese naval striking power..."²⁹ The combined use of sea, air, and land power prevented the Japanese invasion of the island of Midway. While naval power was primarily responsible for the destruction and loss of Japanese carriers, it was the supporting actions by the defensive forces of Midway against the Japanese air attack and the attempted attacks of Japanese ships by land-based aircraft that caused Admiral Nagumo to reconfigure his aircraft. This fatal action then provided Fletcher and Spruance with the opportunity to strike the first and fatal blow and thereby thwart the invasion of Midway. Even though the Japanese invasion force was intact, their inability to establish maritime superiority forced their cancellation of the invasion and withdrawal providing the U.S. with both a strategic and tactical victory.

Joint naval actions have continued since World War II. They have included the amphibious landing on the Korean beaches of Inchon, the evacuation of Marines and Soldiers who fought their way out of the mountains of North Korea; to expeditionary and Riverine operations in Vietnam, where "the Army and the Navy teamed to form the Mobile Riverine Force, which employed heavy firepower and waterborne mobility to decimate one enemy unit after another, especially during the Tet Offensive."³⁰ Today our forces continue to operate in joint and combined operations; these include humanitarian relief, the Global War on Terror, and reconstruction and stabilization of Iraq.

As history continues to demonstrate, sea power has always vitally supported our nation's strategic objectives. From the combined operations of Admiral Porter and Grant, the use of air, land, and sea power during the battle of Midway, to current operations in the Global War on Terror, maritime dominance (naval power) has been an evolving and significant contributor in extending the reach and amplifying the power of the U.S. military. The need for our Navy to work closely with the other services in achieving the desired military objectives cannot be overstated. Close communication, lateral relationships, integrated planning, and commander's intent – to include risk guidance - are vital to successful operations.

Although historic joint operations at the tactical level have worked well, until recently there was no overarching doctrine to guide the strategic and operational integration of the forces. However, the vision and ability of competent leaders to work with their contemporaries has led to greater integration of U.S. forces. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 gave legislative authority for development of a truly joint force.

Joint Force Development and Organization

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provides the basis for the formal establishment of Joint Doctrine, and is responsible for today's Joint Fighting force. Its enactment provides the mechanism which supports lateral coordination at the strategic and operational levels. The Act ensures that training, planning, and execution of operations are coordinated and synchronized.

The drafters of Goldwater-Nichols recognized the importance of such a unified fighting force. The Act specified nine objectives:

- Strengthen civilian authority
- Improve military advice to the President (in his constitutionally specified capacity as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces), Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council
- Place clear responsibilities on the unified Commanders in Chief for mission accomplishment
- Ensure that a unified commander's authority is commensurate with his responsibilities
- Increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning
- Provide for the more efficient use of resources
- Improve joint officer management
- Enhance the effectiveness of military operations
- Improve Defense Department management and administration³¹

Goldwater-Nichols empowered the unified commanders to "issue authoritative direction on all aspects of operations, joint training, and logistics, to prescribe internal chains of command, to organize commands and forces, and to employ forces ...[and] select their headquarters staffs and subordinate commanders."³² This legislation brought together all the operational fighting forces and capabilities under one strategic commander – enhancing the effectiveness of military operations conducted by a truly Joint Force. The authority provided to the unified commanders

provides for unity of effort and the efficient use of resources. This action improves the overall effectiveness of military operations and is the foundation for today's joint force.

The unified commanders, now commonly referred to as the combatant commanders (CCDRs), are responsible for the establishment and overall command of the Joint Force within their Areas of Responsibility (AOR). CCDRs can conduct operations as the Joint Force Commander (JFC) or establish a Joint Task Force (JTF) or sub unified command, which encompasses the unified efforts of the services as components operating under a Joint Force Commander. These efforts are guided by joint doctrine which has established the formal concept of "components" within the joint force. According to doctrine, these components can be created as functional (Maritime Component, Air Component, Land Component, etc.) and/or as service components (Naval, Air Force, Army, etc.). As Figure 1 depicts, these forces combine to provide the JFC with total military power - the overwhelming and complementary capability of Land Power, Sea Power, and Air Power because "jointness cannot be measured by the number of joint publications produced or by listing the new Joint Centers and organizations. [Rather,] jointness is out in the field, in the air, and on the oceans."³³




Figure 4. The Components of Military Power and Their Interdependence.

Figure 1¹

Components of the Joint Force

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. Unified action resulting from clear command relationships and unity of effort is crucial to making this possible.

- General Henry Shelton,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (July 2001)

Joint warfare incorporates the nation's warfighting capabilities into a single force – Joint Force – to accomplish military objectives. The Joint Force is established through the authorities provided in Title 10 of United States Code, which brings the capabilities of all our services together under a single command. For simplicity, the term Joint Force describes a generic force composed of a Joint Force Commander and his subordinate components. These components (the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force)³⁴ are normally organized either as Service components or as Service and functional components. Joint doctrine describes these components as:

- **Service component command** — A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force.³⁵

Service components (Figure 2) are normally designated as **ARFOR**, Army forces; **NAVFOR**, Navy forces; **AFFOR**, Air Force Forces; and **MARFOR**, Marine Forces.




Figure 2

- **Functional component command** — A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time.³⁶

Functional components (see Figure 3) are normally designated as **JFLCC**, Joint Force Land Component Commander; **JFACC**, Joint Force Air Component Commander; **JFMCC**, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander; **JFSOC**, Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander.




Figure 3

Joint doctrine, as indicated identifies functional operations as those conducted by multiple services or overlapping areas of operations under the control of a single component Commander. For example, the Joint Force Land Component would be responsible for all land operations, which could employ the combination of Army, Marine, or coalition forces. The JFLCC plans, coordinates, and controls the execution of land forces in support of the Joint Force Commander's concept of operations. The JFLCC is the supported commander within his Area of Operations (AO). As directed in Joint Publication 3-31, "The JFLCC is responsible for land operations as assigned and establishes command relationships for subordinate forces. The JFLCC is responsible for planning and executing the land operations portion of the JFC's operation or campaign plan. The JFLCC prepares a supporting plan or order to the JFC operation plan that provides JFLCC's intentions, concept of the operation, and details. The JFLCC directs current land operations while continuing to plan and prepare for future land operations." Core functions of the JFLCC include planning, directing, and coordinating operations:

- Movement and maneuver
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
- Fires
- C2
- Force protection
- Logistics

The JFLCC and staff must monitor and may coordinate, and synchronize the Service component support functions (e.g., logistics, personnel support, etc.) that impact joint land operations.³⁷

The JFACC, the air component, has the responsibility for establishing air superiority and coordinating air operations which could include Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and coalition aircraft to include air launched weapons that are employed in his air battle space. Responsibilities of a JFACC include:

- Developing a joint air operations plan to best support the joint force commander's (JFC's) objectives
- Recommending to the JFC apportionment of the joint air effort, after consulting with other component commanders
- Allocating and tasking of air capabilities/forces made available based upon the JFC's air apportionment
- Providing oversight and guidance during execution of joint air operations and coordinating joint air operations with operations of other component commanders and forces assigned to or supporting the JFC
- Evaluating the results of joint air operations
- Performing the duties of the airspace control authority (ACA) and/or performing the duties of the area air defense commander (AADC), unless a separate ACA and/or AADC is designated³⁸

The JFMCC, the maritime component, controls the maritime domain which could include coalition navies; sealift, afloat prepositioned equipment, and civilian shipping; and land forces provided for the conduct of Expeditionary or amphibious operations. The JFMCC provides the joint force with control of the sea, which then provides friendly forces freedom of maneuver from the sea while denying enemy forces access to the sea. The JFMCC advises the JFC on the best use of maritime assets and develops a supporting plan that describes the JFMCC's concept of operations and intent in support of the JFC campaign plan. The JFMCC brings to the fight the ability to strike from the sea and the ability to project power ashore. This power projection includes TLAM (Tactical Land Attack Missile), carrier-based strike aircraft, electronic warfare, naval gunfire, attack helicopters, SOF operations, and Expeditionary operations ashore – Sea Strike. Complementing these offensive capabilities is the defensive shield: maritime superiority, air defense operations, fire support, missile detection and counter battery, and intelligence collection capabilities. The JFMCC thus provides defensive support to the joint

force – Sea Shield. In addition, through the establishment of maritime lodgments, the JFMCC supports expeditionary, humanitarian, and logistical operations ashore – Sea Basing.

The Joint Force Special Operations Command is the Special Forces (SOF) element of the joint force. The JFSOC advises the JFC on the best use of SOF forces. Command and control of SOF forces is exercised through either a theater special operations command (TSOC) or a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). The JFSOC provides the joint force access to the unique capabilities inherent in special operations: “nine core tasks: direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil affairs, operations, psychological operations, and information operations.”³⁹

The use of functional components effectively brings together all the warfighting elements under a Joint Force Commander; it also provides the JFC with the ability to “integrate planning; reduce their span of control; and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, information flow, unity of effort, weapon systems management, component interaction, or control over the scheme of maneuver.”⁴⁰ In determining whether to establish service or functional components the Joint Force Commander “will ultimately determine the makeup of the subordinate commands – components. He will assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command relationships, and establish coordinating instructions for the component commanders.”⁴¹

The Joint Maritime Component

The contributions required of the naval force have not waned; on the contrary they have increased. As President Bush stated in ***The National Strategy for Maritime Security***:

The safety and economic security of the United States depend in substantial part upon the secure use of the world’s oceans... Salt water covers more than two-thirds of the Earth’s surface... These waters are a single, great ocean, an immense maritime domain that affects life everywhere... Like all other countries, the United States is highly dependent upon the oceans for its security and the welfare of its people and economy...Although the global economy continues to increase the value of the oceans’ role as highways for commerce and providers of resources, technology and the forces of globalization have lessened their role as barriers. Thus this continuous [maritime] domain serves as a vast, ready, and largely unsecured medium for an array of threats by nations, terrorists, and criminals...Defeating this array of threats to maritime security – including the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – requires a common understanding and a joint effort for action on a global scale.⁴²

National Strategy for Maritime Security thus highlights the importance of the Joint Force Maritime Component and its expanding role in controlling the maritime domain in support of the “joint effort”.

Across the continuum of joint operations, the JFMCC integrates all the capabilities and assets to control the maritime environment and to support the other functional components in accomplishing the JFC’s joint effort – bringing together the elements of military power to achieve a desired objective. In addition, the JFMCC can serve not only as the functional but also as the Service component to the Joint Force. Both of those responsibilities entail the following actions:

- Coordinate with commanders of other JTF components to ensure effective and efficient conduct of operations. In addition, coordinate with supporting agencies, supporting commanders, and friendly forces and governments as authorized and as necessary to fulfill assigned responsibilities.
- Plan and conduct operations in accordance with CJTF guidance and detailed plans.
- Monitor the operational situation and, as required, pass information to the CJTF.
- Provide liaison personnel to the CJTF, other component commanders, and supporting commanders as necessary or as directed by the CJTF.⁴³

The JFMCC’s challenge is to balance and coordinate all of these requirements to efficiently and effectively contribute to the joint campaign. The maritime environment requires a multidimensional defense against air, surface, and subsurface threats. The JFMCC must quickly gain control of the maritime area of operations to ensure freedom of access, provide Theater Air Missile Defense (TAMD), power projection, and establishment of lodgments which facilitates Sea Basing. To execute his supported role of controlling the maritime environment to his support of land and air operations ashore, the JFMCC must coordinate, plan, and execute across the spectrum of joint operations.

In selecting a JFMCC, the Joint Force Commander should consider rank, experience, staff size, and command and control capabilities. The Navy’s numbered fleet commanders and their staffs have the requisite rank, experience, and command and control capabilities; so they are the primary source for forming a JFMCC for major combat operations.⁴⁴ Depending on the nature of the mission as well as the size and composition of the naval forces assigned to the Joint Force, other potential JFMCC’s include Carrier Strike Group Commanders and Expeditionary Strike Group Commanders.

Today’s JFMCC⁴⁵ responsibilities cover the spectrum of “Peace to War” operations – humanitarian, disaster relief and stabilization operations to Homeland defense, and combat

operations. The forward-deployed fleets the Navy's Sixth, Fifth, and Seventh Fleet - are positioned - in theaters that currently have the most potential for combat operations. These fleets are actively conducting and training for operations as a JFMCC.⁴⁶ Sixth Fleet is supporting the European Command (EUCOM) and operations throughout NATO, the Mediterranean, and Africa. Fifth Fleet is supporting operations of Central Command (CENTCOM), which includes Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF and OIF). Seventh Fleet supports operations within the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). Because of the author's experience on that staff, Seventh Fleet will be the primary reference for the discussion of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.

Given its capacity, the Seventh Fleet has served as both a JFMCC and a JTF.⁴⁷ The Seventh Fleet Commander wears many "hats": a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) for Joint Task Force 519; Commander, Combined Naval Component Command (CCNCC) for Combined Forces Command in Korea; and a JFMCC for potential Sea of Japan operations – along with his day job as Commander, Seventh Fleet.⁴⁸

The responsibility to stand up and operate as a JFMCC is an important function; however, it is just one of the many operational and administrative responsibilities assigned to the numbered fleet commanders – to include controlling, organizing, and training forces to support ongoing or future missions. JFMCC activities are usually brief and sporadic. Even when operating as a JFMCC, the commander's day-to-day Service responsibilities – NAVFOR (Naval Force) – must still be carried out. The newly released Quadrennial Defense Review cites the need to remain capable, available, and ready to function as a Joint Task Force headquarters:

Change must extend beyond the forces in the field to include command and control headquarters. Key is the initiative to organize, man, train, and equip selected Service headquarters to make them Joint Task Force (JTF) capable, available and ready to command and control designated Joint force missions. The existence of a trained and ready pool of JTF capable headquarters will assure a wider range of military response options.⁴⁹

So while support to joint operations is an important and a priority, it is not the only ongoing activity within the numbered fleets. The numbered fleets must be multi-functional, able to do many tasks at once. Further, they must maintain a JFMCC or campaign focus as they perform their day-to-day activities. For example, the morning brief, which highlights operations and key events within the Seventh Fleet Area of Operations (AO) such as intelligence, forces, readiness, deployments, etc. - centered on the standing contingency plans and the ability to stand up as a JFMCC in support them. Weekly intelligence updates provided additional situational awareness to anticipate potential JFMCC missions. Periodic Plan updates and ongoing rewrites of plans,

Joint Force exercises, and actual missions as a JTF or JFMCC: provided opportunities to further hone and train the staff. The Seventh Fleet Commander insisted that the staff remain able to seamlessly and quickly transition from day-to-day operations to serving as a component in a Joint Force or the main element of a JTF staff.

The impetus to train the Seventh Fleet staff to support JFMCC operations and responsibilities began in 2002. It was based on the vision and foresight of the Seventh Fleet Commander at that time, Vice Admiral Willard – who acted without formal JFMCC doctrine. His vision centered on the ability to Command and Control operations: “The root tenants of Command and Control are timeless.”⁵⁰ Since that time, the Seventh Fleet staff has continued to mature and improve on its ability to function as a JFMCC and support the joint force.

JFMCC functions and organizations, as previously described, are ongoing today. Yet the joint force lacks formal JFMCC doctrine. To fill this void, the Navy is engaged in a process of formulating official Joint doctrine. Many individuals and organizations are involved in this process, but most have no attachment to the forward numbered fleets. Outside these staffs, a common misperception is that JFMCC is a “revolutionary” concept. As has already been shown, the Navy has been conducting JFMCC–like operations in support of joint warfare since its inception. The framers of JFMCC doctrine should acknowledge the evolutionary nature of employment of naval forces in joint warfare. There is no need to start with a “clean slate.” Doctrine and operational development should leverage historical examples and incorporate current JFMCC planning and operations.

As the historical examples demonstrate, there is a recurring theme in conducting maritime operations in support of the joint force- coordination, planning, and execution. It is leadership that brings these actions together in the successful conduct of joint activities. The Seventh Fleet JFMCC was no different. As Figure 4 depicts, at the core of the JFMCC framework was leadership. This framework for joint operations is configured around:

- Leadership - Commander’s guidance and intent
- Coordination - establishing lateral and horizontal lines of communication
- Planning – integration of forces and actions toward a common objective
- Execution – aligning and monitoring operations




Figure 4

Leadership - the Commander is Key

Leadership is the process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation.⁵¹

Each level of command and leadership requires an understanding and ability to direct leaders at given levels to assume responsibility for the ends, ways, and means delegated to their assigned roles. They must be able to “formulate and articulate strategic aims and key concepts.”⁵²

In describing the role of leadership in bringing together all of his elements of power, Clausewitz observes in *On War*:

A prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing neither too much nor too little. But the effects of genius show not so much in novel forms of action as in the ultimate success of the whole. What we should admire is the accurate fulfillment of the unspoken assumptions, the smooth harmony of the whole activity, which only become evident in the final success.⁵³

The JFMCC is the operational leader who brings all the elements of maritime power together in a smooth harmony, ensuring optimum and effective use of those resources. “Because the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one [service], campaign, or operation, plans must be crafted to leverage the core competencies of the myriad of capabilities each [service or component] brings to the fight, synchronizing their efforts...toward a single objective.”⁵⁴ The JFMCC leads and coordinates the maritime contribution to the joint effort.

Globalization has changed our world. The challenges facing our nation and its Armed Forces continue to be complex and full of uncertainty. We need only to look at the multitude of issues that continue to confront our leaders as they prepare guidance and seek objectives in support of Iraqi Freedom and the Global War on Terror.

The world has always changed. It is currently changing rapidly – and unpredictably. Rarely can the U.S. go it alone - nor may it want to. The missions and objectives that face this nation’s military forces require them to operate alongside and in cooperation with other nations - coalition forces. This requires JFMCC leadership, at all levels, to become “culturally aware” and to recognize and leverage the capabilities our coalition partners bring to the table. Accomplishing this may require not only organizational change to incorporate these forces, but also internal cultural change to allow coalition partners to take more of the lead in operations and missions. In addition, other government and non-government organizations will usually play a critical role.

Joint doctrine elaborates on leadership:

The role of component commanders in a joint force merits special attention. Component commanders are first expected to orchestrate the activity of their own forces, branches, and warfare communities. In addition, they must understand how their own capabilities best integrate into the overall design to most effectively satisfy the JFC's intent. Component commanders are also the primary sources of advice to the JFC and their fellow component commanders on their requirements for support from, and their capabilities for support to, other component commanders.⁵⁵

Leadership is the most important element of the maritime component. It is through guidance, direction, vision, the ability to integrate all available forces and capabilities, and judicious employment of resources that provides the catalyst for success.

Staff Organization:

The maritime Commander is assisted in integrating the tools, coordinating, planning, and executing operations by his staff. As Jomini declared in, *The Art of War*, in order for the Commander to "give his whole attention to the supreme direction of the operations, he ought to be provided staff officers competent to relieve him of details of execution."⁵⁶ It is the staff's function not only to "relieve him of the details of execution" but also to turn the Commander's vision into a detailed plan which is executable.

The rapid requirement to transition to a JFMCC to support emerging OPLANS or to respond to world wide events precludes the ability stand up a separate JFMCC staff. The numbered fleet staff must therefore be capable of transitioning from day-to-day operations to a JFMCC staff. The JFMCC staff organization should align with higher headquarters to provide functionality between the staffs. Joint doctrine recommends the typical J-coded concept. However, there is a growing trend toward organizing functionally.

Functional organizations - with such centers as operational maneuver, effects, intelligence, protection, knowledge management, and sustainment, etc. - may provide the maritime Commander with a better mechanism for accomplishing the assigned mission. If higher headquarters is not aligned functionally, the Joint Force Land Component manual recommends incorporating those functional areas or centers within a structure consistent with the higher headquarters staff organization. So J-3 would include Ops Maneuver, etc. Whether organizing the staff functionally or along J-codes, the maritime commander must "organize the staff and assign responsibilities to individual Service members assigned to the staff as deemed necessary to ensure unity of effort and accomplishment of assigned missions."⁵⁷

In the Seventh Fleet organization, both higher headquarters (JTF 519 and CFC) were organized along J-codes. So the JFMCC staff was similarly aligned organizationally by J code.

This structure enabled the staffs to plug in and collaborate effectively. As Figure 5 depicts, this process was simplified because normal day-to-day operations were also conducted along conventional staff codes. In executing JFMCC duties, boards and cells that had been established by the JFC were incorporated functionally within the appropriate J code (see right side of Figure 5).

JFMCC HQ Staff Organization/Execution




Figure 5


In all cases:

sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning and direction is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing joint forces with MNFs, simplicity and clarity are critical. Complex or unclear command relationships or organization are counterproductive to developing synergy among MNFs.⁵⁸

Organization of Forces

The assigned mission and forces provide the basis for JFMCC organization of forces. JFMCC forces are normally organized as task forces – CTF, Commander Task Force. These forces provide functionality across the spectrum of potential combat operations. Seventh Fleet

task forces are numbered CTF-70, Commander Strike Groups; CTF-71, Commander Naval Special Warfare; CTF-72, Commander Patrol Wings; CTF-73, Commander Logistic Group; CTF-74, Commander Theater Anti-submarine Warfare; and CTF-76, Commander Expeditionary Forces. To support joint operations and differentiate these activities from day-to-day naval operations, task forces are re-designated as 770, 771, 772, etc. These forces (77X) are activated on mission and forces assigned (See Figure 6). During transition to joint operations, additional forces such as Marine Expeditionary and Mine Warfare may be required; accordingly, they would be designated CTF-777 and CTF-779 respectfully. Task forces can be modified or removed depending on the forces required in the planning process.



CTFs activated based on mission and forces assigned

Figure 6

This organization of forces provides the JFMCC with the capability to expediently assign missions and establish supported and supporting relationships among the respective Commanders of the Task Force thereby supporting the establishment of sea control and operations ashore.

Coordination

Coordination is embedded throughout the framework of the joint structure. It is the combined effects of the capabilities each component brings to the fight and the synergy which results from that effort that generates overwhelming combat power. The primary mechanism which brings the forces together as a synergistic unit is the establishment and employment of

supported and supporting relationships. Joint doctrine defines supported and supporting relationships as:

an effective means to weigh (and ensure unity of effort for) various operations, with each component or subordinate task force typically receiving and providing support at the same time. For example, a land force may be supported for a deep maneuver, a joint force air component for theater counterair and direct attack of enemy centers of gravity, a maritime force for sea control and an amphibious forcible entry, and a special operations task force for direct action and other missions.⁵⁹

The concept of joint operations relies fundamentally on a focused alignment of supported and supporting efforts to achieve maximum effects from application of combat power. This synergistic effort starts with the Joint Force Commander, who establishes the focus of effort and the desired effect he expects to accomplish from the effort. The JFMCC aligns his focus of effort with that of the JFC and coordinates his operations both vertically (supported) and laterally (supporting). While there is one single focus of effort (what the JFMCC sees as the one primary effort to support the JFC's concept of operations) there are other ancillary ongoing efforts. Because of the multidimensional nature of the maritime battle space, there are many efforts ongoing at any given time. JFMCC forces must do many things at once – being supported and supporting operations simultaneously. And it is through the execution of these efforts - the Command and Control process - that the dynamic application of these variables maximizes the overall effectiveness of the joint force.

The Joint Force Commander establishes the support relationships between components. These “support relationships afford an effective means to prioritize (and ensure unity of effort for) various operations.”⁶⁰ Further, “The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs that are planning or executing joint operations.”⁶¹ The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat amorphous but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior commander) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the degree of authority that the supported commander is granted:

The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. The supporting commander will then provide the assistance needed, subject to the supporting commander's existing capabilities and other assigned tasks.

The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The supporting commander will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support into the supported

commander's effort as a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated within the supporting commander's organization.⁶²

It is through the alignment and synchronization of supported efforts, from the Supported Component, to the Supported Task Force, to the Supported Task Group that focuses combat power to achieve actual effects. The synergy that results from contributions by all the supporting components greatly impacts the actual effects on the enemy.

To achieve this alignment, the Supported Commander establishes the sequences and timing required. Supporting Commanders contribute combat power and capability to help achieve the desired effect. Supporting Courses of Action are formulated to contribute to tactical level plans that are aligned with the Supported Commander's focus of effort and desired effects. All levels of command and control then contribute to advancing these plans as their highest priority.

Some examples of support include:

- Apportionment/Allocation – apportioning effort and providing fighting forces (TACON, Tactical Control or OPCON, Operational Control) to the supported commander
- Contribution of resources (fires, equipment, battlespace, C2, intelligence assets, sustainment, engineering)
- Complementary operations - specific action that a unit or force conducts in support of his mission that contributes to the overall capability of the joint force.

The following example will illustrate the relationship among apportionment, contribution of resources, and complementary operations:

The Maritime Component is tasked to conduct an amphibious assault; the Maritime Commander would be the supported commander for that mission. The mission is a complementary operations, in support of the JFLCC's ground campaign. The assault is the JFMCC's main effort (focus of effort). The JFLCC sets the priorities for timing and the desired effects for the overall supporting operation. The JFACC provides TLAM and aircraft for strike operations to shape the battlespace and support the landing (complementary operation). Naval forces conduct surface and subsurface operations and coordinate its air defense capabilities with the JFACC to establish air and maritime superiority within the amphibious area of operations (complementary JFMCC task force operations). When the assault forces are established ashore they are shifted OPCON/TACON to the JFLCC (apportionment of forces). When the assault forces are ashore, the Maritime component becomes supporting; JFMCC then provides logistics support, medical support, ISR, and fires to support Marine forces ashore (contribution of resources).

As this example demonstrates, the apportionment of forces and contribution of other resources contributes to the supported commander's plan and effects on the enemy. However, the applications of combat power by means of complementary operations are likely to have the greatest overall impact.

Planning

True integration and coordination begins with the planning process. Whereas the plan is important, the process is just as important. As von Moltke observed, "No plan survives first contact with the enemy."⁶³ The planning process is continuous, from the long-term planning effort to the short-term modifications by the Commander's planning team. Most planning today involves a parallel process; subordinates remain actively involved in the planning process from the onset. This allows all levels to have a plan in place to commence operations upon completion of the JFC's plan.

The JFC's guidance for conducting an operation normally flows in the form of planning orders, warning orders, execute orders, and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs - which modify existing orders). This guidance is then folded into supporting plans by all the Joint Force components. Upon execution, these plans are refined and turned into operational orders (OPORDS). However, plans change and evolve in response not only to enemy actions but also to unintended and unplanned events. To meet these ever-changing challenges, the JFMCC needs a strong planning team, support from the whole staff, and early input from the subordinate Task Force Commanders who will execute the plan.

Higher headquarters' strategic objectives and primary tasks are communicated in an overarching mission statement and desired outcome. This mission statement is translated into a purpose, the reason for conducting the operation; the method, how the operation will be conducted; and the endstate, the conditions or actions that define the accomplishment of the purpose. The JFMCC mission statement, purpose, method, and endstate all support and encapsulate the Commander's intent. This intent is essential in focusing the planning effort and creating an overarching integrated plan that synchronizes the focus of effort and the supported and supporting relationships altogether ensuring unity of effort. Each task force or subcomponent then develops his intent to meet higher headquarters objectives. Through these detailed concepts of operations, and by working laterally with the other task forces or subcomponents and vertically with subordinate commands and higher headquarters, all components ensure that capabilities are synchronized to achieve an integrated outcome – a unified effort.

The result of this process is a supporting plan (SUPPLAN) which includes phases and focus of effort that are aligned with the phases and efforts specified by the JFC commander. Key to this supporting plan are the lateral supporting assignments which support not only the other functional components but the JFMCC subcomponents – task forces. These lateral supporting assignments are determined by capabilities to contribute combat power and resources to help achieve the desired effects. This supporting plan is then developed further by the “task force” commanders into tactical plans. Finally, a focused plan is produced that aligns vertically with plans of higher and subordinate headquarters and laterally with plans of the supported component, which has identified the focus of effort and desired effects.

In the planning process, Seventh Fleet aligned functionally both vertically with higher headquarters and subordinate CTF’s and laterally with other joint force components to develop courses of action and appropriate tasks in accord with higher headquarters guidance and desired effect. Both JTF commanders (JTF-519 and CFC), for which Seventh Fleet serves as a JFMCC, designated critical fights in their campaign, along with associated desired effects and support relationships. While not currently a doctrinal concept, critical fights were theater-level operational battles (involving kinetic and non-kinetic means) necessary to achieve the campaign effects. Through winning these critical fights, JFMCC’s intent and focus of effort were achieved. This was a useful tool for aligning plans and execution both vertically and laterally. It not only helped to provide focus for JFMCC efforts, but also it was a mechanism to align efforts with the other components’ critical fights. Figure 7 provides a hypothetical example of a Critical Fights list, identifying the Supported and Supporting Commanders for each fight.

Critical Fight	Supported Commander	Supporting Commander
Attack XXX	JFACC	JFMCC, JFLCC, JFSOCC, LNO
Defeat XXX Ground Forces	JFLCC	JFMCC, JFACC, JFSOCC
Blockade Enemy Ports	JFMCC	JFACC, JFLCC, JFSOCC, LNO
Secure XXX Strait	JFMCC	JFACC, JFLCC, JFSOCC, LNO
Defeat XXX Center of Gravity	JFACC	JFMCC, JFLCC, JFSOCC, LNO
Secure WMD	JSOC	JFACC, JFMCC, JFSOCC, JFLCC

Figure 7

Lateral supporting assignments require designated supporting components to contribute combat power or other resources to help achieve the desired effects articulated by the supported component. Supporting COA's are then incorporated into tactical level plans that are aligned with the Supported Commander's focus of effort and desired effects. Finally, all levels of command and control then contribute to advancing these plans as their highest priority. ⁶⁴

Execution

The root tenets of command and control are timeless-but have been lost in the chase for new technologies. Commander must exert exacting control over their forces to advance their plans if they are to defeat that future adversary who is multidimensional, well equipped, well trained and willing to fight, and intending to win. ⁶⁵

Employing the assigned force to execute the plans is what a JFMCC is finally all about. Actions that continuously align ongoing efforts and involve the supported and supporting commanders in advancing their plans are executed through Command and Control. "*Command* is the doctrinal assignment of authority and *control* is defined as guiding the operation." ⁶⁶

Six essential contributions may come from higher headquarters: alignment with commander's guidance, situational awareness, guidance to help advance a plan in execution, procedural compliance, intelligence regarding enemy intentions, and decisions regarding apportionment. ⁶⁷ Figure 8 provides a graphic illustration used by the Seventh Fleet staff for both planning and execution. The process depicted should be considered continuous rather than sequential.




Figure 8

The following discussion elaborates on the six essential contributions that support command and control:

- *Maintain alignment.* The commander's task is to ensure that all execution decisions, apportionment, and allocation requests remain aligned with the operations mission statement and commander's intent (purpose, sequence, end state, and priorities).⁶⁸ Some of the mechanisms which facilitate this are the Supporting Plan, Commander's VTC (Video teleconference) with the JFC and component commander's and the JFMCC's VTC with his task force commanders, and daily intentions messages.
- *Provide situational awareness:* All task force commanders must understand not only their assigned missions, but also missions of the other assigned task forces. Success or failure of one commander may affect the ability of another task force to complete its mission. "The commander must determine whether friendly force disposition is in accordance with the plan, whether enemy force disposition is in accordance with expectations, and whether forces are executing according to plan and procedures."⁶⁹ So all units must share information. The mechanism normally used to provide this data is the common operational picture (COP). Situational awareness includes not only what is happening, but what is supposed to happen. This requires all commanders, in particular their respective battle watches, to know the plan (concept of operations), the daily intentions message (which will be discussed in a subsequent section), and any additional direction provided in the morning briefs (VTCs). The commander's battle watch (his watch stands within the maritime operations center) is his eyes and ears, it must continuously keep him informed of the status of operations.
- *Advance the plan:* Plans are rarely executed as written; modifications are provided through verbal and written correspondence. The commander's responsibility, however, is to "move the plan forward, on the timeline, toward the desired end state."⁷⁰
- *Comply with procedure:* "In monitoring execution, the commander oversees compliance with warfighting procedures (published in special instructions, standard operating procedures, operational tasking, and intentions) to avoid blue-on-blue engagements and achieve efficiencies in plan execution."⁷¹
- *Counter the enemy:* The effects assessment cell, along with intelligence and battle damage assessment, all provide the commander with awareness of the effects of operations on the enemy – which may positively or negatively impact his desired

effect. “The commander must be responsive to emerging intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information that differ significantly from expectations and be prepared to adjust the execution plan. **Knowing what the enemy is doing at all times and being quick to countermove on receipt of reliable information is perhaps the number one goal in command and control** [emphasis added].”⁷²

- *Adjust apportionment* Reinforcements, enemy actions, and unforeseen failures may affect the commander’s ability to conduct operations as planned or desired, requiring him to adjust the apportionment and the allocation of resources to support the effort. “Of all the apportionment factors, the one most frequently adjusted is time.”⁷³ The commander must monitor the operation and remain prepared for all these changes. He must “anticipate requests, and be prepared to adjust as necessary to advance the plan. The warfare commander, who knows what is occurring in all warfare areas and can best judge the consequences of a change in timing in one element, is in the best position to make the call.”⁷⁴

A key component in the execution process is the maritime Commander’s daily intentions message (Figure 9). It provides task force commanders with a mechanism for understanding the JFMCC’s guidance. In turn, their guidance is passed along to their assigned forces.

```
ADRESSEES
EXER/***** PHASE TWO (U)//
MSGID/COMMANDER'S DAILY INTENTIONS /JFMCC-***//
RMKS/1. SITUATION. *** (DEFCON 2)
2. PHASE IIB; SWIFTLY DEFEAT THE EFFORT
A. PURPOSE: CONDUCT MARITIME OPERATIONS TO SWIFTLY DEFEAT
AN ENEMY ATTACK OF COUNTRY ORANGE.
B. METHOD: I WILL CONDUCT PHASE II SWIFTLY DEFEAT THE EFFORT
IN THREE DISCRETE STEPS. FIRST, UPON COMMENCEMENT OF
HOSTILITIES, JFMCC FORCES WILL ATTAIN LOCAL MARITIME
SUPERIORITY TO FACILITATE MARITIME INTERDICTION (MI)
OPERATIONS. SECOND, MI OPERATIONS WILL DEFEAT THE ENEMY
INVASION IN THE ORANGE SEA. THIRD, WE WILL EXPAND MARITIME
SUPERIORITY TO DESTROY THE ENEMY NAVY AND THEIR
CAPABILITY TO WAGE WAR.
C. ENDSTATE: THE ENEMY ATTACK OF ORANGE IS DEFEATED.
ENEMY ARMY AND NAVAL FORCES ARE DESTROYED.
3. MY FOCUS OF EFFORT IS MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS.
(A) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: CTF 770 SUPPORTED; CTF 772, 773,
774 AND 776 SUPPORTING.
(B) DESIRED EFFECTS: (GENERAL APPROACH, EFFECTS ON THE
ENEMY, RESULTANT BENEFIT TO THE JOINT FORCE)
4. OTHER EFFORTS:
5. COMMAND AND CONTROL: (EFFORTS BEING OVERSEEN BY MY
CURRENT OPERATIONS/BATTLE WATCH AND OTHER COMMANDERS
GUIDANCE)
6. COMMANDERS CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTTS (CCIR).
7. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS: (INCLUDES ALLOWABLE
RISK/ALLOWABLE COLLATERAL DAMAGE GUIDANCE)
```

Figure 9

The Daily intentions message was used in the Seventh Fleet JFMCC to align the forces with the maritime Commander's intent. It describes the current phase of operations, the purpose, method, and desired end state. The focus of effort is determined by the Commander of the Joint Force. The JFMCC then aligns his own focus of effort to support the Joint Force. The Joint Force Commander's timing determines when combat power is brought to bear against the enemy, and his focus of effort determines where it will be delivered. There usually are many efforts in play during execution, but there can be only one focus of effort. This effort receives apportionment priority and the most attention within every command center.

The Desired Effects statement is the Commander's narrative description of his expectations of the effect the focus of effort will have on the enemy. A well-articulated, desired effect is essential to ensure development of courses of action and plans that are most likely to achieve the desired result.

While the operation seeks only one ultimate Focus of Effort, there are many ongoing 'other efforts' during a campaign. Figure 10 depicts the continuum from peace to war⁷⁵ and the efforts that must be available on-the-shelf, ready to be executed at any given time. The main difference between 'other efforts' and the focus of effort is the priority given to the main event. Not only does the focus of effort receive priority of apportionment and supporting contributions, it also receives priority command and control attention.




Figure 11

Conclusion

Integration is achieved through joint operation planning and the skillful assimilation of forces, capabilities, and systems to enable their employment in a single, cohesive operation rather than a set of separate operations.⁷⁶

The evolution of warfare has led us to recognize the importance of the Joint Force Maritime Component in supporting joint operations. Joint warfare and the use of the maritime component will continue to assume greater importance. With globalization and the advancements in technology, the oceans remain the primary highway for the movement of resources – which includes military personnel and equipment. Control of the seas allows for the free flow of resources and enables us to impede the movement or actions of those who would use them against this nation. It is a vital requirement, requiring the ability to not only control and protect the oceans but as well to control the avenues and approaches from coastal and inland waterways.

The JFMCC organization must be flexible, structured to meet the vast demands required by the maritime environment but also to provide support to the other joint force components. The framework described in this SRP is not a revolutionary concept; its basic tenets go back to the early days of naval operations. Leadership has and will continue to be the decisive element in any operation or campaign. Leaders' ability to coordinate planning and execution across all levels – vertically and laterally – will facilitate the optimum use of resources and “*the smooth harmony of the whole activity.*”⁷⁷ To support this kind of leadership, JFMCC needs to translate the JFC direction and focus into a JFMCC strategy. This strategy should:

- articulate what is to be accomplished the vision, or end state, must be clear
- provide the broad plan or framework for how to accomplish the vision – identify effects that lead to the end state.
- be continuously assessed – link the vision with reality.

His staff and assigned forces are the Commander's tools for developing and implementing this strategy. However, the JFMCC is only one piece of the 'joint picture', so his staff structure and organization and forces need to fit into that picture. All forces need to understand the nature of supported and supporting actions. The JFMCC organization must continuously look for ways to provide support to the components and the other task force commanders. In addition, the JFMCC and its task forces must precisely articulate what support it requires in the execution of assigned missions.

Doctrine and procedures must capture and articulate the roles, responsibilities, and framework currently used across the numbered fleets. Differing missions – including support to

homeland defense, the GWOT, stabilization operations and contingency plans - require different levels of organization and execution. Capturing the planning, coordination, and execution process across the fleet will establish a baseline that future JFMCCs can use in carrying out assigned missions.

In order to support the rapid transition from a numbered fleet to a JFMCC, the fleets need more staff officers trained in joint operations and especially trained in planning for these operations. This not only includes planners but also FAOs (Foreign Area Officers). The Navy has established a Naval Operations Planning Course (NOPC) which trains naval officers to become joint force planners. The challenge now is to assign a higher percentage of these highly trained officers to the potential JFMCC organizations. To supplement this need for joint expertise, the Navy should consider leveraging the capabilities of the other services. Through cross-pollination, we should create joint billets that will not only provide the numbered fleets with expertise from the other services but just as important, provide the other components with naval expertise. In addition, because of the many missions that the numbered fleets now have on their plates, there should be a standing staff for supporting JFMCC, a collection of trained personnel who can deploy to supplement the staff and assist in supporting JFMCC operations.

Finally, the joint force needs a one-stop shopping location for information on current and past joint operations. There is currently no organization or web portal that current or future components can access to learn from previous or ongoing operations. There is the lessons learned program, but that program is not designed to describe organizations, functions, and day-to-day operations. For example, how was Fifth Fleet organized to support OEF and OIF? What was its role in support to the joint force? Part of the one-stop shopping could include a formalized interview process of outgoing fleet commanders and standing JFMCC's.

The military focus has been mostly on the procurement of equipment; however, what makes the U.S. military really different from other world militaries is its people. Joint warfare is about people – people working together, bringing capabilities together, and sharing ideas, all toward a common cause. We need a great emphasis on providing training to improve the JFMCC and joint process. The JFMCC needs not only trained personnel that understand the roles and responsibilities of the JFMCC, but also understand the roles and responsibilities of the other components. The fleet needs real-time access to how JFMCCs and the other components around the world are operating, organizing, and executing. Leveraging current present day operations and an understanding of previous JFMCC challenges and how they were overcome will provide a capability and insight that does not currently exist – thereby enabling the naval force to continue to move forward in support of joint operations. For as

General Dwight Eisenhower said in 1950, "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever."

Endnotes

¹ John M. Shalikaskvili, GEN, USA, "A Word from the Chairman", *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996): 1.

² Ibid. 7.

³ *Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations*, forward by Admiral Vern Clark, USN and General Michael Hagee, USMC, <http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Concepts/NOC.pdf>; Internet; accessed 8 February 2006.

⁴ Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO Guidance for 2006: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era*, October 2005, accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/navy/cno-guidance_2006.htm; Internet; accessed 17 February 2006

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Leonard Fullenkamp, Stephen Bowman, and Jay Luvass. eds., *Guide to the Vicksburg Campaign* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998)

⁷ E. B. Long, ed., *Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001), 300-301.

⁸ For more detail see: Civil War Times, "How Porter's Flotilla Ran the Gantlet", December, 1962 and *Guide to the Vicksburg Campaign*, edited by Leonard Fullenkamp, Stephen Bowman, & Jay Luvass. University Press of Kansas, 1998

⁹ The operation was to include a coordinated attack by Grant's forces from the north to draw the confederates away from Vicksburg while Sherman's forces moved inland from the Yazoo to capture Vicksburg.

¹⁰ Long, 223.

¹¹ Because of the loss of his logistics base, Grant was unable to precede with his troops south. Unaware of this change in plans, Sherman and Porter preceded as planned. The confederates, still within vicinity of Vicksburg, detected the navy's movement of Sherman's forces and positioned themselves to repel the attack. Unable to move inland Sherman reloaded his forces in Porter's ships and withdrew back down the Yazoo.

¹² John D. Milligan, *Gunboats Down the Mississippi*, (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1965) 146.

¹³ Maritime Superiority is defined as: "That degree of dominance of one force over another that permits the conduct of maritime operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force." Joint

Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 31 Aug 2005)

¹⁴ Milligan, 165-166.

¹⁵ Ibid., 176.

¹⁶ Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* (volume IV): *Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May 1942-August 1942*, (Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2001)

¹⁷ Ibid., 85.

¹⁸ Ibid., 98-99.

¹⁹ Ibid., 101-102.

²⁰ Ibid., 103.

²¹ Ibid., 105.

²² Ibid., 111.

²³ Eric Larrabee, *Commander In Chief: FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, HIS LIEUTENANTS, AND THEIR WAR*, (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Inc, 1988) 384.

²⁴ Morison, 113.

²⁵ John Costello, *The Pacific War*, (New York, NY: Rawson, Wade, 1981) 303-304.

²⁶ Ibid., 304.

²⁷ CDR David J. Jerabek, USAWC Strategic Research Project, *Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's Strategic Leadership During World War II*, 7 April 1999

²⁸ Larrabee, 384.

²⁹ Ibid., 384.

³⁰ Edward J. Marolda, "The Sharp Edge of Containment," *Naval History Magazine*, April 2006, 58.

³¹ James R Locher III, "Has it worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act," *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2001, 105-106.

³² Ibid., 107.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2001), 110.

³⁵ Ibid., 482.

³⁶ Ibid., 219.

³⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, Joint Publication 3-31, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 March 2004), II-7.

³⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, Joint Publication 3-30, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 June 2003), II-2.

³⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, Joint Publication 3-05, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 December 2003), II-2,3.

⁴⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, Joint Publication 0-2, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 July 2001), V-18.

⁴¹ Ibid., V-2,3.

⁴² George W. Bush, *The National Strategy for Maritime Security*, (Washington, D.C.: Whitehouse, September 2005), ii – 2.

⁴³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Task Force Guidance and Procedures*, Joint Publication 5-00.2, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 January 1999), III-2.

⁴⁴ While the numbered fleets have the primary capability, they would still need augmentation to support a long-term JFMCC or CFMCC effort.

⁴⁵ The term JFMCC is used to describe the maritime component activities within the joint force. However, this assumes the Joint Force Commander (JFC) establishes a JFMCC. While there is doctrinal distinction between the JFMCC and NAVFOR which is described later in the paper; from the fleet perspective the NAVFOR (without a JFMCC) would control maritime operations in support of the JFC. The basic framework and missions remain the same – and the NAVFOR must still coordinate laterally and horizontally across the joint force.

⁴⁶ This includes CFMCC (Coalition Force Maritime Component Commander) operations which includes partner nations in support of a coalition mission. Fifth Fleet has numerous coalition partners as part of its CFMCC. Seventh fleet operates as a CCNCC (Combined Commander Naval Component Command, which includes Korean naval forces.

⁴⁷ This is not meant to imply other fleet commands do not have the capability or have not operated as a JTF. The author does not have experience at other fleet commands and is basing this discussion on his tour at Seventh fleet.

⁴⁸ Seventh Fleet is also JTF 515.

⁴⁹ Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), A-5.

⁵⁰ Robert F. Willard, Vice Admiral, USN, *Rediscover the Art of Command & Control*, Proceedings 128 (October 2002): 52.

⁵¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Military Leadership*, Field Manual 22-100, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 July 1990), 1.

⁵² Thomas E. Cronin, "Reflections on Leadership," in *Military Leadership*, ed. William E. Rosenbach and Robert L. Taylor, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 18.

⁵³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.

⁵⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Operations*, Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 July 1997) 345.

⁵⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14 November 2000), V-9.

⁵⁶ Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War*, (London: Greenhill Books, Lionel Leventhal Limited, 1996), 256-257.

⁵⁷ Joint Publication 0-2, V 12-13.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, V-2.

⁵⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Task Force Guidance and Procedures*, Joint Publication 5-00.2, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 January 1999), IV-5.

⁶⁰ Joint Publication 0-2, III-11.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, III-9.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ This is a commonly used expression in military planning circles which is generally attributed to Helmuth von Moltke, a famous Prussian General.

⁶⁴ Derived from 7th Fleet briefs

⁶⁵ Willard, 52.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁶⁷ Concept was developed by ADM Williard, during his tour as the Seventh Fleet Commander. For more information see his article in *Proceedings: Rediscover the Art of Command & Control*, October 2002

⁶⁸ Willard, 53.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ The "Continuum Peace to War" was developed for and by VADM Willard, who was then the Seventh Fleet Commander.

⁷⁶ Joint Publication 0-2, III-15.

⁷⁷ Clausewitz, 77.