

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**USING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION MORE EFFECTIVELY IN THE GLOBAL
WAR ON TERROR**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Winning the Global War on Terror (GWOT) will require the coordinated and deft use of all the elements of national power; diplomatic, information, military and economic. The United States Government has not used the information instrument of national power very effectively to support this long fight. There are three reasons for this ineffective use of information; the competing communication functions and goals of various U.S. Government Departments and Agencies; an insufficient understanding of what is motivating Muslims to actively or passively support violent radical Islam; and a lack of leadership and focus at the national level. Although the President was very clear in defining the objectives in this GWOT, there is no focused communications strategy to achieve the specified end of winning the war of ideas. A new National Security Presidential Directive on strategic communication is needed to solve these shortcomings. An effective strategic communication strategy must achieve two goals: it must counter the ideology that violent radical Islamists use to support their terrorist acts and neutralize anti-Western sentiment amongst Muslim populations. Planning, coordinating and executing a strategic communication campaign plan would be an essential first step to support this strategy.

USING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION MORE EFFECTIVELY IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Winning the Global War on Terror (GWOT) will require the coordinated and deft use of all the elements of national power; diplomatic, information, military and economic. The United States Government has not used the information instrument of national power very effectively to support this long fight. There are three reasons for this ineffective use of information; the competing communication functions and goals of various U.S. Government (USG) Departments and Agencies (agencies); an insufficient understanding of what is motivating Muslims to actively or passively support violent radical Islam; and a lack of leadership and focus at the national level. Although the President was very clear in defining the objectives in this GWOT, there is no focused communications strategy to achieve the specified end of winning the war of ideas. A new National Security Presidential Directive on strategic communication is needed to solve these shortcomings. An effective strategic communication strategy must achieve two goals: it must counter the ideology that violent radical Islamists use to support their terrorist acts and neutralize anti-Western sentiment amongst Muslim populations. Planning, coordinating and executing a strategic communication campaign plan would be an essential first step to support this strategy.

The President has clearly defined four broad ends for combating terrorism in his National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: strengthen America's defensive capabilities at home and abroad, destroy existing terrorist networks, deny them sanctuary, and win the "war of ideas."¹ The information instrument of national power, one of ways that may be used in this fight, requires both diplomatic and military means. Although the Defense Department is the lead agency for the first three goals, the State Department has the lead in the last. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) acknowledged the primacy of information in winning the GWOT when he wrote "victory in the long war ultimately depends on strategic communications."² The information element of national power involves both public diplomacy and information operations. The State Department conducts public diplomacy and its function is to "to engage, inform, and help others understand [U.S.] policies, actions and values."³ The U.S. Armed Forces conducts information operations and related activities in order to "deter, disrupt, dissuade, and direct an adversary. . . [and] influence adversaries and or foreign audiences."⁴ Although public diplomacy and information operations are viewed as having differing goals, their functions do compliment one another. Both agencies must work together and ensure their functions compliment one another, as they share the same target audience in the GWOT.

If strategy is defined as “the art of distributing and applying . . . means to fulfill the ends of policy,”⁵ then an effective strategic communication strategy must achieve two goals: it must counter the ideology that violent radical Islamists use to support their terrorist acts and neutralize anti-Western sentiment amongst Islamic peoples. Critical to both these goals is a correct understanding of the role that violent radical Islam, what we would call terrorism, plays in Islamic society today. The Muslim world, especially in the Middle East, is in the midst of a transformation which is blending elements of neo-nationalism with an Islamic fundamentalism, and combines secular, political and religious change. Violent radical Islamists, like al-Qaeda, represent an extreme element within this process.

This long war requires coordination and synchronization across multiple USG agencies. This can best be done through the existing interagency (IA) process, both at the National Security Council level and at points of execution. Effective use of this existing IA process will require Presidential leadership and focus in the form of a new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on strategic communication, clearly outlining duties, responsibilities, and supported and supporting relationships amongst the various USG agencies. Former Presidents have used this methodology before, with varying degrees of success. Nonetheless, this new NSPD should direct the State Department to develop a strategic communication campaign plan in order to coordinate themes and messages for the U.S. Government. Effectiveness in this information campaign will require an understanding of the various target audiences, the coordination and synchronization of multiple agency messages, tasking authority over various USG communications medium, and measures of performance and effectiveness to evaluate the success of the campaign's efforts. There can be no sequential campaign plan in this long war; all efforts are cumulative and this requires actions to match words and images.

Terms of Reference

Strategic communication is the application of the information instrument of national power and is composed of four core elements: public diplomacy (PD), public affairs (PA), international broadcasting services (IBS), and information operations (IO). According to a 2004 Defense Science Board:

Strategic communication describes a variety of instruments used by governments for generations to understand global attitudes and cultures, engage in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions, advise policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders on the public opinion implications of policy choices, and influence attitudes and behavior.⁶

Strategic communication is the holistic effect achieved through the blending of various USG agency resources used towards a desired end. Strategic communication is the embodiment of effects-based operations, because it links strategic and operational objectives to tactical level actions in order to influence or change behavior or capabilities.⁷ Strategic communication occurs within the information environment, which is composed of the “information, actors and resources that enable the use of information” and occurs in three interrelated dimensions: physical, information and cognitive.⁸ A good strategic communication strategy is composed of three elements: an understanding of the target audience; credible messages and methods of delivery those messages to the target audience; and methods for measuring performance and effectiveness. Understanding the various components of strategic communication, identifying the USG agencies involved, and their competing and complimentary functions underscores the difficulty in developing a comprehensive strategic communication strategy.

The United States Department of State defines the purpose of public diplomacy as “engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences . . . to advance U.S. interests and security and to provide the moral basis for U.S. leadership in the world.”⁹ Public diplomacy involves other governments, but is principally focused on non-governmental organizations and private individuals. The Departments of State and Defense both broadly define public affairs as all communication activities intended to inform and influence domestic audiences and IBS as government funded broadcasting services intended for international audiences.¹⁰ Both Departments of State and Defense engage in public diplomacy, public affairs, and control international broadcasting services assets. Although aimed at different target audiences and for different purposes, in today’s globalized media market, the distances between public affairs, public diplomacy and international broadcasting services functions have narrowed considerably.

Joint Publication 3-13 defines information operations as the integrated use of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, “in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, or deny human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”¹¹ Psychological operations (PSYOP) play a critical role in the execution of information operations attempts to influence foreign audiences at the tactical and operational levels.¹² PSYOP is the only Defense Department activity authorized to use radio, print, and other media in this attempt to influence foreign audiences.¹³ When directed, psychological operations forces can also provide truthful public information to foreign populations and attempt to influence foreign populations.¹⁴ These later missions, if synchronized as part of a strategic communication campaign plan, could clearly support both public diplomacy and public affairs efforts.

Fragmenting the Public Diplomacy Mission

Prior to 1997, much of the public diplomacy mission was performed by the United States Information Agency (USIA), which was an independent foreign affairs agency under the control of the Executive Branch, and provided information overseas through programs like Radio Free Europe and Voice of America.¹⁵ In 1998, President Clinton signed legislation which dissolved USIA and placed its public diplomacy and public affairs functions in the State Department, creating the post of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy. This same legislation kept the Bureau of Broadcasting under the control of the Broadcasting Board of Governors within the Executive Branch.¹⁶

The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is an independent federal agency responsible for “all U.S. government and government sponsored, non-military, international broadcasting.”¹⁷ The BBG broadcasts services through radio, television and the internet and reaches a worldwide audience of over 140 million people in 56 countries.¹⁸ Although a board member, the Secretary of State does not have authority to direct BBG activities, which further hampers the information coordination process.

Recognizing the importance of information in this war of ideas, President Bush initially created the Office of Global Communications (OGC) in January 2003 within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), which was tasked to advise and coordinate the “strategic communication” messages and priorities of the various USG agencies.¹⁹ Although responsible for the interagency coordination of both public affairs and public diplomacy functions, the “OGC evolved into a second tier organization devoted primarily to tactical public affairs coordination . . . [and did] not engage in strategic direction, coordination, and evaluation.”²⁰ President Bush then tasked the State Department, specifically the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, to develop “a government-wide communications strategy, to promote freedom and democracy to win the war of ideas.”²¹ The United States cannot win this long war if it is perceived as not promoting freedom, but attacking Islam. Unfortunately, America is not excelling in this war of ideas. Sheik Abdul-Aziz al-Sheikh, Saudi Arabia's Grand Mufti and a conservative Muslim, in a speech at a mosque on the plain of Mount Arafat, stated:

Oh, Muslim nation, there is a war against of our creed, against our culture under the pretext of fighting terrorism. We should stand firm and united in protecting our religion . . . Islam's enemies want to empty our religion from its contents and its meaning. But the soldiers of God will be victorious.²²

Clearly, the United States has more work to do to influence its target audiences within the region. The State Department, as lead agent, must develop a strategic communication

campaign plan for the GWOT. The Defense Department can support this effort, specifically through its main component of strategic communication, information operations.

In its simplest form, information operations integrate information and information systems in order to aid and influence decisions. Related information operations capabilities include public affairs, civil-military operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD).²³ Although complimentary, these related capabilities each operate under a different set of rules than information operations, which makes integrating these various complimentary efforts difficult.²⁴ As part of a larger strategic communication campaign to counter anti-Western sentiment, CMO and DSPD actions should help fulfill expectations created by information operations efforts. For example, after building 30 schools and 25 clinics in Djibouti, Africa, one soldier noted, "One place we went to they considered the US to be warmongers. But we built a school and when we left they said they considered us friends."²⁵

This close alignment of information operations (IO) and public affairs (PA) can add confusion in the execution of core missions and lead to a loss of credibility for public affairs missions. The purpose of public affairs is to provide timely, accurate information for the domestic media. While the messages maybe similar, the audiences and intent of IO and PA are different.

[Public affairs'] principle focus is to inform the American public and international audiences in support of combatant commander public information needs at all operational levels. IO services to influence foreign adversary audiences using PYSOP capabilities . . . both PA and IO ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to the audience and operational levels.²⁶

Public affairs activities are useful tools in the dissemination of information and when coordinated and synchronized, can support information operations efforts. Care must be taken not to discredit public affairs as a legitimate way for communicating messages to target audiences. Correctly identifying the target audience is a critical first step for formulating an effective strategic communications strategy.

Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism

In order for a strategic communication strategy to be successful, it must first correctly identify the underlying causes for terrorism and address them. Addressing these causes requires a holistic approach which uses all elements of national power, not just information. This approach has strategic policy implications, because the actions of the United States must match its words in this effort. The strategic communication strategy cannot be seen as a

supporting effort in an overall engagement strategy; it must “capture the moral high ground” and guide all USG agencies’ efforts in the GWOT.²⁷ President Bush emphasized this by stating:

We also need different and more comprehensive approach to public information efforts that can help people around the world learn about and understand America. The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations. It does, however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the future of the Muslim world. This is a struggle of ideas and this is an area where America must excel.²⁸

Developing a strategic communication strategy should consist of two complimentary efforts; neutralizing anti-Western sentiment amongst Muslim populations and countering the ideology used by violent ideological extremists. These efforts are complimentary and require a correct understanding of the role that ideology plays in support of terrorism and anti-Western sentiment; both efforts will require a detailed analysis of the target audiences and an understanding of their cultural, policy and security environment.

Understanding the Target Audiences: *Renovatio* and the Jihadist Ideology

The Muslim world, especially in the Middle East, is in the midst of a transformation which is blending elements of neo-nationalism with an Islamic fundamentalism.²⁹ Michael Vlahos calls this Islamic restoration a *renovatio*, because it is part of a “world historical” Islamic revival, which seeks to reorder both religion and civil society.³⁰ This *renovatio* within Islam is a broad based approach combining secular, political and religious change. Ruling régimes wish to manage this change without radically altering the status quo. Moderate Islamists support this change and try to incorporate ideals of humanism and liberalism within a fundamentalist framework. Radical Islamists, many following a Wahhabi or neo-salafi orientation, want to ignore liberalism, and establish a fundamentalist and totalitarian system via *jihad*, holy war. Violent radical Islamist movements reject the authority of current Muslim regimes and seek this change through violence and terrorism.³¹

America needed to understand this Muslim *renovatio* before, but especially after 9/11. Some saw the terrorist attack as the inevitable result of a “clash of civilizations” between Islam and the West.³² This premise incorrectly assumes a monolithic interpretation of Islam, one that conceals the diversity of opinion among Muslims and “accord[s] the most extremist and violent elements in the Muslim world the position of authentic spokespersons for Islam.”³³ Others saw it as the result of a civil war within Islam, which contests the authority of both political and religious leaders and is therefore a contest between “moderates” and “radicals”. This model implies that moderates should adopt Western civic, read secular, values to defeat radical Islam.³⁴ This approach incorrectly shapes the argument, because the role of Islam itself is

being contested, especially within the violent radical Islamist movement.³⁵ Michael Vlahos offers a third model, which sees terrorism as part of a broader movement for change within the Muslim World. This pan-Islamist movement is driven from the bottom up and seeks control through piety rather than violence.³⁶ This drive for reform, *islah*, and renewal, *tajdid*, is not new, but “is as old as the history of Muslims.”³⁷ Understanding this *renovatio* requires an appreciation for the different problems faced by Muslim societies, their differing views of Islamic law, and their differing models for the appropriate spheres of action (political, religious, and military) as well as the legitimacy of their actions.³⁸ Although it is impossible to succinctly identify and discuss all the elements of Islamic history, law and culture contributing to this *renovatio* movement within this paper, strategic communication practitioners must understand how all these elements contribute to any strategy for countering the extreme interpretation of Islam by terrorist groups.

Islam consists of some 1.25 billion believers in forty-one predominantly Muslim countries, stretching from Indonesia west to North Africa. It is the second largest religion in the world and most of its members do not live in the Middle East, but in Central, South and Southeast Asia.³⁹ “Islam, in Arabic, means ‘state of submission’; and a Muslim is one who has submitted to Allah, the one and only God” and Mohammad is His prophet.⁴⁰ Mohammad called for believers to engage in jihad, and live a good life based on religious belief, rather than loyalty to their tribe. The polytheistic Arabi community in Mecca was hostile to these changes, so Mohammad and the faithful moved in a *hijra*, emigration, from Mecca to Medina in 622 C.E. Mohammed ruled Medina, a city-state composed of the community of the faithful, the *ummah*, as a religious, political, and military leader and spent the next ten years of his life consolidating power, uniting the warring tribes in Arabia, and defeating his enemies through jihad.⁴¹ These were the formative years which shaped the worldview for the religion of Islam. Dilip Hiro writes:

Islam . . . created from scratch an entire social order. . . .The events of early Islam offered precedents upon which subsequent Muslim societies strove to organize themselves. It is to this seminal period that contemporary Muslims return for the answers to such basic questions as those pertaining to a political-administrative entity as power, legitimacy, relations between the ruler and ruled, law and order, and social harmony.⁴²

During the first three centuries of the Islamic Empire, the Islamic community continued to expand throughout the Middle East, North Africa, India and Southeast Asia. This expansion led to the development of religious scholars, *ulama* (the learned), who developed Islamic law, the *shariah*, as an “ideal blueprint for Muslim life”.⁴³ It is during this time that the Prophet’s sayings and actions were collected into a narrative and written tradition called the *hadith*. Legal experts,

fuqaha, studied the Quran and the hadith and added to Islamic law. They offered legal responses, *fatwas*, to Muslims concerning questions about the validity of any substance or practice. John Esposito explains that clerics could provide *fatwas* to Muslim rulers to legitimize or de-legitimize their actions.⁴⁴

Islam does not have a clearly delineated religious hierarchy and no single religious scholar speaks authoritatively for all Muslims.⁴⁵ Prior the nineteenth century, the dispersal of religious authority within Islam sometimes prevented direct clashes between religious and temporal authorities.

As long as the rulers did not unduly interfere in religious belief, the *ulama* adopted a largely politically quiet stand. Furthermore, they normally exhorted followers to accept established authority lest dissension led to *fitna* (anarchy) and the fragmentation of the *umma* . . . It was commonly recognized that those learned in religious sciences and Islamic jurisprudence, and recognized as such by their peers, had the right to speak for and about Islamic doctrines regarding both moral and societal issues.⁴⁶

Dilip Hiro argues that modern Islamic reform began in the early nineteenth century in response to the Ottoman Empire's eclipse by Christian European powers. Ottoman intellectuals were faced with a dilemma:

Either Europeans had devised a system better than Islam or the Muslim community had failed to follow true Islam. Since none of them [Ottoman intellectuals] was prepared to concede the inferiority of Islam to any other social system the inevitable conclusion was that Muslims had deviated from the true path. So the stage was set for Islamic reform.⁴⁷

The Ottoman rulers had already begun a *Tanzimat*, a series of edicts focused on military and administrative reform. Some aspects of this reform, as well as Western military, political and economic assumptions of power, were resisted in Algeria, Egypt, and Istanbul. At this time, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani attempted economic and Islamic solutions for dealing with the West. Al-Afghani combined a call for reform of Islam with a vehement anti-imperialist agenda, in response to Muslim rulers' acquiescence to Western interests. He did not, however, reject the advances of modernity.⁴⁸ He called on Muslim rulers and their subjects to actively resist the West's growing influence in the Islamic world, combining the twin examples of the dynamism and militancy of *salaf al-salih*, the pious ancestors, while arguing for the individual's responsibility to practice *ijtihad*, a methodology of creative reasoning. Afghani is seen today as "the modern progenitor of Islamic reform" or salafism.⁴⁹

The power of religious authorities was lessened by the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the legacy of European colonialism in the Middle East. In order to establish their own political authority, many of these new Muslim states sought to control religion by "incorporating schools,

courts, and mosques into their ministries of education, law, and religious affairs” while simultaneously recognizing Islam as the state religion.⁵⁰ This began a process which marginalized many of the religious leaders or fundamentally disempowered them, as in Turkey.

The failure of secular alternatives like pan-Arabism and its semi-socialist economic policies following independence, as well as dilemmas in economic and political development, discredited both ruling regimes and religious authorities who cooperated with them even further.⁵¹ The remnants of the religious establishment sometimes justified state policies. Mohammed Ayoob writes that “many lay thinkers in the Muslim world held the religious establishment as responsible as the temporal rulers for Muslim political decline because of their perceived collaboration with, or at least tolerance of, decadent regimes.”⁵² The growth of nation-states and the discrediting of both ruling regimes and the ulama contributed to the rise of Islamist movements in the twentieth century.

Jihadist Ideology

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror (NMST-WOT) states that violent extremism, specifically al-Qaeda and its affiliates, is the primary threat to the United States. It defines extremists as those who “oppose . . . the right of people to choose how to live and how to organize their societies and support the murder of ordinary people to advance extremist ideological purposes.”⁵³ It also defines moderates as those who “do not support extremists.”⁵⁴ This oversimplification of the problem minimizes the complexity of the various movements that exist within Islamism, what Vlahos calls the *renovatio*. Al-Qaeda’s multiple attacks against the United States were in response to a dual shift of focus within militant Sunni Islamist groups. Certain militant groups rejected those Islamists engaged in peaceful political reform and revival and promoted violent jihad. These violent radical Islamists shifted their main focus from the near enemy – Muslim governments -- to the far enemy – the West. The International Crisis Group outlines three distinct movements for reform within Sunni Islamism, each with its own worldview, method of operation, and principle actors. These three reform movements can best be described as political, missionary and jihadi Islamism.⁵⁵

Political Islamists, as the name implies, generally seek power through the political process rather than violence.⁵⁶ They give precedence to politics and the proselytism of other Muslims, and organize themselves into political parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. In some instances, like Hamas, they will engage in armed resistance against a perceived “occupation” because the circumstances dictate it.⁵⁷ The second movement, missionary Islamism, is concerned with the non-violent activity of preaching, *al-da’wa*, and increasing religiosity, *al-*

iman. This *salafi* movement emphasizes correct behavior and a fairly narrow interpretation of the Quran and the Sunna. The primary concern is with the preservation of the Muslim faith and moral order against the forces of non belief and *fitna*, civil strife.⁵⁸ Jihadi Islamism, what the US defines as “violent extremism”, eschews recognition of Muslim state authority and has actively taken up armed struggle, *al-jihad*, in defense of *dar al-Islam*, the House of Islam. This jihadi movement can be further categorized by three separate objectives: jihad against the near enemy, apostate or pro-Western Muslim regimes (i.e. Egypt);⁵⁹ irredentist movements, a struggle to redeem a part of *dar al-Islam* from non-Muslim occupation (i.e. Chechnya);⁶⁰ and jihad against the far enemy (the West, or the East – the former Soviet sphere).⁶¹

Although there is no single, universally accepted and doctrinaire definition of jihad, it refers to the struggle against Islam’s enemies as well as the struggle to live one’s faith. Different conditions warrant the offensive or defensive invocation of jihad.⁶² Different arguments concerning jihad are drawn from classical, early modern and contemporary sources. John Esposito defines jihad as striving to lead a righteous life, spreading Islam to non-believers, supporting oppressed Muslims (in Afghanistan during the Soviet-*mujahidin* conflict), or attacking America and working to overthrow Muslim governments.⁶³ However, classic sources define jihad as fighting in the path of God. It is difficult to understand the legitimate use of jihad in the modern world, but like just war theory, there are compelling arguments for it. It is critical that non-Muslims understand how violent radical Islamists exploit the authority of the past for precedents to justify their call for jihad against both the near and far enemies.⁶⁴ This exploitation of Islamic rules by violent radical Islamists must be understood as the center of gravity in the war of ideas.

Strategic Ends

The diversity of Islamic thought within the ongoing *renovatio* should give pause to American strategists in the war on terror. Crafting an all encompassing set of strategic communication themes and messages will require an extremely nuanced approach, one which understands the various streams of Islamic reform and revival within the Middle East and the world. The United States must be cautious in its strategic communications strategy so that it isn’t viewed as preaching a better form of Islam to Muslims or advocating that Islamic peoples should simply sublimate their culture and accept western secular values. Additionally, this strategy must account for the many USG agencies charged with conducting strategic communications within the Islamic world, and understand the various resources at their disposal. This strategy must also address the use of communications mediums within the

Islamic world, like *al-Jazeera*. As stated earlier, the strategy for countering the ideological support for terrorism should consist of two complimentary ends; neutralizing anti-Western sentiment amongst Islamic peoples, and countering violent extremists' ideologies. Overcoming anti-Western sentiment is important for two reasons: it allows the United States, as the representative of Western values, to champion universal values such as human rights, democracy and religious tolerance, which then allow these values to be viewed, interpreted and debated within an Islamic cultural context; and it undermines violent radical Islamists ideologies that all Western values are un-Islamic. A supporting effort must also include a public affairs effort to counter anti-Islamic sentiment in the West.

Matching USG policy and actions with strategic communications messages can achieve these dual goals simultaneously. The United States rapid response to the December 2004 tsunami in Indonesia and its subsequent departure from the region burnished the US's image in the region while diminishing support for the violent radical Islamic organization Jemaah Islamiah. After the relief effort, polls in Indonesia found that the positive perception of the United States rose 30 percent while the popularity of al-Qaeda dropped 20 percent.⁶⁵ Conversely, the United States needs to increase its efforts in public affairs to educate the American people when Islamic nations offer aid to support the United States. The United Arab Emirates provided \$100 million to help the victims of Hurricane Katrina.⁶⁶ The United States must do a better job in educating the American public in order to help overcome anti-Islamic biases.

Countering violent radical Islamists' ideology will require detailed analyses by Islamic experts to properly identify critical concepts and provide context to strategic communication planners. One method for countering violent radical Islamists' ideology would be for these experts to identify distortions of Islamic history, law, and Quranic verses and to help Islamic voices question the legitimacy of the effects of jihadist violence.⁶⁷ This critical vulnerability appears to be acknowledged by al-Qaeda in a July 2005 letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, reproaching al-Zarqawi for targeting Muslim civilians and the killing of hostages.⁶⁸ In this letter, al-Zawahiri reminds al-Zarqawi of the importance of maintaining popular support among Muslims.⁶⁹ This popular support for al-Qaeda was further undermined by al-Zarqawi's sponsored Jordanian hotel bombings in November 2005. Following these bombings, al-Zarqawi was condemned not only by Western governments and Jordan, but by the imam of his childhood mosque. Mustafa Suleiman condemned al-Zarqawi for "the criminality of the attacks and how they were not in keeping with Islam."⁷⁰ This condemnation of al-Zarqawi was shared by other Muslims at multiple Islamic websites as well.⁷¹ This reaction from

Muslims, using “legitimate” themes broadcast in a “legitimate” forum, appeared to force al-Zarqawi to respond to this criticism and justify his attacks as aimed against US and Israeli intelligence agents.⁷² This suggests that it is possible that Muslims may recoil from the radical ideology that supports violence within the Islamic world. One strategic communication theme for the US might be that this type of violence against innocents is un-Islamic and therefore that violent radical Islamists do not represent a legitimate alternative movement for true reform and revival within Islam.

Needed: A National Security Presidential Directive on Strategic Communication

This long war requires a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) to facilitate the coordination and synchronization of strategic communication across multiple USG agencies. This new NSPD should direct the State Department to develop a strategic communication campaign plan in order to coordinate themes and messages for the U.S. Government. A NSPD on strategic communication follows precedents set down during the Cold War by Presidents Reagan⁷³ and George H.W. Bush.⁷⁴ After the dissolution of USIA, President Clinton established an interagency working group, called the International Public Information Core Group (IPICG), headed by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Interestingly, while the IPI Charter gave the responsibility for international public diplomacy to the IPICG, it also recognized that information intended for foreign audiences would probably be rebroadcast in American media outlets. The charter required that domestic public affairs activities to be coordinated with foreign IPI efforts, and that “information aimed at domestic audiences should be coordinated, integrated, de-conflicted and synchronized with the [IPICG] to achieve a synergistic effect for [government] strategic information activities.”⁷⁵

Some of the ends and ways needed for a strategic communication strategy NSPD already exist in a number of national security documents. The National Security Strategy outlines a broad strategy for achieving a balance of power for human freedom; by defending the peace against terrorists, by building good relations among nations, and by extending the peace to every continent.⁷⁶ A major goal within the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is waging a war of ideas through “effective, timely public diplomacy and government sponsored media.”⁷⁷ The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) identifies violent radical Islamist’s extremist ideology as the strategic center of gravity in this war and directs the U.S. Armed Forces to support all efforts to contribute to the conditions which counter ideological support for terrorism.⁷⁸ What is missing from these various ends is a unifying strategic communication strategy to synchronize these various efforts.

A new NSPD for strategic communication would provide a strategy, the application of means to achieve policy ends, in support of the GWOT. This new NSPD should codify and clarify for every USG agency the various roles, tasks, and missions in regard to strategic communication and task agencies to provide the appropriate resources to support this effort. Critical to the implementation of this strategy would be the development and execution of a strategic communication campaign plan. This NSPD should clearly identify lead and support roles for all USG agencies. Using NSPD-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization⁷⁹ and DOD Directive 3000.05⁸⁰ as templates, this strategic communications NSPD should direct the State Department to develop a strategic communications campaign plan and task the Defense Department to augment the State Department with planning resources. The President should further strengthen this NSPD and reassign resources, through Executive Order if necessary, from the supporting to the supported agency. This would provide additional enforcement mechanism to the State Department that currently exists only within the National Security Council (NSC) interagency process.

Developing a Strategic Communication Campaign Plan within the Interagency Process

How well the National Security Council performs its interagency functions depends on the decision-making style of the president and the organization of the NSC itself. Traditionally, the NSC is composed of three elements; the statutory members and advisors, the professional support staff from the EOP, and the interagency groups themselves. The organization of the NSC is a Presidential prerogative, with subsequent administrations often times adopting the “best business practices” of previous administrations.⁸¹ NSPD-1, Organization of the National Security Council System, re-affirmed the organizational structure, roles and functions of the NSC, the Principles Committee, the Deputies Committee, and established Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) as the focal point for day to day interagency coordination for national security policy. NSPD-1 established a number of PCCs and authorized the Chairman of each PCC to establish subordinate working groups in order to perform its assigned duties.⁸² In September, 2002, the President directed the National Security Advisor to establish a Strategic Communication PCC.⁸³ This provides the framework for the interagency to synchronize and coordinate the strategic communication campaign plan.

The nexus of ends, ways and means for strategic communication is the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. He/she should co-chair the Strategic Communication PCC. This office was tasked by the President to lead the interagency process for crafting the communications strategy for the USG.⁸⁴ The Under Secretary oversees three bureaus and one

office within the DOS; the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and the Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R/PPR). IIP “produces news articles, electronic and print publications, which provides context to U.S. policies, as well as products on U.S. values, culture, and daily life that serves as a window on positive American values.”⁸⁵ IIP should coordinate and synchronize with the Broadcasting Board of Governors and be the clearing house for all message and themes dealing with strategic communication in the GWOT. R/PPR provides long-term strategic planning, evaluates the effectiveness of performance measures, and advises the Under Secretary on resource allocation within the State Department.⁸⁶ This office should be augmented by additional planners from the Defense Department, act as the strategic communication planners, and provide measures of performance and measures of effectiveness analysis for the information campaign.

Synchronization of strategic communication plans within the Defense Department is relatively straightforward. The President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces through two separate chains of command, with operational control running from the President, through the SecDef, to combatant commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmits orders given by the President and SecDef and, when ordered, oversees the activities of the combatant commanders, as well as acting as their spokesman to the President and SecDef.⁸⁷ He is charged with the preparation and review of joint operational plans and participates in meetings of the NSC. The Joint Staff, although it has no executive authority, represents the combatant commanders concerns and would be one of the two Defense Department focal points for interagency coordination at the NSC PCC level.⁸⁸

The Defense Department has developed a military centric approach to interagency cooperation called the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The JIACG is a formal structure within each combatant command that provides oversight, coordination, synchronization and multi-agency planning for implementing political-military missions and tasks.⁸⁹ The JIACG model provides a template for use at the NSC PCC level for synchronization and coordination of the strategic communication campaign plan. It would also be the agency responsible within each combatant command for coordinating the execution of messages and themes associated with the strategic communications campaign plan.

Developing a new NSPD for strategic communication and writing a strategic communication campaign plan would provide unity of effort and help to coordinate themes and messages for the US Government. Public diplomacy direction would once again be consolidated under a single agency. The State Department would have tasking authority over

USG communications medium, be responsible for developing measures of performance and effectiveness and would evaluate the success of the various information campaigns' efforts. The Defense Department would provide planning and coordinating resources and expertise in order to help synchronize the execution of the campaign plan.

Conclusion

The United States of America is engaged a long war against terrorism. Winning the Global War on Terror will require the coordinated and deft use of all the elements of national power; diplomatic, information, military and economic. Strategic communication is the application of the information element of national power, which involves both public diplomacy and information operations. These two functions, controlled by different USG agencies, nonetheless compliment each other in the GWOT. Presidential leadership and focus in the form of a new National Security Presidential Directive on strategic communication is needed to develop a strategic communication strategy. Once developed, this strategy will then require a strategic communication campaign plan in order to coordinate and synchronize efforts across various US Government agencies charged with public diplomacy and public affairs missions. Any information campaign in this long war must include the twin goals of neutralizing anti-Western feelings in the Middle East and countering violent radical Islamists' use of jihad as a legitimate form of change within the Islamic world. A critical component in developing this campaign plan is a nuanced understanding of the on going *renovatio* within the Islamic world today. Violent radical Islamists, like al-Qaeda, represent an extreme element within this process.

Endnotes

¹ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003), 2.

² Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6 February 2006), 91-92.

³ U.S. Department of State, "The Mission of Public Diplomacy," Testimony at confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Karen Hughes, Washington, D.C., 22 July 2005 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State), available from <http://www.state.gov/b r/us/2005/49967.htm>; Internet; accessed 1 February 2006.

⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Information Operations*, Joint Publication 3-13 (Final Coordination), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), I-6 – I-7. (hereafter cited as Joint Pub 3-13)

⁵ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, (New York: Meridian, 1991), 321.

⁶ Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USDAT&L), *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 2004), 11. (hereafter cited as USDAT&L)

⁷ USJFCOM defines EBO as all operations that are “planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment” in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims. An effect is the physical or behavioral change in a system as the result of the application of one or more elements on national power. A system is a functionally, physically and/or behaviorally related group of elements that interact together as a whole. For additional information see The Joint Warfighting Center, *Operational Implications of Effects-Based Operations (EBO)*, Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 7, (Suffolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, 17 November 2004), Section II, 6-11.

⁸ Joint Pub 3-13, I-1-I-3. The physical dimension includes the communication systems and supporting infrastructure. The information dimension consists of both the message and its means of delivery. The cognitive dimension is the location where humans make their decisions and consists of perceptions, emotions, awareness and understanding. Within the cognitive dimension, targeting is the process of synchronizing messages with other actions to achieve a desired effect. These effects may include influencing adversary decision makers, influencing morale and will to fight, or influencing local populations to support your cause.

⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State), available from <http://www.state.gov/r/>; Internet; accessed 16 January 2006.

¹⁰ USDAT&L, 12.

¹¹ Joint Pub 3-13, I-1.

¹² Psychological Operations “convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.” U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 March 1994), 343.

¹³ Typical missions assigned to PSYOP units include; isolate the adversary from domestic and international support, reduce the effectiveness of the adversary’s forces, deter escalation by adversary leadership, and minimize collateral damage and interference with U.S. Operations. Joint Pub 3-13, II-2.

¹⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, Joint Publication 3-53 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 September 2003), I-5.

¹⁵ U.S. Information Agency (USIA) Alumni Association, “What Is Public Diplomacy?” available from <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/2.htm>; Internet; accessed 1 February 2006.

¹⁶ *Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, FAIR Act, Public Law 105-277*, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 1998, available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/laws/majorlaw/hr1757.pdf>; Internet; accessed 16 January 2006.

¹⁷ U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors, *About the BBG* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors); available from http://www.bbg.gov/bbg_aboutus.cfm; Internet; accessed 31 January 2006.

¹⁸ The Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN), which includes Radio Sawa, Alhurra and Alhurra Iraq TV, provides a 24/7 news and information service in Arabic. MBN is scheduled to launch Alhurra Europe, to reach Arabic-speakers in Europe, in April 2006. For additional information on public broadcasting activities, see Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, *FY 2005 Performance and Accountability Report*, (Washington, D.C.: Broadcasting Board of Governors, 15 November 2005), available from http://www.bbg.gov/bbg_final_par_to_omb_15nov05.pdf; Internet; accessed 3 February 2006.

¹⁹ The OGC was also authorized to create temporary interagency communications teams in order to "promote the interests of the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding, build support for and among coalition partners of the United States, and inform international audiences." George W. Bush, "Establishing the Office of Global Communications," *Executive Order 13283* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 21 January 2003).

²⁰ USDAT&L, 25.

²¹ Karen Hughes, "Keynote Address," Remarks to the 2005 Forum on the Future of Public Diplomacy, Washington, D.C., October 14, 2005, available from <http://www.state.gov/r/us/2005/55165.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 January 2006.

²² Salah Nasrawi, "Muslims Pray for Salvation at Mount Arafat," Associated Press, 9 January 2006; available from http://start.sprint.earthlink.net/article/int?guid=20060109/43c1edd0_3ca6_1552620060109-599847412; Internet; accessed 9 January 2006.

²³ Joint Pub 3-13, I-9 – I-10.

²⁴ Information Operations are offensive and defensive in nature and consists of four functions: to deter, disrupt, dissuade and direct adversaries; to misdirect adversary's plans, execution, and feedback mechanisms; to disrupt an adversary's communications and networks while protecting your own; and to influence adversaries and or foreign audiences. Civil-Military Operations encompasses all those activities between military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations and agencies, and civilians in an operational area. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy are all activities and measures taken by the DOD components, not solely in the area of IO, to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the USG that are designed to promote US foreign policy objectives. For additional information on IO and its related activities, see Joint Pub 3-13, Chapter I and II.

²⁵ James Brandon, "To Fight al-Qaeda, US Troops in Africa Build Schools Instead," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 January 2006, 1.

²⁶ Christopher Lamb, *Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, September 2005), 8.

²⁷ Kent H. Butts, "Conditions of Terrorism," in *The Struggle Against Extremist Ideology: Addressing the Conditions That Foster Terrorism*, ed. Kent H. Butts and Jeffrey C. Reynolds, ed., (Carlisle, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, August 2005), 13.

²⁸ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 31.

²⁹ For a discussion that the role of neo-nationalism and Islamism plays in the Middle East, see Sherifa Zuhur, *The Middle East: Politics, History, and Neonationalism*, (Carlisle: Institute of Middle Eastern, Islamic and Diasporic Studies, 2005).

³⁰ Michael Vlahos, "The Muslim Renovatio and U.S. Strategy", *Tech Central Station*, 27 April 2004, 1, available from <http://www.techcentralstation.com/042704D.html>; Internet; accessed 11 October 2005.

³¹ For a fuller discussion these various movements within Islam, see International Crisis Group, *Understanding Islamism: Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37*, 2 March 2005; Mohammed Ayoob, "Deciphering Islam's Multiple Voices: Intellectual Luxury or Strategic Necessity," *The Middle East Policy* 12 (Fall 2005), 79-90; Fauzi Najjar, "The Arabs, Islam and Globalization," *The Middle East Policy* 12 (Fall 2005), 90-106; and Barry Rubin, "Arab Reformers Debate America," *Middle East Quarterly* 13 (Winter 2006), 49-58.

³² See Bernard Lewis, *Islam and the West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

³³ Mohammed Ayoob, "Deciphering Islam's Multiple Voices: Intellectual Luxury or Strategic Necessity?" *The Middle East Policy* 12 (Fall 2005): 79.

³⁴ Vlahos.

³⁵ See Michael Scott Doran, "Somebody Else's Civil War," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (January/February 2002): 22-42 and Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 24.

³⁶ Vlahos.

³⁷ Salim Mansur, "Muslims, Democracy, and the American Experience," *Middle East Quarterly* 12, (Summer 2005), 67.

³⁸ International Crisis Group, *Understanding Islamism, Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37*, 2 March 2005, 3; available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3301&l=1>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2006.

³⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004), 48-49.

⁴⁰ Dilip Hiro, *War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response*, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 3.

⁴¹ John L. Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 29-32.

⁴² Hiro, 3.

⁴³ Esposito, 34.

⁴⁴ John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, rev. 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 74-84.

⁴⁵ Islamic law was primarily compiled between 750-900 C.E. by scholars of jurisprudence utilizing certain sources for Islamic law: the Quran, the *hadith*, *ijma`* (consensus), *qiyas* (legal analogy) and, until the 10th century, *ijtihad* (a creative process of reasoning) with varying emphases. The complexity in Islamic jurisprudence is compounded by different collections of the hadith and various schools of Sunni and Shi'i Islamic law. Additionally, the *ulama*, or clerics, are trained in particular specializations; some in philosophy, philology, or mysticism, rather than in jurisprudence. Legal opinions that are issued by the *ulama* are not necessarily binding. Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, interview by author, 27 February 2006, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

⁴⁶ Ayoob, 81.

⁴⁷ Hiro, 44.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁵⁰ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 82.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 74-83 and Hiro, 42-56.

⁵² Ayoob, 81.

⁵³ Pace, 11.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, i.

⁵⁶ Both political and missionary Islamists are often incorrectly identified as radicals and extremists. Their ideologies do not support terrorism, but their ideas are often used by violent radical Islamist groups as a justification for their acts of terrorism.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 6-8.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 8-14.

⁵⁹ Gerges, 49-79.

⁶⁰ International Crisis Group, 14-18.

⁶¹ Gerges, 151-170.

⁶² Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, "Islamic Rulings on Warfare," *Strategic Studies Institute Monograph* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2004), 1-6; available from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/>; Internet; accessed 10 October 2005.

⁶³ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 26.

⁶⁴ Ibid., xi-xii.

⁶⁵ Butts, 9-10.

⁶⁶ The White House, "Fact Sheet: The United States–UAE Bilateral Relationship," (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 22 February 2006); available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060222-10.html>; Internet; accessed 1 March 2006.

⁶⁷ Aboul-Enein and Zuhur, 31.

⁶⁸ Abu Musab al-Zarqawi denies the authenticity of this letter and asserts that it is an attempt by the United States to slur al-Qaeda. For more information see "Iraq: al-Zarqawi Claims al-Zawahiri Letter Is False," *Andkronos International*, 13 October 2005, [newspaper on-line]; available from http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level.php?cat=Terrorism&luid=8.0.218548514&par=0; Internet; accessed 27 February 2006.

⁶⁹ Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi dated 9 July 2005, available from http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_101105.html; Internet; accessed 7 December 2005.

⁷⁰ Eli Lake, "Backlash in Zarqawi's Hometown," *The New York Sun*, 14 November 2005, [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.nysun.com/article/22952>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2006.

⁷¹ Maamoun Youssef, "Islamic Web Sites Criticize Jordan Bombing," *Las Vegas Sun*, 15 November 2005, [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/w-me/2005/nov/15/111508073.html>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2006.

⁷² "Zarqawi 'Defends Jordan Attacks'," *BBC News, UK Version*, 18 November 2005, [newspaper on-line]; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4450590.stm; Internet; accessed 28 February 2006.

⁷³ President Reagan's National Security Decision Directive 77 aligned Public Diplomacy with National Security and sought to "encourage the growth of democratic institutions and practices . . . [and] counter totalitarian ideologies." See Ronald W. Reagan, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," *National Security Decision Directive Number 77* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 14 January 1983); available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-077.htm>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2006. National Security Decision Directive 130 established International Information Policy and identified international information programs as "a strategic instrument of U.S. national policy, not a tactical instrument of U.S. diplomacy" and directed that programming be differentiated to

reach audiences in various geographic regions and levels within society. See Ronald W. Reagan, "U.S. International Information Policy," National Security Decision Directive Number 130 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 6 March 1984); available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-130.htm>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2006.

⁷⁴ President George H.W. Bush's National Security Directive 51 (NSD 51) continued these policies with regards to USG IBS functions and directed an increase in broadcast capability to the Islamic world. NSD 51 also directed that USG IBS "should actively and directly support non-traditional U.S. foreign policy priorities, such as . . . the fight against terrorism." See George H.W. Bush, "United States Government International Broadcasting," *National Security Directive 51* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 17 October 1990); available from <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsd/NSD/NSD%2051/0001.pdf>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2006.

⁷⁵ William J. Clinton, "International Public Information," *Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 68 (Classified)* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 30 April 1999), synopsis available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-68.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 February 2006.

⁷⁶ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), iv.

⁷⁷ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 24.

⁷⁸ Pace, 24-26.

⁷⁹ NSPD-44 made the Department of State the focal point for all coordination involving USG agencies and departments for the planning, preparation, and execution of stabilization and reconstruction activities. NSPD-44 created the office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (Coordinator) Operations, established a PCC level group for interagency coordination, and made the Coordinator a member of the NSC staff. It also directed that the Secretaries of States and Defense develop a framework for "coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels" but did not require the development of a pol-mil plan for stabilization and reconstruction operations. NSPD-44 recognized that lead and supporting agency responsibilities could shift throughout these operations and would use the process outlined in NSPD-1 to assign these roles. For additional information see George W. Bush, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 7 December 2005).

⁸⁰ Anticipating the publication of NSPD-44, the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense signed DoD Directive 3000.05 to establish policy and assign responsibility within the Department of Defense (DOD) for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. It directed that all military plans address stability operations requirements "throughout all phases of an operation or plan. . . [and be] exercised, gamed, and, when appropriate, red-teamed . . . with other U.S. Departments and Agencies." This policy assigned responsibilities for three critical coordination or development functions within DOD. First, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) was tasked to coordinate DOD relations with DOS's Coordinator. Secondly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was tasked to develop joint doctrine for stability operations in consultation with other USG departments and agencies. Finally, the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), was tasked to develop new stability operations concepts as part of its joint concept development and experimentation program. For additional information

see Gordon England, *Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 28 November 2005).

⁸¹ For additional information on the NSC and the interagency process, see Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith and Elizabeth McKune, "The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System", August 2005, available from <http://www.ndu.edu/itea/index.cfm?method=main.itemlist&item=7B&resource=1#56>; Internet; accessed 31 January 2006.

⁸² George W. Bush, "Organization of the National Security Council System," *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD -1* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 13 February 2001), available from <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/whitehouse/nspd-1.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 January 2006.

⁸³ USDAT&L, 25.

⁸⁴ Hughes, "Keynote Address".

⁸⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Bureau of International Information Programs* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State); available from <http://www.state.gov/r/iip/>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2006.

⁸⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State); available from <http://www.state.gov/r/ppr/>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2006.

⁸⁷ For a further discussion on Roles, Missions and Functions, see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, Joint Publication 0-2, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 July 2001), Chapter I.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Chapter II.

⁸⁹ The Joint Warfighting Center, *Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)*, Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 6, (Suffolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, 27 June 2004), 5.