INTERAGENCY REFORM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

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This paper assesses the need for reform of the interagency organization and processes. Like Joint Task Forces, interagency organizations are often assembled \textit{ad hoc} after a crisis has occurred and are initially ineffective in their forming and storming stages. For example, conflicting cultures and interests of interagency members inhibit effectiveness. Current post-conflict nation building and reconstruction efforts under Defense Department lead have suffered due to lack of planning and expertise, with non-DOD entities with specific expertise sometimes excluded from the process. Following the military mantra of "train as you fight," full-time interagency bodies should be formed and regionally focused. The benefits of such a structure would include unity of effort, unity of command, and the ability to more effectively prioritize and allocate regional resources in support of national interests.
INTERAGENCY REFORM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

. . . the application of unified statecraft, at the Federal level and in concert with allies and international partners, is critical . . .

—(2006 Quadrennial Defense Review)

In light of the current world order and the nature of conflict anticipated in the coming century, it is critical for the United States to reform both the organization and processes of its interagency system. The unipolar world, with the United States as the sole super power, imposes many obligations and responsibilities upon us. The effects of globalization, democratization, and the information age are changing international roles, responsibilities, and expectations. They have changed the nature of threats to our security. There are, however, limits to our freedom of action and national power. Our adversaries routinely test those limits despite our military pre-eminence. Moreover, the nature and complexity of our security challenges is changing.

Globalization is increasing the capacity of our adversaries, restricting our options due to interdependence with international partners and their limiting influence, and compressing the time required to sense and respond to their actions. Democratization takes time and may involve conflict in its early stages. Transnational organizations, resource scarcity, disease, and environmental changes have emerged as security challenges that require new responses that effectively leverage all elements of national power. Those elements must be applied in an integrated fashion toward a common purpose of defending the nation. Structures and processes at the operational level are required to successfully implement the policies and achieve the objectives developed at the strategic level.

Our current interagency system functions at the national strategic level in the realms of policy-making and coordination. The process is adaptive and dynamic but remains bureaucratic and is increasingly challenged to respond quickly and effectively to emerging transnational security threats. The shortfalls of the system are magnified at the theater strategic and operational level, where authority and direction are required in the execution of actions to promote our national interests. Organizational bias, goal divergence, and bureaucratic inefficiencies can undermine cooperation between and among agencies, increase costs, and threaten the attainment of national security objectives. At the strategic level the president makes policy decisions and has directive authority over federal agencies and departments. Directive authority at the operational level, where policies are implemented, is often unclear. This is because various departments have responsibilities and resources. The founding fathers
designed our government to prevent the abuse of power, not necessarily efficient, governance. Recent attempts at government reform and transformation have repeatedly stressed improving efficiency. While this is a desirable goal, it should never be pursued at the cost of effectiveness.

Since the end of the Cold War we have used the military instrument of power much more readily than other instruments in pursuit of national interests. Some have argued that our other instruments of power have atrophied due to the quick resort to a military option in an environment where our military has no peer competitor. Condoleezza Rice said, "... our military has borne a disproportionate share of post-conflict responsibilities because we have not had the standing civilian capability to play our part fully. This was true in Somalia and Haiti, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and it is still partially true in Iraq and Afghanistan." The diplomatic influence of our combatant commanders has grown exponentially since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. They are focused on regional security issues around the globe, whereas the diplomatic arm of ambassadors and country teams is focused on bi-lateral issues. This imbalance results in the increased use and influence of the military instrument at the expense of the diplomatic.

Winning battles is a military responsibility, winning wars is a government responsibility. The United States military remains unequalled in its ability to defend the nation and win any conventional military engagements. It cannot win the peace without the dedicated involvement of a multitude of other government agencies. Integrated instead of independent actions are required for the complex tasks of humanitarian assistance, nation-building, and reconstruction associated with post-conflict operations, as well as counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, and counter-narcotics.

The Changing Nature of Conflict

Recognizing that stability, security and transition operations can be critical to the long war on terrorism, the Department issued guidance in 2005 to place stability operations on par with major combat operations within the department. (2006 Quadrennial Defense Review)

The end of the Cold War has required us to widen the aperture through which we assess threats to national security. We can no longer focus on a single threat. We must recognize that national security is inextricably linked with global security. Instability anywhere in the world can now threaten national security. Several general trends have emerged since the Cold War:
• Symmetric to asymmetric threats to security
• Mass (forces, fires) to precision
• National to transitional threats
• Analog to digital
• Closed systems to transparency
• Local actions having global implications
• Reduced economic, social, informational, and political boundaries (globalization)

Responding to the threats presented by these trends requires better integration of all elements of national power. The increased complexity of threats mandates a new approach that unifies the efforts of all government agencies and departments in the pursuit of national security. A wise scholar states: "In the twenty-first century, the complex realities of contemporary wars must be understood as holistic processes that rely on various civilian and military agencies and contingents working together in an integrated fashion, to achieve common, workable, and reasonable political-strategic ends."6

Twenty-first century warfare will have two prominent differences from earlier warfare. The primary difference will be in the form of unconventional and asymmetric warfare. The second will be the power and brutality of non state actors advancing ideological causes. These actors will be characterized by indiscriminate use of violence against both military and civilian targets to disrupt order, erode public confidence in existing governments, and thwart the spread of Western (and possibly at a future time, Eastern) values, democracy, and free markets.

Both state and non state actors will employ asymmetric strategies because they lack the means to take on the United States in a conventional manner. Western states, with free, open societies are vulnerable to such tactics. They abhor attacks on noncombatants but cherish their freedoms too much to tolerate harsh, well-intended practices to reduce their vulnerability at the cost of those same freedoms. They will continue to favor short wars with minimal casualties that employ precision weaponry to achieve desired effects. They will have little patience for long, protracted wars that incur a high number of friendly casualties or employ tactics against noncombatants. The ability to gain and sustain national will and commitment when vital national interests are questionable will be difficult. Loss of national will leads to early termination, short of conditions required for enduring peace.

Since the end of the Cold War the United States has enjoyed its status as the world’s lone super power. We have enjoyed the benefits and freedom of action it provides while enduring the huge political responsibility to resolve conflict throughout the world. Our actions and intentions are often interpreted in the international community as those of a self-serving,
hegemonic bully. Conflicts and crises will continue throughout the coming century. Successful responses and resolutions to them require an international response. Unilateral actions will lack credibility and legitimacy in the forum of world opinion and further incite anti-American sentiments. Moreover, the United States is limited by finite resources. With the growing threat of terrorism, the vulnerability of critical communication and computer age systems, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. employs its instruments of power as it did in the past at its own peril. Examining the conduct of post-conflict operations provides insights to the shortcomings of U.S. efforts.

Post-conflict operations have three primary missions that entail interagency involvement – security, humanitarian assistance, and nation building. The Department of Defense is clearly best suited to lead the security effort. This includes providing a secure environment for other government agencies, coalition partners, and non-governmental organizations to work and the training (and possibly equipping) of indigenous security forces who will ultimately be capable of national defense and internal security. Government agencies such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID), international organizations such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and non-governmental relief agencies like the Red Cross and Doctors without Borders, are best suited for leading humanitarian relief efforts. The military can provide critical support to the initial stages of relief efforts beyond providing security. Experience informs us that the Department of Defense should plan to provide significant logistics, medical, engineering, and transportation support to humanitarian operations.

The State Department, with significant support from other federal agencies, is best suited to lead nation building efforts. The State Department team that leads these efforts should have a robust interagency team that resembles a larger, more diverse version of the country teams employed at United States embassies overseas. Key contributors to the team would include the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Treasury, Justice, Energy, Transportation, Defense Information Agency, and many others. All bring unique and required expertise and resources to bear on the critical tasks involved in post-conflict operations. Actual organizational composition would be tailored to the particular requirements of the crisis at hand.

The performance of the United States military in post-conflict operations over the last half century indicates several things. First, there is room for improvement. Second, we do not appear to learn from one event to the next; we either forget or use the invalid approaches, thereby creating problems, and risking the legitimacy and effectiveness of our effort. Third, we need to develop an integrated approach to the conduct of post-conflict activities that incorporates and utilizes more effective employment of all instruments of power. U.S.
responses to crises in Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, all exemplify serious shortcomings. The current system violates one important principle of war and a long-standing Army maxim. Unity of command, a principle of war, or simply unity of effort, and the Army maxim, “train as you fight,” are often violated.

The Need for Reform

. . The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed.\(^6\)

— (National Security Strategy, 2002)

Section IX of the 2002 United States National Security Strategy is titled “Transform America’s National Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century.” Implicit in this requirement is the need to improve interagency organization and processes. The formulation and execution of the National Security Strategy requires adept analysis and application of ends, ways, and means. Clear objectives, feasible methods for achieving them, and sufficient resources are necessary. A process that coordinates and synchronizes the efforts of all government departments and agencies in the integrated application of all instruments of national power is needed. Additionally, an organizational structure that clearly delineates authorities and tasks is essential to effective execution.

Interagency reform is not a new concept. General (Ret) Anthony Zinni, former Commander of United States Central Command, has called for a holistic plan for major combat operations and reconstruction that clarifies the responsibilities of each agency. He called for the creation of a government body with diplomatic, defense, and civilian relief membership. Such organization could rectify the lack of complimentary and integrated planning prevalent in recent operations. He stated that “Nobody can tell the measure of effectiveness” on the ground when “the fog of politics cloud it all back in Washington.” The Chairman of the Joint Chief’s of Staff, General Peter Pace, also cited the need for interagency reform. The Goldwater-Nichols Act forced the military services to adapt their parochial individual service perspectives and undertake actions to develop a truly joint military institution. In September 2004 General Pace said that the current process does a good job of presenting the President with options, “but once the President decides to do something, our government goes back into its stovepipes for execution.” There simply is no one under the President who can order different agencies to do what must be accomplished.\(^8\)

The government also recognizes the need. The Clinton Administration published Presidential Decision Directive 56 in May 1997. Titled, “Managing Complex Contingency
Operations”, its purpose was to establish guidelines for interagency planning for responses requiring myriad components such as political/diplomatic, economic, intelligence, humanitarian, and security. Its clear intent was to establish management practices to achieve unity of effort among all responding agencies through the formulation of standardized, integrated Political-Military Implementation Plans and the utilization of “coordination mechanisms at the operational level.” Unfortunately, neither the Clinton nor current administration has enforced the implementation or adopted the recommendations of PDD 56.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld commissioned the Center for Strategic and International Studies to identify potential Defense Department reforms to improve interagency operations. Their three part report, titled “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols”, called for the creation of a new National Security Council office dedicated to coordinating interagency operations. “It would be responsible for developing standard operating procedures for interagency planning and providing planning expertise to other NSC offices and other interagency teams.” They propose the formation of interagency working groups led by NSC officials that would formulate “common concepts of operation for specific mission areas.” The report called for periodic reviews to “systematically identify gaps, duplication, or misalignment among agencies in regard to specific mission areas.” It recommends: that agencies establish planning offices for plan development and interagency coordination; that the President designate a senior official for each operation to be in charge of and accountable for integrating interagency operations on the ground; and that Congress create a training center for interagency and coalition operations.

President George W. Bush published National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD 1), “Organization of the National Security Council System,” on February 13, 2001. It defined the NSC system as “a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.” It identified membership and responsibilities of a Principals Committee and a Deputies Committee. It abolished all existing Interagency Working Groups supporting the National Security Council and established 17 Policy Coordination Committees (PCC). The PCCs are to serve as “the day-to-day fora for interagency coordination on national security policy.” Six of the PCCs are regionally focused - Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa. Eleven PCCs are functionally focused and chaired by an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary:

- Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs)
- International Development and Humanitarian Assistance (by the Secretary of State)
Global Environment (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy in concert)

International Finance (by the Secretary of the Treasury)

Transnational Economic Issues (by the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy)

Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs)

Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning (by the Secretary of Defense)

Arms Control (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs)

Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs)

Intelligence and Counterintelligence (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs)

Records Access and Information Security (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs).

On October 29, 2001 the President signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1, establishing a Homeland Security Council with Principals and Deputies Committees similar to the National Security Council. It also established eleven PCCs to be chaired by the designated senior directors from the Office of Homeland Security:

- Detection, Surveillance, and Intelligence (by the Senior Director, Intelligence and Detection)
- Plans, Training, Exercises, and Evaluation (by the Senior Director, Policy and Plans)
- Law Enforcement and Investigation (by the Senior Director, Intelligence and Detection)
- Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Consequence Management (by the Senior Director, Response and Recovery)
- Key Asset, Border, Territorial Waters, and Airspace Security (by the Senior Director, Protection and Prevention)
- Domestic Transportation Security (by the Senior Director, Protection and Prevention)
- Research and Development (by the Senior Director, Research and Development)
- Medical and Public Health Preparedness (by the Senior Director, Protection and Prevention)
- Domestic Threat Response and Incident Management (by the Senior Director, Response and Recovery)
This well intentioned action has imposed significant additional requirements on all government departments and agencies that provide input to the coordination committees. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may need a structure to coordinate the actions of their twenty-two separate activities but this directive imposes too great a burden on others outside of DHS. The creation of a Homeland Security PCC under the National Security Council seems more prudent.

NSPD 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization” was published December 7, 2005 with a stated purpose to “promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.” The Secretary of State was designated to “coordinate and lead integrated United States efforts . . . to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities” and to “coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations.” Specific tasks include:

- Develop strategies for reconstruction and stabilization activities; provide U.S. decision makers with detailed options for R&S operations; ensure program and policy coordination among U.S. Departments and Agencies; lead coordination of reconstruction and stabilization activities and preventative strategies with bilateral partners, international and regional organizations, and nongovernmental and private sector entities.

- Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, develop detailed contingency plans for integrated U.S. reconstruction and stabilization, and provide U.S. decision makers with detailed options for an integrated U.S. response.

- Lead U.S. development of a strong civilian response capability; analyze, formulate and recommend authorities, mechanisms and resources for civilian responses in coordination with key interagency implementers such as AID; coordinate R&S budgets among Departments and Agencies; identify lessons learned and integrate them into operational planning by responsible agencies.

In support of the Secretary of State, other executive departments and agencies were tasked to designate “experts as points of contact to participate in relevant task forces, planning processes, gaming exercises, training, after action reviews, and other essential tasks.” While
good in concept, the new Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization is off to a slow start, with insufficient funding and the retirement of its first director.

Recent overtures suggest that the Office for Stabilization and Reconstruction may not fulfill the significant role for which it was envisioned. Congress authorized the transfer of up to $100 million from the Defense to the State Department in the event of a post-conflict operation. Secretary Rice, addressing the role of this office stated, “Should a state fail in the future, we want the men and women of this office to be able to spring into action quickly. We will look to them to partner immediately with our military, with other federal agencies and with our international allies, and eventually we envision this office assembling and deploying the kinds of civilians who are essential in post-conflict operations: police officers and judges and electricians and engineers, bankers and economists and legal experts and election monitors.”

Conditions for Reform

. . . the U.S. government needs to build deployable operational capacity in key civilian agencies like the State Department to conduct critical tasks for which the U.S. military does not have a comparative advantage.18

—National Security Advisory Group

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 we have seen the largest changes in our federal government since the 1947 National Security Act that established the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. Twenty-two separate government agencies were consolidated into the new Department of Homeland Security. Intelligence reform has established a Director for National Intelligence, overseeing the work of fifteen stove piped intelligence activities within our government. The National Counter-Terrorism Center was formed. A new unified command, United States Northern Command has been created to provide command and control of Department of Defense homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. The Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization was established under the State Department with an Ambassador appointed to lead it. The time is right to make the changes required to improve our interagency system. It will not be easy and there will be strong opposition from many, but it is vital for the effective pursuit of our national objectives. The intelligence reform brought about by the 9/11 Commission Report was designed to improve our ability to identify and prepare for threats. Interagency reform is needed to improve our ability to plan for and respond to threats.
Objectives of Reform

. . . the U.S. government needs to build deployable operational capacity in key civilian agencies like the State Department to conduct critical tasks for which the U.S. military does not have a comparative advantage. Such capacity should include a substantial cadre of full-time professionals who are deployable on a non-volunteer basis for rotations of at least a year, as well as a reserve of on-call experts from outside the U.S. government and substantial contracting authorities to access private sector capabilities.¹⁹

—The National Security Advisory Group

Unity of command is a principle of war that entails centralized command and control along with clearly delineated authorities. Unity of command and unity of effort is lacking within the interagency, where government departments and agencies work as stovepipes, pursuing different agendas and competing for limited resources, without sufficient, legitimate authority of one agency over all others involved in crisis response. The glaring questions of responsibility and who was in charge that were highlighted following Hurricane Katrina also arise in overseas crises, even after a lead federal agent is designated. When a lead agent is designated, its authority and ability to direct the efforts and contributions of other agencies is often marginalized.

It is a learned experience in the military that organizations that fail to train to standard under realistic conditions will struggle when called upon to execute their missions during a crisis. As difficult as it sometimes is to assemble the appropriate interagency expertise during a crisis, effectiveness is reduced because the individuals have often have not worked or trained together. The body assembled is often ad hoc (though there are some standing ones), meaning a synergistic plan of what needs to be done must be developed during the crisis as the situation evolves and individuals learn each agency’s capabilities and competencies. The usual result is multiple individual agency and department plans pursuing different objectives, sometimes utilizing the same means (which may not be available to pursue all the objectives simultaneously), and insufficiently resourced. This manifestation of multiple, unsynchronized courses of action, plans, or efforts are usually wholly inefficient and perhaps ineffective.

The pitfalls were starkly illustrated by the challenges encountered following major combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The detailed planning for post-conflict operations that was done by both military and civilian agencies was largely ignored or discarded. The command and control structure envisioned by military planners was not put in place. The Department of Defense was placed in the lead of all post-conflict activities, including many tasks for which it lacked the requisite expertise or sufficient directive authority to obtain required
manpower and resources from other agencies. It is likely also true that in some cases the Defense Department did not know if or where required expertise resided within the federal government. The initial head of the post-conflict Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Relief (ORHA) in Iraq in April 2003 was a retired general rather than a State Department veteran who would have had a better understanding of the means available from federal agencies, as well as Iraq. When Paul Bremer stood-up the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to replace ORHA, he and the CPA were placed under the Defense Department.

Training is important for the interagency process. It facilitates team-building and develops trust and confidence between and among team members. It sensitizes individuals to the myriad culture, agendas, and capabilities of other federal agencies. For some crisis situations, such as disaster relief, we have resident expertise, accumulated through experience, within existing federal agencies. These agencies are often prepared to respond quickly to specific crises. For conflicts of our choosing, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, we fare far worse in the execution of interagency responsibilities. For planned actions where we determine the timing of operations, we need a fully integrated interagency plan – prior to initiating action. The military prepares plans in accordance with direction from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Perhaps we need a National Strategic Capabilities Plan that designates lead and supporting federal agencies to build fully integrated, synchronized plans that effectively and efficiently employ all elements of national power. This would increase the chances of operational success, in less time and at reduced cost, especially if the lead agency formulating the plan also oversaw execution.

Multinational and multi-agency operations require unity of effort and purpose. In interagency operations it is not always clear who is charge. More importantly, the body assembled is at times ad hoc, meaning we start determining what needs to be done too late and have not adequately planned a sensible response. The designation of a Lead Federal Agency does not sufficiently address this problem. The person or agency in charge needs broader authority to prioritize and redirect resources to achieve national objectives. Despite the best intentions of various agencies representatives, their loyalties and interests remain with their agency leadership in Washington. They may run programs on the ground in theater but they serve the Lead Federal Agent as liaisons only. The Lead Federal Agent needs authorities similar to the Combatant Commanders. He or she must be able to harness and direct all resources within the theater in a unified effort toward a common purpose. The current constructs do not provide such authority and success is often dependent on personalities on the ground.
There is compelling evidence to suggest that the absence of an integrated national plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom led to inefficient operations and increased challenges in the execution of post-conflict tasks. Military planning called for the disarming but not the disbanding of the Iraqi military. The disbanding added untold arms, ammunition, and recruits to insurgency efforts, placed many out of work, and significantly increased both the training and time required to stand-up effective, indigenous security forces within Iraq. A key contributor to the success of post-conflict operations is employing the local work force. Contracting decisions, such as those that brought in U.S. truck drivers for six figure salaries, did not make sense economically or politically. The development of a national integrated plan, such as the Political-Military Implementation Plans defined in PDD 56, would likely have reduced the number and scope of challenges faced in the aftermath of major combat operations.

Proposals for Reform

... we must transform old diplomatic institutions to serve new diplomatic purposes.

—Condoleezza Rice

Several steps need to be undertaken to best posture the United States for success in future interagency operations. There has been a lot of talk promoting reform of the interagency organization and processes. A bill sponsored by Senate Foreign Relations Committee members Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Joseph Biden (D-DE) led to the creation of the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction, with Ambassador Carlos Pascual appointed as its first coordinator. This office, under the Department of State, will focus on nations in post-conflict status, leading the effort for non-security missions. It calls for a 250 man Rapid Response Corps to support operations but limits it to volunteers from the State Department and USAID (because State has jurisdiction over them) who have completed “training and simulation exercises for joint civilian-military emergency response operations.” It proposes $80 million in funding with $8 million for establishing the office. Despite its good intentions, this will not resolve the problem. It does not sufficiently regionalize expertise. It relies on volunteers for operations support. Most importantly it ensures a continued ad hoc response that does not include other non State Department agencies and appears more reactive then proactive.

A better alternative would be establishing regional interagency working groups on a full-time basis. They could conduct complementary planning with Combatant Command contingency planners or an integrated planning process could be developed to best ensure unity of effort during execution. Some have proposed such interagency regional teams with the
The interagency group attached to the Joint Force Command to provide the nucleus of an occupation staff. The issue of who is in charge is not fully clear and the actual composition of the interagency regional teams is not addressed. A full solution needs to go further.

Standing regional interagency teams would be a good start. At a minimum, these teams should have compositions similar to country teams located within each embassy. The interagency coordinators should have ambassador-at-large status. Ideally they would have full representation from all federal agencies, with members having reach-back capability to tap into their respective agency’s full suite of information and resources as needed for planning and responding. There should be a regional team aligned with each regional combatant command. During peacetime, the teams would fall under the Department of State. During contingency operations, the executive branch, through the National Security Council, would direct command and reporting relationships. These relationships could be modified as the situation develops. During combat operations the regional interagency team could work in support of the Joint Force Commander. Following combat operations, this relationship could be reversed.

A bolder alternative would subordinate the regional combatant commander to the ambassadors leading each regional interagency group, in effect replicating the national government civilian control of the military on a regional basis. Country ambassadors, who now report to the President via the Secretary of State, would report through the regional Ambassadors back to Washington. The National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy would need amending. Congress would have to pass new legislation authorizing such changes. An “Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act,” as proposed by General Pace, would be required to force such change. The result would be better synchronization and clear unity of effort of all U.S. activities abroad. A National Strategic Capabilities Plan (instead of a military-centric Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan) would task regional ambassadors to develop fully integrated security and engagement plans and would resource them to do it effectively. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review recommends the “creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities.” Such guidance would “set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities” and “help Federal Departments and Agencies better align their strategy, budget, and planning functions with national objectives.” This is an excellent proposal. All national stakeholders would now participate in planning and responding to crises and bring appropriate regional and technical expertise to bear. A new collaborative planning process would likely emerge that integrates all stakeholder input into a single plan for each contingency. The
formulation of separate plans by multiple agencies for the same contingency would not be necessary or efficient.

The proposal articulated in the preceding paragraph would surely incite many federal and military employees if it were being considered by Congress or the President. The changes that the Defense Department underwent in the aftermath of the Goldwater-Nichols Act caused serious unrest in military circles but proved to be necessary reform. A serious approach to a serious problem requires serious reform. No single agency has the necessary authority to force the involvement of other agencies in planning or responding to crises.

Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the scope of the problems we have coordinating activities even in domestic contingencies. The challenges are more complex in the international arena, especially when the use of our military along with allies and coalitions are involved. We have the world’s greatest military. As the lone super power, it is clear that we will continue to become engaged in conflicts around the globe. Just as we prepare for war, we must similarly prepare for building the peace that is intended to follow. That requires reforming how we organize, train, and prepare for operations that require interagency responses. The costs are high but the stakes are also high. To maintain credibility and legitimacy we need to improve our interagency system. Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia experiences cannot and should not be repeated. The jury is still out on our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it is clear that our initial efforts were lacking.

The time for reform is now. If our strategic objectives remain unchanged, we must modify our ways and means in order to achieve them. This requires new interagency organizations employing practices that achieve integration and unity of effort. Leadership needs to advocate and embrace reform of interagency activities. We also need to take a hard look at our military organizations, training, and doctrine to determine if we are properly manned, trained, and equipped to conduct interagency operations. Are we willing to continue accepting unsuccessful to partially successful results? Are we willing to accept the higher risk to our service members that results from poorly planned, ambiguously-led operations? The answers should be clear to all caring leaders. We must adapt ourselves to better posture our forces for success in future complex operations and we must push for reform of the interagency organizations and processes to ensure a more holistic approach to conflict termination that effectively incorporates all elements of national power.
Conclusion

... the United States wins wars faster and with fewer forces and casualties. But “transformation” has had unintended consequences. Rapid victory collapses the enemy but does not destroy it.26

- Brent Scowcroft and Samuel R. Berger

The emerging threats mandate systemic changes to the structures and processes we use to employ our elements of national power. U.S. actions must be vertically and horizontally integrated to achieve national security objectives and ensure a stable world order. Vertical integration is required to ensure policies and strategies formulated at the strategic level can be implemented and executed at the operational and tactical levels. Horizontal integration is required to ensure unity of effort across all government departments and agencies. We can ill afford the strategic risks associated with our current mechanistic, domestically-focused, stove-piped interagency processes. Structures and mechanism that enable execution, instead of coordination, are required.

Our national leadership clearly recognizes the need for change. We have seen drastic reorganization in the federal government and a revamping of military mission priorities all designed to improve some of the shortcomings of the interagency system. Presidential directives have proved ineffective at forcing the required changes. Despite clearly articulated ends, they lack the means that congressional legislation would bring. Bold changes are necessary. The reorganization and formation of the Department of Homeland Security is the model to be avoided. We must move away from the hierarchal structures of the past and toward networked, information-sharing structures of the future. Current structures are typical bureaucracies that are slow and reactive. We must transform to structures that are more decentralized, agile, and proactive.

The anticipated threats of the coming century suggest that we will stay increasingly involved in nation building and humanitarian assistance type endeavors that may involve insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Reform requires increased investment in civilian and government agencies needed to partner with military forces to prepare and respond to such crises. All agencies must have an expeditionary capability, some more so than others. A common network and common language need to be developed so that the actions of all agencies can be synchronized and all elements of national power brought to bear on a problem.

The recent bifurcation of national security councils must be redressed. It is inefficient to have a National Security Council and a Homeland Security Council. One should be a subset of the other. Federal departments and agencies are not robust enough to support the actions of a
second security council and all its attendant committees and working groups. The National Military Strategy should encompass Homeland Security. Just as a single National Military Strategy encompasses both homeland defense and defeating adversaries abroad, our National Security Strategy should cover all aspects of security, including security of the homeland.

Interagency reform must seek to match capabilities to authorities. It must provide sufficient means to achieve strategic ends. It must incorporate a holistic approach that ensures that operational and tactical actions are coordinated, unified, and consistent with strategic policy and guidance. It must build in requirements for personnel development in interagency operations including education and exercises. In the classical Clausewitzian trilogy of the people, the military, and the government, we have a capable military with support of the people (for the right causes) but lack government processes and organizations with sufficient means and authorities to achieve our objectives in a coherent, unified manner.

Congressional action is required to put the structures and processes in place that will make this a reality. Changes to the system through executive orders have been unsuccessful. President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 56 is the best document thus far to incorporate necessary changes. It was superseded by an updated and altered document signed by President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive 44. Clinton’s was a more holistic approach that addressed complex contingencies. Bush’s only addresses reconstruction and stabilization, which are not as broad as complex contingency operations. The fact is that neither directive brought about the intended change. That is why legislation is required to put resources behind the changes. Policy is necessary to ensure our military and civilian agencies are postured to respond quickly and effectively to national security threats. Congressional action created the National Security Council and forced jointness upon the military forces. It is required now to initiate the changes needed for the United States to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Endnotes


2 Elements of national power are military, intelligence, diplomatic, legal, informational, financial, and economic (MIDLIFE). They are sometimes listed as diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME).

4 Rumsfeld, 86.


11 Ibid, 4.


14 Ibid, 2.


16 Ibid, 4.

17 Rice, 5.


19 Perry, 19; The QDR also supports efforts to expand the expeditionary capacity of agency partners (p. 86).

20 The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides planning guidance to the combatant commanders and Service Chiefs in order to
accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The JSCP serves to integrate the deliberate planning activities of the entire joint planning and execution community with a coherent and focused approach. It provides specific theater planning tasks and objectives, delineates necessary planning assumptions, and apportions resources and forces to the combatant commanders for planning based on military capabilities. Supplemental instructions are published separately from the JSCP to provide further planning guidance in specified functional areas like intelligence and logistics.

21 Rice, 2.


24 Garamone.

25 Rumsfeld, 85.