

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE AFRICAN UNION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

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Africa is a continent with a high number of armed conflicts. United Nations, regional organizations, and a number of non African states have tried to manage these conflicts. In 2001, the African states decided to establish the African Union as a successor of the Organization of African Unity. Since its establishment the African Union has made a significant effort to become an active player in conflict resolution of African conflicts. This paper looks into the build-up of capability within the African Union to conduct peace support operations. The African Union faces a number of organizational, decisionmaking, and military challenges as well as providing adequate funds to resource build-up and expansion. This project analyzes the prospects of meeting these challenges. Finally, policy prescriptions for future policies to meet the challenges are provided.

THE AFRICAN UNION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Africa is a continent rife with conflicts. Fourteen out of 27 current UN peacekeeping and peace building operations worldwide are in Africa,¹ and there are no coalitions or other major external military efforts besides UN operations taking place to resolve conflicts in Africa². The number of conflicts in Africa indicates the need for focus on conflict resolution before general development can take place. On the 11th of July 2000 the African Union was established³. The African Union has made a significant effort to become an active partner in resolution of African conflicts. This paper will analyze the potential and limitations of the African Union in relation to management of conflicts and conflict resolution. The African Union has a wide array of means to influence conflicts: building military capacities to conduct peace support operations, developing a peer review mechanism to enhance governance,⁴ and a general system for political and economic cooperation.⁵ This paper will focus on the ability to manage conflicts by military means, which requires a functioning structure as well as military capacities. The analysis will look into the nature of conflicts in Africa and at the general as well as military capabilities of the African Union. As experiences are very limited in some areas, the analysis will in part be comparative in regard to NATO, UN, and the EU. Finally, policy prescriptions for future policies to meet the challenges are provided.

The Nature of Conflict in Africa

African conflicts are spread all over the continent and there are no regions without conflicts⁶. The nature of African conflicts creates the need for capabilities for peace support operations. Characteristics of the nature of conflicts identify general requirements as well as military requirements. Conflicts in Africa show five basic characteristics: Conflicts are intra state, transnational, international or a mixture, states are often weak or failing, external players traditionally try to influence areas of interest, and regional organizations as well as state aspirations for regional hegemony are setting the environment.

General Characteristics of Conflict In Africa

Borders in Africa are in many cases artificial. Artificial borders can cause internal conflicts where two or more nations are living within one state.⁷ Artificial borders can likewise split one nation between two or more states. Artificial borders create both intrastate conflicts, transnational conflicts, and international conflicts. A conflict resolution mechanism, therefore, has to be capable of conducting operations in both civil wars, transnational, and international

conflicts. Furthermore, it has to be capable of conducting peace support operations in a multi-conflict scenario, with several parties with different interests, as seen in Sudan.

Conflicts in Africa often entail weak states. Independence left many of the new countries as weak states⁸ characterized by social instability, lack of health services and education, and lack of security and widespread kleptocracy, an extensive number of military coups and poverty.⁹ Weak and collapsing states are characterized by loss of state control over the political and economical space and the collapse often takes place in a cyclic downfall, a downfall which can be diverted when actions are taken. Weak and collapsing states are characterized by dwindling effort from the state to meet the requirements and failing states often create transnational conflicts, because neighboring countries inevitably intervene.¹⁰ Failing or collapsing states can require peace support operations. An effective peace support effort must be capable of providing or assisting the build up of the three basic services in a state: authority, institutions, and security.

Cold War arming of warring factions and proliferation of small arms, post-colonial era spheres of influence of the former colonial powers who try to maintain cooperation with and exert influence on former colonies¹¹ contributes to maintain the causes for conflict, while external reluctance to intervene in conflicts in Africa increases the requirements for continental actions¹².

Limited external commitment has led to development of regional organizations who among other things contribute to conflict resolution. Africa is divided into five regions; North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa. Each of the regions have a regional organization traditionally established to evolve economic development, but over time as well empowered or organized to participate in conflict resolution.¹³ Beside these overall regional organizations various interests have resulted in no less than 12 different regional organizations engaged in economic development, security, and general development and related issues.¹⁴ Regional organizations can be supportive of a peace support activity as seen in West Africa where ECOWAS deployed troops to Sierra Leone and Liberia. Besides development of regional organizations, regional major powers like Nigeria and South Africa have tried - on their own and together - to cement and expand their influence, including in the area of peace and security.¹⁵ These last three characteristics of external influence, regional organizations, and unilateral aspirations increase competitiveness for any organization involved in peace support actors in Africa.

Military Characteristics of Conflict In Africa

Especially the characteristic of weak or failing states, which is a common trend for conflicts in Africa, poses a number of military challenges in peace support operations.

Conflicts in a strong state tend to be monitoring of an agreement as the state itself can provide law and order. The longer a conflict has lasted the more demanding the reconciliation and rebuilding of social structures will be¹⁶. Peace support operation forces must be capable of supporting themselves and not least of protecting themselves. Depending on the situation in the actual area of conflict that further implies the need of heavy weapons and larger units. The need for multifaceted forces implies the need for police and a comprehensive civil element which can support building up efficient governance as integrated part of the peace support operation, like UN operations are organized¹⁷.

Time is another important factor which influences military efforts. Many conflicts have been protracted over several years. Peace support operations can be launched when an agreement has been reached, it can be launched to impose a solution, or it can be decided to launch a preliminary operation to contain a conflict until a resolution can be reached from which time a peacekeeping operation can be launched¹⁸. If the conflict causes have not been identified before the peace support operation is launched, then it will have to be identified during the mission, contributing to further protraction.¹⁹ International experience from peace support operations conducted in weak states shows that to achieve these demanding objectives, operations have to be sustained for at least several years.²⁰ This means that efficient conflict resolution realistically must be expected to prolong peace support operations to between five and ten years.

Besides all the political challenges facing peace support initiatives in Africa there are, in most cases, important geographical and logistical challenges. The size of African countries is much larger than areas of conflict in other areas of the world and African countries have a weak infrastructure to support movements in the country.²¹

Conflict intervention in Africa has until now primarily consisted of limited peacekeeping efforts. Peace support operations in other continents, however, shows that NATO and coalition forces when going into nation building, normally deploys a force of corps size in a joint framework, especially supported by extensive air forces²². Characteristics of conflict outside Africa have not identified demands exceeding those in Africa. Conflict pattern in Africa does in this background define a number of demands to be fulfilled by military forces deployed in peace support operations.

The African Union

From the outset the African Union must be capable of meeting the requirements created by the conflict pattern in Africa. The analysis will look at the general and the military ability of the African Union to meet the challenges. Besides the already mentioned challenges the ability to procure funds will be included in both parts of the analysis.

African Union Organizational and Decisionmaking Capability

Desired Capabilities

Establishing a new pan African cooperation to handle peace and security in a troubled continent is a very complex and demanding endeavor. The nature of conflicts in Africa shows that efficient resolution of conflicts in Africa requires that the African Union has the authority to intervene in international, transnational, and also in intrastate conflict, authority both in terms of formal authority and acceptability by member states. At the organizational and decisionmaking level it must be able to make the member states comply with decisions²³ and furthermore it has to develop resolve to solve problems. The ability to intervene in intrastate conflicts is important as many conflicts in Africa are intrastate conflicts and conflicts caused by weak or failing states require nation or state building.²⁴

Furthermore, the African Union needs to be able to intervene preemptively at any stage of an emerging conflict. To be able to execute decisions the African Union needs the organizational structure to support such an authority. The African Union needs the ability to override other organizations, regional, continental, and external. It does not mean that it should be capable of overriding the UN, but that the African Union should at least be capable of overriding external actors pursuing their own agendas. Finally, the African Union must be able to conduct operations and provide adequate funding to build sufficient structures.

Actual Capabilities

Authority. The African Union Constitutive Act gives the overall missions of the union in relation to peace and security.²⁵ The mission statement is not very specific in regard to which type of operations the union can undertake.²⁶ The missions of the Security Council in relation to peace support operations does not either give an expressed ability to intervene.²⁷ Further down in the organizational hierarchy the missions for the stand-by force are listed. The missions are to conduct observation and monitoring missions, other types of peace support missions, intervention in a member state if necessary, preventive deployment, and peace building including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization.²⁸ By the establishment of stand-by

forces missions the African Union covers the whole spectrum of operations from intrastate to international conflicts, and it gives the authority to intervene at any time in the conflict cycle including preemptive operations. If an intelligence asset for conflict warning is actually established as indicated this will furthermore make it possible for the African Union to receive warnings at an early stage on the conflict.²⁹

Commitment. Creating a vision³⁰ or a strategy in the African context is needed to ensure compliance and support for actions. So far the African Union has not agreed on whether the missions should be acquired from the outset or stepping stones should be established from which the expectations can gradually develop, besides a staged approach to build the stand-by force, see below. The African Union will have to create will and commitment from member countries including how to resource it with forces, structures, and funds. Going too fast forward may erode support for the African Union and thereby in the long term perspective be counterproductive even if it succeeds in the immediate perspective³¹. Creating political will to confront problems and conflicts is the first step to be taken before the African Union can conduct meaningful peace support operations. Political will to confront problems is needed at all levels. First the member states have to decide that a situation constitutes a conflict which needs to be addressed by the African Union and secondly actual operations have to confront the problems and not just decide that the problem is fictional. Furthermore, as complying with non-African views on a situation can be regarded as subordination to non-African interests and lack of resources to contribute to operations may make increase resistance in some states. Likewise, it can be very problematic to decide during operations that things are not going the right way because such a conclusion may be the starting point of new commitments and if they cannot be met it may imply acceptance of non-African interference.³²

Organizational issues. Overall the African Union is organized with a Heads of State Assembly, an executive council, a permanent representative council and a working body - the commission with a number of commissioners. One of the commissioners is the commissioner for peace and security, who is responsible for conflict prevention and management.³³ To support the Security Council and carry out decisions, a permanent commission on peace and security is established containing a Panel of the Wise, which is a counseling body, a Commission, a military committee and a stand-by force, and a peace fund for financing.³⁴ The Security Council consists of 15 members, like the UN Security Council. However, there are no permanent members and no veto right. The Security Council is though constructed in a way which allows the major powers to be members continuously if the majority of members want it.³⁵ As major powers do not have the ability to project their relative strength in the Security Council, they may

be tempted to focus more on regional institutions than the African Union as local small states are more easily influenced by the physical proximity to the regional hegemon or regional major power.³⁶ In contrast to the UN Security Council, the Security Council of the African Union has an stated mandate to intervene in intrastate conflicts.³⁷

A third organizational factor influencing the ability of the African Union is the military committee and the military staff of the AU. The military committee consists of the chiefs of defence from the 15 member countries of the Security Council.³⁸ This varies from NATO, where all member states Chiefs of Defense are members.³⁹ The African Union approach can make it easier to agree on decisions due to a reduced number of votes and there will hardly be any disputes with the Security Council as the majority in the Security Council will have an identical majority in the Military Committee. On the negative side is that the Military Committee can not take non Military Committee member state military situation into consideration during decisionmaking, which can increase the risk of making militarily infeasible decisions.

Relations to other organizations and states. The majority of the stand-by forces are not solely controlled by the African Union, but as well by the regional organizations.⁴⁰ The African Union faces the same challenge as the UN in launching military operations executed by regional organizations.⁴¹ Dual control of forces inserts a possible political limitation to the ability of the African Union. The regional veto-like influence increases the risk that opposing regional and continental priorities can delay or prevent actions. Regional organizations may be tempted to prioritize regional conflicts before continental conflicts. As all regions do have their own conflicts there will be a natural regional focus which may reduce the ability of reaching consensus in the African Union Security Council on collective continental response to conflicts. On the organizational level the ability is further reduced due to the fact that beside the decisionmaking system of the African Union, the complementary decisionmaking bodies of the regional organizations need to be established and kept working demanding both political and economic investments. The decentralized stand-by force arrangement is a weakness for the African Union in regard to launching actual missions, but also in regard to eventual external funding states, who might be tempted to disperse the investments between the African Union and regional organizations.

Funding. The African Union peace support effort is limited by resources, specifically funds. Funding is addressed by the Peace Fund Division of the Peace Support Commission, and funds are supposed to be acquired from three sources; ordinary budget funds, voluntary contributions from member states, and other sources, like external support.⁴² At the organizational level, funds must be provided to establish and run the organizational infrastructure like offices and

communication. These requirements are extensive, which the African Union currently has no means to fulfill.⁴³ Funding of the African Union central organs has already proved substantially difficult⁴⁴ and member state debt is growing.⁴⁵ From the outset member state funding has proved difficult. Even though the Constitutive Act makes exclusion possible, a substantial number of states are behind.⁴⁶ Problems with funding are becoming increasingly important as funding is a prerequisite for expansion of African Union infrastructure. The African Union has discussed various models of increased systematic internal funding like an insurance and freight levy, or a value added tax or levy on air travel.⁴⁷ As member states currently have not contributed sufficiently, funding is dependent on non African support. Although the last decade has shown a very hesitant Western engagement in conflict resolution in Africa,⁴⁸ there are clear signs of an increased Western engagement in Africa.⁴⁹ The European Union is increasingly committed to support of the African Union. G8 is also increasingly committed to support the African Union by putting the African Union on the political agenda and prioritizing the African Union as an important player in Africa conflict resolution.⁵⁰ But at the same time there are indications for increased need for aid to sub-Saharan countries in Africa in the coming years.⁵¹

Shortfalls

Authority. The African Union has the formal authority to conduct all types of operations, including intrastate intervention and intervention in transnational and international conflicts in conflicts in the member states. It still has not established a formal intelligence system as a warning instrument.

Commitment. Even though all African states, but Morocco, are members of the African Union the organization faces potential shortfalls in regard to member state support of the organization, as the African Union until it becomes an experienced organization it can be perceived by the surrounding world as unreliable, unable, or unwilling to fulfill missions undertaken. It lacks a decided vision or plan on how to gradually expand the political agenda in order not to lose the confidence from member states.

Organizational issues. From an idealistic approach, the Security Council has strong authority and is capable to make decision without veto right. From a realistic view, on the other hand, the legitimacy of the African Security Council influence is falling short due to the lack of the major powers in Africa. The Security Council composition may push major powers in the direction of regional organizations, where the major powers may have an easier access to influence.

The Military Committee is also viable and capable of making decisions. However, the Military Committee only has a limited and changing insight into member state military affairs making it more difficult to make feasible decisions.

Relation to other organizations and states. The African Union control of stand-by forces fall short of complete control, as the African Union is in competition with regional organizations.⁵² At the same time it is a shortfall that conflicts might not be conferred to the African Union, but could as well go to regional organizations with the risk of continental unity been subject to local or regional interests. This shortfall is especially grave with shortage of resources, which might be split between all organizations.

Funding. It is a fundamental shortfall for the African Union that it can not provide adequate funding. Even increasing external funding can not prevent an increased member state deficit with prospects for further increase. The discussed ways of improving funds has not led to decisions and financial shortfall might be creating a Catch 22 situation, where increased funding is dependent on results, which on the other hand are dependent on further funding. The shortfall postpones the ability to build African Union structures and the ability to overcome other shortfalls.

Military Capabilities

Desired capabilities. In order to meet the requirements deducted from the nature of conflicts, the African Union must be capable of executing the full scale of operations at least at joint corps size.⁵³ It must be capable of conducting sustained operations over several years during which it can execute nation and state building support operations as well as taking care of own security. It must be capable of conducting joint operations encompassing the ability to conduct deployment and logistical sustainment over vast distances. These overall considerations give six different requirements. The African Union must have a military command and control structure at its disposal capable of planning and executing operations. It must be capable of providing sufficient forces to conduct all types of operations from monitoring over peace keeping to peace enforcing, including nation or state building. It must keep its forces at a level of readiness and availability enabling timely deployment as well as it must be capable of sustaining forces for a prolonged period of time of at least five years. It must have the ability to deploy forces effectively and timely. It must be capable of providing logistics for build-up, deployment and sustainment and finally the African Union must be capable of funding the requirements.

Actual Capabilities

Command and control. The African Union has a limited command and control capacity for military operations with the Deployed Integrated Task Force Headquarters in Ethiopia, which is responsible for the operation in Darfur and the African Union Military Committee. These headquarters are still in a building-up phase. Building efficient headquarters is a demanding task which is supported by NATO, European Union, and the UN.⁵⁴ Comparing the African Union to NATO and the European Union shows limitations of the African Union capability. NATO has an extensive system of command and control assets in its strategic, operational, and tactical headquarters available to command and control operations, and NATO has decades long experience in running these headquarters.⁵⁵ The European Union has a limited command and control capacity, comparable with the African Union, but has at the same time both limited missions compared to the African Union⁵⁶ and extensive organizational support from NATO⁵⁷. Compared to the European Union the African Union, therefore, has significantly reduced ability to conduct operations, unless the African Union in the long term establishes its own command facilities. Despite its huge budget in its economic program, the European Union must rely upon NATO command and control support.⁵⁸ It is difficult to give a precise estimate of the African Union command and control ability, besides its current proven ability to control a small monitoring mission in Sudan. Support from the UN, NATO, and European Union, however, indicates that the current operation is close to the current command and control ability.⁵⁹

Forces. The African Union is building the African Stand-by Force with a mix of centralized and decentralized forces, and the forces are built over a staged approach. The stand-by forces will consist of five brigades, one from each of the regional organizations and a few centralized assets containing 50 military observers and 240 civilian police and a number of civilian specialists. The brigades will be light brigades with four infantry battalions plus support units.⁶⁰ It is intended that the stand-by force shall conduct six mission scenarios expanding the demands over time. The scenarios contain the full scale of operations.⁶¹ The approved timeline suggests that the African Union until mid 2005 should establish a planning element for the first two mission types while the five regions should establish the brigades with a capacity up to type four missions. The next phase will run until 2010, where the African Union should have built the ability to conduct all six mission types while the regions should have the ability to launch type four missions⁶². These ambitions are very high, and there are already problems in reaching the established goals for phase 1.⁶³

The African Stand-by forces are basically constructed as land forces without any joint capacity such as air support, which is even more essential in a geographical spread operation for projection and sustainment.

Availability, readiness and sustainment. It is indicated that the African Union will build high readiness forces on the same basis as the UN Standing High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).⁶⁴ Applying the SHIRBRIG model in the African Union implies some limitations. A SHIRBRIG type unit is only capable of conducting operations in a benign environment.⁶⁵ The NATO Response Force⁶⁶ is in comparison trained, equipped, and built to conduct the full scale of operations as everything is planned and prepared in a higher degree than is the case with the corresponding part of the SHIRBRIG. Both forces need national case by case approval for deployment.

Using the SHIRBRIG concept would limit the stand-by force by establishing an initial capacity not capable of sustaining operations beyond six months.⁶⁷ A NATO Response Force type force would have an increased ability.⁶⁸ Availability of forces is critical and underlined by the fact that a decision to go along and undertake military peace support operation does not mean the forces are available for neither NATO nor SHIRBRIG.⁶⁹ But having more countries earmark units for the same slot⁷⁰ makes the organization less dependent on specific countries and increases the overall possibility of acquiring adequate troops for contingencies. Applying the SHIRBRIG concept will therefore all in all limit the African Union compared to the challenges, but could work in an initial period of implementation with limited missions. The stand-by force timeline for deployment requires initial units to deploy in 14 days followed by others on 30 days and 90 days readiness. This set the need for training standards and pre-decision training, as it is not possible for the forces to undertake any major training effort from decision to deployment.⁷¹ Major international commitment to the training of peace keeping troops has come forward within the last year. Both G8, US, and the European Union has promised to provide extensive training support⁷² of up to 50,000 troops.

Deployment. The African Union does not possess strategic sea and airlift capacity. In comparison, it can be mentioned that NATO countries are still working to provide strategic transport assets, especially strategic airlift, even though the countries at the Prague Summit in 2002 agreed to provide strategic transportation assets.⁷³ Acquisition of strategic transportation assets can, therefore, be a very time consuming process. NATO and the European Union have provided strategic transport to deploy the reinforcement of the African Union forces in Darfur during 2005⁷⁴. Likewise the African Union does not possess tactical transport capacity within a conflict area and the current force structure does not envisage tactical transport to be provided.

Logistics . The logistical challenges for the African Union are considerable. Deployed units are expected to be logistically self-sustained for 30 days for type 1-3 missions and 90 days for type 4-6 type missions, after which time it is assumed that either UN or the African Union must provide logistical support.⁷⁵ Each country, therefore, has to acquire an initial logistical capacity, which can be very difficult for the individual country to achieve without Western support from the UN, the European Union, NATO, or bilateral. France, as an example, is providing substantial logistic support bilaterally to African states.⁷⁶ The African Union has so far not taken steps to establish its own logistical capacities in order to be able to take over logistical responsibility after the initial period.

Funding. General funding at the military level includes initial funding to cover establishment of brigades in permanent facilities, equipment and training, and it includes establishment of the required command and control systems. Additionally contingency funding, dependent on Western donors, is needed to launch and sustain operations, including provision of strategic transport. The European Union has proposed to divert 1.5% of member states bilateral support to the African Union peacekeeping fund which would provide \$ 250-300 million.⁷⁷ The operation in Darfur is financed by international funds; international organizations are providing financial support to the African Union infrastructure for training and are providing transportation for deployment of forces. However, the earlier mentioned increasing lack of internal African Union funds will not make funding easier but make it increasingly difficult to fund operations, not least combined with an eventual increased need for general financial aid to African countries.

Shortfalls

Command and control. The African Union has extensive shortfalls in its ability to command and control military operations. Although it has the basic core function of a military staff it lack the ability to provide, plan, control, and sustain sizeable military operations. It lacks headquarters capacity at both strategic and operational level and will continue to depend on national, regional, or external support if sizeable operations should be conducted. The shortfall is emphasized by the fact that the African Union has not planned to establish an extensive command and control infrastructure.

Forces. Available forces, when current decisions are implemented, show extensive shortfalls in the African Union force structure. It is estimated that current decided force structure will continue to be inadequate to conduct opposed operations as it will continue to lack a corps size structure and joint capacities, especially air support. It is estimated that the current decided

force structure provide the ability to launch a few simultaneous small scale monitoring operations in a benign environment. The stand-by force has some civilian components probably aimed at conducting civil-military cooperation, but the element can be the core staff of a more robust ability to participate in nation building.

Availability, readiness and sustainment. Any use of armed force is a decision, which countries will not delegate, which is a reality for the stand by force as well as for the European Union, NATO, and the UN. However, if the African Union goes ahead with a SHIRBRIG model for the stand-by force, that will give substantial shortfalls in the long term perspective. A SHIRBRIG type force will not be capable of conducting sustained operations; and it is not capable of operating in a belligerent environment as it lacks both capacity and training. The amount of troops to be trained does support small scale operations with some sustainment. The current system can provide the limited force requirements until a more comprehensive system can be funded and established.

Deployment. Lack of strategic transport means the African Union can not deploy unless forces are provided from adjacent countries to the conflict area or support from external actors is provided. This limitation leads to a regional rather than a continental approach to conflict management. So for the time being the African Union is depending on the European Union or NATO support to provide strategic transport. Limitations imposed by logistical needs include that missions can not be initiated by the African Union unless strategic transport is provided, which is very difficult. Lack of tactical transport reduces the potential areas of operations, as communications has to be via land lines of communication, a shortfall which is exacerbated by bad infrastructure.

Logistics. There has not been identified a efficient solution of providing logistics, as each member state is responsible for the initial period as no African Union assets have been established to support operations after the initial period. To continue operations the African Union will have to provide logistics ad hoc from members, from the UN or from external sources like UN, or NATO.

Funding. In addition to the mentioned general shortfall on financing, funding of operations has not been provided. The current state of affairs more or less makes African Union operations completely dependent on external support, which is a severe shortfall. There is in a foreseeable future no indication that the African Union will be able to provide own funding of operations, effectively reducing the effort to the external will to pay.

Recommendations

The African Union is an ambitious attempt by the African states to expand Pan African cooperation and capabilities. The analysis of the African Union capabilities has shown that the African Union has decided to build structures and decisionmaking procedures which eventually would give the African Union good chances of becoming an efficient organization in dealing with armed conflicts in Africa. A number of shortfalls, however, reduces the momentum of the organization substantially and risks putting the whole idea of an African Union in peril. Two major shortfalls characterize the African Union; lack of funding and insufficient forces and force structure. Any attempt to overcome the shortfalls and increase the African Union possibilities to conduct peace support operations must address these two issues. Furthermore, a number of more moderate shortfalls have to be addressed.

Sustained levels of funding to allow incremental increases of fully capable capacities are a general problem limiting all attempts to develop the African Union and therefore, the first priority for attention. Funding is required both to build-up and sustain structures and to conduct operations. Funding structures requires sustained, focused, and prioritized funding. Sustained improvement of the African Union structures requires sustained funding. The African Union should furthermore prioritize to build a more efficient way of collecting funds, like the continental tax or levy system. And external actors like the European Union should also build a sustained financial support, like a fixed part of development aid. It is necessary to focus the build-up of structures as lack of funds does not make it possible to build all structures simultaneously. Both member states and external actors should prioritize the African Union in front of other regional or continental organizations.

Funding operations is also a challenge. The current situation does not indicate that the African Union anytime soon will be capable of funding own operations. It is therefore necessary that external actors provide funding for current and near term operations and the establishment of a plan, which gradually transfers the funding responsibility to the African Union.

The second keystone issue is the built-up of a credible force capable of conducting full scale operations. The current two stages build-up scheduled until 2010 is not credible as it does neither build a force nor a command structure that can conduct full scale operations in a belligerent environment. The plan must at the end state build a structure comparable to a corps size land component with air support and strategic as well as tactical air and sea transportation capabilities in which a SHIRBRIG modeled force can only be sufficient in the near term soft missions, but which must be made more all round model like the NATO Response Force model. The force structure must be supplemented by adequate logistics which can sustain operations

after the initial period with national logistics and a feasible command structure capable of sustaining and controlling operations with strategic and operational headquarters. The gradual development of the military capacities should, especially due to lack of funds, be coordinated with external players like the UN, NATO, and European Union to establish cooperation and to make capabilities available to the African Union until it can provide own capabilities. Doing this can accelerate the gradual expansion of types of missions for the African Union.

Beside financial and military support, political acceptance of the African Union as the actor responsible for conflict resolution in Africa is necessary. The African states must work to let the African Union lead conflict resolution to build this acceptance. Simultaneously external actors must visibly show support to and confidence in the African Union to force focus on the African Union at the expense of regional organizations, regional major powers, and external powers traditional search for influence. Finally minor deficiencies in the organization should be addressed, namely the Peace and Security Council, in order to make it bodies more in harmony with real power relationships and make all states members of the Military Committee.

The African Union has a built in ability to become an efficient player in Africa, but faces extensive challenges which can only be overcome with extensive external support.

Endnotes

¹ Five of ten peace building and 9 of 17 peace keeping operations currently take place in Africa. Five of ten peace building and 9 of 17 peace keeping operations currently take place in Africa. Available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm> on the internet. Accessed October 2005.

² In Europe, Afghanistan and Iraq peace support operations in 2006 are mainly conducted by NATO and by coalition primary consisting of western powers.

³ African Union Constitutive Act was signed in Togo. Available from http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm on the Internet. Accessed August 2005.

⁴ Jakkie Cilliers, *Peace and Security through Good Governance*, Institute for Security Studies ISS paper 70, April 2003. The paper is opened by a statement of the purpose of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): "The purpose of the APRM is to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the need of capacity building" The definition is quoted from African Peer Review Mechanism (AHG/235(XXXVIII) Annex 2.

⁵ African Union Constitutive Act. Available from http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm on the Internet. Accessed August 2005.

⁶ North Africa has a conflict in West Sahara. West Africa has several conflicts; Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire are examples. East Africa has conflicts in Sudan, and Ethiopia and Eritrea as examples. Central Africa has conflicts in DRC, Uganda as examples and Southern Africa has seen conflicts in Lesotho and Namibia within the last decade.

⁷ Adekaye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, *Pax Africana in the Age of extremes*, South African Journal of International Affairs, volume 7, Number 1, summer 2000, p. 12. Borders in Africa were drawn by the colonial powers often outside any ethnic context. This is seen in Sudan with Arabs in the northern part, Africans in the southern part, as well as Muslims in the North and Christians in the south. Rwanda is a state with two nations, Hutu and Tutsi. Several ethnical groups live within DRC.

⁸ Adekaye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, *Pax Africana in the Age of extremes*, South African Journal of International Affairs, volume 7, Number 1, summer 2000, pp. 12-13. The authors give examples of Tanzania and Zambia having less than 100 university graduates at the time of independence, while Zaire had less than 10. Furthermore the article states that states were very poorly prepared for independence in political and socioeconomic terms. And the article states: "Crises of legitimacy, a lack of political accommodation, and the existence of weak states are major factors contributing to African conflicts".

⁹ Adekaye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, *Pax Africana in the Age of extremes*, South African Journal of International Affairs, volume 7, Number 1, summer 2000, pp. 13-15. The article mentions that there have been 80 successful military coups in Africa since independence. States like DRC, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia are examples of recent weak or failing states merging into conflict.

¹⁰ | William Zartmann, *Collapsed States*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1995, pp. 1-11.

¹¹ Steven Maja, *Distilling the vision of an African Union*, Southern African Political & Economic Monthly, volume 14, No 6, 2001, pp. 5-6: "It must be remembered that since the West has always been hostile to the idea of a "United Africa", the AU must prepare to confront its fanged opposition".

Adekaye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, *Pax Africana in the Age of extremes*, South African Journal of International Affairs, volume 7, Number 1, summer 2000, pp. 13.

Fredrik Soderbaum, *Handbook of Regional Organizations in Africa*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 1996, p. 27 gives an example on how former French colonies during the post colonial era have been economical dependent on France by membership of the CFA Franc Zone. CFA = Commonaute Financiere Africaine. Even though French control was reduced in 1973, its headquarters remains in Paris.

¹² Lack of Western interference in Rwanda and withdrawal from Somalia are the most indigenous examples.

Adekaye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, *Pax Africana in the Age of extremes*, South African Journal of International Affairs, volume 7, Number 1, summer 2000, pp. 13.

Since the end of the cold war the number of conflicts has increased and Western reluctance to commit itself deeply in resolving conflicts has left many conflicts to UN and African initiatives.

¹³ Fredrik Soderbaum, *Handbook of Regional Organizations in Africa*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 1996, pp. 30-31, 48-49, mentions ECOWAS and SADC as examples of regional organizations where peace and security has become part of the purpose in the aftermath of the Cold War. Appendix 1, p. 145 shows a chart of the African organizational architecture. Every state is member of at least one organization and just three countries are just member of one (Morocco, Egypt and Western Sahara) organization.

Adekaye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, *Pax Africana in the Age of extremes*, South African Journal of International Affairs, volume 7, Number 1, summer 2000, p. 20 mentions IGAD as a regional organization trying to build peace and security potential – though without success in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

¹⁴ Fredrik Soderbaum, *Handbook of Regional Organizations in Africa*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 1996, pp. 145-146.

¹⁵ Nigeria has tried to build itself as a great power in West Africa among other things by launching peace support operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. South Africa has intervened in Lesotho in 1998 (Botswana also participated).

Adekaye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, *Pax Africana in the Age of extremes*, South African Journal of International Affairs, volume 7, Number 1, summer 2000, p. 16.

¹⁶ Malvern Lumsden, *Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Three zones of Social Reconstruction*, in *Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process and Structure*, edited by Ho-Won Jeong, Ashgate Hampshire, London 1999, pp. 131-133 and p. 150. The author underline the complexities of reconciliation by stating that besides institution building in a conflict torn society it may be necessary to rebuild social structures in order to brake the repetitive cycle of violence. Building social structure is both the individual and collective social relations. Establishing power structures is needed to rebuild society, but belief in authorities and believing that a new situation is being created to the benefice of the individual as well as of groups can be necessary. This extended approach to reconciliation expands the mission for peace support operations in time.

¹⁷ William Zartmann, *Collapsed States*, edited by, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1995, p. 8.

Three general requirements for efficient operations are establishment of power – rule of law, creating participation and providing the necessary resources.

William Zartmann, *Putting Things Back Together in Collapsed States*, edited by, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1995, p. 269.

Rama Mani, *Promoting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies*, in *Common Security and Civil society in Africa*, edited by Lennart Wohlgemuth, Samantha Gibbons, Stephan Klasen and Emma Rotschild, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Sweden, 1999.

¹⁸ The conflict between the Sudanese Government in Khartoum and Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) is an example of launching a mission after an agreement has been reached. Africa has not had any imposed agreements so far, but Kosovo is an example of

a mission established to impose a solution, although preliminary. The African Union monitoring mission in Darfur in Sudan is an example of a mission launched to contain and build the basis for conflict resolution and a peace agreement.

¹⁹ Richard E. Rubinstein, *Conflict Resolution and the Structural Sources of Conflict*, in *Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process and Structure*, edited by Ho-Won Jeong, Ashgate Hampshire, London 1999, pp. 173-187. The author analyses a number of structural conflict causes, which eventually must be addressed during the conflict resolution. The author states: "Conflict resolution efforts that do not move to a more strategic structural level have the overall effect; therefore, of maintaining the existing system and the conflicts it spawns".

²⁰ There are still foreign forces in Bosnia 10 years after the Dayton peace accord (General Framework Agreement for Peace) was signed. The UN peace support operation in Sudan deployed to support implementation of the Agreement between the Government in Khartoum and the SPLM in southern Sudan is expected to last six and a half year before a final resolution can be reached. Six years after NATO deployment to Kosovo talks on a final solution are just expected to start. UN has decided to commence talks on a final solution in Kosovo on the 24th of October 2005. Available from <http://www.un.org/apps/news> on the Internet. Accessed October 2005.

²¹ Even in a coastal state as Sudan there is beyond 1500 km from the coast to the conflict zone in South Sudan.

²² NATO operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo were corps operations with air support. Coalition operations in Iraq remain corps operations, NATO are gradually developing a corps structure in Afghanistan in connection to expansion of ISAF.

²³ Suresh Chandra Saxena, *The African Union: Africa's Giant Step toward Continental Unity*, in *Africa at the Crossroads*, London 2004, pp. 188-189.

²⁴ In comparison the UN Charter does not authorize the UN to intervene into intra state matters.

²⁵ The missions stated in the Constitutive Act are among others: Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states; encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; Promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments. Available in the Constitutive Act article 3 from http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm on the Internet. Accessed November 2005.

²⁶ Jakkie Cilliers, *Peace, security and democracy in Africa*, Institute for Security Studies, ISS paper 60, August 2002, p. 8.

Lack of clarity in the Constitutive Act is complemented by the missions of the working bodies in the African Union responsible for decision making and execution of peace support activities. The Peace and Security Council under the Assembly of Heads of States is the responsible organ in the African Union for all actions in relation to peace and security

²⁷ The missions of the Security Council are defined to be: to give early warning, to conduct peace making, peace support operations, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian action and disaster management²⁷.

²⁸ Jakkie Cilliers, *Peace, security and democracy in Africa*, Institute for Security Studies, ISS paper 60, August 2002, p. 11.

²⁹ Available from http://www.southafrica.info/ess_info/sa_glance/constitution/au-peacesecurity.htm on the Internet. Accessed November 2005.

³⁰ Steven Maja, *Distilling the vision of an African Union*, Southern African Political & economic Monthly, volume 14, No 6, 2001, pp. 5-6: "There is need for an African strategic doctrine to guide the African Union if the latter is to be viable and legitimate".

³¹ K.Y. Amoako, *African Union Symposium, opening remarks*, Available from www.uneca.org/eca_resources/speeches/amoako/2002/030202speech on the Internet. Accessed in November 2005. Amoako expressed the risks that small countries fear they will be submerged if it goes to fast forward and that some states might fear loss of sovereignty.

³² Jakkie Cilliers, *From Durban to Maputo, A review of 2003 Summit of the African Union*, Institute for Security Studies paper 76, South Africa 2003, pp. 4-5.

The African Union sent a detachment of election monitors to Zimbabwe at the elections in 2002, but contrary to everybody else present they reported that the elections were free, fair and legitimate, and at the 2003 Summit none of the member states asked the Zimbabwe situation to be addressed

³³ Jakkie Cilliers, *Peace, security and democracy in Africa*, Institute for Security Studies, ISS paper 60.

³⁴ Jakkie Cilliers, *Peace, security and democracy in Africa*, Institute for Security Studies, ISS paper 60, August 2002, p. 11.

DIIS report 2004:3 (Danish Institute for International Studies), Available from www.diis.dk p. 11 on the Internet. Accessed November 2005.

Jakkie Cilliers, *From Durban to Maputo, A review of 2003 Summit of the African Union*, Institute for Security Studies paper 76, South Africa 2003, p. 8.

³⁵ Available from http://www.africa-union.org/rule_prot/PROTOCOL-%20PEACE%20AND%20SECURITY%20COUNCIL%20OF%20THE%20AFRICAN%20UNION.pdf on the Internet. Accessed November 2005.

Jakkie Cilliers, *Peace, security and democracy in Africa*, Institute for Security Studies, ISS paper 60, August 2002, p. 8. It is especially mentioned that that major countries from each region can be members for three years compared to the normal two year period, and that they can be reelected.

³⁶ Nigeria has played a dominating role in the interventions in West African conflicts and may as well as other regional powers be tempted to continue on this path. Currently Nigeria has

3000 soldiers deployed into West African conflicts. Available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2005/oct_3.pdf and http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2005/oct_5.pdf on the Internet. Accessed November 2005.

³⁷ DIIS report 2004:3 (Danish Institute for International Studies), Available from www.diis.dk on the 1st of November 2005, p. 11: "The PSC also has a mandate to intervene in intra-state conflicts in the case of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocides and crimes against humanity, and also at the request of a member state (Article 4 j and k)." Available from http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm on the Internet. Accessed November 2005

³⁸ Jakkie Cilliers, *From Durban to Maputo, A review of 2003 Summit of the African Union*, Institute for Security Studies paper 76, South Africa 2003, p. 7.

³⁹ Available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb130104.htm> on the 23rd of November 2005 on the Internet. Accessed November 2005. All member states are members of the Military Committee.

⁴⁰ Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malon, *Progress with the African Stand-by Force*, Institute for Security Studies, ISS paper 98, May 2005, pp. 2, 7-17.

⁴¹ A decision in the UN Security Council will afterwards need to be political decided as well in the NATO system. A vote for action in the UN does not necessarily make regional organizations act and does not necessarily make member states of NATO contribute with forces.

⁴² Jakkie Cilliers, *Peace, security and democracy in Africa*, Institute for Security Studies, ISS paper 60, August 2002, p. 11.

⁴³ For the initial AMIS mission in Sudan the European Union provided 12 billion Euro of a total budget of 21 billion Euros. For the AMIS II mission European Union foresees the provide 80 billion Euros of 177 billions.

Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, *Progress with the African Stand-by Force*, ISS Paper 98, May 2005, South Africa pp. 16-20.

⁴⁴ Jakkie Cilliers, *Peace, security and democracy in Africa*, Institute for Security Studies, ISS paper 60, p. 18, where it is concluded that the predecessor of the African Union – the Organization of African Unity - primarily was funded by international contributions – 30 million \$ out of 48 million \$. The conclusion states that: "...the AU will require substantial assistance from the international community".

Jakkie Cilliers, *From Durban to Maputo, A review of 2003 Summit of the African Union*, Institute for Security Studies paper 76, South Africa 2003, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁵ Available from <http://www.africa-union.org/summit/JULY%202005/Statement%20of%20the%20AUC%20Chairperson%20-%205th%20AU%20Assembly%20Sirte%20Libya.htm> on the Internet, where it states that at the 2005 Summit member state debt had increased. Accessed November 2005.

⁴⁶ Jakkie Cilliers, *From Durban to Maputo, A review of 2003 Summit of the African Union*, Institute for Security Studies paper 76, South Africa 2003, pp. 2-3. Guinea Bissau, Liberia, The Central African Republic, DRC, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia and the Union of Comoros had not paid their debt in 2003.

⁴⁷ Jakkie Cilliers, *From Durban to Maputo, A review of 2003 Summit of the African Union*, Institute for Security Studies paper 76, South Africa 2003, pp. 2-3.

⁴⁸ Withdrawal from Somalia, lack of intervention in Rwanda and very limited intervention in Western African conflicts are signs of lack of commitment.

Suresh Chandra Saxena, *The Africa Union: Africa's Giant Step toward Continental Unity*, in *Africa at the Crossroads*, Westport London 2004, p. 168. The author iterates that Western countries have been very reluctant to support African Development.

⁴⁹ G8 has African issues on their agenda in the latest meeting. The European Union has provided substantial and incremental funding to African Union missions in Darfur. The US has been extensively committed to push the belligerent parties in Sudan towards a peace agreement, which was signed last January. Available from http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/PostG8_Gleneagles_Africa,0.pdf on the Internet. Accessed November 2005.

⁵⁰ Available from http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/PostG8_Gleneagles_Africa,0.pdf on the Internet. Accessed November 2005. At the G8 Summit in Gleneagles in 2005 comprehensive objectives was decided containing general economic support to the African Union and specifically promising to train 75,000 troops by 2010 and enhance support to African Union peacekeeping effort, support to build the Panel of the Wise and a Continental Early Warning System and several other objectives. G8 objectives however are mainly political intentions and not direct commitments. Objectives have to be fulfilled by member states and the European Union. Furthermore extensive cancellation of debt was decided.

⁵¹ Available from http://www.uneca.org/eca/resources/speeches/amoako/2005/012704speech_kyomako.htm on the 27th of September 2005 on the Internet. Accessed November 2005. The speech states that the current aid to sub-Saharan Africa of 25 billion \$ probably will approach 73 billion \$ in 2015.

⁵² Regional organizations might want to prioritize own conflicts instead of deployment forces to other regions.

⁵³ In other larger peace support operations the land component often equates a corps. SFOR and KFOR were corps size operations from the outset. The current operation in Iraq has a corps size land component. ISAF in Afghanistan will have a corps size structure from mid 2006, when NATO ARRC takes over the operation. All the mentioned operations are joint operations.

⁵⁴ NATO runs workshops for the African Union's officers within the Deployed Integrated Task Force (DITF) Headquarters in Ethiopia. The training covering command and control procedures, reporting systems, battle rhythm, intelligence collection and analysis, force generation, situational awareness and task force and headquarters standard operating

procedures refinement began on 1 August 2005. In a separate activity, NATO also provided 14 officers in support of a United Nations (UN) organized MAP Exercise for the AMIS Force Headquarters in Sudan. Available from <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2005/08/050811a.htm> on the Internet. Accessed November 2005.

⁵⁵ In a standard type peace support operation like operations in the Balkans or in Afghanistan the operation is strategically guided from the headquarters in Mons, Belgium. At the same time an operational headquarters is assigned to control the operation and a tactical headquarters, normally corps size headquarters is deployed to conduct the operation.

⁵⁶ According to <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html#0001000001>, the Union Treaty of the European Union from 1992 states:

“The Union shall set itself the following objectives:

- to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence;

- to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union.”

The European Union has so far been successful in Macedonia, DRC and Bosnia.

Accessed August 2005

⁵⁷ European Union operations are led at the strategic level by Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe from the HQ in Mons, Belgium and HQ NATO Southern Command with its deputy in the lead command the operational level of European Union operations.

⁵⁸ Available from http://www.eu.int/eur-lex/budget/data/P2006_VOLUME1/EN/nmc-grseq42960935830-3/index.html on the Internet. Accessed November 2005. The European Union budget for 2006 is 111 billion Euros. Reserves alone (458 million Euros) surpass the need for funding of the African Union. The African Union has a \$158-million budget for 2005, a fourfold increase, in order to finance a series of ambitious projects. The African Union's budget for 2004 was \$43-million. At a summit meeting of the organization in July 2005, the AU Commission asked for a 2005 budget of about \$600-million which was turned down by heads of state. In 2005 \$75-million is earmarked for peace and security, which is less than half the \$200-million sought for this by the commission. Available from http://www.mg.co.za/articlepage.aspx?area=/breaking_news/breaking_news__africa&articleid=193044 on the Internet. Accessed November 2005.

⁵⁹ Draft Workshop Summary 13-14 April 2005, Chatham House, London, which gives both the challenges of funding, donor coordination, and role sharing with the UN and planning support from the European Union. Available from <http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/niiis/G8africapsos.pdf> on the Internet. Accessed November 2005.

⁶⁰ Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, *Progress with the African Stand-by Force*, ISS Paper 98, May 2005, South Africa, p. 3. The article states it is the intention to build brigades consisting of

a headquarters, a headquarters company, four infantry battalions, an engineer battalion, a reconnaissance company, a helicopter unit, military police, a level II medical facility, 120 military observers and a group of civilian experts.

⁶¹ Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, *Progress with the African Stand-by Force*, ISS Paper 98, May 2005 South Africa, p. 3.

1: An advisory type mission, 2: Contribution to an observer type mission, 3: A stand alone observer type mission, 4: A peace keeping or preventive type mission, 5: A multidimensional peace keeping type mission and 6: An intervention type mission

⁶² Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, *Progress with the African Stand-by Force*, ISS Paper 98, May 2005, South Africa, p. 4. The article states the phase 1 time limit has been partially extended, so some of the objectives of phase 1 are now due 30th June 2006.

⁶³ Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, *Progress with the African Stand-by Force*, ISS Paper 98, May 2005, South Africa, p. 16: "However, the gap between aspiration and implementation remains extremely wide".

⁶⁴ Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, *Progress with the African Stand-by Force*, ISS Paper 98, May 2005, South Africa, p. 3. It is stated that the initial concept in 2003 called for a single SHIRBRIG type of unit, later increased into five stand-by brigades with additional capabilities like civil police.

SHIRBRIG: UN Standing High Readiness Brigade. SHIRBRIG was founded in 1996 by Austria, Canada, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Denmark. An additional seven countries have joined SHIRBRIG since it was founded. The basic concept of SHIRBRIG is to have a rapid deployment force, trained to the same operating procedures. Available from www.shirbrig.dk/shirbrig/html/hist.htm on the Internet. Accessed September 2005.

⁶⁵ SHIRBRIG has a force pool concept built on a brigade structure, co-trained to a level where it can conduct peace keeping operations. SHIRBRIG Letter of Intent states: "...acknowledge that the SHIRBRIG will only be employed on a case by case basis, in a manner safe-guarding national sovereignty considerations, on deployments of up to 6 months duration in peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, including humanitarian tasks". Hereby limitation in type of operations and duration and limitations pending national decision are established. Available from <http://www.shirbrig.dk/shirbrig/documents/LETTER%20OF%20INTENT.pdf> on the Internet. Accessed November 2005.

⁶⁶ NATO Response Force is basically a brigade land force but built as a joint force.


⁶⁷ Sustainment requires a superstructure which can take care of the ongoing planning of sustainment during the employment, which a SHIRBRIG type unit can not achieve. This can naturally be changed, but the consequences of a sustained commitment are large as SHIRBRIG is a narrow structure without any superstructure but a small steering committee. Available from http://www.shirbrig.dk/shirbrig/html/plm_intro.htm on the Internet. Accessed November 2005.

⁶⁸ NATO response Force is build on a complete NATO structure with military tactical, operational and strategic headquarters including force generation ability and 56 years in being, which is a huge advantage in the sustainment of operations.

⁶⁹ NATO constantly has to press member and force contributing nations to fill in gaps in the force structures of current operations NATO constantly tries to minimize national caveats for forces deployed into operations, as well as its must repeatedly urge nations to contribute with additional assets. Most recently expansion of ISAF in Afghanistan is executed as troops are offered and not in accordance with the political decision to expand. Among other places mentioned at <http://www.act.nato.int/multimedia/speeches/2004/052504dsactnorway.htm> Accessed November 2005.

Even though SHIRBRIG has more than one of each type of unit in the tool box it has been challenging to get sufficient contributions from participants to operations only planned to use a minor part of the brigade. SHIRBRIG is currently contributing with a headquarters company and staff officers to the UN mission in Sudan – UNMIS. Only at the last moment did Italy commit forces adequately to meet UN requirements.

⁷⁰ The SHIRBRIG brigade pool concept in general has a least two different possible contributors for each unit. Available from www.shirbrig.dk/shirbrig/html/brigpool.htm on the Internet. Accessed September 2005.



⁷¹ Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, *Progress with the African Stand-by Force*, ISS Paper 98, May 2005 South Africa, pp. 4-5.

⁷² *DIIS report 2004:3* (Danish Institute for International Studies), Available from www.diis.dk on the 1st of November 2005, p. 28.

G8 has pledged to train 50.000 peace keeping troops in the next five years. US have earlier promised to train 12.000 troops. France has promised to train 7.000 troops. And UK is deploying military and training teams to support training activities.

⁷³ On 6 June 2002, NATO Defence Ministers announced the preparation of a new capabilities initiative to be adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the Prague Summit. New capabilities included strategic transport. Available from http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/in_focus/capabilities/index.htm on the Internet. Accessed November 2005.

⁷⁴ NATO's logistical support to the African Union mission in Sudan – AMIS - in the form of coordination of strategic airlift began in July. Since then NATO has transported approximately 2800 AU troops including 49 members of the civilian police force. These airlift missions are a

blend of efforts by NATO and the European Union to create a combined endeavor to promote peace in the Darfur region. Available from <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2005/08/050811a.htm> on the Internet. Accessed November 2005.

⁷⁵ Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, *Progress with the African Stand-by Force*, ISS Paper 98, May 2005, South Africa, pp. 4-5. This logistical principle is in accordance with the SHIRBRIG concept. SHIRBRIG Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) states in section 6.5 and 6.7: "Logistics support for the Troop Contributing Nations in the force will ultimately be a national responsibility as governed by bilateral negotiations between the Troop Contributing Nations and the UN" And "Medical support is a national responsibility". It states further that SHIRBRIG will coordinate in order to make the teeth to tail ratio best possible as well as SHIRBRIG will provide role 2 medical support and make access to local hospitals, but the final responsibility lays with the nation it self. MoU available from www.shirbrig.dk on the Internet. Accessed September 2005.

⁷⁶ According to *DIIS report 2004:3* (Danish Institute for International Studies), Available from www.diis.dk on the 1st of November 2005, p. 29, France has established logistical depots in Dakar, Libreville and Djibouti and plans to establish another two depots.

⁷⁷ Jakkie Cilliers, *From Durban to Maputo, A review of 2003 Summit of the African Union*, Institute for Security Studies paper 76, South Africa 2003, p. 6.