MILITARY COMPETENCY-BASED HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT:
A STEP TOWARD THE FUTURE

by

Lieutenant Colonel Aaron M. Zook, Jr.
United States Army

Colonel Elton R. Manske
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
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Aaron Zook

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050

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Throughout the history of the Army, a people-based organization, properly managing personnel has been the basis of great concern. Over time, personnel managers have used different systems to manage people throughout the life-cycle of their service time. The current system has been expanded and renamed to Human Capital Management. Army Soldiers are now managed based on knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) through various measurement tools. The Department of Defense (DOD), as a part of the Quadrennial Defense Review, is investigating the possibility of applying competencies, as opposed to KSAs, as the basis for human capital management. This paper examines the benefits and implementation costs of job competencies as a basis for management of personnel. It explores DOD initiatives to incorporate job competencies into the human capital system; Rand Corporation research; and includes interviews of key individuals within the DOD and Army personnel management systems. Recommendations are made concerning the implementation of a viable Army competency-based Human Capital Management system.
The United States Army's search for increasingly effective and efficient personnel management systems has functionally led them to consider competency-based human capital management (HCM). According to some Department of Defense (DOD) representatives, competency-based management is the wave of the future and necessary for the military Services to keep up with the rapidly changing and complex environment. Some senior Service representatives are rightfully concerned about the impact of wholesale implementation of this new strategy during a time of full military engagement in the Global War on Terror, including Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom and other lesser contingencies. In the Army, concerns revolve around a few points: Army benefits from the new method of human capital management, the costs for the Army to implement the program, and the risks of implementing a new approach to Army HCM.

This paper will first provide a short background of competency-based human capital management (HCM). It will further review the definition of competencies, look at competency frameworks and the concept of metacompetencies. After these basic considerations are discussed, this paper will briefly explore the requirement to evolve current HCM systems into a competency-based (CB) Human Capital Management System (HCMS); review the DOD strategic vision; and investigate CB HCMS benefits, risks, costs and required changes. The final section of this paper will inform the reader of possible methods of implementation, ongoing initiatives to begin implementation in the military, and concluding remarks regarding the impact of CB HCMS for the Army and the military Services in the Department of Defense.

Background

While the use of the term competency is relatively new for the Army, the term has been in use for quite some time by business in the civilian sector as noted below. In order to understand competency-based HCM better, searches and reviews of the following literature were conducted: current books, professional journals, computer databases, published government executive standards and models, government briefings, government websites, and other information document sources. HCM experts at the Army and DOD level also participated in telephonic and in-person interviews, answering multiple questions about competency-based HCM.

Many military, and a few civilian, experts focus more on leadership competencies than the concept of competencies. Though competencies are discussed as a baseline for being
When one talks about competencies in an organization, the focus turns quickly to the leadership of that organization. In the military, that leadership is recognized through the term officer, warrant officer, or Non-commissioned officer. Special trust and confidence are placed in these individuals to lead others in peace and war. A majority of the military publications and references discussing competencies refer to only the officer segment of the military population.

Kenneth Carlton Cooper, author of *Effective Competency Modeling and Reporting*, reviewed a concept in his work that discussed competency management as having come “full circle” in its evolution from the beginning of the twentieth century. Using various jobs, such as accountants, cabinetmakers, and bicycle makers, Cooper makes the case that individuals in the early twentieth century were thoroughly competent at their job only after having completed many years of experience in the field. He further observed that, “Frederick Taylor’s ‘scientific management’ and Henry Ford’s use of the assembly line shifted competencies from workers to time-and-motion-study industrial engineers.” Cooper continues his historical train of thought, discussing how both Taylor and Ford’s methods broke jobs into specific piece parts that required few competencies and were perfect for untrained employees to learn quickly. He relays that even “Work in the military was highly segmented.”

In the 1960’s, David C. McClelland, a Harvard psychologist, “wrote a landmark article in the *American Psychologist* asserting…that companies should hire based upon competencies rather than test scores.” Competency concepts, however, only truly began to enter the mainstream business sector with the work of Dr. W. Edwards Deming, whose work on total quality management (TQM) became widely known in the U.S. in June 1980.

In the private sector, competency-based Human Capital Management (HCM) became “in vogue” in the late 1990’s. As previously mentioned, leadership competencies have become popular ways to set an organization on the path to success. With this in mind, the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense has determined that a review of best business practices is appropriate to ensure the United States military is on the leading edge in every venue, including HCM.

Human Capital Management (HCM) strategies are being evaluated in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2005. Dr. David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD P&R) is responsible for the QDR Integrated Process Team (IPT), Manning and Balancing the Force. Rear Admiral (RADM) Gerald L. Talbot, N13, DOD’s point man, heads the Manning and Balancing the Force’s IPT panel called Human Capital Strategy for DOD. All of the military Services will provide input to that panel on competency...
based HCM. As we progress through this article, you will see Dr. Chu’s vision for a DOD-wide CB HCMS. In order to fully understand that vision, however, the next step is to determine what competency means.

**A Competency Means…**

Often, competencies are ill-defined, loosely defined, or not defined at all by many who deal with them. “To begin with, the word ‘competencies’ today is a term that has no meaning apart from the particular definition with whom one is speaking (Zemke, 1982)” To avoid endless debate about what competency means, this paper seeks to define what competency definition is appropriate for DOD-wide use.

Definitions of competencies in current literature include:

- A mixture of knowledge, skills, abilities, motivation, beliefs, values and interests (Fleishman, Wetrogen, Uhlman, & Marshall-Mies, 1995)
- A knowledge, skill, ability, or characteristic associated with high performance on a job (Mirabile, 1997)
- A combination of motives, traits, self-concepts, attitudes or values, content knowledge or cognitive behavior skills; any individual characteristic that can be reliably measured or counted and that can be shown to differentiate superior from average performers (Spence, McClelland, & Spencer, 1994).
- A written description of measurable work habits and personal skill used to achieve work objectives (Green, 1999).

It’s easy to see the struggle to obtain one agreeable working definition of competencies in the private sector. Below are a few draft definitions of competencies proposed for the military sector by various agencies:

- …a behavior or set of behaviors that describes excellent performance in a particular work context (Job Role, Position, or Function). These characteristics are applied to provide clarification of standards and expectations.
- Competency describes a cluster of knowledge, skill, ability, or attitude an individual must possess or obtain (or circumstances that must exist) in order to perform one or more tasks in a particular job context.
- a set of behaviors that encompass knowledge, skills, abilities (KSAs) and personal attributes that are critical to successful work accomplishment. They describe what employees know, what they do, and how they do it and translate into effective on-the-job performance.

Reviewing each of the definitions reveals that most focus on measurable behaviors as a critical part of competencies or competency modeling. Lucia and Lepsinger, both managing
partners of Manus, a Right Management Consultants company present a simple pyramid model in the book, *The Art and Science of Competency Models, Pinpointing Critical Success Factors in Organizations.* The model, with the categories Aptitude and Personal Characteristics at the base, Skills and Knowledge at the next level, topped off with the category of Behavior demonstrates that, though competencies may include intangible qualities, often measurable behavioral attributes are key to determining if a person possesses the competencies desired by management.

![Competency Pyramid](image)

Another aspect of the definition of competencies relates to whether we are referring to organizational competencies or individual competencies. Kenneth Carlton Cooper writes, "...it is important to clarify the use of the word *competencies.* This term often refers to two related but separate concepts, *core competencies* and *workplace competencies.*" He continues the thought, "In their book, *Competing for the Future,* authors Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad wrote that 'core competencies transcend any particular product or service, and indeed may transcend any single business unit within the organization.' Cooper contrasts this with the following: "Workplace competencies focus on individuals instead of the organization, and they vary by job position versus enterprise endeavors." This distinction is critical, as this paper focuses on workplace competencies of the individual, and not specifically on competencies formed around core organizational requirements.

When critically thinking about competencies, reviews of competencies (i.e. competency modeling and job-task analysis) must be categorized. In a *Personnel Psychology* article on competency analysis, the following observation by Shippmann, et al., contrasting job analysis
and competency modeling provides insight to probable differences between the two: “For example, the majority of experts believe that job analysis is much more work- and task-focused and competency modeling is worker-focused.” Shippmann, et. al., go on to explain that the job analysis focus is on “what” is to be performed, whereas competency modeling is focused on “how” something is completed. Once again, behavior is key to observing the individual’s competency at work.

This paper will focus on a competency as “…a set of behaviors that encompass knowledge, skills, abilities (KSAs) and personal attributes that are critical to successful work accomplishment.”

Competency Frameworks and Metacompetencies

Having defined competencies, the next step is to gain understanding about how external or organizational competency frameworks and the concept of metacompetencies might affect the military’s application of CB HCM. Competency frameworks establish organizational-wide competencies that leadership expects specific individuals or all employees to possess, which in turn relates to individual competencies required for successful completion of a position’s tasks. First, we will explore how a particular competency framework is established and then we will review metacompetencies.

As postulated by Briscoe and Hall in 1999, there are at least three approaches for competency framework construction to review: research-based, strategy-based, and values-based. Briscoe and Hall looked at “31 leading North American organizations with strong involvement in executive development efforts,” to obtain their data.

A research-based competency framework relies primarily on two basic approaches; “Behavioral Event Interviewing’ (or BEI)” and “interviews or surveys with executives or human resource professionals on the executive skills critical to their current performance.” Briscoe and Hall noted that 12 of the 31 companies in their study used this approach. BEI involves interviewing selected executives because of their top performance. These executives describe “critical incidents” that exemplify the keys to their success.

The strategy-based approach sets competencies for the organization based on the future needs of the organization, not past competencies. These strategic level competencies allow for rapidly changing environments including technological fields. Nine organizations in the study directly used the strategy-based approach and several others gained some indirect benefit as well.
The values-based approach applies “idiosyncratic, normative, or cultural values to construct competencies.” Using this definition, Briscoe and Hall discussed the possibilities of using formal or informal values to construct the competencies needed. Their method included asking the senior executives to write specific desired requirements in order to use the exact language in competency formulation. This approach allowed the executives creating the competencies to buy-in to them completely. There were 4 of 31 companies that used this technique directly and at least 5 more out of the 31 that partially used this technique.20

The final recommendation of the Briscoe and Hall study, derived after reviewing the advantages and limitations of each approach, is to focus on “continuous learning.” For the military, this recommendation fit generally with the life-cycle personnel model in use. Education and training are key components to a soldier/sailor/airmen’s growth in rank and responsibility. The following excerpt outlines how to put continuous learning into practice, including the introduction of a metacompetency concept as essential to successfully achieve the desired results.

Hall has proposed the concept of a metacompetency – a competency that is so powerful that it affects the person’s ability to acquire other competencies. …Hall has proposed that two key metacompetencies related to career development are identity and adaptability. If a person has adaptability, he or she is able to identify for himself or herself those qualities that are critical for future performance and is also able to make personal changes necessary to meet these needs. But adaptability alone is not enough. The person also has to change his or her awareness of self, so that he or she internalizes and values that change. Thus, the second metacompetency is identity: the ability to gather self-related feedback, to form accurate self-perceptions, and to change one’s self-concept as appropriate. …With adaptability and identity change, the person has learned how to learn.21

Adaptability and identity change metacompetencies form the basis of continuous learning, resulting in the foundation of what are called learning organizations today. Therefore, metacompetencies are part of a legitimate approach to solve the issue of creating the most successful HCMS possible. Metacompetencies will drive individual competencies. In order to manage each individual to the benefit of DOD, HCM leaders must break metacompetencies into individual competencies for measurement, utilization, promotion and assignment.

For the Army, Leonard Wong and Don M. Snider published their thoughts on metacompetencies in a Future of the Army Profession, Revised Second Edition article. Wong and Snider state that, “From the existing literature on strategic leadership, the current lists of Army strategic leader competencies, and the dictates of current and future operation environments, we have derived six metacompetencies: identity, mental agility, cross-cultural
savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness.” (See endnotes for a definition of each metacompetency.) These six metacompetencies may not be the best to define the direction of the Army’s future. Several other defense organizations have also created their ideal set of metacompetencies that military officers should possess.

Other taxonomies of metacompetencies have been used in briefings at the Department of Defense (DOD) and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) levels. Mr. John Garstka, the Assistant Director for Concepts and Operations, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) published a list of 9 competencies for the next generation of leaders. Each competency appears to be a metacompetency, as each competency is further defined by a sublist of more competencies. Mr. Bill Newlon, JFCOM J9 Decision Superiority Department, published a briefing containing another list of “metacompetencies” that included 7 major categories containing several sub-competencies in each category.

The Army and DOD metacompetency lists have some underlying competencies in common. The presentations mix or label these underlying competencies differently. None of the lists appears complete when compared to the others. The key take-away, however, is that each Service and DOD is reviewing and pondering how competencies might become the foundation for their HCM system.

Competency-Based HCM vs. Current HCM

DOD and Service viewpoints are not always congruent. While the vision, direction, and movement to CB HCM appear to be clear and compelling at the DOD level, Army senior leaders have legitimate concerns about system implementation. While DOD senior leaders articulate their rationale for moving to CB HCM, Army leadership speculates this move may be unwarranted.

A DOD briefing titled “Coming Trends in Military Human Resource Management,” declares multiple systemic shortfalls within today’s HCM system. It 1) is not responsive to differences or significant changes in mission or environment, 2) demands homogeneous career paths, and 3) is designed for the mission, organization and technology of the Cold War – relatively static compared to today.

More specifically, DOD recognizes several Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) based system pitfalls that must be corrected. Concerns under the DOPMA-based system are: 1) not enough value placed on experience, 2) limited return on investment in people, 3) not enough choice of individuals, 4) not enough flexibility for Service managers, 5) too much assignment and geographic turnover, 6) too many forced exit points during a career,
7) inventories don’t always match requirements. DOD asserts the DOPMA-based system is not a good fit with missions, strategies and the evolving environment. Strategically, these systemic shortfalls sub-optimize the HCMS in today’s volatile and uncertain environment.

Dr. David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness states, “The current HCM approach is ‘calendric,’ or time-based, which doesn’t include ‘intense experiences’ (i.e., planning the invasion of Iraq).” Lack of qualitative valuation of these experiences over other less-intense or less-demanding experiences in an officer’s career shortchanges the officer and the military. Dr. Chu’s explanation of the time-based system included two examples. First, officers and NCOs must meet certain time-in-grade requirements for promotion. However, if a certain officer or NCO has had higher quality experience and performance, that officer or NCO should have the opportunity to be promoted earlier. Second, officers have time-based requirements for Joint qualification (i.e., a combat arms officer must meet 22 months time in an assignment to receive Joint Duty credit). This Joint Duty credit may not need to be as lengthy if the officer is serving in a more demanding assignment or clearly demonstrates superior performance in the Joint arena prior to reaching the time-length criteria. A CB HCMS would correct these system inefficiencies.

Currently, the Army does not have a separate CB HCMS policy or strategy. Army senior leaders are concerned that a move to a CB HCMS may not be feasible, and if feasible, may not be acceptable or suitable. While Army leaders have reviewed the CB HCMS concept, major implementation issues could negate the benefits projected by CB HCMS advocates. Army major concerns include: 1) the implementation of a DOD-wide standardized CB HCMS would prove infeasible; 2) the Army’s unit-centric structure, manned with Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) (knowledge, skills and abilities) would not readily accept a CB HCMS, and 3) the Army’s concept of unit cohesion, training and stability (as opposed to individual training) would be undermined.

Feasibility of CB HCMS implementation includes several areas of concern from Service culture to technical problems with integration of current HCM systems in the Army. An example of the enormity of these difficulties is evident in the progress of implementing the Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System (DIMHRS), the DOD Human Capital Management initiative to combine personnel and pay transactions in one system. Originally planned for initial fielding in 2006 the current projected date is still undetermined, but may be as much as two years in the future. While progress has been slower than expected, DIMHRS will be a major step forward for DOD and the Services when full operational capability occurs.
The amount of data required to handle the CB HCMS may exceed that of DIMHRS, as each job requirement (KSAs) must be categorized or broken down into standard competencies that apply across Services. While not insurmountable, moving to a CB HCMS will require in-depth study and creation of a single standardized lexicon for all Services. Service unique terminology may still apply for Service unique items, but accumulating and maintaining this data will require a significant manpower expenditure and Service cooperation to meet the goal. When working with automation systems, one must be cognizant that Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) software applications and products do not necessarily match the needs of each Service. This requires some current HCM systems to remain active and a “software bridge” must be built to translate data and coordinate information flow from government systems to Army DIMHRS systems.

The second issue, management of personnel distribution in a unit-centric structure, requires integration of Army G3 systems with a personnel system designed for filling units to meet readiness requirements. Individual management for manning a unit goes to the MOS and skill level of detail, but not to a specific level of demonstrated success in a competency unless the job is a nominative assignment. While some of the assignments in a unit are more highly screened (i.e., a Battalion (BN) commander, a Command Sergeant Major (CSM), or other specialized capabilities), some screening may be local (i.e., Company Commander) or may be done through NCO channels. If greater granularity is required to manage by competencies, the workload shifts upward to the assignment manager at the Headquarters, Department of Army (HQDA) level. Under this construct, the speed of the assignment process may slow, and the opportunity to decide personnel matters slips from local leaders (BN and Brigade (BDE) Commanders and Major Command assignment officers) grasp. For some skill levels of soldiers, especially the junior enlisted (below the rank of NCO), the volume demand for personnel may outweigh any increased need for granularity. The Army’s new Brigade Combat Team structure allows for direct interaction between unit and top of the system assignment managers without the middle-echelon human capital managers. The new structure increases the personnel staff at BN and BDE levels to create direct management of personnel with HQDA assignment managers; however, this process still manages to units, not to individual assignments based on competencies.

The third issue, unit stabilization, training and cohesion, highlights the Army’s plan to stabilize soldiers and officers at one location long enough to complete a four year training and deployment cycle. The Army’s intent is to enable units to build unit cohesion, train as a team to achieve and maintain unit readiness, and stabilize personnel to maintain unit cohesion and
Moving personnel due to a competency-based opportunity or promotion cycle may disrupt these factors, create an unstable unit environment or lower readiness. Commanders will be reluctant to release a critical officer or NCO in one unit to fill an external unit (i.e., a Commander or CSM) due to a competency requirement match found by a HQDA assignment officer. Personnel policies would require review to ensure the Army maintains readiness if a CB HCMS is implemented.

Vision

A new direction for HCM is required, considering the shortfalls of the current HCMS as identified by DOD, especially lack of emphasis on individual experience, a limited return on investment in people, and insufficient flexibility for Service human capital managers. The Department of Defense Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness expressed his department-wide vision as follows:

A central office should take charge (like a PEO (Program Executive Office)). This type of office would set up the following areas of emphasis:

• A central policy, structure and framework - not execution. The overall concept is that of an umbrella organization, with execution tailored to Services needs (Service-culture sensitive guidance).

• Department-wide (uniformed) leadership and their support.

• A common lexicon

The vision suggests a structure that could standardize policies and enable the personnel systems of all Services to work in harmony, with senior Service personnel input an essential ingredient for success. DOD took a major step towards Service and DOD standardization in the personnel arena with the fall 2003 award of the DIMHRS contract. While this system has been delayed in implementation, the thought process of aligning all Services on one personnel and pay system drives a synergistic approach to HCM. According to DIMHRS experts, the system is capable of documenting personnel competencies and managing the military’s human capital as the CB HCM system. Standardization, through DIMHRS or other automated HCM system, paves the way to better management for all Services in the personnel support role.

Benefits

While there are multiple expected benefits from the new system, senior DOD Personnel and Readiness officials have provided three examples to consider for assuring/building talents
of our future officer corps under competency-based HCM. These examples show benefits for
the Services and for the individual.

1) Officer Specialties. The new HCMS will lead us to a different method of career
management, which emphasizes judgment for promotion selection and is
expected to cause the military to rethink how people prepare for senior
assignment. [The new HCMS will produce different assignment/promotion
systems.] There will be multiple timelines for presentation for promotion and
individual officers could stay in assignments longer.

2) Joint Source Solutions. In the Joint arena, the new HCMS will enable Joint
source solutions with several advantages. The new HCMS will allow use of
personnel in a joint substitution basis (within and cross service). The Services
will have to ask, “How do we share the load?” then equate specialties in the Air
Force, Navy, Marines, and Army to determine substitutability. The Army is
currently demonstrating this concept in Guantanamo Bay, by using Navy
personnel to fill shortages of Army Military Police. And

3) Training. The military must consider a new self-paced paradigm (AIT level
and beyond). The Navy claims to have cut median training time in half using the
Sea Warrior program, the start of the Navy’s CB HCMS.34

DOD is attempting to incorporate CB HCMS for managing civilians and is even considering a
common competency based framework between military and civilian members. This concept is
currently under review by the DOD civilian management office.35

OSD’s vision of future trends in military HCM portends other benefits for a competency-
based HCMS. At a minimum, the new HCMS should provide the following management and
individual benefits: 1) “customized, longer careers that span interagency, international, joint,
reserve component, and acquisition specialties, 2) flexible policy with different outcomes across
services and skills, to include the choice of an alternate career path,” and 3) personnel
requirements [as opposed to time-based promotion quotas] will be met.36 The ultimate
expected end state is a more flexible, strategically adept HCMS.

OSD is pressing for management by qualifications (competencies) as opposed to time-
driven and billet based management. This strategy “makes sense philosophically” because
“strategic human resource management aligns qualifications/competencies “(knowledge, skills,
abilities, and experience) of personnel with requirements” and it “form[s] consensus around a
qualified officer corps for today and future needs.” Qualification/Competency management “can
more easily accommodate changes or new personnel policies.” Managers can expect “longer
Time In Job (TIJ),” better “joint officer management,” more effectively utilized “advance civil
schooling, and Army unit stabilization.” Finally, a qualification/competency based HCMS is
“consistent with future generation emphasis on individual choice and control.”37
As an example, managing by qualification/competencies means the military will “promote officers when they are qualified” [meet competency standards of excellent performance]. If the officer qualifies earlier, they are promoted earlier. If qualified later, then they will be promoted later. The military will “determine which experiences, in what order,” are required to qualify officers. Officers will be “eligible after school, branch qualifying job, and a second good job. [The] length of these qualifying and non-qualifying jobs could be time or event based.” The promotion flow would vary to accommodate qualifications, rather than force qualifications into a time-fixed management pattern.38 This type of management requires rethinking current personnel policies to ensure CB HCM benefits come to full fruition.

Competency-based HCMS and today’s career model are not mutually exclusive. The current capability-based model manages “the generalist (general career model for today’s officer), exceptions (assignment process, not officers), and skills (“one-time use” or limited expertise)” while competency-based management will allow for management of “leader succession (identify/develop senior leaders)” and management of “competencies (development and intensive use of specialized competencies).”39 Both processes can work together to fill mass needs of the Army or Service and create opportunities for service-members to quickly acquire competencies and be compensated for that growth.

Risks

Evaluating risk is critical when implementing a new system. DOD understands that implementing a CB HCMS involves some risk; however, the risk appears to be manageable. During a 30 November 2005 interview, Dr. Chu shed some light on the major risks involved. He believes:

- We are operating on the edge of what we know - Competency-based HCM is not well-explored terrain as opposed to the current system where we have over 100 years of well-explored terrain.

- There will be variable lengths of how long it takes a service-member to move up the ranks. The new system could be too individually focused, and

- We must not lose the current team effect [created prior to deployment].40

Army concerns covered earlier dovetail neatly with these risks. As the senior level managers of DOD and the Services wrestle with the future unknowns, some uncertainties are being explored through Service specific applications like Army DIMHRS and the Navy’s Sea Warrior program.

Other risks were pointed out by Mr. Brad Loo, Deputy Director of Policy, Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management, working in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(OUSD) in Military Personnel Policy. “If competency-based HCMS becomes a Purple System (DOD), there may be a “Czar” (single DOD manager) at the top of the system; however, the new HCMS could be too big of a piece to chew on. The process could become unwieldy,” [resulting in slow strategic response times to Service and Joint specific needs and inability to foster individual career paths.]41

Freedom of Senior Service schools to educate officers in a less-constrained environment is at risk according to military Senior Service College faculty members. Their objections stem from the fact that none of the proposed metacompetency lists appear fully comprehensive, causing fears that an incomplete list will be “pressed” upon the Army from higher levels. This would restrict the ability of school leadership to fully explore academically promising areas outside guidelines presented by JFCOM (see endnote 23). The United States Army War College (USAWC) response to the proposed use of competency management to guide leadership development, as recorded in the JFCOM J9 briefing by Newlon, stated [the] “Competency-Mapping approach contains flaws and should not be relied on as preferred means.”42 The National Defense University (NDU) and National War College (NWC) expressed similar concerns: “NDU-NWC: detailed delineation of competencies & associated ties to PME process would focus curriculum on tasks vice learning areas and objectives appropriate to educational mission.”43

Loss of control of strategic leader development that occurs at Senior Service Colleges in the military is the major concern of these institutions. According to a 2004 article in Parameters, the USAWC explains the issue further: “At stake in this initiative is the process by which the joint community identifies areas for inclusion in the curricula of our service and joint schools and then holds them accountable via the program for the accreditation of joint education.”44 After discussing the criticality of strongly valuing the professional knowledge and experience of Senior Service College staff, Reed, et. al., comment, “Also at stake is the issue of who drives this leadership development process…. We must ask whether outsourcing the development of a list of competencies that then drives the curricula of professional military schools is the wisest course.”45 The 2004 USAWC article quotes several experts who are unsupportive of list-based approaches, including Joe F. Donaldson, Paul J. Elderson, Gary Yukl, and Peter Northouse.

Values and moral leadership may also be at risk according to the cautions of Guy Adams and Danny Balfour in their book, Unmasking Administrative Evil, and comments from distinguished scholar Ronald Heifitz as noted in the 2004 USAWC article.46 Finally, Reed, et. al. comment, “Hence, the leadership development will be caught in a competency trap created by its own learning process. In reality, the adaptation really needed is ignored because the existing
paradigm has been institutionalized to the point of being culturally embedded. DOD must ensure that the introduction of a CB HCMS does not create an unchanging set of “competency-based lists” that restrict the academic freedom of the Senior Service Colleges to execute their mission: educating senior officers for the future needs of the services.

Costs
Transforming today’s HCMS will require a significant effort on the part of DOD and the Services. Knowing the vision, major benefits and risks provides a basis for estimating possible costs of implementing the program. According to Ms. Sheila Earle, Acting Principal Director for Military Personnel Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD), costs involved are primarily:

- Investment costs – Service mapping of functions per position and
- Architecture costs. To estimate costs for the system, a good place to start is the cost of Sea Warrior. The cost will be a slightly larger for the Air Force and about double the size for the Army implementation.

Ms. Earle stated “there will also be costs associated with modifying Service culture. The Navy has tried to be more automated in managing HCMS, involving individual personnel in their career management. For the Army, there is a culture shock of the individual being responsible for certain items of their personnel management…. Specifically, the shock will be for the junior enlisted Soldiers in combat MOS. Due to sheer numbers and their location on the battlefield; ready access to computers for individual career management is limited. The Army is introducing many programs to allow soldiers to individually manage their careers, so progress is being made to meet the needs of the newer generation of Soldiers. Ms. Earle continued, “The Air Force has long ago made the individual responsible for their own career.” This includes ready access to computers due to a more consolidated employment in today’s battlespace. The Service cultural differences are far deeper than these few sentences convey, but they provide a basic understanding of cultural differences from the DOD standpoint.

From the application standpoint, DIMHRS provides an example of the complexity of Service unique requirements and expectations that might be encountered with CB HCMS. As the DIMHRS program is reinvigorated, Army requirements are fine-tuned with the contractor. Simultaneously, Air Force and Navy personnel are observing the changes made and documenting further requirements their particular Service must have incorporated in DIMHRS for a successful fielding. Included in the requirements assessment is a determination of Service unique requirements that cannot be subsumed by DIMHRS due to process integration within a
Service or automation/software configurations that DIMHRS software will not completely support. Each Service has unique personnel and pay system integration; therefore expectations for each Service differ for performance capability of the system.51

How Can the Military Implement Competency-Based HCM?

For the military, the QDR will have a major impact on the implementation of competency based HCM. Mr. Loo provided possible directions the QDR might take. The QDR is still in the approval process and not releasable until FEB 06; however, it will cover the total force (AC, RC, Contractors, and Civilians). Some general themes are that Joint and Service management of officers will come under immediate review and transition, followed by SR NCOs.52 This immediate look at senior officers and NCOs indicates that CB HCMS may initially require focused application on more critical personnel. Beginning with a smaller, select population, would allow DOD and the Services a more responsive development cycle and definitive parameters for examination of implementation and resourcing.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense is pushing to transform the HCM system sooner rather than later.53 The effort to conduct in-depth studies on select populations has already started. According to Colonel Lernes Hebert, Deputy Director, General Officer and Flag Officer (GOFO) management in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD), a review of all Joint billets is currently underway. The Rand Corporation, a military contracted research organization, is defining criteria for a Joint service billet, to ensure proper alignment of jobs. In addition, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has asked the Rand Corporation (starting January 2007) to study how well the Services develop senior enlisted, civilians, and officer reservists. Finally, the concept of a translation layer between the Joint level and the Services is under review, to ensure common understanding of Service terms by Joint billet managers.54 Time, in this rapidly changing and complex environment, is a critical factor. DOD and the United States government “cannot afford to lose talent” now or in the future due to an outmoded and antiquated HCMS.55

A successful example of joint-Service implementation of a system is the Defense Finance and Accounting System (DFAS). Colonel Hebert stated that “DFAS is a model where Services were forced into doing it one way.”56 Ms. Earle adds, “Implementation of Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) 924 shows the outcome. Every Service implemented DMRD 924 differently. DFAS was built on the Defense Joint Military Pay System (DJMS), which came from the Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS), which originally was an Air Force System.”57 Since the DFAS system was adapted from an Air Force Finance system, the Air Force has
easily adapted to joint changes made to the system. The Marine Corps has produced, in conjunction with DFAS, an integrated personnel and pay system called the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS). MCTFS is a government owned software application, run and managed by DFAS. The Army has adopted pay practices that integrate Army Finance and pay systems into the joint system, DFAS. The result of the mandate to use DFAS was DOD-wide enterprise standardization for pay.

DOD and all of the Services gained major lessons learned from this example that are transferable to the CB HCMS development. Standardization, down to the data level, must be coordinated and agreed upon across all of the Services. This equates to the standard lexicon requirement for CB HCMS. Service cultural tendencies do matter, as specific circumstances in each Service dictate variations in the way information is handled digitally and integrated into Service unique systems. Therefore, design architectures must account for the Service required differences, while minimizing unnecessary Service-unique systems and data. For competency-based HCM, this may require a focused approach, restricting implementation to specific populations in the Services where CB HCMS will produce the most immediate and effective impact for the least cost. The notion of a focused approach to implementing a CB HCMS may create acceptable risk for Services to rapidly move forward and establish a successful core framework for further implementation.

### Required Changes for Implementation of CB HCMS

Even with an agreed upon vision and unified DOD and Service support for implementation, current HCM DOD and Service organizations must conduct in-depth analysis and policy reviews to effectively remove statutory and regulatory impediments. Several laws, DOD policies, and Service policies must be reviewed and revised in order to make competency-based HRM a reality. Expected revisions in the law include:

- Remove or modify caps on career length,
- Expand promotion windows,
- Change separation authorities,
- Change the retirement policy or mitigate the effects of current policy,
- Remove or modify failure of selection language, and
- Create a more seamless career flow, including breaks in service.\(^{38}\)
DOD policy changes would require revision, based on statutory changes indicated above, including three other areas: “1) Change promotion timing, 2) Adjust compensation programs, and 3) encourage multiple assignments in place.” Finally, Service changes would include all areas listed above, plus:

- Tailor career lengths,
- Change continuation patterns,
- Increase time in the job (TIJ),
- Change patterns of assignment/education,
- Create multiple career paths,
- Concentrate turnover,
- Reduce accessions, and
- Reduce wickets for some career paths.

Each of these policy changes requires Service Personnel Chiefs to engage in intensive research and adjustment to fully exploit the advantages of the new HCMS. Each Service may establish unique recruiting quotas in order to maintain acceptable manning levels.

**Embedding CB HCMS in the Personnel Life-Cycle Model**

Implementation of specific competencies should start at the beginning of the personnel life-cycle model, the acquisition phase. The prospect of creating competency-based management has already changed how DOD and Congress views pre-commissioning in the military. Congressman, the Hon. C. W. Bill Young, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee (HAC), has worked with the Defense Department to specifically request $6 million to establish and operate a joint ROTC program at the University of South Florida (USF) in Tampa, Florida. The university’s proximity to the Special Operations Command and Central Command in Florida solidified USF as the “ideal location to begin this pilot program to provide joint military course and leadership training at the ROTC level.” The program will combine “existing Army, Navy, and Air Force ROTC programs into a joint military training environment.”

On 25 Aug 05, Mr. Carr, DUSD Military Personnel Policy began the process of establishing this competency-based program. With the National Defense University as the lead DOD agent working with USF, Mr. Carr directed that a pilot program for Joint ROTC be developed and “conducted at the USF ‘Joint Military Science Leadership Center (JMSLC)’ commencing in Academic Year 2006-07, and continuing though 2008.” As part of the Joint
ROTC program, Mr. Carr wrote, “…the unified ROTC curriculum shall allow for improved emphasis on Joint matters consistent with Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01B dated August 30, 2004 …” 462

Service opinions are critical to ensure the statutory Title X Service obligations to train, organize and equip their Service are properly completed. Service concerns about implementation of this program again demonstrate the criticality of a consensus on the implementation of DOD programs. On 9 September 2005, in response to Mr. Carr’s memo, the Army, Air Force and Navy Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs wrote a joint memo to Dr. Chu stating that Mr. Carr’s memo was “premature.” They indicated “substantial concerns about whether a Joint ROTC program, as described by Mr. Carr’s memo, can produce suitably trained and qualified entry-level officers.” 463 They further requested to meet with Mr. Carr in order to discuss alternative ways to make productive use of the advantages of the Joint Military Leadership Center. 464

Conclusion

Clearly, the Department of Defense is leading the way to establish a vision, articulate benefits, risk and costs to produce a unified competency-based Human Capital Management System. Moving to a CB HCMS essentially represents a return to a proven management system characterized by quality personnel who are highly skilled and produce excellent results in their given specialty. The move to ensure maximum utilization of personnel and provision of individual control on upward mobility creates a system where excellence and motivation are rewarded. While history supports a move back to CB HCMS, lessons of process standardization and mass production cannot get lost in the journey. Just as mass makes a difference in orbital mechanics, it equally makes a difference in applying effects in battlespace.

We must not, however, use inexperienced personnel who have not yet learned required basic military and occupational skills, in lieu of skilled manpower in battle situations on land and sea.

The vision of a unified effort, a standardized lexicon, a DOD level PEO organization and Service and DOD senior leader involvement provides a specific direction and leadership to accomplish the task. Benefits of joint source solutions, managed individual control of upward movement, promotion and assignment variability based on competencies, and training cost avoidance for redundant training create positive aspects to a CB HCMS. Risks of trying to change too much too quickly, of navigating unknown territory, of losing the required team building affect of current systems, and possibly constricting academic goals to competency-
based task lists must be avoided or mitigated to maintain a viable and vibrant HCMS that will produce a ready and effective military force.

While the total costs remain to be fully determined and resourced by Congress, the strategic benefit of managing the individual soldier, officer and leader would provide greater flexibility and management of personnel in all Services. In many ways, the individual and the Service would benefit from a more individualized career pattern, promotion opportunities, and visibility for use of the officer or leaders during their career life-cycle. For the time being, however, the cost for all Services and DOD converting to a pure CB HCMS may be too expensive; therefore, a more focused approach would reduce funding impacts and provide a reliable, proven path for further system development.

DIMHRS should not be discounted as an avenue for all services to reach the goals of CB HCMS. Army and Northrup Grumman Information Technology (NGIT) experts state DIMHRS is capable of competency-based HCM and many Army leaders involved in the process believe DIMHRS is the best future HCM system. DIMHRS may be a tool for initial standardization of competencies (perhaps using information from the Navy’s Sea Warrior system to understand the scope of the requirement), to accomplish a truly Joint personnel classification and human capital management system. Now is the time to provide requirements to the DIMHRS Joint and Service managers, as the system undergoes final requirements definitions. Considering the time and dollars invested in DIMHRS and the software capability of the system, DOD and the Services should capitalize on this avenue of approach to HCM data standardization. Senior leader involvement would pave the way for full compliance and successful implementation of a fresh start for a truly Joint personnel system and possible foundation for the DOD CB HCMS.

Given the required changes in law, policy, and regulations, CB HCMS and the current HCMS based on KSAs should coexist and commingle as the suboptimal system for the near future. At higher skill levels, particularly in the officer and NCO ranks, a method for understanding the competencies of the individual in a more granular fashion is required to better manage the force and place the right individual at the right place and time. As we move to Joint focused operations, all Services must share a single lexicon for competencies to ensure mutual understanding and best utilization of personnel in today’s resource constrained environment. For entry-level enlisted soldiers, less granularity may be acceptable for individuals (with the exception of specialty competencies) to create a lethal and responsive military force. In any event, DOD and the Army must not stand still. Focused, methodical, and rapid forward momentum into a competency-based human capital management system is essential to capture the capabilities offered by the information age.
Endnotes

1 Cooper, Kenneth Carlton; Effective Competency Modeling & Reporting (New York, NY; AMACOM, 2000, 4-5.

2 Ibid, 4.

3 Ibid, 5.


6 Ibid, 3 of 23.


10 Lucia, Anntoinette D.; Lepsinger, Richard; The Art and Science of Competency Models, Pinpointing Critical Success Factors in Organizations, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer, 1999), 6-7. At the writing of this book, competency models that identify skills, knowledge, and characteristics needed to perform a job had been in use for more than three decades. The book clearly lays out the methodology for implementing a competency based HRM through laying the groundwork (Ch3), developing a competency model from scratch (Ch.4), finalizing and validating the competency model (Ch. 5), and integrating competency models into HRM systems.

11 Ibid, 7.

12 Cooper, 2.

13 Ibid, 2.
Ibid, 2 Cooper continues in his manual to use the workplace competency as the idea for developing competency models and management techniques. While the focus is on individual performance improvement, competency modeling will also flatten the organization’s hierarchy and create a better overall performance.

Shippmann (et. al), printout page 6 of 25.


- Identity - “The ability to gather self-feedback, to form accurate self-perceptions, and to change one’s self-concept as appropriate.” In an officer’s development of strategic leadership capability, the metacompetency of identity acknowledges that the role of a strategic leader goes beyond personal contributions and shifts to serving as a catalyst for success by subordinates and the organization as a whole.” (p 612)

- Mental Agility - “the ability to scan and adjust learning based on the environment, and entails aspects of cognitive complexity, improvisation, and lightness as found in the strategic leadership literature.” (p613)

- Cross-Cultural Savvy - “… includes the ability to understand cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical, and political boundaries. A strategic leader with cross-cultural savvy is comfortable interacting with and leading joint, international, interagency, or inter-organizational entities.” (p614)

- Interpersonal Maturity - is defined by several interpersonal skills: empowerment; consensus-building; negotiation; the ability to analyze, challenge, and change an organization’s culture so as to align it with the ever-changing outside environment; and an ability to take responsibility for the development of the Army’s future strategic leaders. (p 616, 617 – paraphrase)

- World-Class Warrior - “… understand the entire spectrum of operations at the strategic level to include theater strategy; campaign strategy; joint, interagency, and
multinational operations; and the use of all the elements of national power and technology in the execution of national security strategy.” (p617)

- Professional Astuteness - “… understand that they are no longer merely members of a profession, but leaders of a profession, specifically of the Army profession as it serves the nation.” (p618)


Metacompetencies listed (with sub-competencies) include:

- Change Leader (Adapting to/managing/creating change, transformation, tolerance of others' views, implementation, leading with speed, communications skills)
- Innovation (Entrepreneurship, creating of new knowledge, risk taking and management, adaptability, leveraging technology)
- Personal Leadership (Vision, continuous learner, self-awareness, decisiveness, courage, aggressiveness, honesty and integrity, trust-loyalty-selflessness, initiative, energy and enthusiasm)
- Results-driven (Achievement-oriented, accountable)
- Collaboration (Building coalitions, building consensus, partnering, building social networks, taking the risk to step beyond own organization)
- Strategic thinking (mental agility, analytical, critical thinking, holistic/systems thinking, synthesis, thinking across boundaries, cognitive understanding, external awareness)
- Influence (Communications skill, negotiation skills, political acumen)
- Problem Solving (Interdisciplinary, collaborative, cutting Gordian Knots)
- Leading People (Team builder, teamwork, cultural sensitivity, developing others, inspiring)

Newlon, Slide 24.

Joint Senior Leader Competencies are as follows:

- World Class Warfighter (Strategic Art, Operational Art, Effects-Based Approach, Campaigning, Joint Warfighting)
• Influencing (Communicating, Decision Making, Motivating, Foster Teamwork and Collaboration)

• Conceptual (Cognitive Capacity, Creative Thinking, Critical Thinking, Adaptability)

• Interpersonal Maturity (Communication, Cross-Cultural Savvy)

• Personal Leadership (Joint Values/Warrior Ethos, Identity, Professional Astuteness)

• Improving (Lifelong Learning, Team Building, Leading Change)


26 Ibid, slide 10.


28 Ibid.

29 Talbot, Gerald L.; Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy; Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) N13; Chair, QDR Manning and Balancing the Force Integrated Process Team; telephone interview by author, 5 January 2006; and Mr. Lewis, Mark, Deputy to the Deputy Chief of Staff G1, U.S. Army, telephonic interview by author, 13 January 2006.

30 Lewis, Mark, Deputy to the Deputy Chief of Staff G1, U.S. Army, telephonic interview by author, 13 January 2006.

31 Brooks, Jeanne; Colonel, U.S. Army; Army Functional Team Lead for DIMHRS, interview by author, 18 January 2006, Reston, VA.

In the summer of 2005, a DOD investigative team worked with Army, the Joint Project Management Office (JPMO), the Joint Requirements Integration Office, the contractor and other Services to determine if the program should continue. The program had been under development of Northrup-Grumman Information Technologies (NGIT) since late 2003. The decision to continue required flattening of the management organization (allowing the Army to speak directly with NGIT) and an understanding that approximately 6 months would be allotted to work out any remaining Army requirements before final coding, testing, and implementation.

Integrating DIMHRS, an individual-centric system, with current Army systems, unit-centric system, requires technical solutions to properly enable human capital managers to feed units with mass personnel transactions that will be acceptable by three current systems (Active, Reserve and National Guard). Each of these system managers modifies unit files (to keep them current) in slightly different ways to properly manage individuals and units simultaneously. Additionally, implementing DIMHRS requires Army users to modify current processes to fit the PeopleSoft software as there is only a certain amount of customization and configuration that can be accommodated due to cost. Even with the allowable customization and configuration of the software, there will be a significant amount of Army systems that are intertwined or related to the current HCMS that must be kept running to maintain current level of service to the
soldiers and Army leadership. While NGIT and the Army are working on solving these issues, the Air Force, Navy and Marines are reviewing DIMHRS capabilities as well. In several meetings, the Marines have noted that they will not accept DIMHRS until it provides the level of services they currently have with MCTFS. While NGIT has assured DOD that it can create a system that will answer most of the requirements for an integrated personnel and pay system, it cannot alone provide a solution for reaching the current level of service expected by each of the Services.

32 Chu, interview by author, 30 November 05.


34 Chu, interview by author, 30 November 05.

35 Ibid.


37 Ibid, slide 6.

38 Ibid, slide 7 (This is similar, but more detailed, than current career roadmaps produced by specialty managers in the Services. This will be job-specific).


40 Chu, interview by author, 30 November 05.

41 Loo, Brad, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Military Personnel Policy, Deputy Director of Policy, Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management, interview by author, 30 November 2005, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

42 Newlon, Slide 29

43 Newlon, Slide 30

44 Reed, George; Bullis, Craig; Collins, Ruth; and Paparone, Christopher; “Mapping the Route of Leadership Education: Caution Ahead,” Parameters, Autumn 2004, 46.

45 Reed, et. al., 47.

46 Reed, et. al., 48.

47 Reed, et. al., 48-52.


49 Ibid. Comment by author: The difference between Navy and Army personnel management may be a function of personnel location. Most sailors are either onboard ships or
at land bases, where access to computers is readily available. Soldiers can be located far away from administrative support or computer capacity to support individual soldier actions.

50 Earle, interview by author 30 November 2005.

51 Carroll, Ken; Chief, Enterprise Human Resources Support Division, Acting Program Manager for Army DIMHRS effort, telephone interview by author, 26 January 06.

52 Loo, interview by author, 30 November 2005.

53 Chu, interview by author, 30 November 2005.

54 Hebert, Lernes; Colonel, U.S. Air Force; Deputy Under Secretary for Defense Military Personnel Policy, Director, General Officer Flag Officer Division, interview by author, 30 November 2005.

55 Chu, interview by author, 30 November 2005.

56 Hebert, interview by author, 30 November 2005.

57 Earle, interview by author 30 November 2005.


59 Ibid, slide 12.

60 Ibid, slide 12.

61 Honorable Young, C. W. Bill, Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, Letter to Secretary of Defense, Dated October 3, 2003, page 2

62 Carr, William J., Acting Deputy Under Secretary (Military Personnel Policy), Memorandum for President, National Defense University and President of the University of South Florida, Subject: Joint ROTC Pilot Program, University of South Florida, dated 25 Aug 05, page 1.

63 Denning, Daniel, Principal Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); Navas, William A., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); Dominguez, Michael J., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness); “Joint ROTC Pilot Program, University of South Florida,” dated 9 September 2005.

64 Ibid.