



# Combating a Modern Hydra Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism

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Sean N. Kalic




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## Foreword

*Combating a Modern Hydra: Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism* is number eight in the Combat Studies Institute's Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper series. This work resulted from discussions at Fort Leavenworth about the nature of the enemy facing the United States and its allies since 11 September 2001. Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network had been present at some level in the national and international consciousness since the late 1990s. The events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent global operations taken against Al Qaeda have brought this group to the forefront of the GWOT. While successes have been achieved in the GWOT, the enemy has proven to be resilient and adaptive. This study by Mr. Sean Kalic, of the Department of Military History, US Army Command and General Staff College, examines modern transnational terrorism from the 1960s to the present day, with special emphasis on the adaptation Al Qaeda and other nonstate actors have taken in response to the actions of the United States and its allies. This work provides a cautionary warning about the likelihood Al Qaeda will continue to survive and execute missions in the current operating environment. Mr. Kalic synthesizes much of the pertinent literature and offers insights into the actions taken to fight terrorists. Most importantly, he advises a continual reevaluation of the threat, based on Al Qaeda's flexibility, resiliency, and adaptability. Officers and soldiers who have recently served in operations against the terrorist worldwide will certainly see utility here. As the US Army continues its efforts in combating terrorists, the thoughts found in this narrative are well worth considering.

THOMAS T. SMITH  
COL, IN  
Director, Combat  
Studies Institute



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# **Combating a Modern Hydra**

## **Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism**

### **Introduction**

On 11 September 2001 a new epoch in warfare emerged. With Al Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington DC, the United States suffered one of the most catastrophic attacks on the continental United States in the nation's history. Nineteen days after the attacks, President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and stated, "Our war on terrorism begins with Al Qaeda, but does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."<sup>1</sup> In essence, the president confirmed the opening of the US-led global war on terrorism (GWOT). Unlike previous experiences in which the United States has gone to war, in this new era of warfare, the enemy is fundamentally different.

In the past, the United States went to war against nations, regimes, and alliances. In stark contrast within the parameters of the GWOT, the enemy is not a traditional nation-state, regime, or alliance structure. Rather, non-state actors seek to use terrorism and violence to advance their political, theological, and ideological agendas. Since the entire international community structure has been and is based upon traditional nation-states, the GWOT era presents some specific legal, political, and social complications. The objective of this study, however, is to analyze how the terrorist organizations have adapted to the actions taken by the United States and its international allies to win the war on terrorism.

Since 11 September 2001, the United States and its allies have pursued terrorist organizations by using a wide variety of law enforcement, financial, military, and diplomatic tools. While the conglomerate of actions taken by the US-led coalition have impacted the organizational structure, finances, and operations of terrorist regimes, these non-state actor remain flexible, resilient, and adaptive in the current security environment.<sup>2</sup>

## The Need for Definitions

Before a detailed analysis of the non-state actors' adaptation to the GWOT can begin, it is necessary to establish the definition of terms, parameters, and units of measurement used in this study. First, a brief discussion of terrorism is necessary. Title 22 United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 2656f (d) provides the definition of terrorism for the United States.<sup>3</sup> According to Title 22, terrorism is defined as: "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against noncombatant targets by subnational or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."<sup>4</sup> In addition to this broad and ambiguous definition of terrorism, the US State Department provides a definition of "international terrorism" and "terrorist group."<sup>5</sup> Title 22 defines international terrorism as "terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country."<sup>6</sup> The US State Department defines a terrorist group as "any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism."<sup>7</sup> Although these definitions emerged in response to a rise in international terrorist activity during the 1980s, they remain the standard by which the US government executes the GWOT. The US State Department's definition of terrorism, international terrorism, and terrorist groups provides flexibility and leeway to legitimate actors in their efforts to combat terrorism.

Although the US government established an applicable definition of terrorism, the international community has not agreed to a universal definition.<sup>8</sup> The members of the United Nations (UN), a leading ally in the GWOT, failed continually to reach an agreement on the definition of terrorism because of the need to differentiate "freedom fighters" from "terrorists." Despite this obstacle, the member nations have loosely agreed that terrorism is "an assault on the principles of law, order, human rights, and peaceful settlement of disputes on which the world body was founded."<sup>9</sup> Striving to move beyond the debate over defining terrorism, the member nations of the UN identified the characteristics of terrorism as a means to identify terrorist activity. According to the UN's Working Group on Terrorism, "terrorism is an essentially political act meant to inflict damage and deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of fear, generally

for a political or ideological purpose.”<sup>10</sup> The member nations of the UN agree, “terrorism is a criminal act, but it is more than mere criminality.”<sup>11</sup> Despite a lack of consensus on the legal definition of terrorism, the Working Group on Terrorism provides an additional level of understanding and structure in the fight against terrorism. Importantly, the international community identified links between transnational organized crime factions and terrorist organizations. The links between these two distinct non-state actors are a central element in the GWOT security environment.<sup>12</sup> The work done by the UN members provides insight into the characterization and classification of terrorist organizations and transnational organized crime factions as a distinct sect of non-state actors.

The terms *non-state actor* and *terrorist* are not synonyms. Scholars define non-state actors as “actors autonomous from the structure and machinery of the state, and of the governmental and intergovernmental bodies below and above the formally sovereign state: transnational, rather than transgovernmental.”<sup>13</sup> This broad and ambiguous definition of non-state actors allows the term to apply to a wide variety of groups. In the current security environment, terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hezbollah, as well as transnational organized crime groups have emerged as a distinct variety of non-state actors. The elimination of the threat posed by rogue non-state actors to the stability and security of the global community remains the objective of the United States and its allies in the GWOT. Therefore, within the parameters of this study, terrorist and criminal organizations are the only non-state actors discussed.

## **Terrorism as a Security Threat**

The recognition of terrorist groups as a national security threat to the United States is a relatively new phenomenon. In the Cold War era, the United States spent little time concerning itself with the threat posed by terrorist groups.<sup>14</sup> Within the collective minds of the US populace, terrorism was something that happened in other nations, and Americans largely believed their nation was immune from these types of attacks. The strategic nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and the threat posed by a massive nuclear exchange overshadowed terrorism in the minds of millions of Americans. Successive US presidents

from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan focused on stemming communist expansion. Hence, terrorism remained a relatively obscure and minor element within the national security concerns of the United States during the Cold War.

Despite the US focus on the dynamics of the Cold War, terrorist groups and their actions occasionally merited attention from US presidents. For example, in the aftermath of the 1972 Munich Olympics, President Richard Nixon acknowledged the emerging threat posed by terrorists by establishing an executive working group titled “Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.”<sup>15</sup> Composed of State Department personnel such as Henry Kissinger and Robert Kupperman, the Department of Justice’s Rudolph Giuliani, National Security Council (NSC) Staffer Richard T. Kennedy, and others, the group considered “rumors and unconfirmed reports” of potential attacks against “American nationals and/or businesses.”<sup>16</sup> Specifically the group mentioned hijackings, “crude atomic bombs (dirty bombs),” the use of chemical and/or biological weapons, and the use of Soviet shoulder-fired SA-7 missiles.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, the Committee to Combat Terrorism recognized the need for the international community to unite to fight the growing terrorist threat.<sup>18</sup> Despite the foundations established by the Committee to Combat Terrorism, President Jimmy Carter’s NSC “eventually absorbed” the team, and the lessons learned became victims of the executive branch’s bureaucratic quagmire.<sup>19</sup>

The second major terrorist action faced by the United States surfaced in the 1980s under the tenure of Reagan. In 1985-1986 Reagan faced a series of Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks.<sup>20</sup> The president responded by using military force in the form of Operation EL DORADO CANYON, whereby the US conducted precision air strikes against Libya. The use of overt military force signaled to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi that the United States would not stand for the state sponsorship of terrorist operations against Americans. Despite such occasional episodes, terrorism for the United States remained a nuisance rather than a significant threat to the integrity of US national security objectives.<sup>21</sup> As the Cold War ended, terrorism emerged as a national security concern for the United States.

Beginning in 1990, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, in his *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, listed terrorism as a “national security concern.”<sup>22</sup> Specifically, the report stated:

“Americans are vulnerable to terrorist activities around the globe, and the number of incidents involving Americans may increase. This will enhance the likelihood of US counterterrorist actions supported by the Department of Defense.”<sup>23</sup> Although Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledged “terrorism may increase” in the post-Cold War security environment, it did not identify terrorism as an overt threat to the national security of the United States. Interestingly, within the same DoD *Annual Report*, the administration identified narcotics trafficking and drug abuse as emerging national security threats, while not linking these forces to terrorist organizations.<sup>24</sup> Within the present security environment, the US administration, as well as the international community, openly acknowledge the relationship between narcotics traffickers and terrorist organizations.<sup>25</sup> Despite the connection between terrorist organizations and transnational criminal factions, US President George H.W. Bush focused on outlining a plan to “combat drug trafficking,” while only maintaining a vague awareness of the rise of international terrorism.

Building upon its recognition in 1990 that “terrorism may rise” in the future and the threat posed by narcotics traffickers, DoD stated in its 1991 *Annual Report*: “the flow of illegal drugs into the United States and the demand for such drugs in our society continue to present an unprecedented and perplexing national security threat. The US armed forces continue to combat the production, trafficking, and illegal use of drugs.”<sup>26</sup> While still identifying drug and narcotics traffickers as a major national security threat, the administration addressed terrorism by simply stating:

There are those who seek to frustrate our foreign policy and our national security goals through terrorism. This form of intimidation also threatens the lives, freedom, and property of Americans around the world. DoD is pursuing efforts to combat terrorism and assist friendly nations to counter this global menace.<sup>27</sup>

By 1991, it appeared the United States had finally identified terrorism as a potential national security threat and considered how to combat it. In its 1992 DoD *Annual Report*, however, Bush's administration failed to mention terrorism as a national security concern or even list it as a defense priority.<sup>28</sup> Yet, by the end of 1992, terrorism remained a mounting threat to the national security of the United States.

Similarly in 1993, President Bill Clinton failed to list terrorism as a major national security threat or even as a defense priority. To reconsider the rapidly changing security environment in the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, Clinton's first secretary of defense, Les Aspin, initiated a Bottom-up Review of the national security environment and the military force structure of the United States. In the DoD's 1994 *Annual Report*, Aspin provided the first mention of terrorism as part of the post-Cold War security environment. Specifically, the DoD identified "state-sponsored terrorism" as a regional danger and the "terroristic use of nukes" as permanent elements in the post-Soviet threat environment.<sup>29</sup> With its analysis of the changing security environment and the acknowledged terrorist threat, the Clinton administration provided the first official recognition that the United States needed to confront this new unconventional threat. For the next two years (1995 and 1996), Clinton continued to list terrorism as a "prominent threat to the interests of the United States and its allies."<sup>30</sup> DoD recognized the connection between the "illegal drug trade and international organized crime" as subsidiary national security threats in the post-Soviet security environment.<sup>31</sup>

Clinton and the DoD provided the first official recognition of a new security environment with threats posed by non-state actors such as terrorist organizations, drug traffickers, and transnational organized crime to the security of the United States and its allies. Following this recognition, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen acknowledged a "war on terrorism" based on analysis of recent trends in terrorist attacks in 1997.<sup>32</sup> The DoD, in its 1997 *Annual Report*, outlined the administration's response to the new and expansive terrorist threat.



Cohen acknowledged the “new” terrorist threat by first outlining the factors responsible for the changes in the post-Soviet security environment.<sup>33</sup> Under Cohen’s leadership, the DoD identified “the disintegration of the Soviet Union, changing terrorist motivation, the proliferation of technologies of mass destruction, increased access to information and information technologies, and the accelerated centralization of vital components of the national infrastructure” as the forces that prompted the rise of terrorism as a threat to US national security in the post-Soviet security environment.<sup>34</sup> Additionally, DoD recognized the transition of terrorist groups from “political motivation” to “religious motivation.”<sup>35</sup> This ideological shift to religious motivation led the administration to conclude terrorist attacks in the near future would be planned to inflict “maximized carnage” as a result of the radical interpretation of the Koran.<sup>36</sup> DoD believed the terrorists’ fundamental motivation for violence changed as did their preferred method of attack.

By 2000, Cohen maintained that future terrorist attacks would be more “prevalent, prominent, and lethal” than those in previous eras.<sup>37</sup> The unsecured status of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons and technology in the former Soviet Union greatly concerned the United States, as well as the international community. Fearing terrorist organizations had easier access to “technologies that were once the sole preserve of world and regional powers,” DoD worried that a terrorist organization could use an improvised weapon of mass destruction (WMD) to advance its cause, as well as inflict mass casualties on a scale not normally associated with terrorist attacks.

Access to and the potential use of WMDs by terrorist organizations provided these once marginalized non-state actors with the potential capability to influence national, regional, or international affairs greatly.<sup>38</sup> Having identified the motivation and potential nature of the “new terrorist” threat, Cohen and DoD focused on the nation’s vulnerability and the US efforts to combat the emerging threat.

Moving away from the threat posed by transnational terrorist groups in the post-Soviet security environment to the potential targets of such groups, the Clinton administration considered the

vulnerability of nations to terrorist attacks. The DoD postulated that modern national infrastructures presented “high value and vulnerable” targets for terrorist groups based on their “dependence on computers” and the “interdependence” of vital systems.<sup>39</sup> Specifically, the DoD identified the potential of a cascading effect if a terrorist organization attacked vulnerable electric grids, air traffic control systems, computer networks, or the gas and oil pipelines in the United States.<sup>40</sup> Based upon this analysis, Cohen identified the need to combat terrorism.

The DoD identified two courses of action: antiterrorism and counterterrorism.<sup>41</sup> DoD defined antiterrorism as “defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist attacks” and counterterrorism as “offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.”<sup>42</sup> Backed by structural and organization arrangements within DoD, Clinton established a coordinated antiterrorism and counterterrorism force to meet the terrorist threat.

The Clinton administration’s successive *Annual Reports* from the DoD are of fundamental significance in the current GWOT. First, within these reports, DoD provided the recognition and identification of terrorism as an overt threat to the national security of the United States and the international community in the post-Cold War security environment. Second, Cohen’s 1997 DoD *Annual Report* established the basic organizational and structural arrangements with the executive branch of the government to begin combating the terrorist threat. And finally, within the 1997 *Annual Report*, the secretary of defense openly acknowledged the emergence of the new terrorist threat as an international security threat that revolved around “ideologies.”<sup>43</sup> The genesis of the current GWOT can therefore be found in the DoD’s 1997 *Annual Report*.

Having dedicated a full chapter on terrorism in its 1997 *Annual Report*, Cohen and DoD failed to include the same chapter in 1998, but instead handled the issue within their analysis of the “transnational dangers” in the DoD’s 1998 *Annual Report*.<sup>44</sup> By 1998, Clinton and the DoD fully outlined the “transnational dangers” posed by transnational terrorist organizations. Specifically, the administration declared:

The variety of sub-state and supra-state actors that can affect the security environment will continue to grow in number and capability. Violent, religiously-motivated terrorist organizations have eclipsed more traditional, politically-motivated movements. The latter often refrained from mass casualty operations for fear of alienating their constituencies and actors who could advance their agendas or for lack of material and technical skill. Religious zealots rarely exhibit such restraint and actively seek to maximize carnage. Also of concern are entrenched ethnic- and nationalist-motivated terrorist organization, as well as the relatively new phenomenon of ad hoc terrorist groups domestically and abroad. Over the next 15 years, terrorists will become even more sophisticated in their targeting, propaganda, and political action operations. Terrorist state sponsors like Iran will continue to provide vital support to a disparate mix of terrorist groups and movements. The illegal drug trade and other forms of international organized crime, including piracy, and the illegal trade in weapons and strategic materials, will also persist, undermining the legitimacy of friendly governments, disrupting key regions and sea lanes, and threatening the safety of US citizens at home and abroad.<sup>45</sup>

By the halfway point of his second term, Clinton and his national security team provided a characterization of terrorism as transnational non-state actors that demanded consideration at the forefront of US national and international security concerns. The rapid proliferation of non-state actors gravitated toward the use of terrorism to advance their agendas emerged as a defining issue in the post-Cold War security environment. Interestingly enough, and despite its essential work done in identifying terrorism as a national and international security threat in the post-Soviet Union threat environment, the Clinton administration remained strangely silent on efforts to combat international terrorism in 1999 and 2000. Compared with its deep treatment and analysis of terrorism in its 1997 *Annual Report*, DoD's reports for 1999 and 2000 lacked any follow-up on the nature of the new enemy. It was not until after the Al Qaeda attacks on 11 September 2001 that the

predictions, first voiced in DoD's 1997 *Annual Report*, became the primary priority of the United States and the international community. With Al Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, this once obscure non-state actor convinced the United States that it was a serious and deadly threat to the nation's security and international stability. The GWOT had begun.

After the attacks on the United States by Al Qaeda, President George W. Bush enlisted the support of the international community in the GWOT. In fact, on 12 September 2001 the UN General Assembly and the Security Council "adopted resolutions condemning the attacks and calling on all states to cooperate in bringing the perpetrators to justice."<sup>46</sup> UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, declared that in the struggle with terrorism there is "no alternative to international cooperation."<sup>47</sup> Mimicking the language found in the DoD's 1997 *Annual Report*, Annan asserted the "greatest danger arises from non-state actor" and their potential to "obtain nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons."<sup>48</sup> To stem the threat of terrorists and their possible use of WMDs, Annan recommended the UN needed to take the following actions:

Redouble the efforts to ensure the universality, verification and full implementation of key treaties relating to weapons of mass destruction, including those outlawing chemical and biological weapons and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty; promote cooperation among international organizations dealing with these weapons; tighten national legislation over exports of goods and technologies needed to manufacture weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and develop new efforts to criminalize the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction by non-state groups.<sup>49</sup>

While the secretary general's initial recommendations focused on curbing and criminalizing the manufacture, distribution, and use of WMDs by terrorist groups, the Security Council moved to create the Counter-Terrorism Committee to report on the status and operations within the international community's efforts to combat terrorism.<sup>50</sup> In response to the measures enacted by the Security Council (resolutions 1368 and 1373) and the intensified

threat posed by terrorist groups, the UN General Assembly formed the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism in October 2001.<sup>51</sup>

The nations of the General Assembly believed the Policy Working Group provided assistance in the “global effort” to “dissuade groups from embracing terrorism, deny groups or individuals the means to carry out terrorist acts, and sustain broad-based international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism.”<sup>52</sup> Based upon the group’s mission, the General Assembly stipulated the Policy Working Group needed to focus on eight specific issues related to international terrorism.<sup>53</sup> The General Assembly decided to subdivide the scope of the Policy Working Group to provide a range of “diverse perspectives” on the various issues.<sup>54</sup> Ultimately, the creation of the Policy Working Group provided the UN with an active organization through which the international community could strive toward minimizing the threat of a WMD attack by terrorist groups. The Policy Working Group allowed the UN to be an active participant in the fight to eradicate this new international security threat.

Parallel with the actions taken by the UN in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 attacks, various other multinational organizations joined the US-led GWOT. Most notable, on 12 September 2001, NATO, a Cold War organization, for the first time in its history provisionally invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The language found in Article 5 states an “armed attack on one Ally in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”<sup>55</sup> Upon the determination that the attacks on the United States were “ordered from abroad,” Lord F.N. Robertson, secretary general of NATO, confirmed the alliance’s decision.<sup>56</sup> In the aftermath, NATO became a primary ally in the fight to end international terrorism. Specifically, NATO members agreed to “enhance intelligence sharing and cooperation, provide assistance, based on capabilities, to allies and other states in the campaign against terrorism, increase security measures for US facilities and other Allies on their territory, provide blanket overflight clearances for US and Allied aircraft, deploy naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as provide AWACS.”<sup>57</sup> NATO, by

the beginning of October 2001, firmly supported the GWOT by enacting military measures designed to assist the United States in the war on terrorism.

Beyond its initial support of the United States, NATO remained an active coalition partner in the GWOT by supporting the US and British operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.<sup>58</sup> NATO's support of the war on terrorism did not remain confined to alliance partners. In response to constant terrorist activity in Chechnya and threats posed by terrorist organizations throughout the Russian Federation, President Vladimir Putin met with NATO's Lord Robertson to discuss cooperation between NATO and Russia in Russia's war on terrorism.<sup>59</sup> By November 2001, NATO became a major actor in the international community's efforts to eradicate the threat posed by terrorist groups.

The international community's response to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States did not remain confined solely to military and political alliances. On 19 September 2001, the leaders of the Group of Eight (G8) "condemned the attacks" and offered assistance and cooperation.<sup>60</sup> The G8 leaders endorsed and implemented UN Resolution 1373, as well as supported the efforts of the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee.

Beyond just supporting and endorsing the efforts of other organizations, G8 members established a set of "principles and priorities" to aid in the defeat of terrorist groups.<sup>61</sup> The G8 believed curtailing terrorist access to finances, communication, and organization networks in Afghanistan substantially reduced the international security threat posed by terrorist groups.<sup>62</sup> Also, the G8 nations sought to "reduce the threat of terrorist attacks" by making travel safer for their citizens, limiting the number of sanctuaries available to terrorist groups, and providing improved cooperation in the international monitoring and tracking of terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations.<sup>63</sup> The actions taken and recommended by the members of the G8 nations supported, assisted, and strengthened the measures taken by other international actors such as the UN and NATO.

Taken as a sample of the international community's responses to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, the

measures advocated and enacted by the UN, NATO, and the G8 provided a network of interlocking military, legal, financial, and political actions designed to assist the United States in the GWOT. In the days and months after the attacks, the international community rallied with the United States to curb the threat posed by transnational terrorist groups. These political, military, financial, diplomatic, and judicial actions provided the United States and the international community with a solid foundation to pursue the GWOT. By the close of 2001, the United States and the international community succeeded in assembling a strong international coalition armed with a multitude of tools to defeat the threats posed by non-state terrorist organizations.

### **Measuring Success**

The unconventional nature of terrorism and the subsequent war on terrorism present specific issues when the question of “are we winning the war on terrorism?” is posed. Edward F. Mickolus, in his article “How Do We Know We’re Winning the War Against Terrorists? Issues in Measurement,” tackles this complex and vexing question. According to Mickolus, the analyst has a choice of characteristics to use in analysis. Some analysts opt to focus on “the characteristics of the group,” others on the “characteristics of the events,” and some on “behaviors.”<sup>64</sup> Each one of these approaches has merits and provides valuable insight into the “groups, events, and behaviors” of terrorist organizations. Despite their qualitative utility and the depth of their analytical penetration into the understanding of terrorism and terrorists, the approaches lack an ability to answer the simple question “is terrorism increasing or decreasing?”<sup>65</sup> To the “man on the street,” this is the true measure of the war on terrorism.<sup>66</sup> The process for providing a quantitative evaluation on the success of the GWOT mandates an events-focused approach be applied in this project.

The events-focused approach is simply compiling numerical data on the types, targets, and regions of terrorist activities for a given period. While Mickolus acknowledges the events-focused approach provides the best answer to the question “is terrorism increasing or decreasing?” he highlights a few shortcomings as well.<sup>67</sup> First and foremost, Mickolus notes it is difficult to

establish a baseline of “normal terrorist activity.”<sup>68</sup> Therefore, characterization of increasing or decreasing activity may provide a skewed conclusion. As an example, Mickolus observes terrorist groups may need time for planning operations, and these down periods provide false readings if one is counting the number of events within a specific time period and comparing it against another.<sup>69</sup> According to Mickolus, these limitations do not subvert the usefulness of the events-based paradigm, but rather demand that the analyst using the process simply be “aware of the inherent limitations” of the events-based approach.

In the context of judging the adaptation of terrorist organizations to the GWOT, the positive attributes of the events-based approach outweigh its limitations. Based upon Mickolus’s analysis, the events-based analytical methodology provides insight into the identification of trends. Using this methodology for analysis, one can ascertain if the terrorist organizations are: “continuing with the same type of attacks, shifting to new targets, using new innovative types of attacks, and/or changing their calculus of the cost involved.”<sup>70</sup> The trends identified through the events-based methodology provide data useful in judging the adaptation of terrorist groups to the declared GWOT. Additionally, the events-based methodology allows a comparison of terrorist activity before and after the 11 September 2001 attacks.

While the use of the events based methodology provides insight into trends of terrorist activities, it is necessary to collate this numerical data with observations and analysis provided by experts. Therefore, I will supplement the analysis derived from the event-based methodology with the opinions and analysis found in scholarly and professional journals. Combined, these two sources provide a snapshot of terrorist activity from 1990 to 2003 aimed at discerning how non-state terrorist organizations adapted to the GWOT. While the GWOT is ongoing, it must be acknowledged that any analysis at this juncture is only a small segment of an enduring and much larger and complex analytical process. Despite this limitation, this study provides a significant assessment of the emergent trends within the quest to exterminate terrorism as an international security threat within the first years of the declared GWOT.



## On Sources

In considering the events conducted by terrorist organizations, the State Department since the 1980s compiles an annual report titled *Patterns of Global Terrorism*. Within these reports, the State Department provides a yearly overview of terrorism, terrorist organizations, and their activity. In reporting on the annual activities of terrorists, the State Department offers a regional analysis, a chronology of events, and background information on the “major groups” identified in the report. In addition to this useful information, the State Department provides a statistical review of international and anti-US terrorist attacks. For the purpose of this study, both categories of terrorist events presented in *Patterns of Global Terrorism* are considered. Within the review of “International Terrorist Incidents” and the “Anti-US Attacks,” the State Department categorizes the attacks by “region, type of facility, type of victim, and casualties.” To provide a comparative and useful analysis of the adaptation of terrorists to the GWOT, the data set spans will remain parallel and cover the years 1990 to 2003. The process of using parallel categories provides a basic comparison of events prior to and after the attacks on 11 September 2001 as a way to gauge terrorist activity and actions in two distinct epochs. The comprehensive nature of *Patterns of Global Terrorism* necessitates that it will be the primary source for the analysis of terrorist activity. This event-based approach lacks insight into the impact of the measures enacted by the United States and its international allies in the GWOT; therefore, to gauge the impact of these measures, a different variety of sources are necessary.

Professional and scholarly journals such as *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, and *Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International* provide critical analysis into the operation of terrorist groups in the years prior to and after 11 September 2001. The authors within these sources attempt to assess the impact of the military, criminal, financial, and political measures enacted by the United States and its allies in the GWOT. Together, the primary and secondary sources merge to present a broader and richer analysis of the evolution of non-state terrorist organizations within the security environment defined by the GWOT.

## New Terrorism

Terrorism since 1968 has been coined “new terrorism” as a way to distinguish it from previous epochs. Bruce Hoffman, of the RAND Corporation, argues that terrorism in the past “was practiced by groups of individuals belonging to an identifiable organization with a clear command and control apparatus who had a defined set of political, social, or economic objectives.”<sup>71</sup> Hoffman believes that a distinction exists between the “traditional” and “new” terrorists based upon the traditional terrorist use of public “communiqués” to justify their actions within their particular ideological beliefs.<sup>72</sup> Specifically, Hoffman identifies the Japanese Red Army (JRA), the Red Brigades of Italy, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Abu Nidal, and the Basque Separatist Group (ETA) as traditional terrorist groups. A further distinction exists between “traditional” and new terrorist groups in that “traditional” groups practiced “highly selective and discriminate acts of violence” on “symbolic targets” to attract “attention and advance their cause.”<sup>73</sup> The objective of these “traditional” groups was not to maximize the number of casualties, but rather to use acts of violence (kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings) to support their prescribed agendas. The key determinant between the traditional terrorist organizations and the new terrorist organizations is in their practice of violent acts, the issuance of a claim of responsibility, their command and control structure, and professed ideology.

The new terrorists are organizationally diffused, intent on inflicting mass casualties, religiously aligned, and content with maintaining “anonymity.”<sup>74</sup> The transition between traditional and new terrorist groups essentially means that today terrorist organizations are “far more lethal,” evasive, and dispersed than they were several decades ago. Hoffman, writing before the Al Qaeda attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, stressed that despite the systemic augmentations of the new terrorist organizations, the threat posed by new terrorists may be “exaggerated.”<sup>75</sup> Hoffman followed up this assertion by recognizing terrorism remained “a serious threat to America and American interests both in this country and overseas.”<sup>76</sup> Obviously, the

attacks on 11 September 2001 categorically challenged Hoffman's notion of new terrorist groups as not living up to their preferred intent for mass violence.

The new terrorists emerged in the late 1960s and the early 1970s as various non-state terrorist groups heightened their visibility through bombings and actions that caught the attention of the international news media. In 1972, the Palestinian-based Black September shocked the international community by brashly taking Israeli athletes hostage in the midst of the 1972 Olympics. This single event remains one of the most significant terrorist events that ushered in the era of the new terrorism. Under the watchful eye of international news cameras, the events at the Munich Olympics unfolded before the world. The bloody climax came when the terrorists and their hostages attempted to leave, and West German police attempted to neutralize the terrorists and free the hostages. Unfortunately, the Israeli hostages as well as the terrorists died in the ensuing gun battle. The tragedy of this single event prompted the United States and the international community to recognize two important points. First, terrorism and terrorists posed a threat to national, regional, and international stability. Second, as a direct result of the botched rescue attempt carried out by West German police in 1972, the nations of the international community recognized the need for effective counterterrorism forces. Because of the terrorists' actions at the 1972 Olympics, new terrorism became a permanent and recognized part of the international security environment. Despite an emerging recognition by European nations of the international security threat posed by terrorist organizations, the United States remained primarily focused on the context and threats found within the dynamics of the Cold War, rather than the threats posed by terrorists and terrorist organizations.<sup>77</sup>

Throughout the 1970s, the international community witnessed sharp spikes in the number of international terrorist events.<sup>78</sup> Specifically in Northern Ireland, Europe, and the Middle East, terrorist attacks flourished.<sup>79</sup> Additionally in this period, the hijacking of commercial aircraft became a political tactic of terrorist groups to advance their agenda, as well as provide a quick

means of transportation to a terrorist-friendly nations. Interestingly enough, the hijackers seldom harmed the crew and passengers, as long as victims cooperated with the terrorists' demands. By the 1990s, flight crews were informed to concede to the demands of hijackers as a quick way to diffuse the situation. Analysis of Al Qaeda's attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 speculated that the flight crews of the four hijacked aircraft initially followed this "proven" method. Seemingly by the end of the 20th century, the hijacking of aircraft had become little more than a nuisance and major inconvenience to the crews and passengers involved. Although the hijacking of aircraft often ended with minimal casualties, the international community took lessons from the 1972 Olympics and began using specialized paramilitary and police forces to neutralize the hijackers.<sup>80</sup> Internationally, counterterrorism measures increased as the scale and scope of terrorism expanded in the 1970s and 1980s.

In addition to hijacking, new terrorists used bombs, fire-bombing, vandalism, arson, and kidnapping as methods to advance and gain notoriety for their cause.<sup>81</sup> By the 1980s, the hijacking of aircraft had given way to bombing as the preferred method of terrorist groups to advance their agendas. Three specific examples demonstrate the evolution of terrorists toward more violent and destructive acts. In 1983, a suspected Hezbollah "suicide bomber" killed 241 US Marines when he drove his truckload of explosives into the US Marine compound in Beirut, Lebanon.<sup>82</sup> Second, Sikh terrorists exploded an Air India flight in 1985, killing all 328 people aboard.<sup>83</sup> Last, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi "commissioned" the bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 278 people aboard the aircraft.<sup>84</sup> Combined, terrorists killed a total of 847 people in these three individual bombing incidents. In comparison, RAND analysts Brian Jenkins and Janera Johnson established international terrorists killed 247 people in 1974.<sup>85</sup> Jenkins and Johnson characterized 1974 as a particularly bad year, as the total number of casualties from terrorism had surpassed those found in the period 1970 to 1973.<sup>86</sup> By the middle of the 1980s, it appeared that terrorists had begun to target great numbers of civilians. The number of casualties in the 1970s and the 1980s reaffirms the transition from the "traditional terrorist" era to the

“new” era as one of increased violence. Beyond the use of more violent tactics designed to kill greater numbers of people, the new terrorist era witnessed a gravitation of groups away from political and economic ideology toward the theology driven transnational terrorist organizations.

Largely stemming from the takeover in Iran by the radical cleric Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, militant Islam became an ideological foundation for the perpetuation of terrorism and terrorist organizations within the international security environment. Prior to the rise of Khomeini, the majority of international terrorist organizations tended to focus on nationalist, social, or political issues. Groups such as the IRA, ETA, and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) focused exclusively on the liberation of their people from the control of the British, Spanish, and Israelis. Each of these terrorist groups easily incorporated the tactics and strategies associated with the new terrorism into their organizations and in their fight for national sovereignty. Beyond the advancement of nationalistic goals, terrorist groups, such as the JRA, Red Brigades of Italy, and the Baader-Meinhof group of West Germany, sought to advance various forms of Marxism within the international community by advocating and practicing the use of terrorism. Like the nationalist-focused terrorist groups, the JRA, Red Brigades, and the Baader-Meinhof Group easily integrated the elements associated with new terrorism into their operational strategies and objectives. Contrary to the argument made by Hoffman, the above mentioned terrorist groups blurred the distinction between “traditional” and “new” terrorism.<sup>87</sup> Building on experience gained in the decades prior to the 1970s and 1980s, all six groups remained active participants in the use of terrorism well into the post 11 September 2001 era. Moreover, the rise of the new terrorist era coincided with the political rise of Khomeini and his adherence to radical Islam in Iran. The Iranian support and sponsorship of terrorist organizations in the declared *jihad* against the West additionally characterized the era of new terrorism.

The establishment of a revolutionary “Islamic theocracy” by Khomeini in Iran in 1979 provided a shining example to militant Shi’ite Muslims around the world as hope for the future. Historian John Murphy observes Khomeini recognized this

attraction and used his position to advance the cause of militant Islam.<sup>88</sup> Specifically, Khomeini, Hussein Ali Montazerti (head of the Council for Islamic Revolution), and Iranian President Ali Khameni stressed that “Islamic Iran would be the source of funds and training camps for any Muslim anxious to carry out the permanent holy war.”<sup>89</sup> Coincidentally, at the same time Khomeini established Iran as the epicenter of militant Islam, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and Iran became a major source of funds and training for the Islamic *mujahidin* freedom fighters in their vicious opposition to the Soviet Union’s invasion.

Within the context of the Cold War, the United States overlooked the theological underpinnings of the *mujahidin* fighters and covertly assisted in their arming and training. Beyond the fundamental ideological differences, the United States (specifically the Reagan administration) saw the *mujahidin* and their success in the Afghanistan war as an opportunity to stem communist expansion and weaken the Soviet Union. Only after the demise of the Cold War and the rise of transnational terrorism did links between the United States and Osama bin Laden surface in the context of the Afghan war in the 1980s. The Afghan war provided an excellent training ground for militant Muslims to become battle hardened and demonstrate their faith in the concept of a perpetual *jihad*. Iran remained at the epicenter of this fundamental change in the international security environment by advocating and supporting like-minded terrorist organizations.

The Iranian revolution and the Afghanistan war led to the emergence of sympathetic terrorist militia groups, such as Hezbollah, designed to advance a militant Muslim cause.<sup>90</sup> Amid the political turmoil and chaos of Lebanon’s civil war in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Hezbollah formed to halt the “usurpation of Muslim lands” and to “serve their community” against the Israelis.<sup>91</sup> Specifically, Hezbollah sought to emulate the Iranian example and establish an Islamic Republic in Lebanon and believed Lebanon needed to purge “all non-Islamic influence.”<sup>92</sup> Based upon these beliefs, Hezbollah became vehemently anti-West and anti-Israel.<sup>93</sup> Acting on its beliefs, Hezbollah attacked US and Israeli forces in Lebanon during their peacekeeping operations, which ultimately led President Reagan to remove US Marines

from Lebanon. Hezbollah advanced its agenda through the use of bombings as well as guerilla operations throughout Lebanon and Israel. By the mid-1990s, Hezbollah attempted to distance itself from its terrorist past by recasting itself as a quasi-legitimate political actor within the regional politics of the Middle East as well as within Lebanon.<sup>94</sup>

Hezbollah was not the only militant Islamic organization that emerged after the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power. The rise of Hezbollah characterizes the essence of new terrorism. The rise of militant Islamic terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah evolved in the late 1970s and early 1980s and ascended to their zenith as the Cold War screeched to a halt. In a break with traditional terrorist organizations, these new groups used strong international ties to support their agendas. Recruitment was not limited to a specific country or region, but strove to attract like-minded Muslims from around the world, who believed in the goals and theology advocated by the militant Muslims. Once the groups had recruited from around the globe, they sent their “soldiers” off to training camps funded and sponsored by states, charity organizations, and wealthy individuals. These camps thrived in the Middle East, Northern Africa, and Central Asia to instruct *jihadists* in bomb making, infiltration, communication techniques, and militant theology of the Islamic terrorist organizations. In addition to the training camps, these transnational terrorist groups relied on a complicated web of legal and extra legal financial resources to support their sustained operations. Ultimately, these new terrorist groups believed they were engaged in an ideological struggle with the West.<sup>95</sup> By the end of the Cold War, a whole range of highly advanced, well-funded, and substantially armed transnational terrorist organizations existed within the international security environment. These non-state based security threats posed a substantial risk to national, regional, and international stability. In the midst of this environment, Al Qaeda emerged as the ultimate model of a transnational terrorist organization.

### **The Case of Al Qaeda**

In the wake of its attacks on the United States, Al Qaeda became one of the most widely known transnational terrorist organizations

in history. Prior to these attacks, however, the group and its leader, Bin Laden, remained relatively unknown.<sup>96</sup> However, despite its low international profile, Al Qaeda became the embodiment of a new terrorist organization. Originally developed with the specific objective to train like-minded “Islamic extremists” in the fight against the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, Saudi national bin Laden joined the *mujahidin* resistance in 1979 and later founded Al Qaeda.<sup>97</sup> Bin Laden used his family’s amassed material wealth to help “recruit, finance, and train” *mujahidin* resistance fighters for the Afghan War.<sup>98</sup> Having participated in the successful defeat of the Soviet Union, bin Laden used experience gained in Afghanistan to construct a well-funded, trained, and organized transnational terrorist organization designed to combat the “ideals and influence of unbelievers.”<sup>99</sup> Bin Laden’s objective was to “re-establish the caliphate” by reaching out to support Muslims (Sunni and Shi’ite) oppressed by “non-Muslim regimes.”<sup>100</sup> As Iran and the Ayatollah Khomeini became the epicenter of the first wave of new terrorism in the early 1980s, bin Laden and Al Qaeda emerged in the 1990s as the primary terrorist source willing to support, fund, and train terrorist groups and individuals committed to the *jihād* against the West.

The origins of Al Qaeda are of profound significance to the status and structure of the organization today. During the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan, *mujahidin* fighters “portrayed the event as a holy war,” which resonated throughout the Islamic world.<sup>101</sup> Islamic freedom fighters committed to ejecting the foreign invaders from Afghanistan converged from around the globe to fight the Soviet Union. In addition to the indigenous support from various local Islamic sources, the *mujahidin* received substantial support from the US, European, and Saudi Arabian governments.<sup>102</sup> The experiences gained by *mujahidin* fighters in Afghanistan served as a common force in the creation of Al Qaeda’s network.<sup>103</sup> The success in Afghanistan led militant Muslims to assume a “heady sense of confidence” and belief that they assisted in the demise of the once-powerful Soviet Union.<sup>104</sup> The development of an esprit de corps among the radical *mujahidin* led to an intensified belief in the concept of the *jihād*. The Afghan war provided bin Laden with a “rolodex” of willing participants in his vision for the future.



In the aftermath of the *mujahidin*'s success in Afghanistan, the global security environment fundamentally changed, significantly influencing the belief and vision of Bin Laden. In the summer of 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded the oil-rich kingdom of Kuwait, provoking a military response from the United States and the UN. Saudi Arabia, fearing an invasion, granted permission to the United States and its alliance partners to use its military and port facilities to launch Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. In an effort to appease Muslims and Arabs alike, the Saudi government initially required the foreign troops to leave after the cessation of hostilities. However, in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM, Saudi Arabia allowed US and coalition forces to remain in the country to enforce the peace settlement. This action by the Saudi royal family led bin Laden to claim they were "false Muslims" for renegeing on their policy concerning the US presence.<sup>105</sup> Bin Laden used the opportunity to call for the installation of a "true Islamic state in Saudi Arabia."<sup>106</sup> In response to his claim about the royal family being "false Muslims," as well as his call for the establishment of a "new state," the Saudi government deported bin Laden and revoked his citizenship in 1994. As a result of his diplomatic troubles, bin Laden increasingly relied upon the contacts and networks he had fostered while fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Using his international contacts and his vast monetary resources, bin Laden renewed the fight against "globalization" in Bosnia, Kashmir, the Philippines, and the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union.<sup>107</sup> Through the early stages of building his new transnational terrorist network, bin Laden moved between bases in Sudan and Pakistan before settling in Afghanistan. With the control of Afghanistan in the hands of the radical Islamic Taliban regime, bin Laden had sympathetic governmental support for his declaration of war against "foreign unbelievers."<sup>108</sup> Beyond the charisma of its leader, the revolutionary nature of Al Qaeda as a new terrorist group stemmed directly from bin Laden's reliance on an ideology with mass appeal to militant Muslims. Bin Laden relied upon his business education to develop an organizational structure and diverse financial network to support his militant Islamic network of terrorists.

According to Al Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna, bin Laden and Al Qaeda subscribe to an ideology that is general and broad in appeal to “Middle eastern and non-Middle eastern groups that are Islamic in character.”<sup>109</sup> Anti-Western and anti-Israeli rhetoric forms the foundation of Al Qaeda’s ideological paradigm. Gunaratna argues that bin Laden’s reliance on using militant Islamic theology to target the United States and Israel allows the message to have a “global and resilient appeal” to militant radical Muslims.<sup>110</sup> To further capitalize on his mass appeal, bin Laden emphasizes the development of “pan-Islam unity” aimed toward the establishment of a “community of believers or a *umma*” to displace the hegemony of the West.<sup>111</sup> Within the post-Soviet security environment, the United States embraced an expanded interventionist foreign policy in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. Bin Laden used these endeavors as examples to justify his call to combat the expansionistic tendencies of Western culture and ideology led by the United States. This attack against America’s cultural, political, and military encroachment struck a chord with militant Muslims around the globe, and bin Laden used this to his advantage. Gunaratna observes Al Qaeda believes “until US troops are removed from all lands of the Muslims, no Muslim is absolved from sin except the *mujahidin*.”<sup>112</sup> This belief had mass appeal to the militant Muslim community, which is the exact group bin Laden wished to mobilize.

To advance his theological paradigm, bin Laden and Al Qaeda members believe they are fighting a perpetual *jihad* against the West. This “call to battle” allows bin Laden to cast his struggle as a zero-sum struggle. From bin Laden’s perspective, the zero-sum nature of this conflict demands steadfast belief and devout principles. Beyond the ideological/theological foundations of Al Qaeda, bin Laden revolutionized the structure of terrorist organizations by moving away from the strictly centralized model of traditional organizations.<sup>113</sup> While the core structure of Al Qaeda is vertically aligned in a traditional manner, the organization also relies heavily upon semiautonomous cells found in operational territories throughout the globe that are “horizontally integrated” into the centralized command structure.<sup>114</sup> This amorphous structure permits the central command to maintain control over

specifically identified strategic operations, such as the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, while also allowing the cells to maintain autonomy in their own local and regional operations. The organizational structure of Al Qaeda is important to its success.

Bin Laden is at the pinnacle of the core-centralized structure. Below are the Shura majilis, who operate as a “consultative council” on the day-to-day operational and management details needed to maintain the vast Al Qaeda network.<sup>115</sup> The Shura majilis receive information from four subordinate committees designed to focus on the specific segments of planning and operations. The military, finance, religious/legal, and media committees independently handle compartmentalized portions of current and future Al Qaeda operations. The military committee, by far the most robust and active of the four committees, is directly responsible for “recruiting, training, procuring, and launching support and military operations.”<sup>116</sup> Base teams work with field teams in “planning and preparing attacks,” including the analysis and dissemination of intelligence, training and procurement of armaments, and the arrangement of necessary documents such as passports and visas needed to conduct the operation.<sup>117</sup>

In coordination with the military committee, the other three committees operate to support and sustain operations. The finance committee, as the name implies, is responsible for overseeing and developing the “financial resources needed to sustain Al Qaeda and its operations.”<sup>118</sup> Al Qaeda relies on a complicated global system of “licit and illicit companies, private investors, government sponsors, and religious charities” to fund its operations.<sup>119</sup> Breaking from the other terrorist organizations, Al Qaeda relies on the use of “legitimate businesses to generate revenue” to sustain its operations.<sup>120</sup> In addition to the use of legitimate businesses such as “construction companies, agriculture products, fishing boats, and furniture companies,” Al Qaeda relies on the covert use of philanthropic “Islamic nongovernment organizations (NGOs).”<sup>121</sup> Combining the use of legitimate businesses and the charity organizations allows Al Qaeda to retain a substantial capability to generate large sums of capital despite actions taken by the United States and the UN to freeze the financial assets of the terrorist organization.<sup>122</sup>

The remaining committees, the religious/legal and the media, are removed from the operational side of Al Qaeda's planning. However, they remain vital in the overall synergy of the network. The religious/legal committee "justifies" the actions and operations of attacks within the theological parameters of "Al Qaeda's model of Islam."<sup>123</sup> In bin Laden's ultimate objective of reestablishing the caliphate, the justification of attacks and operations within the tenets of Islam are necessary because they reinforce the significance of the movement. All actions taken by Al Qaeda are interpreted within the context of bin Laden's radical theology. To further spread the word of Al Qaeda's actions, the terrorist organization relies on a media committee to produce "news and information" in support of Al Qaeda operations.<sup>124</sup> The actions of the media committee build upon the justifications of the attacks by the religious/legal committee to produce propaganda designed to influence Muslims to support the Al Qaeda organization and its objectives.

The coordinated actions advocated by the military, finance, religious/legal, and media committees stream in from Al Qaeda-linked cells found throughout the globe. These cells have their own organizational structures and operate both directly in support of centralized directives and upon their own individual plans. This loosely organized cell structure provides Al Qaeda with regional and operational flexibility by allowing the cells to generate and raise their own capital, as well as plan their own operations. Using this diffused method of organization, bin Laden influences a much broader segment of the international political spectrum, more so than if all operations were run and controlled by the centralized network. While the cells have autonomy, they have received strict, rigid, and detailed training in conducting their business based upon the exacting requirements of bin Laden's Al Qaeda model.

The organizational structure of Al Qaeda enables the network to sustain itself and its operations within the increasingly hostile environment of the GWOT. Despite significant arrests, foiled operations, and tighter financial controls, Al Qaeda remains adaptive and flexible. More than any other terrorist group, Al Qaeda embodies the complex and complicated nature of new terrorism.

## Combating New Terrorists

In the post-Cold War security environment, transnational threats such as terrorist groups emerged to fill the void left by the demise of the Soviet Union. However, unlike the days of the Cold War where military and diplomatic solutions provided the best options to combat the expansive enemy, the United States and the international community remained unsure of how to target and prosecute transnational terrorists. Essentially, the United States and other nations used criminal and financial methods to prosecute and bring terrorist organizations to justice for two reasons. First, the use of criminal proceedings to combat terrorism allows the US government and other nations to apply legislation that has a proven track record in fighting crime. By characterizing transnational terrorist groups as criminal enterprises, the nations of the international community can use the well-established international networks, such as INTERPOL, to combat the actions and movement of terrorist members. Through the application of criminal legislation, the United States and the international community are attempting to decapitate and erode the membership of transnational terrorist organizations. Experience in fighting transnational organized crime factions provided the model the United States and other nations used to begin their attack on non-state terrorist organizations.<sup>125</sup>

By using their experiences to combat the influence of transnational organized crime groups, the United States and the UN have expanded the scope and application of traditional criminal legislation to apply to terrorist groups. The objective behind the application of criminal statutes is to weaken the leadership of terrorist organizations by degrading their operational capability. Law enforcement agencies have been successful in applying this approach to capture leadership in Al Qaeda. However, this method has not curbed membership at the lower levels.

In conjunction with the application of criminal legislation, the United States and the UN have sought to erode the capability and operations of terrorist organizations by limiting the international terrorists' access to operating finances. Money is a vital component in the operations carried out by terrorist organizations. Therefore,

the United States and the UN have surmised that if the international community can limit a terrorist organization's access to its capital, the nations of the world can slowly destroy the operational capability of terrorist organizations. The Banking Secrecy Act and the Money Laundering Control Act are two examples of legislation used by the United States to deprive terrorist organizations of their operating funds.<sup>126</sup> As with the use of criminal legislation, the experience gained from fighting and prosecuting organized crime groups provides vital insight into the adaptation and evolution of financial legislation for the war on terrorism.

The United States and its allies in the war on terrorism extensively use criminal and financial methods to erode the growing presence of transnational terrorist organizations. Clinton established a precedent when he used executive orders as an additional tool to fight transnational terrorism. Specifically, Clinton issued Executive Order (E.O.)12947 on 23 January 1995 to deter potential terrorists from disrupting or attempting to stop the Middle-East peace process. Clinton stated in the E.O. 12947 "grave acts of violence committed by foreign terrorists that disrupt the Middle-East peace process constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States."<sup>127</sup> The executive order also outlawed an individual or a group's "financial, material, and technological support and/or assistance" to terrorist organizations identified as hostile to the Middle-East peace process.<sup>128</sup> Although Clinton issued E.O. 12947 to ensure stability in the peace process, the document provides another example of US legislative attempts to reduce the support and influence of terrorist organizations in the years prior to the attacks by Al Qaeda.

In addition to the use of criminal legislation, financial legislation, and executive orders to fight terrorism, military force is yet another tool available to political leaders as they attempt to curb the threat posed by groups such as Al Qaeda.<sup>129</sup> However, until the openly declared "GWOT" by President George W. Bush, the military option remained the most reserved and guarded response used by US presidents.

As the United States expanded its fight against terrorism in the 1990s, so did the UN. Scholars Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss argue “prior to the 1990s, the General Assembly of the UN approached the issue of terrorism as a general international problem.”<sup>130</sup> Within this period, the General Assembly strove to develop “an international framework for cooperation among states,” while still directly avoiding a definition of terrorism.<sup>131</sup> Based on increased terrorist activity in the 1990s, the persistent issue of terrorism slowly gravitated toward the jurisdiction of the Security Council and away from the General Assembly. Boulden and Weiss observe that the “attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the bombing of American embassies, and first attacks on the World Trade Center” led the Security Council to begin issuing sanctions as a way to deal with the state sponsorship of terrorism.<sup>132</sup> The Security Council directed these actions against nations such as Libya and Sudan, which supported terrorism, and any other nation refusing to cooperate with the rest of the international community in the condemnation of terrorism. In the aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC, the UN and the Security Council fundamentally embraced the position of President George W. Bush in his efforts to eradicate the threat posed by terrorism by initiating a “global war on terrorism.”

Although efforts to combat terrorism before 11 September 2001 had been well established, the severity and high casualties in the Al Qaeda attacks reinforced the sentiments within the United States and the international community that terrorism needed to be stopped. International actors such as the UN and NATO, as well as individual nations such as Britain and Russia, pledged to assist in the US war to eradicate transnational terrorist groups. The response to terrorism by the United States and the nations of the world fundamentally changed after 11 September 2001.

For the United States, actions taken against terrorist groups prior to 11 September 2001 focused on the criminal actions and financial assets of transnational terrorist networks in an effort to reduce their operational capability. In the period after the attacks,

President George W. Bush established that the United States would use all means necessary to combat the forces of terrorism. Bush warned that nations assisting, supporting, or conducting terrorist operations would be held accountable for their actions. Bush openly declared a GWOT and broke with previous administrations by arguing the transnational terrorist threat, posed specifically by Al Qaeda and its leader bin Laden, demanded overt military force. Bush and his National Security Council viewed the attacks as “acts of war.”<sup>133</sup> As the administration officially linked Al Qaeda and bin Laden to the attacks, Bush’s cabinet moved to align the nation for a “campaign against terrorism.”<sup>134</sup> Congress supported the president’s decision by “approving a joint resolution that authorized the use of armed force against those responsible for the attacks.”<sup>135</sup> Secretary of State Colin Powell diplomatically maneuvered to align nations with the US position, while Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his staff at DoD worked on putting together a military package to use against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government in Afghanistan.

On 7 October 2001, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM began. The initial stage of the attack consisted of “aircraft and cruise missile attacks on Taliban forces, Al Qaeda fighters, training sites, command and control systems, and radar installations” in Afghanistan.<sup>136</sup> The second phase of the operations entailed the landing of US Special Forces and Army Rangers.<sup>137</sup> Behind the special forces and rangers, US Marine Corps Expeditionary Units (MEUs) followed to establish a base in the vicinity of Kandahar, from which US forces could fight for control of the nation.<sup>138</sup>

The combat operations carried out in Afghanistan by the United States were not unilateral. The British, Russian, and Pakistani governments as well as other nations overtly supported and contributed to the combat effort.<sup>139</sup> The sustained combat operations in Afghanistan by the United States and its allies against the Taliban and Al Qaeda therefore represent a fundamental break with how nations attempted to combat terrorism prior to September 2001. The use of overwhelming military force is not what made this action different; rather it was the alliance forged in the wake of 11 September 2001 to reduce the international security threat posed by transnational terrorist groups.



In conjunction with the use of military power, the United States and the international community recognized the fight against terrorism demanded the application of a whole spectrum of approaches. The work done before 11 September 2001 became fundamentally significant because it provided a foundation upon which the United States and the international community began to build and expand common links found throughout the national systems. The link of transnational organized crime, arms traffickers, and narcotics traffickers to terrorist organizations proved to be one such connection made and pursued in the international community's fight to eradicate transnational terrorist groups. The use of criminal, financial, and immigration legislation, combined with the use of force by law enforcement and military organizations, converged to offer the nations allied in the GWOT a plethora of tools to combat the transnational terrorist activity. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, the international community worked diligently with the United States to establish a loosely grouped cooperative network of national and international laws designed to curtail and eventually eradicate threats posed by terrorist organizations. The actions taken by the United States and the international community discussed thus far describe how Al Qaeda's attacks forced the United States and the international community to focus on transnational terrorism as an international security issue. The second part of this study details the adaptation of terrorist groups since they were first identified as a potential security risk in the immediate post-Cold War environment.

### **Assessing the Numbers**

Since the 1980s, the US State Department has compiled annual data on the actions and attacks conducted by terrorists. These annual reports provide the numerical data on international terrorist attacks as well as anti-US attacks. Combined, these sources provide a composite of terrorist activity prior to and after the established GWOT.

Before a detailed analysis of the adaptation of terrorist organizations after the declaration of the GWOT, it would be useful to compare the trends of international terrorism from the beginning of the new terrorist era in 1968 to the current

environment. The trend from 1968 to 2003 demonstrates that the peak of international terrorism occurred well before the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (see Figure 1). The peak of international terrorist events reached its apogee in 1987 before falling off significantly in 1989. According to the State Department, the total number of terrorist activities reached a high of 665 incidents in 1987.<sup>140</sup> Alone, these numbers mean virtually nothing; however, when compared with




Figure 1. Total Terrorist Events, 1968-2003

In comparison with the high point of 665 incidents in 1987, at the start of the new terrorist era in 1968, the total numbers of events failed to ascend beyond 200.<sup>141</sup> Between 1968 and 1970, international terrorist activity steadily increased to a high of approximately 300 incidents.<sup>142</sup> In 1971, the total number of terrorist incidents slightly decreased to just over 200 events before reaching a high of approximately 550 in 1972. This high point of terrorist activity in the first years of the new terrorist era produced a trend in which terrorist activity remained between 350 and 580 total incidents for the remainder of the decade.<sup>143</sup> Overall, the 1970s witnessed a slow and steady increase in the total number of international terrorist events. By the end of the decade,

international terrorist incidents more than doubled. Despite this steady increase, terrorism for the United States remained a relative nuisance that flared up from time to time and demanded cursory presidential attention.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the base level of international terrorist events started at 499.<sup>144</sup> While this total number of events was more than double the number of the events carried out in 1968 by international terrorist groups, the initial years of the 1980s witnessed a flat growth rate in the total number of terrorist incidents. From 1980 to the end of 1983, the total number of terrorist activities fluctuated no more than 10 incidents.<sup>145</sup> Beginning in 1984, terrorist activity increased to beyond 600 incidents per year. The rise above 500 total incidents, which had not been seen since 1978, emerged in 1984. Unlike the years 1973 and 1978 that saw the terrorist activity immediately drop after spiking, between 1984 and 1989 the total number of incidents remained above 600. Contrary to the trend throughout the 1980s, terrorist groups slowed their pace of attacks significantly in 1989 to just 375 incidents.<sup>146</sup>

This low point for international terrorist activity coincided with the first rumbling of the demise of the Cold War security environment. Despite this short reprieve for the international community, international terrorist groups rebounded from their low in 1989 to a pinnacle of 565 events in 1991.<sup>147</sup> Despite the vast increase made between 1989 and 1991 (a jump of 180 events over two years) by terrorist groups, their activity fell off again in 1994.<sup>148</sup> International terrorist activity again surged in 1995 to 440 events before this vacillating trend stabilized in the period 1996 to 1999.<sup>149</sup> At the turn of the century, total international terrorist attacks stood at approximately 400 events per year, which represented an approximate 100-percent increase in terrorist activity from the beginning of the new terrorist era in 1968. Clearly by the end of the 20th century, terrorist groups had become a much more visible threat to international, regional, and national security and stability.

Al Qaeda's attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 provided the impetus for the GWOT. President Bush led the

international charge to curtail the threat posed by transnational terrorist groups. While the United States and Great Britain, as well as organizations such as the UN and NATO, responded to the war on terrorism, the statistics provided by the US State Department offer a different perspective.

Before the 11 September 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda, the trend of international terrorist incidents ebbed in 1998 to 274 events throughout the globe.<sup>150</sup> The year 1998 represents a low point for the total number of international terrorist events. Not since the beginning of the new terrorist era had the international community experienced such a low number of total terrorist incidents. By 1999, the decreasing trend in the total number of international terrorist events reversed itself. For the year, terrorists carried out 395 events as compared with 274 in 1998.<sup>151</sup> This net increase of 121 events brought the total number of international terrorist events to a level approximately that found in 1974.<sup>152</sup> The general upward trend that began at the close of the 20th century maintained its trajectory throughout 2000. In 2000, the international community witnessed 426 international terrorist events, marking a major upswing from the low of 1998.<sup>153</sup> Yet the number of terrorist events experienced in 2000, although high, was still well below the high point witnessed by the global community in 1987.<sup>154</sup> On the eve of Al Qaeda's 11 September 2001 attacks, the international community was at the apogee of a spike in the total number of international terrorist attacks. While at first this trend may seem alarming, the total number of terrorist attacks experienced in 2000 was only approximately two-thirds of the total number experienced in the second half of the 1980s, when terrorism was considered an international, regional, or national nuisance rather than a major international security and stability threat. Due to the high number of casualties, the method of attack, and the sophistication of Al Qaeda's planning, the events of 11 September 2001 fundamentally challenged the international community's perception about the need to combat transnational terrorist groups in the interest of international, regional, and national stability and security.

Reporting in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US State Department reported a sharp decline in the total

number of international terrorist attacks. For 2001, international terrorist groups carried out 355 attacks, including the three attacks by Al Qaeda cells on the United States.<sup>155</sup> A cursory glance at the statistics provided by the State Department leads one to assume that the rapid response by the United States and the international community in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks influenced the decline in the total number of international terrorist attacks in the closing months of 2001. Despite the noticeable dip in the total number of terrorist attacks from 426 in 2000 to just 355 in 2001, attribution for the decrease in terrorist activity cannot be placed solely on the actions and policies enacted by the United States and the international community in the aftermath of 11 September 2001.<sup>156</sup>

While the overall number of international terrorist attacks decreased by 71 attacks between 2000 and 2001, the global community saw an even greater decline of international terrorist attacks in the following years. After a year of being engaged in the GWOT, the international community experienced just 198 terrorist attacks for 2002.<sup>157</sup> Judging from statistics provided by the US State Department, the first year of the GWOT had substantially reduced the overall ability of transnational terrorist organizations to execute attacks. In comparison, the total number of international terrorist attacks in 2002 was the third lowest point in history of the State Department's recording of international terrorist attacks. Only the years 1968 and 1969 experienced lower rates of terrorist attacks. Again in 2003, the US State Department reported a decline in the total number of terrorist attacks. While the decline for 2003 was only a net decrease of eight events from 2002, this decline characterized a return to terrorist activity levels not seen since 1968.<sup>158</sup> While it is not entirely conclusive to attribute the US-led GWOT as the sole contributor to the marked decline in the total number of international terrorist attacks, it appears the increased attention and focus by the United States and its allies on efforts to curb terrorism has had an impact on the operational capability of groups such as Al Qaeda. However, beyond this superficial statistical analysis, it is difficult to project the future impact the GWOT will have on the number of terrorist attacks.

While the starting point of 1968 and the ending point in 2003 have roughly an equal number of terrorist attacks, the points between 1968 and 2003 depict a general trend.<sup>159</sup> Looking at the data in general terms, a characterization can be made that the number of international terrorist attacks steadily increased from 1968 to 1987.<sup>160</sup> After reaching a peak in 1987, the total number of terrorist attacks steadily declined from 1988 to 2003.<sup>161</sup>

This period of decline started well before the US recognition of transnational terrorist groups as legitimate national security threats. It is interesting to note the foundation established by the Clinton administration vis-à-vis the recognition of terrorism as a legitimate national security threat emerged at a point when the total number of international terrorist attacks declined from the numbers encountered by his predecessor, George H.W. Bush. Despite presiding over a downward trend in the total number of terrorist acts in his first term, Clinton saw an increase in the number of terrorist attacks in his last years in office. The increase in terrorist activity in the late 1990s reversed itself in the year before 11 September 2001. It is difficult, therefore, to attribute the decline in the total number of international terrorist attacks to George W. Bush's declaration of a war on terrorism. While it appears based on the statistics provided by the State Department that the GWOT has assisted in the decline of international terrorist attacks, the need for more information and time will prove if the trend extrapolated from the State Department's statistics are consistent with the general decline since 1988, or conversely the beginning of another upswing in the total amount of terrorist activity. It is evident from the analysis based on the "Total International Terrorist Attacks" that this source provides only a rough characterization of how transnational terrorist organizations have adapted to the GWOT. The inconclusiveness found in the above evidence demands that additional sources merit attention in an attempt to provide a more detailed characterization of terrorist adaptation to the GWOT.

To supplement the data provided by the State Department on the total terrorist attacks between 1990 and 2003, it is important to assess the data on international and anti-US terrorist attacks

within several categories (type of attack, type of facility attacked, and casualties). However, unlike its multiyear presentation of the total number of terrorist attacks, the State Department's data on international and anti-US attacks according to type of facility, event, and region appears on an annual basis only. Interestingly, the State Department's *Patterns of Global Terrorism* makes no attempt to assess this data across a multiyear spectrum. To get a comparative sense of how terrorist organizations have adapted to the GWOT, this multiyear comparison is necessary. By assembling the annual data found in *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, it is possible to build a graphic representation of the terrorist attacks by type of attack, facility attacked, and casualties (see Figures 2-6). This information provides additional insight into the types of targets and methods used by international terrorist groups from 1990 to 2003 to conduct operations.

To begin a more detailed inspection of terrorist activity, it is helpful to analyze the preferred methods used by terrorist groups in attacking both international and US targets. In international attacks by terrorist groups from 1990 to 2003, the favored method of attack has consistently been the use of bombs (see Figure 2). With the exception of the years 1992 and 1996, bombings accounted for well over half of the total number of international terrorist attacks from 1990 to 2003. At the beginning of the 1990s, bombings accounted for approximately 63 percent of total international terrorist events.<sup>162</sup> By the middle of the decade, terrorist bombings had dropped off to a mere 30 percent of the total international terrorist events.<sup>163</sup> In 1995, firebombing supplanted bombings as the primary event used by terrorists.<sup>164</sup>

In comparison, the additional categories of events studied by the State Department, such as armed attack, arson, and kidnapping, in the first half of the 1990s never accounted for more than 35 percent of the total international events carried out by terrorists. In fact, by the beginning of the Clinton administration's second term, armed attacks, kidnappings, arson, and hijackings dropped below 20 percent. In stark contrast, as these "other" types of terrorist events receded midway through the 1990s, bombings and fire bombings accounted for almost 80 percent of international terrorist

activity. By the end of Clinton’s tenure as president, bombings as a percentage of total terrorist events rose beyond the 90 percent mark.<sup>165</sup> Judging from the data provided by the State Department in its annual assessment on terrorism on the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, bombing became the preferred method of carrying out attacks on international targets. All other types of terrorist activities remained far below bombings. The




Figure 2. Type of Terrorist Attacks on International Targets, 1990-2003

In the same period, 1990 to 2000, terrorists continued to rely on bombing and firebombing in their attacks on US targets (see Figure 3). In 1991 and 1992 bombings accounted for more than 50 percent of the total anti-US attacks carried out by terrorist organizations.<sup>166</sup> Despite an overall drop in the number of bombings used in attacking US targets by terrorist groups in 1994, bombings as a percentage of total events still remained at approximately 50 percent. The steady rate of bombing by terrorist groups in their US attacks led to the steady decrease in armed attacks, arson, and kidnapping.

In a phenomenon similar to international terrorist events in the period between 1992 to 1996, bombings against US targets fell as a percentage of total US attacks before they rebounded in 1997






Figure 3. Type of Terrorist Attacks on US Targets, 1990-2003

(see Figure 3). Prepared in 1997, the Clinton administration’s recognition of a “war on terrorism” in its *DoD Annual Report* coincided with the resumption of bombings as the preferred method of terrorist groups in both international and anti-US attacks. In 1998, bombings used in anti-US attacks accounted for approximately 80 percent of the total anti-US attacks carried out by terrorist groups.<sup>167</sup> The percentage of bombings dropped slightly in 1999 to approximately 75 percent.<sup>168</sup> Despite this small reduction, bombings at the end of the 1990s remained the primary method used by terrorist organizations in their attacks on US targets.

In the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the total number of bombings against US targets declined as a total percentage of all anti-US attacks. Interestingly, while bombings after 2001 dropped, the other methods of terrorism (armed attack, kidnapping, and arson) used in anti-US attacks remained consistent with pre-11 September 2001 levels, leading to their increase as a percentage (see Figure 3). The steadiness of the other methods of terrorism used in attacks on US targets and the decline in bombings as percentage of total attacks appears to be a phenomenon limited to attacks on US targets (see Figures 2 and 3).<sup>169</sup>

In comparison with US events, terrorist groups increased their use of armed attacks in 2002, while still favoring bombing

in attacking international targets.<sup>170</sup> While the international community witnessed a spike in the use of armed attacks in 2002, terrorist groups' use of kidnapping and hijacking continued to fall as an overall percentage of total international attacks. In stark contrast to the terrorists' reduction in the use of bombing against US targets in the post-11 September 2001 security environment, these same rogue groups maintained their commitment to the use of bombings to attack international targets.

Due to the lack of data available after 2003, it is difficult to predict how the GWOT has impacted the operations of terrorist organizations with any degree of certainty. In the past three years, it appears the terrorists' commitment to the use of bombing has maintained itself. Although bombing as a percentage of total international and anti-US attacks has declined in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, it still accounts for well over 50 percent of all terrorist attacks. Even with the declared GWOT, the trend toward the use of bombings in international terrorist attacks remained constant. It is only in attacks on US targets that it appears the declared GWOT had an impact on the terrorist operations. However, as Mickolus observed in his article "How Do We Know We're Winning," this decline in the terrorists' use of bombs against US targets can as easily be attributed to factors such as the need for terrorist organizations to plan, conduct reconnaissance, raise funds, and train for future missions, as it can be attributed to the GWOT.<sup>171</sup> On a positive note, it appears terrorists' use of hijacking, arson, and sabotage in both international and US attacks remained consistent with their pre-11 September 2001 levels (see Figures 2 and 3). Based on the data provided by the US State Department for 2002 and 2003, it appears this trend to favor other methods of terrorist attacks on both international and US targets will remain a minority in the calculation of total terrorist attacks.

Although the analysis of terrorist events conducted against international and US targets fails to produce a conclusive answer to the question of how terrorists have adapted to the GWOT, it does provide insight into terrorist operations in the period prior to and after 11 September 2001. To supplement the analysis of the type of events conducted by terrorist organizations on international and

US targets, it is important to look at the type of facility or victims attacked by terrorist groups.<sup>172</sup> This information, combined with the analysis of the type of event, provides an even greater picture of international terrorist activity in the years 1990 to 2003.

Interestingly, at the start of the 1990s, terrorist organizations in their attacks on both international and US targets favored targets classified as other by the US State Department (see Figures 4 and 5).<sup>173</sup> In both international and US terrorist events in 1990, terrorists attacked targets classified as other 40 percent of the time. These attacks on other targets outpaced attacks against military and government targets by a 2:1 margin. Attacks against “business” targets in 1990, however, hovered at roughly 35 percent of total facilities attacked.<sup>174</sup> Despite this initial year of terrorists favoring other targets, by 1991 a trend emerged in which facilities classified as “other,” “government,” “military,” and “diplomatic” began to decline as a total percent of international and US facilities attacked by terrorist organizations (see Figures 4 and 5). As for attacks against business facilities, terrorist organizations increasingly favored these softer and less secure targets over all others by 1991 in both their international and anti-US attacks.

While business facilities accounted for over 60 percent of both international and US attacks by 1993, terrorist attacks on diplomatic, governmental, and military sites fell to below 10




Figure 4. International Terrorist Incidents by Type of Facility, 1990-2003




Figure 5. Attacks on US Targets, 1990-2003

percent of the total type of facility attacked.<sup>175</sup> In comparison to the low level of attacks against government, military, and diplomatic locations, terrorist attacks on targets classified as other fell to an estimated 25 percent of the type of facilities attacked in both the international and anti-US categories. With the exception of a spike in the targeting of other facilities in 1994, terrorist groups continued to favor attacking businesses rather than government, military, or diplomatic facilities throughout the remainder of the 1990s (see Figures 4 and 5).<sup>176</sup>

By the end of the 1990s, attacks against government and military installations vacillated between 2 and 10 percent of the total type of facilities attacked for both international and anti-US events. However, in 1998 an interesting phenomenon occurred that produced an uncharacteristic spike in the graph of the percent of “type of facility for anti-US” attacks. In 1998, the State Department reported that the terrorist organizations launched only 23 attacks against US facilities.<sup>177</sup> As a result of this low number of facilities attacked by terrorist organizations, graphing by percentage leads to a huge spike in the diplomatic category, while the business graph plummets (see Figure 5). This anomaly is the only major

deviation between the comparative data on international and US facilities attacked by terrorist organizations in the decade before Al Qaeda's attacks on 11 September 2001. However, without primary sources from the terrorists' perspectives, it is difficult to ascertain the significance of this anomaly.

After 2001, the trends established by terrorists in the 1990s concerning the type of facility attacked for international and US attacks changed. In the international attacks, business locations as a total percentage of type of facility attacked dropped from a high of approximately 75 percent in 2001 to an estimated 55 percent in 2002 (see Figure 4).<sup>178</sup> By 2003, businesses accounted for only 45 percent of the total international facilities attacked by terrorist organizations.<sup>179</sup> Such a low figure had not been seen since 1994. However, while business as a total percentage of facilities attacked declined, terrorist organizations dramatically increased their targeting of facilities categorized as "other." Terrorist attacks on other facilities rose from an estimated 19 percent in 2001 to approximately 35 percent in 2002, and even further in 2003 to a high of nearly 41 percent of total type of facility attacked (see Figure 4). Conversely, international attacks on government, military, and diplomatic facilities rose only nominally and stayed under 10 percent, a stabilized point since 1993.

In overall judgment of the statistics presented by the State Department, the GWOT seems to have reduced terrorists' targeting of business facilities and, at least, stabilized attacks on government, military, and diplomatic sites. Unlike the trends discussed in the type of method used by terrorists in attacks on international and US targets, there was no decline prior to the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. The reduction and the stabilization in the business, government, military, and diplomatic categories of facilities happened after 2001 and seem to be a result of the international efforts to reduce the threat posed by transnational terrorist groups.

Compared with the international statistics, the impact and events after 11 September 2001 had a different effect on terrorists' targeting of US facilities. In the year after 11 September 2001, terrorists increasingly targeted US diplomatic, government, and

military sites. As a percentage of total facility types attacked, diplomatic sites rose to a point just over 10 percent, while government and military targets only slightly increased to approximately 6 and 4 percent, respectively, for 2002.<sup>180</sup> Attacks on US facilities classified as other also increased in 2002 to roughly 21 percent of total type of facility attacked by terrorist organizations (see Figure 5).<sup>181</sup> Despite a net increase in the percent total of attacks against military, diplomatic, government, and other facilities, attacks against US businesses substantially decreased in 2002. Between 2001 and 2002, the percent total of attacks aimed at US business sites fell from an all-time high of nearly 90 percent in 2001 to a much lower 60 percent in 2002 (see Figure 5).<sup>182</sup> This reduction proved short-lived, and by 2003 attacks against US business facilities as a percentage of the total facility type attacks by terrorists again started to rise.<sup>183</sup> Likewise, the percentage of other US facilities attacked by terrorist groups in 2003 rose to approximately 22 percent of the total type of facilities attacked.<sup>184</sup> Despite an increase in the percentage of US businesses and other facilities targeted by terrorists between 2002 and the end of 2003, attacks against diplomatic sites fell roughly 7 percentage points to about 5 percent, while government and military maintained their position below 10 percent of total type of US facilities attacked.

Based on statistics presented by the US State Department for the type of US facility targeted in the midst of the GWOT, it appears that after a short one-year decline in 2002, business and other facilities witnessed an increase in 2003, while attacks against diplomatic facilities fell, and government and military remained stable. Extrapolating from this data, it appears that the United States can expect increased attacks against business and other facilities to increase as the United States continues to lead the GWOT.

Overall, the data on the type of facilities attacked by terrorist groups provides a glimpse into the type of targets selected before and after 11 September 2001. It appears that from the international facilities targeted between 1990 and 2003, business sites outpaced all other types by three times. After 2001, other facilities as a group began to rise, while businesses as a group dropped in the wake of Al Qaeda's attacks. In 2003, the business and other

groups converged, while the diplomatic, government, and military groups remained flat as a percent of the total types of international facilities attacked by terrorist groups. In comparison, the data for US facilities maintained a similar pattern to international facilities, with the exception that the other category remained at less than 25 percent of the total type of facilities attacked by terrorist groups. While providing some insight into the impact of the GWOT and the adaptation of terrorist organizations, these statistics still fall short of providing a definitive answer.

Beyond looking into the method of attacks and the types of facilities attacked by terrorist groups to understand terrorist groups' adaptation to the GWOT, it would be useful to assess international and US casualties from terrorist attacks (see Figure 6). As with the analysis of the two groups of terrorists' behavior, the analysis of casualties will span the period from 1990 to 2003. Within the context of this study, casualties include both dead and wounded and cover both international and US victims. For international victims, the State Department provides annual numbers based upon region (Latin America, Middle East, Africa, Eurasia, Western Europe). The annual figures for each region and year were added together to get a sum for all international casualties.<sup>185</sup> To keep the data as congruent as possible, the State Department separates the wounded and dead in its counting of US victims of terrorist attacks; therefore, two categories were added together for a total of all US casualties. Based on the data provided by the US State Department in *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, the total number of the international and US casualties from 1990 to 2003 can be compared to assist in the analysis of terrorist adaptation prior to and after 11 September 2001.

In 1990, terrorists inflicted 834 international casualties, as compared with 43 US casualties.<sup>186</sup> For the next three years, international casualties resulting from terrorist attacks remained below 1,000 victims. Within the same period, US casualties decreased to 23 in 1991, and just three in 1992.<sup>187</sup> Resulting from Al Qaeda's first attempt to destroy the World Trade Center in February 1993, US and international casualty figures inverted from their previous positions (see Figure 6).<sup>188</sup> International casualties stood at 504, while US casualties doubled the international figure




Figure 6. International and US Casualties, 1990-2003  
(Dead and Wounded)

by ascending to a record 1,011.<sup>189</sup> Despite this brief spike in the total number of US terrorist victims, the casualties of the United States remained on the average a hundred times lower than the international casualty rate from terrorist attacks. While the US rates stayed well below 1,000 for the remainder of the decade, the international community experienced wild fluctuations in casualties from 1995 to 1999. In the years 1995 and 1998, the international community experienced over 6,000 casualties attributed to terrorist attacks (see Figure 6). In 1996, international casualties declined to roughly 4,000. In contrast, the years 1997 and 1999 saw casualties just below the 1,000 mark for the international community.<sup>190</sup> Based on data, it appears terrorist groups increasingly used violence against international, regional, or national targets, as opposed to directly targeting mass numbers of US citizens. Al Qaeda reversed this trend in 2001.

In the aftermath of Al Qaeda's attacks on the United States, for the first time since 1993, US casualties were more than double those of the international community, despite the fact that the 11 September 2001 attacks became the largest loss of life to terrorist organizations for the United Kingdom. The United States experienced approximately 3,000 casualties, whereas the international community bore 1,340 (see Figure 6).<sup>191</sup> Although Al Qaeda's dramatic attacks signaled the beginning of a new epoch for the United States and the international community, the trend



in high casualties for the United States did not sustain itself in the years after the attacks. In 2002, total US casualties fell to a mere 62, and a year later fell even further to 52.<sup>192</sup>

Simultaneously, as the United States witnessed a marked decline in its casualties from terrorists, the international community saw an increase in casualties to 2,742 for 2002, and another decline in 2003 to 1,900.<sup>193</sup> Therefore, despite the attacks by Al Qaeda and the initiative of the United States to launch an international war against terrorism, casualties resulting from terrorist attacks fell back to their pre-11 September 2001 pattern.

This drop in US casualties after 2001 does not necessarily indicate that Al Qaeda backed away from targeting and killing US citizens. Rather, it seems to signal Al Qaeda's commitment to plan, execute, and conduct a long-term war against the West. While this change in the international dynamics of terrorism has been a core element in the new terrorist era, Al Qaeda has adapted its ideology and structure to usher in a fundamental change in the paradigm of new terrorists.

Overall, the statistics covering the general trend of terrorist attacks since 1968, type of terrorist attacks, the type of facility attacked, and casualties merge to provide insight into the changes terrorist groups have undertaken between 1990 and 2003. As far as a general trend, terrorism attacks overall have declined since 1987 and have even fallen to a point not seen since the beginning of the new terrorist era in 1968. Based on the data, it is not clear if this decline is a result of the GWOT or other unquantifiable factors. While the State Department has yet to publish its *Patterns of Global Terrorism* for 2004, terrorist activity remained a prominent threat in the global security environment and has even seemed to increase within Operation IRAQ FREEDOM. Three years into the GWOT, Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations still pose a threat to the international community, as exemplified in the Al Qaeda-supported Madrid bombings in the spring of 2004, as well as in events in Mosul, Baghdad, and Fallujah, Iraq.

A simple scan of the news relating to terrorism in 2004 shows a resounding propensity on the part of terrorists to continue to use bombings as the preferred method of attack. The major worry

by the United States and the international community is that terrorists will further adapt their bomb-making capability to use or incorporate WMDs. Based upon declassified intelligence sources, it appears several Al Qaeda cells have already been working on the incorporation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and/or radiological bombs. The United States and the international community fear this type of adaptation most. While the United States and the UN work diligently to curb illegal access to WMDs, terrorist organizations have become resourceful in their desire to improve their destructive capability beyond traditional explosives, which the data on terrorist methods of attacks does not bear out. This point definitely highlights one of the major limits of focusing on events to judge terrorist adaptation.

Beyond their continued use of bombs of various types, terrorists have moved away from targeting government and military facilities in favor of attacking business sites and other facilities. Since the start of the GWOT, terrorists have adapted to the new security environment by increasingly targeting US and international business facilities. While a small spike in terrorist activities directed toward military, government, or diplomatic facilities occurred in 2001, these types of attacks began to decline again in 2002. Again, from the available data, it is difficult to derive any definitive conclusion from these sources. Likewise, the casualty figures present some additional insight into terrorist behavior in the era of the GWOT but provide no real indication of “how we are doing” against the primary global threat. To gain further insight on the impact of the GWOT, it is necessary to look toward a different type of source. Beyond the analysis of the statistics, the writings and analysis advanced by scholars and experts in the study of terrorism and terrorist organizations provide even greater insight. Several journals, such as *Jane's Intelligence Review*, *Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International*, and *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, provide direct commentary on the subject of terrorism, as well as an informed assessment of the impact of the war on terrorism and terrorist adaptation.



DoD photo, Senior Airman Sean Worrell, US Airforce

Photo 1. Khobar Towers complex, near King Abdul Aziz Air Base, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, bombed 25 June 1996, killing 19 and injuring over 260



Photo 2. Crater caused by the explosion of a fuel truck outside the northern fence of Khobar Towers




DoD photo, Tech SGT Cedric H. Rudisill

Photo 3. Pentagon crash site, 11 September 2001



D. Ward

Photo 4. West-facing wall of the Pentagon



DoD photo

Map 1. Khowst, Afghanistan Terrorist Camps



DoD photo

Zhawar Kili Al Badr Terrorist Training Camp sustained severe damage  
Map 2 above: main camp; Map 3 below: west camp



## Beyond the Numbers

Former CIA Director R. James Woolsey, in an article for the *Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International*, argues that the United States was/is in the middle of World War IV.<sup>194</sup> Woolsey observes that, even before the events of 11 September 2001, “Islamist Shi’a, Iraqi and Syrian Ba’athists, and Islamist Sunnis” have been at war with the United States.<sup>195</sup> Although the “war” has been an ongoing process from the “enemy’s perspective,” Woolsey observes that Al Qaeda’s attacks forced the United States to admit finally it is engaged in a war with practitioners of militant Islam.<sup>196</sup> Essentially, Woolsey argues based upon the radical theology advocated by terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, the United States is engaged in an ideological struggle and needs to convince moderate Muslims that this fourth World War is not against Islam. Woolsey believes the United States can use the historic examples of World War II as a lesson in the GWOT by convincing Muslims around the world that the fight is not “against them, but against tyranny.”<sup>197</sup> Woolsey is not the only advocate of this position. Former US Chief Assistant Attorney Andrew C. McCarthy supports Woolsey’s position. McCarthy argues the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 solidified the recognition on the part of the United States and the international community of the overt need to combat the growing appeal of militant Islam.<sup>198</sup>

Both Woolsey and McCarthy advance the opinion that transnational terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda have increasingly sought to convince Muslims everywhere they are engaged in a protracted ideological struggle against the oppressive regimes of the United States and Israel. From the perspectives of Woolsey and McCarthy, terrorist organizations have merely ramped up their rhetoric and destructiveness of their attacks in the wake of the attacks on 11 September 2001, whereas the United States and the international community adapted to the attacks by finally recognizing the need to engage and fight a protracted war against the forces of militant Islam.<sup>199</sup> Additionally, Woolsey and McCarthy argue that the United States and the international community need to work hard to forge relationships and long-term

alliances with the international moderate Muslim community. Only by discrediting the radical theology advanced by bin Laden and other militant mullahs can the United States and the international community succeed in eradicating militant Islamic terrorism.

Within the context of this study, it is interesting to note that both McCarthy and Woolsey avoided any significant discussion on the changing nature of terrorist groups either before or after 11 September 2001. Judging from their remarks, the most significant adaptation to emerge within the context of the GWOT came from the United States and the international community. The recognition by the United States and the international community of the need to combat the radical theology and militant ideology advocated by Al Qaeda and other like-minded terrorist entities serves as the first major change identified by Woolsey and McCarthy within the new era of warfare.

In addition to the adaptation made by the United States and the international community to fight and win the war against militant Islam, Hoffman provided an assessment of Al Qaeda and terrorist organizations in the post-11 September 2001 security environment. Hoffman maintains that in the first year of the war on terrorism, a “gloomy prognosis” emerged from within the United States.<sup>200</sup> While the Bush administration remained fixated on capturing bin Laden and staving off further attacks on the United States, the nation remained shrouded in a fog of fear. Hoffman asserts, however, that by March 2003, the Bush administration began forecasting the demise of Al Qaeda based on the arrest and capture of key figures such as Khalid Sheik Mohammed.<sup>201</sup> Hoffman cites quotations made in the early spring of 2003 by Congressman Porter J. Goss (current director of Central Intelligence as of December 2004) and the former director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, that the United States “had turned the tide on Al Qaeda.”<sup>202</sup> Despite the optimism advanced by the administration in spring 2003, Hoffman argues that it would “be imprudent to write Al Qaeda’s obituary,” based on Al Qaeda’s ability to “mutate into new and more pernicious forms.”<sup>203</sup>

Hoffman bases his stunning revelation on several facts. First, despite the death or arrest of over half of Al Qaeda’s central

leadership, Al Qaeda's "weakened" central command structure "remains operational."<sup>204</sup> Second, bin Laden and Al Qaeda have portrayed US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as glaring examples of US imperial aims to "occupy Islamic Holy lands." Third, Al Qaeda and bin Laden have used the actions taken by the United States and the international community to justify an expanded concept of *jihad* against all infidels.<sup>205</sup> In the post-11 September 2001 security environment, Hoffman maintains that bin Laden "fused the concepts of individual *jihad* and revenge" to incite radical Muslims to take up arms in his struggle.<sup>206</sup> Last, Al Qaeda continues to attract new *jihadists*. Hoffman points to the production of video tapes and maintenance of websites as prime examples of Al Qaeda's continued efforts to export its message that "the West is hostile to Islam, violence is the only language understood by the West, and *Jihad* is the only option." Based on these foundations, Hoffman maintains that Al Qaeda remains "committed to its sense of purpose."<sup>207</sup>

Other experts and scholars on terrorists and terrorism share Hoffman's pessimistic characterization of the impact of the war on terrorism on Al Qaeda and other like-minded terrorist organizations. A terrorist specialist from the University of Saint Andrews, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, argues that since 11 September 2001 Al Qaeda has adapted to the GWOT by "identifying loopholes and gaps in the western security architecture," thereby enabling them to maintain an operational capability in an increasingly complex security environment.<sup>208</sup> Gunaratna uses excerpts from Ayman al-Zawahiri's "Knights Under the Prophets Banner: Meditations on the Jihadist Movement," printed in December 2001 to build his case that Al Qaeda has adapted to the GWOT, as well as maintained its commitment to its ideological struggle.<sup>209</sup> According to Gunaratna, al-Zawahiri advocated the "escalation of terrorism." After the GWOT had already commenced, al-Zawahiri stated Al Qaeda needed to:

inflict the maximum casualties against the opponent, no matter how much time and effort such operations take; the need to concentrate on the method of martyrdom operations as the most successful way of inflicting damage on the opponent and the least costly to the



Mujahideen in terms of casualties; the targets as well as the type and method of weapons used must be chosen to have an impact on the structure of the enemy and deter it enough to stop its brutality, arrogance, and disregard for all taboos and customs; and focusing on the domestic enemy alone will not be feasible at this stage.<sup>210</sup>

Gunaratna argues that despite the US-led efforts to weaken and eradicate Al Qaeda, the transnational terrorist organization continues to adapt to the efforts designed to counter its operations. Increasingly, Al Qaeda called on militant Islamic groups around the globe to ally in the fight against the West. In the wake of 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda co-opted political parties, Islamic charities, and other militant Islamic groups to strengthen and expand its international support base.<sup>211</sup>

Although the US and its allies continue to erode the leadership of Al Qaeda, membership flourishes. According to former director of the US Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Yosef Bodansky, in the pre-11 September 2001 era Al Qaeda relied on “approximately 250,000 individuals willing to die for the cause, while an additional 2.5-5 million people supported their efforts.”<sup>212</sup> In the post-11 September 2001 era, Bodansky claims “as many as 500,000-750,000 people are willing to be trained” as suicide bombers, while a further 10 million more radical Muslims are willing to “support the operations of suicide bombers.”<sup>213</sup> In addition to the 10 million plus cited by Bodansky, he states an additional “50 million more Muslims are willing to offer financial support” to Al Qaeda’s cause.<sup>214</sup> Based on these numbers, Bodansky concludes that “America is losing the war on terrorism” based upon actions taken within the context of the GWOT and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.<sup>215</sup>

In addition to expanding its global support base, Al Qaeda has also sought to increase its destructive power by investing in surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and light antitank guns.<sup>216</sup> Documents recovered in Kabul after the US invasion of Afghanistan and in the aftermath of a UK police raid on suspected Al Qaeda safe houses, revealed the terrorist organization possessed manuals on the use and manufacture of chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) weapons.<sup>217</sup> While it

appears that Al Qaeda has not yet developed or produced a CBR weapon, experts agree it will attempt to do so in the near future.<sup>218</sup> Acquisition of a CBR weapon by a terrorist organization has been the nightmare scenario envisioned by successive US presidents since the 1990s.

Al Qaeda appears to be readily adaptive to the post-11 September 2001 security environment. Since 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda has consistently maintained its commitment to its ideological struggle by expanding its international support base while also improving its weapons cache. In addition to these adaptations, Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have maneuvered to maintain high levels of international funding, despite sanctions and actions taken by nations to impede the funding of terrorist organizations. One of the most significant changes to Al Qaeda's post- 11 September 2001 operations has been its willingness to partner with international drug traffickers.<sup>219</sup> In the group's early genesis as an emerging international security threat, bin Laden and Al Qaeda renounced drug traffickers for religious purposes. Two main factors led to the partnership with this once taboo element. First, Al Qaeda and bin Laden recognized that through their association with the Taliban government in Afghanistan, they could easily get involved in the international trafficking of heroin to supplement their finances.<sup>220</sup> Second, Al Qaeda ignored its previous theological aversion to participating in narcotics trafficking, claiming the production and subsequent sale of heroin contributes to the "social degeneracy" of the US and Western population.<sup>221</sup>

The relationship between terrorist groups and drug traffickers is not isolated to transnational groups such as Al Qaeda. Since the 1980s, Latin American and South American terrorist organizations, such as the M-19 in Colombia and the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, actively participated in narcotics trafficking to raise capital to support their terrorist agendas. This relationship between terrorist and criminal enterprises established a model through which the vast majority of terrorist organizations have "ties to drug related activity."<sup>222</sup> In the wake of the international crackdown on state, group, and individual financial support of terrorist organizations, terrorists have increasingly cooperated with drug traffickers.<sup>223</sup>

The relationship between drug traffickers and terrorist organizations has additional benefits beyond the generation of profits. Drug traffickers, long experts in the laundering of money, have passed on this vital information to terrorist organizations.<sup>224</sup> This provides terrorists with the technical knowledge of how to clean and rechannel illegal profits into legitimate businesses. Also, the nefarious relationship between terrorist groups and drug traffickers has opened access to “corrupt government officials and political institutions” previously closed to terrorist organizations.<sup>225</sup> Terrorist groups are not the only ones to benefit from this association.

For their part, drug traffickers receive “protection, production facilities, and transportation assistance” from the terrorist organizations.<sup>226</sup> Afghanistan, under the control of the Taliban, offers the most recent example of how Al Qaeda provided “protection, production facilities, and transportation” for heroin. In this model, Al Qaeda and the Taliban also provided workers to cultivate and produce opium poppies. From either the terrorist or the drug trafficker perspective, the relationship is a winning proposition for both sides.

The recognition of the relationship between these two international security threats is not a product of the GWOT. Rather, this relationship has been acknowledged by the United States since the 1980s.<sup>227</sup> However, prior to September 2001, the US government viewed threats posed by terrorists and drug traffickers as two individual and distinct security threats. As the threat from terrorist organizations evolved throughout the 1990s, the US government began slowly to see the mutual relationship between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers. In April 2002, the US government “officially” recognized the relationship between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers.<sup>228</sup> Likewise, the international community by the mid-1990s began to associate transnational organized crime factions with terrorist organizations. Within the post-Cold War security environment, this threat surfaced in Latin America, Southwest Asia, and in the former Soviet republics. The recognition by the United States and the international community of the cooperative relationships between terrorist organizations and narcotics traffickers is a significant

change in the GWOT. The nations allied in the fight against terrorism have finally started to view transnational terrorism as a security threat beyond the use of violence. However, alliances with drug traffickers are not the only evolution devised by Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations to adapt to the post-11 September 2001 security environment.

In addition to allying with criminal groups, Al Qaeda, since the beginning of the GWOT, has reached out to other Islamist groups to form a broad and deep terrorist coalition.<sup>229</sup> Before the attacks on the United States, Al Qaeda “served as a local and regional” indoctrination and training center for Islamic terrorist organizations.<sup>230</sup> With the loss of his support and training centers in Afghanistan, bin Laden searched for “associate groups” that could perpetuate Al Qaeda’s objectives. Seeking alliances with groups such as Abu Sayyaf, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Egyptian Islamic Jihad Group, Tunisian Combatant Group, Libyan Islamic Fighters, and Al-Ansar Mujahidin in Chechnya, Al Qaeda has significantly expanded its operational capability and its geographic influence.<sup>231</sup> A broad alliance between Al Qaeda and smaller Islamic terrorist organizations provides Al Qaeda with much more operational flexibility, as well as with a greater diffused organizational structure.<sup>232</sup>

Al Qaeda’s decision to expand its affiliation and contact with other militant Islamic groups in an effort to “disperse and decentralize” in the aftermath of the US-led invasion in Afghanistan is a prime example of the adaptive capability of the Al Qaeda network. According to Hoffman, Al Qaeda relies on and emphasizes a “mix and match” approach to its operations.<sup>233</sup> Hoffman asserts that Al Qaeda uses “four different levels of operational styles” to carry out its objectives. For large-scale operations, such as those on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Al Qaeda relies on its “professional cadre” to conduct attacks that require substantial funding and are controlled by the central committees of Al Qaeda.<sup>234</sup> One step below the professional cadre level, Hoffman suggests that Al Qaeda supports “trained amateurs.” These individuals, characterized by Ahmed Ressam and shoe-bomber Richard Reid, receive target information from

the central committees and little funding for their operations.<sup>235</sup> With only sparse support, these operators are encouraged to recruit additional support from within militant Islamic communities and to generate operational capital beyond the “seed money” provided by central command through “petty thievery.”<sup>236</sup> In addition to these two types of operational styles, Al Qaeda uses affiliations with “local walk-ins” and “like-minded insurgents, guerillas, and terrorists” to advance its agenda.<sup>237</sup> These last two groups are the ones Al Qaeda has increasingly sought to ally with in the post-11 September 2001 environment.

Al Qaeda supports local walk-in Islamic radical groups because these groups provide indigenous plans and operations based upon local situations and observations. Essentially, these groups pitch their plans to Al Qaeda in an effort to get financial support.<sup>238</sup> This mutually beneficial appeal allows the local group to conduct an active operation to advance its agenda while Al Qaeda provides financial support. Al Qaeda’s interest in these groups is that they provide additional reach and expand the operational capability beyond the central Al Qaeda structure for minimum investment.

In addition to supporting walk-ins, Al Qaeda supports like-minded organizations.<sup>239</sup> Hoffman observes that bin Laden supports groups in “Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Chechnya, Philippines, Bosnia, and Kashmir” who advance the *jihad*.<sup>240</sup> Al Qaeda’s support of like-minded groups is not just about advancing the *jihad*, but also to build operational ties with national and regional terrorist organizations that can assist Al Qaeda in future operations.<sup>241</sup>

Within the context of the GWOT, Al Qaeda has increasingly relied on the second, third, and fourth styles of operation. With movement to a more decentralized and diffused operational style via associations and alliances with other radical Islamic groups, Al Qaeda has been able to maintain itself as a local, national, regional, and international security threat while minimizing the exposure of the central command structure, which has been a major focal point of the US and international community’s GWOT.<sup>242</sup> This adaptation toward the increased reliance on alliances has allowed Al Qaeda to remain active in an increasingly difficult operational environment.

The analysis offered by scholars and experts such as Woolsey, McCarthy, Bodansky, Hoffman, and Gunaratna provides a bleak picture. While the experts' prognosis is rather grim, they do offer hope. Hoffman, Gunaratna, Woolsey, and McCarthy all suggest that the United States and the international community need to conceptualize this war as an ideological struggle (which President Bush acknowledged in his commencement address to Air Force Academy graduates in June 2004). Beyond this acknowledgement, the allies in the GWOT ought to gravitate away from focusing on the actions of terrorists and refocus on the symptoms of radical terrorism.<sup>243</sup> The United States and the international community need to work with moderate Muslim communities throughout the world to assist in stemming the influence of radical Muslims.<sup>244</sup> Only by discrediting the ideals and agendas of militant Islam can the international community eradicate Islamic terrorism and succeed in the GWOT.<sup>245</sup> Consistently, scholars and experts alike have agreed that "Militant Islam is our enemy, and we cannot co-exist with it."<sup>246</sup> However, terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda have sought to subvert the war on terrorism by claiming legitimate acceptance within the Islamic community. This method of claiming legitimacy is yet another adaptive effort by a transnational terrorist organization to justify its actions within the context of a radical theology.

## **Conclusion**

After three years of sustained warfare against terrorism, the United States and its allies have made progress in their efforts to diminish the threats posed by non-state actor such as Al Qaeda. The Taliban regime, which provided bin Laden and Al Qaeda with substantial support, has been deposed and removed from power in Afghanistan. Roughly 50 percent of Al Qaeda's top leaders have been arrested or killed in the months and years after 11 September 2001. Throughout the globe, most notably in Britain and the Philippines, law enforcement and intelligence agencies foiled plots by Al Qaeda cells. The United States and the international community, including the UN, froze the assets of individuals and organizations that support and fund terrorist activity and terrorist groups. Despite the substantial progress made in the GWOT, Al Qaeda and other like-minded organizations remain operational. The attack by Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM), an

affiliate of Al Qaeda, killed 191 people with a commuter train bombing in Madrid on 11 March 2004.<sup>247</sup> Despite successes in the GWOT, this single event demonstrates that terrorist organizations remain capable of conducting large-scale operations even while the United States and the international community continue to apply pressure on these nontraditional threats. The brief investigation of the bombing in Madrid reveals that this incident exemplifies the trends and adaptive efforts of terrorists identified in this study.

As for supporting the statistical analysis found in this essay, the bombing in Madrid reinforces the trend that terrorist organizations continue to use bombings designed to inflict the maximum number of casualties as their preferred method of attack. Second, the commuter rail facility struck by GICM supports the trend that terrorist organizations since 11 September 2001 focus their attacks on targets classified as business and other as identified by the US State Department. Third, the terrorist attack in Madrid in March 2004 supports the consistent trend since 2002 that terrorist organizations have increasingly targeted international civilians rather than US citizens. Finally, the Madrid bombing supports the evidence that terrorist organizations have increasingly scaled back on the total number of operations conducted in a year while striving for higher casualties in each attack. The Madrid bombing serves as a fitting example of the nature and behavior of terrorist organizations in the post-11 September 2001 period.

In addition to supporting the statistical characterization of terrorist behavior within the last two decades, the Madrid attacks also reinforce the analysis of the experts and scholars cited in this study. Christopher Jasparro, assistant professor of transnational studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, reports that GICM was an affiliate of Al Qaeda. This affiliation supports Gunaratna's thesis that since 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda has increasingly established alliances and affiliations with other militant Islamic terrorist organizations. Using Hoffman's styles of operations, GICM used characteristics identified with both the local-walk in and like-minded group styles. According to Jasparro, GICM had the support of Al Qaeda, but the organization also used criminal activity to support its plan.<sup>248</sup> GICM incorporated the mix and match approach to planning the successful bombing of the

commuter rail system in Spain's capital. This type of multilevel approach by terrorist organizations has become a standard tactic in the post-11 September 2001 period. Additionally, the GICM attack exemplifies another element of terrorist adaptation in that GICM exploited contact with "drug traffickers and other criminal elements."<sup>249</sup> Since 11 September 2001, the United States and the international community have increasingly sought to reduce the financial support of terrorist organizations by freezing their financial assets, as well as those of their supporters. In an effort to recuperate their financial resources, terrorist organizations have increasingly allied with drug traffickers. These nefarious alliances are emblematic of the major adaptive efforts taken by terrorist organizations to maintain their violent presence within the GWOT. The United States and the international community have recognized the significance of this scheme and have worked diligently in the past years to curb these associations.

The significance of the Madrid train bombing is that it reinforces the flexible, resilient, and adaptive nature of transnational terrorist organizations. Although terrorist activity has declined overall since 1987, and even further since it was recognized by Clinton as a substantial security threat in 1997, transnational terrorist groups remain a substantial threat in the international security environment. It appears that these nontraditional threats maintain a resilient nature and will continue to adapt to the forces designed to curtail them. The United States and the international community need to convince Muslims round the world that the GWOT is designed to eradicate the small sect of militant Islamists and not Islam writ large. Only by stifling the international Islamic community's acceptance of militant Islam can the United States and international community stop the continued evolution of transnational terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda.

Understanding the adaptive and resilient nature of transnational terrorist groups provides the allies in the GWOT with critical insight into the enemy. By incorporating this data into antiterrorist doctrine, strategy, and tactics, the allies in the GWOT can adjust their operations to meet the changing demands of the security environment. Against a dynamic enemy such as Al



Qaeda, it is necessary to leverage the full spectrum of political, diplomatic, military, and law enforcement measures in the fight against terrorism. To date, the United States and its allies have consistently applied a broad spectrum of resources to combat the terrorist threat. As the fight continues and the enemy adapts, the allies in the GWOT need continually to reassess the threat and adjust accordingly. In the context of the GWOT, the United States and its allies need to maintain a constant awareness of how best to eradicate the terrorist threat by assessing and adjusting the best mixture of political, diplomatic, military, and law enforcement measures to apply. By retaining flexibility and maintaining constant pressure on transnational terrorists, the United States and its allies will prevail in the GWOT.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2001*, (Washington DC: State Department, May 2002), i.

<sup>2</sup> Bruce Hoffman, "Change and Continuity in Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (May-June, 2001), 419; Anthony Davis, "Resilient Abu Sayyaf Resists Military Pressure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, (September 2003), 14; Tamara Makarenko, "Transnational Crime and Its Evolving links to Terrorism and Instability," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, (November, 2001), 23; Rohan Gunaratna, "Al Qaeda Adapts to Disruption," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 16 (February, 2004), 20.

<sup>3</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990*, (Washington DC: State Department, 1991), iv.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, iv; The State Department further clarifies the term noncombatants as "civilians and military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed or off duty."

<sup>5</sup> *Pattern of Global Terrorism: 1990*. iv.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, v.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Kofi Annan, "Immediate Far-Reaching Changes in UN Response to Terror," Text of Address before the UN General Assembly, Press Release SG/SM 7977, October 10, 2001, <<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sgsm7977.doc.htm>>, August 17, 2004, 3,

<sup>9</sup> UN Security Council Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism, "Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism," <<http://www.un.org/terrorism/a57273.htm>>, November 1, 2004, 5.

<sup>10</sup> UN Policy Working Group on Terrorism, 5.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> UN Security Council, "Press Release SC/7158," September 28, 2001, <<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm>>, November 11, 2005, 2.

<sup>13</sup> Daphne Josselin and William Wallace. "Non-State Actors in World Politics: A Framework," *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, Daphne Josselin and William Wallace eds. (New York: Palgrave Press, 2001), 3.

<sup>14</sup> John Eubanks and Evan Kohlmann, "Trends in Anti-American Terrorism," *Journal of Counterterrorism and Security International* (Winter, 1999), 22-24.

<sup>15</sup> Robert A. Fearey, Memorandum to Members and Participants in the Working Group Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, "Minutes-One Hundredth and Ninth Meeting of the Working Group/Cabinet to Combat Terrorism," June 10, 1976, <<http://wid.ap.org/documents/nixonterror.html>>, January 25, 2005, 1.

<sup>16</sup> Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, "Threat Assessment," undated, <<http://wid.ap.org/documents/nixonterror.html>>. January 25, 2005, 2.

<sup>17</sup> Richard T. Kennedy, Memorandum to Henry Kissinger, "Status of USG Actions Against Terrorism," November 25, 1972, <<http://wid.ap.org/documents/nixonterror.html>>, January 25, 2005, 1; Robert A. Fearey, Memorandum to Members and Participants in the Working Group Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, October 20, 1975, <<http://wid.ap.org/documents/nixonterror.html>>, January 25, 2005, 3.

<sup>18</sup>Kennedy, 2-3.

<sup>19</sup>Interestingly, many of the scenarios and ideas envisioned by the Committee parallel the ideas and scenarios discussed by the United States and the International community in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001. See Frank Bass and Randy Herschaft, "US Foresaw Terrorist Threats: Nixon Era Panel Planned Defense," *Lawrence Journal*, January 24, 2005, 3A.

<sup>20</sup>For a quick reference to the successive incidents faced by President Ronald Reagan and his administration, see Peter Huchthausen, *America's Splendid Little Wars: A Short History of US Military Engagements 1975-2000* (New York: Viking, 2003), 89-94.

<sup>21</sup>Walter Laqueur. *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3.

<sup>22</sup>Dick Cheney, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress*, [hereafter DoD, *Annual Report 1990*] (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1990), 2.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Don Barnard. "Narco-Terrorism Realities: The Connection Between Drugs and Terror." *Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International*, (January 2003), 31; Makarenko, 22.

<sup>26</sup>Dick Cheney, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress*, [hereafter DoD, *Annual Report 1991*] (Washington DC: GPO, 1991), 2.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Dick Cheney, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress*, [hereafter DoD, *Annual Report 1992*] (Washington DC: GPO, 1992).

<sup>29</sup>Les Aspin, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress*, [hereafter DoD, *Annual Report 1994*] (Washington DC: GPO, 1994), 2-3.

<sup>30</sup>William J. Perry, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress*, [hereafter DoD, *Annual Report 1995*] (Washington DC: GPO, 1995), 1-2; William J. Perry, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress*, [hereafter DoD, *Annual Report 1996*] (Washington DC: GPO, 1996), 2.

<sup>31</sup>DoD, *Annual Report 1995*, 1-2; DoD, *Annual Report 1996*, 2.

<sup>32</sup>William S. Cohen, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress*, [hereafter DoD, *Annual Report 1997*] (Washington DC: GPO, 1997), 79.

<sup>33</sup>The access to weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups, combined with the potential use of such weapons, led the Clinton administration to consider this threat "new."

<sup>34</sup> DoD, *Annual Report 1997*, 76.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>DoD, *Annual Report 1997*, 76.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 76-77.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 77.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 79.

<sup>44</sup>William S. Cohen, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress*, [hereafter DoD, *Annual Report 1998*] (Washington DC: GPO, 1998), 2.

<sup>45</sup>DoD. *Annual Report 1997*, 2.

<sup>46</sup>Annan, 1.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Security Council Committee of the UN. "Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work," S/AC.40/2001/CRP.1, October 16, 2001, <http://un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/guidelines.htm>.

<sup>51</sup>UN Security Council, 2.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 1.

<sup>53</sup>The General Assembly identified the following issues for observation by the Policy Working Group: "International legal instruments and international criminal justice issues; Human rights; Activities of the UN system; Weapons of Mass Destruction and other weapons and technology; use of ideology (secular and religious) to justify terrorism; Counter-terrorism Committee of the Security Council, Media Communications, and Non-UN multilateral initiatives." See UN Security Council, 3.

<sup>54</sup>UN Security Council, 3.

<sup>55</sup> Christopher Bennett. "Aiding America," *NATO Review*, web edition <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0104-01.htm>>, October 18, 2004, (Winter 2001), 1.

<sup>56</sup>Bennett, 1.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>Group of Eight. "G8 Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Since September 11," US State Department, Fact Sheet, June 26, 2002, <<http://www.state.gov/e/ed/rls/fs/11477.htm>>, October 15, 2004, 1.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 1.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>64</sup>Edward E. Mickolus. "How Do We Know We're Winning the War Against Terrorists? Issues in Measurement." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (May-June, 2002), 151.

<sup>65</sup>Mickolus, 152.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., 153.

<sup>71</sup> Hoffman, 417.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., 417-18.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., 418.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., 419.

<sup>77</sup>This sentence is not meant to convey the idea that the United States has completely ignored the terrorist threat, but rather that the implications and issues framed within the strategic nuclear balance and the Cold War obscured the severity of the security threat posed by the “new” terrorists.

<sup>78</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990*, 39.

<sup>79</sup>Brian M. Jenkins and Janera A. Johnson. “International Terrorism: A Chronology (1974) Supplement,” Report for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, February 1976, 1-3, R-1909-1-ARPA.

<sup>80</sup>The most significant examples would be the Israeli Raid on Entebbe, France in Marseilles 1994, and Germany in Mogadishu in 1997.

<sup>81</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990*, 38.

<sup>82</sup>Judith Palmer Harik. *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), ix.

<sup>83</sup> Laqueur, 3.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Jenkins and Johnson, 1.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid.

<sup>87</sup>Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “How New is New Terrorism” *Studies in Terrorism*, (September-October, 2004), 439-451.

<sup>88</sup>John F. Murphy Jr. *Sword of Islam: Muslim Extremism from the Arab Conquest to the Attack on America* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002), 123.

<sup>89</sup>Murphy, 122.

<sup>90</sup>Harik, 1.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995* (Washington, DC: State Department, 1996), 48.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid.

<sup>94</sup>Harik, 1.

<sup>95</sup>Andrew McCarthy, “Global War on Terrorism? No, It’s a Global War on Militant Islam,” *Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International*, (Summer 2004), 53.

<sup>96</sup>According to Gunaratna, in *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkley Books, 2002), the US government did not learn the “real name” of bin Laden’s group until after its attacks on US embassies in Africa in 1998, xlii. Gunaratna’s claim differs from that information provided by the State Department in *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997* which was published in April of 1998, in which the State Department clearly identified bin Laden’s groups as Al Qaeda. See *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997*, 30.

<sup>97</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997*, 30.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 74.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid.

<sup>101</sup>Brian Michael Jenkins. *Countering al Qaeda: An Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions for Strategy* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002), 3, MR-1620-RC.

<sup>102</sup>Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 74.

<sup>103</sup>Jenkins, 3.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid.

<sup>105</sup>Rohan Gunaratna, "Blowback," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, (August 2001), 43; Gunaratna. *Inside Al Qaeda*, 74.

<sup>106</sup>Gunaratna, "Blowback," 43.

<sup>107</sup>Jenkins, *Countering al Qaeda*, 3.

<sup>108</sup>Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 56.

<sup>109</sup>Gunaratna, "Blowback" 43. Gunaratna observes that bin Laden's theological preaching was influenced by the teachings and ideas of Dr. Ayman Muhammad al Zawahiri.

<sup>110</sup>Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 116.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., 17.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid., 72. Brad McAllister offers a contradictory position in "Al Qaeda and the Innovative Firm: Demythologizing the Network," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (July-August), 297-319. McAllister argues that, while the original organization of Al Qaeda by Osama bin Laden was "innovative," the actual structure does not "differ much from other Islamist organizations."

<sup>114</sup>Gunaratna, "Blowback," 43.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid.

<sup>119</sup>Mark Basile. "Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (May-June 2004), 169.

<sup>120</sup>Basile, 170. Basile observes that the vast majority of terrorist organization tend to rely on "fraud, narcotics trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion" to raise operating capital.

<sup>121</sup>Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 90-91.

<sup>122</sup>Basile, 183.

<sup>123</sup>Gunaratna, "Blowback," 43.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid.

<sup>125</sup>Alok Baveja, "America's 'War' on Terrorism: Can the US Learn from its War on Drugs?" *Journal of Counterterrorism and Security International*, (January 2002): 16.

<sup>126</sup> Paul J. Smith. "USA Adopts Financial Legislation for Counterterrorism," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, (August 2004), 35.

<sup>127</sup> William J. Clinton "Executive Order 12947: Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process," *The Federal Register*, (January 25, 1995), 5079.

<sup>128</sup>Executive Order (E.O.) 12947, 5079; The US government specifically identified Abu Nidal, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Hezbollah Islamic

Resistance Movement (HAMAS), Jihad, Kach, Kahane Chai, Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi Faction (PIJ), Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas faction, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command as the primary terrorist organizations that posed a threat to the Middle-East peace process in 1995.

<sup>129</sup>President Ronald Reagan's authorization of Operation EL DORADO CANYON in 1983 and President Clinton's use of cruise missiles against targets in Sudan and Afghanistan in the wake of Al Qaeda bombing on US embassies remain the two primary examples of the use of military force against terrorists in the years prior to the Al Qaeda attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001.

<sup>130</sup>Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss, "Wider Terrorism and the United Nations," *Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11*, Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 10.

<sup>131</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup>*Ibid.*, 6 and 11.

<sup>133</sup>Charles H. Briscoe, Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroder, and Kalev I. Sepp. *Weapon of Choice: US Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 33.

<sup>134</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>135</sup>*Ibid.* The approval by Congress was not a declaration of war, but rather the authorization and support of the president's decision to use military force against Al Qaeda and Bin Laden. Under the War Powers Act, the president must inform Congress of his decision to use military force, upon which those forces can only be deployed for 60 days. If the president needs an extension, he may appeal to Congress for an additional 30 days before the troops then either need to be removed or approved by Congress.

<sup>136</sup>Stephen M. Duncan. *A War of a Different Kind: Military force and America's Search for Homeland Security* (Annapolis: Naval Institution Press, 2004), 53.

<sup>137</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>138</sup>*Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>139</sup>Approximately 12 nations supported and assisted the United States in its operations in Afghanistan. The activity of support ranged from the commitment of combat forces by nations such as Britain, to fly-over rights granted by several republics of the former Soviet Union.

<sup>140</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003* (Washington DC: State Department, 2004), 176.

<sup>141</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1990*, 39. Until 1995, the State Department did not provide a total number of terrorist incidents. It only graphed the "totals" based on a scale ranging from 0 to 1,000. Beginning in 1994, the State Department maintained the scale, but also provided annual totals for the number of terrorist incidents.

<sup>142</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990*, 39.

<sup>143</sup>*Ibid.* In the four years between 1973 to 1977, the total number of international terrorism activity fluctuated slightly around 400 incidents.

<sup>144</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 1994*, 65.

<sup>145</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>146</sup>Ibid.

<sup>147</sup>Ibid.

<sup>148</sup>The State Department attributed 322 incidents to international terrorists groups in 1994. This low level of activity parallels the total number of events experienced in 1975.

<sup>149</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, 176.

<sup>150</sup>Ibid.

<sup>151</sup>Ibid.

<sup>152</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1990*, 39; *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, 176.

<sup>153</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, 176.

<sup>154</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 1994*, 65; *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, 176.

<sup>155</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, 176.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid.

<sup>157</sup>Ibid.

<sup>158</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990*, 39; *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, 176.

<sup>159</sup>According to the State Department's statistics, there is significant fluctuation between years 1971 and 1972, while 1995 and 1996 register as relatively flat.

<sup>160</sup>The steady increase is a general characterization, and it is noted that in the years from 1968 to 1987, levels of terrorist activity ebbed and flowed throughout the 19-year period.

<sup>161</sup>Compared to the general upward swing in terrorist activity from 1968 to 1987, the downward trend from 1988 to 2003 followed a similar pattern.

<sup>162</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990*, 38.

<sup>163</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995* (Washington DC: State Department, 1996), 70.

<sup>164</sup>Ibid.

<sup>165</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000*, appendix C; *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*, 176.

<sup>166</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991* and *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1992*.

<sup>167</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998* (Washington DC: State Department, 1999), 98.

<sup>168</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999* (Washington DC: State Department, 2000), 106.

<sup>169</sup> The analysis of this information does not include information and data from the invasion and fighting in Iraq. It appears from the preliminary data streaming in from the battlefield that kidnappings and murders have increased to rival bombings as a preferred method of terrorist attacks. There are several problems, however, with the Iraq example. It is unclear if the insurgents are Al Qaeda-affiliated agents determined to inflict damage on the United States and its allies, or if the insurgents are indigenous fighters focused on stabilizing their country. These objectives are by no means exclusive of one another and demonstrate the complexity of attempting to quantify the impact of the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

<sup>170</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002* (Washington DC: State Department, 2003), xx.



<sup>171</sup>Mickolus, “How Do Know We’re Winning,” 152.

<sup>172</sup>A word on methodology; for international terrorist incidents the US State Department from 1990 to 2003 consistently used “type of facility” to gauge terrorist activity against “business, government, military, diplomatic, and other” targets. In providing data on anti-US attacks, the State Department from 1990 to 1999 referred to “type of victim” of terrorist attacks. The victim categories identified by the State Department were “business, government, military, diplomatic, and other.” In 2000 the State Department changed its characterization from “type of victim” to “type of target,” while still employing the “business, government, military, diplomatic, and other” categories. As a result the data used in the development of the graph for anti-US attacks combines the data from both styles to get a representation of the continuity and/or change on terrorist target both before and after the internationally declared GWOT.

<sup>173</sup>For the purposes of this study, the category classified as “other” refers to those facilities that cannot be classified as “business, government, military, or diplomat.”

<sup>174</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990*, 38-42.

<sup>175</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1993* (Washington DC: State Department, 1994), 68-71.

<sup>176</sup>It is interesting to note that in both the international and anti-US category, the 1994 spike in terrorist attacks classified as other both rose to an approximated 38 percent of total type of facilities attacked.

<sup>177</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998* (Washington DC: State Department, 1999), 91-96.

<sup>178</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001* (Washington DC: State Department, 2002), 174; US State Department, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002* (Washington DC: State Department, 2003), 164.

<sup>179</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, 178.

<sup>180</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*, 174; *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, 2002, 164.

<sup>181</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002*, 166.

<sup>182</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*, 181; *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002*, 166.

<sup>183</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, 181.

<sup>184</sup>Ibid.

<sup>185</sup>In this listing of region casualties, the State Department had a category for North America. However, because these numbers tend to closely reflect the US totals, they have not been included in the total international casualty figures used in this analysis.

<sup>186</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990*, 40-41.

<sup>187</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 1994*, 67.

<sup>188</sup>A solid account of the planning and operational detail that went into this first attempt to destroy the World Trade Center in New York can be found in Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America* (New York: Random House, 2003).

<sup>189</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism*, 1998, 93.

<sup>190</sup>According to data provided by the State Department, the highs in 1995 and 1998 were 6,456 and 6,694 respectively. In comparison, the years 1997 and 1999

saw the number of international casualties drop to 907 and 950; *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999*, 103.

<sup>191</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*, 173.

<sup>192</sup>*Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, 180.

<sup>193</sup>*Ibid.*, 178.

<sup>194</sup>R. James Woolsey. "World War IV: An Address Delivered at the Restoration Weekend," *Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International*, (January 2003), 23.

<sup>195</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>196</sup>*Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>197</sup>*Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>198</sup> McCarthy, 52-54.

<sup>199</sup>Woolsey, 29; McCarthy, 56.

<sup>200</sup>Bruce Hoffman, "Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An Assessment," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (November-December, 2003), 229.

<sup>201</sup>Hoffman, "Al Qaeda," 430.

<sup>202</sup>*Ibid.* George Tenet resigned as Director of Central Intelligence in November 2004. President Bush selected Congressman Goss as the next director of Central Intelligence, pending Senate approval. In late November of 2004, the US Senate confirmed Goss's appointment as the new director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>203</sup>Hoffman, "Al Qaeda," 430.

<sup>204</sup>*Ibid.*, 433.

<sup>205</sup>*Ibid.*, 431.

<sup>206</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>207</sup>*Ibid.*, 439.

<sup>208</sup>Rohan Gunaratna, "Al Qaeda Adapts to Disruption," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, (February 2004), 20.

<sup>209</sup>Rohan Gunaratna, "Confronting the West: Al Qaeda's Strategy After 11 September," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (July 2002), 27.

<sup>210</sup>Cited by Gunaratna, "Confronting the West," 27.

<sup>211</sup>Gunaratna, "Al Qaeda Adapts to Disruption," 20.

<sup>212</sup>Etgar Lefkowitz, "Terror Expert: Qaeda WMD Attack on US Likely Soon," *Jerusalem Post*, November 29, 2004, <<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/edfiles/e20041129339615.htm>>, November 29, 2004: 2

<sup>213</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>214</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>215</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>216</sup>Anthony Davis, "The Afghan Files: Al Qaeda Documents from Kabul," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (February 2002), 18; and Gunaratna, "Al Qaeda Adapts to Disruption," 21.

<sup>217</sup>Gunaratna, "Al Qaeda Adapts to Disruption," 21; Davis, "The Afghan Files," 17.

<sup>218</sup>Lefkowitz, 1.

<sup>219</sup>Barnard, 32.

<sup>220</sup>Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*, 17.

- <sup>221</sup>Brian LeBlanc, "Sources of Terrorist Funding: The Drug Trade," *Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International* (Summer 2004), 28.
- <sup>222</sup>Barnard, 32.
- <sup>223</sup>LeBlanc, 27.
- <sup>224</sup>Barnard, 33.
- <sup>225</sup>LeBlanc, 28.
- <sup>226</sup>Barnard, 32.
- <sup>227</sup>Barnard, 32.
- <sup>228</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>229</sup>Rohan Gunaratna, "Al Qaeda's Operational Ties with Allied Groups," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (February 2003), 20; James Risen, "Evolving Nature of Al Qaeda is Misunderstood, Critic Says," *New York Times*, November 8, 2004, <<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20041108335596.htm>>, November 8, 2004, 1.
- <sup>230</sup>Gunaratna, "Al Qaeda's Operational Ties," 20.
- <sup>231</sup>Ibid. The US State Department has identified these groups as terrorist organizations and have listed them on the international watch list.
- <sup>232</sup>Gunaratna, "Al Qaeda's Operational Ties," 20.
- <sup>233</sup>Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (September-October 2002), 309.
- <sup>234</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>235</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>236</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>237</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>238</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>239</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>240</sup>Ibid., 310.
- <sup>241</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>242</sup>Risen, 1.
- <sup>243</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>244</sup>McCarthy, "57.
- <sup>245</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>246</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>247</sup>Christopher Jaspardo, "Madrid Attacks point to Sustained Al Qaeda Direction," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (August 2004), 30.
- <sup>248</sup>Ibid. 30-31.
- <sup>249</sup>Ibid.



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