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THESIS

**CONTEMPORARY RADICAL ISLAM AS A
CONSEQUENCE OF TRADITIONAL LEGACIES AND
GLOBALIZATION? A CASE STUDY OF THE SOUTHERN
PHILIPPINES.**

by

Tonya M. Klempf

March 2006

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Aurel Croissant
Tuong Vu

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**CONTEMPORARY RADICAL ISLAM AS A CONSEQUENCE OF
TRADITIONAL LEGACIES AND GLOBALIZATION. A CASE STUDY OF THE
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES**

Tonya M. Klempp
Captain, United States Air Force
B.S., California State University, 1997
MBA, Troy State University, 2000

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2006**

Author: Tonya M. Klempp

Approved by: Aurel Croissant
Thesis Advisor

Tuong Vu
Second Reader

Douglas L. Porch
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

The most recent wave of Islamic revivalism began in the second half of the twentieth century as a nonviolent movement of expressing ideological differences and discontent with the political, economic, and social condition among Muslims and inspired a reformation of the Muslim identity. Today, contemporary radical Islam, with militancy and terrorist tactics as its cornerstone, has all but overshadowed the call for a nonviolent struggle and has permeated several internal conflicts across the globe.

The Muslim separatist movement in the southern Philippines is one such conflict. Following decades of discontent and sporadic violence, conflict in the southern Philippines broke out in late 1972 when the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) launched coordinated attacks against the government. Following a failed peace agreement in 1976, divisions began to form within the MNLF and in 1984 the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was formed. The MILF, as the name indicates, placed more emphasis on Islam. In 1991, the radical group Abu Sayyaf (Bearer of the Sword) broke off from the MNLF once again claiming disagreement with the peace process. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) stated its main purpose as being the establishment of an Islamic state, based on Islamic law (Shariah).

By the mid-1990s, what had originated as a nationalistic struggle advocating the concept of the “Moro” identity, had evolved and produced two increasingly radical groups. After conducting a diachronic comparative analysis, this thesis concludes contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines is a fusion of both traditionalism and globalization. Furthermore, the causal factors evolved with respect to each group’s ideology, objectives, and tactics. Whereas the MILF was more representative of the legacy of traditional Islam, the ASG was much more a product of globalization.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The most recent wave of Islamic revivalism began in the second half of the twentieth century as a nonviolent movement of expressing ideological differences and discontent with the political, economic, and social condition among Muslims and inspired a reformation of the Muslim identity.¹ World events such as the Six-Day War in 1967, the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973, the 1978 Iranian Revolution, and the 1979 Russian invasion of Afghanistan significantly contributed to the mobilization, militarization, and eventual radicalization of the fundamentalist movement.² Today, contemporary radical Islam³, with militancy and terrorist tactics as its cornerstone, has all but overshadowed the call for a nonviolent struggle and has permeated several internal conflicts across the globe.

The Muslim separatist movement in the southern Philippines is one such conflict. Following decades of discontent and sporadic violence, conflict in the southern Philippines broke out in late 1972 when the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) launched coordinated attacks against the government.⁴ Although its objective was to establish an independent state for all the Muslim peoples of the Philippines, the MNLF applied a broader concept of Philippine Muslim *nationalism* embodied in the “Moro” identity in order to have a more cultural-

¹ Esposito, John L, *Islam: The Straight Path*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 158, 160 & 165.

² Further details available in Esposito, 160. and Sedgwick, Mark, “Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, (Winter 2004), 797.

³ Contemporary radical Islam is also synonymously referred to as “radical Islamism,” “radical Islamist” or “Islamic militancy.” And, for the purpose of this thesis, the definition of contemporary radical Islam is, as defined by Zachary Abuza; “[A movement whose ideology is] to establish an Islamic state governed by *sharia* through violence and extralegal means...” Abuza, Zachary, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 4.

⁴ In 1912 the government sanctioned migration policies (northerners to the south) with the officially declared objective of increasing the production of agricultural crops by establishing vibrant small family farms. This disruption to the population structure throughout the region was felt in most aspects of life: social, economic, and political. The programs brought about a chain of events that would become the foundation of future Muslim discontent. Gutierrez, Eric and Saturnino Borras, Jr., *The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies*, (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), 7.

historical appeal.⁵ Following a failed peace agreement in 1976, divisions began to form within the MNLF and in 1984 the Moro *Islamic* Liberation Front (MILF) was formed. The MILF, as the name indicates, placed more emphasis on Islam and most of its leaders were Islamic scholars from traditional aristocratic and religious backgrounds. Even though the MILF distinguished itself from the MNLF by stressing the Islamic aspect of the separatist movement, their objectives were similar. In 1991, however, the radical group Abu Sayyaf (*Bearer of the Sword*) broke off from the MNLF claiming disagreement with the peace process. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) stated its main purpose as being the establishment of an Islamic state, based on Islamic law (*Shariah*).

By the mid-1990s, what had originated as a nationalistic struggle advocating the concept of the “Moro” identity, had evolved and produced two increasingly radical groups. The first group, the MILF, emphasized the concept of an Islamic identity, whereas the second, the ASG promoted a violent call for the Islamization of the Muslim community. Analyzing the causes of contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines and the evolution of the movement from a nationalist Moro movement to a nationalist Muslim movement and a radical Islamic fundamentalist movement is the focus of this thesis.

B. PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the causal factors of contemporary radical Islam in terms of traditional legacies and globalization⁶ through a case study of Muslim separatist movements in the southern Philippines.

⁵ The term “Moro”, often used disparagingly by Christian Filipinos, was transformed by the separatists into a positive symbol of collective identity—one of unity and continuity. Islam, Syed Serajul, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines,” *Asian Survey*, vol. 38, no. 5 (May 1998), 418.

⁶ For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of globalization is, as described by David Goldblatt (et al.): “Globalization denotes a shift in the spatial form and extent of human organization and interaction to a transcontinental or interregional level. It involves a stretching of social relations across time and space such that day-to-day activities are increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the globe and the practices and decisions of highly localized groups and institutions can have significant global reverberations.” Goldblatt, David, David Held, Anthony McGrew and Jonathan Perraton, “Economic Globalization and the Nation-State: Shifting Balances of Power,” *Alternatives*, vol 22, no 3 (1997), p. 271.

This thesis will demonstrate that contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines is a fusion of factors associated with both tradition and globalization. Additionally, elements of each (tradition and globalization) evolve in that the factors that were important to one group at a certain point in time were not the same for another group at a different point in time. Therefore, the argument is two-fold: (1) Contemporary radical Islam is both a product of globalization and traditional legacies. That is, the two groups, the MILF and ASG, that were created as a result of a split from the first major Muslim separatist movement in the Philippines, the MNLF, have factors associated with both. (2) The role of globalization and tradition as causal factors of contemporary radical Islam with regard to the two groups, MILF and ASG, differ significantly.

C. IMPORTANCE

The thesis has importance at both the global and country-specific levels. First, with regard to the Global War on Terrorism, the 9/11 Commission recommended a two-pronged strategy in combating Islamic terrorism⁷: disrupt the leadership of terrorist networks and counter the rise of radical ideologies within the Islamic world that inspire terrorism.⁸ Although the first goal has been the focus of current U.S. policy, and works to gain the more short-term goal of stabilization through destabilization of the enemy, the second, more long-term goal has seemingly been neglected. Combating the rise of radical ideologies within the Islamic community requires differentiating between causes and enablers as well as analyzing and understanding the origins and causal factors. – As author Alan Richards stated regarding the matter, “...the wrong diagnosis will typically lead to the wrong prescription.”⁹

⁷ Terrorism is, as defined by Martha Crenshaw: “...the deliberate and systematic use of threat of violence to coerce changes in political behavior. It involves symbolic acts of violence, intended to communicate a political message to watching audiences.” Found in: Conteh-Morgan, Earl, *Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflict*, (New York: Routledge, 2004), 255, (Source not noted).

⁸ Kean, Thomas H., et al, *9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 363.

⁹ Richards, Alan, *Socio-Economic Roots of Radicalism? Towards Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals*, (Carlisle, Pa: US Army War College, July 2003), 2.

The second dimension is in relation to the conflict in the southern Philippines and is comprised of two facets. First, analyzing the conflict in the Philippines from the broader perspective of the role of Islam and how it was and is currently being affected by both globalization and radical Islamism will present a more comprehensive diagnosis of the problem. This diagnosis can then be applied in resolving the conflict by addressing both the internal aspects of the causes of the conflict as well as the external influences. Secondly, following the 9/11 attacks the United States drastically enhanced its relationship with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (G.R.P.). Since then the two governments have continued to work closely in support of the G.R.P.'s domestic war on terrorism and the U.S. government has dedicated a significant amount of resources. The findings of this thesis will be applied to examine if current U.S. policy is appropriate and useful for ending that conflict.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

Most studies on terrorism and Islamism analyze the issue from a global, regional or country perspective. Regarding the research focus of this thesis, there are basically two approaches in the literature on contemporary radical Islamism. While the first approach defines the problem in terms of culture and religion, the second approach emphasizes the impact of globalization as the core of the problem. To caveat, however, it is important to note that most scholars agree contemporary radical Islam is not *exclusively* due to tradition or globalization, but that one plays a significantly larger role than the other.

The most in-depth work in this field is undeniably by scholars writing from the global perspective.¹⁰ This prospective covers a broader spectrum of terrorism and Islamism across the Muslim world. There is little consensus among scholars writing from this perspective with various cultural, political, and economic factors being cited as the core cause of radical Islamism. The opinions

¹⁰ See works from: Huntington, Samuel, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, (summer 1993), 22-50; Kepel, Gilles, *Jihad, The Trail of Political Islam*, translated by Anthony F. Roberts, (Cambridge, Ma: Belknap press of Harvard University Press, 2002); Rapoport, David. "The Fourth Wave," in Cronin, Audrey Kurth. *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46-73; Cronin, Audrey Kurth, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security*, vol. 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/03), 30-58; Richards.

of these scholars range significantly. Scholars such as Samuel Huntington looked to differences among cultures as the (inevitable) cause of conflict.¹¹ Author Paul Berman, on the other hand, sought the answer from political factors by explaining that conflict has nothing to do with Islam and everything to do with totalitarianism whose greatest threat is liberal society.¹² Still others such as Alan Richards center on socioeconomic factors.¹³

Most authors writing from the Southeast Asian regional perspective focus on the idea that Islamic militancy, or radical Islamism, is a result of internal conflict and festering historic grievances.¹⁴ This is certainly not surprising since contemporary radical Islam as a product of globalization would have been a very hard argument to make considering many conflicts started before the impacts of globalization were evident. In recent years however, the emergence of transnational terrorist links has motivated many scholars to emphasize the international dimension of terrorism, that is the prospects of “imported” terror, and to analyze the possibility that rising support for radical Islamism is caused by deepening levels of globalization.¹⁵

With regard to the Philippines, the question of “homegrown” versus “imported” terrorism is even more intriguing given that the conflict has evolved and splintered twice over the past three decades. Although there is certainly strong agreement as to the historical causes of the conflict, there is considerable debate as to why it has endured and is becoming increasingly more violent. Scholars studying the Philippines are divided over whether the conflict is being

¹¹ Huntington, 22-50.

¹² Berman, Paul, *Terror and Liberalism*, (NY: Norton, 2004).

¹³ See Richards.

¹⁴ For works emphasizing internal factors see: Simon, Sheldon, “Managing Security Challenges in Southeast Asia: Essays by Sheldon W. Simon,” *NBR Analysis*, vol. 13, no 4, (July 2002) 25-37; Ramakrishna, Kumar and See Seng Tan, ed., *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2003), 1-35; Azra, Azyumardi. “Bali and Southeast Asian Islam: Debunking the Myths,” in Ramakrishna, Kumar and See Seng Tan, 39-56.

¹⁵ For works emphasizing transnational factors see: Wright-Neville, David, “Dangerous Dynamics: activists, militants and terrorists in Southeast Asia,” *The Pacific Review*, vol. 17, no. 1, (March 2004), 27-46; Abuza; Smith, Paul J., *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability*, (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2005).

prolonged due to external influences such as globalization¹⁶ (not just as a *backlash* to it but also the *internationalization* of terrorism), or if it's actually internally generated quests for socio-religious identity.¹⁷

According to Audrey Kurth Cronin, the work in the field of radical Islamism (or religious terrorism in general) suffers from a gap in knowledge. She states that because the phenomenon of religious terrorism crosses over so many academic fields (including, but not limited to, political science, sociology, psychology, theology, economics, anthropology, history, law, and international relations) it poses a challenge for an academic community that is unaccustomed to collaborating. As a result of not having overcome this challenge, many hypotheses regarding the origins of terrorism have yet to be substantiated or disproved and the area of research, in general, remains predominantly underdeveloped. As Audrey Cronin points out, "The distinctive perspectives and modes of research engaged in by scholars in each of those disciplines have led most to rely on the familiar perspectives and long-established arguments that are prevalent in each field."¹⁸ This gap is a problem at the source level. That is, students researching the topic of contemporary radical Islam are limited to sources or references that are "stove-piped" in one academic field and there is little that can be done to overcome this challenge. However, in this thesis, references from the various academic fields were specifically sought out in an effort to blend the views and minimize the gap.

As previously stated, the major debate surrounding the issue of contemporary radical Islam is whether the core causal factors (as opposed to factors that prolong conflicts and are therefore enablers rather than causes) are generated as a product of globalization or a legacy of tradition—Is it a response to external influences or is it internally generated from a resurgence of deeply rooted traditions?

¹⁶ For works supporting the globalization theory see: Tan, Andrew, "The Indigenous Roots of Conflict in Southeast Asia: The Case of Mindanao," in Ramakrishna, Kumar and See Seng Tan, 97-116; Rodell, Paul A. "The Philippines and the Challenge of International Terrorism" in Paul J. Smith, 122-144.

¹⁷ See McKenna, Thomas M. *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

¹⁸ Cronin, *Attacking Terrorism*, 39.

The most renowned author, writing from the global perspective and supporting the school that espouses contemporary radical Islam as a reaction to conflicts among the world's great cultural and/or religious traditions, would undoubtedly be Samuel Huntington. In his 1993 publication, *"Clash of Civilizations,"* Huntington views Islam, together with a few other major religions, as a global religion not restricted to national boundaries.¹⁹ Huntington argues that the increased propensity of people to define their identity in ethnic and religious terms will result in an "us" versus "them" mentality that when combined with cultural and religious differences over policy issues (human rights, immigration, trade, the environment, etc.) and the encroachment of the West (i.e. promoting its values as universal, global military and economic hegemony) will result in the mobilization of anti-West groups based on common religious and "civilization" identity. Religious conflicts are, therefore, global and not national.

Along these same lines, but perhaps a stronger, more direct argument for the legacy of tradition school of thought comes from Gilles Kepel who argues that this new form of terrorism is not the forceful indignation of a powerful Islamist movement, but rather that of a declining one.²⁰ He states that during the 1970s and 1980s the Islamist movement appealed to those Muslims who were frustrated with the status quo and viewed the political ideals of Islamism as their glimmer of hope, but as the movement began to fail to politically mobilize and strengthen, desperate measures of violence and destruction were taken to reverse the decline. These measures resulted in increased militancy and the tolerance of terrorism.²¹

The final proponent of the legacy of tradition school of thought is David Rapoport. Although his arguments do not center on the question of the actual *causes* of conflict, he uses a more systematic, and cyclical approach that centers on socio-political ideologies to develop his classification of contemporary religious terrorism, mostly Islamic, which he names the "fourth wave" of

¹⁹ Huntington, 26.

²⁰ Kepel, 4.

²¹ Green, John, "Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam," *The Booklist. Chicago*, vol. 98, iss. 15, (1 April 2002), 1284.

international terrorism.²² His argument focuses on the ideological inspirations that resulted in terrorism. In the first wave the *anarchists* were inspired by the failure of a democratic reform program, then the *anti-colonialists* called for national self-determination and in the third wave *leftist* movements were driven by the theme that existing systems were not truly democratic. At the core of the fourth or *religious* wave is the call for the end to secularism, and therefore (by default) democracies. He further states that Islam is at the heart of this wave and describes his hypothesis as follows:

[The] political events providing the hope for the fourth wave originated in Islam, and the successes achieved apparently influenced religious terror groups elsewhere. Although there is no direct evidence for the latter connection, the chronology is suggestive.... Three events in the Islamic world provided the hope or dramatic political turning point that was vital to launch the fourth wave. In 1979 the Iranian Revolution occurred, a new Islamic century began, and the Soviets made an unprovoked invasion of Afghanistan.²³

Contrary to Rapoport's argument is that of Audrey Kurth Cronin who views contemporary radical Islam as more of a power struggle between the "haves" and the "have-nots" brought on by the economic and political disparity of globalization. She basically argues that

...even though the newest international terrorist threat, emanating largely from Muslim countries, has more than a modicum of religious inspiration, it is more accurate to see it as part of a larger phenomenon of anti-globalization and tension between the have and have-not nations, as well as between the elite and underprivileged within those nations. In an era where reforms occur at a pace much slower than is desired, terrorists today, like those before them, aim to exploit the frustrations of the common people (especially in the Arab world).²⁴

²² According to Rapoport, waves of modern terrorism were generated first by the anarchist movement in the late nineteenth century; second by the anti-colonial movement in the 1920s; and finally by the radical ideas of the "New Left" in the 1960s. Cronin, *Attacking Terrorism*, 39.

²³ Rapoport, 61.

²⁴ Cronin, *Behind the Curve*, 35.

Furthermore, she states the *jihad* era is energized by a pervasive sense of alienation and search for religious identity and doctrine.²⁵ Therefore, she argues that the challenge of dealing with this type of terrorism is two-level: the religious zealots and the broader enabling environment of failed social, political and economic institutions.²⁶

Cronin is not alone, Alan Richards also declares the effects of globalization, or more specifically the socioeconomic impact of failing to fully integrate into the global economy, have contributed to the spread of radicalism.²⁷ He states that Islamic radicalism is a political response to the socioeconomic, cultural and political crisis throughout the Islamic world that was brought on by modernization and globalization. According to Richards, overwhelming growth in population and urbanization along with failing government policies and negative changes in education caused increased levels of unemployment and poverty which alienated many Muslim youths.²⁸

From the Southeast Asian regional perspective, the debate surrounds the idea of “homegrown” versus transnational terrorism and that the “brand” of Islamic radicalism throughout Southeast Asia was specific to the region. From there the debate further breaks down to what the causal factors of radicalism in SEA are; internal or external, reverting back to tradition or responding to globalization.

In his article, David Wright-Neville states; “...the prevailing orthodoxy was that [Southeast Asia] was home to a benign form of Islam quarantined from the troubling cultural dynamics that had given this religion in other parts of the world a militant and sometimes violent edge.”²⁹ Sheldon Simon maintains this view and asserts that terrorism in Southeast Asia is homegrown with concerns largely being confined to national borders.³⁰ Although he acknowledges there are some

²⁵ Cronin, *Behind the Curve*, 37.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 38.

²⁷ Richards, 4.

²⁸ *Ibid*, v.

²⁹ Wright-Neville, 27.

³⁰ Simon, 25.

ties to Al Qaeda, Simon holds that the level of cooperation and coordination among terrorist groups is nowhere near that of groups outside the region.³¹ Furthermore, Simon argues that the approach to countering terrorism is in dealing with the causes which he views as the political, social and economic environments.

...Southeast Asian states must change the political, social, and economic milieus that breed terrorism. Specifically, socioeconomic development in the southern Philippines must take place, and economic recovery in Indonesia, the restoration of law and order in the Moluccas and Sulawesi, and a political solution to the conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya must be sought. [Until] the socioeconomic deficits [are] erased, terrorism will continue to flourish regardless of outside efforts to eradicate it. Hunting down terrorists deals with the symptoms but not the underlying disease.³²

Zachary Abuza, a strong proponent of the new orthodoxy, argues that views such as Simon's are outdated. He suggests this has changed in the last few years as incidents of radical Islamist terrorism throughout the region increased significantly and asserts that although Muslim grievances are local, there is a distinct trend in the region since 1990—an expansion of transnational activities of radical Islamists.³³ Abuza emphasizes the fact that although the historical roots of militant Islam is nothing new in the region, the links to international terrorist groups is.³⁴ And for Abuza, the international aspect of terrorism in Southeast Asia cannot be underestimated.³⁵

Paul Smith shares Abuza's beliefs and further expounds in that Islamic militancy is being imported to the region, predominantly through charities, through Middle Eastern Islamic ideologies, specifically Wahhabism.³⁶ Smith, reiterating Abuza's point regarding the experiences of Southeast Asians in the

³¹ Simon, 25.

³² Ibid, 37.

³³ Abuza, 4.

³⁴ Abuza, 81.

³⁵ Ibid. "Al-Qaida did not simply arrive in the region and establish a network from scratch, but rather they found groups who had already been established and had legitimate grievances that they had been fighting for a prolonged period."

³⁶ Smith, xi.

Middle East, states that aside from Islamic ideological influences, the historical developments in the Middle East also account for the changing Islamic mind-set.³⁷ More specifically, Barry Desker maintains that this trend is attributable to two major historic events—the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The psychological impact of the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent revolutionary experience of many Southeast Asian Muslims, who either volunteered in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet army or studied in Saudi and Pakistani madrasas imbibing the local culture of political violence and change, polarized the Islamic milieu in the region.³⁸

Along these same lines of external religious influence, but from the perspective of the debate surrounding the question of the causal factors of radicalism in Southeast Asia, Azyumardi Azra and Kumar Ramakrishna contend that the emergence of neo-Salafism³⁹ is the root of radical Islamism. Azra and Ramakrishna suggest that although socioeconomic factors *facilitate* radicalism, addressing the politico-religious roots of radicalism is essential to combating terrorism.⁴⁰ Conversely, Zachary Abuza views the problematic internal situation as the core of the issue:

The growth of Islamic extremism around the world since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 has less to do with theology and a lot to do with the failure of the domestic political economies of their respective countries. Increasing gaps between the rich and poor, unemployment, corruption, a lack of economic diversity, and the lack of a viable political alternative have all given rise to Islamic extremism. People literally become so desperate that they have nowhere to turn but to extremist religious politics.⁴¹

³⁷ Smith, xii.

³⁸ Desker, Barry, "The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 25, no. 3 (December 2003), 495.

³⁹ Neo-Salafism is defined as that "...which blends the return-to-roots fundamentalism of traditional Salafism, with the additional ideational thread of an Islam under siege from Christian, Zionist and secular forces." Ramakrishna, Kumar, "US Strategy in Southeast Asia: Counter-terrorist or Counter-terrorism," in Ramakrishna, Kumar and See Seng Tan, ed., 321.

⁴⁰ Azra, 53, and Ramakrishna, 320.

⁴¹ Abuza, 16.

In between the debate of new versus old orthodoxy is Wright-Neville who agrees that the old orthodoxy is outdated, but is critical of the new orthodoxy. He suggests that the threat is exaggerated because of "...a failure to account for nuanced differences in the nature of Islamist politics in the region"⁴² and that it is actually an "attitudinal dynamic" that is legitimizing extremists in the eyes of many Southeast Asian Muslims. Wright-Neville called for "an understanding of the complex interplay of cultural, economic, political and social forces that lay behind this attitudinal shift."⁴³

The debate regarding the conflict in southern Philippines in particular overlaps the arguments of both the global and regional perspective. Some scholars, such as Thomas McKenna, maintain the argument of tradition—citing resistance to colonialism that dates back centuries and the ensuing formation of an Islamic identity.⁴⁴ McKenna states that "the struggle for Muslim separatism in the Philippines (or for that matter any separatist struggle) may only be adequately understood by means of a wide-ranging and multilayered analysis of domination, accommodation, and resistance."⁴⁵ McKenna suggests that the contemporary Muslim Separatist movement is purely a legacy of tradition based around the dynamics of ethno-religious politics. It must be noted, however, that McKenna limits his scope of discussion to the MNLF and the MILF—the ASG is not mentioned.⁴⁶

Others such as Andrew Tan⁴⁷ argue that the failure to develop socio-economically in the midst of an increasingly modern and globalizing world has led to the violent recourse of fundamentalist Muslims. Tan views religion as a "rallying call and focal point of resistance to the government" and emphasizes that conflict is a nationalist and territorial struggle.⁴⁸ Furthermore, although Tan

⁴² Wright-Neville, 27.

⁴³ Wright-Neville, 27.

⁴⁴ See McKenna.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 5.

⁴⁶ One reason for this might be that McKenna's research was limited to the southern Philippines city of Cotabato or "Campo Muslim" whereas the ASG operated mostly in the Sulu Archipelago.

⁴⁷ Tan, 112.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

acknowledges that the pan-Islamic militant ideology of the founding members of groups such as the ASG can be traced to their experiences in the Afghan conflict, he states that these links should not be overemphasized. The topic of international terrorism, Tan states, with links to groups such as Al Qaeda, has moved to the forefront since 9/11, but the fact remains that armed Muslim separatist movements long predated this phenomenon.⁴⁹ Still others such as Paul Rodell emphasize the transnational “flavor” of the groups in the Philippines and the non-economic effects of globalization—more appropriately, the rising influences of external entities.⁵⁰ While Rodell agrees with Tan that the Muslim separatists in the Philippines were inspired by their experiences in the Afghan conflict, he further contends that fundamentalist Islam became a divisive issue among leaders of the MNLF as early as 1977 and led to the creation of the MILF.⁵¹ For Rodell, the increasing role of religious fundamentalism opened the door to transnational terrorism in the southern Philippines.⁵² He concludes that if it is to be closed, the enabling environment for international terrorism must be removed through internal socio-economical and political means.⁵³

In summary, the study of contemporary radical Islam is extremely diverse and scholars from all three perspectives (global, regional and country specific) have proposed an array of factors as being the cause of contemporary radical Islam. The debates can, however, be categorized into two views: Those who see the causal factors as being an internally generated legacy of tradition and those who contend it is an externally generated product of globalization. Those who support the legacy of tradition school cite cultural identity, ideological inspiration and historical political, social and religious grievances as the major contributing factors. For those who support the impact of globalization claim, the underlying factors are viewed as being based on the socio-economic and political disparity and internationalization of radicalism brought on by globalization.

⁴⁹ Tan, 98.

⁵⁰ Rodell, 132.

⁵¹ Ibid, 123.

⁵² Ibid, 132.

⁵³ Ibid, 138.

E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary questions analyzed in this thesis is: Is the current conflict in the southern Philippines between Muslim minorities and the government of the Philippines, supported by the country's Christian majority, a consequence of the legacy of traditional Islam or a product of globalization? In the instance that both play a role, how can the level of influence and relevance of each factor be assessed? In answering these questions, the following three questions must first be addressed: First, is globalization an enabler or a root cause? Second, how has radical Islamism evolved? And third, from a regional perspective how has the internationalization of radical Islamism affected Southeast Asia, both Muslims and non-Muslims alike?

F. METHODOLOGY

The objective of this study is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the root causes and the role of Islam in order to explain the evolution of the protracted separatist movements in the Philippines with respect to their ideologies, objectives, and tactics. Therefore, this study is an exercise in diachronic comparative analysis.⁵⁴ It analyzes and compares and contrasts two different periods during the southern Philippines conflict that are considered the formative years for each group. The first is from 1976, when the MNLF settled for autonomy in signing the Tripoli Agreement, to 1984, when the MILF officially broke off and formed a separate movement. The second is from 1989, when the ASG entered the conflict, to 1995 when it waged its major terrorist attacks. The analysis focuses on the causes of the formation and increased radicalization of the groups with respect to factors associated with tradition and globalization. Therefore, the independent variables are tradition and globalization, while the dependent variable is contemporary radical Islam.

The sources for this thesis are predominantly academic. Other sources include reports and documents issued by the Philippine, United States, and Australian governments, and reports and documentations from several non-government organizations.

⁵⁴ For the purposes of this thesis, a diachronic comparison is defined as the study of a phenomenon as it changes through time.

G. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY

Chapter II (*Background*) begins with a brief discussion of the arrival and development of Islam throughout Southeast Asia. Then it transitions to how Islam spread within what is today known as southern Philippines and focuses on the impact and development of the various ethnic communities. The third section of the chapter provides an overview of the history of conflict against the Spanish and American colonizers focusing on the role of Islam. Finally the factors and courses of events that ended organized rebellion of the Moro National Liberation Front are discussed.

Chapter III (*Contemporary Radical Islam*) provides an analysis of the origins and root causes. The chapter begins with a description of the evolution of contemporary radical Islam then provides an analysis and evaluation of the various factors of tradition and globalization and the impact of each on the development of contemporary radical Islam. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that contemporary radical Islam is a fusion of factors related to globalization as well as tradition.

Next, in Chapter IV (*Evolution and Ideology*), the analysis is taken one step further. That is, on top of being a fusion of the two concepts, the importance, prioritization and level of influence each had was not the same for the groups. Basically, although both factions were from the MNLF, the factors that caused the MILF to organize were not the same as those that caused the ASG to breakaway. Therefore, the impact of globalization and tradition on MILF was not the same as it was on ASG. Evolution of the group would certainly affect the tactics, but how does it affect the core ideology of the group?

Finally, in Chapter V (*Implications and Conclusion*) the findings are summarized and the importance of the thesis is reviewed. Also discussed are possible implications on U.S. foreign policy with respect to the Philippines and the importance of developing U.S. policy based on this understanding of contemporary radical Islam as an evolving fusion of impacts of globalization and traditional legacy is addressed.

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II. BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information on the origins of Islam in Southeast Asia and more specifically the Philippines and to discuss the role of Islam in the anti-colonial struggle against the Spanish and Americans as well as the factors that led to organized Muslim rebellion. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the arrival and development of Islam throughout Southeast Asia and how Islam spread within what is today known as the southern Philippines—focusing on the impact and development of the various ethnic communities. The bulk of the chapter provides an overview of the history of the conflicts against the Spanish and American colonizers focusing on the role of Islam. Finally the factors and courses of events that ended organized rebellion of the Moro National Liberation Front are discussed.

B. ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

There is little consensus among scholars as to the origins of Islam in Southeast Asia but they do generally agree that Islam was first introduced in the region as a by-product of the trade routes between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The crux of the debate regarding the origins of Islam in Southeast Asia surrounds the question of *by whom* and *when* Islam was first proselytized there. One of the most comprehensive and best supported theories is by D. R. SarDesai, who contends that Arab contact with Southeast Asians predated Islam as traders visited the region on their way to China and continued this practice even after converting to Islam. However, fearing the possibility of risking their trade and relationship with local elites, these Arab-Muslim merchants made no real attempt to convert the locals. He further asserts that the Indians had no such fears for they had established themselves as bearers of rich traditional and cultural influences throughout Southeast Asia early on and that in fact, with regard to outside influences of culture, India had the greatest impact throughout the region. As SarDesai describes:

...most of Southeast Asia followed the Indian cultural patterns. The absorptive, syncretic quality of Indian culture ...succeeded in striking roots in the Southeast Asian region, which adopted the alien cultural traits without in the process losing its identity. The relative acceptability of Indian culture may be further attributed to geographical commonness, relative lack of Indian political ambition in the region, and the state of commerce between India and Southeast Asia.⁵⁵

Religion was perhaps the most obvious account of this influence. Since both Buddhism and Hinduism evolved in and spread from India to Southeast Asia during the first millennium, it is quite possible that Islam too, although arriving later, was introduced and welcomed in the same manner. SarDesai also contends that Indian influence was the work of both commercial traders (predominantly from the Indian coastal regions of Gujarat⁵⁶ and Coromandel) and the Brahmans, or *priestly class*—which accounted for the extensive “acculturation” of the class of Southeast Asian elites.⁵⁷ He further concludes that the fact that Indians were promoting Islam gave it a certain level of legitimacy among Southeast Asians, but another aspect that appealed to them was that, reminiscent of Hinduism and Buddhism, it came in a relatively peaceful fashion and made some accommodations. This theory seems fitting when taking into account the legacy of tolerance and compromise that is reflected even today in the practice of Islam by Southeast Asian Muslims.

Although the ideological appeal of Islam in general attributed to the *acceptance* of Islam by Southeast Asians, the initial *spread* of Islam can be attributed to the fact that merchants began to combine trade with the peaceful transmission of religion and culture. More specifically, they developed kinships by marrying royalty and raising the children under Islam, provided economic

⁵⁵ SarDesai, D. R., *Southeast Asia; Past and Present*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003), 17.

⁵⁶ Notably, Islam was originally peacefully introduced in India by Arab merchants and missionaries and spread in northern trade regions of India including Gujarat beginning in the eighth century A.D., but this peaceful relationship ended when, at the turn of the first millennium, the Turkic tribes invaded the Indian subcontinent from the northeast. Website on South Asia History which credits the library of Congress and dated 1995: <http://www.cet.edu/earthinfo/sasia/SAhis.html> and website on Islam in India: http://www.indianchild.com/comming_of_islam.htm. Both were accessed November 2005.

⁵⁷ SarDesai, 18.

incentives by offering better terms of trade to Muslims in the region, and inspired rulers to convert by holding superior positions in trade and business.

Scholars generally agree that the thirteenth century A.D. marked the beginning of the Islamization of insular Southeast Asia and that it became well-established by the fourteenth century.⁵⁸ (Reference Figure 1 below.) Several factors can be attributed to the subsequent spread of Islam throughout the Malay Archipelago during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: increased competition over trade between the Hindu Kingdom of Majapahit and Muslims, the development of Muslim-controlled Malacca as a major center of trade, the aggressive proselytization of Christianity by the Portuguese, and the subtle and unwavering Sufi⁵⁹ missionaries.⁶⁰




Figure 1. The Spread of Islam⁶¹

⁵⁸ Islam, Syed Serjul, *The Politics of Islamic Identity in Southeast Asia*, (Singapore: Thomson Learning, 2005), 18.

⁵⁹ “[In] Southeast Asia, Islam was spread primarily by Sufi brotherhoods and merchants rather than the armies of Islam. Sufism brought a message of Islam whose mystical doctrines and practices proved attractive to many and was open to linkages with local religious traditions and customs. Whereas official Islam often emphasized strict observance of the letter of the law, Sufism presented an alternative tradition flexible and open to assimilation and synthesis. Outside influences were absorbed from Christianity, Neoplatonism, Hinduism, and Buddhism.” Esposito, John, *The Islamic Threat, Myth or Reality?*, (NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 35.

⁶⁰ SarDesai, 60.

⁶¹ Ibid. p. 59.

In the fourteenth century, Siam and the Hindu Kingdom of Majapahit competed for maritime trade. By the turn of the fifteenth century, however, Majapahit was weakened by a war of succession and the entry of Malacca as a trade competitor. Malacca, however, after being established as a great port city, found itself competing with adversarial forces and eventually looked to the Muslim states of Sumatra for support. As a result of recognition by the Sultan of Pasai on Sumatra, Malacca advanced the spread of Islam and became the ideal example of how despite implementing Islamization, local customs and traditions were untouched.⁶²

Islam's greatest level of expansion occurred during the sixteenth century as it finally reached inland villagers of major islands and the Indonesian Archipelago.⁶³ Ironically, this was also the period when the Christianity touting Portuguese dominated trade in the region. During their reign, the inclination to force Christianity on the indigenous peoples, despite the fact that they had historically been receptive to the peaceful incursion of religious influences, drew deep resentment and increased the spread of Islam as it became a "weapon" or symbol of unity against the oppressive Portuguese. The behavior of the Portuguese left Muslims leaning on one another for trade and marginalizing trade with the Portuguese whenever given the opportunity. The eventual consequence of the Portuguese policy was that the spread of Islam was no longer through passive means—that is, Southeast Asians throughout the insular region actively sought Islam as a means of expressing their discontent with the Portuguese.

As mentioned previously, the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia is attributable to several factors, however, the most important was the way in which Islam was presented. That is, the "compromising spirit of the advocates of the new religion, who did not at all insist on the abandonment by the peoples of the region of their Hindu-Buddhist cultural heritage."⁶⁴ Consequently, Islam only

⁶² SarDesai, 60.

⁶³ Heidhues, Mary Somers, *Southeast Asia: A Concise History*, (NY: Thames & Hudson, 2001), 13.

⁶⁴ SarDesai, 59.

minimally influenced the traditional cultural practices of Southeast Asian believers and the indigenous civilization, which then included Hindu-Buddhist influences, remained prominent.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, Islam proceeded to spread throughout insular Southeast Asia and over time made it to Mindanao where it was halted with the conquest of Manila by the Spaniards.



Figure 2. Republic of the Philippines⁶⁶

⁶⁵ SarDesai, 60.

⁶⁶ Website: <http://www.hawaii.edu/cps/luzviminda.html>. Accessed March 2006.

C. ISLAM IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

Islam arrived in the Philippine archipelago in the late 15th century and spread as far north as Manila Bay. The process by which Islam spread throughout modern-day Philippines distinctly resembled that of the rest of Southeast Asia—marriage, commercial and political alliances and influential rulers. (Reference Figure 2 above for a map of the Philippines.) In doing so, Islam was crucial to the establishment of political, socio-cultural, educational, and religious institutions that significantly contributed to creating and developing communal consciousness and a feeling of Islamic identity.⁶⁷

Some seven centuries after Muslims began passing through the region of Southeast Asia, a sultanate was finally established in the southern Philippines in the late 15th century as the first organized form of government in that region.⁶⁸ Moreover, according to some scholars, the Sultanates of Sulu and Mindanao “...had achieved the most developed and cohesive political organizations of any group inhabiting the Islands at that time.”⁶⁹ Supporting this assertion, Cyrlac Pullapilly stated:

The authority structure placed the sultan at the head of a group of datus (chieftans of clans) and by virtue of his armed might and shrewd alliances (usually reinforced by marriages) he was able to maintain his power. The sultan and datus were both political and religious leaders, and the relationships among the sultan, datus, and their people—the whole web of duties, prerogatives, rights and obligations—were codified in the *Tariq*. It was a clear and specific set of rules which was highly conducive to the maintenance of stability of the society.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Yegar, Moshe, *Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar*, (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002), 186.

⁶⁸ Yam, William L., “Islam in the Philippines,” in Cyrlac K. Pullapilly, (ed.), *Islam in the Contemporary World*, (Notre Dame, Indiana: Cross Roads Books, 1980), 359.

⁶⁹ Gowing, Peter G. and Robert D. McAmis, *The Muslim Filipinos*, (Manila, Philippines: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), ix.

⁷⁰ Yam, 360.

Admittedly, however, the ensuing power struggles among the Muslim leaders would ultimately limit the ability of Muslims to thwart the rise of Western colonialists.

Islam continued to spread north during the first half of the 16th century as the Sultanates gained power and prestige and the Islamic institutions became well engrained in society. By the time the Spaniards arrived in 1565, Islam had spread to the southern portion of Luzon Island, including the modern-day capital of the Philippines, Manila. By 1571, however, the northward expansion was halted when the Spaniards had managed to expel the first sultan of the Manila region, Raja Suleiman.⁷¹

The power struggles among Muslim elites would account for the inability of the Muslims to effectively meet the challenge of Western encroachment. The major contributing factor behind this phenomenon was that, although Muslim Filipinos shared in a belief in Islam, they differed along ethnolinguistic lines—that is, they were separated by considerable geographic and linguistic barriers among the three major and ten minor ethnolinguistic groups throughout the region (a division that remains today). This can perhaps be attributed to the “non-intrusive” way in which Islam was proselytized throughout the region—that factor which made Islam attractive also allowed each group to maintain their traditional cultural differences and therefore still divided them.

The three main Muslim Filipino ethnolinguistic groups throughout history (and remain today) have been the Maguindanao (or *Maguindanao-Iranun*) of the Cotabato region, the Tausug (or *Tausug-Sama*) of the Sulu Archipelago, and the Maranao of the Lanao region. It is estimated that the Tausugs began converting to Islam in the late 14th century and were therefore the first of the main ethnolinguistic groups to do so. They also established the Sultanate of Sulu which eventually became the strongest political entity by the time the Spanish arrived a half century later.⁷² The Maguindanao are thought to have begun converting to Islam in the early 16th century. They too established a sultanate,

⁷¹ Yegar, 186.

⁷² Ibid, 187.

the Sultanate of Maguindanao. Together, the Maguindanao and Sulu Sultanates, due to the fact that they were better organized than their northern counterparts, would endure the main burden of the war against the Spanish that spanned centuries. The Maranao, who lived in the isolated and inaccessible territories of northwestern Mindanao, were the last of the main groups to convert to Islam. All three groups significantly differ in “their languages, subsistence patterns, social and political development, degree of Islamization, contacts with the non-Muslim world, dress, customs, arts and other aspects of culture.”⁷³ However, all three also fiercely resisted non-Muslim encroachment.

D. ISLAM AND CONFLICT IN THE PHILIPPINES

1. The Moro Wars

When Malacca fell to the Portuguese in 1511 the Muslims throughout the region were awakened to the possibility of foreign subjugation. For the Moros, this fear was realized once the Spanish began to colonize and Christianize the northern Philippines in 1565. According to Moshe Yegar, the Spanish came to the southern Philippines

...to gain Muslim recognition of Spanish sovereignty, to develop commercial ties with the Muslims of the south, exploit the natural resources in their territory, put an end to their piracy and attacks on Christian settlements in Bisaya and Luzon, and convert them to Christianity as they had succeeded in doing in the northern islands.”⁷⁴

The three-hundred year long war that ensued came to be known as the “Moro Wars.” Some scholars view this period of Muslim Filipino history as the defining period that “...made the Philippine Muslim what he is today” and “helped to define his attitudes and relations to all non-Muslim foreigners as well as to non-Muslim Filipinos.”⁷⁵

⁷³ Gowing, ix-x.

⁷⁴ Yegar, 200.

⁷⁵ Majul, Cesar Abid, “The Muslims in the Philippines; A Historical Perspective,” in Gowing, 7.

Renowned author Cesar Majul divided the Moro Wars into six stages.⁷⁶ The first stage began in 1569 when the Sultanate of Brunei (who was allied with the Sultanate of Sulu) was targeted by the Spanish due to their political and commercial control over the Philippine archipelago.⁷⁷ By 1580, Spain emerged as the clear victor, not only in taking Manila as their stronghold, but also in managing to diminish Brunei's influence over the region. Unfortunately for the Spanish, their success did not carry over to the second stage. Here the Spanish failed at their attempt to colonize Mindanao. The fact that the Muslims were allied with the Ternatan, an ethnic group of modern-day Ternate, Indonesia, was a significant contributing factor to halting the Spanish.⁷⁸ In the third stage, which began at the turn of the seventeenth century and spanned half a century, the Maguindanao and Buayan Sultanates allied and fought the Spanish over control of the Visayas. The Spanish eventually prevailed in their efforts, but not until they conquered the Molucca Islands thereby cutting off the aid from the Ternatans. In the fourth stage the Spanish adopted a type of scorched earth policy in order to "depopulate Muslim areas" and, perhaps most significantly, recruited the *indio* (previously conquered Filipinos) to fight the Muslims.⁷⁹ The Spanish policy devastated the Muslims and both the Sulu and Maguindanao retreated inland until they struck peace agreements in 1645 and 1646 respectively.⁸⁰ The agreement gave the Maguindanao Sultanate so much territory that it became to the most extensive native kingdom in the history of the Philippines, excluding the Republic of the Philippines—it even expanded into the Maranao region. However, merely a decade later, in 1656, Maguindanao was back in the throngs of war having declared a "*jihad*" in order to garner more Muslim support. After seven years of fighting, the Spanish withdrew and peace was established once again. This time, however, it would last 55 years—until

⁷⁶ Majul in Gowing, 7.

⁷⁷ Yegar, 200.

⁷⁸ Majul, in Gowing, 7.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 8.

⁸⁰ The Spanish were amenable to the agreement despite the fact that the enemy was retreating because they were eager to resolve the conflict and hold off other encroaching Europeans, especially the British.

1718 when the Spanish tried to retake Zamboanga. The sultanates used the hiatus to reorganize and refortify their empires, and reestablish commercial trade. In the fifth stage, the Spanish attempted to weaken Muslim resistance by converting the sultans, but failed. Additionally, Spanish power declined as the British invaded, and temporarily controlled, Manila in 1762. Subsequently, the fighting in the south lessened. Moreover, the British received territory in North Borneo from the Sulu Sultanate in a show of gratitude for British aid.⁸¹ Finally, in the sixth stage, the European rivalry that began in the previous stage intensified as the French joined the British in vying for Spanish claims. Recognizing their threat, Spain entered into another agreement with the Sulu Sultanate in 1851. Twenty years later the Spanish once again invaded Sulu and the island of Jolo fell in 1876. This final stage was also marked by the technological military advances by the Spanish who, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, used their innovations to militarily dominate the Muslims. Nevertheless, Spanish reign over the Philippines ended in 1898 when Spain relinquished sovereignty over the entire Philippines Archipelago, including the southern region, to the United States.⁸²

Hence, three main points can be drawn from the legacy of the Moro Wars. First, although the Spanish were successful in that they managed to exact heavy fatalities on the Muslims and rendered their incursions futile, they never gained total control of the Muslim regions.⁸³ As Yegar describes:

While not invariably crowned by success, Spain's vigorous military offensive in the closing decades of its rule in the Philippines inflicted heavy losses on the Muslims whose raids became ineffectual. The Muslim sultanates were left with few options. Their commerce was interrupted, many of their settlements destroyed in the fighting, and the population depleted because of losses sustained in fighting, in starvation, and disease. In effect, the

⁸¹ Yegar, 203.

⁸² The agreement was the Treaty of Paris, signed 10 December 1898, which ended the Spanish-American war.

⁸³ Yam, 361.

sultanates lost much of their independence despite the fact that the Spaniards did not manage to totally conquer Muslim territory.⁸⁴

In the end, despite these hardships, the Muslim political, legal, religious, social, and administrative institutions were left in tact and uninfluenced by the Spanish.

Secondly, scholars agree that the wars were in general a religious matter for the Muslims—which also meant fighting to preserve the Muslim way of life. As Yegar points out: “...it was the Spanish aim to convert [the Muslims] which was the strongest element in Muslim resistance to the Spaniards and their Christian allies...”⁸⁵ However, the question that inevitably arises when discussing the topic of the Moro Wars is: What impact did this devastating war have on the process of Islamization that was occurring prior to Spain’s arrival? As mentioned previously, the spread of Islam was halted and indeed even reversed as the Spanish gained control of the northern portions of the Philippines and successfully converted the indigenous people to Christianity. On the other hand, with regard to the impact these wars had on the actual development of an Islamic consciousness, the answer is less clear. Some scholars, such as Moshe Yegar and Cesar Majul, identify this period as the turning point which resulted in the development of an Islamic identity. Yegar assess that:

The process of Islamization deepened among Moros, and a solidarity, which had not previously existed, was created between the various communities. Resistance to the Spanish and the “Wars of the Moro” shaped a concept of an all-inclusive Moro community despite differences among the various Muslim ethnic groups.⁸⁶

Additionally, Cesar Majul, the foremost historian of Muslims in the Philippines, noted that “the motivating force behind [the Spanish-Muslim] wars was religious differences”⁸⁷ and directly correlated the anti-Spanish struggle with “growing Islamic consciousness of the Muslims in the Philippines” also stating

⁸⁴ Yegar, 205

⁸⁵ Ibid, 200.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 207.

⁸⁷ Majul, Cesar, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*, (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1985), 18.

that “the role that Islam played in stiffening the resistance of the Muslims against Spanish efforts to dominate them cannot be over-emphasized.”⁸⁸

Others such as Thomas McKenna, however, argue that:

...Spanish aggression against the Muslim polities of the archipelago did not, to any significant degree, stimulate the development of an overarching ethnoreligious identity self-consciously shared by members of various Muslim ethnolinguistic groups. ...[Furthermore,] while it is reasonable to assume that Islamic appeals were occasionally employed to mobilize opposition to Spanish aggression in the southern sultanates, there is little historical evidence to suggest that indigenous resistance to the Spanish threat led to a heightened Islamic identity among the Muslim populace...⁸⁹

To clarify, McKenna is not arguing that an Islamic identity does not exist today among Muslim Filipinos, he argues that this identity was intentionally developed by American colonialists in an effort to “...prepare Philippine Muslims for the eventual end of American colonialism and their inclusion in an independent Philippine republic as a consolidated and relatively progressive ethnic minority.”⁹⁰

Third, the wars created very deep seeded hatred and prejudices between the Muslims and the indigenous Christians in the Philippines. As one author describes:

The war, which was marked by bitterness and cruelty, had potent religious-theological considerations for both sides, engendering an overwhelming hostility between the Muslim and Christian populations which has lasted to the present day. A schism was created which split the population sharply along religious lines and set the Christian *Indio* against the Muslim Moro.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Majul, Cesar, *Muslims in the Philippines*, (Manila: St. Mary's Publishing, 1973), 343.

⁸⁹ McKenna, 81-82.

⁹⁰ Nermeen Shaikh, “Transcript of Interview with Thomas McKenna,” *AsiaSource*, website: www.asiasource.org/news/special_reports/philippine.cfm. Accessed: March 2006.

⁹¹ Yegar, 207.

2. American Colonization

In 1898, as a result of the Spanish-American war, the United States gained possession of the Philippines. The stated policy of the United States was outlined by President William McKinley in an address to Congress in 1899:

The Philippines are not ours to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government. This is the path we must follow or be recreant to a mighty trust committed to us.⁹²

Therefore, "...American policy in the south was aimed at developing, civilizing, strengthening, and preparing the Muslims for self-rule in order to integrate them into the mainstream of life in the Philippines."⁹³ However, it would take nearly a decade for the United States to even begin implementing its policies of development in the Philippines. This was due not only to the "Moro problem" they inherited from the Spanish, but also the fact that the arrival of the Americans coincided with the rise of the Christian-Philippine nationalist movement which began fighting the Spanish for independence in 1896.⁹⁴ Although allied initially, after realizing the U.S. would not be granting them independence, the nationalists engaged in a war against the U.S. that essentially ended in 1902 when the movement's leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, was captured. Sporadic fighting continued in the north, but in the south the fighting became more intense.

In mid-1899, the U.S. signed an agreement with the Sultanate of Sulu. However, sporadic fighting broke out in 1901 and in 1904 it was officially dissolved by the U.S., citing the fact that the current policy "...undercut the sovereignty of the United States because of the recognition it gave to the authority of the sultan of Sulu in the internal affairs of the sultanate."⁹⁵ The

⁹² Gowing, 33.

⁹³ Yegar, 216.

⁹⁴ It should be noted here that the Muslims, although sharing the same goal as the nationalists—to expel the Spanish from their territories—refused to join them and merely remained neutral. This decision is indicative of the level of resentment the Muslims had not just for the *Christian* Spanish, but also the *Christian* Filipinos. Yegar, 208.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 217.

tougher policy sought to restrict traditional Muslim authority—that of the sultan and the *Dato*—and proved devastating to the Muslims social fabric.

With military operations still being waged, in 1903 the U.S. established the “Moro Province” which was overseen by U.S. military governors. These governors tried with little success to improve the political, economic, and social development of the Muslim regions. Some progress was made in the area of public works; schools and hospitals were built, agriculture and commerce were stimulated, and slavery was banished.⁹⁶ Although the Americans’ non-religious intentions were acknowledged by the Muslims, it soon became evident that they too conflicted with Islam. The differences were evident at the very basic level—American values of “individualism, social mobility, equality before the law, *separation of church and state*, and the activation of democratic modes in local government” directly conflicted with Muslim traditional practices.⁹⁷ Everything aspect of life for the Muslim was affected by the changes; from education to taxation, to the very inconceivable concept of separation of church and state—the cornerstone of American democracy. As Yegar explains:

...The Muslims neither understood nor accepted the distinction between secular and religious matters which the Americans brought with them. According to Islam, both religious and political authority resided in the person of the sultan and the various *Dato*. Infringing on their traditional role could only be construed as an affront to religion and the traditional way of life. As far as Muslims were concerned, the imposition of the laws and customs of foreign infidels amounted to religious coercion and was a threat to the character of the Muslim *Ulama*.⁹⁸

Renewed fears among the Muslims that not only were they in danger of losing their way of life, but that they were to be incorporated into a politically Christian dominated state inspired many Muslims to continue to fight. Nevertheless, by 1913 the U.S. Army had routed most of the Muslims and the southern Philippines enjoyed relative peace through the decade. Military control was relinquished in 1913 to U.S. civilian authorities and the Moro Province was

⁹⁶ Yegar, 216.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 215.

changed to the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The region progressed steadily in all areas of development under the governorship of Frank W. Carpenter. But in 1921, barely a year since the Department was dissolved, hostilities renewed in the wake of animosity between the Muslims and the Christian Filipinos as the latter replaced the U.S. administrators in the south.

Another major point of contention for the muslims stemmed from the government sanctioned migration policies which began in 1912. Three factors converged and caused the state to sponsor migration policies: (1) the political-military tension between the colonial state and filipino revolutionaries in luzon since the early years of the twentieth century, (2) the push to extend the reach of nation-building, (3) the pull of capital accumulation for both private and state interests.⁹⁹ The government's initial or "official" objective in promoting resettlement programs (the migration of northerners to the south) was to increase the production of agricultural crops such as rice and corn by establishing vibrant small family farm agriculture. Although this objective was never fully realized, as eric gutierrez and saturnino borras describe, its impact would prove devastating:

[the] settlement programs were assessed by most scholars and policymakers as failures in terms of their officially stated goals... the expense of setting up physical infrastructure had been cited as among the obstacles (lichauco 1956). But the impact of such programs on the preexisting structural and institutional makeup of mindanao would be far-reaching. As james scott (1998: 191), in a more global context, explains: "the concentration of population in planned settlements may not create what state planners had in mind, but it has almost always disrupted or destroyed prior communities whose cohesion derived mostly from non-state sources."¹⁰⁰

The programs brought about a chain of events that would become the foundation of future muslim discontent. The indigenous peoples (muslims and lumads), especially the poor, became landless and were displaced from their communities. The sheer number of migrants turned the majority of predominantly muslim regions into christian dominated areas within a few

⁹⁹ Gutierrez, 7.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 9-10.

decades. In fact, mindanao's 75% muslim majority at the turn of the century would dwindle to 25% in 1960, then less than 18% in 1990 where it seems to have remained.¹⁰¹ This disruption to the population structure throughout the region was felt in most aspects of life: social, economic, and political. Although lumads and even some christians felt the depredation caused by these failed programs, it was the muslim communities who came to bear the brunt of the poverty and social and political exclusion.

The legacy of the American colonization of the Philippines was two-fold. First, they managed to penetrate and control the Muslim territories by force—arguably finishing what the Spanish had started. Secondly, but more importantly, in their ignorant quest to “civilize” the Philippines, they effectively dismantled the Muslim political, legal, religious, social, and administrative institutions. Along these lines, the support for and implementation of the migration policies that brought Christians into their homeland was perhaps the most demoralizing. Although there was certainly animosity towards the United States, it was nowhere near that towards the Christian Filipinos. The distrust and hatred that was seeded during the Moro Wars was only further exacerbated during the U.S. occupation.

E. MORO ORGANIZED REBELLION

The Republic of the Philippines was formed on July 4th, 1946, and the so-called Filipino “nationalist” movement believed their goal had been achieved. Most Muslims, however, considered themselves a separate nation and wanted to preserve their own social, economic, and political codes and ethics. By the late 1960s, after several failed attempts to integrate the Muslim population, grievances in relation to Christians coincided with an increasing Muslim self-consciousness and provided the basis for a separatist movement. Although entwined political, social, and economic grievances created the unrest, two events were critical for the formation of that separatist movement. First, the Corregidor incident (also known as the Jabidah Massacre) in March 1968—where some 30 military trainees, all Muslim, were slaughtered by their superior

¹⁰¹ Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert, “Options in the Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in the Southern Philippines,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 41, No. 2, (Mar-Apr 2001), 274.

officers, all Christian—outraged the Muslim community.¹⁰² As a result, on May 1, 1968, Udtog Matalam announced the formation of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) and issued a manifesto demanding an independent state comprised of Sulu, Palawan, and much of Mindanao. The basis for this declaration was the “objection to the turning over of Sabah to Christian Filipinos, ...indignation at the Corregidor massacre, ...and disgust with the conditions of Muslim Filipinos.”¹⁰³ After co-opting some of the MIM leaders by providing them high positions in the administration, the Philippine government forced the rest of MIM to disband in 1970. However, an underground movement in the youth section of the MIM, feeling betrayed by their leaders, continued and would go on to create the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).¹⁰⁴ The second factor critical to forming separatist movements was the campaign for the elections of 1971 because it attracted the attention of Muslim states (i.e. Libya and Malaysia) and focused attention on the shifting balance of political power between Christians and Muslim groups which escalated the level of violence (i.e. tensions rose and violence broke out in areas “where Christian migration had resulted in Christian majorities and hence had the potential for unseating Muslim political leaders, if the Christians voted together.”¹⁰⁵).

The underground separatist movement MNLF was formally organized during this time by young men from non-elite Muslim families who had attended universities in Manila on government scholarships expressly intended to integrate Muslims into the Philippine nation—Nur Misuari became the chairman of MNLF.¹⁰⁶ The majority of recruitment would come from Tausag (Nur Misuari’s group), Samal, and Yakan ethno-linguistic groups concentrated in the Sulu

¹⁰² Quimpo, 408. “Most reports at the time said that the Muslims mutinied when they did not receive their paychecks, and that their officers killed about thirty of them. Other accounts, from Muslims, attributed the massacre to the refusal of the recruits to obey because they felt the invasion of Sabah was unjustified.”

¹⁰³ Noble, Lela Garner, “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines,” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 43, (1976), 409.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* Noble sights an interview with Commander Ulangutan of the MNLF, April 1974.

¹⁰⁵ Syed 410.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* p. 449.

Archipeligo.¹⁰⁷ Although its objective was to establish an independent state for all the Muslim peoples of the Philippines, the MNLF applied a broader ranging central concept of Philippine Muslim *nationalism* in order to have a more cultural-historical appeal. This nationalism was embodied in the term “Bangsamoro” or “Moro Nation.” The term “Moro”, often used disparagingly by Christian Filipinos, was transformed by the separatists into a positive symbol of collective identity—one of unity and continuity. This national character of the MNLF was reflected in a policy statement from the first issue of *Maharlika*, an MNLF newsletter:

From this very moment there shall be no stressing the fact that one is a Tausug, a Samal, a Yakan, a Subanon, a Kalagan, a Maguindanao, a Maranao, or a Badjao. He is only a Moro. Indeed, even those of other faith who have long established residence in the Bangsa Moro homeland and whose good-will and sympathy are with the Bangsa Moro revolution shall, for purposes of national identification, be considered Moros. In other words, the term Moro is a national concept that must be understood as all embracing for all Bangsa Moro people within the length and breadth of our national boundaries.¹⁰⁸

Although entwined political, social, and economic grievances created the separatist movements such as MNLF, the catalyst that set-off the “war” against the Philippine government was the declaration of martial law by President Marcos in September 1972. Additionally, the declaration broadened the base of support of Muslim radicals. Martial law basically centralized the Marcos regime’s power to the point that it was almost exclusively in the hands of “Christians” including Marcos’ family and associates, technocrats, and the military. From this consolidation, the restrictions on legitimate political activities left only two options open for the activists—join and accept regime policies or revolt. When the regime immediately began taking guns away from civilians many interpreted it as

¹⁰⁷ Gershman, John. *Self-Determination Regional Conflict Profile: Moros in the Philippines*, (October 2001). Found on-line at: www.seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/Modules/Modules/MuslimMindanao/self_self_determination.htm. Accessed March 2006.

¹⁰⁸ Syed, 418.

threat to their *option* to later resort to force. Therefore, both Muslims who advocated non-violent actions through political channels and those “opportunists ready to seize any chance to achieve immediate goals—for power, wealth, or pride—became willing to join the radicals.”¹⁰⁹

In late October 1972 the war broke out as Muslims began their attacks. Thousands of lives were lost during the armed struggle in Mindanao and hundreds of thousands were displaced. After nearly four years of fighting, the Marcos regime came to the realization that resolving the conflict would require more than a military solution, which was also proving impractical, and attempted to negotiate a peace settlement of the conflict.

With the help of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Tripoli Agreement was negotiated and signed by the MNLF leaders and the Philippine government in December 1976. This agreement called for an immediate ceasefire and established the framework for autonomy in 13 of Mindanao’s 21 provinces where a majority of Muslims lived. The ceasefire was short-lived because the two sides had serious disagreements on the implementation of the pact predominantly on the issue of the plebiscite. President Marcos, without consulting the MNLF, established interim autonomous governments in two regions covered under the Tripoli Agreement. The MNLF accused the government of violating the terms of the Tripoli Agreement and refused to recognize the autonomous governments.¹¹⁰

Immediately after the peace agreement was signed, the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO) was organized. Its founders were two traditional leaders living as expatriates in Saudi Arabia. They claimed the BMLO as the leader of the Muslim struggle in the Philippines due to their “traditional prerogatives” (both were former congressmen and sultans of their provinces). Since Nur Misuari, the leader of the MNLF, belonged to a different ethno-linguistic group and social class he refused to acknowledge the BMLO. The BMLO therefore appealed to the MNLFs second-in-command (and nephew to

¹⁰⁹ Noble, 411.

¹¹⁰ Bacani, Benedicto R., *The Mindanao Peace talks: Another Opportunity to Resolve the Moro Conflict in the Philippines*,” United States Institute of Peace, (January, 2005), 4.

one of the BMLO leaders) Salamat Hashim who had received extensive religious training in Egypt.¹¹¹ Already divided by ideological differences with Nur Misuary, Salamat Hashim demonstrated his independence by creating the “MNLF-Salamat.”

In 1977 the movements found themselves back in conflict with the Philippine Army. By 1978 three groups claimed to be the leaders of the Muslim movement in the Philippines: the MNLF-Misuary faction, MNLF-Salamat faction, and the BMLO.¹¹² The Muslim separatist movement was in disarray and popular support began waning. The MNLF was especially hard hit by top leaders either cooperating with the government or joining MILF. The movements emerged from this low period by acknowledging that they had a similar enemy but differing views. As a result, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) first announced its existence as a separate movement from the MNLF in 1984. The MILF claimed the area they considered to be the “Bangsamoro” (Moro Nation) which included the islands of Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and Palawan.

The MILF, as the name indicates, placed more emphasis on Islam and most of its leaders were Islamic scholars from traditional aristocratic and religious backgrounds. The MILF would go on to become the largest group. Although the exact number of members is unknown, the MILF claims to have 120,000 members while the Government estimates about 8,000 while Western intelligence sources cite about 40,000 members.¹¹³ Most of its members are reportedly from the Maguindanaon and Iranun ethnic groups of the Cotabato region.¹¹⁴

F. SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter was to provide background information on the origins of Islam in Southeast Asia and more specifically the Philippines and to

¹¹¹ Iacovou, Christos. “From MNLF to Abu Sayyaf; The Radicalization of Islam in the Philippines.” *Institute of Defense Analysis, Greece*, (July 2000).

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Gershman.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

discuss the role of Islam in the anti-colonial struggle against the Spanish and Americans as well as the factors that led to organized Muslim rebellion.

Islam throughout Southeast Asia, like Hinduism and Buddhism before it, arrived in a peaceful manner and spread throughout Southeast Asia as a result of social interaction among communities as well as a defiant gesture against external influences. As Southeast Asians were able to freely adapt Islamic practices of their choosing, the form of Islam found in the region is different from that of the rest of the world. The principle reason for this *freedom* is directly attributable to the *priorities and origins* of the proselytizers of Islam in the region. That is, at one point in time Arab Muslims, not unlike Christians, were spreading the word of Islam “with a Koran in one hand and sword in the other.”¹¹⁵ As it was though, Islam in Southeast Asia became both a symbol of peace and resistance. In a religion such as Islam where it is the definitive authority in all aspects of life including, political, economic, legal, and ethical matters, it is not hard to see how the historical glamorization of Islam as a “rallying call” meshed with this holistic view to create Southeast Asian Islam. The Philippines was no different in this regard and is an ideal example of this phenomenon as religion became the one factor that crossed over the vast ethnolinguistic communities.

The history of the Muslim Filipinos is marred with conflict. The legacy of the three-hundred year Moro Wars was three-fold; (1) the preservation of the Muslim institutions despite an unbending and powerful European foe, (2) the fact that although all Muslims fought for the sake of Islam and preservation of their culture, they never united as one under Islam, and (3) the fact that Christian-Filipinos joined the Spanish to fight the Muslims planted the seeds of hatred, prejudice, and suspicion that still exists today. The colonization by the United States, however, brought the Muslims their greatest challenge. Having to succumb to the Americans militarily, the institutions the Muslims had fought so hard to preserve were dismantled in a matter of decades. The most devastating blow, however, came as an unintended consequence of an agricultural

¹¹⁵ SarDesai, 21.

development policy—transmigration of Christians into Muslim areas—which further broke down the Muslim institutions. This became even more evident following the creation of an independent Republic of the Philippines.

Two decades after independence the “Moro Problem” was still unresolved and Muslims resorted to organized rebellion against the Philippines government. Once again, the Muslims were engaged in conflict, this time, however, it was the “Filipino foreigners” they were fighting. The MNLF was the first to “rally” the various Muslim groups with a nationalist call for support. As the conflict dragged on, the alliance began to break down. The peace agreement was never truly adhered to by either party and the conflict continued.




Figure 3. Map of the Southern Philippines¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ Rood, 51.

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III. CONTEMPORARY RADICAL ISLAM

A. INTRODUCTION

As stated in the previous chapter, for the purposes of this thesis, contemporary radical Islam is defined as a movement whose ideology is “to establish an Islamic state governed by *sharia* through violence and extralegal means...”¹¹⁷ In order to understand this phenomenon as it has come to exist today, it is necessary to understand the chain of events that led to it.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the origins and root causes of contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines. The first section is a description of the evolution of radical Islamism from its beginning as an anti-nationalist movement in the Middle East to what is known world-wide today as contemporary radical Islam. The second section outlines the impact traditional factors have had on the evolution of radical Islamism in Mindanao while the third section is an outlines for factors related to globalization. In the fourth section these factors are evaluated, demonstrating that the two factors are not mutually exclusive; in fact contemporary radical Islam in Mindanao is a fusion of both globalization and traditional legacies.

B. EVOLUTION OF RADICAL ISLAM

Modern Islamist ideology materialized in the Middle East in the second half of the twentieth century as a revivalist, anti-nationalist movement. In the early 1920s much of the Muslim world was under European imperial and/or colonial control and the Ottoman Empire—which had been the seat of the Caliphate—was dissolved. The Caliphate, although limited in real power by then, was seen as the unifying symbol of Islam by many Muslims. Muslim empires and influence were quickly deteriorating—giving way to Westernization. It was under this perceived threat to Muslim livelihood and a “community in crisis” that contemporary Islamic activism emerged.

¹¹⁷ Abuza, 4.

1. Emergence of Islamic Activism

The propagators of the Islamic revivalist movement viewed the core of the crisis as being two part; Western imperialism and Westernized nationalist Muslim leadership. In the early years of the movement, the most prominent and revered theorists were Hassan al-Banna of Egypt and Mawlana Mawdudi of Pakistan. The groups founded by each of these religious scholars—the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, in Egypt, and the *Jamaat-i-Islami* in 1941, in India (pre-dating the establishment of Pakistan in 1947), respectively—remain today the hallmark of Islamic movement organizations. Support for Al-Banna’s Brotherhood was limited at first, but eventually the group appealed to the masses and grew in numbers—going on to be the largest movement despite its founder’s assassination in 1949. Mawdudi’s Jamaat, however, maintained a modest number of followers throughout its history and mostly appealed to the Muslim religious-elite in Pakistan. Both leaders viewed their societies as being too reliant on the West, politically ineffectual, and culturally defunct. Furthermore they viewed the increasing incursion of Western culture (such as education, law, customs, values) as being significantly more destructive in the long run because it directly threatened the core of the Muslim community—its identity.¹¹⁸

Al-Banna and Mawdudi believed the internal aspects of the problem were most pressing and therefore focused on the Islamization of the Muslim community. They shared the belief that Islam, by providing comprehensive guidance for every aspect of a Muslim’s life, was better than capitalist and Marxist ideologies. And in support of this key principle, they established organizations that promoted social and political activism.¹¹⁹ They both also worked to match modernization with scripture and tradition by reinterpreting Islam and applying it to the challenges of modernity. Islamization of society—through social, peaceful activism—was of the highest priority. This was especially true for Mawdudi, who believed that—although an Islamic state was the only infallible mechanism for preserving the Muslim community—he

¹¹⁸ Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, 130.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, 132.

espoused working from within the system by participating in the political institutions. For Mawdudi, the divergence between the “Islamist avant-garde” and the Muslim masses did not necessitate armed revolution or even resistance.¹²⁰

For al-Banna and Mawdudi, the solution to the crisis of the Muslim communities in their respective regions lied in indoctrinating the people (socio-religious reforms) while changing the government (political reform) at the same time. With this in mind, the Brotherhood found an unlikely ally in the nationalist movement that had emerged following WWI and was leading the charge for independence from European colonizers.

2. Rise of Nationalism and Marginalization of Islam

Nationalist movements, although ideal in the sense that their main purpose was to free Muslims from foreign control, proved detrimental to the religious entities since their ideology was secularist which marginalized the role of religion in society and politics. As Gilles Kepel explains:

Nationalist sentiments among Arabs, Turks, Iranians, Pakistanis, Malaysians, Indonesians, and others had fragmented the historic ‘land of Islam’ (*dar el-Islam*) into communities with clearly different priorities. The nationalists took control of the tools of modern communication...and placed them at the service of ideals, such as freedom and equality... This project of emancipation...allowed nationalists to thrust aside the religious establishment in their pursuit of secular goals. Above all, it sidelined the ulemas, who had traditionally exercised sole control over the written language and had used it as a vector for the expression of religious values.¹²¹

At first, the call for independence was being espoused by both the nationalist groups such as the Free Officers Movement (FOM) and Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. (The former was a group of disenchanted young middle-class officers from humble backgrounds with a secular-nationalist agenda and the latter called for an “Islamic order” and socio-religious reform.) When members of the FOM took over the Egyptian state

¹²⁰ Kepel, 36.

¹²¹ Ibid, 24-5.

through a coup d'état in July 1952, the Brotherhood welcomed the change with the hope that the new government would unite the country and implement Islamic order.¹²² However, the alliance quickly broke down as the nationalists' secular agenda proved contrary to the goals of the Brotherhood and both camps found themselves competing for the same social strata—the urban lower-middle class. The competition led to conflict when, in 1954, the Brotherhood was blamed for an assassination attempt on the life of the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

As President of Egypt, and one of the former leaders of the FOM, Nasser outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and arrested, imprisoned, exiled, and executed most of the leaders and successfully weakened the movement to the point that they were rendered powerless for the next two decades. Demoralized, but not destroyed, however, Muslim Brotherhood organizations continued to grow elsewhere in the Middle East.

During the movement's retreat its remaining followers would look to examine the reasons behind their failure. Many found answers in the prominent writings of Islamic scholar and leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb. Following the assassination of al-Banna in 1949, Qutb emerged as the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although influenced by al-Banna and Mawdudi's ideological theories and concept of the Islamic state, Qutb saw the means for attaining their goals as requiring a more radical program of action.¹²³ By rejecting any and all forms of nationalism, Qutb in effect declared the Egyptian polity illegitimate.¹²⁴ His "uncompromising de-legitimization of all 'manmade' political communities, prompted in part by the state's violent attack on the Brotherhood and its teachings, [led] many radical Muslim fundamentalists to embrace violent struggle..."¹²⁵

¹²² Ibrahim, Ibrahim, "Islamic Revival in Egypt and Greater Syria," in Cyriac K. Pullapilly, 163.

¹²³ Burke, Jason, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*, (NY: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2004), 52.

¹²⁴ Brykczynski, Paul, "Radical Islam and the Nation: The Relationship between Religion and Nationalism in the Political Thought of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb," *History of Intellectual Culture*, vol 5, no. 1, (2005) 13.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, 13.

Imprisoned during the 1954 government crackdown, Qutb wrote his most influential and radical works there until his execution in 1966. Many scholars speculate Qutb was profoundly affected by the Nasser regime's brutal suppression of the Brotherhood:

...Imprisoned and tortured ...he became increasingly militant and radicalized, convinced that the Egyptian government was un-Islamic and had to be overthrown. ...[Furthermore] Qutb regarded the West as the historic enemy of Islam and Muslims... Equally insidious, he believed, were the elites of the Muslim world, who ruled and governed according to Western secular principles and values that threatened the faith, identity, and values of their own Islamic societies.¹²⁶

3. The Saudi Arabia Connection

Unable to publish his work in Egypt, Sayyid's brother, Muhammad Qutb, published them in Wahhabist¹²⁷ Saudi Arabia where they were held with high regard by the growing number of supporters. In fact, many of the Brothers fled to Saudi Arabia in order to avoid persecution and found refuge and a channel to voice their beliefs at Saudi universities. As Kepel explains, despite the fact that Qutb's writings called for the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy, the Islamists and the Wahhabists "...shared certain major points of doctrine—notably the imperative of returning to Islam's 'fundamentals' and the strict implementation of all its injunctions and prohibitions in the legal, moral, and private spheres."¹²⁸

Despite the alliance and growing popularity with the Wahhabists that began in the mid-1950s, the revivalists entered the 1960s still relatively unknown, and hadn't successfully penetrated the social masses. However, this quickly changed by the late 1960s as a direct result of Saudi Arabia's newfound wealth in exporting oil. Saudi Arabia used its wealth to "export" contemporary Islamism by various methods. Of significance was the Muslim World League—created in 1962 in Mecca and funded by Saudis as a non-government entity—because it

¹²⁶ Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 259-60.

¹²⁷ Abuza, 12. The Wahhabi sect of Sunni Islam present in Saudi Arabia was the result of the alliance between the Saud clan and Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab that established the Saudi monarchy in 1744.

¹²⁸ Kepel, 50.

was the first organization established for the purpose of countering nationalist influences of leaders such as Nasser by introducing Wahabbism.¹²⁹ Its operations included dispatching missionaries throughout the Muslim world, distributing the writings of many of its most prominent ideologists, and building Mosques and providing ideological and financial support to various Islamic associations. As discussed later in the chapter, the Saudi campaign was far reaching—to include the Moros of the southern Philippines.

Aside from the League, the global climate also became an important factor. Nationalism (local and regional) combined with the divisive, bipolar nature of the Cold War had left the Muslim world politically and religiously at odds. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, secularism had permeated the governments of almost every majority-Muslim nation, except Saudi Arabia. These governments systematically marginalized the power and influence of the traditional Islamic leaders, or *ulemas*, as their once sacred duties were placed increasingly in the hands of secular intellectuals.¹³⁰

4. The Weakening of Nationalism and the Revival of Islamism

As many of the leaders of “nationalist” governments throughout the Muslim world became increasingly oppressive and authoritarian, ideologies of Islamic revivalism and the call to reestablish Islam and once again normalize the cultural, social, and political behaviors of Muslims began to gain momentum.¹³¹ The ensuing “clash of ideologies” between the secularists and Islamic revivalists was particularly true in the “hot bed” of activism at the time—Egypt.

A major turning point for the Islamist movements—although more a benefit in the form of a setback for the nationalists that made the movement more appealing for those disillusioned by nationalists—came in June of 1967 as a result of the humiliating loss of the Six Day War which culminated with a substantial loss of territory including East Jerusalem. This defeat, made even more unpleasant by the fact that Nasser had initiated the war by attacking the

¹²⁹ Beinun, Joel, “Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of an Egyptian Social Movement,” *CR: The New Centennial Review*, vol. 5, issue 1, (Spring 2005), 166.

¹³⁰ Kepel, 52.

¹³¹ Kepel, 25.

Israelis, gravely damaged the credibility of the nationalists' ideology. The shock left many Muslims disillusioned and looking for answers which resulted in a new phase of growth and expansion of religious revivalism.¹³² The gap between secularists and non-secularists began to diminish as the disappointment felt by both groups was channeled towards a rejection of Western-style modernization.

There was a general consensus that Muslims had failed to produce a viable, authentic cultural synthesis and social order that was both modern and true to indigenous history and values. Western models of political, social, and economic development were criticized as imported transplants that had failed, fostering continued political and cultural dependence on the West and resulting in secularism, materialism, and spiritual bankruptcy. Neither Western liberal nationalism nor the Arab nationalism/socialism of Egypt...had succeeded.¹³³

This soul-searching was compounded by several key events which facilitated expansion. First, Nasser, the strongest proponent of nationalism in the Arab world, died unexpectedly in 1970. His successor, Anwar Al-Sadat, unable to match Nasser's charisma or influence, reached out to Islam in an effort to use it as a tool for supporting his weak regime. He reversed Nasser's position toward the activists by releasing and exonerating the imprisoned and exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood. He even allowed the establishment of Islamic organizations on university campuses. All this was done to counterbalance the left for he still maintained tight control over the political realm. Sadat also successfully manipulated the religious sector by propagandizing the October 1973 Egyptian-Syrian war against the Israelis as an Islamic holy war, and although in the end it was a loss militarily, among Muslims it was viewed as a moral victory for Islam.

Also during this same period, Saudi Arabia led an oil embargo against the US and other Western states in protest over their support for Israel during the war. This event was a major turning point for Middle Eastern international relations since it was the first time in modern history that a Muslim country held

¹³² Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 160.

¹³³ *Ibid*, 162.

and applied economic leverage over the (“Western”) international community. But the event that boosted the revivalist movements to new heights was the Iranian Revolution late in 1978. The fact that the first successful “Islamic revolution” occurred in a non-Arab, Shii Muslim state did not prevent the majority Sunni¹³⁴ Muslims world-wide from accepting and celebrating the victory.¹³⁵

Its success in effectively mobilizing Iranians against a seemingly invincible shah seemed to validate Islamic activist claims that a return to Islam would restore religious identity and vitality and enable Muslims, with God’s guidance, to implement a more autonomous and self-reliant way of life despite a regime’s military power and Western allies. ...it became tangible corroboration for those who sought explanations for the apparent failures of their governments and believed that less dependence on outside forces, greater self-reliance, and the reaffirmation of Islam offered an alternative.¹³⁶

Emboldened by these events, Islamist movements became increasingly radical as well as more militant and factions began to form. For example, in Egypt militant groups like Muhammad’s youth (also known as the Islamic Liberation Organization), the Army of God, and Excommunication and Emigration attempted to overthrow the government through violent means. Former members of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, disillusioned by the moderate stance of the organization as well as the government’s blatant misrepresentation of Islam, resorted to supporting revolutionary groups.¹³⁷

At this point it was increasingly evident that the fervor of the Iranian Revolution, which culminated in February of 1979, resulted in the ideological understanding and acceptance of the radical Islamist movement. However it wasn’t until December of that same year when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan that these movements united and mobilized to fight with their Afghan

¹³⁴ The Shii sect of Islam was created as a result of a dispute over the rightful successors of Muhammad (the Caliph). Shii’s believe the successor must be from the bloodline of Muhammad, whereas the Sunni accepted the selection of a successor by the assembly of advisors. Additionally, several doctrinal differences have emerged over time.

¹³⁵ Burke, 60.

¹³⁶ Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 163.

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, 171.

brethren. The *Mujahadeen*, as the Islamist “freedom fighters” would come to be known, were comprised of Muslims from all corners of the Muslim world. And after defeating the Soviets they would return to their homelands as heroes who had been militarized and undergone a radical process of Islamization.

Within a span of three decades, Islamic revivalism, which called for nonviolent social activism, had evolved into radical militant fundamentalism with an ideology that is conceptually counter to the means it is willing to use in achieving its goal. In summary, radical Islamism today evolved from activists’ calling to address the problem of a perceived Muslim community in crisis. Scholars such as Egypt’s al-Banna and Pakistan’s Mawdudi viewed the solutions as coming from within the Muslim community through social and political reformation centered on traditional Islamic practices and beliefs. However, as the secular nationalist movements came to power and increasingly marginalized the role of traditional religious leaders, it became clear to their successors that the nationalists had betrayed their cause. Scholars such as Qutb viewed the Egyptian nationalists as being no different than the governments they had ousted and that they could not be reasoned with—only forcibly removed. This militant call to overthrow “ungodly” regimes began to gain momentum throughout the 1970s as many nationalist governments—having failed to establish vibrant and viable economic, political, and social development models—lost legitimacy. As the radical ideology of the Islamists gained popularity, watershed world events such as the “October War,” the Saudi Arabian oil embargo, the Iranian Revolution, and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan emboldened the spirit of the movements. Additionally, political and religious rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia prompted both to export their revolutionary ideologies. It is under these conditions that contemporary radical Islam came to exist. In the next two sections the causes of contemporary radical Islam are examined in the context of being a legacy of tradition and a product of globalization as applicable to the conflict in the southern Philippines.

C. RADICAL ISLAMISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: A LEGACY OF TRADITIONALISM

The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines is a legacy of tradition. In doing so, first a summary of how radical Islamism in the Middle East was a legacy of tradition is delineated. This is essential in order to support one of the arguments made in this thesis which is that contemporary radical Islamism in the Philippines is not a legacy of tradition based on *Moro* Islamic history, but rather that it is a legacy of tradition based on *Middle Eastern* Islamic history. This is not to discount those experiences unique to the Muslim Filipinos and the influence Islam has in their lives. That is, the fact that Muslim Filipinos generally hold their ancestral heritage of resisting Western invaders with such high regard is certainly a part of their identity today. The extent to which the patriotic notion of “defiant resisters” and “protectors of the homeland” is attributable to radical Islamic ideology present in the southern Philippines is a point of contention among scholars. However, what is without question is that this patriotism did not *cause* contemporary radical Islamism in the southern Philippines—the Moro Islamic heritage is emanated by all the separatist groups in the southern Philippines, whether they are secular or Islamist.

1. Middle Eastern Origins

Several elements of traditionalism link it to the creation of contemporary radical Islamism. The radical Islamists in the Middle East looked to traditional Islam for answers in explaining why their society was in decline in every aspect. They viewed their societies as having strayed from Islam in allowing it to be marginalized—most specifically by un-Islamic governments and leaders. Politically, they viewed their so-called “nationalist” governments, being secular and Western-oriented in nature, as working only to minimize the role of Islam in the political arena. Hence, the fundamental cornerstone of contemporary radical Islamism was to destroy the “ungodly state” through a violent revolution.

The West was viewed as a historic external enemy, but the enemies from within were considered a more immediate threat since they were directly responsible for continuing Islam down its path of decline. Radical Islamism was

viewed by its propagators as the “righteous vanguard” striving to correct a society gone astray.¹³⁸ The movement was driven by the conviction that *Jihad* was a Muslim responsibility and the only means to establishing the new Islamic order. This conviction manifested within the group’s members a “...genuine sense that they [were] warriors engaged in a desperate struggle for survival against an aggressive and powerful enemy intent on humiliating, weakening and eventually destroying them.”¹³⁹ The Islamists believed they were fulfilling the divine commandment of establishing an Islamic government. Along this same line, the ideology of the radical Islamists was further supported (in their view) in the founding of Islam—they equated the plight of Islam in modern times with that of the days of the Prophet when he triumphed over the *jahiliyya*¹⁴⁰ and created his Islamic state.¹⁴¹ Whether prevailing over the *jahillyya* or conducting a *Jihad*, it is clear that the ideological inspiration of contemporary radical Islam is firmly rooted in the legacy of traditional Islam.

2. Contemporary Radical Islam in the Philippines

Contemporary radical Islamism in the southern Philippines is a legacy of tradition *through* the Middle East. That is, radical Islamism in the Middle East was a legacy of tradition and those radical Islamist movements influenced, encouraged and supported the radical Islamist component present in the southern Philippines conflict today. (This concept is discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.) Unique historical and cultural backgrounds reveal distinct differences between the plight and struggle of the Middle Eastern and Filipino Muslims. For example, the Muslims in the Philippines are a religious minority whereas in the Middle East there are only sects of Islam that are minorities (Sunni vs Shii); the overall objective of the Moro struggle is not to overthrow the government but to separate from it entirely in creating a “Moro nation;” Islamic leaders in the Philippines do not necessarily believe that the poor condition of the

¹³⁸ Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 259.

¹³⁹ Burke, *Al Qaeda*, 32.

¹⁴⁰ *Jahillyya* is the barbarism and ignorance that preceded the coming of Islam in Arabia. See Burke, 329.

¹⁴¹ Kepel, *Jihad*, 31.

Muslims is due to society straying away from Islam, but rather believing the re-Islamization process will bring about a stronger unified Islamic community to fight against an unjust state. However, these differences are contextual differences *not* ideological. The core of the ideology of radical Islamism is firmly rooted in and applicable to both groups because they both view themselves as the *righteous vanguard* and accept wholeheartedly that the establishment of Islamic order is the answer.

As described in chapter two, the Muslims in the southern Philippines steadfastly resisted Spanish, American, and (what they described as) Filipino colonizers for most of the last four centuries. And although the current struggle originated over three decades ago in 1972, the call for an Islamic state only came a little over two decades ago with the formation and official announcement of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984. This, however, is not meant to portray the role of Islam as insignificant until this time. The process of Islamization of the Filipino-Muslims in the modern era began as far back as the late 1940s, following WWII. It was during these formative years that a new generation of Filipino Muslims experienced an Islamic revival and would go on to be the leaders of the original separatist movement. Middle Eastern Muslims taught the Filipinos Islam and the Arabic language in the *madrasahs* they helped erect and more mosques were built to accommodate the increasing number of regular observers of religious practices. The revival was not limited to the internal Islamic dynamics of the southern Philippines; it was also a time of external interaction with the broader Islamic community worldwide as young men began embarking on the *hajj* and studied at Middle Eastern schools, most notably the University of Cairo. This experience introduced the post-war generation to nationalist revolutions and inspired secessionist thinking.¹⁴² It also accounted for the relationship between the Moro Islamists and Moro nationalists who had joined together to form the MNLF (akin to that of the original Muslim Brotherhood and nationalist movement in Egypt). Therefore this “wave” of Islamization in the Philippines in the middle of the 20th century was both a

¹⁴² Yam, 364.

domestic experience for the masses as well as a foreign experience of immersion into various Middle Eastern societies. Of crucial importance to this point is that the “wave”—although ideologically revolutionary—was not radical. Recall during this period the Islamist movements in the Middle East were focused on social activism.

But just as revolutionary ideologies turned increasingly radical throughout the Middle East with the passing of time, so it was in the Philippines. However, in 1972 Filipino Muslims—of both secular and Islamic ideology—united out of outrage over the seemingly endless cycle of grievances based on discrimination, poverty, and inequality mostly linked to the transmigration policies of the government and the “land-grabbing” by Christians from the north. This mass outrage resulted in the creation of the MNLF and its’ subsequent declaration of war. In 1976, after nearly four years of heavy fighting against the Republic of the Philippines, the MNLF abandoned its demand for independence and settled for autonomy by signing the Tripoli Agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The ill-fated agreement lasted less than a year. The failure of the agreement further exacerbated disunity, mistrust, and divisions already present among the top leadership of the movement and in 1984 Hashim Salamat, a respected Islamic scholar and one of the original founders of the MNLF officially broke off from the MNLF and created the MILF citing the movement, under the leadership of Nur Misuari, had grown intolerably secular and moderate.¹⁴³

Up until this point, the Moro struggle had been represented by the MNLF—a militant-nationalist movement. The MILF, with its emphasis on Islamic ideology added a militant-Islamist element to the conflict. This element of radical Islamism was “imported” from the Middle East where it was grounded in the legacy of traditionalism.

3. Creation of the MILF and ASG

Hashim Salamat lived in the Middle East (mostly Egypt) from 1959 until 1970 when he returned to help lead the secessionist movement. Salamat, highly

¹⁴³ Yegar, 342.

influenced by the writings of Qutb and Mawdudi, based himself in Pakistan where he was “undoubtedly influenced by the military and ideological currents of the Afghan *jihad*.¹⁴⁴ With regard to his ideology as the leader of the MILF, he was quoted as stating: “[We want] an Islamic political system and way of life and can be achieved through effective *Da’wah*,¹⁴⁵ *Tarbiyyah*¹⁴⁶, and *Jihad*.”¹⁴⁷ This ideology of radical Islamic revivalism was accepted and emulated by the members of the MILF. The overall purpose of the MILF was to establish an independent Islamic state in the Mindanao region. His group defined itself in terms of Islamic identity and, much like the radical Islamist movements in the Middle East, the MILF rallied Muslims against a regime that was secular (albeit also a Christian government) who had not only helped dismantle the social and political institutions of Islam, but continually worked to counter efforts to rebuild them.

Also like the Middle East, the Filipino Muslims were inspired toward radicalization by the global events that demonstrated Muslim strength through Islamic revolution. What had started out as Muslim social activism materialized into Moro nationalist movements who challenged the government directly via military power, but when the nationalists wavered, it was clear that their agenda would not prevent the secular government from continuing to dismantle Islamic identity. The only alternative was to rally Muslims by calling upon the one factor they all shared—their Islamic heritage. Again, this ideology was the fundamental

¹⁴⁴ “Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),” *Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre*, (4 May 2005), Online: http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jtic/doc_view_groups.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit/jwit0277.htm@current&Prod_Name=JTIC&QueryText=&group=Moro+Islamic+Liberation+Front+%28MILF%29 . Accessed: 21 February 2006.

¹⁴⁵ “Dawa traditionally meant ‘the call’ to Islam, propagation of the faith among nonbelievers. Today, Islamic ‘Call’ societies represent a rapidly growing and diversified socioreligious movement consisting of many organizations aimed not simply at non-Muslims but at calling upon Muslims themselves to return to Islam, to more fully and self-consciously reappropriate their Islamic identity and be more observant in the practice of their faith.” Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 259.

¹⁴⁶ Tarbiyyah is “recruitment and training [conducted by an organization].” Abuza, 5.

¹⁴⁷ Tiglaio, Rigoberto, “Peace in His Time,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (5 September 1996), 24.

cornerstone of the “call to arms” being propagated by Middle Eastern radical Islamists.

Contemporary radical Islamism was popularized among the Moros of the southern Philippines through the mobilization of the MILF who also looked to the legacy of traditional Islam to wage an insurgency based on radical ideology and militancy. However, the MILF was not alone in its quest—ideologically—to establish an independent Islamic state and return to the fundamentals of Islam. As the MNLF pursued a path of demobilization and struggled to implement its agreements with the Philippines government while maintaining its public support of the Muslims, the MILF continued to fight for recognition and was eventually brought to the table by the late-1990s. However, by 1991 another group, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) had entered the conflict with a much more radical doctrine. They too demanded an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines, but they were not willing to recognize or negotiate with the government and in addition to their militant activities, they used increasingly violent terrorist tactics. The ASG and the MILF were both—albeit to different degrees—radical Islamist groups founded as a legacy of Islamic tradition.¹⁴⁸

D. RADICAL ISLAM IN THE PHILIPPINES: THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION

In assessing contemporary radical Islam as a product of globalization, it is necessary to define the limits of the scope of this study with regard to the topic of globalization. First, as stated in the opening chapter, for the purposes of this thesis, globalization

...denotes a shift in the special form and extent of human organization and interaction to a transcontinental or interregional level. It involves a stretching of social relations across time and space such that day-to-day activities are increasingly influenced by

¹⁴⁸ The fact that each of the groups were composed of members from essentially one ethnolinguistic group is a relevant factor when discussing the tribal and clannish behavior of each group. However, for the purposes of this thesis, this ethnolinguistic dynamic will not be deeply explored because although it may attribute to the fractionalization and infighting present among Filipino Muslims, it is outside the scope of this thesis which focuses on the causes of contemporary radical Islam. Suffice to say that the MNLF leadership and vast majority of its members were Tausug, the MILF were mostly Maguindanaon but quickly gained support across ethnolinguistic lines, the ASG were also composed of mostly Tausug. A brief background of each group is outlined in chapter two.

events happening on the other side of the globe and the practices and decisions of highly localized groups and institutions can have significant global reverberations.¹⁴⁹

Secondly, although globalization is often associated with economic factors, this study also focuses on the social (or more specifically, the socioreligious), political and cultural aspects of globalization with regard to states, societies, as well as transnational entities. Thirdly, in discussing the elements of traditionalism that linked it to the creation of contemporary radical Islam, the discussion inevitably touched on factors related to globalization (i.e. internationalization of Islam and transnational elements). This is an understandable point of inquiry and will be addressed later in the chapter, the portion of the thesis that analyzes the fusion of globalization and traditionalism. Finally, as a point of clarification, the topic of globalization in the context of this thesis must also be reiterated. Although the background of contemporary radical Islam was discussed at length in order to establish the roots and process of evolution that it endured, the focus of this thesis regards radical Islamism in the southern Philippines. With this in mind, suffice to say an in-depth analysis of the impact of globalization on the worldwide Muslim community will not be conducted.

Globalization, as the name implies, has great reach and impact and as David Held describes, "...it is best thought of as a multi-dimensional phenomenon involving diverse domains of activity and interaction including the economic, political, technological, military, legal, cultural, and environmental."¹⁵⁰ In addition to this, the effects of globalization should be thought of in both depth and expansiveness.

Contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines as a product of globalization occurred indirectly through two avenues; the Philippine state and Middle Eastern Muslim societies. (See Figure 4.)

¹⁴⁹ Goldblatt, 271.

¹⁵⁰ Held, David, "Democracy and Globalization; MPIfG Working Paper 97/5." *MPIfG Lecture Series Economic Globalization and National Democracy*, (20 March 1997), 3. Online: www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp97-5/wp97-5.html. Accessed February 2006.




Figure 4. Radical Islamism and the Effects of Globalization

As diagrammed in figure one above, elements of globalization—most significantly, cultural imperialism and economic disparity—negatively impacted both Muslim societies in the Middle East and the state of the Republic of Philippines.¹⁵¹

First, with regard to the avenue of the Philippines state, the positive effects of globalization (growth, stability, development) were temperate at best. However, the negative effects were felt throughout the country with little growth and development and where they was growth, it was usually extremely asymmetrical. Factors such as poor state planning and utilization of resources, rampant corruption, as well as weak institutions ill-equipped to deal with the negative affects of globalization, prevented the state from developing politically, socially, and economically and thereby remaining a weak state. As one area expert assesses;

...globalization is exacerbating poverty and thereby intensifying the [Philippines'] ethnic, religious and socioeconomic divisions. Globalization, therefore, is challenging an already premature and weak state's ability to manage its ethnic, socioeconomic and religious diversities.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ Apart from the fact that the actual degree of impact and resulting effect of each element were different for both entities, the purpose here is to show that both elements in fact influenced these entities.

¹⁵² Banlaoi, Rommel C., "Globalizaiton and Nation-building in the Philippines: State Predicaments in Managing Society in the Midst of Diversity," in Yoichiro Sato, ed., *Growth and Governance in Asia*, (Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), 210.

This poor domestic situation, both attributable to (in part) and exacerbated by globalization, had devastating impacts on the Filipino Muslims.¹⁵³ Having been systematically marginalized politically, socially, and economically, the negative effects of globalization “trickled down” into Muslim society and promoted an environment of despair and restlessness that was ripe for radicalism. A logical question stemming from this would be: But, if globalization did not necessarily discriminate regionally, (albeit the Muslim-populated areas are among the most impoverished regions¹⁵⁴) how could it have *caused* radical Islamism in the south? This, of course, applies to the notion that not everyone who is economically and socially deprived resorts to conflict. In fact, even within the Moro community not all supported the radical Islamist ideology. So how is it then that radical Islamism is a product of globalization? I posit that the social and economic *void* left by the negative effects of globalization entwined with blatantly irresponsible governance was filled by those Middle Eastern entities. In addition to their financial investments in Moro communities they also “exported” their revivalist (if not revolutionary) ideology.¹⁵⁵ The impact of these successful efforts by foreign governments (and later, transnational entities) to socially (and in a roundabout way, economically) develop the Muslim regions in the southern Philippines cannot be underestimated. Contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines is a product of globalization—the void it created opened the door to ideological influence and indoctrination.

A second avenue in which radicalism in the southern Philippines is a product of globalization is via Middle Eastern Muslim societies. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, many of these societies also suffered from the

¹⁵³ For further detail on the social and economic condition of the Muslim Filipino population, see Gutierrez.

¹⁵⁴ Ringuet, Daniel J., “The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in Mindanao,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 24, iss. 1, (April 2002), 33.

¹⁵⁵ Middle Eastern states have, especially since the oil-boom of the 1970s, significantly increased the amount of aid provided in the religious realm to Muslim countries throughout Southeast Asia. Specifically, this assistance was in the form of scholarships to universities in the Middle East, funding for religious education and institutions and for Muslim religious organizations. “These trends were especially important in countries with Muslim minorities where there was relatively little traditional governmental support for Islamic needs.” Von der Mehden, Fred R., *Two Worlds of Islam; Interaction between Southeast Asia and the Middle East*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 99.

negative effects of globalization (such as the threat of cultural imperialism and increasing economic deprivation) which provided fuel for Islamic revivalists who became increasingly radical in ideology as well as action. However, the ensuing radical Islamist groups in the Middle East, although a product of globalization themselves also *used* globalization to further their cause. (See Figure 5 below.) In this instance, they worked to build a transnational network thereby “internationalizing” their movement. Deeply entangled in this international web was the southern Philippines.¹⁵⁶




Figure 5. Radical Islamism as a Product of Globalization

Hence, contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines was a product of globalization with elements coming from dual sources—the state and external transnational entities.

¹⁵⁶ The fact that the movements in the southern Philippines have ties with transnational radical Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya is supported and documented in-depth by scholars such as: Abuza, and Ramakrishna, Kumar and See Seng Tan.

E. RADICAL ISLAM AS A FUSION OF TRADITION AND GLOBALIZATION

Thus far, the two factors believed to be the cause of radical Islamism have been delineated as separate entities—those elements supporting the theory that it is a legacy of tradition and those supporting the idea that it is a product of globalization. One of the arguments made in this thesis, however, is that these factors are *not* mutually exclusive but are actually overlapping and entwined—that is, radical Islamism is a fusion of both factors and one directly includes elements of and impacts the other.

This puts forth the question; in what context is contemporary radical Islam a fusion of the legacy on tradition and a product of globalization? Perhaps more aptly put would be to ask in what context is contemporary radical Islam a fusion of the legacy of tradition and a product of the *phenomenon* of globalization. Recall in the definition of globalization it is a spatial phenomenon, whereas tradition was the basis for the ideology—the *message*, the process of globalization was the *medium* upon which it was carried and how it allowed for the message to spread. What linked the medium with the message was the ideology. (See figure four below.)




Figure 6. Radical Islamism in the Philippines: The Message and the Medium

When discussing the elements of traditionalism linked to the creation of contemporary radical Islam, it inevitably touched on factors related to globalization—and vice versa. As stated previously, there were two components of globalization and with regard to addressing the issue of fusion both are directly applicable. For the first component—the instance where external entities used

globalization to internationalize their movements—there is historical precedence. That is, whenever Filipino Muslims underwent a process of Islamization it was historically from the “reintroduction of Islam” by outsiders—as it was in the 1940s. Filipino Muslims were historically welcoming of their Islamic re-indoctrination by Middle Eastern Muslims—whether it was learned domestically or from visiting abroad.¹⁵⁷ It is along these same lines that radical Islamism in the Philippines was introduced and influenced by Middle Eastern ideologists as part of an internationalized radical movement *rooted* in a common understanding of traditional Islam. That is, radical Islam evolved in the southern Philippines with an ideology centered on a violent call for the return to traditional Islam, but this was not an internally generated phenomenon—it was introduced, supported, and perpetuated by external influences.

Insofar as the second component of globalization—the indirect impact of a weak and underdeveloped state—evidence also exists in the historical context that fuses it to the concept of radical Islamism as a legacy of tradition. As discussed in detail previously in this chapter the leaders of the MILF and the ASG were exposed to extremist ideologies in their travels abroad, and the MILF and the ASG were both founded under the banner of establishing an Islamic state to bring an end to the substandard status placed upon the Muslims by the government of the Philippines. However, ideology alone was not enough to merit a war against the government—the desperate condition of the Muslim population in the southern Philippines¹⁵⁸ however, which was distinctly drawn down religious lines, provided a perfect mixture—though not exclusively due to the negative effects globalization had on development of the state.

F. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, contemporary radical Islam as it exists today evolved over a span of three decades from a nonviolent social activist movement into a radical

¹⁵⁷ Lingga, Abhoud Syed M., “Muslim Minority in the Philippines,” (15 April 2004). Online: http://www.bangsamoro.com/bmoro/moro_muslim_minority.php. Accessed: March 2006. This paper was presented during the SEACSN Conference 2004: “Issues and Challenges for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia,” in Penang, Malaysia on 12-15 January 2004.

¹⁵⁸ Point of clarification may be required here: this is not to say that the negative effects of globalization experienced by the state were the *sole* reason for the poor condition of the state, just that the two factors are related and relevant to the findings.

militant fundamentalist one that incorporated an ideology which was conceptually counter to the means it is willing to use in achieving its goal. The elements of traditionalism that link it to the creation of contemporary radical Islamism are eerily similar with respect to the case of the Muslim struggle in the southern Philippines. In fact, radical Islamism in the Middle East influenced, encouraged and supported the radical Islamist component present in the southern Philippines conflict today.

Contemporary radical Islamism was popularized among the “Moros” of the southern Philippines through the mobilization of the MILF who also looked to the legacy of traditional Islam to wage an insurgency based on radical ideology and militancy. This same radical ideology would also be used later by the ASG to justify their means which consisted of increasingly violent terrorist tactics. Furthermore radical Islamism is also linked to elements of globalization. In the case of the Philippines, it was a product of globalization with elements coming from dual sources—the state and external transnational entities. These factors, far from being mutually exclusive, overlapped and entwined to make radical Islamism a fusion of both factors.

IV. EVOLUTION AND IDEOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY RADICAL ISLAM IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

A. INTRODUCTION

Having established that contemporary radical Islam is a fusion of both globalization and traditionalism in the previous chapter, the analysis is taken one step further in this chapter to exploring the concept of contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines as an *evolving* fusion of these causal factors. That is, the evolution of the increasingly militant and radical Muslim separatist groups in the Philippines is the focus of this chapter. It addresses these questions: To what degree did globalization and traditionalism impact the increasingly radical separatist movements with regard to ideology, objectives, and tactics? How did elements of these causal factors differ in importance, priority and level of influence for each group? The argument put forth in this chapter is that the role and impact of the elements of globalization and tradition differed greatly between MILF and ASG.

In meeting this objective the formative years of the MILF and ASG are outlined, specifically addressing the causal factors associated with the acceptance and application of radical Islamist ideologies and practices. Then the findings of this diachronic comparative analysis are presented indicating that during the formative years of the radical Islamist organization of MILF emerged as more of a legacy of tradition than a product of globalization, whereas the ASG materialized more as a product of globalization than a legacy of tradition.

B. ASSESSMENT OF CAUSAL FACTORS IN THE FORMATION OF MILF

As discussed previously in chapters two and three, the MILF, although not officially announced as such until 1984 actually began to take shape following the failure of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. In this section, the formative years of the MILF, 1976 to 1984, are chronologically delineated with particular focus on the influences of globalization and traditional Islamist ideology.

In 1969 a group of young revolutionaries met at a training camp in Malaysia to organize a movement against the government of the Republic of the

Philippines. Around this same time Hashim Salamat established *Nurul Islam*, an organization promoting Islamic renewal among the Moros. Salamat was well versed in the revivalism being propagated in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.¹⁵⁹ He had spent the previous eight years studying at Al-Azhar University in Cairo and had completed high school in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. This was certainly not unheard of—McKenna asserts that during the period of 1955 to 1978 the Egyptian government approved over two hundred scholarships to Moro Muslim students as a component of Nasser’s pan-Islamic programs.¹⁶⁰ However, it should be noted that Salamat, although related to a Congressman, was not from a wealthy or prominent family. Like Misuari he was not an aristocrat, but an ordinary Muslim—one that was increasingly becoming more aware of the need for social and political change in the Muslim Philippines. Dissatisfied with the traditional elite system, Salamat envisioned himself advocating for reform in the Muslim political and religious environment—beginning with the traditional elite.¹⁶¹ However, he quickly realized there was a more pressing matter, that of defending the Muslim community from an unjust and oppressive government and, in following this realization, he joined forces with Nur Misuari’s group essentially merging his revivalist Islamic ideology with that of revolutionary secular nationalists.

In a matter of five years, however, the unlikely alliance began to crumble. By late 1975, after three years of fierce fighting between the MNLF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the war had come to a strategic stalemate due mostly to the overwhelming number of government troops being continuously deployed into the area.¹⁶² Realizing this, Nur Misuari, began to

¹⁵⁹ According to the MILF profile posted at the Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center website, Salamat was “...influenced by the writings of the leading theorists of the Islamic state, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb and the Pakistani Abul A’ala Maududi.” “Moro Islamic Liberation Front”, *Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism*, (16 February 2006), Online: [http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jtic/doc_view_groups.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit/jwit0277.htm@current&Prod_Name=JTIC&QueryText=&group=Moro+Islamic+Liberation+Front+\(MILF\)](http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jtic/doc_view_groups.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit/jwit0277.htm@current&Prod_Name=JTIC&QueryText=&group=Moro+Islamic+Liberation+Front+(MILF)). Accessed: March 2006.

¹⁶⁰ McKenna, 143.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, 144.

¹⁶² Rodell, 128.

question the reality of attaining the objective of an independent Moro republic. This, however, created a fundamental dilemma: “Misuari was forced to change not only his own thinking, but he had to convince the rest of the MNLF leadership to lower their expectations to a more attainable goal of autonomy within the Republic of the Philippines.”¹⁶³ With his credibility on the line, Misuari pushed forth with peace talks which resulted in the establishment of the Tripoli Agreement. This agreement called for a fully autonomous regional government of the thirteen provinces of the Mindanao region. When the agreement failed, the rift within the MNLF became profound. As Rodell describes: “Under Misuari’s leadership the MNLF had been a united Moro organization transcending ethnic loyalties and supplanting traditional Muslim political leaders. It was also a secular political movement rather than a religious vehicle.”¹⁶⁴

Among the several rival factions brewing, one proved most devastating—that of former ally and co-founder of the MNLF, Hashim Salamat. Concerned Misuari’s leadership was taking the movement away from its Islamic origins, Salamat attempted, in late 1977, to take over the MNLF—a move that was reportedly supported by more than half the MNLF leaders.¹⁶⁵ Misuari responded by branding Salamat a traitor and ejecting him from the front. Salamat’s subsequent departure (along with several other leaders) gravely undermined the organization’s ability to function in the long term. External entities were also affected in that the split had left their Middle Eastern supporters divided as well—while Egypt opted to back Salamat’s group, Libya continued to support Misuari.

After successfully breaking away from the MNLF, Salamat worked to garner more financial, political and social support for his movement. He developed a four-point strategy that included Islamization, self-reliance, political organization, and military build-up.¹⁶⁶ One of the main strategies of the MILF in

¹⁶³ Rodell, 128.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Billington, Gail, “Afghansi-linked Terror in the Philippines,” *Executive Intelligence Review*, (13 October 1995). Online: http://www.larouchepub.com/other/1995/2241_philippines_terror.html. Accessed: 10 March 2006.

¹⁶⁶ “Moro Islamic Liberation Front”, *Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism*.

meeting their Islamist objectives was to revitalize the role of Islam within the Moro community and to concurrently build an all encompassing Muslim identity as well as Islamic credibility.¹⁶⁷ Salamat appealed to the community in several ways. He advocated self-reliance and envisioned and eventually created "...a defacto autonomous Islamic community within Philippine territory, with its own army, *Sharia* courts, prisons, and even educational system."¹⁶⁸ Salamat also advocated his warriors to show self-restraint and their military tactics would consist of orthodox guerrilla warfare and hit-and-run attacks that minimized civilian casualties.¹⁶⁹

As he worked to maintain momentum, the challenge of building a military branch arose. However, following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there was no shortage of "training grounds." Beginning in early 1980, Salamat dispatched over 600 trainees to receive military training and possibly move on to join the Afghanistan *Mujahadeen*.¹⁷⁰ It was from this encounter that the future military leaders of the *Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces*, the armed wing of the MILF, would gain their experience. But, perhaps more importantly, a connection was made with the men who would later lead Al Qaeda.

In March 1984, when MILF was officially announced as a new movement that would rival the still dominant MNLF, its Islamic characteristics were highly emphasized.

The very name denoted its emphasis on religious values, especially the upholding of *Sharia* law. Salamat was genuine about this shift and was an *ustadz* (Islamic teacher)... Under his guidance the MILF took on a profoundly religious character as *imam* (community religious leaders) and *alim* (Islamic scholars) began to play prominent roles.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷ Tan, 101.

¹⁶⁸ Abinales, Patricio, "American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview," *East-West Center Working Papers, Politics and Security Series*, no. 7, (October 2004), 11.

¹⁶⁹ Chalk, Peter, "Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (2001), 248.

¹⁷⁰ Abuza, 91.

¹⁷¹ Rodell, 129.

Salamat announced that his group would not only uncompromisingly pursue nationalist goals, but that it would *also* champion instilling traditional Islamic values and teachings. He declared his movement would be ideologically different from the MNLF:

[S]ome personalities in the revolution advocate the idea that the sole and singular objective in our struggle is simply to liberate our homeland, giving no importance to the system of government that shall be established. (We want) an Islamic political system and way of life and can be achieved through effective *Da'wah*, *Tarbiyyah*, and *jihad*.¹⁷²

To this end, the MILF came to exist as a radical Islamist separatist movement. In less than a decade it would grow to be the largest and most popularly supported movement in the region, even crossing the ever-tenuous ethno-linguistic barriers. Its identity was firmly rooted in the religious background of its leaders.

During its formative years MILF was characterized by a high propensity to look to traditionalism in building its ideology. The influence of Hashim Salamat and his devotion to the principles of traditional Islam are a direct reflection of this as it is also indicative in the declared objectives of the group:

To make supreme the Word of Allah. To gain the pleasure of Allah. To strengthen the relationship of man with his creator. To strengthen the relationship of man and man. To regain the illegally and immorally usurped legitimate and inalienable rights of the Bangsamoro people to freedom and self-determination. To establish an independent state and government and implement *Shari'ah* (Islamic law).¹⁷³

Furthermore, the importance of this fundamental component of religious identity is reflected in the fact that the group's members "...highlight the centrality of their Islamic faith to their national identity."¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² Tiglao, 25.

¹⁷³ "Interview with MILF Leader Sheikh Salamat Hashim," *Nida'ul Islam*, issue 23, (April-May 1998).

¹⁷⁴ "Moro Islamic Liberation Front", *Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism*.

On the other hand, globalization also seemingly played a role in creating the radical Islamist character of the MILF since the group was also indoctrinated in the global effects of *jihad* through its involvement in the Afghanistan conflict. However, the argument here is that the MILFs involvement in that conflict did not divert attention away from the primary concerns within their homeland. That is, while the MILF did in fact send trainees only about 30 percent actually joined the *mujahidin*.¹⁷⁵ The others returned to the Philippines upon completion of their training. During the MILFs formative years—although they actively solicited support in the form of resources, they only had limited engagements with external entities—to this day the group maintains its objectives are limited to addressing the problems of the *Bangsamoro*.

The acceptance and application of radical Islamist theories and practices during the formative years of MILF was caused more by factors associated with traditionalism than those associated with globalization. That is, the radical Islamist organization of MILF was more a legacy of tradition than a product of globalization. The *message* (tradition) was the focal point of this group and responsible for launching the group whereas the *medium* (globalization) played the role of sustainment.

C. ASSESSMENT OF CAUSAL FACTORS IN THE FORMATION OF ASG

The Abu Sayyaf (*Bearer of the Sword*) broke off from the MNLF in 1991 claiming disagreement with the ongoing peace process, but its truly formative years were from 1989 to about 1995.¹⁷⁶ In this section, these formative years of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) are chronologically delineated with particular focus on the influences of globalization and traditional Islamist ideology.

The ASG stated its main purpose as being the establishment of an Islamic state, based on Islamic law (*Shariah*). One author analyzed the emergence of ASG as an important shift within the Muslim Nationalist movement:

¹⁷⁵ Abuza, 91.

¹⁷⁶ This period was chosen as the “formative years” of the ASG due to the fact that 1989 marked the year ASG first began to form and 1995 is viewed as a turning point for the group with regard to capability. (In December 1994 the group took responsibility for bombing an international flight and in April 1995 they ambushed the town of Ipil killing 54 people.)

It represents a process towards the Islamization of the Moro identity and the formalization of the already existing Islamic trend within the MNLF. The nationalist essence of the MNLF was incorporated into the Abu Sayyaf's protracted struggle for Islamization of the Moro community, entailing operational transformation of the movement. ...Abu Sayyaf rejects the practice of the complementary non-violent mobilization (*dawa*) since violent struggle (*Jihad*) corresponds to the group's ideological strategy, while moderation of the struggle constitutes an inevitable acceptance of the MNLFs concessions to the State.¹⁷⁷

The onset of ASG meant the full-fledged radicalization of the Moro movement. Abu Sayyaf was, like the majority of MNLF, Tausug, and didn't break off due to longstanding tribal differences, nor was it class differences—both group leaders were from “commoner” backgrounds. In fact, Abu Sayyaf represented a “blend” of both MNLF and MILF—ethno-linguistically similar to the MNLF, but ideologically closer to MILF. The leader of the group, Abdurazzak Abubakar Janjalani, shared some similarities with Salamat: They both received scholarships and were religiously educated in the Middle East (although Janjalani received his education in *Wahhabist* Saudi Arabia) and espoused adherence to traditional practices.¹⁷⁸ They were both also involved in the war in Afghanistan. They were also eventually funded by various Middle Eastern states and Al Qaeda. However, within these similarities lie cavernous differences—mostly relating to Janjalani's propensity for extremism.

Janjalani's extremist ideology regarding Islamic traditionalism is best reflected in the objective of the ASG. Like the MILF, the ASG looks to establish an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines, however, while MILF stops there, the ASG is much more radical in its purpose:

[T]he Abu Sayyaf additionally espouses violent religious intolerance, advocating the deliberate targeting of all southern Filipino Catholics. Abu Sayyaf also sees its objectives in Mindanao as intimately tied to an integrated effort aimed at asserting the global dominance of Islam through armed struggle and an extreme

¹⁷⁷ Iacovou.

¹⁷⁸ Barreveld, Drs. Dirk J., *Terrorism in the Philippines: The Bloody Trail of Abu Sayyaf, Bin Laden's East Asian Connection*, (NY: Writers Club Press, 2001), 113.

religious fervor not generally shared (at least overtly) by the MILF.¹⁷⁹

As previously mentioned, the MILF did send trainees to Afghanistan, and some did go on to become part of the *Mujahadin*. However, the level in which this experience directed MILF ideology was far less “intimate” than for the ASG. In fact, some scholars look to this “intensive involvement in the Afghan war” by the ASG as accounting for the violent legacy of the Abu Sayyaf.¹⁸⁰ This is further supported in the fact that aside from being educated in Saudi Arabia, during his experience in Pakistan, Janjalani received training at a camp that was overseen by a professor of *Wahhabist* Islam whose strict interpretations were appreciated by many wealthy Saudis, including Osama bin Laden.¹⁸¹ Later, Janjalani, in honor of this mentor, Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf, would name his movement after him.

Hence, the experience in Afghanistan undoubtedly contributed to the extreme *Jihadist* views of Janjalani, however, it was also where he developed a close relationship with future key players of Al Qaeda. Bin Laden seems to have taken a keen personal interest in Janjalani’s aspirations to establish a breakaway group in the Philippines. As one author states: “Janjalani is said to have met with bin Laden in Afghanistan and been encouraged by him to form a violent breakaway splinter group in the southern Philippines when he returned to the Philippines from the *jihad*.”¹⁸² Zachary Abuza attributes this “encouragement” on the part of bin Laden to be for the purposes of expanding his own Al Qaeda network which he formed in 1988.¹⁸³ “The cell,” Abuza states, “would also be an important base of support for terrorist operations.”¹⁸⁴ Again, ties to Al Qaeda were made to the MILF, however, existing evidence suggests these ties were

¹⁷⁹ Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk, *Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia*, (Arlington, Virginia: RAND, 2001), 89-90.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 91.

¹⁸¹ Abuza, 100.

¹⁸² Williams, Clive M. G., “The Question of “Links” Between Al Qaeda and Southeast Asia,” in Ramakrishna and Tan, 87-88.

¹⁸³ Abuza, 100.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*.

limited to a shared superficial belief in the cause (basically the need for an Islamist movement), but more important to the MILF was financial support and mutual access to training camps.¹⁸⁵ Once the ASG was established, Ramzi Yousuf, an al Qaeda operative, was dispatched in 1993 to the southern Philippines to plan and launch multiple international terrorist attacks and train members of the group.¹⁸⁶ Under Yousef's tutelage, the ASG embarked on an international as well as domestic terrorist campaign.

In summary, the ASG and the MILF share some fundamental similarities; however, the evolution of the ASG was heavily influenced by radical transnational entities. That is, although grounded in traditional Islamist values, the group was profoundly involved and even encouraged by transnational entities—which is where its identity is seemingly firmly rooted. During its formative years MILF was characterized by a high propensity to accept the extremist doctrine of these foreign entities in building its ideology. Although certainly the ideology of the ASG is centered around traditionalism, the global effects of *jihad* and the experiences of its leaders involved in the Afghanistan conflict were a much more significant determinant of the “brand” of contemporary radical Islam accepted and upheld by the ASG. The acceptance and application of radical Islamist theories and practices during the formative years of ASG were caused more by factors associated with globalization, in the sense that these transnational entities, not only a product of globalization themselves, but using globalization to further their cause, than those associated with traditionalism. That is, the radical Islamist organization of ASG was more a product of globalization than a legacy of tradition. The *message* (tradition), although highly touted and extremist, was not the focal point—in fact, it seems it was more commonly used in a rhetorical sense to energize the movement. Certainly radical Islamist ideologies are epitomized as a legacy of tradition, but for the ASG, the *medium* (globalization) played the most significant role in launching and developing the group.

¹⁸⁵ Abuza, 100.

¹⁸⁶ Yegar, 346.

D. FINDINGS OF DIACHRONIC COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Recall that in the previous chapter it was argued radical Islamism in the southern Philippines is a fusion of factors associated with tradition and globalization. Furthermore, two avenues of globalization were attributable to radical Islamism. The first was indirect economic impacts resulting in a weak state and the second was transnational networks. Based on these findings, the proposed model was that tradition was the basis for the ideology—the *message*, and the process of globalization was the *medium* upon which it was carried, how it allowed for the message to spread. What linked them together was the ideology. (See figure 7 below.)




Figure 7. Contemporary radical Islam in the Philippines: A Fusion of Factors

In this chapter the concept of contemporary radical Islam—as it exists in the case of the Muslim separatist movements in the southern Philippines—was explored as an *evolving* fusion of the causal factors of traditionalism and globalization. In doing so, a diachronic comparative analysis was conducted in the previous two sections where the formative years of the MILF (1976 – 1984) and the ASG (1989-1995) were evaluated in terms of which, if either, causal factor played a significantly greater role in creating each radical Islamist movement. The chronology of events that occurred during the formative years of each group indicated that the MILF was based significantly more on traditionalism whereas the ASG seemingly leaned toward factors associated with globalization. (See figure 8.)




Figure 8. Contemporary Radical Islamism in the Philippines: An Evolution of Causal Factors

The method of diachronic comparative analysis was chosen in conducting this study in order to explain the different outcomes in a single state, the Philippines, of a conflict that has spanned over three decades with its propensity towards increased radical ideologies and level of violence. What accounts for the evolution of a Islamist separatist movement—in the same state, and under basically the same political, social, and economic conditions—from an Islamic nationalist militant one to a violent call for Islamization (including religious intolerance) and the establishment of a pan-Islamic state? In conducting the analysis each groups ideologies, objectives, and tactics were evaluated. The following are the findings based on the research.

With regard to the ideologies of each group, they have essentially the same level of influence from the causal factors. That is, the ideological basis for the MILF (I_M) and that of the ASG (I_A) were not more significantly influenced by either of the two factors. The difference that is shown is reflective of the ASG's propensity for violence (international and sectarian). Moreover, as established in

the previous chapter, and shown in the figures above, the ideology is what essentially linked or fused the two factors together. (Figure 9.)




Figure 9. Ideology of the MILF and ASG

When assessing the question of objectives, the two groups begin to differ. Whereas the objectives of the MILF (O_M) show very little change since their objective is to establish a separate Islamic state, but there is an increased level of globalization due to the fact that the objectives are a response to addressing the negative indirect effects of globalization. As for the objectives of the ASG (O_A), the call for a pan-Islamic state is less from traditional factors and more from the influence of transnational entities. (Figure 10.)




Figure 10. Ideology and Objectives of the MILF and ASG

Finally, the most extreme difference appears when evaluating the groups' tactics. For the MILF, their tactics are more traditional. As discussed previously, the MILF—although occasionally conducting terrorist attacks—typically adhere to

guerilla warfare operations indicative of a militant group. The ASG's tactics on the other hand have been condemned (at least outwardly) by not only both the MNLF and the MILF, but by other Muslim nations. Additionally, their tactics are highly influenced and supported by transnational entities. (Figure 11.)




Figure 11. Ideology, Objectives, and Tactics of MILF and ASG

In summary, the MILF tends to be influenced slightly more by traditional factors, while being consistently influenced at the same level by factors related to globalization. The ASG, however, seems to be increasingly influenced by factors associated to globalization—especially in its objectives and tactics. (See figure 12.)




Figure 12. Influential factors of the MILF and ASG

E. CONCLUSION

Although the MILF and ASG are both radical Islamist organizations and are consequences of a legacy of traditional Islam and a product of globalization, they differ significantly as to the level of influence and relevance experienced by each group during their formative years. Essentially, the MILF was more

representative of the legacy of traditional Islam whereas the ASG, on the other hand, was much more a product of globalization. In assessing the comparative diachronic analysis, the following conclusions were drawn: (1) Contemporary radical Islam is an *evolving* fusion of factors associated with tradition and globalization. (2) This evolution went from a time when traditional legacies were the dominant causal factor of radical Islamism to one where it is decidedly more a product of globalization.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS TO U.S. POLICY

A. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis focused on the protracted radical Islamist separatist movements in the southern Philippines. The debate surrounding the question of causal factors which account for the rise of radical Islamist movements was assessed. These debates, which were analyzed from a global, regional and country perspective, fell into two schools of thought: those who view the causal factors of contemporary radical Islam as being a legacy of tradition and those who contend it is a product of globalization. The argument posited here however, was that not only was contemporary radical Islamism a *fusion* of globalization *and* traditionalism, but it was also *evolving*. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis was to conduct an in-depth analysis of the root causes and the role of Islam using a diachronic comparative analysis.

The first area examined in this these was the background of the origins of Islam in Southeast Asia and more specifically in the Philippines and the role of Islam in the anti-colonial struggle against the Spaniards and Americans as well as the factors that led to organized Muslim rebellion some three decades ago. The conclusions drawn from this analysis were two-fold. First, the peaceful way in which Islam was introduced, accepted, and adopted by many Southeast Asians facilitated the spread of Islam throughout the region; however, its greatest period of expansion was during the colonial era when Islam became the rallying call against the Christianity proselytizing invaders. Perhaps the most epic example of this was the three century-long conflict between the Spanish and the Muslims in the Philippines which came to be known as the Moro Wars. During these wars—although rarely uniting as one—vast ethnolinguistic communities rallied in the name of Islam to fend off their common enemy. It wasn't until the Americans took control from the Spanish that the entire region was finally colonized. Second, the greatest legacy of the Americans was the fact that in a matter of decades the Americans managed to dismantle the institutions the Muslims had fought so hard to preserve. Two decades after the Americans left

an independent Republic of the Philippines in 1946, the Muslim regions, still unable to rebuild their traditional institutions compounded by the fact that they were being increasingly marginalized by the majority Christian state, once again engaged in conflict—except this time it was the “Filipino foreigners” they were fighting. For the first time, however, the Muslims organized a movement that effectively represented the “Moro Nation”—the Moro Nationalist Liberation Front.

Next the causal factors of contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines—traditionalism and globalization—were examined. A distinct evolutionary pattern became evident in chronologically outlining the evolution of radical Islamism from its beginnings as an anti-nationalist movement in the Middle East during the mid-twentieth century to what is known world-wide today as contemporary radical Islam. Within a span of three decades, Islamic revivalism, which called for nonviolent social activism, had evolved into radical militant fundamentalism with an ideology that is conceptually counter to the means it is willing to use in achieving its goal. Stated bluntly, radical Islamism today evolved from activists calling to address the problem of a perceived Muslim community in crisis—or more specifically, an identity crisis. The solutions to these problems were seen as having to come from within the Muslim community through social and political reformation centered on traditional Islamic practices and beliefs. Islamization of society (socio-religious indoctrination) through peaceful activism was of the highest priority.

However, this objective suffered significant setbacks as nationalist movements increasingly dominated the political arena. Although ideal in the sense that the two movements shared common ground in that their main purpose was to free Muslims from foreign control, the nationalists’ secular ideologies proved detrimental to the Islamic revivalist movement. Hence, as the nationalists gained political power and social influence they increasingly marginalized the role of the religion.

The most profound example of this occurrence was in Egypt where revivalist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood were outlawed and its leaders were arrested, imprisoned, exiled and executed. The brutal suppression

of these revivalist movements by the Egyptian secular government would result in scholars such as Sayyid Qutb viewing nationalist governments as being no different than the governments they had supported the overthrow of. Furthermore, implanted in his embittered reaction was the conclusion that the secularists could not be reasoned with—only forcibly removed.

As it were, many nationalist governments—having failed to establish vibrant and viable economic, political, and social development models—lost legitimacy and the militant call to overthrow these “ungodly” regimes gained momentum throughout the 1970s. As the radical ideology of the Islamists gained popularity, watershed world events such as the “October War,” the Saudi Arabian oil embargo, the Iranian Revolution, and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan emboldened the spirit of the movements. Additionally, political and religious rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia prompted both to export their revolutionary ideologies. These conditions facilitated the development of contemporary radical Islam and it was under this context that the causes of contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines were examined.

In presenting the argument that contemporary radical Islamism in the southern Philippines was a legacy of tradition, one critical clarification needed to be explained: Radical Islamism in the Philippines was not a legacy of tradition based on Moro Islamic traditionalism, but rather a legacy based on Middle Eastern Islamic traditionalism. Radical Islamism was viewed by its propagators as the “righteous vanguard” striving to correct a society gone astray.¹⁸⁷ The movement was driven by the conviction that *Jihad* was a Muslim responsibility and the only means to establishing the new Islamic order. The Islamists believed they were fulfilling the divine commandment of establishing an Islamic government. Along this same line, the ideology of the radical Islamists was further supported (in their view) in the founding of Islam—they equated the plight of Islam in modern times with that of the days of the Prophet when he triumphed over the *jahiliyya*¹⁸⁸ and created his Islamic state.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ Esposito, *Islam*, 259.

¹⁸⁸ *Jahillyya* is the barbarism and ignorance that preceded the coming of Islam in Arabia. See Burke, 329.

Whether prevailing over the *jahillyya* or conducting a *Jihad*, it is clear that the ideological inspiration of contemporary radical Islam is firmly rooted in the legacy of traditional Islam. This ideological inspiration was also embraced by Muslim Filipinos. That is, radical Islamism in the Middle East was a legacy of tradition and those radical Islamist movements influenced, encouraged and supported the radical Islamist component present in the southern Philippines conflict today. Hence, radical Islamism in the Philippines was a legacy of tradition through the Middle East. Significant differences between the plight of Middle Eastern and Filipino Muslim societies exist and are quite evident—especially those surrounding the question of minority status, the overall objective (separating verses overthrowing the government), and the current view of society (gone astray verses need to unify). Although these conditions made each society ripe for revolution, they were contextual differences *not* ideological. That is, the core of the radical Islamist ideology was firmly rooted in and applicable to both groups because they both viewed themselves as the righteous vanguard and wholeheartedly accepted the establishment of Islamic order as the answer to their problems.

In the Philippines, two major radical Islamist groups splintered off from the original MNLF—the MILF in 1984 and the ASG in 1991. The focal point of the MILF’s Islamist ideology can be traced to its founder Hashim Salamat. Salamat, having been educated in Egypt, was highly influenced by the Islamist ideology being espoused by the movement’s most prestigious scholars such as Qutb and Mawdudi. The overall objective of the MILF was to establish an independent Islamic state in the Mindanao region. This group defined itself in terms of Islamic identity and, much like the radical Islamist movements in the Middle East, the MILF rallied Muslims against a regime that was secular (albeit also a Christian government) who had not only helped dismantle the social and political institutions of Islam, but continually worked to counter efforts to rebuild them.

Also like the Middle East, the Filipino Muslims were inspired by the global events which demonstrated Muslim strength through Islamic revolution. What

¹⁸⁹ Kepel, 31.

had started out as Muslim social activism materialized into Moro nationalist movements which challenged the government directly via military power. However, when the nationalists wavered (settled for autonomy over secession), it became clear their agenda would not prevent the secular government from continuing to dismantle the Islamic identity of the Muslim Filipinos. Therefore, the only alternative for the MILF was to rally Muslims by calling upon the one factor they all shared—their Islamic heritage. This ideology was the fundamental cornerstone of the “call to arms” being propagated by Middle Eastern radical Islamists. The MILF was not alone in its view—ideologically—to establish an independent Islamic state and return to the fundamentals of Islam. In 1991 the ASG entered the conflict with a much more radical doctrine. The ASG differed from the MILF in that their leaders were indoctrinated in radical Islamism in Afghanistan (and Pakistan) following the Soviet invasion. Despite these different circumstances, both were—albeit to different degrees—radical Islamist groups founded as a legacy of Islamic traditionalism.

Demonstrating that contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines was also a product of globalization, the two avenues in which this occurred were explained: through the Philippine state and through external transnational entities. With respect to the Philippine state, factors such as poor state planning and utilization of resources, rampant corruption, as well as weak institutions ill-equipped to deal with the negative affects of globalization, prevented the state from developing politically, socially, and economically and thereby remaining a weak state. This weak state, in-turn, further exacerbated by the negative effects of globalization, “trickled down” into Muslim society and promoted an environment of despair and restlessness that was ripe for radicalism.

It wasn't these negative effects alone which caused the movements to radicalize; rather, the negative effects of globalization entwined with blatantly irresponsible governance had resulted in a social and economic *void*. This void was, in time, filled by those Middle Eastern entities with radical Islamist ideologies. Subsequently, their financial investments in Moro communities also “exported” their revivalist (if not revolutionary) ideology. Therefore, in this sense,

contemporary radical Islam in the southern Philippines became a product of globalization—the void it created opened the door to ideological influence and indoctrination of Muslim Filipinos.

The second avenue with regard to the topic of globalization was via Middle Eastern Muslim societies. The ensuing radical Islamist groups in the Middle East, having suffered from the negative effects of globalization themselves, were not only a product of globalization but also *used* globalization to further their cause. In this particular instance, they worked to build a transnational network thereby “internationalizing” their movement which eventually expanded into the Philippines.

After presenting the evidence advocating both globalization and traditionalism as causes of radical Islamism in the southern Philippines—this thesis argued that they these factors were not mutually exclusive. The MILF looked to the legacy of traditional Islam to wage an insurgency based on radical ideology and militancy. This same radical ideology would also be used later by the ASG to justify their means which consisted of increasingly violent terrorist tactics. Furthermore, in the case of the Philippines, it was a product of globalization. These factors, far from being mutually exclusive, overlapped and entwined to make radical Islamism a fusion of both factors. Therefore, whereas tradition was the basis for the ideology—the *message*, the process of globalization was the *medium* upon which it was carried and how it allowed for the message to spread. What linked the medium with the message was the ideology.

Finally, the idea that the concept of radical Islamism is an *evolving* fusion of these causal factors was explored. Upon conducting a diachronic comparative analysis of the formative years of the MILF and the ASG, the evidence conclusively indicates this to be so. That is, although the MILF and ASG were both radical Islamist organizations and were consequences of both a legacy of traditional Islam and a product of globalization, they differed significantly as to the level of influence and relevance experienced by each group. During its formative years (1976 to 1984) the MILF was characterized by a high propensity to look to

traditionalism in building its ideology. The influence of Hashim Salamat and his devotion to the principles of traditional Islam are a direct reflection of this. However, globalization also influenced the creation of the radical Islamist character of the MILF. The MILF was undoubtedly indoctrinated (and even participated) in the global *jihad* and also actively solicited support in the form of resources; however, it was never at the expense of the movement against the Philippine government and they remained focused on their objective of addressing the problems of the *Bangsamoro*. For the MILF the *message* (tradition) was the focal point of the movement and was responsible for launching them whereas the *medium* (globalization) played the role (albeit important) of sustainment.

The ASG, conversely, although sharing the same traditional Islamist ideology, was heavily influenced by radical transnational entities. That is, although grounded in traditional Islamist values, the group was profoundly involved in and even encouraged by transnational entities—which is where its identity is seemingly firmly rooted. The ideology of the ASG is centered around traditionalism, but the global effects of *jihad* and the experiences of its leaders involved in the Afghanistan conflict were a much more significant determinant as to the “brand” of contemporary radical Islam accepted and upheld by the ASG. For the ASG, the *message* (tradition), although highly touted and extremist, was not the focal point, it was in fact the *medium* (globalization) that played the most significant role in launching and developing the group. Essentially, in assessing each group’s ideology, objectives, and tactics, it becomes evident that the MILF was more representative of the legacy of traditional Islam whereas the ASG was much more a product of globalization.

B. U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

As previously stated, this thesis has importance at both the global and country-specific levels. First, with regard to the Global War on Terrorism, it explored the seemingly neglected portion of the 9/11 Commission recommended

strategy in combating Islamic terrorism: to counter the rise of radical ideologies within the Islamic world that inspire terrorism. At the country-specific level, the fact that the United States has dramatically enhanced its relationship with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (G.R.P.) since the 9/11 attacks is also of importance. The two governments have continued to work closely in support of the G.R.P.'s domestic war on terrorism and the U.S. government has dedicated a significant amount of resources to combat this threat.

This thesis argued that understanding the origins and causes of radical Islamism was critical to countering the rise of radical Islamist ideologies and thereby was critical to countering terrorism. Simply stated using a concept as nebulous as ideology, if its past is known then there will be a better understanding of its future—at least more so than only understanding it in the context of what it is today.

Understanding the importance of the role of ideology in determining the actions of a threatening entity would provide an immeasurable advantage to policymakers. The purpose of the case study on the conflict in the southern Philippines was to demonstrate this importance. A tendency exists among U.S. policymakers to view ideology as a mere “rallying cry,” separate from the causal factors. However, the case study of the Philippines clearly shows an instance in which the various causal factors of radical Islamism were not separate unrelated entities, but rather a fusion of factors relating to traditionalism and globalization entwined and interrelated and linked through ideology.

A second implication of understanding and correctly assessing the causes and role of contemporary radical Islam as it applies to the separatist movements in the southern Philippines conflict is that the U.S. has a unique opportunity to use it to improve relations with Muslims across the globe. Although the relationship forged with the Philippines government is tenuous at times and accounts for a certain level of controversy over the level of U.S. involvement in fighting the Muslim rebels, the Muslim population is seemingly less hostile to U.S. involvement—at least less so than most other Muslim populations across the globe. Possessing a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of “radical

Islamism” and basing policy on it will persuade more moderate Muslims around the world to reconsider their opinion of the U.S. This improved U.S. image would certainly create a more open and amenable environment for exchanges and thereby work toward stifling radical Islamist movements as well as countering the rise of their ideology.

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