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**AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM**

by

Paul T. Brooks

March 2006

Thesis Advisor:

Second Reader:

John Arquilla

David Tucker

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**AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM**

Paul T. Brooks  
Major, United States Army  
B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1990

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
March 2006**

Author: Paul T. Brooks

Approved by: Dr. John Arquilla  
Thesis Advisor

Dr. David Tucker  
Second Reader

Dr. Gordon McCormick  
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis

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## **ABSTRACT**

More than four years after the September 11 attacks, it is time to reexamine the state of American grand strategy to identify possible refinements to improve synchronization, resource allocation and policy execution at all levels. This research examines U.S. grand strategy to determine the nation's plan for employing five instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and law enforcement. It develops seven fundamental features of a grand strategy, and compares thirteen national strategy documents to these fundamentals to determine areas for future refinement. The study uses a brief analysis of national responses to the IRA, Sikh militants, and Hezbollah in Lebanon to illustrate these features in action. The study concludes by proposing a series of steps to refine America's grand strategy as well as a framework to integrate instruments of national power in the struggle against transnational terrorism.

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This research compares America's plan to employ diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and law enforcement power in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Seven fundamental features of a grand strategy are employed to evaluate U.S. grand strategy, and a brief analysis of others' responses to three terrorist movements (the IRA, Sikh separatists, and Hezbollah) is presented. The study concludes by proposing refinements to America's grand strategy in an age of terrorism.

### **A. U.S. GRAND STRATEGY**

America's diplomatic strategy stresses democratization in an effort to create a safer environment for U.S. citizens and interests. This diplomatic strategy is not completely synchronized with execution. The U.S. supports many nations with weak democratic traditions and practices, and this dichotomy creates problems for other instruments of power. The vignettes presented in Chapter IV suggest that American diplomatic strategy needs to be refined to focus on developing democratic traditions that provide mechanisms for substantive participation by a broad spectrum of groups in a society. The recent election success by Hamas challenges American diplomacy to recognize a democratic success story, while maintaining a consistent stance against terrorism.

The vignettes presented in Chapter IV offer a second lesson for diplomatic strategists: engagement and negotiation are crucial to maximizing the gains created by military and police forces. The key to effective negotiations with the IRA was that the British found partners that could speak for the IRA or put pressure on the group, Sinn Fein and the Irish Republic. American diplomats must figure out who can influence groups like al-Qaeda and begin substantive dialogue with these actors. This initiative may mean normalizing relations with Iran, negotiating with Syria, or talking to anti-U.S. tribal leaders in the Pakistani border regions. The important thing is that American diplomats cannot be limited by biases against traditional adversaries or unfriendly governments.

The nation's core strategy documents employ informational power along two tracks: enhancing situational understanding and persuading foreign audiences. Situational understanding requires a vastly improved ability to collect, process, and share information among U.S. and international partners. All three vignettes highlight the importance of possessing timely and accurate intelligence in defeating terrorist organizations. As the 9/11 Commission's follow-up report indicated, this nation may not be doing enough in these areas.<sup>1</sup>

The "battle of ideas" is being waged daily by virtually every organization in the U.S. government, and various supporting strategy documents emphasize the importance of this effort.<sup>2</sup> The focus of these efforts is to persuade audiences throughout the world that American policy and actions are just and beneficial to all. American efforts to persuade foreign audiences are difficult to analyze because they are not defined in any substantive way. The administration's recent efforts to enhance the Department of State's public diplomacy capability indicates that it is serious about this effort; however the message that American will send to the world remains unclear. The lack of a national information strategy makes it difficult for this diverse group to project a unified message and avoid unsynchronized action.<sup>3</sup>

American military strategy is not well defined in overarching national strategy documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) or National Strategy for

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<sup>1</sup> *Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations*, December 2005, 9/11 Public Discourse Project, <http://www.9-11pdp.org> (accessed January 19, 2006). *Report on the Status of 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Part II Reforming the Institutions of Government*, October 20, 2005, 9/11 Public Discourse Project, <http://www.9-11pdp.org> (accessed January 21, 2006).

<sup>2</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* Department of Defense, <http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/dod/nps18-031605-15.pdf> (accessed September 6, 2005), 9. This document will be referenced as the NDS. Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, Joint Chiefs of Staff, <http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/dod/nps17-052404-01.pdf> (accessed November 1, 2005), 12. This document will be referred to as the NMS. Colin L. Powell and Andrew S. Natsios, *U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009*, Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/> (accessed October 30, 2005), 30-32. This document will be referenced as the DOS/USAID Strategic Plan.

<sup>3</sup> Carnes Lord, "Psychological-Political Instruments," in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 225-234. Robert Satloff, *The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), 19-34.

Combating Terrorism (NSCT). The National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) do a better job establishing goals, and describing broad military activities; however, both are unclear about military priorities, specific objectives, or measures of effectiveness. American military strategy is generally combative, seeking to identify and destroy terrorist organizations wherever possible to prevent attacks on the U.S. or its interests. The focus is on direct military action to defeat terrorist organizations, and indirect actions to support and develop allies.

National economic strategy revolves around two core ideas: the expansion of free markets to strengthen foreign partners in the GWOT, and the provision of developmental aid to undermine the root causes of terrorism. The U.S. employs a number of trade agreements in an effort to create partners with an investment in opposing terrorist organizations. This effort has the added benefit of creating interdependencies that will serve the U.S. well in times of crisis. These aid packages generally focus on improving the recipient's ability to conduct counterterrorism operations and deny terrorist organizations much needed resources.

This study has characterized U.S. law enforcement strategy in terms of "cooperative prosecution:" the employment of federal law enforcement agencies to work with and through foreign security forces to prosecute terrorists and destroy their financial support. This strategy attempts to prosecute terrorists and their organizations wherever there is sufficient legal infrastructure and political will. In the absence of one or both of these critical features, law enforcement organizations are working with their foreign counterparts to develop them. Few if any refinements are required to law enforcement strategy. Cooperative prosecution attacks terrorism as a criminal act, just as military strategy attacks it as an act of war. This allows the U.S. to pursue opportunities wherever as develop in the conflict.

## **B. SUPPORTING FEATURES**

Grand strategy employs all available national power in the achievement of national security objectives in both war and peace. Successful grand strategy constrains national objectives according to available means, and seeks to balance the two while striving to achieve defined goals. To exceed available means courts disaster, and

necessitates deliberate efforts to generate additional resources. Finally, grand strategy focuses on national security, the accomplishment of those interests political leaders deem vital to national survival.<sup>4</sup> Contemporary American grand strategy must exploit the international environment by blending the components of national power. Chapter II describes seven common features of a successful grand strategy. These features are: defined interests and objectives; identified threat; plans to employ instruments of power; maintenance of power; balanced ends and means; horizontal and vertical synchronization; and a “hybrid” nature.

The most significant deficiency in American grand strategy is the lack of a common set of interests and objectives to focus the planning effort. Core and supporting national strategy documents do not reflect a consistent understanding of the reasons that the U.S. is at war. This glaring deficiency makes it virtually impossible to integrate the programs of disparate agencies across the federal government. The definition of terrorism and who exactly is America’s enemy is one that creates additional problems for grand strategy. The recent electoral victory of Hamas challenges America in part because the group falls within the NSS definition of a terrorist organization.<sup>5</sup> This problem is created in part by the evolving nature of the nation’s adversary. Is the threat a specific terrorist organization of a radical religious ideology? The question has not been answered in enough detail yet to focus all the instruments of national power.<sup>6</sup>

The NSS and the NSCT do not include plans to maintain the instruments of national power. This is a significant deficiency given that many of the sources of national power are shared by multiple instruments, and few mechanisms exist to

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<sup>4</sup> For a detailed discussion of the definition of grand strategy see Paul Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, ed. by Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 5-6; Edward Luttwak, *Strategy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 179; and John Collins, *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973), 14-15. J.H. Elliot, “Managing Decline: Olivares and the Grand Strategy of Imperial Spain,” *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991).

<sup>5</sup> George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (accessed February 10, 2005), 5. This document will be referenced as the NSS.

<sup>6</sup> David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, eds. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46-73. Satloff, 59-69. Interview with Mr. Robert Andrews, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC), conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School on March 1, 2006.

prioritize demands. While select supporting strategies attempt to transform their practices and organizations to generate more power, a deliberate plan to maintain the sources of national power is absent. American grand strategy also makes little effort to balance ends with available means in the fight against terrorism. This is difficult to judge because of the vast quantity of resources required for continued operations in Iraq, and America's need to maintain the ability to conduct large-scale conventional operations. However, grand strategy should guide a nation through a conflict to create a better peace by limiting objectives to avoid exhausting resources. American grand strategy does not appear to make any effort to prioritize or constrain the initiatives of various departments through any mechanism other than the budgeting process. Finally, the Fiscal 2006 budget indicates that there may be a lack of balance in American grand strategy. The financial resources of the nation are predominantly devoted to the DOD. It could be argued that greater funds should be allocated for foreign developmental aid or homeland defense initiatives.

American grand strategy does not adequately address the subject of vertical and horizontal synchronization. The interagency process of coordination and staffing has proven too cumbersome to effectively manage the GWOT. Lead agencies for policy and programs are not clear, and coordinating mechanisms do not facilitate synchronization. This problem has manifested itself most starkly in the negative effects of detainee operations on a variety of instruments of power.

One of the strengths of American grand strategy is its hybrid nature. The prevailing strategic pattern is cumulative action to defeat a variety of enemy organizations. Within this pattern, grand strategy is simultaneously persuasive, combative, and developmental. This hybrid nature is essential to exploit the global environment.

### **C. RECOMMENDATIONS**

This study develops a series of seven recommendations to improve the conduct of grand strategic planning and the content of U.S. grand strategy in an age of terrorism. These recommendations focus on refining the existing strategy and systems rather than radically recreating them.

**1. Plan for strategic action.**

America's strategy documents do not provide clear linkages between strategy and programs to enable integration and synchronization. The interagency system should adopt a military-style planning process that stresses: decisive actions to secure national strategic objectives, shaping actions to create a favorable environment for decisive actions, and sustaining actions to maintain existing gains and develop additional national power. Chapter V presents a framework to conduct grand strategic planning in a manner that clearly illustrates these linkages.

**2. Organize for strategic action.**

The interagency system is dominated by committees and departments with individual and organizations biases. This system has not produced a well synchronized grand strategy. Two organizations, the National Security Council's Counterterrorism Security Group and the National Counterterrorism Center, have the potential to resolve this problem. These organizations must be empowered to act and provided with clear roles and responsibilities that facilitate leading the interagency system.

**3. Develop a National Information Strategy.**

The nation must develop a formal information strategy that focuses on supporting the efforts of the multiple agencies to persuade foreign audiences and improve situational understanding. This strategy should stress shared values, but it must do more than just present American versions of these to the world; it must engage target audiences in debate over substantive issues relating to these values. The 9/11 Commission's series of follow-up reports published in 2005 illustrated that we still have a great deal of work to be done to improve situational understanding across federal, state and local governments. A formal national information strategy should organize and prioritize these efforts to ensure that resources are used effectively.

**4. Define national interests and strategic objectives.**

The NSC should immediately develop a set of prioritized national interests and national strategic objectives. This set must address the total scope of US interests, not just the GWOT, to enable strategists to allocate resources with the entire effort in mind. Strategic objectives should be interdepartmental in nature, directly linked to national interests, and describe how the nation will achieve each goal. In the absence of these two

critical focusing elements, various federal departments and committees identified their own without a common priority or focus.

**5. Align national strategy documents.**

Upon completion of the national interests and objectives, each organization must revise and update their strategies to support this new structure. Current national strategy documents were written out of sequence and describe a great many initiatives that are underway, complete, or overcome by events. They do not reflect existing budget constraints, interim decisions, or the current global environment. This revision will improve the strategic alignment and enable decision makers to understand the totality of effort directed against any strategic objective.

**6. Update U.S. supporting strategies annually.**

Each agency and committee responsible for carrying out U.S. grand strategy, must publish an annual update to their supporting strategy. This document should describe the progress made since the last report, any changes to the strategy, and the focus for the next reporting period. It should be published at the start of the budget cycle and include budget priorities that have been synchronized across the departments. This will serve two functions. First, it will provide the American public an annual report of progress in the GWOT and an appreciation for the way ahead. Second, it will provide the President a tool during the budget process to ensure that key programs do not become the victim of bureaucratic politics.

**7. Plan to maintain power.**

The NSC and HSC should begin studying policies and programs to maintain and further develop the sources of national power. This is a cross departmental initiative that should focus on things like geography, resources, population, economic development, political structure, national morale, and national reputation. These sources of power are interrelated, and combine to produce an aggregate level of national power, but they cannot be directly employed.<sup>7</sup> Because they are not the direct responsibility of any one department or agency, little thought has gone into maintaining these sources of power for the conflict. This must change if the nation is going to stay the course in a protracted conflict.

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<sup>7</sup> A.K.F. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1958), 102-107 & 116-117.

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## I. AMERICA'S GRAND STRATEGY

We will direct every resource at our command - every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war - to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.

- President George Bush

### A. INTRODUCTION

With these words the President made it clear that success in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) required a grand strategy to address this new and unique threat.<sup>8</sup> He did not outline a grand strategy or suggest any sort of priorities for the nation. Grand strategies integrate all the elements of national power to achieve broad national security objectives. This is not to suggest that all instruments have an equal part to play; the actions of each instrument are constrained by its capabilities and limitations, resources available, and the global environment. America's grand strategy is explained in the 2002 National Security Strategy, the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and a variety of supporting strategies from cabinet agencies. While the US is not unfamiliar with the threat of transnational terrorism, it is not the traditional nation-state enemy that America is well prepared to fight. Transnational terrorism will not be defeated with conventional military forces on a classically defined battlefield; in fact military forces may have only a small role to play in the conflict. The clandestine and networked nature of this threat requires a strategy that shapes the global environment to reduce the conditions that enable transnational terrorist organizations, while at the same time attacking these organizations from multiple directions. To win the GWOT, American grand strategy must reflect the realities of the global environment and exploit it by blending multilateral and unilateral policies across the full spectrum of national power.

More than four years after the September 11 attacks, it is time to reexamine the state of American grand strategy to identify possible refinements that could improve synchronization, resource allocation and policy execution at all levels. There are many

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<sup>8</sup> George W. Bush, "Address to the Joint Session of Congress and the American People," September 20, 2001, The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> (accessed November 15, 2005).

indications that this refinement is overdue. One of the most telling of these indicators can be found in the 2005 federal budget. This budget allocates \$401.7 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) and only \$10.3 billion to the Department of State (DOS).<sup>9</sup> These numbers represent the total funds allotted to the DOS for the employment of US diplomatic, informational, and economic power throughout the world. These numbers include money for everything from the salary of Foreign Service officers to foreign military assistance programs and humanitarian aid. The DOS is expected to accomplish its objectives on only 2.6% of the DOD's budget, and only 1.26% of the entire budget for discretionary spending. Paul Kennedy, in his book *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, ascribes great importance to balancing ends and means, and emerging from a conflict with one's economy intact.<sup>10</sup> The brief example noted above suggests that American strategy may not be balanced yet to effectively integrate and utilize the elements of national power in this conflict.

Grand strategy must respond to the unique environment that evolves around every threat-response conflict. In 1996 Barry Posen and Andrew Ross suggested that the changing global environment at the end of the Cold War necessitated a reevaluation of U.S. grand strategy; the U.S. faced no peer competitor in this new environment. Their article, entitled "Competing Visions for a US Grand Strategy," argued that four strategic archetypes have historically dominated American foreign policy: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security and primacy. The specific elements of each strategy are interrelated and interdependent; thus, unique features of each strategy cannot be taken in isolation. These grand strategies developed out of a global environment that was particular to the time.<sup>11</sup> The U.S. is again faced with a unique global environment, one that is significantly different from 1996. The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) created a new threat to the survival

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<sup>9</sup> Summary of Department of State and Defense 2005 Budgets, Office of Management and Budget, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/budget.html> (accessed November 18, 2005).

<sup>10</sup> Paul Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, ed. by Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991).

<sup>11</sup> Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions of U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21, no.3 (1996): 5-16 & 52-52. The authors compare neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security and primacy as grand strategies. They identify the environmental conditions that shaped each, and discussed select policy implications. Their most significant conclusion was that while each strategy had similar features, "for the most part one cannot indiscriminately mix and match across strategies (as both post-Cold War administrations have attempted to do) without running into trouble."

of the nation and changed America's understanding of its place in the world. Today's enemy is a transnational terrorist movement that is loosely bound together by a radical ideology but with disparate political goals which are often unacceptable to the western world. It is time to reassess America's grand strategy for this unique 21<sup>st</sup> Century conflict.

David Baldwin proposes a useful methodology for understanding instruments of power in his book *Economic Statecraft*. This methodology provides boundaries that are academic constructs, but that serve to organize and focus how states attempt to influence. Baldwin proposes three criteria to define an instrument of power:

1. Conformity with scientific canons requiring parallel categories to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive of all cases.
2. Avoidance of unnecessary departures from common usage. Ideally, categories would be consistent with common usage by laymen, academics, and policy makers.
3. Utility in identifying and clarifying policy options for modern statesmen. The important thing is to capture the richness and variety of available techniques without overwhelming the policy maker with a huge number of categories.<sup>12</sup>

The first and third criteria are closely related, and may cause some confusion. Baldwin seems to be saying that the domains of each instrument do not overlap; for example diplomatic actions may often be distinct from military actions. However, Baldwin recognizes that there is overlap; diplomatic activity is meaningless without military and economic power to lend force to diplomacy. In the case of overlap, the definition of a particular instrument should provide a useful understanding of a set of policy options. Informational power, which supports every other instrument of power, may not be exclusive enough to be considered by Baldwin a separate and distinct instrument. Yet information strategy, expressed in terms of activities to employ or generate soft power, does provide decision makers with a way of thinking about unique options for influencing adversaries and friends. Thus, Baldwin's third principle can be applied to define information as a distinct instrument. The key point to take away is that, contrary to Baldwin, there may be some overlap between powers, but that utility to decision

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<sup>12</sup> David Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 12.

makers should be the deciding factor in defining an instrument of power. This study will argue that five distinctive instruments provide utility to planning grand strategy in an age of terrorism: diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and law enforcement. A deeper discussion of each is presented below.

Chapter I describes how America plans to employ the instruments of national power; in short to explain American grand strategy. It will accomplish this by comparing policies and programs across the population of strategy documents to identify the plan to employ the five instruments of power. Chapter II will build on this work by conducting a literature review to develop an outline of the fundamental components of a grand strategy. This framework will allow us to examine U.S. grand strategy as a larger entity, rather than as a collection of policy statements. After briefly discussing America's historical grand strategies, Chapter III will compare current strategy documents with the fundamental components identified in chapter two to gain a fuller understanding of the current grand strategy. The heart of this chapter will be the elements that focus, synchronize, and enable the policies and programs identified earlier. This section will conclude by identifying gaps in the current strategy that could negatively impact on America's efforts in the GWOT.

Chapter IV presents three brief vignettes that examine the forces directed against the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, Sikhs in India, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Each of these conflicts is relatively recent and pits a transnational covert movement, motivated at least in part by religion, against an established legitimate government. These cases also offer examples of the range of force that may be employed by a government, and illustrate the positive and negative effects of integrated instruments of national power. The outcome of these cases reflects the range of possible resolutions to a terrorist conflict, and the legitimate governments involved cover the spectrum from developing to developed world. America may be able to take advantage of this trend and use it to encourage other groups to moderate their practices before they reach a point where they threaten national interests. This study will focus on how select elements of grand strategy were applied in each conflict to identify lessons for the current environment.

Chapter V presents the study's conclusions and recommendations for decision makers and researchers. These conclusions include: a theoretical framework to synchronize the instruments of national power in strategic planning; a recommendation to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the various committees charged with planning and implementing grand strategy; and various immediate refinements to existing grand strategy to improve synchronization. Additional study is suggested to validate the supporting strategies of each instrument of power, and continue to refine the threats and opportunities of the current environment. Finally, further work is also needed to develop a comprehensive national information strategy that addresses both the need to improve situational awareness and persuade foreign publics.

A comprehensive definition of grand strategy has three critical features. First, grand strategy plans to integrate select national powers in the achievement of national security objectives in both war and peace. Second, grand strategy tailors national objectives to available means, and seeks to balance the two while striving to achieve a degree of national security. Third, grand strategy is focused on the accomplishment of those interests that the political leadership deems are important to national survival.<sup>13</sup> Briefly stated, the development of a grand strategy is dependent on six features that are critical to effectively employing national power: a definition of national interests and strategic objectives; a clear identification of the threat; a plan to maintain the instruments of power; a balance between ends and means; vertical and horizontal synchronization; and a hybrid nature. The plan to employ instruments of national power emerges out of these six features during the planning and execution of policy and programs. Chapter II examines each of these features in greater detail. American grand strategy is not contained in a single statement of policy; rather, it is spread over thirteen loosely aligned documents which were developed by disparate agencies often out of logical sequence. It is critical that we consider these documents as a whole in order to identify gaps, and determine where they may need to be refined or refocused.

## **B. U.S. GRAND STRATEGY**

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the centerpiece of American grand strategy, but it is not a stand alone statement. Three documents form the core strategy:


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<sup>13</sup> Kennedy, 5-6; Luttwak, 179; and Collins, 14-15.

the NSS, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), and the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS). This core is expanded and sharpened by the ten supporting strategies:

- The National Defense Strategy (2005)
- National Military Strategy (2004)
- National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
- U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009
- The National Maritime Strategy (2005)
- The US Coast Guard Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security (2002)
- The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (2003)
- The National Money Laundering Strategy (2002)
- The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003)
- The National Drug Control Strategy (2003)

Figure 1 presents a way to understand how these strategies relate to each other. Classified strategies and plans are not included in this diagram and will not be addressed in this analysis.



**Figure 1. US Grand Strategy for the Global War on Terrorism**

Each document varies in scope and authority, and articulates a part of the plan to employ the instruments of national power. The following section examines the policy initiatives contained in each supporting strategy to determine how national power will be employed by the various agencies of the federal government. After analyzing the initiatives the study attempts to explain the general plan for using each instrument of national power.

The grand strategy that these documents describe, and that national leaders have attempted to articulate, is summarized in Table 1. To eliminate the threat of transnational terrorism, American grand strategy focuses diplomatic power on a strategy of encouraging democracy institutions and multilateral action against terrorist organizations. Information power attempts to persuade foreign audiences and improve the nation’s situational understanding of the terrorist threat. Military strategy is generally combative, rather than deterrent, attempting to engage and defeat terrorist organizations whenever possible. This grand strategy includes economic initiatives to enhance free market cooperation and develop weak societies. Both of these efforts are intended to create stronger partners in the war on terrorism and deny enemies access to key resources. Finally, the nation’s law enforcement strategy is characterized as cooperative prosecution; federal agencies working with and through domestic and foreign law enforcement organizations to attack the criminal aspect of terrorism.

Instrument of Power	Strategy for Employment
Diplomatic	Democratization & Multilateralism
Informational	Persuasion & Situational Understanding
Military	Combative & Preventive
Economic	Free Markets & Development
Law Enforcement	Cooperative Prosecution

**Table 1. U.S. Grand Strategy**

**1. Diplomatic Strategy**

There are two themes that run throughout the policies and programs that describe the use of American diplomacy: democratization and multilateralism. The President has

frequently made the case that the nation will be more secure in an environment where foreign governments are representative of, and responsive to, their populations; in short, where they are some form of representative democracies.<sup>14</sup> In a 2005 address to the National Endowment for Democracy, the President emphasized the importance of democracy to the struggle against transnational terrorism. Democratic countries are stronger and more capable of denying terrorists safe havens from which to plan and coordinate operations. Democracy is also essential to reducing the underlying frustrations and anger that enable radical Islamists.<sup>15</sup> The recent success of the terrorist group Hamas in January's Palestinian elections illustrates the danger of this strategy; terrorist groups have the potential to muster public support to gain the legitimacy of an elected government. This is not a major problem if the government in question does not have the resources to seriously threaten U.S. security or interests. However, if a democratization strategy creates a similar situation in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan the U.S. is faced with a much more serious problem.<sup>16</sup>

The NSS contains one of the strongest statements about democratization when it states that the U.S. will “expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy... .” The document goes on to state that freedom and the rule of law will be cornerstones of U.S. foreign policy and bilateral negotiations.<sup>17</sup> The strategy envisions using diplomacy to strengthen relationships with other nations, primarily in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, in order to improve the abilities of these nations to participate in the GWOT, and enhance their ability to deal with terrorism at the state or regional level. The theme of spreading the costs of counterterrorism runs throughout the NSS; for example, there is mention of involving Europe in efforts in Africa as a way to develop the region. The document also contains a number of initiatives that other countries may find objectionable, such as efforts to

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<sup>14</sup> George W. Bush, “President Bush Discussed Freedom in Iraq and the Middle East at the National Endowment for Democracy,” November 6, 2003, The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html> (accessed January 27, 2006).

<sup>15</sup> George W. Bush, “President Discussed the War on Terror at the National Endowment for Democracy,” October 6, 2005, The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/print/20051006-3.html> (accessed January 19, 2006).

<sup>16</sup> Elaine Shannon, “Rice's busy Week in the Mid East,” *CNN.com*, February 23, 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/02/21/rice.week/index.html> (accessed March 3, 2006).

<sup>17</sup> NSS.



protect American citizens from the International Criminal Court, and to tie humanitarian aid to quantifiable governmental or human rights reform.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) discusses the use of diplomatic power throughout its list of initiatives in a manner very similar to the NSS. Both documents feature plans designed to enhance or compel a multilateral effort to increase partner nations' capabilities and commitment to counterterrorism, while at the same time enhancing their ability to deny terrorist organizations a foothold. The NSCT is more aggressive in its initiatives however. There is a mention of differentiating policy towards a nation according to their status as an able, weak or reluctant state in the fight against transnational terrorism. The strategy requires the Chief of Mission to report on a nation's counter terrorism efforts, and further implies that aid will be contingent upon action. In contrast, the DOS/USAID Strategic Plan recognizes the importance of partner nations and developing their capabilities, but is less aggressive than the NSCT and does not suggest any sort of coercive diplomacy. More significant is NSCT's mention of "compelling unwilling states" to cease providing support to terrorist organizations. This initiative is not developed in any serious detail in any strategy document. The NSCT states that the US will hold accountable states that "sponsor or actively provide sanctuary to terrorists."<sup>18</sup> While both military supporting documents consistently include state sponsors of terrorism as threats and potential targets, the subject does not receive this sort of explicit attention.<sup>19</sup> There is no mention of diplomatic initiatives that could be directed against "unwilling" nations in the DOS/USAID Strategic Plan. This is an example of a cross-instrument policy that the NSCT has developed, but no other document recognizes.

The DOS/USAID Strategic Plan is the supporting strategy specifically concerned with the employment of US diplomatic power. It is an extensive plan that includes thirteen "key priorities," three principles aims, four strategic objectives, and twelve strategic goals with seventy-nine included policy initiatives. It is interesting to note that although this strategy contains goals and policy initiatives that address terrorism, winning

<sup>18</sup> George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, The White House, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter\\_terrorism/counter\\_terrorism\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf) (accessed February 10, 2005), 20-21. This document will be referenced as the NSCT.

<sup>19</sup> NSCT, 21. NDS, 8. NMS, 4.

the war on terrorism is not a “key priority” or even a strategic objective of the plan. The closest the document gets is to designate “achieving peace and security” as a strategic objective. The plan recognizes the importance of international partners and reflects the NSS and NSCT’s emphasis on developing multilateral alliances to increase international participation in the war on terrorism. To that end there are a number of initiatives that focus on using diplomacy to work with international partners “to identify, disrupt, & destroy terrorist organizations of global reach.”<sup>20</sup> The plan reflects the common focus on improving the ability of partner nations to conduct counterterrorist activities, and deny terrorist organizations safe haven.

Although the DOS/USAID plan has some disconnects with other strategy documents, there are many notable consistencies. The plan recognizes the diplomatic work that will be required to secure the nation’s borders; policy initiatives such as build “smart borders” reflect this recognition. This is the system of layered checks intended to track foreign shipping and individuals from their point of origin, through foreign and domestic ports, to their final destination. The Smart Borders program is major objective of the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) that levies a variety of requirements on many supporting agencies and strategies.<sup>21</sup> Another consistency is in the area of drug trafficking. The DOS/USAID plan recognizes the need to coordinate counter-narcotic efforts in the Andean region as well as in Afghanistan and central Asia. This is consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy’s efforts to fight drugs on the home front and overseas.<sup>22</sup>

There are some elements of U.S. diplomatic strategy that many nations may find objectionable. Many of the initiatives that support the democratization strategy promote democratic traditions and institutions in a part of the world where they threaten the status quo. This may seem like an attempt to foist the American system of government, which

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<sup>20</sup> DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, 9.

<sup>21</sup> DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, 11; George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, Office of Homeland Security, [http://knxup2.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nat\\_strat\\_hls.pdf](http://knxup2.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nat_strat_hls.pdf) (accessed March 3, 2005), 22. This document will be referenced as the NSHS.

<sup>22</sup> DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, 15. George W. Bush, *National Drug Control Strategy*, The White House, <http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nps13-042604-11.pdf> (accessed March 9, 2005), 30-39. This document will be referenced as the NDCS.

many in this world object to, on other nations.<sup>23</sup> These initiatives are critical if one believes that democratic nations are less likely to fight one another, or that terrorism will cease to be an appealing tactic if people are prosperous and have a legitimate outlet for political discontent.

The strategy of democratization and multilateralism is generally well coordinated across formal policy documents. The focus of the NSS and NSCT is consistently on rewarding democratic reform and encouraging representative government. The DOS/USAID Strategic Plan lays out a strategy to encourage democratic reform in an effort to build partners that actively participate in the GWOT and are capable of handling terrorist within their own borders without assistance. Diplomatic initiatives compliment the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to provide military assistance.

As we will see, in many areas of America's grand strategy there is a great deal of work to be done. Democracy and multilateralism will help to set the conditions for constructive interaction with Middle Eastern governments, but they will not eliminate support for anti-American terrorism. As Hamas demonstrated in the recent Palestinian elections, democracy may bring this nation's adversaries greater legitimacy and power. Michele Dunne eloquently points out, in his article "Ending Support for Terrorism in the Muslim World," that much of the animosity towards the U.S. is a direct result of foreign policy decisions that various administrations have made with respect to the Middle East. Dunne argues that a progressive reexamination of all the governments and societies in the region should form the basis of a new effort to support true agents of democratic change in the Muslim world. He does not advocate breaking off relationships with partners in the region, rather using America's influence to support and encourage real change in nations.<sup>24</sup> This is one approach that has not been tried, and has great potential for yielding high dividends in increased support, legitimacy and freedom of action in the region.

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<sup>23</sup> DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, 19-27.

<sup>24</sup> Michelle D. Dunne, "Ending Support for Terrorism in the Muslim World," *A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism*, ed. By Adam Garfinkle (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2004), 55-58.

## 2. Information Strategy

There has been a great deal of focus on “winning the war of ideas,” so much so that one could understandably assume that this was the essence of America’s information strategy. However, the nation’s core strategy documents employ informational power along two tracts: enhancing situational understanding and persuading foreign audiences. It is the former program that has received the most support and attention. Arguably this is because it is easier to grasp and has potential for greater immediate rewards. The NSCT highlights the importance of improving intelligence collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination in the effort to prevent attacks and defeat terrorist organizations.<sup>25</sup> Programs to improve America’s situational understanding are expanded upon by the NSHS and the National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (NSPPCIKA). These strategies include initiatives that recognize the need to improve technical collection systems to track everything from terrorist finances to WMD agents and technology. These initiatives also have a human component that recognizes the importance of improving human intelligence collection, and our ability to accurately analyze the collected data. The NSPPCIKA even goes so far as to describe what amounts to a total reexamination of domestic intelligence requirements and procedural obstacles in an effort to provide more effective support to domestic counterterrorism efforts.<sup>26</sup> Finally, all three strategies devote significant attention to programs for improving information sharing throughout government, at the federal, state, local levels, and with the public and private sectors.

One theme that frequently appears in the strategy documents, especially the NSCT and the National Maritime Strategy is the idea that America must develop total “domain awareness” in our efforts to identify, track, and act against any threat to the US or its citizens.<sup>27</sup> This is an ambitious goal that may be effective as an ideal endstate, but may be totally unworkable as an achievable objective. The country cannot hope to deploy enough high technology systems to monitor every inch of its borders, and even

<sup>25</sup> NSCT, 16-19. As with other strategy documents, this theme runs throughout the NSCT both explicitly and implicitly in a variety of policies and programs.

<sup>26</sup> George W. Bush, *National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets*, The White House, [http://knxup2.hsdn.org/homesecc/docs/whitehouse/physical\\_strategy.pdf](http://knxup2.hsdn.org/homesecc/docs/whitehouse/physical_strategy.pdf) (accessed March 9, 2005), 25-27. This document will be referenced as the NSPPCIKA.

<sup>27</sup> NSCT, 25.

the most advanced system can be deceived. That is not to suggest that the nation should not strive to improve its awareness of threats, rather that initiatives like the “smart borders” program are a better investment. The maritime strategy effectively describes the difficulties with achieving maritime “domain awareness” and identifies realistic advances that can be made.<sup>28</sup>

Two key elements of government’s effort to improve communications with the public are the Homeland Security Advisory System and a series of sector specific Information Sharing Analysis Centers (ISAC). The advisory system is the government’s primary means of providing security information to the general public; it is a system that continues to be developed and refined to maximize its effectiveness. The ISACs are organizations that focus on exchanging industry specific security information, vulnerability assessments, and sharing threat warnings. This system is far from ideal. Participation in ISACs is voluntary, and while procedures are being developed, safeguarding proprietary information is an issue.<sup>29</sup>

The NSCT, and to a lesser extent the NSS, envisions winning the “war of ideas” as a means to erode support for radical organizations. This is a critical component in the nation’s grand strategy, but the two most active national security organizations, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, reflect very different approaches to this challenge. The national military strategies are about fighting conventional wars and do not effectively support fighting at the level of ideals, values, or ethics. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) recognizes the importance of attacking terrorist organizations at the ideological level, but fails to identify any role for the DOD in this effort. The DOD has begun a variety of initiatives to improve its capability to persuade at the strategic level, some more successful than others. The most public of these was the Office of Strategic Information, which was disbanded in 2003 amid controversy over its mission. Other initiatives include the restructuring of U.S. Strategic Command to conduct IO and the establishment of an Information Operations Center of Excellence at the Naval

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<sup>28</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Strategy for Maritime Security*, The White House, <http://knxup2.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dhs/nps03-092305-02.pdf> (accessed November 8, 2005), 16-17. This document will be referenced as the NSMS.

<sup>29</sup> NSPPCIKA, 27.

Postgraduate School.<sup>30</sup> The National Military Strategy (NMS) recognizes the need for a strategic communications plan, but the focus is on deterring threats by demonstrating strength and resolve. Neither document recognizes that military action may be damaging to US soft power, and that operations may need to be conducted with second and third degree effects in mind.<sup>31</sup>

The DOS/USAID Strategic Plan includes initiatives to enhance the nation's ability to communicate with the world in order to improve overall understanding of American policy and motivations. The departments will pursue this goal through policies and programs designed to increase the nation's capability to conduct public diplomacy and respond to negative propaganda. The strategy emphasizes the traditional tools of public diplomacy, broadcast media and educational exchange, as well as includes some new ones like the World Wide Web. Most important, the strategy states that the departments will listen to the international community and "inform the policy process through accurate readings of public opinions in foreign countries."<sup>32</sup> This is significant because it indicates two things. First, it shows that there is awareness that the US must improve its understanding of the perspectives of foreign audiences. Second, there may be an effort to consider the reaction of the international community when crafting foreign policy. This was reinforced by Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes in her confirmation hearings when she recognized the critical link between "policy and public diplomacy." Hughes stated that Secretary Rice intended for "me personally and public diplomacy institutionally to play a key role in policy development."<sup>33</sup>

American information strategy pursues a bifurcated path that reflects the dual nature of informational power. The first aspect of this strategy are initiatives to improve

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<sup>30</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, February 17, 2006, Department of Defense, <http://www.defenselink.mil/> (accessed March 3, 2006). Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon and Bogus News: All is Denied," *The New York Times*, December 5, 2003; <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 3, 2006). William M. Arkin, "Defense Strategy; The Military's New War of Words," *Los Angeles Times*, November 24, 2002, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 3, 2006).

<sup>31</sup> NDS, 9. NMS,12.

<sup>32</sup> DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, 30-32.

<sup>33</sup> Karen Hughes, "The Mission of Public Diplomacy," U.S. Department of State, [www.state.gov/r/us/2005/49967.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/us/2005/49967.htm) (accessed January 19, 2005).

situational understanding among federal, state and local governments as well as with foreign partners in the GWOT. There are certainly initiatives to improve intelligence collection, but in reading the strategies a great deal more effort is being put into analyzing and sharing the information that already exists. Information sharing is a major theme in the National Strategy for Homeland Security as well as in the reorganization plans ongoing in many agencies. A great deal of work is still left to be done, however. Although the process of reform and reorganization is underway within national security agencies, as the 9/11 Commission's December 2005 report shows the nation has not yet made significant progress in improving information sharing or communication.<sup>34</sup>

The second aspect of information strategy is the U.S. government's attempt to engage the world on the level of ideas, values, and ethics by aggressively pursuing traditional diplomacy, and by reviving public diplomacy organizations. This information campaign attempts to persuade various societies of the rightness of American policies and programs, while simultaneously discrediting terrorism and violent Islamic movements in general. It is thought that an improved international reputation will increase America's ability to peacefully influence the actions of other nations.<sup>35</sup> The travels of Secretary Rice and Undersecretary Hughes in late 2005 exemplify the beginnings of an effort to explain American foreign policy. However, Undersecretary Hughes' information strategy may never enjoy any real success until it begins to address the very real issue that many people throughout the world understand but object to American foreign policy; it may not be a question of simply explaining American motives and objectives better.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> *Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations*, December 2005, 9/11 Public Discourse Project, <http://www.9-11pdp.org> (accessed January 19, 2006). *Report on the Status of 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Part II Reforming the Institutions of Government*, October 20, 2005, 9/11 Public Discourse Project, <http://www.9-11pdp.org> (accessed January 21, 2006).

<sup>35</sup> Douglas J. Feith, "U.S. Strategy for the War on Terrorism," U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040414-0261.html> (accessed January 19, 2006). Lord, 225-234. Hughes.

<sup>36</sup> Anthony Shadid, *Night Draws Near: Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2005). Derk Kinnane, "Winning Over the Muslim Mind," *The National Interest Summer*, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed January 20, 2006). Shadid describes in detail how the attitude of Iraqi civilians has changed in light of the execution of American foreign policy in Iraq. No measure of explanation of the motives for this policy is going to redress their humiliation and anger at the occupation of their land. At this point in the conflict, actions matter and the U.S. may be judged more for how many doors our soldiers kicked in than for how free and fair the 2005 Iraqi elections were.

Two critical pieces are missing from US efforts to employ information power. First, the US lacks an explicit information strategy that prioritizes efforts to improve intelligence and information sharing, while at the same time fully developing initiatives to engage foreign audiences. The NSS contains a short section devoted to the subject, but it lacks any specific policy initiatives, priorities, or concept of how the goals will be accomplished.<sup>37</sup> Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes described a sort of information strategy in her July 2005 confirmation hearings. Undersecretary Hughes called for a program of “engagement, exchanges, education and empowerment.” It is impossible to debate the merits of this strategy because it is not described in any significant detail, but there are indications that it may not be well thought out. Education is an example of this danger. It is briefly described as “the path to upward mobility and greater opportunity.” Education program will focus on English language training as a means to “improve their own [people in underdeveloped countries] lives and learn more about our [American] lives.”<sup>38</sup> This is troubling because English is only a small part of what education programs should try to teach; the programs should be focusing on areas like HIV/AIDS prevention, civil engineering, reading, writing, and a whole host of other topics where education could make a difference in their lives. Second, the US lacks a coordinated plan to inform the American public about the conduct of the GWOT, an important aspect to maintaining national will. The American public is inundated with information from the media, the government’s web sites are difficult to navigate, and the dynamics of governmental politics makes it difficult for the President to communicate effectively. In this environment the American public has no concept of where the GWOT stands or how it is going, all they know is that soldiers are dying daily in Iraq and the al-Qaeda is still a threat four years after September 11<sup>th</sup>.

### **3. Military Strategy**

The strategy to employ military power outlined in the NSS and other core documents is surprisingly vague, although it is clear that there is a large military component. The NSS states that the US will employ “direct and continuous action using

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<sup>37</sup> NSS, 6.

<sup>38</sup> Hughes.



all the elements of national and international power,” against terrorist organizations.<sup>39</sup> However, the NSS in no way outlines a strategy to employ the military in this fight. The NSCT makes the strongest statement when it notes that the US will “focus decisive military power & specialized intelligence resources to defeat terrorist networks globally.”<sup>40</sup> The document goes on to reflect the complexity of this task by directing regional commanders to begin planning for humanitarian operations as well as implying that the military will have a role in denying terrorist access to ungoverned areas of the world. The military strategy described in these documents is a broadly stated set of themes that do little to constrain or integrate the military effort.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) do a significantly better job outlining the strategy to employ military power in the conflict. Both documents lay out a set of general objectives for military forces, and describe what the military will do to carry the fight to the enemy. Neither document makes any attempt to outline specifically how the military will conduct operations, presumably preferring to leave operational planning to the regional combatant commanders. The NDS establishes four “strategic objectives,” and concentrates on defeating adversaries overseas before they can make it to America.<sup>41</sup> The strategy states that the military will accomplish this task by accomplishing a set of goals that include “limit [sic] adversaries’ options, deny them their means of support, defeat organized resistance, & establish security.”<sup>42</sup> What is missing is a description of how the military will accomplish these goals. The strategy reflects the need to share intelligence, improve the nation’s ability to conduct defensive military operations, and support civil authorities in times of crisis. Just as the core documents stress the importance of allies, the NDS stresses working with and through allies to improve their ability to conduct counterterrorist operations, participate in the international effort, and exert control over ungoverned areas of the world. Finally, the NDS focuses on transforming the entire Department of Defense, from the civilian

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<sup>39</sup> NSS, 5-7.

<sup>40</sup> NSCT, 17.

<sup>41</sup> The NDS is a product of the office of the Secretary of Defense. The NMS is a product of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The four “strategic objectives” listed on page IV of the NDS are to “secure the US from direct attack, ... Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action, ... Establish favorable security conditions.”

<sup>42</sup> NDS, 8.

bureaucracy to the military forces. This initiative is intended to improve efficiency and flexibility, while at the same time developing a force that is more capable of fighting transnational terrorist organizations.

The NMS differs little from the NDS in content or style, but the few ways it does diverge are important. The NMS states very clearly that the 1<sup>st</sup> priority of the military forces is “winning the war on terrorism,” surprisingly this is not commonly stated in many other strategy documents.<sup>43</sup> The NMS links NDS’ strategic objectives with supporting military objectives and Joint Operations Concepts (JOC) to describe how the military operate. This nesting that is extremely effective in illustrating how higher objectives can guide the planning process for subordinate organizations.<sup>44</sup> Full spectrum dominance (FSD) is a feature of the NMS that is not included in the NDS. This is similar to the issue of domain awareness discussed in the previous section. The NMS however, recognizes FSD as a general goal, and uses it to focus initiatives to improve information collection and exchange. One initiative intended to deliberately cross the boundary between military and information power, is the Counter-Terrorist (CT) Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs). These are teams designed to facilitate integration & information sharing at the interagency level. This program has great potential to enable military operations and improve the overall outcome of military activities.<sup>45</sup>

One of the most interesting features of the national military strategies is their focus on a capabilities-based approach to force development. Both documents repeatedly state that they are concerned with developing the capabilities that allow the military to effectively fight in any environment, against any enemy.<sup>46</sup> This is an enemy neutral approach to force development in an environment characterized by vastly different types of adversaries. In essence capabilities based forces must be prepared to fight every sort of enemy that they might encounter; the same force that is prepared to fight a tank battle must be prepared to fight a counterinsurgency. As events in Iraq are illustrating, this is a

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<sup>43</sup> NMS, iv.

<sup>44</sup> NMS, 3.

<sup>45</sup> NMS 21-23.

<sup>46</sup> NDS, 11-17. NMS, Chapter III.

very difficult task to demand of the force.<sup>47</sup> This feature will most likely hinder the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to fight the transnational terrorist organizations because, instead of forcing change it enables the status quo. The military will always train to defeat the most dangerous threat, with the assumption that anything not as dangerous can be handled as well. A capabilities-based force design encourages this thinking instead of challenging the military to focus on the enemy at hand.

The strategy to employ military power is generally described in the national strategy documents. The focus is on direct military action to defeat terrorist organizations, and indirect actions to support and develop allies. The strategy documents generally describe how the military will fight, but not what the military will do in any specific region. At the operational level these strategy documents may create difficulties in prioritizing resources. Allocating resources may be more reactionary rather than deliberate because of a lack of clearly designated priority among regions, adversaries, or commands. The military's strategy is overwhelmingly combative and cumulative, attempting to take the fight to the transnational terrorist organizations wherever there is an opportunity to do so. Iraq and Afghanistan are only the most visible of these actions; operations go on in South America, Southeast Asia, and the Horn of Africa daily.

American military activities in the Philippines illustrate this strategy. United States military forces participate in high profile exercises such as the annual Balikatan training exercise and less public ones such as small unit counterterrorism training. In these "training exercises" US forces work closely with their Philippine "trainees" to target terrorists and destroy them. This strategy has had mixed results in the Philippines; while decreasing the strength of the Abu Sayyaf group, the surviving members have strengthened their ties to Indonesia's Jemmah Islamiah (JI), as well as the Filipino Moro

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<sup>47</sup> Nigel Aylwi-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," *Military Review* NOV-DEC 2005, <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/NovDec05/index.asp> (accessed January 12, 2006). Mark Thompson, "Army at the Breaking Point," *Time*, January 26, 2006, <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1153175,00.html?cnn=yes> (accessed January 27, 2006). Thompson reports on Andrew Krepinevich's 2006 report to the Secretary of Defense on the state of U.S. military strategy in Iraq and the overall health of the force. Krepinevich argues that operations in Iraq have "dangerously stretched" the military. This is a conclusion that Secretary Rumsfeld and top military leaders disagree with.

Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and become increasingly lethal in their attacks.<sup>48</sup> While the strategy is generally combative, there are notable exceptions. U.S. Task Force Horn of Africa is engaged in significant nation building efforts throughout the region to improve the quality of life of the population. These efforts also degrade the terrorists' ability to recruit and train, while simultaneously improving America's image in the region.<sup>49</sup> This use of resources may provide the military's longest and most productive contribution to the GWOT, because terrorism will always be an available choice of disaffected groups in the world. To the extent that the U.S. is not a viable, acceptable, or appropriate target in the mind of those groups, the nation will be safer.

#### **4. Economic Strategy**

Like informational power, there is no explicit plan to employ American economic power; this does not mean that it is unused or somehow neglected. On the contrary, economic power is employed by every agency and department involved in the fight. Some organizations make deliberate use of this instrument to affect the behavior of friends, adversaries, and others in the struggle. The problem is that there is no systematic overarching approach to applying economic power in this grand strategy. This is surprising given that, as a "hard power," economic resources have the potential to produce direct and often quantifiable results. In general the core documents focus on applying economic power to reward cooperative nations and organizations, while the supporting strategies focus on applying economic resources to enable operations. The notable exceptions to these trends are the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) and the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (DOS/USAID) Strategic Plan.

One feature of economic strategy not explicitly spelled out in the strategy documents is the drive to open markets throughout the world. Since September 11, 2001

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<sup>48</sup> Andrew Feickel, *U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia*, Congressional Research Service (2005), <http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesecc/docs/crs/nps21-101305-02.pdf> (accessed January 23, 2006), 14-16. Thomas Lum and Larry A. Miksch, *The Republic of the Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations*, Congressional Research Service (2006), <http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesecc/docs/crs/nps21-012006-12.pdf> (accessed January 23, 2006), 7-11.

<sup>49</sup> James Brandon, "To fight Al Qaeda, US troops in Africa build schools instead," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 9, 2006, <http://search.csmonitor.com/2006/0109/p01s04-woaf.html> (accessed January 23, 2006).

the U.S. has entered into, or announced the intention of entering into, Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with various Middle Eastern and Central America nations, established Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFA) with countries as diverse as Egypt and Algeria, and worked for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership for nations such as Saudi Arabia.<sup>50</sup> The purpose of these FTAs is to remove the barriers to trade globally as a means to undermine poverty and encourage democracy. These agreements will result in foreign partners less likely to support terrorist organizations, and foreign populations that are less vulnerable to terrorist recruiting.<sup>51</sup> The nation's strategy for employing economic power can be summed up as an active effort to increase free markets throughout the developing world, also referred to as marketization, and focused developmental aid to weak states.

American policy documents and foreign aid programs, since September 11, have refocused developmental aid on nations in the Middle East in an attempt to make these needed improvements.<sup>52</sup> The National Security Strategy (NSS) stresses programs and policies that employ economic power persuasively: developmental assistance in return for economic and political reform or the expansion of free markets. The NSS does suggest

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<sup>50</sup> US-Middle Eastern Free Trade Area Fact Sheet, *The White House*, [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040609-37.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040609-37.html) (accessed January 24, 2006). FTAs are in effect with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain; on October 17, 2005 the President notified Congress of his intent to enter into a FTA with Oman. TIFAs are in effect with Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar [signing dates omitted]. See also: George W. Bush, "President discusses Trade, CAFTA at Organization of American States," June 6, 2005, *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050606-1.html> (accessed January 24, 2006). Notice of Intent to Enter into a Free Trade Agreement ..., *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040220-9.html> (accessed January 24, 2006). In addition to the Middle Eastern FTAs, the U.S. has entered into the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua; established a number of bilateral FTAs with various Asian countries, most notably Singapore; and extended the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to 2015. The details of these agreements can be found at [www.whitehouse.gov](http://www.whitehouse.gov). Fact Sheet: Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021026-7.html> (accessed January 24, 2006). The U.S. has established TIFAs with Indonesia and the Philippines, among others. The Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative is intended to facilitate the establishment of FTAs with each member country as a means to greater security and prosperity in the region.

<sup>51</sup> For more information on the link between trade and security see: statements on CAFTA; Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, and U.S.-Morocco FTA; and Deputy National Security Advisor Faryar Shizad's September 14, 2005 press briefing. These statements are available at [www.whitehouse.gov](http://www.whitehouse.gov). Bush, "President Discusses Trade, CAFTA at OAS."

<sup>52</sup> Patrick M. Cronin, "Foreign Aid," *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, ed. by Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 238-240.

that foreign aid will be used as a reward for progress towards freedom and democracy. There is an implied threat of economic sanctions in its discussions of actions to defeat terrorist organizations, but no direct threats to withhold aid. In fact, as we have already mentioned, the administration's primary program to expand American foreign aid, the Millennium Challenge Accounts (MCA), is not tied to recipient nation's counterterrorist operations at all.<sup>53</sup> As has already been mentioned, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) adopts a much more aggressive tone. The NSCT seems to conflict with the message of the NSS, and the precedent set by the MCAs, when it states that nation's "stand on terrorism will be considered when deciding on aid."<sup>54</sup>

The DOS/USAID Strategic Plan is the primary mechanism for directly employing economic power to develop partners in the GWOT. Aid is packaged as either humanitarian or security assistance and is often not linked to the recipient's counterterrorism efforts. Developmental aid to vulnerable nations and populations receives the most attention in this supporting strategy. Programs and organizations such as the Millennium Challenge Accounts, the President's HIV/AIDS initiative, or the Multilateral Development Banks have twofold effect. The direct effect of these programs is to reduce the poverty, disease, and misery of populations in second and third world societies. The indirect effect of these programs is to reduce the hate and rage that are thought to contribute to the appeal of terrorism, and increase the appeal of western ideals and traditions.<sup>55</sup> The DOS/USAID Strategic Plan includes a series of initiatives that focus on "diminishing the underlying causes of terrorism" in countries like Pakistan, Nepal, and the Sudan.<sup>56</sup> These are initiatives designed to reduce poverty, unemployment, and improve access to health care. The programs illustrate the close relationship between political objectives and the economic resources that are often used to secure these objectives.

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<sup>53</sup> NSS, 4 & 18-21.

<sup>54</sup> NSCT, 23.

<sup>55</sup> George W. Bush, "President's Address to the UN High-Level Plenary Meeting," September 14, 2005, *The White House*, [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050914.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050914.html) (accessed January 24, 2006). Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 2006: Department of State and International Assistance Programs, *Office of Management and Budget*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/state.html> (accessed January 23, 2006).

<sup>56</sup> DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, 6-7 & 10.

A striking feature of the NSHS is its attempt to manage the costs of the programs it advocates; this is not a common feature among supporting strategies. The NSHS contains significant and costly initiatives, some of which are: recapitalizing the US Coast Guard, developing a common communications system for 1<sup>st</sup> responders, and developing new sensors to identify and track WMD. However, the NSHS contains a section that recognizes the costs of these programs, discusses spreading the costs between levels of government (federal, state, and local), and prioritizes initiatives for the 2004 fiscal year.<sup>57</sup> In contrast, the DOS/USAID plan fails to contain any discussion of economic feasibility, and little mention of priorities, among the vast numbers of programs it calls for.

Economic power does not suffer from a lack of employment, but it does suffer from a lack of focus. Every strategy document mentions providing aid to foreign nations to encourage a variety of behaviors. What is missing is a focus to these efforts. There is no interagency/cross strategy prioritization of effort to allow for employment of financial resources. The static nature of these strategy documents also creates a problem for focusing resources. The NSHS includes a list of priorities for fiscal 2004 budget, but that is now almost three budget cycles old. Under this system, in effect the federal budget becomes the ultimate prioritizer of the nation's grand strategy. U.S. economic power is ultimately allocated by Congress through the budget process, and economic power enables virtually all other powers to act. Thus, U.S. grand strategy is at the mercy of a fickle system that is hampered by partisan politics. A second feature that is missing from America's economic strategy is any serious discussion of economic sanctions and how they might be used to influence other international actors. There is a great deal of debate regarding the effectiveness of such sanctions, but that does not change the fact that they are a legitimate tool that should be factored into the nation's strategy. As it stands now foreign nations have no idea how positive or negative sanctions might be employed against their nation so they are forced to act without considering the possible effects of these tools.

## **5. Law Enforcement Strategy**

The core US strategy documents illustrate two foci for US judicial power: drugs and terrorism. Judicial power is not discussed in any detail in the NSS, but does receive

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<sup>57</sup> NSHS, 63-69.

significant attention in the NSCT and NSHS. The NSCT predictably focuses on employing law enforcement elements to prosecute criminal cases against terrorists wherever they operate. To this end it advocates expanding the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, US law enforcement activities overseas, and “breaking the nexus between drugs and terror.”<sup>58</sup> The NSHS includes multiple initiatives to increase the size, capability, and effectiveness of a range of law enforcement organizations. One of the most significant initiatives in the NSHS is the plan to expand the number and functions of the FBI led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). As of December 2004 the FBI had added 64 JTTFs for a total of 100; participation in these included 2,196 FBI agents, 838 other federal government representatives and most significantly 689 representatives from state and local law enforcement agencies. This growth is in addition to the expansion and reorganization of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, the development of an interagency Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), and the realignment of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) under the Director of National Intelligence.<sup>59</sup>

The explicit strategy to employ the law enforcement elements of the US government is contained in two documents, the National Money Laundering Strategy (NMLS) and the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). The NMLS is focused directly on the terrorist threat, while the NDCS addresses terrorism as a lesser included challenge in the fight against drug trafficking. These documents only touch on the efforts of law enforcement to track and prevent the action of terrorist organizations at home and abroad; they are primarily directed against a subset of the larger fight. A more detailed description of counterterrorism operations is contained in the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 2004 performance report and plan. This document focuses law enforcement on investigating and prosecuting individuals and terrorist organizations, as well as to improving law enforcement’s capability to conduct counterterrorism operations in general. The plan predictably focuses on DOJ organizations, the FBI, Immigration and

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<sup>58</sup> NSCT, 16-17 and 22.

<sup>59</sup> “Protecting America Against Terrorist Attack: A Closer Look at the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” *Federal Bureau of Investigations*, <http://www.fbi.gov/page2/dec04/jttf120114.htm> (accessed December 11, 2005). Office of the Inspector General, *The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information*, <http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0410/findings2.htm> (accessed on December 11, 2005). *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, Congress of the United States, <http://www.c-span.org/pdf/s2845confrept.pdf> (accessed September 18, 2005).



Naturalization Service (INS), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the US Attorney's Office to name a few. It does not include the activities of non-traditional organizations such as the Coast Guard or the Border Patrol.<sup>60</sup>

America's law enforcement strategy for the GWOT could be summed up as aggressive and cooperative prosecution on all terrorism related crime. While official strategy documents emphasize money laundering and counternarcotic efforts, the nation's law enforcement is pursuing a much broader agenda. Federal Bureau of Investigations Director Robert Mueller stated that the FBI's "top three national security priorities are now counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber security." He went on to outline a strategy that revolves around legal attaches working with "our counterparts overseas on joint investigations, intelligence-sharing, and the development of new methods to prevent attacks."<sup>61</sup> This is a cumulative strategy that attempts to collapse terrorist organizations through an attrition scheme. Operations to identify and eliminate the sources and networks financing terrorist organizations are only one part of a much larger effort. Cooperative prosecution describes a strategy that attempts to prosecute terrorists and their organizations wherever there is a legal infrastructure and a will to support these actions. When an inadequate legal infrastructure exists, the nation's law enforcement agencies, in particular the (FBI) through its International Training Program, work to develop one. Programs are in place to train foreign police forces both in their country and in the United States. The FBI has increased its number of agents and offices overseas and provides specialized investigative assistance to partner nations on a variety of crimes.<sup>62</sup> In addition to conducting its own international training program, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has an International Response Team that

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<sup>60</sup> *FY 2002 Performance Report/FY 2003 Revised Final Performance Plan/FY 2004 Performance Plan: Strategic Goal 1*, U.S. Department of Justice, <http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2002/pdf/Section01.pdf> (accessed December 11, 2005). Paul H. O'Neill and John Ashcroft, *National Money Laundering Strategy*, <http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesecc/docs/justice/monlaund.pdf> (accessed on December 8, 2005). This document will be referenced as the NMLS.

<sup>61</sup> Robert S. Mueller III, "Remarks by the Director to the Council on Foreign Relations," *FBI: Major Executive Speeches*, <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/speech062204.htm> (accessed January 25, 2006).

<sup>62</sup> International Training Program, FBI Academy, <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/td/academy/itp/itp.htm> (accessed January 25, 2006). Tom Fuentes, "Protecting America from Afar," *U.S. Department of Justice*, [www.fbi.gov/page2/sept05/protectingamerica091205.htm](http://www.fbi.gov/page2/sept05/protectingamerica091205.htm) (accessed January 25, 2006). Mr. Fuentes expects the FBI presence overseas to double the size of its staff, and expand its footprint to "63 main offices and 17 suboffices" by 2007.

works with the State department to “to provide technical and investigative assistance at international explosives and fire incidents.”<sup>63</sup> The FBI is the leading agency for international law enforcement efforts, but as the example of the AFT International Response Team shows, it is far from the only agency working to with and through international partner nations.

### **C. CONCLUSIONS**

America grand strategy has historically run the gamut from isolationism to fully engaged collective security. Regardless of the features of the strategy, each one is a reflection of the constraints and opportunities of the global environment and the relative effectiveness of the instruments of American power at the time.<sup>64</sup> The grand strategy that has developed to guide American policy since September 11 is similarly a product of the unique environment in which it evolved. It is not captured neatly in one document or speech; to fully understand it one must look across a spectrum of policy documents and public statements by America’s leaders. It is a strategy that includes a role for each instrument of national power. It is also a strategy that reflects the opportunities of the global environment, but one that may not take into account that same environment’s limitations on action.

Diplomatic power focuses on encouraging democracy in an effort to reduce the points of friction between societies, and to provide a peaceful outlet for social discontent. Informational power is used to persuade a number of audiences throughout the world. The object of this persuasion is to improve the image of America and her policies, while at the same time discrediting the message of her enemies. Informational power is also concerned with improving America’s overall situational understanding of the global environment. This aspect includes information collection, processing, and sharing among U.S. and international partners. The military is an integral part of efforts to provide humanitarian assistance and strengthen foreign nation’s ability to combat terrorism within its own borders. Military strategy however, is generally combative, seeking to identify and destroy terrorist organizations wherever possible, other missions are secondary or a

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<sup>63</sup> AFT Snapshot: 2005, *ATF Online*, U.S. Department of Justice, <http://www.atf.gov/about/snap2005.htm> (accessed January 25, 2006).

<sup>64</sup> Posen and Ross.

means to accomplish this primary task. The strategy to employ economic power is characterized by the drive to open markets around the world in an effort to improve the economic prosperity of foreign and domestic populations. American diplomacy frequently employs economic power to strengthen weak states and improve the quality of life for people in the developing world. Developmental aid and health care assistance are examples of economic power. Finally, the strategy to employ the nation's law enforcement organizations is one of cooperative prosecution. Federal agencies, primarily the FBI, will work with and through foreign partners to prosecute terrorists and terrorism related crimes at home and abroad.

General Andre Beaufre examined the effects of the relationship between the importance of an objective, the military resources available, and the force's freedom of action in his book *An Introduction to Strategy*. He argued that these relationships shaped the strategic patterns available to the nation's leader. For example, in a conflict with moderately important objectives and large military resources available, the nation's leader should adopt a strategy of threatening military action, as that may be sufficient to accomplish the objectives.<sup>65</sup> One can assume that the force has sufficient freedom of action to make this threat believable. Let's try to put this reasoning into the context of America's grand strategy for a moment.

The objectives of the GWOT are not as well defined as many would like, but all would certainly agree that securing the nation from terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is one of them. This is a highly important objective clearly, but how sufficient are America's resources? Diplomatically there are indications that the US has sufficient resources to discourage states from supplying WMD to terrorist organizations. However, with a nuclear armed North Korea, a resurgent Iran, and questions of about the security of weapons in the former Soviet Union, diplomacy may

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<sup>65</sup> Andre Beaufre, *An Introduction to Strategy*, trans. MG R.H. Barry (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 26-27. While the book's focus was military strategy, Beaufre described his strategic patterns as examples of "total strategy." This concept is similar to grand strategy in that it is the highest level of strategic planning, and the prevue of political leaders. However, unlike grand strategy, "total strategy" is solely concerned with the conduct of "total war;" it does not seem to have a place prior to or after the conflict. In contrast grand strategy directs activities before, during, and after war with an eye to producing a more secure post conflict society. Beaufre's reasoned that the interaction of objectives, military resources, and freedom of action shaped the nation's use of force in its total strategy. Similar constraints act upon each instrument of power to shape its employment at the level of grand strategy.

by insufficient to prevent terrorists from acquiring a weapon. Militarily the nation has more than enough resources to seize or destroy a terrorist WMD. The nation does not have adequate intelligence to prevent terrorist organizations from acquiring or employing a WMD. The value of economic power in this calculation is questionable. The nation certainly has the resources to purchase weapons that appear on the black market, or it could conceivably pay scientists from developing nations not to use their knowledge. However, programs to prevent the spread of AIDS in Africa or increase jobs in the Philippines will not prevent al-Qaeda from developing a dirty bomb or chemical weapon. The nation's law enforcement elements are active and capable. With successes such as that against the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan, they have shown an ability to work with and through other agencies and governments to counter this threat. Table 2 summarizes the nation's capability to prevent a terrorist organization from acquiring and employing a WMD.

Importance of Objective	National Power	Capability
High (Terrorist use of WMD)	Diplomatic	2
	Informational	1
	Military	5
	Economic	3
	Law Enforcement	4

**Table 2. Evaluation of Resource Capability  
(5 is highest)**

Beaufre's study focused on the leader's options in employing military might, but some of the same logic can be applied to this example. In this example the enemy has an informational advantage that cancels out America's military advantage, and degrades the nation's judicial lead. In cases of inadequate military force Beaufre argues that the leader should adopt either an indirect strategy or one centering on low intensity conflict. In the above example the nation has no dominant instrument of power that can carry the fight,

but it is faced with a highly important objective. In this case it would seem that an indirect strategy that attacks the terrorist organization from a variety of directions to achieve a cumulative effect is the only one with a chance of success. Beaufre also included the commander's freedom to employ his forces, his freedom of action, in his calculus.<sup>66</sup> In the example of a terrorist WMD, the use of military force is further restricted when one considers freedom of action. America faces an information imbalance that makes a preemptive use of military force difficult, and a legitimacy problem that makes preventive one even more problematic. The nation is free to use its diplomatic and informational resources, but these have little capability to achieve the objective. Finally, the nation is also free to employ its law enforcement elements, and these have shown themselves to be effective in some instances. However, these assets are only available when the terrorist organization is operating within a nation that is willing to cooperate with the U.S. led war on terrorism; in ungoverned areas like Somalia, FBI legal attachés are incapable of any significant action.<sup>67</sup> Table 3 demonstrates how these limitations might affect American instruments of power.

Importance of Objective	National Power	Capability	Freedom of Action
High (Terrorist use of WMD)	Diplomatic	2	High
	Informational	1	High
	Military	5 2	Low
	Economic	3	Moderate
	Law Enforcement	5 3	Moderate

**Table 3. The Effect of Freedom of Action on Resources**

<sup>66</sup> Beaufre, 26-31.

<sup>67</sup> The federal interagency effort to disrupt and destroy the A.Q. Khan network illustrates that it is often impossible for WMD smuggling and development to take place entirely in nations that will not support the U.S. led efforts. Although Pakistan only grudgingly cooperated after the network was discovered, the U.S. was able to work with and through South Africa to seize a nuclear processing facility destined for Libya. For more information see: Josh Meyer, "Case Reveals Nuts and Bolts of Nuclear Network, Officials Say," *Los Angeles Times*, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed January 28, 2006). Douglas Frantz and William C. Rempel; "New Find in a Nuclear Network; A Pakistani Scientist Used South African Affiliated in an Effort to Outfit Libya with a Uranium enrichment Plant," *Los Angeles Times*, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed January 28, 2006).

This analysis seems to present a grim future for American grand strategy. It asserts that no one instrument of power is particularly capable of preventing a transnational terrorist organization from acquiring and employing a WMD. Beaufre's reasoning applies to the war on terrorism just as it does a conventional battle. The nation, faced with a highly important objective and an array of moderately capable means, must employ a hybrid strategy that uses powers with great freedom of action, but limited capability, to develop the situation and create the conditions to employ those with greater capability. Put simple diplomacy and informational power must achieve what is achievable within their realm, but also shape the environment to allow military and judicial forces to act against terrorist organizations. This requires great cooperation among federal agencies to coordinate and synchronize their actions within a larger plan of attack.

This study now turns to an examination of the principles behind grand strategy to consider how a successful strategy is constructed and executed. The various instruments of national power are interdependent and must be coordinated to operate most effectively. As the previous example suggests, these instruments should work synergistically to facilitate and reinforce each other's operations in pursuit of a larger goal. How does this happen? What are the mechanisms that allow this integration? How effectively is American grand strategy using these mechanisms? These are some of the questions this study will attempt to answer in the next chapter.

## II. ELEMENTS OF A GRAND STRATEGY

### A. GRAND STRATEGY DEFINED

Paul Kennedy presents a comprehensive definition of grand strategy that serves as a starting point for this study. Grand strategy, in Kennedy's theory, is a broad set of long-term policies that guide a nation during peace and war by the "balancing of ends and means" to achieve national interests, and ensures the nation emerges from conflict better off than when it began. Grand strategy focuses on maintaining peace while being prepared for war by bringing "together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is wartime *and* peacetime) best interests." This is a critical point because it emphasizes the role of grand strategy during peace time: to simultaneously avoid and prepare for success in war. Grand strategists must look beyond the battlefield and understand the importance of divergent issues such as the management of critical resources, how diplomacy may affect the relative balance of power, and the importance of "morale and political culture" to a nation's ability to defend its interests.<sup>68</sup>

Grand strategy is defined by Edward Luttwak in his book, *Strategy*, as the highest level of national maneuvering where military operations blend with the other interactions between states. Luttwak recognizes that grand strategy is much broader in scope than military strategy, but seems to imply that grand strategy is a product of actions taken at lower levels, rather than the overarching framework that guides those actions.<sup>69</sup> In contrast, Kennedy argues the grand strategy is that deliberate employment of all elements of national power in a systematic way to secure national interests. Luttwak adds that grand strategy is relatively narrow in its focus; it is focused on those relationships, policies and programs that directly threaten or protect the nation.<sup>70</sup> The distinction that grand strategy focuses on national security confers greater gravity on the efforts of the strategist to plan and synchronize policies and programs. This concept is also important

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<sup>68</sup> Kennedy, 5.

<sup>69</sup> Luttwak, *Strategy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 179.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 180.

when national leaders prioritize resources because policies and programs that affect national security receive a higher priority and a greater allocation of resources than others.

In *Grand Strategy: Practices and Principles* John Collins sharpens the distinction between grand strategy and military strategy by explaining that grand strategy “controls military strategy,” with the latter being only one subordinate element of the former.<sup>71</sup> This concept of nested strategies is enormously useful in understanding how the elements of national power interrelate. Essentially each element of national power has its own individual strategy for achieving specific goals; these strategies exist within, and support, the larger framework of national grand strategy. Collins also expands on Kennedy’s concept of military and non-military power by including all efforts to influence an adversary through “threats, force, indirect pressures, diplomacy, subterfuge, and other imaginative means.” Collins specifically discusses the importance of the economic and psychological elements in a nation’s efforts to influence its adversaries.<sup>72</sup> The important thing to note is that military force is only one way that a nation influences its friends and adversaries, and it may not be the most powerful tool available.

These authors have offered complementary definitions of grand strategy that build on three main points. First, grand strategy is the employment of all available national power in the achievement of national security objectives in both war and peace. Second, successful grand strategy constrains national objectives according to available means, and seeks to balance the two while striving to achieve these goals. To exceed available means courts disaster, and necessitates deliberate efforts to generate resources.<sup>73</sup> Third, grand strategy is focused on national security, the accomplishment of those objectives vital to national survival.

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<sup>71</sup> John Collins, *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973), 14-15.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>73</sup> J.H. Elliot, “Managing Decline: Olivares and the Grand Strategy of Imperial Spain,” *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). Elliot describes a Spanish grand strategy that clearly exceeded the nation’s available means. National leaders deliberately chose this path in an attempt to stop the Spain’s declining power in the world. They expected to increase resources to match their strategy through a series of internal reforms and victories in foreign policy initiatives. Unfortunately, it is not sound strategy to depend on a victory to provide you the means to achieve further victory. Spain found this out in the late 1640s.



American grand strategy today must exploit the international environment by blending the components of national power. We should begin with a common understanding of the components of a grand strategy to effectively examine US efforts. Table 4 summarizes the seven features that this study argues are critical to crafting an integrated and effective grand strategy. They are: defined interests and objectives; identified threat; plans to employ instruments of power; maintenance of power; balanced ends and means; horizontal and vertical synchronization; and hybrid in nature.

FEATURES	EXPLANATION
Defined Interests & Objectives	National interests are selected security goals that focus instruments of power. Objectives enable prioritization, synchronization, resourcing, and planning.
Identified Threat or Opportunity	Enables actors to determine what must be done to achieve an objective. Affects definition of interests and objectives.
Employment of National Power	The plan integrates and synchronizes instruments of national power in pursuit of grand strategic objectives.
Maintenance of National Power	Maintains the sources of national power for a protracted conflict.
Balanced Ends and Means	Objectives are attainable with the resources at hand. Prevents a nation from overreaching its capabilities and emerging from the conflict weaker than it entered.
Horizontal and Vertical Synchronization	Policy and programs are coordinated from the lowest level to the highest within and across instruments of power.
Hybrid in Nature	Grand strategy requires direct and indirect applications of power. Individual policies and programs will achieve objective through sequential and/or cumulative action.

**Table 4. Principles of Grand Strategy**

**B. FEATURES OF A GRAND STRATEGY**

**1. Defined Interests and Objectives**

National interests express the country’s highest priorities, those which a nation is willing to go to war over. In distinguishing between vital and secondary national interests, Collins states that survival is a society’s only vital interest. He goes on to define survival as maintaining and “‘acceptable’ degree of independence, territorial

integrity, traditional life styles, fundamental institutions, values, and honor.” A nation will always fight for its survival, but secondary interests require political decision makers to make a value decision before committing military force. As his case study of Korea illustrates, national interest evolve over time, often to a point where the loss of additional troops and resources are unacceptable.<sup>74</sup>

Clearly defined national interests provide the limits and guides to decision makers. Hans Morgenthau argues in his book, *Politics Among Nations*, that national interests distinguish the conduct of politics from other disciplines within the “realism model” because they are more influential than moral values in guiding statesman’s application of power. Put in other words, foreign policy is shaped more by political leader’s efforts to achieve national interests, than by their personal morality or ideology.<sup>75</sup> This becomes problematic, according to Morgenthau, when national interests and ideology become conflated. Ideology is rarely bounded by the constraints of limited resources, competing belief systems, or peers with their own goals and agendas. National interests are statements of a desired endstate, but they should reflect the realities of the global environment and the capabilities of the nation. Ideology is unbounded and theoretical, national interests are constrained and realistic.

Morgenthau does not suggest that power should be exercised to its fullest extent in pursuit of national interests; in fact he rejects the theories of Machiavelli and Hobbes. Morgenthau argues that the exercise of power should be constrained by “morality, mores, and law,” to ensure that the rights of all members of the society are protected. One might ask in a conflict between different value systems how is either constrained. Morgenthau

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<sup>74</sup> Collins, 1-2. Collins recognizes that different cultures and societies have different definitions of “acceptable survival.” He explains that the definition of acceptable is “conditioned by future prospects,” and illustrates this distinction with the example of post WWII Germany. Even though the country barely survived as a nation, it maintained acceptable levels given the future potential. In contrast the US would not accept the sort of domination imposed by the Soviet Union on countries behind the Iron Curtain regardless of the situation.

<sup>75</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1973), 5. Morgenthau’s realist model, outlined on page 3-4, understands the world as a place that is imperfect because of the dynamics of human nature. Moral principles cannot be fully realized because of conflicting interests. It sees “a system of checks and balances [as] a universal principle for all pluralist societies. It appeals to historic precedent rather than to abstract principles, and aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good.” Power is defined on page 9 as “anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man,” relationships from physical violence to psychological pressure.

argues that the pressure exerted on each side in the form of “sanctions” will keep behavior within acceptable limits.<sup>76</sup> This argument implies that sanctions imposed from within a society limit actors within that society. This presents a problem in a situation where the society refuses or is unable to apply sanctions on an actor. In this case Morgenthau might argue that sanctions must be imposed by an actor from outside the society.

Poorly defined national interests may result in the squandering of national resources through the responses leaders make to perceived threats. Jutta Weldes argues in her article, “Constructing National Interests,” that the realist theory fails to yield a sophisticated definition of national interest, and overestimates the clarity of threats to those interests. The author argues that statesmen develop American foreign policy based on a shared understanding of “national interests,” which evolves over time in response to individual biases and the global environment.<sup>77</sup> Weldes’ argues that U.S. definition of Soviet missiles in Cuba as a direct threat to the nation’s survival was entirely justifiable, but only one possible definition. The missiles could have been defined as a defensive action by the Cubans or an attempt by the Soviets to establish parity with the United States. Neither of these represents a threat to vital national interests. Either of these definitions, Weldes argues, might have caused the Kennedy administration to react differently. The presence of missiles in Cuba was clearly unacceptable regardless of the reason for their deployment, but their removal may have been accomplished without allowing the confrontation to reach the crisis levels that it did.<sup>78</sup> The lesson of Weldes’ study is that in any situation there are a number of ways to understand an adversary’s actions. The deeper your understanding of these motivations the more sophisticated your definition of national interests will be and the more efficient your response to threats.

National strategic objectives, derived from clearly articulated national interests, focus policy, resource allocation, and the employment of national power. Both are never

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid, 225-229. Sanctions vary with respect to the norm violated. They range from individual ethical dilemmas to jail sentences for the violation of established laws.

<sup>77</sup> Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 3 (1996): 276-278, <http://md3.csa.com/> (accessed August 5, 2005).

<sup>78</sup> Weldes, 289-295. Weldes outlines three competing understandings of the Cuban Missile Crisis: the conventional, Soviet defensive deployment, Soviet/Cuban attempt to balance power.

static, but plans cannot be built without a foundation, and the interest – objective construct is that foundation. Objectives are the state’s attempt to define how it is going to achieve its interests; they are the stepping stones from status quo to the endstate as defined by the national interest. These objectives are not specific to any one element of national power; rather, they are multidimensional with “political, military, economic, and other subdivisions.”<sup>79</sup> Military victory in a war must not be confused with the attainment of strategic objectives because it is rarely sufficient to achieve the long term goals for which a nation goes to war.<sup>80</sup> Military victory may not even be necessary to achieve political objectives in a war. The North Vietnamese did not achieve a military victory in Vietnam, yet they achieved their political objective.<sup>81</sup> No one instrument of power is sufficient to achieve the nation’s strategic objectives because each can only attack a part of the problem. America’s counterterrorism policy is executed in the domestic and international sphere simultaneously by many agencies at all levels of government. If each of these entities has a different understanding of the nation’s political objectives it will be impossible to coordinate their actions to effectively attack the total issue. Decision makers within each instrument of power use common strategic objectives to design supporting strategies which integrate the strengths of their instrument in the overall effort.

Liddell Hart, in his book *Strategy*, discusses how instruments of national power should be nested in support of the political “object.” Hart says:

It [the term objective] has a physical and geographical sense – and thus tends to confuse thought. It would be better to speak of ‘the object’ when dealing with the purpose of policy and of ‘the military aim’ when dealing with the way forces are directed in the service of policy.<sup>82</sup>

Just as there is a “military aim” so is there an economic, diplomatic, and informational one. Hart argues that “the object in war is a better state of peace,” and that a nation should “conduct war with constant regard for the peace you desire.” The danger of allowing a nation to focus primarily on military means is that the military aim becomes

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<sup>79</sup> Collins, 3.

<sup>80</sup> Liddell Hart as quoted in Collins, 3.

<sup>81</sup> Luttwak, 219-225.

<sup>82</sup> B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954), 351.

the political object.<sup>83</sup> Success against an Iraqi insurgency cannot become synonymous with success in the GWOT, because defeating that insurgency is only a small step in the broader conflict. This points to another important concept relating to objectives: there is not one easily identifiable objective, no one achievement will defeat transnational terrorism. Success in the GWOT requires a broader effort, some objectives may be: the defeat of existing and nascent terrorist organizations in many countries; the strengthening of a number of weak governments in Africa, the Middle East, and Central America; and the disruption of terrorist networks in Europe; the improvement of healthcare and human rights in a variety of countries; or a very hard to define win in the “war of ideas.”

## **2. Identified Threat**

An effective grand strategy must include a clearly identified threat to allow decision makers to map the specific objectives necessary to secure national interests. It is important to recognize that the global environment is an ever changing one, and grand strategy must be flexible enough to take advantage of opportunities that arise from this dynamic. Opportunity, like the enemy, is rarely completely predictable; however, initiatives such as democratization may shape the environment to provide greater opportunity to secure American objectives. Threat driven long range planning enables instruments of national power, many of which such as informational power require time to be effective, to be integrated and synchronized.

Collins states that “national security interests, objectives, and policies are meaningful only when viewed in context with threats, both external and domestic.” He goes on to explain that the threat is critical because it will often drive “what *should* be done, what *can* be done, and *how* to go about it;” interests, objectives, and policies are shaped by the nature and degree of the threat they oppose. Adversaries and allies evolve over time in response to changes in national leadership, interests, or economic situations. To evaluate an emerging adversary the analyst must consider three factors about the adversary: capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities.<sup>84</sup> These factors, along with a careful evaluation of the environment, allow the strategist to focus on actual threats to national security. They also allow a critical rank ordering of the threat based on

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<sup>83</sup> Hart, 351-352.

<sup>84</sup> Collins, 8-9.

likelihood and consequences of adversary actions. Collins argues that a diverse and “hydraheaded” threat demands critical evaluation and prioritization to facilitate the massing of different powers against the most significant threats first.<sup>85</sup> America has committed significant resources to date in the GWOT, but is this allocation based on a critical evaluation of the actual threat, or is it in response to perceived threats?

The definition of terrorism has been debated and reconstructed throughout the years for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are academic rigor and political expediency. Caleb Carr traces the historical evolution of terrorism, in his book *The Lessons of Terrorism*, to determine that terrorism has been practiced by virtually every nation at one time or another. His argument that terrorism as a tactic has never been successful is not surprising; however, he goes on to imply that conflicts often hinge on which side is more discriminating in its use.<sup>86</sup> Today many second and third world nations embrace terrorism as a legitimate tactic of “freedom fighters” in the struggle against perceived and actual oppression. One needs look no farther than Saudi Arabia’s telethons in support of the families of suicide bombers to understand that the current American definition of terrorism is not universally accepted throughout the world. It should be noted that many terrorism scholars disagree with Carr. Robert Pape argues in his article “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” that in fact terrorism is often successful in achieving its desired effects, and this is precisely why groups adopt it.<sup>87</sup>

Terrorism is nothing new, and as Carr shows, it has been a tactic that nations and non-state groups alike turn to to affect the conflict by influencing civilian support for or against an adversary<sup>88</sup> Geoffrey Levitt contends in his book, *Democracies Against Terror*, that international conventions designed in the 1970s to counter state-sponsored terrorism were and are ineffective because governments sympathetic to terrorist aims, and tolerant of terrorist means did not fully support their implementation.<sup>89</sup> The rise of non-

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<sup>85</sup> Collins, 8.

<sup>86</sup> Caleb Carr, *The Lessons of Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002), 3-16.

<sup>87</sup> Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (August 2003), Provided as a reading in NPS SO 3801 International Terrorism.

<sup>88</sup> Carr, 6.

<sup>89</sup> Geoffrey Levitt, *Democracies Against Terror: The Western Response to State-Supported Terrorism* (New York: Praeger, 1988), 23-24.

state transnational terrorist organizations has only made these conventions more ineffective. Support for transnational terrorist organizations is more deniable than ever because these groups are very difficult to track and have considerable resources of their own. Public sympathy for Islamic freedom fighters is high throughout the Middle East, many believe they are truly fighting a legitimate battle against a foreign oppressor.<sup>90</sup> It is important that we define the enemy to enable diplomatic and informational initiatives to build partnerships of capable nations and influence public opinion. As Carr points out these organizations, and their fighters, must be defined as a legitimate army engaged in a war with the United States. To define them as mere criminals, or as some sort of international insurgency, risks limiting the military's role in the conflict.<sup>91</sup> Here again Carr is challenged by authors who argue that terrorism is fundamentally a criminal act. Terrorists should be treated as criminals, to do otherwise may undermine the international legal system or risk failure.<sup>92</sup>

Levitt outlines two ways to define terrorism: deductive and inductive. Deductive definitions of terrorism attempt to “sets forth a single, analytical definition to cover all acts the definer wishes to consider as terrorist.”<sup>93</sup> An example of a deductive definition can be found in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”<sup>94</sup> This definition does not attempt to identify specific types of violence, or characterize the political nature of the action. This definition is vague enough to enable the full range of U.S. foreign and domestic policy, but is it clear

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<sup>90</sup> Shadid.

<sup>91</sup> Carr, 8-9 and 224-231.

<sup>92</sup> Lindsey Clutterbuck, “Law Enforcement,” *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, eds. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004). David J. Scheffer, “Delusions About Leadership, Terrorism, and War,” *The American Journal of International Law* 97, no. 1 (January 2003), <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed March 3, 2006).

<sup>93</sup> Levitt, 6-7.

<sup>94</sup> George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, The White House, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter\\_terrorism/counter\\_terrorism\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf) (accessed February 10, 2005), 1. It is interesting to note that the official American definition of terrorism excludes the overt use of force by a state against civilian populations. The U.S. does not target non-combatants with lethal fires, but it certainly does target them with psychological pressure and humanitarian aid. The point here is that many of America's partners in the GWOT have not such compunction about targeting civilian populations in domestic security actions or under the veil of “smoking out” their opposition.

enough to focus that policy or engender cooperation from other governments? Levitt's inductive approach attempts to be clearer while at the same time being more flexible.

An inductive definition of terrorism “delineates a series of specific categories of criminal acts that together compose an open-ended framework to define terrorism.” This framework identifies “unacceptable behavior” without having to argue over the semantics of the label terrorism. Levitt cites aircraft hijacking or hostage-taking as examples of such categories which have been successfully addressed by international conventions that could not agree on a deductive definition.<sup>95</sup> This defining convention focuses on the actions rather than the motivations of the actors, and may be very useful in enabling diplomatic actions. It is easy for nations to agree that anyone hijacking an airplane or detonating a bomb in a market is a terrorist, but does this facilitate interagency coordination and cooperation? Is every terrorist an enemy of the US, or are some terrorists more dangerous than others? The reality of framing this conflict as a war against terror is that terrorism is too vague an enemy to assist planners in prioritizing threats, synchronizing programs, and allocating scarce resources.

A deductive definition of terrorism does not clarify the threat or narrow the field of adversaries, and it may even be counterproductive because it leads directly into the terrorist versus freedom fighter debate. Paul Pillar outlines four types of groups that threaten US interests, in his book *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy*, they are: select European and Latin American leftist organizations; Palestinian militant organizations; ethnic separatists; and religious based organizations.<sup>96</sup> Within these four categories are groups with widely disparate capabilities and aims; many of which pose no threat to US interests. By identifying the enemy simply as “terrorism” national leaders may encourage regionally focused subordinates to allocate valuable resources against groups that cannot impinge on national interests. Strategy must be flexible enough to address emerging threats, but rigid enough to focus on the most serious of these threats without becoming too wed to any one particular adversary.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Levitt, 7.

<sup>96</sup> Paul Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2001), 44-47. Pillar places Islamist terrorist organizations as the chief religious based terrorist threat.

<sup>97</sup> Pillar, 49-50 & 56.



Finally, Carr proposes a slightly different definition of terrorism that may have some utility to a variety of instruments of power. Carr states that terrorism is “warfare deliberately waged against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable.” Carr’s definition differs from that found in the NSCT by avoiding the debate over combatant status, and including any violence waged against civilians, not just that conducted by sub-national groups. This definition takes terrorism out of the realm of the criminal by using the label warfare and referring to the political purpose of the action. Carr’s point is to recognize these organizations as military forces engaged in a war, not as criminals.<sup>98</sup> Who is the enemy? Any individual or nation that deliberately wages war against a civilian population is the enemy of the U.S. under this construct. This definition may create a backlash among some of America’s partners in the war on terror, but it would facilitate seizing the moral high ground in the war of ideas. It may help to encourage some of America’s partners to improve their performance on human rights issues, thereby deflecting some criticism of American aid to these governments. It may even help the U.S. to revise conventions dealing with terrorism in the current 21<sup>st</sup> century. However, such a definition would be counter-productive unless it was backed up with both positive and negative economic sanctions against state and sub-state perpetrators alike.

### **3. Instruments of National Power**

The heart of a grand strategy is its plan to employ instruments of power to achieve national interests. The theorists differ on their descriptions of these instruments, and how they interrelate, however. Morgenthau suggests instruments can be divided into those that “are relatively stable, and those which are subject to change.”<sup>99</sup> Joseph Nye, in his book *Soft Power*, describes instruments of national power as either *hard* or *soft*. Hard powers, such as economic or military power, have quantifiable applications that can be tied to observable results. Soft powers, elements such as diplomatic or informational

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<sup>98</sup> Carr, 6.

<sup>99</sup> Morgenthau, Chapter 9. The author describes national power as an aggregate of the capabilities for action generated by eight resource factors. The factors that are “relatively stable” are geography, natural resources, industrial capacity as elements that are generally stable in a society. The change prone instruments are population, national character, national morale, quality of diplomacy and quality of government.

power, are less easily measured, and their effectiveness is difficult to judge.<sup>100</sup> It is clear that different aspects of government bring different strengths and weaknesses to a conflict; the Department of Defense has different capabilities from the Department of State. While Nye's taxonomy is helpful to understand the importance of soft power, it does little to present options to decision makers as they craft policy and plan actions to achieve political objectives. It is important to put national capabilities into a more restrictive common framework to understand what each contributes to counterterrorism struggle.

*a. Diplomatic Power*

Let's turn to a consideration of what it is that strategic planners can expect diplomats and diplomacy to contribute to the counterterrorism fight. Hans Morgenthau defines diplomacy as "the formation and execution of foreign policy on all levels;" however, it is his description of diplomacy that is more useful to this study. It is the process by which instruments of national power are put to use in the service of foreign policy goals and objectives.

It is the art of bringing the different elements of national power to bear with maximum effect upon those points in the international situation which concern the national interests most directly.<sup>101</sup>

For Morgenthau, the *quality* of a nation's diplomacy is the key to that nation's ability to leverage long term benefits from any physical and spiritual resources that it might possess. A nation with weak diplomatic institutions, or one unwilling to use its resources in pursuit of national interests, is doomed to have an inconsistent record of success in foreign policy. Morgenthau argues that it is a focus on "tradition and institutions rather than upon the sporadic appearance of outstanding individuals," that delivers consistent and long term quality foreign policy. The US tends to rely on an imbalance of resources to achieve foreign policy successes. This record of success is inconsistent because it depends on the appearance of dynamic leaders rather than strong institutions and traditions.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), Chapter 1.

<sup>101</sup> Morgenthau, 140.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 142-144.

Accepting for a moment that Morgenthau's post-World War II criticism of American diplomacy is correct, the implications are particularly important to the war on terrorism. Counterterrorism policies and programs are focused against networked non-state actors that operate across national boundaries. Diplomacy in this environment is simultaneously more difficult and more important than in any of the nation's previous conflicts. An abundance of resources may be insufficient when confronted with a scarcity of accessible targets. Diplomacy, in Morgenthau's construct, uses national resources to achieve foreign policy ends. In the modern American system many of these resources are managed and employed by unique agencies with their own unique plans to counter "terrorism." Without entering into a debate about Dr. Rice's dynamism, we must ask if the influence of the Secretary of State is sufficient to make up for weak traditions, autonomous institutions, and an environment characterized by a scarcity of targets.<sup>103</sup>

Henry Kissinger describes diplomacy in his book, *Diplomacy*, as the official efforts of a nation to solve foreign policy issues through negotiation and mutual agreement (formal and informal) without resorting to violence. Kissinger illustrates this description by examining Europe's efforts to secure collective security in the early 1800s. The Quadruple Alliance, the Holy Alliance and the European Congress system attempted to establish agreements to deter aggression, and forums to work out disagreements peacefully. Although this system was inherently weak, it revealed a characteristic that became a hallmark of European diplomacy.<sup>104</sup> European diplomacy is pragmatic and focused by national interests, rather than absolute moral principles. Peace is an elusive state that must be deliberately crafted by accommodating these divergent national

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<sup>103</sup> For an analysis of the competing strategy documents see Chapter 3 of this study. America has three core strategy documents (National Security Strategy (2002), National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002), and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), and a variety of supporting strategies from many agencies (National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002), National Drug Control Strategy (2003), National Defense Strategy (2005), DOS/USAID Strategic Plan 2004-2009 (2003) are examples of a few of the overlapping strategy documents).

<sup>104</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 82-91, and 247. The Quadruple Alliance consisted of Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. The Holy Alliance consisted of Prussia, Austria, and Russia. The European Congress system was an attempt to periodically gather European Foreign Ministers to work out solutions to disagreements between nations. Kissinger argues that this system attempted to impose a form of *collective security* on the nations involved. Unfortunately, because no individual nations were obligated to support the collective agreements, this system was inherently weak. Even with this inherent weakness, the system successfully prevented total war in Europe for more than 30 years is impressive.

interests to achieve a common good.<sup>105</sup> Kissinger's description of diplomacy focuses on formal and informal interactions between states. In a conflict between states and non-state actors it may be necessary to redefine the actors whom diplomats are allowed to interact with. The danger in this is that by recognizing a terrorist organization you legitimize it. This redefinition is not without precedent however. Israel has a history of diplomatic interactions with terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah. Great Britain has interacted with the Irish Republican Army. The United States has interacted with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. It may be too soon to accept negotiations with al-Qaeda, but it is a use for diplomacy that is not without precedent.

Counterterrorism planners should expect the diplomatic actors and institutions to integrate the nation's resources in the pursuit of targets that contribute to the achievement of political objectives. Diplomacy has traditionally focused on state-to-state interactions, but that was a function of the environment. As non-state actors and non-governmental organizations gain power, diplomatic institutions must be prepared to enter into negotiations, establish formal and informal relationships, and perhaps even enter into treaties with new entities that wield power in the global environment.

***b. Informational Power***

Information as an instrument of power has a dual nature. In one sense it is the influence that America's unmatched ability to collect, process, and disseminate raw data engenders. In this visualization, information can only marginally be considered a "mutually exclusive" category of power. It is possible to intimidate foreign leaders with America's ability to collect ground truth, but relatively low technology methods can defeat the best collection system. It is possible to gain the cooperation of other nations through promises of information, but is this really distinct from diplomacy?

The ability to provide a more complete and accurate recounting of facts, be they the history of an issue or the reality as it exists on the ground, one's position has greater credibility, power, and appearance of rationality. Jeffrey Pfeffer argues in his book, *Managing with Power* that "all organizations strive for the appearance of rationality and the use of proper procedures." Pfeffer makes the point that organizations attempt to make the most right decision possible given some degree of uncertainty. Once

<sup>105</sup> Kissinger, 126-127, 506-510, and 615-616.

a decision is made actors often strive to persuade others of the rightness of their decision; mastery of the facts and an appearance of unbiased rationality are very important to this effort.<sup>106</sup> Governments are similar to business organizations in this regard; the need to appear rational and credible drove the US to the United Nations in search of a resolution to support the invasion of Iraq. The ability to collect, process, and disseminate accurate information to domestic and foreign audiences lends some degree of legitimacy to US foreign policy by making it appear more rational.

Joseph Nye captures the value of information as an enabler of other instruments of power in his 1996 essay “America’s Information Edge.” American intelligence systems and technologically advanced weaponry all revolve around information; they are collectors and consumers of it. This information system enables a military machine that is capable of destroying individual buildings in a crowded city or targeting individual enemy leaders in a frontier village. This is a double edged sword. American intelligence systems and high technology weapons were designed to fight conventional, high intensity, state-on-state war. The nation is now faced with a unconventional, clandestine, non-state enemy. In this environment America’s intelligence system is uniquely ill-suited to provide the information those political leaders and military forces need to be effective. It might be argued that the terrorist holds the informational advantage; America is an information sieve, with an internet connection the modern terrorist can learn a great deal more about a target than the FBI can learn about his organization with all the tools at their disposal. The U.S. is a learning organization however. As the recent uproar over the National Security Agency’s surveillance of terrorist communications indicates, the nation’s intelligence system is working to refine the way it uses its systems and improve their resolution.

Accurate information allows foreign policy actors a better understanding of the nation’s strengths and weaknesses, which in turn allows these actors to better mitigate risk and negotiate from a position of strength. Information that confirms strength indicates areas where leaders may take greater risks and press an adversary harder for concessions. Information that shows weakness, however, should indicate to

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<sup>106</sup> Jeffrey Pfeffer, *Managing With Power: Politics and Influences in Organizations* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1994), 248-261.

policy makers areas where they cannot compromise with adversaries. Information is also a tool in its own right. Under the “information umbrella” the United States influences other countries by sharing information that will improve their military capabilities or enhance their negotiating position. Nye asserts that the Dayton Peace Accords were successfully negotiated in part because of America’s ability to precisely monitor adversary forces and report on their actions.<sup>107</sup> While it is impossible to judge just how much of an effect this capability had on the sides, it is clear that the issue of verification is an essential one in any agreement.

Information has a dual nature: in addition to enabling other instruments, informational power has the ability to influence in its own right. America could use its attractive ideals and shared values to engage foreign publics, achieving substantive change through dialog. This concept is at the center of the “battle of ideas” that American leaders have emphasized in policy and rhetoric since September 11, 2001.<sup>108</sup> American ideas, values, and ethics are enormously influential in the world. If these ideas are disseminated and supported in a subtle manner which does not trumpet them as “American,” but rather frames them as universal, they can influence large segments of target audiences. This is the heart of Nye’s concept of “soft power;” the idea that America can influence foreign publics to cooperate and support its foreign policy by making America itself more acceptable and appealing.<sup>109</sup> Information is a component of every instrument of power, but by articulating how ideas and values can be used to influence populations you present decision makers with a unique set of influence options.

Information power can be further understood in two dimensions: technological and conceptual. It is America’s ability to create “information imbalances” in these dimensions that has long been a source of power. John Arquilla and David Rondfelt argue in their book, *The Emergence of Noopolitik*, that the conceptual realm has greater potential impact. The world currently operates according to principles of

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<sup>107</sup> Joseph Nye, “America’s Information Edge,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 2 (MAR/APR 1996), <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed October 4, 2005).

<sup>108</sup> NSS, Chapter 2 & 3. NSCT, p23-24. Douglas J. Feith, U.S. Strategy for the War on Terrorism, speech by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, April 14, 2004, Department of Defense, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040414-0261.html> (accessed January 19, 2006).

<sup>109</sup> Nye, Chapter 1.

*Realpolitik*, which emphasizes the information as an enabler conceptualization. In the future a society could operate within a system of *Noopolitik*, which emphasizes the exchange of ideas to resolve conflicts. In this second system information technology is merely a tool to exchange ideas, the real work is done by these ideas. In such a system, a country's ability to achieve its national interests would depend on the quality of its "ideas, values, norms and ethics" as well as its willingness to share and compromise.<sup>110</sup> Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that global relationships are shifting away from *realpolitik* interactions as the dominant paradigm. This emergent environment will be more suited to *noopolitik* because of its interconnected and interdependent nature.<sup>111</sup>

The United States faces two adversaries in the Global War on Terrorism: the transnational terrorist, and a number of legitimate but increasingly radical Islamic movements dissatisfied with their way of life. Many nations in the Muslim world are searching for a system of government that will embrace their values and ideals, but at the same time effectively provide for their needs and protect their interests. To date the major modern movements in the Arab Middle East such as Pan-Arabism, Baathism, Wahhabism, and the Iranian Shiaism have been unable to provide an acceptable level of stability, security, and justice.<sup>112</sup> These populations feel threatened by globalization, and consider the United States the leader in this movement. These populations also feel threatened by democracy because they equate it with the style practiced in the US, making the general concept of democratic government seem incompatible with core Muslim values and ideals. America's relationship with Europe further degrades her ability to exercise *noopolitik*s. In the absence of a threat from the Soviet Union, many European publics are beginning to object to some American policy because of a

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<sup>110</sup> John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward and American Information Strategy* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999). The authors describe *Realpolitik* as focused on state-to-state relations and the application of hard power (military and economic) to achieve national interests. In contrast, *Noopolitik* focuses on state-to-group relations and the application of soft power (diplomacy and information) to influence groups to cooperate in achieving a mutually acceptable resolution to conflict. *Noopolitik*s requires a willingness to share information, and an ability to compromise to reach mutually acceptable resolutions to conflicts that is not possible in a *realpolitik* paradigm. The *Noopolitik* paradigm depends on a shift from understanding information in terms of how it facilitates other instruments of power, to one of considering the intrinsic value of ideas, and their ability to influence target audiences.

<sup>111</sup> Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 30-31.

<sup>112</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, trans. Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge, MA: Belnap Press, 2002), 61-80, 361-376.

perceived threat of American hegemony.<sup>113</sup> American leaders are unable to effectively interact in this environment largely because of their reliance on *realpolitik* tools and traditions. The *noopolitik* paradigm offers a possible method to engage the Muslim world and Europe simultaneously. These two conditions are essential to winning the immediate fight against transnational terrorism, and establishing conditions that discourage disaffected groups from adopting terrorism as a tactic of choice in the future.

**c. Military Power**

Military power is the ability of a nation to raise, project and sustain armed forces in actions designed to achieve national interests. Military power is the most direct hard power that a country possesses, and it is the easiest to understand. It is the coercive application of violence to “compel our adversary to do our will.” Clausewitz asserts that the political objective, which is at the heart of all war, can be reached by action short of total disarmament and overthrow of an adversary. Thus, while arguing that “disarming the enemy is the aim of military action,” he recognizes the importance of limited military actions in support of national interests.<sup>114</sup> The nature of the GWOT makes limited war an important tool in America’s supporting military strategy. Transnational terrorist organizations have no territory to conquer, no standing field armies to disarm, no national leaders to overthrow; wide scale conventional war against al-Qaeda is impossible.

Robert Osgood argued that the U.S. should embrace and prepare for limited war in the struggle with Communism in his 1957 book *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*. Osgood felt that the depth of ideological conflict between the two forces, and the massive destructive power of nuclear weapons made this inevitable, and really the only form of war that was acceptable.<sup>115</sup> Today the paradigm is very similar. The U.S. is again faced with an enemy that has a violently different

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<sup>113</sup> Antony J. Blinken (2002), “Winning the War of Ideas,” *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 101-104.

<sup>114</sup> Clausewitz, Chapter 1.

<sup>115</sup> Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1957), 127-130. Osgood asserts, on pages that a number of rules are critical to success in limited warfare. First, the political objective in a limited war is the primary goal for all force employed. This is important because it will restrain the natural tendency of military actions to escalate and become increasingly brutal. Second, those political objectives must be moral ones in order to maintain the legitimacy of the fight, and the force that is applied. Third, force that is applied must be proportional to the enemy and objectives sought. Finally, political objectives must be attainable with the force available, and that the nation has a responsibility to exercise restraint on the demands it makes of its military forces. These rules reinforce the need for clearly defined national interests and objectives discussed earlier.



worldview, and is apparently unwilling to compromise any part of that view. The U.S. represents just such a threat to the radical Islamist terrorist. However, unlike the Cold War, neither belligerent can totally destroy the other. To be sure, terrorists with a weapon of mass destruction could inflict unacceptable damage on the nation, and would possess significant coercive power, but it could not eliminate the U.S. in the way the Soviet threat could at the height of the Cold War. That said, the terrorists' information advantage, their clandestine and elusive nature, and their tacit support from some nations make it impossible for the U.S. to use military means to totally destroy them. In a situation where neither side can totally destroy the other, and where neither is willing to compromise their ideology, limited war is the only realistic alternative.

Liddell Hart argues that the less a nation respects "moral obligations" the more it is likely to be intimidated by physical strength. These nations can be deterred if they can be convinced that the threat of retribution is great enough to make the negotiated settlement preferable.<sup>116</sup> In some ways, this argument can be extended to a transnational group. Israel and Hezbollah maintained a tenuous truce for years by threatening the populations of Lebanon and Israel with renewed violence if either side strayed from accepted rules of their conflict. Because both sides respected the threat of physical violence that the other represented, negotiations were possible. Hezbollah is one of the most powerful transnational, non-state terrorist organizations, but it differs from al-Qaeda in a significant way. Hezbollah has a homeland and people to protect; it is not truly stateless.<sup>117</sup> To the extent that the adversary has physical resources and an identifiable supporting population the group is vulnerable to being influenced by coercive military force.

Military capacity has both a positive and negative aspect. Positive applications of military power, such as forward basing or other similar moves, can persuade allies by reassuring them that mutual defense treaties will be honored in the event of war. Negative applications of military power, such as direct actions to destroy

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<sup>116</sup> Hart, 370-372.

<sup>117</sup> Augustus R. Norton, "Changing Actors and Leadership among the Shiites of Lebanon" *The Annals* 482, no. 1 (November 1985), <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.navy.mil> (accessed April 13, 2005). Judith P. Harik, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism*, (London: IB Tauris & Co Ltd., 2004), 122-123.

terrorist cells, can dissuade adversary action through the threat of violence.<sup>118</sup> While this section has focused on the negative application of military force, this dual nature provides yet another way to understand the utility of military power to the political leader. Military power can be used to garner the support of nations that are concerned about becoming targets of terrorist organizations. Positive applications of US military power are exemplified by the military assistance missions that go on daily in South America to combat drug trafficking or in Africa to counter maritime hijacking.

*d. Economic Power*

Economic power is also often considered a “hard power” because it is quantifiable and it has the potential to have direct positive results. David Baldwin’s definition of “economic statecraft,” found in his book of the same name, provides a good starting point to understand the economic instrument of power. He defines “economic statecraft” as “governmental influence attempts relying primarily on resources that have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money.”<sup>119</sup> Baldwin’s definition is too narrow to fully define economic power because it puts too much focus on the employment of financial resources to actively influence international actors; it ignores a host of influence levers that are directly related to a nation’s wealth. In contrast, Hart simply labels “wealth” as an instrument of power. This conceptualization is too broad to provide political decision makers a useful set of options for exerting influence. A better definition of economic power is a nation’s ability to transform financial resources and institutions into policies, programs, and actions that influence international actors in support of national interests. Economic power is a trade agreement that reinforces the bonds of interdependence between allies. Economic power is aid, military or humanitarian, delivered in return for cooperation. Economic power is also the ability to deploy and sustain a military unit far from home for an extended period of time.

Baldwin describes the tools to conduct “economic statecraft” in terms of positive and negative sanctions. In this way he mirror’s the positive and negative aspects

<sup>118</sup> Luttwak, 190-191. Armed “suasion” is a nation’s ability to persuade allies and dissuade adversaries through the promise of military action. It differs from direct coercion because it is focused on the promise of military action rather than the application of military forces to achieve national interests.

<sup>119</sup> Baldwin, 32-40. Baldwin focuses on three important characteristics in his explanation of Economic Statecraft that apply equally to concepts of economic power: economic instruments are the primary tools to exert influence, they are focused on an international actor, and they are employed to influence that actor’s behavior in some way.

of military power discussed in the previous section. Positive sanctions, such as reduced tariffs, favorable licensing agreements, or subsidies, promise to deliver something of value to the target of a government's influence efforts. Negative sanctions, such as freezing assets, suspending favorable trade agreements, or punitive taxation, promise to increase the cost of doing business for the target nation.<sup>120</sup> Baldwin's taxonomy focuses on state to state influence; however many of these same techniques of economic statecraft instruments could be useful in dealing with a transnational non-state adversary. Positive and negative sanctions can be used against state sponsors of terrorism, reluctant or non-cooperative states, and in support of friends in the conflict.

There is a great deal of debate over the ability of negative economic to induce a nation to change its policies and behavior. Negative economic sanctions threaten state sovereignty and generally meet stiff resistance from the target government. Additionally, economic sanctions often do more harm to the average citizen than other forms of coercion.<sup>121</sup> Negative economic sanctions do have practical and legitimate benefits for the nation advocating and employing them however. They can serve as signals of commitment to other nations. Prior to their imposition, they carry a promise of financial cost to the target, and they can provide a measure of legitimacy to other forms of coercion that may become necessary.<sup>122</sup> Negative economic sanctions directed at corporations, banks, or humanitarian institutions have the potential begin to drive a wedge between core radicals and their less motivated, but operationally critical, support systems. For example, a bank in Switzerland that is allowing terrorist organizations to use its resources is unlikely to continue this behavior if it is directly threatened with denial of access to U.S. markets.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Baldwin, 40-42.

<sup>121</sup> Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security* 22, no. 2, (Autumn 1997), [www.jstor.org](http://www.jstor.org) (accessed January 31, 2006). Jack Patterson, "the Sanction dilemma," *Middle East Report* 187/188 (Mar-JUN 1994), <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed January 31, 2006). A. Cooper Drury, "Sanctions as Coercive Diplomacy: The U.S. President's Decision to Initiate Economic Sanctions," *Political Research Quarterly* 54, no. 3 (Sep 2001), <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed January 31, 2006).

<sup>122</sup> Drury, 486. Patterson, 24-25.

<sup>123</sup> Paul K. Davis and Brian M. Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al-Qaeda* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1619/index.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1619/index.html) (accessed May 2, 2005).

US commitment of financial resources, without any direct and measurable return on investment, is critical to the employment of economic power in the fight against non-state transnational terrorist organizations. Decision makers should also consider neutral or indirect sanctions in their effort to leverage economic power in the GWOT. Neutral sanctions refer to the use of resources and relationships to shape the environment and limit a terrorist organization's freedom to conduct operations. These sanctions differ from positive and negative sanctions in that they do not attempt to directly influence the behavior of other nations of non-state actors, they attempt to alter the operating environment for those actors. The Millennium Challenge Accounts which go to underdeveloped countries who have demonstrated a commitment to "governing justly, investing in people, and encouraging economic freedom," but are not tied to cooperation on counterterrorism initiatives are one example of neutral sanctions.<sup>124</sup> Another example might be a clandestine program to buy any and all weapons of mass destruction available on the black market, or the support of military forces in the field. Table 2 illustrates some possible neutral sanctions in the areas of trade, aid, and other instruments that could positively contribute to the GWOT.

Trade	Aid	Other Instruments
Programs to improve job opportunity.	Programs to provide increased drug availability or vaccinations	Support for extended deployment of military forces
Aid to counter negative effects of international trade agreements	Programs to increase literacy rate in underdeveloped nations	International reward programs
Boycott/embargoes of specific banks or businesses	Funding for major public works projects in neutral nations	Purchase of all WMD precursors or renegade weapons

**Table 5. Examples of Neutral Sanctions**

*e. Law Enforcement Power*

Law enforcement power is the ability of the United States to employ its national law enforcement organizations in the international environment to directly or indirectly aid in the prosecution of transnational terrorist organizations. American law

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<sup>124</sup> "Millennium Challenge Account," The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations/millennium.html> (accessed January 30, 2006).

enforcement power is employed in three ways: investigative assistance, legal diplomacy and prosecution. The United State has a unique ability to deploy task organized teams to assist other nation's counterterrorism investigations, and maintain this assistance through embassy legal attaches. These teams have access to some of the best forensic resources available to support these activities. Legal diplomacy is a term used to describe the ongoing relationships agencies such as the FBI and DEA have with their counterparts overseas. These relationships are very similar to State Department diplomats. They can be used to influence the development of counterterrorism policy and activity within those nations.<sup>125</sup> Finally, American legal actors could be used to prosecute cases in internationally recognized courts such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) or a UN War Crimes Tribunal. While it would take additional diplomatic activity to enable United States participation, this participation would reduce the perception that the U.S. was acting unilaterally and convictions would increase the legitimacy of American actions.<sup>126</sup> Reputational costs and benefits from actions such as these are difficult to predict. Participation in the ICC could be perceived as crass a tactic designed to improve America's standing in the global community, rather than an honest example the nation's respect for international law. Some authors have argued that this would be the natural

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<sup>125</sup> For more a detailed description of the FBI's operations overseas see Leslie King and Judson Ray, "Developing Transnational Law Enforcement Cooperation," *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 16, no. 4 (2000), [http://oh1.csa.com/ids70/view\\_record.php?id=3&recnum=0&SID=8fd09a08011ca962247778f417e5f20b&mark\\_id=cache%3A12&mark\\_low=0&mark\\_high=1](http://oh1.csa.com/ids70/view_record.php?id=3&recnum=0&SID=8fd09a08011ca962247778f417e5f20b&mark_id=cache%3A12&mark_low=0&mark_high=1) (accessed November 2, 2005). For a current example of investigative assistance and transnational law enforcement efforts see Montira Narkvichien, , Gary Fields, and David Cloud, "In Switch, Thailand Appears to Join Antiterror Fight," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 11, 2002, <http://libproxy.nps.navy.mil/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=110342436&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed November 2, 2005).

<sup>126</sup> The international Criminal Court it tasked to investigate and prosecute "crime [sic] of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes." While the US is not a signatory to the treaty enacting the court, 99 other countries are. The court represents an enormous legitimizer and participation in it could improve America's position with respect to the terrorist organizations in the minds of many target audiences. Prosecuting terrorists through the court could have many positive effects (legitimacy) and negative effects (US military charged with terrorism), but on whole it is a new avenue that has been ignored by the United States so far. For more information on the ICC go to the courts' website at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/home.html>.

inclination of friends and adversaries alike.<sup>127</sup> If this is the case then isolated actions like this would be meaningless unless accompanied by a firm and irrevocable commitment to the action over an extended period of time.

The concept of law enforcement power describes a use for U.S. law enforcement agencies that is mutually exclusive of other national powers. Diplomacy and military force do not investigate and prosecute terrorists in foreign courts. Loan guarantees do not help to develop better police practices. As with any instrument of power there are some overlaps; loan guarantees can help to influence other nations to craft strong counterterrorism laws or to crack down on the organizations. The definition is compatible with common understandings of how law enforcement agencies function in the international environment. National leaders and laymen alike expect agencies like the FBI or DEA to be involved with their counterparts overseas. Much has been written about the criminal nature of terrorism and the importance of aggressive law enforcement within national borders to identify and eliminate terrorist organizations. Many areas in Europe and South East Asia are not open to US military operations to destroy terrorist cells, but they are open to law enforcement assistance. Defining law enforcement power as an instrument of power provides utility to national leaders by focusing on a set of tools that are often overlooked, and yet are essential to counterterrorism programs.

#### **4. Maintenance of the Sources of National Power**

National power is not an infinite thing; military force is expended, money runs out, the power of ideals is overcome by images of battlefield reality. Each can be extended by more efficient employment or regenerated through dedicated efforts to do so. Effective grand strategy must include a plan to maintain the sources of national power if it is to effectively employ them over the long term. Many authors argue over national power and what constitutes an instrument of power, but few distinguish between the instruments and their sources. Organski makes this distinction in his book, *World Politics*, by examining six sources of national power: geography, resources, population,

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<sup>127</sup> Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 44-48. Mercer argues that desirable actions by an adversary are perceived as the result of "situational attributes," in other words isolated reactions to unique situations, and not exemplary of their character. These actions will not result in reputation formation. Conversely, undesirable actions are perceived as the result of "dispositional attributes," or character traits, and are exemplary of character. These actions can contribute to reputation formation. The opposite is true for the way the behavior of allies is perceived.


economic development, political structure, and national morale. To these he adds national reputation, describing it as the degree to which other nations believe a given nation has power. These sources of power are interrelated, and combine to produce an aggregate level of power, but they cannot be directly employed. One of the critical parts of Organski's theory is that sources of power must be transformed through some mechanism into a form that can be employed in pursuit of national interests.<sup>128</sup>

One way to understand this system is to consider each instrument of power a construct of raw materials, the infrastructure to convert those materials, and the mechanisms to employ outputs. If any part of this construct is neglected, the instrument will fail to influence. If any part of this construct is overused, the instrument will become unstable and ultimately ineffective as well. This system is complicated by the fact that some of the same raw materials, transforming infrastructure, and employment mechanisms are parts of multiple constructs. Figure 1 uses the instrument of military power to illustrate the system concept. Some of the resources that enable an effective military are manpower, natural resources to power vehicles and equipment, financial resources to arm and support the force, and national willingness to commit these forces. The military-industrial complex that produces weapon systems, the military infrastructure that trains and maintains these forces, and the civilian structure that works to deploy and sustain these forces represent the infrastructure that transform raw materials into outputs. The nation's armed forces (army, navy, air force, etc.) and their political and uniformed leadership represent the mechanism for employing this instrument.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> Organski, 102-107 & 116-117. Organski lists only four instruments of power: wealth, resources, manpower, and arms. Morgenthau also discusses national power but fails to make the distinction between instruments and sources of that power.

<sup>129</sup> Arthur F. Lykke, "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," *US Army War College Guide to Strategy*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2001). H. Richard Yarger, "Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model," Lykke originally presents a stool model to illustrate how military strategy is composed of objectives, concepts and resources. Risk is incurred when one of these elements is out of balance with the other legs of the stool. Stated simply, in Lykke's construct, military strategy consists of balancing ends, ways, and means in the execution of operations. Yarger expands on Lykke's model to present eight premises of grand strategy that closely reflect many of the points in this paper.



**Figure 2. The Military Instrument of Power**

This system also illustrates the complications of interrelationships. Financial resources support military forces, but also nation building diplomatic efforts, and ally reinforcing economic efforts. Infrastructure to support military forces also provides relief to areas hit by natural disasters, and moves the commodities promised by diplomatic agreements. Even the mechanism of employment, the military forces themselves, often do double duty as in the case of disaster relief. The point here is not to emphasize the interrelated nature of source and instruments, it is to emphasize that sources of power are consumed by many instruments. The overarching grand strategy must regulate this drain and provide a plan to maintain these sources. If any one instrument of power is allowed unregulated access to a resource without a plan to replenish it, the resource will be exhausted.

Let's examine national morale, a source of power that is under attack from a variety of adversaries, in an effort to better understand the importance of planning to maintain these sources. Organski describes national morale as the "willingness by a large percentage of the individual's in a nation's population to put the nation's welfare above their own personal welfare." Morale contributes to multiple instruments' ability to influence because it is a measure of the nation's commitment to employ that instrument.<sup>130</sup> Collins adds that three factors shape a people's "aptitude and stomach for war": national character, will, and ethics. These characteristics are not constant; rather, they are subject "to transient attitudes" that reflect the mood of the times. National morale is affected by factors such as the actions of ruling elites, external and internal

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<sup>130</sup> Organski, 179.



pressures, and perceived ethical dilemmas.<sup>131</sup> Organski and Collins complement each other in this discussion and both can be applied to a nation's overall ability to contest an issue. Some actions, such as a protracted war against a covert enemy, demand greater commitment of resources, and thus greater morale. This resource is under attack by adversaries and enemies that question national character, disseminate propaganda, and employ unconventional tactics designed to create horrific damage.

It is impossible to measure the direct relationship between terrorist actions and American national morale. A recent CNN poll found that 62% of people polled were "dissatisfied with the way things were going in the United States." More than half of those polled, 58%, felt that the President's second term has been a failure.<sup>132</sup> Americans seem to feel safer since September 11, but they also feel that additional attacks are likely, and they don't believe that America is winning the GWOT. The nation seems to be about split over the issue of government wiretapping; with slightly higher numbers finding it acceptable under certain conditions.<sup>133</sup> A Presidential approval poll is a poor measure of national morale, but other polls do begin to touch on American will. Questions about support for wiretapping and confidence in the government's ability to protect the nation give some indication of national attitudes. Ultimately however, the only measure of national will is history; future generations will decide whether the U.S. maintained sufficient will to confront the threat of terrorism or if it chose to capitulate. Al-Qaeda's public statements regarding their intention to force the U.S. out of the Middle East are meant to degrade national morale to the point that this nation will no longer be willing to

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<sup>131</sup> Collins, 211-218. When Collins is discussing "Transient Attitudes" he is speaking specifically about the difference between the current mood of the population and the nation's long term national character. Collins notes that national character traits cannot be discounted, but recognizes that it is difficult to explicitly define universal traits and dangerous to give them too much weight. Collins argues that national will is a measure of the commitment of the people to the fight. It is a critical aspect to the nation's ability to maintain warfare over a protracted conflict, and a prime target for enemy manipulation. Ethics are a broad category that encompasses the "morals, mores, and laws" that guide and constrain national leaders.

<sup>132</sup> CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/01/26/bush.poll/index.html/> (accessed January 31, 2006).

<sup>133</sup> "War on Terrorism," Polling Report.com, <http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm> (accessed February 1, 2006).

bear the costs of supporting friendly governments or maintaining forces in the region.<sup>134</sup> The danger of a wavering nation may be significant. American national leaders argue that pulling out of Iraq or backing down from the larger GWOT will embolden terrorist organizations to take more aggressive action against American citizens and interests in the region.<sup>135</sup>

## 5. Balanced Ends and Means

Liddell Hart discusses the importance of balancing ends and means throughout his book *Strategy*. Hart argues that a nation must “conduct war with constant regard for the peace you desire.” Methods must be tempered by available resource to avoid emerging from conflict in a worse state than when it began. The nation that expends all of its resources risks being worse off at the close of conflict than at the beginning.<sup>136</sup> Hart goes so far as to suggest that in military strategy, ends should be crafted to fit available means.<sup>137</sup> It is important not to take the argument too far into the realm of grand strategy. During a conflict available means and their relative influences often shift. At the level of grand strategy resources may be husbanded, replenished, or new ones generated. Limiting national ends in response to an evaluation of currently available means is counterproductive. It would be better to argue that in grand strategy the means should be bounded by desired end states. The nation will be far more effective by focusing on the post-conflict environment, and how the use of different instruments now might affect that future environment. Hart’s argument does suggest that supporting objectives for individual instruments should be limited by their capabilities, and reemphasizes the need for integration and coordination of these instruments.

This study makes the case that grand strategy is not solely a wartime feature of national policy, it is a continuous one. Walter Lippmann reinforces Hart’s concept of

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<sup>134</sup> “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement (1998),” Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm> (accessed February 1, 2006).

<sup>135</sup> “Setting the Record Straight: Democrats On An Artificial Timetable In Iraq,” *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051130-9.html> (accessed March 3, 2006). Richard B. Cheney, “Vice President’s Remarks on the War on Terror at the American Enterprise Institute,” November 21, 2005, *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051121-2.html> (accessed March 3, 2006).

<sup>136</sup> Hart, 366-370.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, 348.

balance by suggesting that “the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium,” and that this effort is the “constant preoccupation” of leaders. Lippmann offers a slightly different view of this relationship however. He suggests that “foreign commitments” should be the basis for the level of power that is required. It is the responsibility of the government to then develop sufficient power to secure these commitments.<sup>138</sup> Lippmann’s analysis of a possible post World War II environment determined that the U.S. required a strong air and naval capability, a strong alliance with Great Britain, and close relationships with Europe. These features were required to establish the level of power that would be required to fulfill security commitments if Russia attempted to act aggressively in Europe or Asia.<sup>139</sup>

The relationship between objectives and resources shapes the strategic options available to national decision makers. Returning for a moment to General Beaufre’s strategic patterns, discussed in Chapter I, illustrates the interdependent nature of objectives and resources. Beaufre asserts that strategy is dictated by the importance of objectives, the military resources available, and a nation’s freedom to employ them.<sup>140</sup> He outlined five strategic patterns which are summarized in Table 6. It is interesting to note that in only one of his five patterns is military action the primary decisive instrument of foreign policy. This may be recognition of the very limited utility of military force in resolving conflict, or of the many factors that limit a nation’s freedom to employ the forces that are available.

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<sup>138</sup> Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), 3-10.

<sup>139</sup> Lippmann, 119-154.

<sup>140</sup> Beaufre, 25-30.

Importance of Objective	Military Resources	Associated Strategic Pattern	Freedom of Action
Moderate	Large	Direct <u>Threat</u> of military action (DT)	Undefined
Moderate	Inadequate	Indirect Pressure (IP) (Diplomatic or Economic)	Limited
High	Limited	Successive use of DT and IP combined with limited force	Restricted
High (Imbalance)	Inadequate	Protracted low intensity conflict (Unconventional Warfare)	Large
Undefined	Sufficient	Violent & Rapid Military Action	Undefined (presumably unlimited)

**Table 6. Beaufre's Strategic Patterns<sup>141</sup>**

Beaufre makes no attempt to restrict objectives according to available means, as Osgood argued may be necessary; rather, he stresses their relative importance. This is central for grand strategy because of the variety of instruments available to a nation such as the United States. The capability, suitability, and availability of the various instruments should guide the decision maker's choice and commitment to a particular unified strategy. Balance does not mean that each instrument is employed equally, or even at all, in a conflict. It means that instruments are applied where appropriate, and when they can contribute to achieving strategic objectives. The interplay between conflict, environment, capabilities, and limitations shapes the employment of the various instruments of power. Thus the policies and programs that put grand strategy into execution are not the same for all conflicts in all environments; what works against Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines will not work against Hamas on the West Bank or al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 26-28. The author's exact terms are used whenever possible to ensure the best understanding of concepts summarized by this table. The focus of these patterns is on military resources and military strategy to achieve national objectives.

## 6. Vertical and Horizontal Synchronization

Grand strategy is most effective when it strives to synchronize actions vertically and horizontally across the instruments of national power. The depth and complexity of effort to achieve this synchronization demands a mechanism to plan, direct, and deconflict the actions of the various governmental departments involved in the fight.

In *Strategy*, Edward Luttwak describes the five levels (technical, tactical, operational, theater strategic and grand strategic) and two dimensions (vertical and horizontal) of grand strategy. He argues that effective actions create an advantage, or at least no disadvantage, vertically within an instrument of power and horizontally across the other instruments.<sup>142</sup> The true power of an action lies in its ability to have wide ranging effects on multiple instruments. The interaction of levels and dimensions is easily understood when examined the ongoing controversy over detainee operations in the GWOT. These policies that regulate detainees and interrogation techniques represent a change at the technical level of the military instrument. They caused some negative effects at the tactical level when pictures of the activities at Abu Ghraib became public and allegations of institutionalized torture began to spread. These effects were vertical; troops on the ground faced increased opposition, officials were forced to revise and explain their guidance on interrogation. The horizontal effect of these actions was much more significant. Gerard Fogarty asserts in his article entitled “Is Guantanamo Bay Undermining the Global War on Terror?” that these techniques have seriously damaged America’s ability to maintain the critical coalition of nations supporting the war on terror.<sup>143</sup>

The effect of the detainee controversy on diplomatic and informational power is an example of the horizontal effects of one action taken at the technical level of the

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<sup>142</sup> Luttwak, 69-71 & 208-230.

<sup>143</sup> Gerard P. Fogarty, “Is Guantanamo Bay Undermining the Global War on Terror?,” *Parameters* 35, no. 3 (Autumn 2005), <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 23, 2006).

military instrument of power.<sup>144</sup> The most effective grand strategy achieves “harmony” by synchronizing actions vertically and horizontally to ensure that positive effects in one realm are not negated, nor do they negatively impact, another realm. Grand strategy requires more of an action than this however; actions should maximize their value by reinforcing and building upon the effects of others.

Luttwak offers two reasons to question the application of synchronization theory to grand strategy. First, he argues that it may be impossible to apply his theory because of the level of detailed planning required to synchronize priorities, policies, and decisions at every level across a large bureaucracy. Luttwak argues that every single action, innovation, and decision would have to be coordinated throughout every agency involved in the fight, clearly this is not realistic; but neither is this level of synchronization a necessary condition for success.<sup>145</sup> Efforts can be made to coordinate significant policy initiatives and sensitize decision makers to the potential horizontal and vertical impacts of their actions. Boundary spanning organizations must be empowered to force this coordination. Second, Luttwak states that there is no guarantee that, even with all this detailed planning and coordination, policy decisions will be any better than if they were made in haste with little coordination.<sup>146</sup> This point cannot be argued, but goes against common sense. Actions that are well thought out and coordinated to maximize their positive impact, while at the same time minimizing their negatives, cannot fail to be better than those made in the heat of a crisis with limited information and conflicting biases.

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<sup>144</sup> Luttwak, 219-225. Luttwak asserts that WWII Germany illustrates the effects of vertical and horizontal disharmony. Although the Nazi government was able to conduct effective military operations, it was unable to conduct effective diplomacy to fracture the alliance forming against it. Additionally, the German propaganda instruments could not persuade international audiences, nor could economic power keep up with Allied wartime production. Luttwak characterizes this as horizontal disharmony, or the inability to act effectively across multiple instruments of power. In contrast, Luttwak presents Vietnam as an example of the effect of horizontal harmony. North Vietnamese and Vietminh military actions maintain a high enough level of success to sustain a protracted conflict. These military actions complimented diplomatic and informational activities directed against the U.S. population and its international support. These diplomatic and informational activities that ultimately degraded support for the war enough to result in a withdrawal of American forces. Without American support the South Vietnamese forces were easily defeated.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, 231-233.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, 233-236.

Harmony in programs and policies is enormously important in the GWOT, not just because it increases effectiveness, but because of the sheer numbers of governmental agencies involved in the fight. During the Clinton administration a group within the National Security Council known as the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) was responsible for coordinating counterterrorism policy and activities. The Bush administration has reduced the authority of the CSG, and adopted a more decentralized style that places the responsibility for coordinating policies and programs on individual departments.<sup>147</sup> This approach has not proven to be effective in managing the GWOT because the dynamics of American politics will not allow the various departments to accomplish these tasks on their own. Organizations like the Departments of Defense and State have divergent cultures, agendas, priorities, and worldviews. National leaders have different biases, opinions, personal agendas, and may tend to reflect their agency's perspective. A mechanism such as the CSG, positioned in the bureaucracy above the departmental system, must actively deconflict competing perspectives, prioritize resources, and synchronize the actions of all entities in the fight.<sup>148</sup>

In 2004 Congress recognized this problem and mandated the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) within the office of the Director of National Intelligence. This was not a new organization, having existed previously within the CIA, but its responsibilities were; the NCTC was given the responsibility to plan and direct

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<sup>147</sup> Richard Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004). Government Accounting Office, GAO-03-165 Report to Congressional Requesters entitled *Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat* (Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 2003), <http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesecc/docs/gao/d03165.pdf> (accessed August 11, 2005). Government Accounting Office, GAO-01-822 Report to Congressional Committees entitled *Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations* (Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 2001), 31, <http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesecc/docs/gao/d01822.pdf> (accessed August 30, 2005). Lynn E. Davis, Gregory Treverton, Danial Byman, Sara Daly and William Rosenau, *Coordinating the War on Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 2004), 3, <http://www.rand.org> (accessed August 11, 2005).

<sup>148</sup> Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 2d Edition* (New York: Longman, 1999). Amy Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). Allison and Zelikow compare the Rational Actor Model, Organizational Behavior Model, and Governmental Politics Model to describe national level decision making in terms of the biases of organizations and actors involved. Zegart discusses the significant influence of individual and organizational bias in the formulation of national security organizations.

counterterrorism policy and programs across the federal government.<sup>149</sup> While the roles of the CSG, the new NCTC and the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Council are still a bit unclear, there is recognition of the need for an organization empowered to force synchronization, set priorities, and arbitrate disagreements among agencies.

## 7. Hybrid Nature

Admiral Joseph Wylie proposes two patterns of military strategy, in his book *Military Strategy*, that apply to grand strategy: cumulative and sequential. The sequential strategic pattern is relatively easy to understand. It is strategy that emphasized a logical progression through a "series of actions growing naturally out of, and dependent on, the one that preceded it." Wylie argues that Allied island hopping strategy in the Pacific during WWII was an example of a sequential military strategy. Cumulative strategic patterns emphasize the combined effects of divergent actions which overwhelm an adversary, and bring about collapse. Wylie cites the Allied submarine campaigns to deny Axis forces critical wartime resources as an example of a military cumulative strategy. Wylie goes on to argue that effective military strategy is rarely solely sequential or cumulative; in fact the two compliment each other, and are interdependent.<sup>150</sup>

Al-Qaeda is clearly executing a hybrid strategy in its war for a Muslim Caliphate. The group's efforts to force western nations out of the Middle East through sustained acts of terrorism in a variety of geographic regions, and propaganda directed against a variety of target audiences are part of a cumulative strategy. The planned shift from far enemy (the US) to the near one (apostate governments in the Middle East) after the west has been forced out of the region is a sequential one.<sup>151</sup> Given the nature of the enemy and the global environment America must meet al-Qaeda's hybrid strategy with a hybrid of

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<sup>149</sup> 108<sup>th</sup> Congress of the United States, *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Report of Conference Committee* (Washington, DA: Congress of the United States, 2004), section 1021, <http://www.c-span.org/pdf/s2845confrept.pdf> (accessed September 18, 2005). This legislation will be referenced as the Intelligence Reform Act.

<sup>150</sup> Joseph Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967), 24-27.

<sup>151</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkley Books, 2003), 51-70. Daniel Byman, "Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do we Understand our Enemy?" *World Politics* (October 2003): 146-148, [http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/journals/world\\_politics/v056/56.1byman.html](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/journals/world_politics/v056/56.1byman.html) (accessed September 27, 2005).



its own to exploit the opportunities that the environment presents. Opportunities for cumulative effects exist in the economic and informational realm. Efforts to cut off terrorist financing and strengthen emerging nations in Africa are cumulative in that they seek to deny terrorist organizations resources and operating room in general. Efforts to develop better intelligence and a more refined picture of the terrorist organization are clearly cumulative; intelligence agencies weave together many small unconnected details to develop overall estimates. The struggle to win the “battle of ideas” is another cumulative effort. There are no intermediate objectives to be gained in the effort to change public opinion; one cannot start in a specific city, or with a specific concept and work through progressively the Muslim world. Opportunities for sequential actions exist in the military, diplomatic, and judicial realms. Iraq and Afghanistan are the easiest examples to consider. The US must begin by securing basic needs like clean water and electricity, before progressing to higher order needs by developing effective governments, internal security forces, and industry. Sequential objectives are important for another reason; they are quantifiable markers that indicate the strategy’s effectiveness to the American public. Progress in the GWOT is important to maintaining the national morale which is a key resource in this conflict.

One danger of overemphasizing sequential strategies is that they may tend to lead to a focus on the dominant instrument of power to the exclusion of all others. Grand strategy cannot be limited to one instrument of power or line of approach because of its scope and influence. Four pairs of strategic options, each with a contribution to make to a GWOT grand strategy, illustrate the complicated nature of this subject. Wylie's cumulative and sequential strategies, and Beaufre's direct and indirect strategies, have already been discussed. Collins includes two additional pairs that bear mentioning: deterrence and combative strategies, and countervalue and counterforce strategies. Deterrence strategies are "designed to prevent or limit the scope of wars," and contrast with combative strategies that are designed to fight wars using military forces and massive firepower. This pair is easily adapted to a conflict between nation states or

between a state and sub-state actor like a transnational terrorist organization.<sup>152</sup> Deterrence is difficult strategy to execute against a clandestine group because they have few tangible resources to threaten, and those that they do have are difficult to identify; it is generally accomplished by hardening possible targets. The combative approach is a major portion of US counterterrorism policy; however, difficulties in identifying acceptable targets make it impossible to focus solely on combative strategies. The Counterforce/Countervalue strategic pair is described by Collins as primarily a nuclear targeting strategy, but it too applies to the GWOT. Counterforce nuclear strategies target adversary forces, while countervalue strategies target things which will produce unacceptable losses for the adversary nation such as cities.<sup>153</sup> Counterforce counterterrorism actions could focus on military direct action against members of terrorist organizations or their or psychological warfare programs to reduce their pool of potential recruits. Winning the “battle of ideas” is an example of counterforce targeting. Efforts to seize terrorist bank accounts or deny their ability to use *hawalla* systems to move money are countervalue actions that target al-Qaeda’s financial support. The point here is to emphasize that grand strategies must be hybrid in nature in order to take advantage of the opportunities of the global environment, and minimize the strengths of the enemy’s organizational structure.

### **C. INTERRELATED AND REINFORCING NATURE OF ELEMENTS**

We will turn briefly to a discussion of the interrelated and reinforcing nature of the components of an effective Grand Strategy before closing this chapter. The triangle between interests, objectives and threats is fairly obvious but needs some amplification. Four rules apply to the interaction between these three key elements.

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<sup>152</sup> Collins, 16. Collins' list of four strategic pairs includes Wylie's sequential and cumulative as well as Beaufre's direct and indirect pair. Beaufre contrasts military force (direct) against "psychology and planning" (indirect); however, Collins misinterprets the indirect approach. The indirect approach is more than psychology and planning; it is a strategy that focuses on employing other instruments of power as the primary influencing agent in a conflict, to force one's adversary to fight the direct confrontation over a large area while contending with the indirect efforts in a variety of spheres. The concept of conflict at the peripheral is important in an indirect strategy; attacking prime targets is akin to attacking the center of an enemy's defensive line, it is the place where the defense is strongest. In the indirect strategy one seeks to apply strength against the weakly defended periphery to sap the enemy's strength and force him to fight in a variety of directions simultaneously.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, 16-17.

First, at the start of a conflict, threats to national interests shape objectives. As interests become more narrowly defined, the adversary's ability to affect them increases. In 1982 Israel invaded and occupied Lebanon to defeat the nascent Palestinian Liberation Organization and secure Israel's borders. Almost twenty years later, after a protracted Hezbollah terror campaign that the IDF could not defeat, Israel no longer considered occupying Lebanon a vital national interest and retreated from the country. Hezbollah changed Israel's understanding of vital national interests by inflicting unacceptable casualties on the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), and demonstrating a willingness to refrain from striking against civilian targets.<sup>154</sup> Israeli national interests evolved from securing its borders to defeating Hezbollah during the conflict. This evolution empowered Hezbollah to affect Israel's calculation of the costs and benefits associated with the struggle to achieve these interests.

Second, narrowly defined national interests result in more quantifiable objectives and better synchronization of powers. This seems intuitive, but a brief example may clarify this rule. If America's national interest is the defeat of al-Qaeda, then objectives can be developed that focus on each group in the network, nations at risk of al-Qaeda influence, and the systems providing support for the network. Country teams or interagency coordination groups can then develop integrated plans to achieve these objectives. If America's national interest is the defeat of terrorism then how do you prioritize between al-Qaeda and Columbian narco-terrorists.

Third, political objectives are multidimensional, and no one instrument or action is sufficient to achieve the total goal. Well defined objectives enable leaders to identify their part of the greater effort, increase the positive effects of synchronize, and reduce wasted resources. Leaders must make hard decisions about scarce resources to maintain a protracted effort, objectives focus these decisions.

Finally, national interests, threats, and objectives are not static things; they are dynamic, time sensitive, and often change during a conflict. This evolutionary nature may create pressure to reallocate resources or redefine the threat in the middle of the struggle. With the fall of the Taliban, the threat in the Middle East shifted from al-

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<sup>154</sup> Norton, 29-30. Harik, 122-123.

Qaeda's core group in Afghanistan to Saddam Hussein. Al-Qaeda's core leadership is still a threat, but it is no longer as important as defeating the insurgent forces in Iraq. National interests, threats, and objectives are critical tools to focus strategy, but they are not static tools. They must be continually reevaluated, decision makers must be flexible enough change in mid conflict, and the American public must be educated to understand and accept these changes.

A few general rules are important to guide the strategic thinker attempting to craft a grand strategy that effectively combines the instruments of power. First, the instruments are interrelated, and the indirect effects of actions in one realm often manifest themselves in another. Robert Pape argues that military operations degrade soft power, and hinder American diplomatic efforts in his article entitled "Soft Balancing Against the United States." The unpopularity of American military action in the Middle East makes the US in general less appealing throughout the world. This status in turn makes it more difficult for American diplomats to secure cooperation (diplomatic power), American ideas to sway international publics (information power), and America's allies to support her initiatives.<sup>155</sup> Using military force does not automatically trigger counter-balancing, it is using it in a manner that other nation's find threatening that is important. During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, President Bush stopped the ground war after meeting the coalition objectives of ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. America's use of military forces in the Middle East did not trigger counter-balancing because they threatened only Iraq. A push to Baghdad would have indirectly threatened many governments in the region and beyond. It could have been seen as a unilateral move to use force to change the global environment to suit American interests, rather than a justifiable use of force to counter aggression.<sup>156</sup>

Second, unless used skillfully, hard power (military and economic) drains resources that are critical to soft power (diplomatic, informational, and judicial). Military forces cost a great deal to train, equip, deploy, and sustain. Military operations overseas often negatively impact national morale and tarnish America's image overseas.

<sup>155</sup> Robert Pape, "Soft Balancing Against the United States," *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005).

<sup>156</sup> H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 497-498.

Economic power generally consumes financial resources, and, as the debt begins to pile up, its use may degrade national morale.

Finally, soft power enables and facilitates the use of hard power, but it may also obviate the need to employ hard power. Diplomatic agreements can create alliances that bring other nations into the fight, thus lowering the requirements for US troops and financial resources. Judicial power works through diplomatic agreements and is dependent upon the good will of host nations to apprehend and prosecute terrorists throughout the world. Actions to engage the moderate Muslim world can reduce hostility to America and reduce the support for terrorist organizations.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

America's grand strategy in an age of terrorism must exploit the global environment and make use of all the varied instruments of power America possesses to win this conflict. To accomplish these tasks it must be more than just a set of policy initiatives that make use of all available power that this nation possesses. It must be an integrated plan that is capable of sustaining a protracted conflict. It must include mechanisms to focus and constrain the power of this nation while simultaneously being flexible enough to take advantage rapidly of the opportunities that our enemies offer.

Grand strategy is the highest level of strategic planning, and is focused solely on threats to national security. The ideal strategy consists of seven fundamental components: well defined interests and objectives; an identified threat; a plan to employ all the instruments of national power; a plan to maintain the sources of national power; a balance between ends and means; horizontal and vertical synchronization, and it should be hybrid in nature. These components are not unique to the GWOT, although the particular blend of instruments of power may be. This study argues that five instruments of power are particularly applicable to this struggle: military, informational, diplomatic, economic, and judicial. Each instrument is mutually exclusive, commonly accepted, and identifies unique a set of options to political leaders.

Grand strategy is founded upon a real or anticipated adversary that has the potential to threaten vital national interests of the nation. Adversary and interests are intertwined: both evolve over time and each affects the other. National objectives should evolve out of interests and map how a nation will achieve overall goals in light of the

defined adversaries. These three factors shape the integration of the instruments of national power, affect the maintenance of the sources of a nation's power, and guide the balance and synchronization of powers.

Grand strategy should balance a nation's objectives and its means of achieving those objectives. This is no simple matter due to the vast scope of options and the intangible nature of some instruments. Ends should not generally be limited by means, but leaders must be cognizant of the limits of particular instruments of power. Some strategic objectives may not be achievable with available resources within the desired timeframe; in this case either the objective or the time frame must be changed. The grand strategist must not employ one instrument beyond its limits, lest they risk exhausting that instrument. Strategic objectives are cannot be achieved by one instrument of power, rather they require the cumulative effort of a number of instruments.

Sources of national power must be deliberately maintained and replenished during the conflict. Balancing ends and means is not enough to maintain sources of power such as financial resources or national will. National leaders must make difficult decisions about policies and programs to develop resources, mechanisms, and infrastructure for the protracted conflict. Financial resources support every instrument's objectives; military forces engage in nation building, FBI training academies train foreign police forces. Each leg of the instrumental triad must be carefully managed because none are unique to only one instrument.

Horizontal and vertical synchronization maximizes the positive effects of actions, while simultaneously minimizing inevitable negative impact on overall outcomes. Actions resonate vertically within instruments of power. Tactical advances in counterterrorism drive changes in terrorist weapons, tactics and strategy. The interconnected nature of the instruments of power enables actions to resonate across the instruments as well. Aid to tsunami victims in Indonesia increases American soft power and may make it easier for diplomats in Jordan. Significant policies and programs must be deliberately synchronized by an extra-departmental organization to avoid the obstacles presented by personal and organizational biases that are prevalent in American government.

Hybrid strategies effectively take advantage of the opportunities in the global environment. Economic and diplomatic efforts to deny terrorist organizations safe havens and resources are likely to be cumulative. Military and judicial efforts to defeat individual terrorist organizations are likely to be sequential. Targeting efforts are counterforce and counter-value depending on the engagement mechanism and the objective. Defensive activities act as a deterrent, while offensive operations in Iraq are combative. Grand strategy in general, and GWOT grand strategy in specific, employs diverse tools and techniques against a variety of adversary vulnerabilities. Grand strategy political objectives focus on shaping an environment, rather than solely on the defeat of the enemy.

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### **III. SUPPORTING FEATURES OF U.S. GRAND STRATEGY**

This chapter conducts a review of national strategy documents to determine how well or poorly they reflect the features of grand strategy identified in Chapter II. The features that we will focus on are: defined interests and objectives, identified threat, maintenance of national power, balance of ends and means, and vertical and horizontal integration. In general the strategy documents include a wide range of plans and programs to target terrorist organizations, their support infrastructure, and the underlying conditions that encourage terrorism. The strategy does not prioritize these plans and programs, nor does it focus them on critical groups or regions to maximize the effectiveness of resources. In effect they attempt to address terrorism everywhere simultaneously, at the risk of addressing nothing adequately. The strategy documents do not include the mechanisms that could improve the allocation of resources or the synchronization of programs. Finally, the most glaring deficiency is the lack of planning to sustain efforts over a protracted conflict; this would include plans to sustain national power and balance efforts across powers.

#### **A. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES**

The most significant deficiency in this grand strategy is the lack of a common set of interests and objectives to focus the planning effort. The NSS describes many goals, but never explicitly defines US national interests as they relate to any region or conflict. National interests are broad statements of a desired end state that can stand alone and still describe the goal in enough detail to facilitate planning. While they are not bound by specific nations, issues, or adversaries, national interests must be specific enough to enable strategists to conceive of a way to achieve the aims. National interests allow policy makers to form the supporting strategic objectives that map a path from the current situation to the endstate.

The NSS seems to identify only one national interest when it states that “aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.” It further states that the path to safety is “political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.” These goals could be construed as national interests, but they do not define an attainable endstate. The strategy makes strong statements of

national interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the India-Pakistan conflict, Indonesia, in Latin America and finally in Africa. In each of these regions, national interests seem to revolve around the resolution of ongoing conflict and the growth of democracy, but here again it is open to interpretation. In issues directly relating to the GWOT the NSS is less clear. The strategy states that one of the nation's highest goals is to prevent its adversaries from developing the ability to employ weapons of mass destruction. This is a clear statement of interests that should facilitate setting strategic planning. The strategy is more vague on the subject of terrorism because it fails to differentiate the variety of terrorist threats. Middle Eastern Islamic terrorists appear to have the same priority as Latin American narco-terrorists. The document does narrow the focus somewhat by identifying "terrorist organizations of global reach" as the highest priority, but does not name specific networks or organizations.<sup>157</sup>

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) is particularly weak in its identification of national interests. Reading the document may lead one to believe that American strategy is shaped by the goal that "civilized people around the world can [sic] lead their lives free of fear from terrorist attacks."<sup>158</sup> The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) does a significantly better job describing interests. While also failing to identify any specific national interests it is clear that the document is guided by four concepts: deterring and preventing terrorist attacks in the US, reducing America's vulnerability, limiting damage from attacks, and consequence management. These four interests enabled planners to develop six strategic objectives that require the integration of all instruments of national power.<sup>159</sup>

The supporting strategy documents vary in their descriptions of interests. Most prefer to identify a set of goals and objectives particular to their focus area, rather than craft their policies and programs in support of common objectives. The Department of State and US Agency for International Development (DOS/USAID) Strategic Plan contains a comprehensive listing of thirteen "key priorities" that could fit the definition of

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<sup>157</sup> The NSS includes eight broad concepts that could be construed as national interests, and are intended to guide policy and program planning. However, these concepts are not stand alone definitions of national interest and require additional explanation to facilitate planning.

<sup>158</sup> NSCT, 1.

<sup>159</sup> NSHS, vii-x.

national interests. These priorities range from Arab-Israeli peace to “drug eradication and democracy in the Andean region.” Rather than using these priorities to focus policy initiatives however, the strategy establishes four “strategic objectives” to focus planning: peace and security, sustainable development, international understanding, and strengthening departmental capabilities.<sup>160</sup> These objectives allow the strategy to develop policy initiatives to cover a host of issues, but they weaken the focus of the document and do not provide any priority for planning.

National strategic objectives are as poorly defined and understood as national interests. Rather than crafting policy and programs to support national objectives, each strategy document defines its own set of “strategic objectives,” and outlines policy initiatives to support them. The NSS’ eight broad initiatives are supplemented by a variety of objectives that range from the specific, “prevent ‘rouge states’ from gaining WMD” to the very general, “promote economic growth & economic freedom beyond America's shores.”<sup>161</sup> Many objectives, such as improving protections for workers and the environment, have only tenuous links to defeating the terrorist threat.<sup>162</sup> This lack of defined strategic objectives facilitates a lack of continuity in supporting plans. An example of this lack of continuity can be seen in the area of information sharing. The NSHS clearly focuses on improving the dissemination of intelligence and improving communications among all the organizations engaged in counterterrorism. The Department of Defense is also concerned with intelligence, but there is no real focus on information sharing or improving dissemination outside the military community. The NDS’ focus is on “fuse [sic] operations and intelligence” and building a “network-centric force.”<sup>163</sup>

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) are particularly weak in their description of national interests and objectives. Both documents discuss refer to the NSS’ goals of fostering the growth of democracy and building a “better world.” The NDS identifies four “strategic objectives,” but again these

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<sup>160</sup> DOS/USAID Strategic Plan , 1-4.

<sup>161</sup> NSS, 13 & 17.

<sup>162</sup> NSS, 19.

<sup>163</sup> NDS, 13-14.

are military-centric objectives not national strategic objectives.<sup>164</sup> The NMS recognizes the NDS objectives, and identifies three military supporting objectives. This is a good example of the objective nesting that should be going on throughout the supporting documents. It is interesting to note that neither military strategy identifies defeating terrorism or the al-Qaeda network as an objective, although the NMS does list “winning the war on terrorism” as its highest priority.<sup>165</sup>

Overall, American grand strategy for the GWOT lacks a clearly defined endstate for the conflict. This deficiency has led to a lack of commonly understood national strategic objectives that outline specific goals for regions, conflicts, or even relationships with other nations. The various agencies responsible for the implementation plans have designed a variety of supporting strategic objectives that are not common across all instruments of power. This lack of continuity has created confusion over priorities. This confusion is evidenced by the lack of interoperability among first responders in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, some three years after the NSHS made “seamless communications among all responders” major initiative in its strategy to prepare for a terrorist attack.<sup>166</sup>

## **B. IDENTIFICATION OF THE THREAT**

The core strategy documents attempt to identify the threat in a deductive manner. In other words they attempt to provide a single definition of terrorism that applies to a wide variety of acts and agendas.<sup>167</sup> NSS states that the “enemy is terrorism” and goes on to define terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”<sup>168</sup> In contrast, the NSCT includes a lengthy discussion of terrorism that incorporates and expands on the NSS definition. The NSCT describes terrorists as those individuals and organizations who “strive to subvert the rule of law and effect change through violence or fear.” This strategy categorizes terrorism according to the nature of the perpetrator and the geographic span of activity: “state level, operate within a single

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<sup>164</sup> NDS.

<sup>165</sup> NMS, iv.

<sup>166</sup> NSHS, x.

<sup>167</sup> Levitt, 6-7.

<sup>168</sup> NSS, 5.

country; regional, operating across at least 1 international border; and global, operating across several regions or more.” The structure of the transnational networked terrorist organization is important to the NSCT. Finally, in a theme that reoccurs in other documents, the strategy highlights those terrorist organizations attempting to develop WMD as the highest threat.<sup>169</sup>

The NDS seems to understand the definition of threat contained in the NSCT, but that understanding is not reflected in the NMS. The NDS states that “today’s war is against terrorist extremist networks, including their state & non-state supporters.” It goes on to describe enemies of the US as those who attempt affect the American way of life and limit the nation’s freedom of action.<sup>170</sup> Unlike the NDS, the NMS states that the country faces threats from a wide range of actors including traditional and rouge states, state-sponsored terrorism, a variety of non-state actors that includes transnational terrorist networks, & some individuals. Terrorist organizations are a lesser included threat, rather than the prime threat facing the nation.<sup>171</sup>

One important element of any counterterrorism strategy is the fight to deny terrorist organizations the resources to carry out their activities, and the National Money Laundering Strategy (NMLS) is part of this effort. It is important to examine how the NMLS defines terrorism because the majority of fund raising for these organizations is conducted overseas where there are a variety of opinions regarding the nature and legitimacy of terrorist organizations. This strategy clearly identifies terrorism as its primary focus, and demonstrates an understanding of the complexity of attacking terrorism financing.<sup>172</sup> However, it makes no attempt to define who the US considers a terrorist or what it considers a terrorist organization. It reflects the deductive approach to defining terrorism by discussing the “non-financial” goals of terrorist organizations: “publicity, political legitimacy, political influence, and dissemination of an ideology.”<sup>173</sup> The definition may not facilitate the efforts of the Department of State to gain

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<sup>169</sup> NSCT, 1, 7-10, & 16.

<sup>170</sup> NDS, 1 & 6-8.

<sup>171</sup> NMS, 4.

<sup>172</sup> NMLS, 3-4, 14-16.

<sup>173</sup> NMLS, 14.

cooperation in efforts to attack terrorist financing because it is so vague. It may be impossible for nations such as Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt to participate in this effort for internal political reasons. Nevertheless, there are signs that many countries in the Middle East are beginning to cooperate in the effort to affect terrorist organizations' financial resources. Fourteen Middle Eastern Nations formed Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) to develop regional actions and work to implement international anti-money laundering standards. To date the group has had two planning meetings and made little significant progress, but it is a start.<sup>174</sup>

Deductive definitions of terrorism form the core of America's strategy documents. Unfortunately, these definitions do not address the problem that not all societies agree on a common definition of terrorists or their innocent victims. Hezbollah is considered a national resistance organization in much of the Arab world. Israel felt its actions against Lebanese civilians were legitimate during the invasion of 1982.<sup>175</sup> America's preference for a deductive definition of terrorism is not a serious problem when considering unilateral US efforts. There is a general understanding that the al-Qaeda network is the greatest threat that the nation faces, and that any organization that targets civilians is a terrorist organization. There is a small degree of confusion among some of the strategy documents that could be cleared up with a more definitive definition of the threat. For example, The NMS seems to consider other nation states as a threat on par with al-Qaeda. This confusion could make it difficult to prioritize resources and operations. It is in the area of diplomacy and military or judicial operations overseas that this lack of clarity will have the greatest negative impact. Without a clear and acceptable definition of the enemy America will face resistance to bilateral initiatives that may run counter to other nation's interests.

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<sup>174</sup> MENAFATF Web site, November 30, 2004, <http://www.menafatf.org/ArticleDetail.asp?rid=548> (accessed December 9, 2005). The fourteen member states are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. For additional information regarding international cooperation see Martin A. Weiss (2005) *Terrorist Financing: US Agency Efforts and Interagency Coordination*, Congressional Research Service, 45-48, available at <http://library.nps.navy.mil/> (accessed December 9, 2005).

<sup>175</sup> Augustus Norton, "Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 1 (Autumn 2000): 29-30, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.navy.mil> (accessed April 13, 2005). Harik, *Hezbollah...*, 122-123.

This study focuses on America's response to the threat posed by transnational terrorist organizations, but a grand strategy must address the full range of threats facing a nation. With this in mind it is important to recognize some of these threats and acknowledge their affects on this analysis. The National Military Strategy (NMS) discusses the threat posed by states, rouge states, non-state actors, and some individuals to the United States. This strategy is generally focused on hostile adversaries.<sup>176</sup> Few if any state entities pose an immediate direct threat to the United States; however, that could change if China continues to expand its military capability or Russia continues its decline. Non-State entities like the European Union have the potential to present an economic threat to the U.S., if they do not already. Certainly groups such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have the ability to negatively affect national interests. The Department of State/U.S. Agency for International Development (DOS/USAID) Strategic Plan includes additional things like regional instability, poverty, and disease in its understanding of the threat.<sup>177</sup> These features may not rise to the level of a threat to national interests, but given that a significant portion of grand strategy is focused on countering these environmental conditions they need to be taken into consideration.

Any criticism of contemporary American grand strategy must be tempered by an acknowledgement of the effects of such a broad consideration of threat. Future threats require the commitment of current resources to ensure that the nation is prepared to meet them. This commitment may skew that balance of resources in favor of one instrument of power over another. For example, if the U.S. faces a modern conventional threat in the next 20 years from a hostile state actor, then additional resources must be diverted from the current low-intensity conflict to develop and procure advanced weapons for that future fight. This dynamic does not change the features of a grand strategy however; it only makes them more important. In an environment of limited resources, it is absolutely critical that grand strategy includes a solid understanding of the threat in order to correctly allocate these resources. Grand strategy must constrain strategic objectives to ensure that these resources are not exhausted or risk failure in other areas.

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<sup>176</sup> NMS, 4.

<sup>177</sup> DOS/USAID Strategic Plan.

### **C. PLAN TO MAINTAIN INSTRUMENTS OF POWER**

The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) do not include plans to maintain the instruments of national power. This is a significant deficiency given that there is no one office responsible for the entire Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and that many of the resources that go into national power are shared by multiple instruments. In contrast, the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) does recognize the need to take some actions to conserve resources. The strategy includes a call to “mobilize the entire society” and encourages the private sector to sacrifice for the nation’s defense. The strategy also includes multiple initiatives to include state and local governments as well as the private sector in defense of critical infrastructure and crisis management. This is a recognition that the federal government is limited in its ability to fund all the initiatives and that available resources must be husbanded to some extent.<sup>178</sup> The fact that capabilities and resources are limited necessitates strategic planning and deliberate efforts to prioritize activities.

The national military strategies also recognize the need to maintain the sources of power. Both documents stress continuing to transform the military to build a lighter, faster, and more lethal force capable of dealing effectively with the terrorist threat, while maintaining conventional preeminence. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) recognizes the need to weigh the costs and benefits of achieving its objectives, and states that the Department of Defense (DOD) will make “deliberate choices” to balance risk.<sup>179</sup> The National Military Strategy (NMS) discusses “recapitalizing critical capabilities” to ensure that they are maintained throughout the fight.<sup>180</sup> Taken together these documents acknowledge the need to maintain the force, and provide basic guidance to accomplish this requirement.

Like the military strategies, the US Department of State and US Agency for International Development (DOS/USAID) Strategic Plan contains the beginnings of a plan to maintain diplomatic power. One could argue that the way to build diplomatic power is to conduct diplomacy in support of objectives that benefit partner nations.

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<sup>178</sup> NSHS, 3 and 11.

<sup>179</sup> NDS, 11.

<sup>180</sup> NMS, 6.



American diplomacy clearly focuses on developing our allies. Hans Morgenthau suggested, in his book *Politics Among Nations*, that America has an inconsistent record of foreign policy success because it lacks the institutions and traditions to conduct diplomacy effectively.<sup>181</sup> The DOS/USAID Strategic Plan includes initiatives to improve the training of professional diplomats and USAID personnel, as well as to increase the size of both organizations. These changes begin to correct the systemic deficiency that Morgenthau describes. One diplomatic strategic objective that has the potential to significantly enhance American diplomatic strength is that of Promoting International Understanding. The policy initiatives supporting this objective focus on conducting aggressive public diplomacy to explain American actions and motivations. Antony Blinken argues, in his article “Winning the War of Ideas,” that effective public diplomacy is critical because it enables a nation to act by reducing the resistance of foreign publics. The US has global interests and faces global threats. The environment has changed and the US stands without a significant ideological rival. The US cannot rely on overwhelming military strength in an environment characterized by problems with no military solution.<sup>182</sup> Diplomatic power must be allowed to solve these challenges, and effective public diplomacy is a way to strengthen that power.

One of the most significant deficiencies in American grand strategy is the lack of a plan to maintain economic power. Without entering into a debate about the effectiveness of tax or spending cuts, and the strength of the economy, it is important to note that the national focus is not on maintaining the economic resources to fight. In 2002 the federal debt was approximately \$6 trillion; in 2005 it is projected to be over \$8 trillion.<sup>183</sup> It is impossible to relate this increase solely to the GWOT or the ongoing war in Iraq; however, it is important to realize that they have contributed to this growth. American grand strategy is not husbanding economic resources; it is expending them without any constraint.

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<sup>181</sup> Morgenthau, 142-144.

<sup>182</sup> Antony J. Blinken, “Winning the War of Ideas” *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 101-104.

<sup>183</sup> Homepage, *Bureau of the Public Debt*, November 23, 2005, <http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/>; (accessed December 10, 2005). “U.S. Public Debt,” *Wikipedia*, December 9, 2005, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.\\_public\\_debt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._public_debt) (accessed December 10, 2005).

The national strategy for the GWOT does not include a plan to maintain the instruments of national power. There are a few notable exceptions such as the NDS, but these exceptions do not constitute a plan. The impact of this deficiency may or may not be significant. If the war in Iraq is concluded quickly, the overall costs of offensive actions will rapidly decline. This will free up a great deal of resources for foreign aid and homeland defense initiatives, as well as reduce the growing federal debt. However, if the war continues, or if the GWOT escalates in another region, then the long term ability of this nation to absorb additional costs may become an issue.

#### **D. BALANCED ENDS AND MEANS**

The core national strategy documents make little mention of balancing ends and means to conserve resources and achieve objectives; the NSHS is a notable exception. This strategy includes a major initiative to develop a comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment (TVA) so that future efforts to improve the protection of key assets can be prioritized. The document recognizes that assets are not unlimited and that budgeting decisions will have to be made. It refers to the infrastructure protection plan as a means to “inform” the planning, programming, and budgeting process. The infrastructure plan picks up this theme and states that it will use the TVA to set protection priorities and establish baseline standards. This plan continually refers to the need to spread the costs of protection programs, and study problems before launching programs to ensure that the resources are well spent.

The national military and diplomatic strategies are not as concerned with balancing ends and means as the strategies which focus on homeland defense. While the NDS recognizes the importance of operating within fiscal constraints, the NMS does not mention any constraints. The fiscal 2006 budget requests \$407.6 billion for the Department of Defense.<sup>184</sup> On the surface it seems that the DOD has few limits to its means. However, a deeper look at the military shows that the services are having serious recruiting problems and their fleet of vehicles is aging faster than anticipated. Much of

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<sup>184</sup> “FY 2006 Budget: Summary Tables,” *The White House*, Office of Management and Budget, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/budget/2006/toc.html> (accessed December 11, 2005).

this is due to the ongoing conflict in Iraq, but that does not change the fact that the military does in fact face some limitations on its resources that the strategy has not reflected.

The 2006 federal budget tells us a great deal about balance. Admittedly this is not a perfect metric; it does not reflect the disproportionately high returns that some policies and programs have the potential to provide. It may distort the allocations because foreign military assistance is included with the aid allocations as opposed to military expenditures.<sup>185</sup> However, almost 50% of federal discretionary spending is allocated to the DOD, while the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State each receive less than 4%. The FY 2006 budget requests only \$49.9 billion, or 5.9%, for homeland security related programs; this includes \$9.5 billion for DOD programs and the \$27.3 billion for DHS.<sup>186</sup> In light of the fact that diminishing the underlying causes of terrorism and protecting the homeland is so important to the grand strategy, these figures seem to indicate that the strategy execution is out of balance.

It is difficult to assess the balance in American grand strategy without a common set of strategic objectives. One cannot lay out the variety of initiatives and look for gaps or redundancies. It is difficult to examine one country or region to gain an understanding of all the programs that apply. The dual nature of this grand strategy, overseas offensive activities coupled with domestic defensive initiatives, makes evaluation even more difficult. There is clearly a focus on getting every instrument of power into the fight, but are the effects of these forces being maximized?

#### **E. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL SYNCHRONIZATION**

Core and supporting strategy documents do not adequately address the subject of vertical and horizontal synchronization. Lead agencies are often not clearly identified, coordinating mechanisms do not appear to be a significant feature, and the lack of priorities makes synchronization problematic. Supporting strategy documents frequently appear to have been written in a vacuum with little focus on other instruments of power

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<sup>185</sup> “FY 2006 Budget: Department of State,” *The White House*, Office of Management and Budget, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/budget/2006/toc.html> (accessed December 11, 2005). Foreign Military Financing accounts for 24.86% of international assistance program funding as compared to the Millennium Challenge Accounts which are 16.22% and “developmental assistance” which is 5.95%.

<sup>186</sup> Budget: Summary Tables.

or governmental departments. There are some notable exceptions. The NSHS emphasizes the role of the Department of Homeland Security as the single point of contact for state and local governments for terrorist prevention and emergency response. The aforementioned ISAC initiative exemplifies efforts to synchronize governmental and private sector activities. This strategy also makes an effort to designate lead agencies in areas such as information analysis, vulnerability assessment, and counterterrorism policy.<sup>187</sup> Other efforts to intuitionalize synchronization include the NMS' interagency Joint Operational Concepts Counter-Terrorist (CT) Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs).<sup>188</sup>

There are indications that, while it may be planned for, synchronization is not well supported during operations. The most notable of these indicators is the disconnect between efforts to conduct public and traditional diplomacy in light of the controversy over the CIA's covert detention centers. This is an example of a policy that may have been very effective vertically within the intelligence or military realms, but highly problematic in others.<sup>189</sup>

#### **F. HYBRID NATURE OF THE STRATEGY**

American grand strategy for the GWOT heavily favors cumulative actions to defeat terrorism. Defensive initiatives contained in the NSHS and efforts to deny safe havens to terrorist organizations contained in the NSCT are examples of cumulative strategies. Offensive concepts contained in the national military strategies, and National Money Laundering Strategy are intended to defeat terrorist organizations through attrition while simultaneously denying them the resources they require to maintain their strength. These initiatives will work over time to reduce viable targets and increase the pressure on terrorist organizations. There is little evidence of a sequential aspect to this grand strategy.

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<sup>187</sup> NSHS, 13-16.

<sup>188</sup> NMS, 12 and 21-22.

<sup>189</sup> See "U.S. rebukes U.N. rights charge," *CNN.com*, December 8, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/12/08/un.us.humanrights.ap/index.html> (accessed December 11, 2005). "CIA prisons: EU warns members," *CNN.com*, November 28, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/11/28/eu.prisons.ap/index.html> (accessed December 11, 2005). Peter Ford, "Controversy grows in Europe over CIA jail network" *Christian Science Monitor*, December 1, 2005, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1201/p01s03-woeu.html> (accessed December 11, 2005).

The strategy clearly includes a combative military element, with conventional and unconventional forces deployed worldwide to locate and engage terrorist elements. However, the strategy also emphasizes deterrence, with active and passive initiatives in the NSCT and infrastructure protection plan. Direct and indirect strategies are employed to attack terrorist organizations from every possible angle. The efforts of the nation's military and law enforcement forces represent the direct approach. The initiatives of the Department of State and the US Agency for International Development represent the indirect approach. Admiral Beaufre noted in his book, *An Introduction to Strategy*, that this mix was essential when a nation faced an imbalance of force and/or freedom of action.<sup>190</sup> The US faces just such an imbalance. America has significantly greater military force, but the enemy has an informational advantage that more than compensates. Both sides possess a degree of freedom of action that is tempered by environmental constraints. The US cannot take decisive violent action whenever and wherever it might locate an enemy; this is evident along the Afghan Pakistan border. Transnational terrorist organizations, perhaps because of the difficulties of covert operations, cannot strike at will; this is evidenced by the lack of attacks in the US during in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a perfect time to strike.

The question becomes, have we chosen the right hybrid mix of strategies? One strategic pattern that is missing from this mix is that of engagement. There are no initiatives to engage the radical terrorist organizations in any way. This is peculiar given that the country did not hesitate to engage the Soviet Union which, a much larger threat than al-Qaeda, during the Cold War. There may be enormous gains to be made through some form of interaction with the terrorist organizations. In this the lessons from Israeli's interaction with Hezbollah may be important. Hezbollah was one of the world's most dangerous terrorist organizations in the 80s and 90s, now the group is largely quiet, although still threatening. This transformation was brought about through a combination of diplomacy, military force and environmental changes that encouraged the group to participate in the political system of Lebanon. Israel may regret "giving in" to the

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<sup>190</sup> Beaufre, 25-30.

demands of the terrorists, but they have had significantly less violence on their Lebanese border since withdrawing from that country.<sup>191</sup>

## **G. CONCLUSIONS**

It would be tempting to try to label American grand strategy for the Global War on Terrorism with a quick, media friendly catchphrase, but that would not do it justice. It could be described as constructive engagement, active deterrence, or coercive diplomacy, but as we have seen, these would fail to capture its preemptive qualities. The truth is that this is a dynamic strategy that does not fit neatly into a 30 second synopsis.

The nation's grand strategy is strong on plans and initiatives to employ the instruments of national power, but it is weak on mechanisms to synchronize and integrate these instruments in planning and resource allocation. The military, diplomatic, and judicial instruments are the most extensively developed portions of the strategy. America's information and economic instruments suffer from a lack of supporting strategic plans. The lack of a clearly defined national interests and national strategic objectives makes it extremely difficult to understand how the instruments interrelate and reinforce each other. Thus, is virtually impossible to understand in any detail how this grand strategy will move the nation from status quo to a better end state.

The nation's grand strategy does not include a comprehensive plan to maintain the instruments of power, and shows little evidence of balance among the powers. This is particularly concerning given that the war in Iraq is in its fourth year and there are signs that American national will is waning.<sup>192</sup> Horizontal and vertical synchronization across this grand strategy is more difficult to judge. Select themes are consistent across the strategy documents, there is some recognition of lead agency designations, and a number of interagency coordinating bodies have been established. Synchronization is about ensuring that actions by one instrument of power do not negatively impact on another. With this in mind, the execution of policy and programs by the various agencies of the US government, even with the mechanisms just mentioned, frequently seem to be out of harmony.

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<sup>191</sup> Norton, "Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal ...," 30-35.

<sup>192</sup> Gary Langer, "ABC News Poll," *ABC News.com*, November 3, 2005, <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/PollVault/story?id=1278080> (accessed December 11, 2005).

American grand strategy is clearly a hybrid form that defies easy description. It is primarily cumulative, indirect, and deterrent, although it has significant direct and combative elements. The strategy, when taken as a whole, seems to be advocating every action that could have positive results, rather than focusing on a deliberate path to a defined end state. The strategy seems to be motivated in many ways by admirable ideals, rather than realist aims. These characteristics may be a function of the management style of the administration, the bureaucratic process, or the environment. Regardless of the reason, this hybrid strategy is difficult to grasp, measure, and refine.

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## **IV. GRAND STRATEGIES AGAINST TERROR**

This chapter examines grand strategic responses to terrorist threats from the IRA in Northern Ireland, Sikh separatists in India, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. These cases were selected for five reasons. First, each of these conflicts is relatively recent and pitted a transnational covert movement, motivated at least in part by religion, against an established legitimate government. Second, these cases offer examples of the range of force that may be employed by a government, from overwhelming to minimal. India's grand strategy against Sikh separatists offers an example of a strategy that successfully employed overwhelming law enforcement and military force. Great Britain's strategy was also successful but with significantly less force. Third, these cases illustrate the positive and negative effects of integrated instruments of national power on the outcome of a counterterrorist campaign. Fourth, the outcome of these cases reflects the range of possible resolutions to a terrorist conflict. In Northern Ireland, the IRA was not defeated but a negotiated ceasefire has led to disarmament by the group. In India, Sikh terrorist groups were defeated by combined police and military force. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has begun to participate in the legitimate government after Israel's failure to defeat the organization. Finally, these cases involve legitimate governments that cover the spectrum from developing to developed world. This spectrum is important in the current conflict because America's allies are not solely developed western nation-states; they include some of the poorest underdeveloped countries in the world.

This chapter will not attempt to present full blown case studies of each conflict. It will examine selected features of the British and Indian grand strategies to determine lessons that could be applied to the GWOT. The chapter will also examine a series of influences that have combined to moderate the policies and actions of Hezbollah. This vignette differs in form and content because of the features of the Lebanese environment. It is included because it may offer a model for engagement with future terrorist groups such as Hamas, and Israeli actions may offer valuable lessons for the GWOT. The conflicts in Northern Ireland and India are primarily internal domestic matters. Negotiation and engagement in these conflicts often occurred between government representatives and domestic political parties. This chapter will consider the negotiations

and diplomatic methods used in order to gain a better and more complete appreciation of the grand strategies employed against terror.

#### **A. BRITISH STRATEGY TO COUNTER IRA VIOLENCE**

British grand strategy has evolved from 1968, the start of what this paper will term the “modern phase” of the conflict in Northern Ireland, to today. It includes three periods of intense negotiation to resolve the conflict. The vignette illustrates the importance of three features of grand strategy: the importance of national interests and objectives; the grand strategy itself must employ all the instruments of national power in a manner consistent with existing opportunities and constraints; and the effect of a particular balance on the success of the effort.

##### **1. Roots of the Conflict**

The situation faced by Great Britain in the modern phase of the conflict in Northern Ireland is not unlike that faced by the U.S. in the GWOT. In the early 1970s Great Britain found itself allied with an oppressive and largely Protestant government in Northern Ireland that was reluctant to allow needed political reform in the province. The Catholic minority felt threatened, persecuted and was beginning to demand civil rights reform.<sup>193</sup> Neither of these communities should be thought of as homogeneous entities. Political, cultural, and even religious schisms exist in each society. One valid generalization can be made; the population was generally segmented along religious lines on the issue of national identity. The Catholic minority generally favored eliminating the 1920 partition and unifying the country as one independent Irish Republic. The Protestant majority generally favored remaining part of Great Britain, and was more than willing to fight for this ideal.<sup>194</sup> This environment was ripe for the sectarian violence that erupted in the late 1960s.

The current phase of the conflict is rooted in the 1920 partition that created the predominantly Catholic Irish Republic, and the smaller, predominantly Protestant British province of Northern Ireland. Sporadic violence in the province continued from partition to the late 1960s as Catholic groups demonstrated for one united Ireland, but could not

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<sup>193</sup> Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict ad Emancipation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 124-128. Frontline, “The Conflict,” <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/conflict/> (accessed December 13, 2005).

<sup>194</sup> Joseph Ruane, 49-78.

gain enough support to create significant problems.<sup>195</sup> A number of organizations on both sides of the conflict eventually turned to terrorism to advance their political agendas. The Catholic Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) is arguably the best known of these groups, but Protestant groups such as the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR). These groups had widespread support in their geographic regions, and in the case of the IRA, even controlled some parts of major urban areas.<sup>196</sup> Other nations and foreign groups frequently provided active and tacit support to the conflict. The most significant of these foreign actors was the Irish Republic, where Catholic militants often found sanctuary after terrorist actions.<sup>197</sup>

Northern Irish Catholics began a series of civil rights marches in 1968 calling for, among other things, equal voting rights. The Protestant majority felt threatened by this new attempt to gain power and influence in the region. Sectarian violence increased as the semi-autonomous government dragged its feet on political reform and attempted to crush what quickly turned into a violent resistance movement. Catholic ghettos in many of the major cities became barricaded enclaves where government security forces did not go.<sup>198</sup> This conflict came to a head in August of 1969 in the Catholic neighborhood of Bogside when local youths responded to a Protestant march with bottles and stones. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) could not restore order in the area and lead units of the conventional British army were deployed to separate the sides and restore order.<sup>199</sup> Great Britain quickly assumed responsibility for the conflict in the eyes of Catholic groups by way of its natural tendency to favor supporting the local government's security forces

It is important to understand the IRA threat that emerged from these early years: the IRA is really two organizations, aligned in purpose, separated by tactics. The Official IRA is the descendant of the group that operated from 1921 to 1969. They favor less violent methods that even included participation in the Northern Irish Parliament in 1969.

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<sup>195</sup> Frontline, "The Conflict."

<sup>196</sup> Tony Geraghty, *The Irish War* (London: Harper Collins, 1998), 20-22 & 225-235

<sup>197</sup> David Bleakly, *Peace in Ireland* (London: Mowbray, 1995).

<sup>198</sup> Frontline, "The Conflict."

<sup>199</sup> Geraghty, 20-22.

This group was unable to protect Catholic ghettos from the violence of 1968-1969. The Provisional IRA, also known as Provos or PIRA, is the hard line violent faction that split from the Official IRA in December 1969 over the issue of participating in the Northern Irish government. This group dedicated itself to protecting the Catholic minority first and foremost, and is not hesitant to use violent means to achieve its goals.<sup>200</sup>

## **2. Lessons of British Grand Strategy**

In March 1972, Great Britain assumed direct authority for Northern Ireland's security and judicial systems, allowing the Northern Irish government to retain some limited authority. Prior to 1972 the problems in Northern Ireland were the responsibility of the Northern Irish government, England was involved, but not in a leadership role. After 1972, this situation changed dramatically; the central government and Prime Minister was now responsible for resolving the conflict. The British Army quickly realized that it was impossible to follow their standard counterinsurgency doctrine that proved so successful in areas such as Malaysia; the political situation in Northern Ireland demanded more drastic measures.<sup>201</sup>

One simple national interest guided British policy and actions in Northern Ireland almost from the start of the modern period of the conflict. It was not clearly expressed until the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, but simply stated it was a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Protestant Loyalists and Catholic Nationalists. Objectives supporting this interest were not as clearly expressed but they seemed to include: engaging the Irish Republic in Northern Irish affairs; securing and upholding majority consensus on the political status of the province; guaranteeing defined civil rights for all citizens; reforming the political system; and defeating the terrorist organizations.<sup>202</sup>

This interest, when combined with determined British diplomats, resulted in almost immediate negotiations with the Irish Republic and eventually a wide variety of actors in Northern Ireland, including the IRA represented by Sinn Fein. The initial phase

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<sup>200</sup> Guelke, Adrian, "Loyalist and Republican Perceptions of the Northern Ireland Conflict: the UDA and Provisional IRA" in *Political Violence and Terror*, ed. By Peter H. Merkl, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986), 94-96.

<sup>201</sup> David Harkness, *Ireland in the Twentieth Century: Divided Island* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 100-101.

<sup>202</sup> Bleakley, 142-146 & 188-192. Anglo-Irish Agreement – Document, Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/aia/aiadoc.htm> (accessed February 8, 2006).

of negotiations worked out a power sharing deal in December 1973 that addressed many of the issues on both sides of the conflict.<sup>203</sup> British objectives, particularly in the area of civil rights and political reform, addressed a major issue for the Catholic community without the appearance of “giving in to terrorist’s demands.” The objective of engaging the Irish Republic allowed Great Britain to work with and through a highly influential third party to affect some of the changes demanded by the IRA. Great Britain has used these objectives to guide negotiations, implement reform in the government of Northern Ireland, and control the use of force against terrorist organizations throughout the modern conflict. This initial agreement was unsuccessful in stopping the violence because the parties to the agreement could not control the radicals in the streets. The Irish Republic could not control the IRA, nor could the British government control loyalist terror groups.<sup>204</sup>

British diplomacy was pragmatic, issue oriented and virtually continuous throughout the modern conflict. It was not limited to engagement with the Irish Republic, although that was a consistent and major feature of the strategy. The governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major negotiated three different agreements in an attempt to marginalize the terrorists and end the violence in the province.<sup>205</sup> Negotiations over the nature and form of the future government took place with a variety of unionist and loyalist parties. When one agreement fell apart the government began a new round of talks with a different blend of actors. For example, when the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement did not solve the problems of the region, talks began as early as 1988 with a broader range of parties that included Sinn Fein.<sup>206</sup> The lesson of British efforts is that effective diplomacy requires continual engagement with influential actors, not just

<sup>203</sup> Harkness, 102-114.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., 102-114.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid., 100-126. Bleakley, 142-162. Northern Ireland Timeline: The Good Friday Agreement, BBC.co.uk, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/timelines/ni/good\\_friday.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/timelines/ni/good_friday.shtml) (accessed February 15, 2006). The four major agreements are: the 1937 Sunnyside agreement which created the Council of Ireland; the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement which defined the Republic’s role in Northern Irish governance; the 1993 Downing Street declaration which restated British commitment to majority consent on the future of the province and redefined the Republic’s role in the province; and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement which established a framework for a representative government that emphasized power sharing, and devolved authority.

<sup>206</sup> Paul Bew, Peter Gibson, and Henry Patterson, *Northern Ireland 1921-1996: Political Forces and Social Classes* (London: Serif, 1996), 214-220. The Anglo-Irish Agreement was negotiated between Great Britain and the Irish Republic. It provided a limited advisory role for the Republic in Northern Irish affairs.

state entities, and a focus on an achievable goal. Sinn Fein was and still is an important actor because it provides the British government a way to talk to the IRA without violating their policy of not negotiating with terrorist organizations.

British military strategy evolved from one of direct engagement at the start of the modern conflict, to one that emphasized restraint and the civilian control of military force. Operations in Northern Ireland ranged from conventional security patrols to unilateral direct action missions. As we will see the combination of special forces and conventional actions were insufficient to stop the violence; however, the pressure they put on the radical group was critical to enabling diplomatic actions in the late 1990s to secure a cease fire. Tony Geraghty describes conventional military operations in his book *The Irish War*, as “ham fisted” and an effective recruiting tool for the IRA. He makes these accusations because conventional military operations in the 1970s focused on cordon-and-search missions, riot control, and patrolling. All these operations were conducted without adequate intelligence and disproportionately targeted Catholics or Catholic neighborhoods. Geraghty argues that the British leaders had forgotten the lessons of Malaysia and Oman, that the population was an important resource to be deliberately developed and protected. Instead the conventional military adopted a confrontational strategy that alienated the public and legitimized terrorist propaganda. The author notes that a shift began in the early 1980s away from confrontation to a more sophisticated strategy that emphasized intelligence gathering and police leadership. This shift was important in changing the momentum of the conflict, but it would take more than 20 years to come to fruition.<sup>207</sup>

Two features of this military strategy merit discussion because of their importance to the overall effort: the efforts to develop quality intelligence and Special Forces’ operations in association with local police. Military units such as the Mobile Reconnaissance Force (MRF), the 14<sup>th</sup> Intelligence Company, and the Field Reconnaissance Unit (FRU) were specially developed by the British Army to support operations in Northern Ireland. They provided detailed information through covert reconnaissance, surveillance, and penetration of suspected terrorists groups and operations. These units were characterized by meticulously selected and highly trained

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<sup>207</sup> Geraghty.

operatives selectively employed on critical missions. Intelligence collection was tightly integrated with the operations of both the police and military forces, with these military forces often coming under some form of police control.<sup>208</sup> Although the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) eventually developed its own reconnaissance and special direct action capabilities, this relationship would continue throughout the modern conflict.

These British special forces did not confine their actions solely to reconnaissance and surveillance however. Mark Bowlin describes the organization's deception and psychological operations in his thesis entitled *British Intelligence and the IRA: The Secret War in Northern Ireland, 1969-1988*. The "Embezzlement Sting," was a deception operation conducted by the MFR using a double agent named Louis Hammond. The operation attempted to degrade the IRA's popular support, by portraying the group as "racketeers and gangsters." While the long term outcome of this operation could not be measured, it seemed to have the desired immediate effect of threatening popular support for the group. The IRA certainly felt it did as they further damaged their own reputation by picking up Hammond and attempting to kill him for his part in the fictitious plot.<sup>209</sup>

The Special Air Service (SAS) operations in Northern Ireland illustrate the other significant feature of British military strategy, that of finding and destroying terrorists. Deployed to Northern Ireland for the modern conflict officially in 1976, the SAS differed from regular army units in its skills, tactics, and equipment. The unit brought another dynamic to the fight as well; unlike the regulars, who were always at risk when they moved, the SAS was "licensed to take the war to the enemy." They were a clandestine offensive force that hit hard, fast, and unexpectedly and then melted away. This dynamic changed the battlefield calculus in the conflict considerably.<sup>210</sup> Special Air Service operations took two forms. The first were surveillance and apprehension missions with a high likelihood for violence or a high degree of difficulty. These missions frequently

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<sup>208</sup> Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, *A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), 87-89. Geraghty, 43-52. Peter Harclerode, *Secret Soldiers: Special Forces in the War Against Terrorism* (London: Cassell & Co., 2000), 227-228 & 315-316.

<sup>209</sup> Mark L. Bowlin, *British Intelligence and the IRA: The Secret War in Northern Ireland, 1969-1988* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1998), 80-83.

<sup>210</sup> Geraghty, 119, 130-131.

included tight integration with RUC units.<sup>211</sup> The second were politically sensitive clandestine missions that did not allow for mistakes. Missions such as cross border snatches exemplify politically sensitive operations.<sup>212</sup> This focus on special forces does not lessen the contribution of a large number of conventional forces. However, the conventional forces' operations differed greatly in type and effectiveness.

Great Britain devoted significant economic resources to diminishing the conditions of poverty and inequality that generated a great deal of discontent in Northern Ireland. This could be described as a developmental strategy, but it would be a mistake to equate this to American efforts to undermine the causes of terrorism. Great Britain enacted many economic development programs, such as social security reform and urban renewal, not within the framework of counterterrorism activities, but as part of the Thatcher administration's nationwide efforts to improve the society as a whole. Developmental projects in Belfast illustrate the mixed results of this economic strategy. Belfast was designated as an Enterprise Zone and significant money was committed through programs such as Making Belfast Work. Community based Action Teams attempted to create jobs, improve job skills through continuing adult education, and improve health care. These programs came at a time when governmental benefits were revised downward, tax laws rewritten, and Belfast's levels of poverty and unemployment were higher than other areas of the country. The net effect of these programs was very little improvement to the life of the average person.<sup>213</sup> One of the reasons for these poor results was the disparity between the Protestant and Catholic societies. Some of these divisions were unavoidable in a population wracked by internecine violence; for example, the development of Catholic ghettos in cities like Belfast and Derry was inevitable given

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<sup>211</sup> Martin C. Arostegui, *Twilight Warriors: Inside the World's Special Forces* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), 68. Arostegui describes a clandestine surveillance operation in which SAS soldiers hid in a water tower to identify and document the activities of an IRA bomber before turning him over to the RUC.

<sup>212</sup> Geraghty, 119-120. Geraghty describes what has since become known as a rendition. On March 12, 1976 an SAS team crossed into the Irish Republic and apprehended Sean McKenna, a PIRA soldier, and delivered him to the RUC in Northern Ireland; McKenna was later sentenced to 25 years in prison for terrorist offenses. These operations did not always go well. A similar operation was carried out in April to apprehend PIRA treasurer Peter Cleary. This one did not go quite as well for Cleary. He attempted to escape, and struggled with his guard for the man's weapon. Cleary was wounded in the melee, and then finished off with a *coup de grâce* shot from one of the troopers.

<sup>213</sup> Frank Gaffikin and Mike Morrissey, *Northern Ireland: The Thatcher Years* (London: Zed Books, 1990), 136-149.



the threat these communities faced. The government attempted to target these divisions through programs such as “Education for Mutual Understanding” and the reorganization of public housing. But these programs were insufficient to address the needs of the Catholic community and did not degrade support for the terrorists.<sup>214</sup>

Great Britain was at a serious information disadvantage in the 1970s, and information was power in this conflict. This paper has already noted the activities of highly specialized military forces to gather detailed information; however, surveillance was only one element of the effort. Interrogation of captured PIRA soldiers was an important part of the effort to gain actionable and time sensitive intelligence. While it yielded some good information, the program was poorly managed and created significant problems for the British forces. The interrogation methods used by the British Army included a number of questionable techniques that frequently crossed the line between legitimate interrogation and torture. This created international pressure and became a propaganda weapon for the IRA.<sup>215</sup> In addition to interrogation, British forces developed and ran a small network of informers and agents within various terrorist organizations. This network was relatively effective at disrupting these organizations by creating doubt and mistrust within the groups. It is credited with forcing the PIRA to shift from a military style brigade based structure to a cellular one. This in turn made operations more difficult, while simultaneously making the group harder to penetrate, track, and defeat.<sup>216</sup>

The British information war was not limited to intelligence gathering. Public diplomacy and domestic psychological operations were also practiced by the Army in the conflict. Although little is written about these efforts, David Charters briefly outlines British psychological operations in his article “Intelligence and Psychological Operations in Northern Ireland.” Charters notes six features of the Army’s “psychological ‘offensive,’” and describes the difficulties with conducting such an operation against a

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<sup>214</sup> Derek Birrell, “Social Policy Responses to Urban Violence in Northern Ireland,” *Managing Divided Cities*, ed. Seamus Dunn (Staffordshire: Keele University Press, 1994), <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/policy/birrell.htm> (accessed February 8, 2006).

<sup>215</sup> Bradley W.C. Bamford, “The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland,” *Intelligence and National Security* 20, no. 4 (December 2005), <http://www.metapress.com> (accessed February 8, 2006), 589-590. Geraghty, 46-51.

<sup>216</sup> Bamford, 590-539.

domestic target. Of note, Charters states that the offensive recognized the importance of winning over the public and attempted to employ civil affairs personnel to accomplish this task. The Army also deliberately worked to counter terrorist propaganda and establish a public relation's plan.<sup>217</sup> Little is written about the government's overall effort to win the battle of ideas in both the international and domestic arena. There seemed to be a deliberate effort to reassure all sides in the conflict that their rights would be respected and that their opinions mattered. The meticulous language in the 1985 and 1993 agreements illustrates that great care was taken not to alarm loyalists while at the same time not alienating nationalists.<sup>218</sup>

The judicial element of British grand strategy included reforms within the RUC to make it more effective and less partisan, but also incorporated a number of other interesting features. Internment was the early policy of holding suspected terrorists for extended periods without charges or trial. This policy was highly unpopular and was eventually discontinued.<sup>219</sup> To address difficulties with trying terror suspects, Great Britain introduced Diplock courts, a system of special courts with lower evidentiary standards, no jury, and wider latitude on testimony and confession. These courts were the subject of much debate over their legality, but their decisions generally survived appeal and contributed to a decrease in violence in the 1970s.<sup>220</sup> The policy of *criminalization* of terrorism began in the mid 1970s. This policy included initiatives to portray terrorists as common criminals in an effort to isolate them from their nonviolent supporters. It also removed the special status afforded terrorists within the criminal

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<sup>217</sup> David A. Charters, "Intelligence and Psychological Operations in Northern Ireland," originally published in *Journal of the Royal Services Institute for Defence Studies* 122, reprinted in *Dimensions of Irish Terrorism*, ed. Alan O'Day (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1994), 380-381.

<sup>218</sup> Harkness 104-114. Bleakley 136-146 & 156-162.

<sup>219</sup> Geraghty, 43-52. Bleakley, 101-109. Frontline, "British Actions," <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/conflict/> (accessed December 13, 2005).

<sup>220</sup> Charles Carlton, "Judging Without Consensus: The Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland," originally published in *Law & Policy Quarterly* 3, no. 2 (April 1981), reprinted in *Dimensions of Irish Terrorism*, ed. Alan O'Day (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1994), 248-257.

justice system and allowed *supergrasses* witnesses at trial. These policies contributed to the extremely effective prison protests which culminated in the hunger strikes of the early 1980s.<sup>221</sup>

British grand strategy reflected a mix of measures that favored diplomatic and law enforcement activities, while eventually maintaining lower, more specialized, level of military force. It included significant informational elements, but employed insufficient economic power. It would have been very easy for Great Britain to attack the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland from a purely combative military strategy, or even a hybrid military-judicial strategy. While it is impossible to predict the effect of rejected options, it is unlikely that such strategies could have resolved the conflict any sooner. British strategy attempted to balance law enforcement and military actions with aggressive and substantive diplomatic engagements. The limited success of economic aid may indicate that insufficient economic resources were devoted to the effort, but it may also indicate that the aid provided was poorly administered, incorrectly targeted, or that economic issues were not central to the conflict. Either way, economic power failed to contribute to the efforts to secure a peaceful resolution to the conflict. This particular mix of national power did not achieve immediate results, changes in the domestic and global environment were needed to make continued terrorism counterproductive for all parties involved.

Some significant factors worked in favor of the British effort. First among these was the establishment of direct rule in the province. This action allowed Westminster to impose governmental reforms in Northern Ireland and directly involve the Irish Republic in the conflict.<sup>222</sup> Without direct rule it would have been almost impossible to begin the series of treaties that ultimately culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Accord, almost 30 years after Great Britain took the lead in the conflict. Second, resolving the root of Catholic unrest, generally a lack of civil rights in the province, was not antithetical to

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<sup>221</sup> Frontline, “British Actions” and “The Hunger Strikes.” Bamford, 594-595. Geraghty, 101. Supergrasses witnesses were informants that were given immunity or lighter sentences in return for their testimony against other terrorists. Often a single informant testified against many members of an organization, and often this testimony was uncorroborated. Many of the convictions based on supergrasses testimony were overturned; however, Bamford argues that this still created chaos within the groups because of the information it provided to other terrorist groups, and the mistrust it encouraged within groups.

<sup>222</sup> Harkness, 100-103. Bleakley, 110-117. Frontline, “The Conflict.”

British interests. This allowed the government to enact reforms without appearing to give in to terrorists, an important feature in any counterterrorist strategy. Finally, between 1972 and 2005, the environment changed in Northern Ireland. Voting rights reform and open elections allowed the Catholic minority to have input into the policies and programs of their government. The IRA was encouraged to adopt peaceful tactics through “the movement’s inclusion into a systematic process of dialogue, and the negative response from one’s political constituency which delegitimised the use of armed force.”<sup>223</sup> Jonathan Stevenson argues in his article “Peace in Northern Ireland: Why Now?” that the European Union (EU) has changed the environment as well. The Irish Republic is in a better position within the EU structure than Great Britain, thus the nationalist position is less threatening to the northern Protestants. Unity with the Irish Republic would mean access to the greater economic opportunities that this position affords. The Good Friday Agreement takes advantage of these relative strengths and provides a much greater role for the Republic in the affairs of Northern Ireland.<sup>224</sup>

Balance in grand strategy is more than just employing instruments of power to the maximum of a nation’s capacity, it is the art of blending the application of those instruments so that actions are reinforcing and scarce resources are maximized. Great Britain eventually achieved a good balance of diplomatic, military force, and law enforcement power. Constant and determined diplomatic efforts brought key actors together to work out their differences. Ideology did not hinder needed governmental reforms that were designed to diminish the underlying conditions that empowered radical elements in the Catholic community. Military and law enforcement actions were so successful in preventing terrorists’ operations that groups like the IRA chose to participate in the political process in order to continue the struggle.<sup>225</sup> Not all policies and programs were well synchronized. Interrogation tactics, for example, resulted in global condemnation and “damage to Britain’s international reputation.”<sup>226</sup> Judicial

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<sup>223</sup> Peter R. Neumann, “The Bullet and the Ballot Box: The Case of the IRA,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 6 (December 2005): 971, <http://www.metapress.com> (accessed February 8, 2006).

<sup>224</sup> Jonathan Stevenson, “Peace in Northern Ireland: Why Now?” *Foreign Policy* no. 112 (Autumn 1998), <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed February 8, 2006).

<sup>225</sup> Neumann, 969. Neumann quotes Brendan Hughes, a “former Belfast Brigade commander,” who describes the effectiveness of British military activity and the limited options open for the IRA.

<sup>226</sup> Bamford, 589.

power has been over-employed in this conflict to the extent that it was often out of synch with other strategies. Internment and criminalization programs, for example, added to support for the IRA within the province and may have done more harm than good. Overall however, this grand strategy was well balanced and has shown positive results in the fight against terrorism in Northern Ireland.

### **3. Conclusion**

The British grand strategy in Northern Ireland has managed the conflict between Protestants and Catholics for over 30 years with a mixed record of success and failure. It is not a strategy that emerged full blown in 1972 from an official policy document; rather, it is one that evolved over the decades of conflict. The strategy contains many of the features of an effective grand strategy, and clearly attempts to employ all the instruments of national power available to Great Britain in the struggle. However, it is also a strategy that has yet to completely resolve the conflict, despite the recent positive steps. This strategy illustrates the value of clearly stated national interests and objectives in focusing and enabling the instruments of national power. It attempts to employ all the instruments of national power, and does so in a manner that is generally well balanced. Diplomatic and military force has been sufficient, economic force insufficient, and law enforcement efforts at times excessive; Table 7 summarizes this evaluation. The outcome of this conflict remains less than settled. The cease-fire in Northern Ireland has led to disarmament by the IRA, and militant groups are involved in the legitimate government of the province, but the issues of sovereignty and governance remain unresolved.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> Associated Press, "IRA Completes Disarmament," CBS News World, September 26, 2005, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/26/world/main884579.shtml> (accessed March 15, 2006).

Instrument of Power	Strategy for Employment	Effectiveness
Diplomatic	Negotiation	++
Informational	Persuasion & Situational Understanding	+
Military	Selective Engagement & Support for L.E.	+
Economic	Development	-
Law Enforcement	Prosecution	+
<b>Outcome</b>		Disarmament

**Table 7. British Grand Strategy in Northern Ireland**

Narrowly defined and limited national interests provided flexibility to British grand strategy that allowed the nation to capitalize on certain environmental changes in the province. Changes in voting laws and recognition for groups such as Sinn Fein gave radical organizations an opportunity to peacefully affect reform. The European Union has made nationalist goals less threatening to the Protestant population. Both of these changes were easily used by grand strategists who were focused on the national interest of achieving a peaceful settlement to the conflict. If America defines her national interests in the Middle East as achieving a secure, stable, and peaceful region, the U.S. will have a great deal of flexibility in designing pragmatic and tailored policy and programs.<sup>228</sup> Encouraging the development of representative governments might be a strategic objective in Egypt, Kuwait, or a number of other nations where it is appropriate. In other nations, such as Saudi Arabia or Iran this objective may be entirely inappropriate, or a long term one that is not discussed.

Instruments of power must be balanced according to the threat and objectives. British law enforcement and military activities worked in concert with her diplomatic efforts. Great Britain began at an information disadvantage, but efforts to improve

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<sup>228</sup> *Random House Unabridged Dictionary* 2d edition, ed. By Stuart Berg Flexner, (New York: Random House, 1993). Stable is defined as: “1. not likely to fall or give way, as a structure, support, foundation, etc; firm; steady. 2. able or likely to continue or last; firmly established; enduring or permanent; a stable government. 3. resistant to sudden change or deterioration ... .” Secure is defined as: “1. free from or not exposed to danger or harm; safe. 2. dependable; firm; not liable to fail, yield, become displaced, etc. ...” Peaceful is defined as: “1. the normal, nonwarring condition of a nation, group of nations, or the world. ... 3. a state of mutual harmony between people or groups, especially in personal relations: Try to live in peace with your neighbor. ...”

intelligence collection and persuade the Northern Irish public to support political efforts to resolve the conflict turned this deficit around to where intelligence was enabling operations. Had British economic policy been successful in the region, it is entirely possible that the conflict might have been resolved sooner. In the Middle East, America is reluctant to engage nations such as Iran and Syria as consistent partners in the war on terrorism. While there are many good reasons for this reluctance, these are the very nations that may be able to affect the groups that threaten the United States. One of the lessons of British diplomacy in Northern Ireland is that all legitimate actors with any sort of influence in a conflict, except of course the terrorist group themselves, should be engaged in diplomatic negotiations. British military activities were notably restrained after the early 1980s, law enforcement operations were in the lead, because it was important to exercise restraint when combating an enemy that hid among the population. Information is critical to these conflicts. Great Britain put its collection effort into avenues where it could reap the greatest rewards, human intelligence. The U.S. must critically evaluate the balance in its current grand strategy to determine if the blend of policies and programs that has evolved in the last since September 11, 2001 is appropriate to the threat, objectives and global environment faced today.

## **B. INDIAN STRATEGY TO COUNTER SIKH VIOLENCE**

One of the most violent periods of terrorist activity took place in the Indian state of Punjab from the mid 1970s to the late 1990s. During this period Sikh militants, Hindu militias, and sectarian mobs accounted for over 20,000 dead and countless other casualties. The violence was rooted in a Sikh separatist movement that developed in the late 1970s around the issue of control over the style and content of worship at Sikh temples. This movement featured religious fundamentalism and political nationalism in equal and complementary parts.

The Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee (SGPC), an elected body, controlled Sikh all temples within Punjab, as well a number of significant ones outside the state. The moderate Akali Dal party controlled the SGPC through the party's success in popular elections. This control gave Akali Dal access to enormous resources, and significant influence over the practice of religion in what is traditionally non-hierarchical faith. Sikh militants groups initially developed as a fundamentalist counter to the

influence of Akali Dal.<sup>229</sup> The Sikh culture had strong nationalist traditions that stem from a long and proud history of ethnic identity, success in battle, and status as an independent nation in the 1700s. These nationalist traditions were used by the religious fundamentalists in an attempt to rally a broader audience of Sikhs against the Hindu dominated Indian government. It would be a mistake to suggest that the separatist movement represented the majority of Sikhs; in fact it represented a minority, but it was a powerful minority.<sup>230</sup>

The Indian province of Punjab, located on the country's western border with Pakistan, is shown in Figure 3. Two critical cities in the province, Amritsar and Chandigarh, are located in the northwest and centereast respectively. Punjab is bordered by the provinces of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, and Rajasthan. New Delhi, located in the southeast of the province of Haryana, is relatively nearby.




Figure 3. Map of Indian Conflict Area<sup>231</sup>

<sup>229</sup> Rajiv A. Kapur, *Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), xv-xvi.

<sup>230</sup> Cyntia Keppley Mahmood, *Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues With Sikh Militants* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 18-20, 33-49, & 107-120. Carl H. Yaeger "Sikh Terrorism in the Struggle for Khalistan," *Terrorism* 14, no. 4 (October 1991): 221-223.

<sup>231</sup> Map of Punjab province from Google images and available at <http://punjabgovt.nic.in/ECONOMY/districts/punjab.htm> (accessed February 21, 2006). "Maps & Geographic Information Systems," Agriculture Gateway to India, [http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/aim/diglib/india/images/INDIAMAP\\_NEW.jpg](http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/aim/diglib/india/images/INDIAMAP_NEW.jpg) (accessed February 21, 2006).



## 1. Roots of the Conflict

The modern phase of the conflict, ongoing since the mid 1970s, had its origins in political intrigue and power struggles within the Indian government. In 1978 Indira Gandhi's son, Sanjay, and her Home Minister, Zail Singh, created a Sikh political organization to splinter the growing power of the Akali Dal party. This new party, known as the Dal Khalsa, was led by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a fundamentalist religious leader who did not eschew violence in the name of his cause. Almost immediately upon inception the group began to violently oppose Akali Dal policies and eventually running afoul of the government that created it.<sup>232</sup> From 1980 to 1984 the protection of Gandhi's government allowed Bhindranwale to grow his organization and reach a point where he no longer needed external support. Beholden to none, the Dal Khalsa became increasingly violent in an effort to drive the Hindu population from Punjab and "force" Sikhs from outside the state to return home.

In 1984, after six years of escalating violence, Bhindranwale and his followers took refuge from the police in the holiest of Sikh temples the Golden Temple in the city of Amritsar. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi eventually sent in the Indian army to apprehend Bhindranwale and end the standoff. The militants, armed with machine guns and anti-tank rockets, held off the troops for much of the night until tanks were committed effectively ending the fight. Casualty figures in this engagement are a subject of much dispute. Up to 79 Indian soldiers and 493 militants, including Bhindranwale were killed in the fighting. A number of religiously significant parts of the temple were heavily damaged as well. It should be noted that Sikhs were well represented in the military at all levels and many were involved in the raid on the temple. Also of note, in response to the raid two Sikh military units totaling more than 2000 troops mutinied, and a number of officers were killed during the actions.<sup>233</sup>

This event galvanized Sikh separatists and motivated many other groups. Within the year Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, and anti-Sikh riots

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<sup>232</sup> Yaeger, 223-228.

<sup>233</sup> Apurba Kundu, *Militarism in India: The Army and Civil Society in Consensus* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998), 172-183. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "India in 1984: Confrontation, Assassination, and Succession," *Asian Survey* 25, no. 2 (February 1985): 131-134.

throughout the country killed as many as 2500 Sikhs.<sup>234</sup> Over the next 15 years as many as 25,000 people were killed and another 20,000 to 40,000 disappeared or were illegally detained by Sikh extremists, Hindu militias, or the police. Sikh terrorists groups massacred Hindus in bus hijackings, targeted assassinations, and bombings in the name of their “armed struggle.” The overwhelming majority of their targets were Indian; although some attacks were carried out outside of India, even these were generally against Indian targets.<sup>235</sup> Sikh terrorists groups had a great deal of active and tacit support from the larger Sikh community within India, as well as the international Sikh diaspora. As with Islamic extremists however, Sikh militants and their supporters represented only a small fraction of the world’s Sikh population. This is one of the few terrorist movements that have been successfully defeated. The question of how India achieved this feat is one that this paper will now attempt to briefly address.

## **2. Lessons of Indian Grand Strategy**

Indian grand strategy was markedly different from the British efforts in Northern Ireland even though both dealt with sectarian separatist movements. Diplomacy was an important feature of the Indian program, but it did not play the leading role that it did in Northern Ireland. This grand strategy made an initial effort to resolve the central issues diplomatically, but quickly turned to a strategy the emphasized overwhelming police and military power to crush the terrorist organizations. This vignette illustrates the importance of synchronization in a grand strategy more than anything else. The Indian response to Sikh violence is one that was initially desynchronized and ineffective. It is only after police and military forces took the lead that the conditions changed and efforts were ultimately successful.

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<sup>234</sup> Yaeger, 229-230.

<sup>235</sup> Mahmood, 143-156. Gurharpal Singh, “Punjab since 1984: Disorder, Order, and Legitimacy,” *Asian Survey* 36, no. 4 (April 1996): 411, <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed February 9, 2006). “Bloody Sunday in Punjab,” *The Economist* 301, no. 7475 (December 6, 1986): 47-50. Sanjoy Hazarika, “India Sending More Troops to Punjab as Toll Rises” *The New York Times*, May 22, 1988, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 10, 2006). Prem Jha, “India’s Losing War on Terrorism,” *U.S. News and World Report* 104, no. 20 (May 23, 1988): 48-49, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 10, 2006). Reuters, “India Arrests Sikh in ’85 Bombing of Jetliner,” *The New York Times*, July 19, 1992, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 11, 2006). Reuters, “Two Sikhs in Canada Get Life in Bomb Plot,” *The New York Times*, January 29, 1987, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 11, 2006). Clarity, Milt Freudenheim, Katherine Roberts and James F., “Sikh Terrorists Kill 72 in Attacks on Buses in India,” *The New York Times*, July 12, 1987, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 11, 2006).

The central governments of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi unsuccessfully attempted to engage the Sikh leadership in an effort to resolve the issues surrounding the conflict. In 1982-1983 Indira Gandhi's government began talks with Sikh leaders of the Akali Dal party, the leading Sikh political organization. In late 1982 the Akali Dal and the more militant Dal Khalsa parties combined to put greater pressure on Gandhi's government, resulting in negotiations and significant concessions by Gandhi over religious and territorial issues.<sup>236</sup> These concessions were based on the 1973 Anandpur Sahib resolution of the Akali party. In that resolution, the party, on behalf of the greater Sikh community, expressed a series of 45 demands which included greater control of temples outside Punjab, greater control of water rights, and territorial changes that would put Punjab in sole control of the city of Chandigarh. Gandhi's concessions met or made progress on most of the religious demands in the Anandpur Sahib resolution, but few if any of the territorial ones. This agreement fell apart in part because Gandhi's government could not convince the chief minister of the state of Haryana, which included Chandigarh, to agree to territorial changes that would turn the city over to Punjab.<sup>237</sup>

Indira Gandhi's initial attempts to use diplomatic power to resolve the crisis failed for two reasons. First, her government could not deliver on all the promises it made. The disposition of Chandigarh was critical to Sikh notions of statehood and identity. Failure to turn it over to Punjab became a long standing source of contention. Second, Gandhi's government was not dealing with the right actor. Akali Dal was aligned in purpose with Bhindranwale's Dal Khalsa, but it did not control the militant group. In fact Bhindranwale worked throughout the negotiations to undermine Akali Dal in an effort to assume the leadership of Sikh society. Bhindranwale's terrorists went on a rampage of violence immediately after the agreement was signed. This violence was directed against

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<sup>236</sup> Maya Chadda, *Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 132. Kapur, xiv-xvi & 194-200. Akali Dal gained its status as the leading Sikh party through its success in gaining overwhelming control of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee (SGPC) which was the committee charged with managing Sikh temples throughout Punjab and in some other areas. The SGPC through its ability to affect the very way Sikhism was worshipped was in a position of leadership in the community. Additionally, the committee has access to significant resources derived from the contributions of Sikhs to their local temples.

<sup>237</sup> Chadda, 124-125, 132. Mahmood, 115-117. Chandigarh was designated the capital of both Punjab and Haryana after the 1966 redrawing of state boundaries which coincided with Gandhi's taking power in India. Possession of the city has been the subject of at least one successful death fast by a Sikh leader, and it has been central to the conflict between the Indian government and Sikh militants since the 1973 resolution.

leaders in the government, Sikh society, and the Hindu community, but also at ordinary individuals solely on the basis of their religious orientation. Akali Dal was effectively marginalized by the violence; the party began to adopt more hardline position in an effort to halt its slipping support. The government likewise became more aggressive and violent in its attempt to stop the violence. In the end, relations between the Sikh community and the government were more polarized than before the 1983 concessions, and the stage was set for the 1984 raid on the Golden Temple.<sup>238</sup>

Rajiv Gandhi's government also tried to employ diplomacy to resolve the problem which had grown to nationwide proportions by early 1985. The Rajiv-Longowal Accord, signed in mid 1985 between the central government and the President of Akali Dal, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, came after Gandhi released key Akali leaders from prison and appointed a trusted ally as governor of Punjab. The agreement gave the city of Chandigarh to Punjab and agreed to further negotiations or arbitration to resolve the more contentious issues such as water rights, autonomy, and control of "extra-territorial" temples. Maya Chadda argues in her book, *Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India*, that these moves were part of a deliberate effort by Gandhi to isolate Sikh militants from the more moderate population which Akali Dal represented. Gandhi went on to allow elections to take place in Punjab as a further attempt to reinforce moderate elements within the population. Scholars differ in their explanations of why this agreement fell apart; what is clear is that neither side could adhere to the promises it made. The city of Chandigarh was not transferred to Punjab, the recommendations of the water commission were delayed, and the Akali government in Punjab was eventually dismissed in May 1987. The Akali leaders, like their predecessors in 1982, could not prevent the militant separatist groups from continued acts of terrorism.<sup>239</sup> This series of interrelated events fueled militant violence and increased the separation between the Indian central government and common Sikhs. The Indian government shifted to a strategy that favored strong police action to target and defeat terrorist organizations at any cost after the collapse of the Rajiv-Longowal Accord in 1987.

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<sup>238</sup> Chadda, 134-135.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid., 136-139. Singh, 412. "India: Accord with the Sikhs," *Oxford Analytica*, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 10, 2006).

Little is written about Indian information strategy. Most of the details must be interpreted from the tactics and results of police and military forces. However, it seems that there was a deliberate attempt to use the power of information in two ways. First, Indian forces attempted to discredit terrorist leaders by publicizing their apostasy, graft, and self indulgence. This was part of an effort to isolate the militants by destroying their reputation as devout and pure Sikhs. The government, for example, during the second siege of the Golden Temple publicized the terrorists' desecration of the holy site, and highlighted that terrorists routinized rape of Sikh women on the grounds of the holy site.<sup>240</sup> Second, Indian forces attempted to reassure the population that it could be secure from terrorist violence. The military's heavy presence and constant night patrolling during Operation Raksack II was an effort to achieve this goal. These efforts are generally credited with vastly improving the flow of critical information to security forces as the population began to resist the militants.<sup>241</sup>

Military force played a supporting role in the Indian government's grand strategy to defeat Sikh terrorist groups. The 1984 raid on the Golden Temple marked the most direct employment of military forces against Sikh militants. Military strategy began to change in the late 1980s as a result of popular opposition to the temple raid. Mano Joshi, in his research entitled *Combating Terrorism in Punjab: Indian Democracy in Crisis* for the *Conflict Studies* series, discusses these changes and the pivotal roles played by the military in the 1990s. In 1991-1992 approximately 120,000 troops were deployed in Punjab to participate in Operation Rakshak II, the extended joint police-military action that he credits with changing the momentum of the conflict. Joshi describes three primary roles for conventional Indian military forces during this period. First and foremost, the overwhelming Army presence allowed police forces to concentrate on tracking down and killing or capturing terrorist leaders. Prior to the deployments of 1991-1992, police forces were tied up with security missions or afraid to leave their defensive positions; the military created maneuver room for the police. Second, as previously mentioned, the presence and activity of military forces encouraged "grass

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<sup>240</sup> K.P.S. Gill, *Punjab: The Knights of Falsehood* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1997), 98-105.

<sup>241</sup> Mano J. Joshi, *Combating Terrorism in Punjab: Indian Democracy in Crisis*, *Conflict Studies* 261 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1993), 19-20.

roots” resistance to the terrorist groups. Finally, the military supported the police with training, planning, and quick reaction forces when needed. This support was critical to creating an effective and active police force.<sup>242</sup> The effectiveness of diplomatic power was very different from that of law enforcement and military powers. Diplomacy consistently failed to resolve the issue, and was largely abandoned after 1985. Military power initially inflamed the conflict in 1984, but was redirected to a supporting role when law enforcement moved to the front.

The imposition of “President’s Rule” in Punjab changed the complexion of the conflict. The central government turned away from a negotiated settlement that addressed Sikh issues, and moved to defeat the terrorist organizations through expanded police powers and increased use of paramilitary forces. The Punjabi police force was reorganized, expanded and reinforced with elements of “the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), and the regular use of the Army.” A package of anti-terrorism legislation, passed between 1980 and 1985, implemented what has been called a “counter terror” strategy. Police and other governmental organizations commonly employed hit squads, routinized torture, and targeted the families of suspected terrorists.<sup>243</sup> India’s central government took over control of local government in the conflict zone in order to impose change. Unlike Northern Ireland, the structure of Punjab’s government was not a problem; Sikh’s controlled the local government when Gandhi imposed “President’s Rule” in 1987. The problem was that the state government could not stop the violence and political pressure to assume control overwhelmed Gandhi. The conflict in India became one between the central government and Sikh separatists, the local government was either unwilling or unable to act effectively against the militants.

The extreme measures taken by state security forces began to wear down Indians’ national will in 1989 until a number of events occurred to reinforce the nation’s commitment to the strategy. In 1991 the Congress party, the party of both Gandhis,

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<sup>242</sup> Joshi, 12-14.

<sup>243</sup> Singh, 411-413. Mahmood, 7-10 & 37-40. McDonald Hamish, “India: Punjab Pacified – Terrorism Wanes, but Police Methods Come Under Fire,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* 156, no. 13 (April 1, 1993), <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 19, 2006). Hamish coins the phrase “counter-terror” to describe this new strategy.

retook control of the central government in general elections. The party followed this up in 1992 with a victory in the Punjab elections. These election victories put the hardline Congress party in control at every level involved in the fight; a consistent, five year strategy to fight Sikh terrorism was possible. In 1991 a number of terrorist actions by Sikh militants, including the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, combined to make violence in the name of religion no longer acceptable to the population. What followed was a massive deployment of conventional and paramilitary troops to Punjab to support police forces. The combined security forces began the tit-for-tat action that decimated the terrorist organizations. This was, in effect, a military strategy executed led by the police. In 1992 the security forces began to gain control of the conflict. Police casualties dropped, a number of terrorist leaders were captured or killed, approximately 800 militants surrendered and the general population began to show signs that they were no longer intimidated by the terrorists.<sup>244</sup>

Authors generally credit the Indian “counter-terror” campaign with defeating the Sikh terrorism. However, K.P.S. Gill argues in his book, *Punjab: The Knights of Falsehood*, that the turnaround came as a result of a change within the Sikh population that enabled the police to be successful. The relatively peaceful resolution of a second siege of the Golden Temple in 1988 marked the turning point for the militants. The groups lost their “ideological moorings” according to Gill, and their atrocities began to alienate them from the population. Militant groups effectively lost the information war for the support of the population because of their excessive violence and immoral behavior. The Sikh population responded by joining the Punjab police force in large numbers in an effort to resist the terrorists at the risk of their own life and that of their families. Key to this effort was the local support which slowly began to deny the militant groups access to critical resources, and provide the police with critical information to identify the fighters.<sup>245</sup> Gill states that the average Sikh never accepted the extremist ideology espoused by the terrorist groups, and they paid for this refusal with their lives;

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<sup>244</sup> Singh, 413-414. Hamish.

<sup>245</sup> Gill, 99-108. Sanjoy Hazarika, “Sikhs Surrender to Troops at Temple,” *The New York Times*, May 19, 1988: A3, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 10, 2006).

according to Gill's figures, 61% of the victims of Sikh terrorism were Sikhs.<sup>246</sup> It was their shift from passive to active resistance that changed the momentum of this conflict and ultimately defeated the terrorist groups.

The actions of the Indian central government against Sikh terrorists illustrate the danger of poorly synchronized grand strategy. The government's actions in three realms of power created significant problems and had the potential to seriously compound the conflict. Diplomatically, the governments of both Indira and Rajiv Gandhi made agreements that they could not keep. The issues of Chandigarh and water rights were central to the militant's cause and the central governments failure to deliver on promises concessions legitimized the terrorist's fight. It is entirely possible that Indira Gandhi could have prevented the entire conflict in the early 1980s if her government had not supported the actions of Bhindranwale or had they delivered on their 1983 agreement with leaders of Akali Dal. Militarily, the storming of the Golden Temple in 1984 created the impression that the Indian Army was targeting Sikhs. This created a barrier between the military and the population in Punjab, a significant problem in counterinsurgency operations.

The effect of excessive police force is the most interesting question when considering the issue of synchronization in Indian grand strategy. Government sanctioned use of torture, execution, and targeting the families of suspects is not considered an acceptable practice in democratic nations. Gurharpal Singh states, in his article "Punjab Since 1984: Disorder, Order, and Legitimacy," that "a liberal democratic system that replicates the methods of terrorists in its anti-terrorist policies threatens to undermine its own foundations." Caleb Carr takes a more consequentialist approach when he argues that terrorism is always unsuccessful in achieving its objectives, and nations that resort to it ultimately risk defeat.<sup>247</sup> On the surface it would seem that the police "counter-terror" tactics were desynchronized from diplomatic and even military actions. The extreme tactics employed by security forces should have driven a wedge

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<sup>246</sup> Gill, 75-76. It should be noted that Mano Joshi credits Gill with engineering the extreme police policies of the early 1990s. These policies included a shoot-to-kill rule during raids, regular execution of suspects, retaliation against suspect's families, and a bounty system that encouraged killings rather than apprehension.

<sup>247</sup> Singh, 418-419. Carr, 3-16.



between the greater Sikh population and the central government. This wedge should have encouraged Sikh terrorism to spread to other states in India. Domestic and international outrage should have created diplomatic problems for India. The reasons why these expected negative effects did not develop to the extent that they created a problem for India are important.

Three features of the Punjab conflict enabled the central government to systematically employ “counter-terror” tactics. The first we have already discussed, it is Gill’s argument that the overwhelming majority of Sikhs opposed the terrorists. The government actions to publicize the militant’s atrocities in fact drove a wedge between the Sikh population and the militants. Second, for a variety of reasons the idea of an independent Sikh state did not appeal to the larger Sikh population.<sup>248</sup> These two reasons suggest that a legitimate government has a great deal of latitude when facing a domestic enemy lacking in popular support. The government’s actions never created international outrage in part because they never created domestic outrage. Finally, it is important to note that this strategy produced a measurable decrease in violence and visible successes in terms of dead, captured or surrendered terrorists.<sup>249</sup> A unique convergence of public opinion, governmental leadership, and a self destructing adversary enabled India’s “counter-terror” strategy. While these features are unlikely to be reproduced in the conflict that the U.S. now faces, this vignette illustrates the power of the war of ideas in the war on terrorism.

It is possible to argue that the activities of police and paramilitary forces in the early 1990s were not out of synch at all. Military operations were planned and executed to isolate areas for police action or gather intelligence. Diplomatic activity ensured that the 1992 Punjabi elections were conducted and the outcome put a supportive state

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<sup>248</sup> James Clad, “Terrorism’s Toll: continuing Violence Muddies Sikh Activists’ Aims,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* 150, no. 41 (October 11, 1990): 33-34, <http://www.proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 10, 2006). Clad argues that three factors explain the failure of Sikh terrorism. First, the central issue of Sikh militants, securing an independent Sikh homeland, fails to motivate the larger Sikh population. Second, Sikh militant groups are factional and cannot present any sort of unified front with common aims. This is compounded by the criminality and lack of ideological commitment demonstrated by many groups. Finally, the fact that the larger Sikh population is not just ambivalent on the issue of a homeland, many are committed to a united India. These people serve at all levels throughout the nation’s security forces and are committed to defeating the militants.

<sup>249</sup> Joshi, 13-20. Hamish.

government in place for a five year term. Informational activity decreased support for terrorists and may have deflected international opposition.<sup>250</sup> The Indian “counter-terror” strategy is an example of effective synchronization and integration of elements of national power, but not one that the U.S. should attempt to emulate.

### 3. Conclusion

India’s strategy from 1980 to the mid 1990s to combat the threat of Sikh terrorism was a grand strategy executed at the local level. It was a strategy that applied a variety of instruments of national power in concert to defeat a violent terrorist movement that could have threatened vital national interests had it grown unchecked. The Indian government faced a movement that claimed the legitimacy of religious fundamentalism, and used nationalist rhetoric to maintain, for a time, significant popular support. Indian grand strategy employed insufficient diplomatic power and little direct economic power, sufficient informational power, but used overwhelming military and law enforcement power; Table 8 summarizes this evaluation. This conflict was resolved after Sikh separatist groups collapsed under the cumulative pressure of police and military actions.

Instrument of Power	Strategy for Employment	Effectiveness
Diplomatic	Negotiation	--
Informational	Persuasion & Situational Understanding	+
Military	Counter-Terror & Support for L.E.	++
Economic	Not Applied	-
Law Enforcement	Counter-Terror	++
Outcome		Success

**Table 8. Indian Grand Strategy in Punjab**

Indian diplomacy was ineffective from the start of the conflict, so much so that it was virtually abandoned in the 1990s in favor of the “counter-terror” strategy. As we have discussed, diplomacy failed because neither side could really live up to promises made in negotiations. Governmental representatives did not have the power to compel

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<sup>250</sup> Joshi, 13-20.

Hayana to give up its interests in Chandigarh, nor could it settle the issue of water rights. Although central to militant's demands, the issue of an independent Sikh nation was never addressed by the government. The Akali Dal party, the legitimate political organization that represented militant organizations in negotiations, could not control the militant groups who often worked to derail negotiations.

Indian military and law enforcement strategies throughout the 1980s were ineffective at curbing the violence. However, the 1988 Golden Temple siege began to change this dynamic. The military assumed a supporting role to the police in counterterrorism operations. The law enforcement units in Punjab were reorganized, trained, and vastly expanded to improve their performance in the field. Finally, a package of special legislation and police powers provided the mechanisms to rapidly change the environment. Militant organizations could not adapt to these changes and never regained the initiative.

The information campaign waged by governmental forces was an important factor in the defeat of Sikh militants. This campaign again focused on persuasion and developing better situational understanding. Sikh militant groups lost the war for public support through their immoral behavior and employment of indiscriminate excessive violence. By the end of the conflict the public clearly saw these groups more as criminals than as freedom fighters. Indian efforts to improve situational understanding focused on developing intelligence from the population by securing it from militant reprisals. When the Indian Army began effectively separate the population from the terrorists, valuable information began to flow.

This vignette illustrates the effect of synchronization in grand strategy. Indian strategy in the 1980s was poorly synchronized; instruments of national power were working at cross purposes and their actions were counterproductive. In contrast, the central government's strategy in the 1990s was well synchronized; actions that had the potential to negatively impact the overall effort were mitigated by success in other areas. All instruments of national power worked in concert to support the nation's law enforcement organizations. These organizations used an unusual degree of force to

rapidly defeat the terrorists, but that level of force was not unacceptable to the larger population or the international community.

### **C. ISRAELI STRATEGY TO COUNTER HEZBOLLAH VIOLENCE**

Hezbollah, one of the most dangerous and effective transnational terrorist organizations of the late twentieth century, was not defeated by Israeli grand strategy. Unlike the previous terrorist groups, Hezbollah remains to this day a viable military force and an influential actor in the Middle East. However, in the wake of Israeli concessions, the group has voluntarily moved away from direct terrorist action as a means to achieve its goals. Lebanon occupied a key place in Israeli grand strategy in the late 1970s and early 1980s: it provided the country an opportunity to secure a key border and break the tightening circle of hostile Arab states. This vignette will examine the use of Israeli diplomatic, informational, and military power to counter the threat of terrorist violence from Hezbollah. Democratization is likely to produce additional terrorist organizations attempting maintain viability by participating in the legitimate government; Hamas may be only the first of many. This examination is intended to identify lessons for dealing with current groups attempting to assume a measure of legitimacy through their participation in the political process.

#### **1. Roots of the Conflict**

Hezbollah had its earliest roots in two 1970s groups, *Harakat al-Mahroumeen* (the Movement of the Deprived) and *Afwaj al-Muqawamah* (the Lebanese Resistance Detachments), also known as Amal. These groups were founded by Musa al-Sadr, a Shi'a cleric born in Iran and educated in Najaf, to gain political recognition and improve the standard of living of Lebanese Shi'ites. This highly unstable population was the least privileged of the 18 different religious sects inhabiting Lebanon.<sup>251</sup> Al-Sadr's groups did not achieve any significant gains in the 1970's, and were in danger of losing popular support until three events in 1978 gave the organization a much needed boost.<sup>252</sup> First,

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251 Hala Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 8-12. Eyal Zisser, "Hizballah in Lebanon: at the Crossroads," *MERIA Journal* 1, no. 3 (1997), <http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/meria/journal/1997/issue3/jvol1no3in.html> (accessed June 3, 2005). Zisser notes that the success of Shia Islam in Iran and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon worked in concert with a sharp increase in the Lebanese Shi'ite population between 1950 and 1970, and a migration to the urban slums of major cities. The organization that evolved out of Amal was uniquely Lebanese and its goals reflected this identity.

252 Augustus Norton, "Hizballah: from Radicalism to Pragmatism?" *Middle East Policy* 5, no. 4 (1998): 2, <http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/> (accessed June 3, 2005).

the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, while on a trip to Lybia rallied Amal's supporters and gave new life to the group. Second, the success of Iranian Shi'ites in overthrowing the Shah and installing an Islamic government provided the Amal its inspiration. Finally, in August, Israel invaded Lebanon to drive out the PLO fighters using the country as a base of operations. Hezbollah evolved from disagreements that began to appear within Amal regarding general tactics and the group's response to Israel.<sup>253</sup>

Islamic Amal, under the leadership of Sayyid Husayn Musawi split in 1982 from the more conservative and secular Amal, and formed the nucleus of Hezbollah. The new group interpreted Shi'a Islam in a more "doctrinaire" and less popular way than its predecessor.<sup>254</sup> The two groups were at war with each other throughout much of the 1980s until Syria imposed a peace agreement in 1989 that became known as The Damascus Agreement.<sup>255</sup> The animosity between them is not as apparent today, as evidenced by the groups' combined electoral tickets in the 2005 national election.<sup>256</sup>

Hezbollah's violence ran the gamut of terrorist operations, and evolved over time in response to changes in the global environment and the group's organizational needs. In 1983 Hezbollah, through a front organization called Islamic Jihad, conducted a series of spectacular bombings to affect the behavior of the United States (US), France and Kuwait. In April, a suicide car bomb destroyed the US embassy in Beirut, and in October two additional bombings destroyed the US Marine and French paratrooper's barracks. The immediate death toll from these three actions was 362 people, but the secondary

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253 Norton, "Hizballah: from Radicalism . . .," 2-3.

254 Zisser, "Hizballah in Lebanon... ." Augustus Norton, "Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 1 (2000): 25, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/> (accessed April 13, 2005). To illustrate the difference between the groups' style of worship, Norton contrasts the celebrations of Amal's members at Muharram ceremonies with those of Hezbollah's members. Amal's members "participate enthusiastically" in the bloody self-mutilation of the rites. In contrast, Hezbollah's members "limit themselves to orderly marching in the festivals."

255 Jaber, 33-35. The Damascus Agreement regulated relations and operations between the two groups. Its most significant effect however, was to demonstrate for all sides in the conflict the power of Syria and the Syrian military in the country. Iran was forced to concede this influence because of Syrian threats to reestablish relations with Iraq in 1988.

256 Sam Ghattas, "Aoun Sets Back Anti-Syrian Opposition," *The HeraldTribune.com*, June 13, 2005, <http://www.heraldtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050613/API/506130832> (accessed June 13, 2005).

effects were much greater; they set in motion a process that eventually resulted in the U.S. withdrawal of military forces from Lebanon.<sup>257</sup>

Hezbollah turned to kidnapping in 1984 to provide Iran, during its long war with Iraq, much needed money, arms, and to secure the release of Iranian fighters from foreign jails. The most spectacular example of the success of these operations was the French repayment of \$330 million in back debt to Iran in return for two hostages. This tactic did not always pay off, as the seven year ordeal of Terry Anderson illustrated.<sup>258</sup> Hezbollah changed tactics again in June 1985 when the group hijacked TWA Flight 847 from Athens and eventually diverted it to Lebanon. The ordeal ended seventeen days later when Israel released 31 jailed Shi'ite prisoners. Ultimately this hijacking was a success for Hezbollah; the group received enormous press coverage, and appeared to force both Israel and the U.S. to capitulate to its demands.<sup>259</sup>

As the Lebanese civil war drew to a close and civil society began to rebuild Hezbollah was at a crossroads. It was a group with an impressive terrorist pedigree and a natural constituency. It was also a group that faced increasing isolation from both its constituency and the society at large. Hezbollah developed a pragmatic and flexible strategy that employed terrorism to affect the behavior of both Western and Israeli governments. When this strategy became counterproductive, the group deliberately limited its attacks and increased participation in legitimate institutions.<sup>260</sup> Hezbollah demonstrated a value maximizing rational actor style that has positive implications. It may be possible to negotiate a resolution to the issues that motivate emerging militant

<sup>257</sup> Ann Byers, *Inside the World's Most Infamous Terrorist Organizations: Hezbollah* (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2003), 26-35.

<sup>258</sup> Byers, 36-39. Jaber, 122-123 & 129-144.

<sup>259</sup> Byers, 39-44. Magnus Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: the Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), 95 and 164. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, *The Never Ending War: Terrorism in the 80s* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1987), 37-51.

<sup>260</sup> Roxanne Euben (1995), "When Worldviews Collide: Conflicting Assumptions about Human Behavior Held by Rational Actor Theory and Islamic Fundamentalism" *Political Psychology* 16, no. 1 (1995): 160, reprinted as a reading for NPS course SO 3801-International Terrorism. Euben outlined the basic tenants of Rational Actor Theory in this article. The rational actor pursues goals based on his perception of self-interests, and makes choices designed to maximize positive outcomes and minimize negatives ones. The critical idea is that the actor, who is knowledgeable of alternative courses of action, as well as the costs of each, chooses the one that will provide him the greatest overall utility. The natural tendency, in the face of internal schism (organizational pressure) resulting from disagreements over tactics and strategy, is to resort to increasing violence and more radical rhetoric. Hezbollah successfully resisted this tendency to shift in the opposite direction when violence proved to be counterproductive.

groups before they reach a point compromise is no longer possible. Interests were critical in this equation. Israel's vital interest was border security; the nation invaded Lebanon to stop Palestinian attacks on Jewish settlements. The conflict with Hezbollah developed as a result of actions during this invasion. Hezbollah's vital interest was to end the Israeli occupation. These interests were not in direct conflict, and thus there was room for negotiation.

In an effort to establish conditions when negotiation might be productive in a counterterrorist operation, Giandomenico Picco distinguishes between groups such as Hezbollah, which engage "tactical terrorism," and al-Qaeda, which engages in "strategic terrorism." Tactical terrorism is characterized by a substantive goal and a willingness to negotiate an end to terrorism in return for the satisfaction of that goal. Strategic terrorism is characterized by goals that will change if ever realized because the struggle is more important than the goal itself. Picco argues that some terrorist organizations will negotiate when their investment in society reaches a level at which further terrorism is counterproductive. Groups such as al-Qaeda do not develop this level of investment in society, in part because their structure and goals do not allow it. Pico makes the point that these groups are fundamentally different and should not be fought in the same way. Modern American grand strategy must address a number of different terrorist organizations. The danger of ignoring this distinction, of conflating all terrorist groups under the label of strategic terrorists, is to miss opportunities to conserve resources and secure a peaceful resolution to conflicts.<sup>261</sup>

## **2. Lessons of Israeli Grand Strategy**

Israeli diplomacy can be characterized by two themes: negotiation and intervention. Terrorism can be constrained by diplomatic activity under certain circumstances. Diplomatic pressure in 1996 from the US, France, Syria, and Iran, on Hezbollah and Israel forced both sides to agree to a historic pact that defined a set of rules for the fight. These rules, referred to as the April Understanding, restricted Israel from targeting Lebanese civilians and civilian infrastructure; in return Hezbollah refrained from conducting attacks within Israel and agreed to only target Israeli military

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<sup>261</sup> Giandomenico Picco, "The Challenges of Strategic Terrorism" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17, no. 11, <http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/> (accessed April 19, 2005).

forces within Lebanon. This internationally recognized and monitored agreement legitimized the group's actions against the Israeli military and provided de-facto recognition of the group's status as a resistance organization.<sup>262</sup> American and French diplomacy, and presumably economic power, influenced Syria and Iran to pressure Hezbollah to agree to the deal with Israel. Syria and Iran were important actors in the equation because they had the ability to cut off the flow of weapons and money to the terrorist group.

It is important to note that Israel and Syria were involved in negotiations over the disposition of the Golan Heights during much of the 1990s as well. These talks centered on the amount of land Israel was willing to give up in return for peace with its Arab neighbor. Syria demanded a full pull-back from the Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 borders. Yitzak Rabin always insisted on including "normalization, security arrangements, and a timetable for the implementation of the various measures," with any discussion of withdrawal. The various "security arrangements" demanded by Israeli negotiators were often unacceptable to Syria.<sup>263</sup> These negotiations led to little significant progress in Israeli-Syrian relations, and may have set the stage for Israel's 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath.

Israel's interventionist policy began with its efforts to create allies in Lebanon as a counter to the influence of first the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and later Syria. Throughout the conflict Israel developed and supported the Christian Phalangist militia of Bashir Gemayel that won the Lebanese Presidential elections of 1983. Beginning in the mid 1970s, the Israeli intelligence service known as the Mossad, began funneling arms and support to Christian groups in southern Lebanon. These groups coalesced into the Phalange under the leadership of Gamayel by 1980, and were intended to counterbalance anti-Israeli forces in Lebanon. This was a strategic move that ultimately backfired on Israel; in April 1981 Gamayel successfully manipulated an engagement with Syria into a crisis that Israel was forced to resolve. Israel shot down two Syrian helicopters while defending Phalangist forces in the Bekaa Valley. The

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<sup>262</sup> Norton, "Hizballah and Israeli Withdrawal...", 29-30. Harik, *Hezbollah : The ChanginG ...*, 122-123.

<sup>263</sup> Shlaim, 530-537.



shoot-down resulted in an increased Syrian presence in the country and cemented Israeli support for Gamayel's group.<sup>264</sup> Indirect Israeli intervention gave way to direct intervention in 1982 when the IDF invaded Southern Lebanon and began military operations against PLO forces in the country.

Israel's experience in Lebanon existed within the larger paradigm of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that began soon after Israel's proclamation of statehood in 1948. During Israel's direct involvement in Lebanon the larger conflict was marked by an intense period of negotiations. Two of the highlights of this dialog were the 1978 peace agreement with Egypt and the 1985 negotiations with Jordan on the Palestinian issues. Israel developed a negotiating strategy during the 1980s that became characteristic of its later efforts from 1992-1995; the nation refused to be drawn into large scale international conferences and insisted on individual negotiations with one or two Arab states. This tactic allowed Israel to negotiate from a stronger position and frequently control the process.<sup>265</sup> The effectiveness of Israeli diplomacy was very much subject to the preferences of its Prime Minister however. Avi Shlaim implies in his book, *The Iron Wall*, that Peres' efforts to negotiate a resolution to the Palestinian conflict in 1985 had a good chance of being successful; however, when Yitzhak Shamir, and the Likud party, assumed the premiership in 1986 these negotiations fell apart.<sup>266</sup> This is a pattern that was repeated in 1996 when Benjamin Netanyahu and the Likud party regained the leadership of the Israeli government and immediately began working to delay and degrade the Oslo Accords.<sup>267</sup>

Israel's efforts to develop situational understanding began in 1976 with the Mossad's support to Gamayel's group. Military intelligence units of the IDF also worked with and through other Maronite Christian groups some of whom would eventually form the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA). These relationships were initiated to provide Israel

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<sup>264</sup> Haim Hecht, "Mossad: An Intelligence Failure," *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 12, no. 4 (Summer, 1983), <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed March 5, 2006). Kirsten E. Schulze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 167-169.

<sup>265</sup> Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001), 352-382 & 431-450.

<sup>266</sup> Shlaim, 431-450.

<sup>267</sup> William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 342-348. Shlaim, 564-595.

information about the activities and disposition of PLO fighters.<sup>268</sup> The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) maintained good tactical and operational intelligence throughout the conflict; this intelligence was sufficient to conduct a number of raids to kill various Hezbollah leaders in the early 1990s.<sup>269</sup> The 1993 shift from targeted attacks to large scale offensives did not require significant intelligence support, and what they had seems to have been ignored. In 1996 the IDF conducted an artillery attack against a well known UN refugee camp at Qana killing over a hundred civilians.<sup>270</sup>

Israel relied on its position as the victim of Palestinian and Hezbollah terrorism to lend its actions legitimacy in the domestic and international media. The nation made little effort to engage or persuade audiences to degrade support for the terrorist organizations attacking Israel and the IDF in Lebanon. This may have been the result of a combination of factors. First, Israel had a long tradition of practicing *realpolitik*, and with few exceptions her leaders in the early 1980s supported a straightforward offensive philosophy.<sup>271</sup> Second, in 1983 Israel lost any claim it had to the moral high ground when it allowed Phalangist militiamen to massacre defenseless civilians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut.<sup>272</sup> Finally, Israel had the strong support of the U.S. throughout the period. Israel made no excuses for its actions against Lebanese civilians and treated the various operations in the 1990s as justifiable uses of military force to secure their border region.<sup>273</sup> This attitude was extremely damaging to Israel's grand

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<sup>268</sup> Gordon Thomas, *Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), 135-136. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 11-29.

<sup>269</sup> Caryle Murphy, "Israeli Raid Kills Hezbollah Leader; Attack Called a 'Message' to Terrorists," *The Washington Post*, February 17, 1992, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 6, 2006). Mary Curtius, "Israel, Hezbollah Duel in S. Lebanon Mideast: Jerusalem Politicians Spar Over Best Tactics to Use Against Militant Group," *Los Angeles Times*, December 17, 1994, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 6, 2006). "Israel Attacks Hezbollah," *The Washington Post*, May 26, 1992, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 6, 2006).

<sup>270</sup> Bruce W. Nelan, "Dark With Blood," *Time* 147, no. 18 (April 29, 1996), <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 6, 2006).

<sup>271</sup> Simon Murden, "Understanding Israel's Long Conflict in Lebanon: The Search for an Alternative Approach to Security During the Peace Process," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 27, no. 1 (May, 2000): 27-32, <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed March 6, 2006).

<sup>272</sup> Leila Shahid, "The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports," *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 32, no. 1 (Autumn, 2002), <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 6, 2006).

<sup>273</sup> Murden, 35-38. Mary Curtius, "8 Civilians Killed in Israeli Air Strike on Lebanon," *Los Angeles Times*, August 5, 1994, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 6, 2006). "Over the Top," *The Economist* 339, no. 7962 (April 20, 1996), <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 6, 2006).

strategy because it undermined the government's domestic and international support. The Israeli government had no effective response to Hezbollah's increasingly professional propaganda effort to demonstrate the effects of Israeli military operations against non-combatants. This deficiency eventually contributed to the Clinton administration's actions to pressure Israel to cease Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, and domestic pressure to withdrawal completely from Lebanon in 2000.<sup>274</sup>

Israel responded to Hezbollah's violence by applying overwhelming military force against the Lebanese civilian population to indirectly affect the group's actions. The Iron Fist policy, begun in 1985, was the first in a series of offensives intended to drive the population of southern Lebanon out of their homes and destroyed the country's infrastructure. Similar Israeli campaigns in 1993, and 1996 could be termed part of a "counter-terror" strategy by the IDF. In each action the IDF directed overwhelming military force against the Lebanese civilian population in an effort to stop Hezbollah's attacks. These actions created hundreds of thousands of refugees and terrific damage to the infrastructure of the country.<sup>275</sup> However, this strategy was unsuccessful in achieving its goals. Hezbollah responded in 1993, and again in 1996, by targeting settlements in northern Israel with Katyusha rockets. Hezbollah reportedly "fired [sic] more than 600 Katyushas into Israel, while Israel fired an estimated 25,000 shells at Lebanese targets and flew 600 combat air sorties" during the 1996 offensive.<sup>276</sup>

This strategy had a number of secondary effects. First, as has already been discussed, it degraded domestic and international support for Israel's operations in Lebanon. Israel's efforts to justify them by claiming that they were a response to Hezbollah's terror operations did not work.<sup>277</sup> Second, the attacks taught Hezbollah that the civilian population would be harmed, valuable infrastructure destroyed, and much of the group's good work reversed if it struck Israel too hard. While there was significant

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<sup>274</sup> Norton, "Hizballah and Israeli Withdrawal..." 31. Nelan. Murden, 42-45.

<sup>275</sup> Jaber, 25-27. Norton, "Hizballah and Israeli Withdrawal..." 27.

<sup>276</sup> Norton, "Hizballah and Israeli Withdrawal..." 29.

<sup>277</sup> Nathan Jones, "Israeli Media Pressure Builds on Barak to Leave Lebanon Now," *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 19, no. 3 (April 30, 2000), <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 6, 2006).

support for operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon, there was little support for them after these forces withdrew in 2000.<sup>278</sup>

Israeli military strategy included sponsoring a number of militias that we have already mentioned, most notably the SLA and the Phalangists. These groups were provided massive quantities of arms, ammunition and other supplies in an effort to build a counterbalance to Palestinian, Syrian and eventually the Hezbollah threat from the country. These groups were vicious and not entirely under the control of the IDF; in 1980 Gemayel's forces killed the leadership of a rival militia, also an Israeli ally, in a bid to unify Christian leadership.<sup>279</sup> In other instances, such as the massacre at Sabra and Shatila the militias carried out tasks too dirty for the IDF. On September 15, 1982 the IDF moved to secure West Beirut and encircle the two Palestinian refugee camps known as Sabra and Shatila; Israel maintained that PLO fighters were hiding in the camps. Without entering into a debate about the degree of control exercised by the IDF, what is clear is that the Israeli military allowed Christian militias to enter these camps and massacre hundreds of unarmed Palestinian civilians. This episode galvanized anti-Israeli sentiment both within Lebanon and in many foreign populations.<sup>280</sup>

Ironically, Israel's diplomatic failures combined with their military operations against the Lebanese population opened the door for Hezbollah to assume a larger and more legitimate role in Lebanese society. This larger role has led in part to a general reduction in violence and greater security along Israel's border. The group made the most of this opportunity by beginning the transformation that eventually led to its success in various elections. Hezbollah began providing critical social services to the Lebanese population as a way to ensure that the population remained in their homes and continued to shelter the group's fighters. Organizational motivations gave way to instrumental ones as the group's commitment to the population grew. The most important of the social services Hezbollah provided was medical care. Communities in Beirut's suburbs and throughout southern Lebanon depended on a network of more than forty Hezbollah built and maintained health care facilities for low cost, high quality medical, dental and

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<sup>278</sup> Norton, "Hizballah and Israeli Withdrawal....," 27, 29-30, & 34.

<sup>279</sup> Schulze, 107-108.

<sup>280</sup> Shahid.

pharmaceutical care.<sup>281</sup> The public came to depend on services which the government of Lebanon could not provide. Thus, Hezbollah developed a loyal following in stabilized communities, which translated into cover for their fighters and political power in the emerging Lebanese government.<sup>282</sup> Medical services were just one of the many social services provided by Hezbollah, others included: repairing and improving schools and public housing; building and repairing the electrical infrastructure in a variety of areas; providing emergency water supplies to Beirut and making long term improvements to the water supply infrastructure.<sup>283</sup>

The 1989 Ta'if Accords had a profound effect on Hezbollah because it allowed the group to participate in the government, and raised the cost of nonparticipation to an unacceptable level. Hezbollah violently resisted Lebanese governments prior to 1989 because they were generally extremely repressive and demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with the occupying Israeli forces. Ta'if altered these realities. Hezbollah positioned itself as a “constructive opposition” and worked from within the system to build a better government.<sup>284</sup>

The popular support developed through these social services once translated into greater freedom of action in the fight against Israel, but today it means greater political power for Hezbollah. For its part, the population has an interest in supporting the organization that significantly improved their standard of living.<sup>285</sup> The results of this relationship are striking. In the 2005 national elections the combined Hezbollah/Amal ticket won 35 of the 128 seats up for election, the second largest block of seats in

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<sup>281</sup> Jaber, 156 & 158-159.

<sup>282</sup> Ibid., 156 & 158-159. Harik, *Hezbollah: the Changing Face ...*, 83-84 & 89.

<sup>283</sup> Jaber, 156 & 166. Harik, 84-92 & 124.

<sup>284</sup> Aal Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 26-28.

<sup>285</sup> Deborah Amos, “The Political Evolution of Hezbollah” *All Things Considered*, April 14, 2005, National Public Radio, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4600740> (accessed June 9, 2005).

parliament.<sup>286</sup> The group maintained, and improved slightly, its political representation in traditional strongholds. Hezbollah has tremendous value as a coalition partner in this new government; giving it a greater ability to influence a wide spectrum of political actors. This influence was apparent in the very unlikely alliance between Hezbollah and Michael Aoun during the campaign season.<sup>287</sup> The social services that Hezbollah provided created a constituency that needed political representation, was vulnerable to reprisals by Israel, and consumed social services that were expensive to maintain. These three realities drove Hezbollah's decision to enter politics and tempered its actions against Israel.<sup>288</sup> As Norton recounts, Hezbollah even refused to respond to the 2000 destruction of Lebanese power plants in order to deny Israel an excuse to conduct further operations against the Lebanese population.<sup>289</sup>

The very act of participating in the political process was a moderating influence on Hezbollah. The sectarian nature of Lebanese politics and the confessional structure of the government make it impossible for the group to gain and maintain an overwhelming or even a narrow majority.<sup>290</sup> Compromise and coalition building are the keys to progress in this system, and Hezbollah has learned to work effectively within it. Norton argues that because these requirements are not going to change any time in the foreseeable future, Hezbollah effectively abandoned its goal of an Islamic republic and

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<sup>286</sup> "Hezbollah Wins South Lebanon Poll," *CNN.com*, June 6, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com> (accessed June 6, 2005). Morshed al-Ali, "Baalbek-Hermel Backs Hezbollah" *The Daily Star: Lebanon* (2005), <http://www.dailystar.com.lb> (accessed June 13, 2005). Nayla Assaf, "Aoun sweeps to victory in Mount Lebanon, Zahle" *The Daily Star: Lebanon* (2005), <http://www.dailystar.com.lb> (accessed June 13, 2005). "Lebanon Election Results," The Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8195/lebanon.html> (accessed February 20, 2006). "Lineup of Lebanon's New Cabinet," Yalibnan, [http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2005/07/lineup\\_of\\_leba.php](http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2005/07/lineup_of_leba.php) (accessed February 20, 2006).

<sup>287</sup> Bassem Mroue, "Anti-Syrian Aoun Making Lebanon Comeback" *MSNBC.com*, June 13, 2005, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8194440> (accessed June 13, 2005). "FACTBOX-Facts about Lebanon's Michel Aoun" *MSNBC.com*, June 13, 2005, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8194440> (accessed June 13, 2005). Harik, *Hezbollah: the changing face ...*, 45-46.

<sup>288</sup> Saad-Ghorayeb, 53. Norton, "Hizballah and the Israeli ...," 30-34. Zisser, "Hizbullah: New Course or ..."

<sup>289</sup> Norton, "Hizballah and the Israeli ...," 30.

<sup>290</sup> In accordance with the Ta'if Accords seats in parliament evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, and then further divided based on sect. Additionally, the critical seats in government, President, Prime Minister and Speaker of the Parliament are allocated to the Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shi'ite Muslims respectively (CIA World Factbook available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html#Govt>, accessed June 12, 2005).

fully embraced democracy as a way to achieve its ends.<sup>291</sup> While there are disagreements regarding Hezbollah's long term goals, Norton's argument, that participation and compromise are strong mainstreaming influences, is a sound one. Actions would have been unthinkable to Hezbollah leaders in the 1980s, were possible after the successes of elections in 1992.<sup>292</sup>

Hezbollah looked to Iran for inspiration and direction, but asked Syria for permission to act because of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon.<sup>293</sup> The group's leaders studied in the same Najaf seminaries as the Ayatollah Khomeini, maintained constant contact with Iran's senior clerics, and recognized the authority of the Iranian ayatollahs.<sup>294</sup> Hezbollah received money from direct Iranian government programs and through unofficial religious channels (institutionalized Islamic religious taxes and informal donations). However, this money supply, especially the official funding, is at the mercy of changes in the political environment. The Iranian government of Hashemi Rafsanjani's reduced official support to Hezbollah in the early 1990s as part of an effort to appear more moderate and attractive to foreign investors. This reduction caused Hezbollah to diversify its fund raising activities; some experts believe that today Hezbollah could continue operations at current levels even if Iran significantly curtailed its support.<sup>295</sup>

Hezbollah was critical to Syria's strategy to bring Israel to the negotiating table and eventually secure the return of the Golan Heights because the group maintained the military pressure on Israel that Syria could not. Syria forced Lebanon to insist that peace

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<sup>291</sup> Norton, "Hizballah: from Radicalism ...," 156. Zisser, "Hizballah in Lebanon ..." Zisser points to three characteristics of Lebanese society that make it unlikely that Hezbollah could establish an Islamic republic: the society is a "mosaic of communities" which will not allow one to dominate the system; the Shi'ite population is a minority even among Muslims; and Hezbollah has the support of only about 20-25% of this Shi'ite minority.

<sup>292</sup> Zisser, "Hizballah in Lebanon ..." Zisser cites two actions in 1995 that illustrate the moderating effect of political participation: first, Hezbollah's dialogue with Rafiq Hariri's about the possibility of joining his government; second, the group's lack of opposition to the extension of Lebanese President Ilyas Hirawi's term of office.

<sup>293</sup> Ranstorp, 110-118.

<sup>294</sup> Norton, "Hizballah and the Israeli ...," 24. Jaber, 47-49, 54-55 & 71 and Harik, *Hezbollah: the changing ...*, 16.

<sup>295</sup> Jaber, 150-153. Judith Harik, "Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizballah," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 1 (March 1996): 62-63, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/> (accessed June 3, 2005).

negotiations with Israel include Syria, and by extension the return of all lands seized from both countries.<sup>296</sup> Although Hezbollah was critical to Syrian strategy, the nation established early in the relationship that it would not hesitate to use military force to ensure that Hezbollah did not stray outside the boundaries of acceptable action.<sup>297</sup> Syria controlled the flow of resources from Iran to Hezbollah, and Syrian troops provided the coercive pressure that effectively made Hezbollah a proxy in the struggle against Israel.

The Ta'if Accords threatened Syria's overall strategy in Lebanon because they threatened the existence of Hezbollah; as a militia the group would have to disarm under the accords. Syria "encouraged" Hezbollah to drop its objections to the accords and participate in the government in order to provide Hezbollah enough legitimacy to maintain its weapons and continue the fight against Israel.<sup>298</sup> Recent events on the ground in Lebanon present a challenging environment for Syria in the future. Israel undercut Syrian strategy by unilaterally pulling out of Lebanon in 2000 and generally acting with restraint toward the country ever since. The uproar surrounding the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri forced Syria to pull its conventional ground forces out of Lebanon. The Hezbollah/Amal coalition had a great deal of success in the recent Lebanese elections, even though an anti-Syrian coalition known as Tayyar al-Mustaqbal (Future Tide) won the largest block of seats. These elections will create a parliament in Lebanon that is decidedly anti-Syrian, reducing the threat to Israel.<sup>299</sup> The fact that pro- and anti-Syrian sentiments mean little as political players build coalitions in opposition to the status quo, may indicate that Syrian influence is not that important a factor anymore.

### **3. Conclusions**

Lebanon occupied a key position in Israeli grand strategy because it offered the country an opportunity to breach the encirclement of hostile Arab nations. The 1982

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<sup>296</sup> Hajjar, 17-19. Norton, "Hezbollah and the Israeli ...," 33.

<sup>297</sup> Harik, *Hezbollah: the Changing Face ...*, 40. In 1987 a group of Hezbollah fighters manning a checkpoint refused Syrian soldier's orders to move. The details of the disagreement between Hezbollah fighters and the Syrian military are sketchy, but the Syrian solution was not: all 24 of the Hezbollah fighters were executed on the spot.

<sup>298</sup> Jaber, 71-74.

<sup>299</sup> Ghattas. "Lineup of Lebanon's New Cabinet," Yalibnan, [http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2005/07/\\_lineup\\_of\\_leba.php](http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2005/07/_lineup_of_leba.php) (accessed February 20, 2006).



invasions of Lebanon was intended to defeat PLO forces based throughout the country and set the conditions for Christian leaders to assume control. The actions of the IDF during and after this campaign generated tremendous animosity among the Lebanese population, and provided Hezbollah's foundation issue. Israeli strategy from 1982 to 2000 was ineffective and in many cases counterproductive to national interests. The strategy, summarized in Table 9, ultimately led to Israel's expulsion from Lebanon and Hezbollah elevation to a position of influence within the society; in short a failure of Israeli grand strategy.

Instrument of Power	Strategy for Employment	Effectiveness
Diplomatic	Negotiation & Intervention	–
Informational	<i>Realpolitik</i> & Situational Understanding	--/+
Military	Counter-Terror	– – –
Economic	Direct Support for Allied Militias	–
Law Enforcement	Not Applied	
Outcome		Failure

**Table 9. Israeli Grand Strategy in Lebanon**

Israeli diplomacy emphasized the importance of negotiation and intervention throughout the conflict in Lebanon. Although negotiations were ongoing with Syria, the Lebanese government, and even with Hezbollah through third parties, the record of success of these efforts was mixed. Negotiations with Hezbollah to constrain the conflict were successful, but talks with Syria regarding the disposition of the Golan Heights and Israeli security were failures. Israel intervened directly and indirectly in Lebanon to create an ally in the region and later to engage and destroy threats to Israeli settlements. This intervention was also a decided failure. The Christian militias and South Lebanese Army could not gain and maintain control of the country. The IDF did defeat the PLO, but could not defeat Hezbollah and was eventually forced to withdraw. One of the reasons for the failure of intervention may have been a poor understanding of the realities of Lebanese society: the Christians were not in the majority, nor did the militias represent

all Christians; the Lebanese President was not supremely powerful and could not guarantee Israel's security; and finally that military gains did not always translate into political ones.<sup>300</sup>

Information power was not deliberately employed by Israel in this conflict. This was a serious deficiency that ceded valuable ground to Hezbollah, and created significant domestic and international pressure. Israel attempted to justify their repeated actions against the Lebanese population as a legitimate response to the terrorist violence of Hezbollah. This was a *realpolitik* response to terrorism that emphasized an unapologetic use of extremely violent conventional military action to defeat an clandestine unconventional enemy; it was doomed to failure. In contrast, Israeli intelligence agencies seemed very capable of providing high quality intelligence on the movements of terrorist leaders. This information resulted in the death of a number of high ranking Hezbollah leaders.

Overwhelming military force was applied in this conflict, but it was applied against the wrong target. Israeli actions against Lebanese civilians and infrastructure damaged its legitimacy in the international community, provided legitimacy to Hezbollah's terrorism, and did not achieve their aims. Ultimately Israel was unable to put enough pressure on either the Lebanese or Syrian governments to stop Hezbollah's activities. These actions worked against the IDF by engendering support for Hezbollah and providing the group significant opportunities to increase its influence in the country.

Hezbollah adopted a more moderate position after Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. The combined effects of political participation and the demands of providing social services to the population created an investment in the system that Hezbollah could not risk. Iran and Syria exercised significant authority over the group's activities during the conflict, but that may be changing. Iran's financial support to the group is not be as important as it once was, and the absence of Syrian troops in the country limits that nation's ability to coerce Hezbollah's obedience.

Israeli grand strategy was out of balance and desynchronized in this conflict. Diplomatic power was applied ineffectively and informational power was not applied at

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<sup>300</sup> Schulze, 169-172.

all. Military force was overwhelmingly applied, but against targets that damaged Israel's ability to conduct the fight and maintain the sources of national power. Ultimately this blend of supporting strategies was unsuccessful; Israel was forced out of Lebanon and Hezbollah remains a significant force in being.

#### D. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has briefly examined three very different terrorist movements and three national responses. Only one of these conflicts was completely resolved, the other two remain in transition. Table 10 summarizes these national responses and the outcome of each conflict.

Instrument of Power	Great Britain	India	Israel
Diplomatic	++	--	--
Informational	+	+	-/+
Military	+	++	---
Economic	-	-	-
Law Enforcement	+	++	NA
Outcome	Disarmament	Success	Failure

**Table 10. Comparison of Strategic Responses**

Great Britain was challenged during the latter half of the 20th century by sectarian terrorist violence in Northern Ireland. The national interests and the objectives that developed provided British leaders the ability to negotiate with a wide variety of actors, and compromise on the central issues of the conflict. The British instruments of national power did not start out well balanced, but they evolved over time to become an effective blend of political negotiation and police force. The efforts of a variety of organizations to collect information and portray terrorists in a negative light facilitated these actions in a way that was essential to the struggle. Northern Ireland clearly illustrated the effectiveness of law enforcement and military power in forcing terrorist organizations to negotiate an end to the violence. This assumes that diplomatic initiatives exist to engage the organizations and negotiate that settlement, without diplomacy one could argue hard power would be much less effective.

India's actions to defeat Sikh separatist terrorism illustrate the importance of synchronization and integration of the instruments of power. Initially diplomatic and military actions were ineffective and desynchronized. It was only after 1990 that diplomacy, military actions, and information power were organized in support of law enforcement's efforts to destroy the terrorist organizations. Without debating the morality and efficacy of "counter-terror," the point is that the strategy was only successful because it was supported effectively. India seems to present a counterpoint to the idea that diplomatic avenues to negotiation must be present for military and law enforcement power to be successful. In fact this case illustrates that a terrorist movement can be defeated, but at what cost? The "counter-terror" strategy employed by India is not an acceptable or practical option for the United States in the current environment. The unique conditions that were discussed in this vignette are unlikely to be duplicated elsewhere, and the extreme measures taken are unacceptable in this country.

Israel's strategy illustrates the importance of the particular policies and programs included in supporting strategies for securing national interests. This vignette demonstrated the danger of ignoring the information content of military and diplomatic activities. It also showed the problems that may develop from an over reliance on one instrument of power; in this case the military instrument. Finally, this vignette provided some valuable insights about the moderating effects of political participation and social services on a militant terrorist organization. This may suggest areas of opportunity for relations with future groups.

The most common theme running through each of these vignettes was that of negotiation and engagement. Each national government made significant efforts to negotiate a resolution to the conflict. What distinguished these efforts were the choices of negotiating partners each nation made. British diplomacy was the most successful of the three because of continual commitment to negotiations even as different actors proved valuable to the effort. Israel was the least successful because it was attempting to negotiate issues that were not central to the conflict, such as the disposition of the Golan Heights.

One interesting feature of these vignettes is that there was generally little if any focus on maintaining instruments of power. Actions were taken by one instrument to enhance the effectiveness of another, but the governments involved did not deliberately attempt to regenerate or develop additional capabilities. The notable exception to this tendency is in the area of information collection. Both Great Britain and India clearly worked to develop better intelligence on terrorist organizations, and use this intelligence to enable targeted operations. While Israel may have worked to develop similar information, it was not translated into effective action. This does not suggest that it is not important to maintain the capability to act across the spectrum of national power; rather, it is indicative of the relatively low cost of counterterrorist operations.

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## V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. CONCLUSIONS

#### 1. US Grand Strategy

##### *a. Diplomacy*

America's diplomatic strategy attempts to develop democratic traditions and institutions in order to create a safer environment for U.S. citizens and interests. In theory, not only will democratic nations be less likely to resort to violence to resolve disputes, but they will be more likely to cooperate against violent organizations. Political leaders continually stress that representative governments abroad create a safer environment for U.S. citizens and interests. Documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) recognize the importance of building democracy, but focus the majority of their initiatives on building alliances against terrorism.<sup>301</sup> Diplomatic strategy is not completely synchronized with execution. The U.S. supports many nations with weak democratic traditions and practices, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. That these are critical allies in the fight against transnational terror, does not change the fact that this dichotomy creates problems for other instruments of power.<sup>302</sup>

The vignettes presented in Chapter IV suggest that American diplomatic strategy needs to be refined to focus on developing democratic traditions that provide mechanisms for substantive participation by a broad spectrum of groups in a society. The IRA did not agree to a cease fire solely because the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was successful, it agreed because Sinn Fein offered a peaceful opportunity to pursue its goals. Similarly, Hezbollah began to moderate its activity when it entered the Lebanese government. Participation in government encourages investment in the legitimate systems for change, and commitment to the official policies and programs.

The recent election success by Hamas in the Palestinian territories presents a challenge for American diplomatic strategy. The U.S. has decided that it cannot deal directly with terrorist organizations. The Palestinian people, reacting to fraud in the

<sup>301</sup> Bush, "President Bush Discussed Freedom ... ." NSS, 2-4. NSCT, 20-21.

<sup>302</sup> Sheehan, 110-112.

Palestinian Authority (PA) elected representatives of Hamas to clean up the corruption.<sup>303</sup> The challenge to American leaders is how to recognize a democratic success story, while simultaneously maintaining a consistent stance against terrorist groups. The lesson of Northern Ireland is that American decision makers must find some way to engage Hamas through a third party or front organization. The Israeli experience in Lebanon illustrates that just such engagement may be the best way to moderate a terrorist organization and enhance overall security in the region.

The vignettes presented in Chapter IV offer a second lesson for diplomatic strategists: engagement and negotiation are crucial to maximizing the gains created by military and police forces. The British never stopped negotiating to stop the violence in Northern Ireland, even as the IRA was bombing London. The key to these negotiations was that the British found partners that could speak for the IRA or put pressure on the group, Sinn Fein and the Irish Republic. Indian efforts at negotiation with Sikh separatists were not successful because neither side in the process could deliver on its promises.

In addition to democratization the U.S. should adopt a policy of engagement with influential actors, not just partner nations. This means that diplomats must figure out who can influence groups like al-Qaeda and begin substantive dialog with these actors. This initiative may mean normalizing relations with Iran, negotiating with Syria, as both the Clinton and early Bush administration have done, or talking to tribal leaders in the Pakistani border regions. The important thing is that American diplomats cannot be limited by biases against traditional adversaries or unfriendly governments. This is not to suggest that the U.S. accede to the demands of radical Islamist leaders in an effort to indirectly influence Osama bin Laden to renounce terrorism. It is an effort to recognize that avenues of influence exist that the nation has not yet exploited to put pressure on al-Qaeda and its affiliate organizations.

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<sup>303</sup> Fareed Zakaria, "Caught by Surprise. Again.; Arafat Created One of the Most Ill-disciplined, Corrupt and Ineffective Organizations Ever to be Taken Seriously on the World Stage," *Newsweek* 147, no. 6 (February 6, 2006): 32, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 11, 2006).



***b. Information***

The nation's core strategy documents employ informational power along two tracts: enhancing situational understanding and persuading foreign audiences. Situational understanding requires a vastly improved ability to collect, process, and share information among U.S. and international partners. As hard as it will be to improve situational understanding, the effort to persuade foreign audiences will be even harder. This "battle of ideas" is being waged daily by virtually every organization in the U.S. government, and various supporting strategy documents emphasize the importance of this effort.<sup>304</sup> The focus of these efforts is to persuade audiences throughout the world that American policy and actions are just and beneficial to all.

The efforts of agencies such as the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Justice (DOJ), and the intelligence community to improve the nation's situational understanding are essential steps in combating transnational terrorism. All three vignettes discussed the importance of timely and accurate intelligence in defeating terrorist organizations. As the 9/11 Commission's follow-up report indicated, this nation may not be doing enough in these areas, but information collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination must remain a major part of any emerging information strategy.

Efforts to persuade foreign audiences are more difficult to analyze because they are not defined in any substantive way. The confirmation of Karen Hughes as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, and the increase in funds budgeted for public diplomacy indicate that the administration is serious about this effort. The message that American public diplomacy organizations will send to the world is still unclear however. Previous efforts to ignore public diplomacy immediately after September 11<sup>th</sup>, or to "sell" America under Charlotte Beers, were ineffective if not counterproductive because they failed to include substantive issues. This is not an effort that is going to be won or lost by one section of the Department of State (DOS). Public diplomacy is conducted by virtually every governmental organization involved in the GWOT. The lack of a national information strategy makes it difficult for this diverse group to project a unified message and avoid desynchronous action.<sup>305</sup>

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<sup>304</sup> NDS, 9. NMS, 12. DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, 30-32.

<sup>305</sup> Lord, 225-234. Satloff, 19-34.

In his book *The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror*, Robert Satloff argues that U.S. information strategy should focus on more than broadcasting values and explaining policy. Satloff explains that the “battle of ideas” can only be won by engaging the Muslim world on serious issues, identifying and promoting our allies in the Muslim world, advocating for American policies and interests, and aggressively countering Islamist propaganda. Publicly discussing values with moderate Muslim politicians is important, but supporting anti-Islamist leaders or reformist education initiatives is more important. Radio Sawa style broadcasts are useful only if they include substantive messages designed to influence the youth of the Middle East.<sup>306</sup> Satloff notes that some policy might be objectionable in the Muslim world but does not focus any serious discussion on how to address this dilemma. Issues such as U.S. support to Israel and treatment of detainees create a significant barrier and provide a huge advantage to radical Islamist propaganda. They cannot be addressed solely through programs that attack radical ideology or teach American values better. This problem is central to American efforts to conduct *noopolitik* in the current environment because it is an obstacle to all other dialogue. American policy cannot and should not be changed simply because a portion of the Muslim population objects to it, but the effects of policy should be carefully considered for its impact on this nation’s ability to influence adversaries and allies alike.

**c. Military**

American military strategy is not well defined in overarching national strategy documents like the NSS or NSCT. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) do a better job establishing goals, and describing broad military activities. However, both the NDS and NMS are still unclear about military priorities, specific objectives, or measures of effectiveness. American military strategy is generally combative, seeking to identify and destroy terrorist organizations in order to prevent attacks on U.S. citizens or interests. The focus is on direct military action to defeat terrorist organizations, and indirect actions to support and develop allies. Other missions, such as humanitarian assistance or foreign military training, are secondary to the effort.

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<sup>306</sup> Satloff, 47-54 & 60-68.

Contemporary military strategy is complicated by the fact that the nation is really fighting two wars; a counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a global war against terrorist organizations. The former is low intensity conflict led predominantly by conventional forces. The latter is low intensity conflict led by special forces and other government organizations. These two struggles frequently overlap, and often demand many of the same scarce resources. The use of the British military in Northern Ireland suggests that the strategy of employing U.S. special forces in small teams to work with and through indigenous forces to combat terrorist organizations is sound. When necessary, small highly trained units can act directly to destroy select terrorist targets, but that should not be the norm.

The role for conventional forces is more complicated. The British regular Army in Northern Ireland had a limited role in counterterrorism operations, as did the Indian Army in Punjab. Both forces enabled police or special operations units by conducting static security missions or area denial patrols. The Israeli Army in Lebanon is a notable example of conventional military forces being employed to counter terrorist organizations, and it was generally a failure. This would seem to suggest two points. First, the role of the U.S. military in Iraq should be to enable Iraqi police. Second, that if the conventional military is to be widely used to fight transnational terrorists, then significant training and organizational issues must be addressed.

*d. Economic*

National economic strategy revolves around two core ideas: the expansion of free markets to strengthen foreign partners in the war on terrorism, and the provision of developmental aid to undermine the root causes of terrorism. The U.S. has increasingly focused on establishing Free Trade Agreements (FTA) or Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFA) with a host of Middle Eastern, Asian, and Central American countries in an effort to create partners with an investment in opposing terrorist organizations. This effort has the added benefit of creating interdependencies among these nations and the U.S. that will serve the nation well in times of crisis. American developmental aid attempts to strengthen foreign nation's ability to resist the influence of terrorist organizations. Aid packages generally focus on improving the recipient's ability to conduct counterterrorism operations and deny terrorist organizations

much needed resources. These packages are also designed to reduce poverty, unemployment, and improve health care in an effort to eliminate the reasons individuals turn to terrorism. Much of U.S. aid is not tied to counterterrorism activity at all, but even these packages are still intended to produce a more stable and secure environment.

*e. Law Enforcement*

This paper characterized U.S. law enforcement strategy as cooperative prosecution: the employment of federal law enforcement agencies to work with and through foreign security forces to prosecute terrorists. This strategy pursues terrorists directly and indirectly through their financial support. The nation's law enforcement elements are pursuing this strategy aggressively with expanded operations at home and overseas in an effort to collapse terrorist organizations from the cumulative weight of many individual actions. This strategy attempts to prosecute terrorists and their organizations wherever there is sufficient legal infrastructure and political will. In the absence of one or both of these critical features, law enforcement organizations are working with their foreign counterparts to develop them.

Law enforcement strategy is an area where few if any refinements are required. Cooperative prosecution attacks terrorism as a criminal act, just as military strategy attacks it as an act of war. This allows the nation to pursue opportunities wherever they develop in the conflict.

**2. Supporting Features**

The most significant deficiency in American grand strategy is the lack of a common set of interests and objectives to focus the planning effort. Core and supporting national strategy documents do not reflect a common understanding of the reason that this nation is at war. This glaring deficiency makes it virtually impossible to integrate programs of disparate agencies across the federal government. It is extremely difficult to allocate scarce resources in the conflict in this environment because there is no clear link

between a program and an objective. A secondary effect of this deficiency may be the administration's inability to clearly articulate the plan in a way that encourages confidence and understanding.<sup>307</sup>

The debate over the definition of terrorism and who exactly is America's enemy in the GWOT is not as insignificant as it would seem to be. The recent electoral victory of Hamas created great difficulty for America in part because the group clearly advocates what the NSS defines terrorism as, "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents" in their campaign against Israel.<sup>308</sup> This puts the U.S. in the position of refusing to support a democratically elected government before they even take office. The problem for grand strategists is not the definition of terrorism, but their understanding of the threat to the United States. In part this problem is created by the evolving nature of this nation's adversary. The definition of terrorism is difficult enough to get a wide coalition of nations to agree upon. When one begins to question just what public diplomacy professionals are supposed to aggressively counter the confusion grows significantly. Is the threat a specific terrorist organization, the hate filled speech coming from Islamist clerics, or is it perhaps the mob threatening to burn an embassy in retaliation for an offensive newspaper cartoon? The question has not been answered in enough detail yet to focus all the instruments of national power.<sup>309</sup>

The NSS and the NSCT do not include plans to maintain the instruments of national power. This is a significant deficiency given that many of the sources of national power are shared by multiple instruments, and few mechanisms exist to prioritize demands. A few supporting strategies do attempt to transform their practices and organizations to generate more power within available resources. The efforts of the DOD to transform the Army into a smaller, lighter force will increase combat power and effectiveness. The DOS' efforts to improve the training and experience of Foreign

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<sup>307</sup> War on Terrorism, Pollingreport.com, <http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm>, (accessed March 2, 2006). A selection of polls including CBS News, Harris, and ABC News/Washington Post taken in January and February 2006, show that only slightly more than 50% of the American public approves of the administration's handling of the war on terrorism and well over half expect another terrorist attack in the U.S. within the next year.

<sup>308</sup> NSS, 5.

<sup>309</sup> Rapoport, 46-73. Satloff, 59-69. Interview with Mr. Robert Andrews, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC), conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School on March 1, 2006.

Service Officers, and revise many organizational practices to improve efficiency will improve the nation's ability to conduct diplomacy. What is missing is a deliberate plan to maintain the sources of national power, such as national will or financial wealth. National will, for example, is critical in the fight against transnational terrorists because it is the very target of their operations. Israel learned this very lesson when Hezbollah forced the nation to eventually withdraw from Lebanon.

American grand strategy also makes little effort to balance ends with available means in the fight against terrorism. Admittedly, this is difficult to judge because of the vast quantity of resources required for continued operations in Iraq, but a couple of points are important. Grand strategy should guide a nation through a conflict to create a better peace. In order to do this grand strategy should limit its objectives according to available resources. American grand strategy however does not appear to make any effort to prioritize or constrain the initiatives of various departments through any mechanism other than the budgeting process. Again some supporting strategies have begun to recognize that resources are not unlimited and are making an attempt to focus their efforts. The best example of this is the National Strategy for Homeland Security's initiative to complete a comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment. The nation now faces rising federal debt, difficulties in military recruiting, and a lack of confidence in its chief executive that could indicate the beginning of a crisis of national will.<sup>310</sup>

American grand strategy may also not have the correct balance of resources allocated to the respective instruments of power. The Fiscal 2006 budget analysis in Chapter III indicates that the financial resources of the nation are predominantly devoted to the DOD. It could be argued that greater funds should be allocated for foreign developmental aid or homeland defense initiatives. This is a difficult issue to judge quantitatively because many of these programs provide high returns for relatively little investment. The fact remains that little progress has been made undermining the causes of terrorism in the last four years, and most of the programs to accomplish this task are not located in the DOD.

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<sup>310</sup> "Summary Tables," Fiscal 2006 Budget, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/tables.html> (accessed March 2, 2006). Damien Cave, "For a General, a Tough Mission: Building the Army," *New York Times*, February 5, 2006, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 2, 2006). Pollingreport.com.

American grand strategy does not adequately address the subject of vertical and horizontal synchronization. The interagency process of coordination and staffing that is supposed to be coordinated by the NSC has proven too cumbersome to effectively manage the GWOT. Lead agencies for policy and programs are not clear, and coordinating mechanisms do not facilitate synchronization. This problem has manifested itself most starkly in the issue of detainee operations and interrogation techniques. The activities of military and civilian authorities in Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and elsewhere damaged the nation's ability to conduct traditional diplomacy and degraded the effectiveness of public diplomacy.<sup>311</sup>

One of the strengths of American grand strategy is its hybrid nature. Cumulative actions to defeat individual terrorist organizations through many small victories is the prevailing strategic pattern; there are few if any examples of clearly sequential strategic operations. Military, economic, and law enforcement strategies are all cumulative in nature. American grand strategy is combative, and includes direct and indirect attacks against terrorist organizations, combative elements. However, it is also developmental, focusing significant effort on attempts to undermine the issues and conditions which drive groups to employ terrorism. This hybrid nature is essential to take advantage of the unique power dynamics in the GWOT.

## **B. STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. Plan for Strategic Action**

American grand strategy in this age of terrorism includes initiatives for a broad range of programs, from preventing the spread of AIDS to countering the threat of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>312</sup> The National Security Strategy (NSS) is too far reaching to focus the instruments of national power or provide clear linkages between strategy and programs. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) focuses

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<sup>311</sup> Gerard P. Fogarty, "Is Guantanamo Bay Undermining the Global War on Terror?," *Parameters* 35, no. 3 (Autumn 2005), <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 23, 2006). "U.S. Credibility Gap in Europe" *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 7, 2005, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 2, 2006). "Leaders: Minced Words; Torture," *The Economist* 377, no. 8456 (December 10, 2005): 18, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 2, 2006). Fareed Zakaria, "Pssst ... Nobody Loves a Torturer; Ask any American Soldier in Iraq When the General Population Really Turned Against the United States and he will say, 'Abu Ghraib,'" *Newsweek* 146, no. 20 (November 14, 2005): 36, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed March 2, 2006).

<sup>312</sup> NSS.

clearly on the issue of terrorism but it lacks important mechanisms to integrate and synchronize power, mechanisms such as stated national interests and objectives.<sup>313</sup> This section recommends a framework for planning grand strategy that deliberately integrates the instruments of power to affect the environment in a variety of ways.

Military planners have long studied how to integrate and synchronize disparate elements of military combat power; infantry, artillery, intelligence, and logistics must support each other if the unit is to be successful. The interagency process that produced the constellation of national strategy documents does not demonstrate a similar tradition. The framework outlined in Table 11 attempts to apply basic military planning techniques to the interagency system in order to facilitate grand strategic planning. This framework blends policies and programs to shape the environment for long term progress, sustain current gains, and secure strategic objectives. Decisive actions directly contribute to achieving the strategic objective; rarely will one decisive action be sufficient. Shaping actions set the conditions for decisive actions to achieve the strategic objective. Sustaining actions are policies and programs that preserve existing gains and create additional power for future actions. At the level of grand strategy no one action is likely to completely secure a strategic objective, and in fact the decisive actions may need to be maintained for a protracted period of time to be effective.<sup>314</sup>

In the simplified example below, a possible strategic framework to stabilize the Middle East is examined as part of a larger effort to defeat the transnational terrorist organizations that threaten the United States. Grand strategic planning below begins by enumerating national interests and strategic objectives; these objectives are then prioritized to aid in resource allocation. Decisive actions are identified to achieve the each stated objective. In this simplified example we have identified six decisive actions to stabilize the Middle East. Clearly this is not an all inclusive set, and does not

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<sup>313</sup> NSCT.

<sup>314</sup> U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3.0: Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2001), 4-23 to 4-25. This concept is taken from the Army's conceptualization of "categories of operations" within a battlefield organizational structure. These categories attempt to group actions according to their purpose in a battle: shaping, decisive or sustaining. Decisions are made to allocate resources and assign priorities according to the importance of an action in light of its effect on the overall operation. The Army's defines Sustaining Operations more narrowly than this paper does, but that is because of the differences between military strategy to win a specific battle and grand strategy to secure national interests.



necessarily reflect the decisions of U.S. political leaders. It is meant to illustrate a way to conduct strategic planning that integrates and synchronizes instruments of power.

<b>National Interest: Defeat transnational terrorist organizations that threaten the U.S.</b>			
<b>National Strategic Objective: Stabilize Middle Eastern nations</b>			
	<b>Shaping</b>	<b>Sustaining</b>	<b>Decisive</b>
<b>Diplomatic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Normalize relations w/ Iran &amp; Syria</li> <li>- Engage Hamas leaders</li> <li>- Negotiate with terror groups that have not become transnational</li> <li>- Secure the U.S. military access to Pakistan border regions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Work with &amp; through established NGOs like NATO and UN rather than “ad-hoc coalitions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Negotiate a settlement of the Palestinian issue to the satisfaction of both parties</li> </ul>
<b>Information</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Encourage democracy in Saudi Arabia and Egypt</li> <li>- Energize Public Diplomacy activities</li> <li>- Improve intelligence collection to support military and legal activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Develop democratic tradition in Middle East through commitment to cross media programming</li> <li>- Tell GWOT success story better to US population and world</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Counter radical Islamic propaganda</li> </ul>
<b>Military</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Infiltrate Pakistani tribal regions</li> <li>- Reorganize conventional forces in the Middle East</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Complete transformation</li> <li>- Defeat Iraqi insurgency</li> <li>- Develop effective Iraqi military</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Defeat Al Qaeda core</li> </ul>
<b>Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Establish FTAs Saudi Arabia &amp; Egypt</li> <li>- End dependence on oil in western world</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Maintain support for Pakistan</li> <li>- Ensure success of Afghanistan and Iraq</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Restructure aid relationships in the region to reflect GWOT</li> </ul>
<b>Legal</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Expand activities of Legal Attaches in Middle East</li> <li>- Prosecute or release detainees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Develop effective Iraqi police</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Prosecute al-Qaeda network</li> <li>- Deny funding to Middle Eastern terrorist organizations</li> </ul>

**Table 11. Framework for Strategic Planning**

*a. Decisive Actions*

Six actions are identified in this simplified framework to secure the strategic objective of stabilizing the Middle East; clearly there are more but these are sufficient for the purpose of this section. American diplomatic efforts concentrate on solving the Palestinian issue to the satisfaction of all sides. This issue is at the center of much of the Muslim rage and anger toward America; settling it will seriously undermine the terrorist’s cause and immediately degrade their “national” will to fight. The death of Yasser Arafat, the public’s dissatisfaction with Fatah, and the rise of Hamas as a political force created an instability within the Palestinian authority that America could exploit.<sup>315</sup>

<sup>315</sup> Peter Grier, “Moment of Opportunity in the Mid East.” *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 15, 2004, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1115/p01s03-wome.html> (accessed on November 22, 2004). Grier discusses the opportunity created by Arafat’s death. These conditions are amplified by the decline of Fatah and the rise of Hamas.

Informational elements focus on countering radical Islamic propaganda to enhance America's role in the world and degrade the legitimacy of terrorist organizations. If successful, this effort would decrease the overall tension in the region and allow legitimate governments to reform without the threat of revolution. The nation must devote significant effort to degrading the effectiveness of al-Qaeda's propaganda machine and exposing the reality of terrorist violence.<sup>316</sup> The vignettes presented in Chapter IV demonstrated the impact of these efforts in terms of reduced support for the terrorists, improved intelligence gathering, and freedom of action.

Military and legal decisive actions are inseparable and focus solely on defeating the core member's of the al-Qaeda network operating in the Middle East. The major nodes in the network must be penetrated and defeated to ensure the group cannot effectively act against governments in the region. This effort has both a military and legal nature, and new relationships must be built to facilitate interaction.

The system of U.S. aid and alliances in the Middle East needs to be reexamined in light of the transnational terrorist threat. Massive American foreign aid flows to the region through a variety of programs designed to provide humanitarian assistance and ensure security. However, many of these programs were designed and implemented during the Cold War when strategic partnerships were built to contain the threat of Communism. This reexamination might result in changes to the aid currently allocated to Israel and Egypt or new programs such as the \$3 billion aid package that was promised to Pakistan in 2003.<sup>317</sup> These changes provide the administration a more proactive way to use the foreign aid resources to stabilize the region.

Al-Qaeda's financial resources and systems are among the group's most important strategic assets. This is a decisive action that requires the input of multiple instruments of power with law enforcement organizations in the lead. America has a functioning law enforcement system in place; however, more could be done to formal and informal financial institutions. Punitive actions against international banks, for example,

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<sup>316</sup> Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, "Terror, Islam and Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 11-14.

<sup>317</sup> James Russell, Lecture on Foreign Military Sales, NPS course # NS3320: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East, October 17 & 19, 2005. Rose Gordon, "Bush Okays \$3 Billion aid Package to Pakistan, but No F-16s," *Arms Control Today* 33, no. 6 (Jul/Aug 2003), <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 23, 2006).

could be increased and made more immediate. These actions might range from immediate fines, official embargos, unofficial boycotts, or media campaigns organized to force these institutions to police themselves.<sup>318</sup> This sort of a sanction regiment might employ a number of instruments of power; current law enforcement efforts might be joined by information resources attempting to create negative publicity, and economic sanctions against the institutions that enable terrorist operations.<sup>319</sup> Restrictions on the terrorist's ability to move money through international banking systems will force increased reliance on the *hawala* systems already in use. The U.S. and a number of Middle Eastern states have begun to bring *hawala* systems under official regulation thus increasing the pressure on terrorist organizations.<sup>320</sup>

**b. Shaping Actions**

In this example shaping activities should focus on reducing American isolation, undermining support for al-Qaeda, and setting the conditions for decisive action. Diplomatic activity is central to shaping operations, but significant informational and economic elements are also required. There is a massive anti-American sentiment in the world that must be countered before any significant progress can be made to stabilize the Middle East. This sentiment makes it difficult for our friends and allies to publicly agree with American positions and follow America's lead.<sup>321</sup>

In this strategic framework, American diplomats are focused on engaging the actors that are influential in the region. Iran, Syria, and the Hamas government in the Palestinian territories represent three opportunities that the U.S. cannot afford to ignore. As the example of Northern Ireland demonstrates, any group that is not directly engaged in overt terrorist actions should be considered a potential partner in resolving the conflict. The U.S. maintained an embassy in Moscow during the Cold War; it should do so in

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<sup>318</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, 93. Gunaratna, 80-84.

<sup>319</sup> Patrick D. Buckley and Michael J. Meese, "The Financial Front in the Global War on Terrorism," *Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the New Security Environment*, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid L Sawyer (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), 53.

<sup>320</sup> John D.G. Waszak, "The Obstacles to Suppressing Radical Islamic Terrorist Financing," *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 36, no. 2/3 (2004), <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 23, 2006). Bala Shanmugam, "Hawala and Money Laundering: A Malaysian Perspective," *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 8, no. 1 (September 2004), <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed February 24, 2006).

<sup>321</sup> Ivan Krastev, "The Anti-American Century." *Journal of Democracy* 15, no.2 (2004): 5-6.

Tehran during the GWOT. As the Hezbollah vignette pointed out, as radical groups develop an investment in peace they naturally moderate their activities if not their rhetoric. Hamas may be at a “tipping point” in the group’s history that has the potential to positively affect decisive actions.<sup>322</sup> Diplomatic shaping operations engage influential Middle Eastern actors to ensure the settlement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority is not immediately undermined by other nations with conflicting agendas. This activity also facilitates the decisive actions to defeat al-Qaeda by engaging actors that may be able to influence the group.

Traditional diplomatic efforts should coincide with public diplomacy activities to counter the influence of radical Islam, and begin to lay the foundations of democracy in the Middle East. There are indicators that gaps in the Islamic world exist and can be exploited. Moderate Sunni and Shi’ite leaders are not taking a leading role in the Middle East, or the militant movements, because of religious and governmental obstacles.<sup>323</sup> Information activities must also attempt to develop democracy in the region gradually. Saudi Arabia, for example, is one of the most autocratic and repressive regimes in the region, yet there are opportunities for reform. The internal struggle to determine a successor to King Fahd coupled with nascent democratic institutions creates an opportunity to encourage continued democratic reform.<sup>324</sup> Public diplomacy efforts in Brazil in the 1970’s required a similar balance between the need to maintain good relations with a strategically important military dictatorship and the need to foster democracy in the country. United States Information Service (USIS) programs emphasized educational exchanges, binational centers, and cultural programs.<sup>325</sup> This effort was ultimately successful, and while it is not a template for Saudi Arabia, it does show that America can execute delicate influence operations.

Military shaping actions focus on setting the conditions to defeat al-Qaeda’s core organization. This might include efforts to infiltrate Special Forces troops into the Pakistani tribal regions or other areas where al-Qaeda is continuing to operate. It

<sup>322</sup> Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2002).

<sup>323</sup> Radwan Masmoudi, “The Silenced Majority,” *Journal of Democracy* 14, no.2 (2003): 41-42.

<sup>324</sup> Jean-Francois Seznec, “Stirrings in Saudi Arabia,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no.4 (2002): 39.

<sup>325</sup> Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating With the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 141-149.

also may include reorganizing conventional forces to fight on a non-contiguous battlefield where platoons and companies are the primary unit of action, not the battalions and brigades of today's Army. The successes of U.S. Special Forces in the Philippines indicate that this significantly smaller scale operational paradigm is appropriate for a war against a clandestine terrorist group.<sup>326</sup>

Economic power might shape the environment by focusing on increasing free trade agreements with the nations in the region. This would provide additional revenue and job opportunity in the region in an effort to reduce the pool of recruits al-Qaeda draws upon. The validity of this tactic is frequently debated, but there is evidence that aid and increased trade actually reduces transnational terrorism within a country. A Pennsylvania State University study has found that "to the extent that trade and FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] promote economic development, economic globalization has an indirect negative effect on transnational terrorism."<sup>327</sup> Ending the western world's dependence on oil would not contribute to stabilizing the region, in fact it would likely destabilize it further. However, it would increase the Administration's freedom of action in the Middle East, thus enabling many other actions. The President identified ending America's dependence on oil as a priority in the 2006 State of the Union, but shaping actions must go farther than that.<sup>328</sup> The economic ties that are developed through FTAs and other economic policies create interdependent relationships. If the rest of the world remains dependent on Middle Eastern oil, U.S. policy will continue to be constrained by these relationships.

Law enforcement's ongoing efforts to attack terrorist organizations should be supplemented by an initiative to resolve the issue of detainees in the war on terrorism. This action would eliminate another point of contention between the U.S. and much of the Muslim world, thus strengthening the position of American diplomats. It would also increase the effectiveness of persuasion efforts to counter Islamic radical propaganda.

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<sup>326</sup> Eric Schmitt, "U.S. and Philippines Setting up Joint Operations to Fight Terror," *New York Times*, January 16, 2002, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed January 17, 2006). Raymond Bonner and Carlos H. Conde, "U.S. and Philippines Join Forces to Pursue Terrorist Leader," *New York Times*, July 23, 2005, <http://proquest.umi.com> (accessed January 17, 2006).

<sup>327</sup> Quan Li and Drew Schaub, "Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no.2 (2004): 232.

<sup>328</sup> George W. Bush, 2006 State of the Union Address to Congress, The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/index.html> (accessed February 23, 2006).

*c. Sustaining Actions*

Sustaining actions focus on maintaining successes and allies in the Middle East. Diplomats might focus on working through established and recognized quasi-governmental organizations to conserve American power. The employment of NATO in Afghanistan is a prime example of a trend that should continue. Information power will play a critical role in sustaining gains made in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. The Islamic populations of many countries in the Middle East have been socialized to know only protest at the point of a gun; there was no other productive outlet for dissent. Information activities that demonstrate the positive side of democracy and encourage democratic participation are important to solidify change. Information power must also sustain national will in the United States. This paper has already discussed the importance of planning to maintain sources of power, and the danger of a crisis of will. Efforts to maintain national will are important to ensure that the U.S. maintains sufficient support for the commitment of additional financial and manpower resources in the region.

Other sustaining actions demonstrate a similar focus on solidifying gains and generating future power. Military efforts to defeat the Iraqi insurgency and train Iraqi security forces sustain the nascent democracy that is being built. The Army's transformation initiatives are critical to fielding a future force that can deploy more rapidly and act in smaller size units on a noncontiguous battlefield. This transformation will enable the Army to fight terrorist groups with more than special operations forces once the fight in Iraq is finished. Economic sustaining efforts should focus on supporting countries that are critical to this strategic objective and where gains have already begun to affect the environment: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The recent agreement to forgive 80% of Iraqi debt is an example of effective use of economic power to consolidate and support gains.<sup>329</sup> Law enforcement sustaining actions might focus on solidifying the gains made in Afghanistan and Iraq by developing effective internal security structures in these countries. A great deal more work must be done before the criminal justice systems in Afghanistan and Iraq can effectively support their governments.

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<sup>329</sup> Chris Burns, "Russia Agrees to Iraqi Debt Plan," *CNN.com*, November 21, 2004, <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/21/iraq.debt/index.html> (accessed on November 21, 2004).

The framework described above to achieve the strategic objective of stabilizing the Middle East will not defeat transnational terrorism. It was presented to demonstrate a way to integrate the policies and programs of American grand strategy in pursuit of a single focused goal. In a fully developed grand strategy a number of national interests with their supporting strategic objectives would compete for scarce resources. This framework would facilitate prioritizing the allocation of those resources. A secondary benefit of this planning framework is that it makes it much easier to understand “the plan.” National powers are interdependent and reinforcing; this framework allows one to visualize these relationships understand their importance. This ability is critical to appreciating the second and third order effects of any changes. The sequence of nested strategic objectives can be understood by the average American, making it easier to demonstrate success and improves the government’s ability to keep the American public informed.

## **2. Organize for Strategic Action**

A variety of studies and reports have identified the need to reorganize the federal government’s system for planning and managing national security affairs. In 2004 the Rand Corporation produced an Occasional Paper entitled *Coordinating the War on Terrorism*. This paper looked at a variety of questions related to terrorism, and recommended consolidating all counterterrorism responsibilities, to include authority for a government wide counterterrorism budget, under the NSC. These recommendations generally represent a return to, and formalization of, the structure that existed under the Clinton administration.<sup>330</sup> The 9/11 Commission focused in on the interagency problems that contributed to the success of the al-Qaeda attacks. The report’s recommendations regarding intelligence reorganization and counterterrorism planning were adopted almost verbatim by the Congress in the Intelligence Reform Act.<sup>331</sup> Each report attempted to address the basic problem of how to plan and execute grand strategy in an interagency

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<sup>330</sup> Lynn E. Davis, Gregory F. Treverton, Daniel Byman, Sara Daly, and William Rosenau, *Coordinating the War on Terrorism OP-110-RC* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2004), 11-14, [www.rand.org](http://www.rand.org) (accessed August 11, 2005).

<sup>331</sup> 9/11 Commission Report, 403-406.

environment. However, little focus was put on the dynamics of individual and organizational behavior that can combine to degrade governmental decision making systems.<sup>332</sup>

Prior to and after September 11, 2001 counterterrorism strategy was designed, coordinated, and to some degree controlled by the National Security Council's Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). Various national level agencies were designated as "lead agencies" for different portions of the fight, but synchronization among these entities was inconsistent. The *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004* redesigned the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and moved it from the CIA to the newly created Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in an effort to improve this system.<sup>333</sup> One of the key points to understand is that government is a competitive environment and each actor represents their own department's interests. These actors understand new organizations such as the NCTC in terms of the threat to existing power and authority structures.

Three groups currently plan and coordinate U.S. grand strategy: the NSC's Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), the DNI's NCTC, and the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Council (HSC). The HSC will not be discussed in this paper. While it is a part of the planning structure, the HSC's focus is largely defensive departmental strategy. Under President Clinton's NSC this group was called the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) and possessed a great deal of direct and symbolic power within the interagency system.<sup>334</sup> President Bush made significant

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<sup>332</sup> Allison and Zelikow. Zegart.

<sup>333</sup> Intelligence Reform Act, section 1021.

<sup>334</sup> William J. Clinton, *Presidential Decision Directive 2: Organization of the National Security Council*, The White House (1993), 2-3, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-2.htm> (accessed September 1, 2005). William J. Clinton, *Presidential Decision Directive 62: Combating Terrorism, Fact Sheet*, The White House (1993), 2, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-62.htm> (accessed September 1, 2005). Richard Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 10-11 and 230.



changes to the NSC in general and the CSG in particular. These changes drastically reduced the group's power to design and direct counterterrorism policy.<sup>335</sup>

Modern grand strategy operates in a highly complex and dynamic environment, necessitating an organization that is capable of coordinating adjustments to strategy rapidly and effectively across the government. The CSG's structure and authority facilitated just such coordination. However, the organization had a natural tendency to drift from strategy formulation and policy coordination to operational direction. This drift threatened the domains and powerbases of other agencies.<sup>336</sup>

Under President Bush the CSG is more closely aligned to its core process of coordinating between national security agencies. The Bush Administration, through various national security strategies and taskings, structured the U.S. government in a divisional configuration; each department is a division with roles and responsibilities for a portion of the GWOT.<sup>337</sup> Over 40 different federal agencies are involved in counterterrorist programs domestically and abroad; and these programs are seldom solely domestic or foreign. State and local agencies are additional critical actors in domestic programs.<sup>338</sup> This broad spectrum of agencies and actors creates an environment that is ill suited to a divisional structure because divisions are not boundary spanning organizations. The CSG is intended to be a boundary spanning organization. The group integrates the array of agencies through the use of functionally organized formal working

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<sup>335</sup> George W. Bush, *National Security Presidential Directive – 1: Organization of the National Security Council System*, The White House (2001), 4-6, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm>, (accessed September 1, 2005). Clarke, 230. The CSG is now a subordinate working group of the Policy Coordination Committee for Counterterrorism and National Preparedness (PCC/CT), and reports to the Deputies Committee. The National Coordinator no longer sits on the Principles Committee and he no longer has two high ranking deputies.

<sup>336</sup> United States Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change* (Washington, DC: US Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century, 2001), 50-51, [www.knxas1.hsdl.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/legis/nps14-040604-02.pdf](http://www.knxas1.hsdl.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/legis/nps14-040604-02.pdf) (accessed August 20, 2005). Clarke.

<sup>337</sup> Government Accounting Office, GAO-03-165 Report to Congressional Requesters entitled *Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat* (Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 2003), 6-10, <http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/gao/d03165.pdf> (accessed on August 11, 2005). Mintzberg, 110-111. Clarke.

<sup>338</sup> Government Accounting Office, GAO-01-822 Report to Congressional Committees entitled *Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations* (Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 2001), 31, <http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/gao/d01822.pdf>, (accessed August 30, 2005).

groups.<sup>339</sup> Agency representatives in these working groups are supposed to develop options that integrate the activities of their departments. As the report of the 9/11 Commission illustrated, this process is not as smooth as it sounds. The divisional structure of the current government vests a great deal of power in individual departments. Competition between these agencies, or disagreements among Secretaries, can lead to delays and missed opportunities in the dynamic environment that is the GWOT.<sup>340</sup>

The National Counterterrorism Center is a relatively unique type of governmental entity because it is by definition boundary spanning. The original Presidential implementation order tasked the center with integrating intelligence from across the government, performing strategic planning, and assigning “operational responsibilities to lead agencies for counterterrorism activities.”<sup>341</sup> Congress revised and vastly improved the organizational design of the NCTC by formalizing the strategic and operational duties of the center and its director. The Intelligence Reform Act created a direct link between the President and the director of the NCTC; this link provides the director the ability to bypass the time consuming and agency dominated process of the NSC’s committees. While the statute says that the DNI will resolve interagency objections to the NCTC’s taskings, one could imagine that an NCTC director with the President’s ear will seldom need to have issues resolved.<sup>342</sup>

The NCTC, and its director have a statutory responsibility to conduct “strategic operational planning,” and “to assign roles and responsibilities as part of its strategic operational planning duties to lead Departments or agencies... .”<sup>343</sup> To accomplish these tasks the center is to establish a standing directorate called the *Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning*. This directorate is tasked to conduct planning for the entire US government; thus, active support for this organization is in the best interest of virtually all

<sup>339</sup> Bolman and Deal, 49-50. GAO-03-165, 62. The CSG’s working groups are: the Exercise and Readiness Subgroup, the Terrorism Financing Working Group, the Training and Assistance Subgroup, the CT Finance Training and Technical Assistance Working Group, the Hostage Crisis Working Group, and the Technical Support Working Group.

<sup>340</sup> 9/11 Commission Report, 189.

<sup>341</sup> George W. Bush, *Executive Order National Counterterrorism Center*, The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-5.html>, (accessed August 16, 2005).

<sup>342</sup> Intelligence Reform Act, Sect 1021. The director reports to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on intelligence issues and directly to the President on “the planning and progress of joint counterterrorism operations.”

<sup>343</sup> *Ibid.*, revision to Sect 119 (d) (2) and (3) [of National Security Act of 1947].

national security agencies. The directorate is also tasked with monitoring the execution of operations across the government. This provides an external monitor on interagency cooperation and execution of all GWOT related programs.<sup>344</sup> In contrast to this system, the CSG was limited to oversight of overseas counterterrorist operations, while the Homeland Security Council monitors domestic operations.<sup>345</sup>

The Intelligence Reform Act outlines six missions for the center, but the Congress clearly considers the center's core practices to be twofold: first, to integrate intelligence to support the *entire* government; second, to conduct strategic operational planning and tasking for the GWOT.<sup>346</sup> The Strategic Operational Planning directorate focuses on the latter mission. It should produce plans that incorporate all elements of national power, but also ones that reflect the realities, capabilities, and limitations of these powers. Plans must balance ends and means while at the same time achieving an acceptable level of security from terrorist threats.<sup>347</sup>

The organization should adopt a customer focus to encourage other agencies to commit their experts to the center's planning team. This in turn would encourage agency buy-in and partial ownership of the eventual plan.<sup>348</sup> The danger of a customer focus is that the NCTC's position in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) may cause it to tailor products to the President rather than the entire community of agencies involved in CT activities; a condition that various commission reports attribute to the NSC.

A number of the NCTC's structural features create formal and informal power for the organization. The center's position within the EOP should keep it above agency struggles, and lend it a great deal of authority. The appointment and confirmation process for the center's director invests the position with the confidence of both the President and Congress. Finally, the director's dual reporting responsibilities, to the DNI and the President, enables the director to bypass the NSC's bureaucracy and take matters directly to the highest authority for decision. Two aspects of this system are critical.

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<sup>344</sup> Intelligence Reform Act, revision to Sect 119 (j).

<sup>345</sup> Davis et al, *Coordinating the War on Terrorism*, 4.

<sup>346</sup> Intelligence Reform Act, Sect 1021 revision to Sect 119 (d).

<sup>347</sup> Kennedy, 4-5.

<sup>348</sup> Jay Galbraith, Diane Downey, and Amy Kates, *Designing Dynamic Organizations: A Hands-On Guide for Leaders at All Levels* (New York: AMACOM, 2002), 27.

First Presidential preference and style; the President may not want to invest as much power in the center's director as the act allows. Second, the personality of the center's director will greatly affect the amount of power that the position develops. One need only imagine how much power the position might develop if Donald Rumsfeld filled the role as opposed to a less dynamic individual.

The NCTC's challenge is to achieve effective lateral capability throughout the organization as well as the community of agencies it serves. To accomplish this goal the Strategic Operational Planning directorate must leverage human and virtual technology. One of the benefits of interagency participation is that parent agencies will not refuse their representatives access to proprietary databases; by ensuring broad participation the directorate avoids a potential roadblock. The directorate must also be supported by advanced virtual networking and knowledge management tools that facilitate and enable rapid collaboration.<sup>349</sup>

The Intelligence Reform Act restructured the National Counterterrorism Center to create an organization with the potential to effectively plan and monitor grand strategy. The center is not alone in this effort; it is joined by the CSG, HSC, and various departmental actors. There is a danger that the interagency system may become overwhelmed by intergovernmental power struggles and organizational politics with this many committees involved in planning and integrating competing departments. It is critical that roles and responsibilities of each organization be agreed upon in a way that encourages integration and does not further paralyze the system.

### **3. Develop a National Information Strategy**

The nation must develop a formal information strategy to integrate the instruments of power in support of this strategy. Public diplomacy must focus on shared values such as justice and representative democracy but it also must do more than just present American versions of these to the world; it must engage target audiences in debate over substantive issues relating to these values. Efforts already underway to expand traditional public diplomacy programs should continue, but these need to be prioritized to focus the majority of resources on select societies. The "battle of ideas" is

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<sup>349</sup> For a detailed comparison of some virtual tools in use by the military today see Paul Brooks and David Kirkendal, "United States Military Service Networking Capabilities" term paper for NPS SO 4106 (2005), provided on request.

the responsibility of a variety of organizations, and each must actively support the effort. This final point sounds simple, but in fact may be the most difficult one to achieve. Organizations like the Department of Defense are well versed on telling the press about their operations, they are not experienced at appreciating the affect of their actions or tempering their actions to get a desired effect.

#### **4. Define National Interests and Strategic Objectives**

American grand strategy does not have an explicitly stated set of national interests. The lack of commonly understood interests is mirrored by a lack of explicitly stated national strategic objectives. In the absence of these two critical focusing elements the federal departments and committees charged with drafting the supporting strategy identified their own goals and objectives. In many cases there is no common priority or focus to these. It is virtually impossible to gain a full understanding of the total effort in any one area because of this condition. Without a full understanding of the effort it is difficult to make nuanced adjustments to any part of the strategy without risking unforeseen effects.<sup>350</sup>

The NSC should immediately develop a set of prioritized national interests and national strategic objectives. This set must address the total set of US interests, not just the GWOT, to enable strategists to allocate resources with the entire effort in mind. Objectives should be directly linked to interests and describe how the nation will achieve each goal. Objectives should not be specific to any one instrument of power; rather, federal departments should develop supporting objectives to explain how they will contribute to achieving the stated end-state.

#### **5. Align National Strategy Documents**

Upon completion of the national interests and objectives, each organization responsible for a supporting strategy must revise and update it in light of the new priorities. Current national strategy documents were written out of sequence and often do not reflect the current environment. Some examples of this are:

- National Military Strategy written a year before the National Defense Strategy

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<sup>350</sup> For a more complete discussion of national interests and objectives see Morgenthau and Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," 276-278.

- Coast Guard Maritime Strategy written 2 years before the National Maritime Strategy
- Homeland Security Strategy written by the Homeland Security Office and contains budget priorities for FY '04.

These documents describe a great many initiatives that are underway, complete, or overcome by events. They do not reflect existing budget constraints, interim decisions, or the current global environment. This revision will improve the strategic alignment and enable decision makers to understand the totality of effort directed against any strategic objective.

#### **6. Update U.S. Supporting Strategies Annually**

Each agency and committee responsible for a national strategy document must publish an annual update document. This document should describe the progress made since the last report, any changes to policy and programs, and the focus for the next reporting period. This may sound counterintuitive, but supporting strategies are more about the operational details of how an instrument of power is going to act to achieve strategic objectives. These actions take the form of policies and programs which may change year to year for any number of reasons. These updates should be published at the start of the budget cycle and include budget priorities that have been synchronized across the departments. This will serve two functions. First, it will provide the American public an annual report of progress in the GWOT and an appreciation for the way ahead. Second, it will provide the President a tool during the budget process to ensure that key programs do not become the victim of bureaucratic politics.

#### **7. Plan to Maintain Power**

The nation's grand strategy evidences little planning for maintaining the instruments of national power. During World War II there were multiple efforts underway to maintain power; these ranged from victory gardens to Disney anti-Nazi

cartoons. This effort is absent from today's strategy. Some of the strategy documents include a nascent effort to maintain power, but there is no comprehensive plan at the national level.<sup>351</sup>

The NSC and HSC should begin studying policies and programs to maintain and further develop the sources of national power. This is a cross departmental initiative that should focus on things like geography, resources, population, economic development, political structure, national morale, and national reputation. These sources of power are interrelated, and combine to produce an aggregate level of national power, but they cannot be directly employed.<sup>352</sup> Because they are not the direct responsibility of any one department or agency, little thought has gone into maintaining these sources for the conflict. That must change if the nation is going to stay the course in a protracted conflict.

### **C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY**

This paper does not attempt to evaluate the effectiveness and appropriateness of each supporting strategy, only to identify gaps in the nation's strategic framework, and suggest broad strategic themes. It is impossible to study these cases however, without identifying some common strategic themes, and where appropriate these themes were incorporated into recommendations. Further study and analysis is required to determine the most effective supporting strategy for each instrument of national power. It would be impossible to undertake such a study without a significant background in Islam, the Middle East, and each discipline. This study must begin with an agreed upon set of national interests and strategic objectives to focus the analysis.

One of the most important recommendations of this study is that the U.S. should engage international actors with the capability to influence transnational terrorist organizations or target populations. Additional study is needed to determine who those influential actors are and how they can contribute to this effort. This study should be objective and attempt to ignore national biases against any individual actor. The study should also avoid limiting itself to America's partners in the GWOT. Many countries

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<sup>351</sup> DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, 15. George W. Bush, *National Drug Control Strategy*, The White House, 33-38, <http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nps13-042604-11.pdf> (accessed March 9, 2005). NMS; 6 & 14-20.

<sup>352</sup> Organski, 102-107 & 116-117.

that openly oppose U.S. interests may be able to exert significant pressure on al-Qaeda. These opportunities should be identified and presented to national leaders.

Additional study and debate by national leaders is required to clarify the threat facing this country. It is not enough to say that terrorism is the threat, and attempt to define this tactic more clearly; the threat is continually evolving, and may in fact be much more complex. Grand strategy is concerned with the totality of national security; this means that while planners may concentrate on the threat of transnational terrorism, they cannot ignore potential threats from emerging peer competitors, or other sub-national actors such as drug cartels. However, it seems that the true nature of the violent transnational Islamic movements is poorly understood. This threat has been described at various times as criminal, military, and ideological, but it has never been clearly explained so that planners from across the spectrum of national power can craft an effective response to it.

The U.S. must develop an information strategy that simultaneously enhances situational understanding of the direct terrorist danger and actively engages the Muslim world on substantive issues. Current grand strategy contains a long list of policies and programs to improve intelligence collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination; however, there is no organization or prioritization to this list. Almost every national strategy document recognizes the information content of policies and programs, and each at least mentions the need to conduct some form of public diplomacy. None of these documents define how the nation will accomplish this critical task however. Additional in depth study is required to determine the best way to communicate with each of the disparate groups that make up the Muslim world. This work should form the basis of a national information strategy that focuses the actions of each agency to achieve appropriate national strategic objectives.



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