

National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism



“This is a pivotal moment in our nation’s history and in world history. We must stay committed if we are to win the Global War on Terrorism and defend the U.S. and our national interests.”

General Richard B. Myers

1 FEBRUARY 2006

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, DC 20318

Report Documentation Page

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Global War on Terrorism
Military Strategic Objectives:

- Deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive
- Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.
- Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and increase capacity for consequenc management.
- Defeat terrorists and their organizations.
- Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations
- Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism

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“Our nation -- this generation -- will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.”

-- President George W. Bush



Secretary's Foreword

The nation is at war with terrorist organizations that pose a threat to its security and that of other societies that cherish the principles of self-government. In the face of this threat, the United States, under the President's leadership, has worked closely with its growing coalition around the world to defeat that threat and to create an environment universally hostile to the extremists who employ terrorism as their weapon of choice.

The global coalition has had notable successes. Since September 11th, some 50 million people in two nations that supported terrorism and threatened their neighbors, now rule themselves. As a result of coalition efforts around the world, thousands of individuals, including three quarters of al Qaida's leadership, have been removed from terrorist ranks.

Relationships with existing allies and efforts to expand the number of security partners are vital because of their unique access, information, and other capabilities. Essential for the successful prosecution of this long-term war will be U.S. efforts to strengthen existing partnerships and develop new regional partners that agree to cooperate in distinct aspects of the War on Terrorism.

This document, the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT), presents the approach the DoD will take in fulfilling its role within the larger national strategy for combating terrorism:

- It reflects the lessons learned by the department after three and a half years of war.
- It is meant to provide the department's commanders and planners guidance on military objectives, and their relative priority in the allocation of resources.
- It provides guidance as well for cooperation with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and with coalition partners for planning and conducting military operations.

This last feature of the NMSP-WOT is of critical importance. Success in this war depends on a strategic offensive and efforts to counter extremist ideologies that fuel terrorism. The Department of Defense has an important role to play in this, but it cannot succeed in its responsibilities in isolation from the efforts of the rest of the U.S. Government and the efforts of coalition partners.

This strategic plan lays out the strategy for the department.


DONALD H. RUMSFELD
Secretary of Defense



MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution List

Subject: National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism

1. As this plan is published, our Nation is entering the fifth year of sustained combat operations. Our successes thus far in the war are clearly due to the dedicated and courageous service of our Nation's Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who are serving within our borders and around the globe. Their service as warriors, diplomats, peacekeepers, and peacemakers has been exceptional. They are truly our Nation's most precious and important assets. They have done this while serving alongside fellow patriots from other US government agencies and courageous coalition partners. This strategic plan is meant to guide their efforts to future success in the war.
2. The NMSP-WOT is the culmination of significant reflection and debate within our military and our government. Initiated by our Secretary, this debate has produced a clearer understanding of the enemies we face and the conditions under which we fight, and led to a coherent and comprehensive strategic approach to guide the Armed Forces' contributions to success in the war.
3. Key to our success, as always, will be the skill and dedication of our people. The nature of this war demands that we invest heavily in providing our people with the mindset and the skills needed for success. This war demands nothing less than an effort akin to that which we dedicated to the Cold War. Investing in our greatest resource -- our people, including a holistic approach to educating our leaders -- will ultimately lead to victory.
4. The NMSP-WOT articulates the comprehensive plan for our Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism. It is meant to serve as a guide for further planning and to articulate how the military will contribute to achieving our Nation's objectives in the war.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Peter Pace".

PETER PACE
General, United States Marine Corps
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The NMSP-WOT constitutes the comprehensive military plan to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) for the Armed Forces of the United States. This document reflects the lessons of the first four years of the Global War on Terrorism, including the findings and recommendations of the 9-11 Commission and a rigorous examination within the Department of Defense (DoD), personally led by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The NMSP-WOT outlines the Department's strategic planning and provides strategic guidance for military activities and operations in the GWOT. The document guides the planning and actions of the Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, Combat Support Agencies and Field Support Activities of the United States to protect and defend the homeland, attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at home and abroad, and support mainstream

efforts to reject violent extremism.

Strategic Environment

In the GWOT, violent extremism -- in its various forms -- is the primary threat to the United States, its allies, and interests. Groups and individuals who advocate extremist ideologies often see the United States and the West as obstacles to their ability to achieve their aims.

The terms "**extremist**" and "**moderate**" are used in this document as follows: "**Extremists**" are those who (1) oppose -- in principle and practice -- the right of people to choose how to live and how to organize their societies and (2) support the murder of ordinary people to advance extremist ideological purposes. "**Moderates**" or "**mainstream**," refer to those individuals who do not support the extremists. The term "**moderate**" does not necessarily mean unobservant, secular or Westernizing. It applies to people who may differ from each other and from the average American in any number of ways except that they oppose the killing of ordinary people. The term "**terrorist**" refers to those who conduct terrorist acts.

Nature of the War

The United States is at war against extremists who advocate and use violence to gain control over others, and in doing so, threaten our way of life. The GWOT is a war to preserve ordinary peoples' ability to live as they choose, and to protect the tolerance and moderation of free

and open societies. It is not a religious or cultural clash between Islam and the West, although our extremist enemies find it useful to characterize the war that way. These violent extremists see the U.S. and the West as primary obstacles to achieving their political ends. In fighting this global conflict, the United States must ally itself with partners around the world, especially those in the Muslim world who oppose domination by extremists.

The nature of free and open societies enables terrorist networks to take advantage of freedom of movement, communications, financial systems, and logistical support. Extremist networks are able to operate in and exploit seams between states, between military and police forces, and between international and local laws. Consequently, the United States and partner nations remain highly vulnerable to terrorist violence designed to undermine the international antiterrorist coalition and to cause some members to seek to “opt out” of the struggle.



The conditions that extremist networks exploit to operate and survive have developed over long periods. The effort to alter those conditions will require a long-term, sustained approach whose success is key to promoting an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and their supporters.

Nature of the Enemy

The enemy is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals -- and their state and non-state supporters -- which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends. The Al Qa'ida Associated Movement (AQAM), comprised of al Qa'ida and affiliated extremists, is the most dangerous present manifestation of such extremism. Certain other violent extremist groups also pose a serious and continuing threat.

There is a direct relationship between the enemies' motivations and the willingness to use terror tactics. The enemies of the United States and its partners are motivated by extremist ideologies antagonistic to freedom, tolerance, and moderation. These ideologies have given rise to an enemy network of extremist organizations and their state sponsors and non-state supporters. Extremists use terrorism -- the purposeful targeting of ordinary people -- to produce fear to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of political, religious, or ideological goals. Extremists use terrorism to impede and undermine political progress, economic prosperity, the security and stability of the international state system, and the future of civil society.

All enemy networks rely on certain key *functions, processes, and resources* to be able to operate and survive. These three elements are an important basis for

counter-network strategies and can be defined as follows:

- *Function* (Critical Capability): A specific occupation, role, or purpose.
- *Process*: A series of actions or operations (i.e., the interaction of *resources*) over time that bring about an end or results (i.e., a *function*).
- *Resource* (Critical Requirement): A person, organization, place, or thing (physical and non-physical) and its attributes. In network vernacular, a *resource* may also be referred to as a “node” and the interaction or relationship between nodes described as “linkage.”



Specific functions, processes, and resources vary from group to group, network to network, and even from time to time. This demands an agile and adaptive approach to deny terrorists those critical elements that allow operation and survival of the network. A common lexicon and analytic framework is therefore essential to identify and describe these elements within the enemy’s complex and ever-shifting network of networks. Such an approach facilitates ease, simplicity, and broad applicability at the strategic level within DoD and among the interagency and partner nations. As a strategic start-point, the terrorist network of networks is organized by NMSP-WOT into nine basic components

for the further detailed study of its critical elements of operation and survival:

- Leadership
- Safe Havens
- Finance
- Communications
- Movement
- Intelligence
- Weapons
- Personnel
- Ideology

This categorization serves as a common lexicon for orienting and coordinating efforts against enemy networks.

National Strategy

Ends. The national strategic aims are to defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society; and create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.

Ways. The U.S. Government strategy for GWOT is to continue to lead an international effort to deny violent extremist networks the components they need to operate and survive. Once we deny them what they need to survive, we will have won. In the mean time, we must deny them what they need to operate. This strategy has three elements and relies on three critical crosscutting enablers.

The key elements of the U.S. government GWOT strategy are: *protect and defend the homeland; attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at home and abroad; and support mainstream Muslim efforts to reject violent extremism.* The three crosscutting enablers are: *expanding foreign partnerships and partnership capacity; strengthening capacity to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of WMD; and institutionalizing domestically*

and internationally the strategy against violent extremists.

Means. Success in this war will rely heavily on the close cooperation among U.S. Government agencies and partner nations to integrate all instruments of U.S. and partner national power -- diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL). The clandestine nature of terrorist organizations, their support by some populations and governments, and the trend toward decentralized control and integration into diverse communities worldwide complicate the employment of military power.

Mission for the Global War on Terrorism

The Department of Defense, as authorized under its chain of command and in coordination with other government agencies and coalition partners, will develop plans and, when directed:

- Thwart or defeat terrorist attacks against the United States, its allies, and interests;
- Attack and disrupt terrorist networks abroad so as to cause the enemies to be incapable or unwilling to attack the U.S. homeland, allies, or interests;
- Deny terrorist networks the possession or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effects (WMD/E);
- Establish conditions that allow partner nations to govern their territory effectively and defeat terrorists; and
- Contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.

Military Strategic Approach

The Armed Forces of the United States will support national and international activities to counter the enemy's ideology, support moderate alternatives, build capacities of partners, and attack the enemy to deny its key resources and functions. This strategy is expressed in terms of ends, ways, and means.

Ends. The Contingency Planning Guidance establishes four termination objectives as the military contribution to achieving these national strategic aims in the GWOT. These objectives and the mission expressed in this strategy account for the comprehensive military contribution to the GWOT. The CPG termination objectives can be found in the classified version of this document.

Ways. The U.S. government strategic elements and crosscutting enablers call for both direct and indirect military approaches. Direct approaches primarily focus on protecting our interests while attacking the enemy. Indirect approaches primarily focus on establishing conditions for others to achieve success.

The military contribution to this strategy focuses on the accomplishment of six strategic objectives:

Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive. At the national military level, the armed forces focus efforts to deny the enemy the nine terrorist network components discussed earlier. This effort will identify global linkages among terrorist networks, and then arrange regional actions to achieve network-wide effects. The base plan proposes a five-step process to defeat violent extremism (comprised of **mapping** nodes and connections, identifying the **network**, developing an **action plan**, tying

the plan to **metrics**, and **tracking** progress to determine effects). Doing this for all network components for all countries maps the network, identifies linkages, facilitates sharing “best practices,” and informs capacity building efforts.

Enable partner nations to counter terrorism. While nations around the world must fight terrorist extremism within their own borders, many lack the capacity to do this. The armed forces will work with other agencies to enable our partners’ success. This effort is key to creating a global environment inhospitable to terrorists.

Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and increase capacity for consequence management. Military activities include efforts to: detect and monitor acquisition and development; conduct counterproliferation operations, security cooperation activities, WMD active and passive defense, and coordination of consequence management operations (logistics, health service support, and decontamination activities).

Defeat terrorists and their organizations. This military strategic objective directly addresses the enemy’s ability to continue global terrorist operations. This requires continuous military operations to develop the situation and generate the intelligence that allows us to attack global terrorist organizations.

Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations. The military contributes by setting conditions for the success of other U.S. Government agencies and coalition efforts.

Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism. Countering

Ideological Support for Terrorism attacks the enemy’s strategic center of gravity -- extremist ideology. To ensure unity of effort, the Department of Defense will coordinate closely with the Federal agencies assigned primary responsibility for this effort in the U.S. Government. The military’s role in contributing to the establishment of conditions that counter enemy ideologies is critical. Among the ways that the military contributes are:

- **Security.** A secure environment allows moderates to express themselves without fear of intimidation.
- **Humanitarian Assistance.** These efforts are often key to demonstrating benevolence and goodwill abroad, reinforcing support for local governments and mitigating problems that extremists exploit to gain support for their cause.
- **Military-to-Military contacts.** The military’s extensive footprint and access to foreign military leaders influence the way they think about the GWOT and the actions they take to counter violent extremists and promote moderates.
- **Conduct of Operations.** The way we conduct operations -- choosing whether, when, where, and how - - can affect ideological support for terrorism. Knowledge of indigenous population’s cultural and religious sensitivities and understanding of how the enemy uses the U.S. military’s actions against us, are considerations for military planning. The conduct of military operations should avoid undercutting the credibility and legitimacy of moderate authorities opposed to

the extremists, while limiting the extremists' ability to spread their ideology.

- **Military Information Operations (IO).** DoD has significant capabilities that can assist in amplifying the voices of moderates, while helping to counter extremists.

Means. The combination of the Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, the Combat Support Agencies, and the programs and resources of the Department of Defense constitute the military means for fighting the GWOT.

Conclusion

This National Military Strategic Plan is the result of close cooperation between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands and Services. Building on the lessons learned over the past four years, it maps DoD's way ahead for the next few decades of this long struggle.

It is of supreme importance that the United States Military understand the nature of the threat and the nature of this war. This understanding is critical to the implementation of this strategy. Integral to the National Military Strategic Plan for the GWOT is the concept of "supporting mainstream efforts to reject violent extremism." All military members need an understanding of this critical element of the strategy. We must be aware of the culture, customs, language and philosophy of affected populations and the enemy, to more effectively counter extremism, and encourage democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity abroad.

It remains vital that the United States, our allies and partners face this enemy with a force of intelligent and culturally attuned professionals. Now is the time to invest in the human capital needed to combat this enemy for the coming decades.



Strategic Plan

I. PURPOSE

This National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) constitutes the comprehensive military plan to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) for the Armed Forces of the United States. It is the plan that guides the contributions of the Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, Combat Support Agencies and Field Support Activities of the United States to protect and defend the homeland, attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at home and abroad, and support mainstream efforts to reject violent extremism.

The NMSP-WOT fulfills the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's responsibilities for strategic planning and provides strategic guidance for military activities and operations in the GWOT. The strategy articulates the military contribution to achieving the national GWOT objectives as identified in the: National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS).

The plan serves to:

- Implement the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) by identifying the military strategic framework for achieving the CPG-directed GWOT Termination Objectives,
- Identify capabilities the Military Departments should seek to provide,
- Guide ongoing activities,
- Identify priorities,
- Establish a mechanism to measure progress, and
- Inform planning for future DoD actions in the GWOT.

As the basis for the family of GWOT-related plans and the relationships among them, this plan will guide the preparation of:

- Commander, USSOCOM's Global Campaign Plan,
- Geographic Combatant Commanders' GWOT Theater Campaign Plans,
- Functional Combatant Commanders' GWOT supporting plans,
- Combatant Commanders' strategic communication activities pertaining to GWOT, and
- Coordination within DoD, with other U.S. Government agencies, and with coalition partners in support of the GWOT.

Strategic Guidance




Figure 1

Figure 1 depicts key documents that provide strategic guidance in the GWOT. Additional documents are listed in the classified version.

Authority to conduct military operations, resulting from this plan, will be contained in specific execute orders or other directives as approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President.

The base plan is divided into eight sections:

- Purpose,
- Strategic Environment,
- National Guidance,
- Strategic Assumptions,
- Key Considerations,
- DoD Mission for the GWOT,
- Strategic Approach, and
- GWOT Priorities.

The annexes identify responsibilities, provide direction to coordinate efforts within DoD, guide coordination within the U.S. Government, and provide procedural information. The following annexes are summarized in section IX of this document.

- Annex B, Intelligence
- Annex C, Operations
- Annex D, Logistics
- Annex E, Legal Considerations
- Annex F, Public Affairs
- Annex G, Coalition Management
- Annex H, Strategic Communication
- Annex J, Command Relationships
- Annex L, Homeland Defense, Homeland Security and Civil Support
- Annex T, WMD/E
- Annex V, Interagency Coordination

Due to the unique nature of this document, the annexes do not strictly follow the military's Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) format.

II. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Prior to 9/11, the United States countered terrorism primarily through diplomacy and law enforcement. President Bush, however, declared the 9/11 attacks as “acts of war” by an “evil that is intent on threatening and destroying our basic freedoms and our way of life.” Since that time, DoD’s understanding of the nature of this war and the nature of the enemy continues to mature and evolve.



There is a direct relationship between the enemies’ motivations and the willingness to use terror tactics. The enemies of the United States and its partners are motivated by extremist ideologies antagonistic to freedom, tolerance, and moderation. These ideologies have supported the development of a transnational movement comprised of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals, their state sponsors, and non-

state supporters. These extremists use terrorism -- the purposeful targeting of ordinary people -- to produce fear to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of political, religious, or ideological goals. Extremists use terrorism to impede and undermine political progress, economic prosperity, the security and stability of the international state system, and the future of civil society.

There have been other struggles in history between ideologically incompatible views. Modern democracy was challenged during WWII by fascist totalitarianism and then during the Cold War by communism. Both struggles required the use of U.S. and partner instruments of national power to ensure that respect for individual rights and tolerance prevailed over extremism and intolerance.

The terms “**extremist**” and “**moderate**” are used in this document as follows: “*Extremists*” are those who (1) oppose -- in principle and practice -- the right of people to choose how to live and how to organize their societies and (2) support the murder of ordinary people to advance extremist ideological purposes. “*Moderates*” or “*mainstream*,” refer to those individuals who do not support the extremists. The term “*moderate*” does not necessarily mean unobservant, secular or Westernizing. It applies to people who may differ from each other and from the average American in any number of ways except that they oppose the killing of ordinary people. The term “**terrorist**” refers to those who conduct terrorist acts.

In terms of the threat categories described in the current National Defense Strategy, terrorist networks, like al Qa’ida, may employ *irregular*, *catastrophic*, or *disruptive* methods to challenge U.S. security interests. *Irregular* threats employ

“unconventional” methods to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents. *Catastrophic* threats involve the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD like effects (WMD/E).² *Disruptive* threats may come from terrorist organizations that develop and use breakthrough technologies to negate current U.S. advantages in key operational domains.

Some extremists’ goals, objectives, and methodologies take on the characteristics of insurgencies. At the furthest end of the spectrum, some extremists espouse a *global insurgency* aimed at subverting the existing political and social order of both the world of Islam and the broader world. They aim to undermine Western influence, redefine the global balance of power, and establish a global pan-Islamist caliphate. Rather than simply seeking to overthrow a particular government in the traditional sense of the term insurgency, these extremists aim to fundamentally change the nature of the world order.

Aspects of the current strategic environment contribute to and enable the spread of terrorist extremism, such as globalization and the existence of “opportunists.” Globalization complicates warfare exponentially owing to the dense intertwining of the systems that make countries and organizations strong or weak -- financial, economic, political, social, military, and information among many others. Dense patterns of telecommunications allow the worldwide dissemination of data, information, and knowledge in real time. It is through the combination of television, radio, telephony, Internet, computers, and an oral society that people are able rapidly to learn or to seize upon bits of data as truth with no facts or critical analysis or explanation of

context. Technology and globalization has made it easier for extremist leaders to attract well educated recruits to serve as leaders and foot soldiers, fuel the frustration of disaffected and unemployed youth, increase global sympathy, move operatives to points of destination throughout the world very quickly, provide financial support, and exchange data to synchronize attacks.

“Opportunists,” such as criminal organizations, weapon proliferators, and rogue states, undercut the rule of international law and governmental legitimacy, contributing to an environment of corruption. Additionally, inadequate government capacity and presence allow the existence of safe havens and sanctuaries in various regions of the world. These conditions foster a “convergence of convenience” between extremists and opportunists who support each other to satisfy their own interests. They may share a common enemy or other broad goals. Our efforts in the GWOT address the convergence of opportunists’ and extremists’ interests. The United States is only beginning to understand the collusive nature of this criminal-extremist nexus.

Opportunists could contribute to the proliferation of dangerous technologies. A key danger in this war is that terrorist extremists will obtain and use WMD/E. The enemy can exploit the fear and disruptive impact these weapons instill and not just their destructive kinetic effects.

Even as the United States and partners engage against extremism, other terrorist threats exist. The President has stated that “no group or nation should mistake America’s intentions: We will not rest until terrorist groups of global reach have been found, have been stopped, and have been defeated.” Attacks by global and regional terrorist extremist organizations other

than the al Qa’ida and those extremists associated with them, could become a feature of the strategic landscape. Consequently, the United States and its partners should continue to be vigilant, collaboratively plan, and be prepared to identify and eliminate the various terrorist threats against the American people and other civilized societies.

Nature of the War

The United States is at war against extremists who advocate and use violence to gain control over others, and in doing so, threaten our way of life. The GWOT is a war to preserve ordinary peoples’ ability to live as they choose, and to protect the tolerance and moderation of free and open societies. It is not a religious or cultural clash between Islam and the West, although our extremist enemies find it useful to characterize the war that way. These violent extremists see the U.S. and the West as primary obstacles to achieving their political ends. In fighting this global conflict, the United States must ally itself with partners around the world, especially those in the Muslim world who oppose domination by extremists.



The clandestine nature of terrorist organizations, their support by some populations and governments, and the

trend toward decentralized control and integration into diverse communities worldwide complicate the employment of military power. Success in this war relies heavily on the close cooperation among U.S. Government agencies and partner nations to integrate all instruments of U.S. and partner national power -- diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL).

The nature of free and open societies enables terrorist networks to take advantage of freedom of movement, communications, financial systems, and logistical support. Extremist networks are able to operate in and exploit seams between states, between military and police forces, and between international and local laws. Consequently, the United States and partner nations remain highly vulnerable to terrorist violence designed to undermine the international antiterrorist coalition and to cause some members to seek to “opt out” of the struggle.

The conditions that extremist networks exploit to operate and survive have developed over long periods. The effort to alter those conditions will require a long-term, sustained approach whose success is key to promoting an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and their supporters.

Nature of the Enemy

There is no monolithic enemy network with a single set of goals and objectives. The nature of the threat is more complicated. In the GWOT, the primary enemy is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals -- and their state and non-state supporters -- which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for

ideological ends. The Al Qa’ida Associated Movement (AQAM), comprised of al Qa’ida and affiliated extremists, is the most dangerous present manifestation of such extremism. Certain other violent extremist groups also pose a serious and continuing threat.



Networks provide survivability via a combination of redundant systems, secrecy, and a cellular structure. They can be highly adaptable, and the al Qa’ida Network (AQN) is an example of such adaptation. Following the elimination of the AQN base of operations in Afghanistan, the remaining leadership and key operational elements dispersed around the globe, effectively franchising Islamist extremism and terrorist methodology to regional extremist organizations. The AQN’s adaptation or evolution resulted in the creation of an extremist “movement,” referred to by intelligence analysts as AQAM, extending extremism and terrorist tactics well beyond the original organization. This adaptation has resulted in decentralizing control in the network and franchising its extremist efforts within the movement. Other extremist networks have proven to be equally adaptive.

Enemy Critical Vulnerabilities

The networked and cellular structure of global extremist threats calls for careful and continuous analysis of their organizations

and operating systems to identify enemy vulnerabilities. Center of gravity and critical vulnerability analysis enables the U.S. Government to focus efforts more effectively on the enemy.

Centers of Gravity

Centers of gravity exist at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and differ for each extremist network or organization. At the strategic level, the AQAM's center of gravity is its extremist ideology. This ideology motivates anger and resentment and justifies, in the extremists' eyes, the use of violence to achieve strategic goals and objectives. A principal focus of this strategic plan is to support other U.S. Government agency efforts to counter the extremist ideologies that fuel terrorist networks.

At the operational and tactical level, various centers of gravity exist, including key leaders, popular support, organizational support (state and non-state supporters) and key operational elements of the organization. Center of gravity analysis must be tailored to a specific network for each campaign of the GWOT.

Key Network Components

All enemy networks rely on certain key *functions*, *processes*, and *resources* to be able to operate and survive. These three elements are an important basis for counter-network strategies and can be defined as follows:

- *Function* (Critical Capability): A specific occupation, role, or purpose.
- *Process*: A series of actions or operations (i.e., the interaction of *resources*) over time that bring about an end or results (i.e., a *function*).

- *Resource* (Critical Requirement): A person, organization, place, or thing (physical and non-physical) and its attributes. In network vernacular, a *resource* may also be referred to as a "node" and the interaction or relationship between nodes described as "linkage."

Specific functions, processes, and resources vary from group to group, network to network, and even from time to time. This demands an agile and adaptive approach to deny terrorists those critical elements that allow operation and survival of the network. If denied to the enemy, they can become critical vulnerabilities. Attacked individually or in combination, the loss of key functions, processes, and resources serves to disrupt the enemy's ability to operate. Attacked systematically over time, the enemy center of gravity can be undermined and the network rendered unable to survive. A common lexicon and analytic framework is therefore essential to identify and describe these elements within the enemy's complex and ever-shifting network of networks. Such an approach facilitates ease, simplicity, and broad applicability at the strategic level within DoD and among the interagency and partner nations. As a strategic start-point, the terrorist network of networks is organized by NMSp-WOT into nine basic components for the further detailed study of its critical elements of operation and survival: Leadership; Safe Havens; Finance; Communications; Movement; Intelligence; Weapons; Personnel; and Ideology. This categorization serves as a common lexicon for orienting and coordinating efforts against enemy networks.

Leadership. Leadership provides the motivation and energy necessary to maintain coherent progress toward a goal. Most terrorist extremist groups

have a central figure who embodies the cause and several operational leaders/ coordinators who provide leadership on a functional, regional or local basis. Adaptive organizations have a “bench” of leaders prepared to assume greater responsibilities, if required. For example, although the AQ network retains a level of centralized control over its own operations, control of the broader movement is decentralized. Usama Bin Laden acts as the inspirational leader of many in the extremist movements, not as an operational director. This resource is vulnerable to the military, intelligence, law enforcement, and informational instruments of national power. Military, intelligence, and law enforcement instruments focus on capturing or killing key terrorist leaders, while informational instruments focus on degrading their standing with their followers and potential recruits. Leadership provides the following focus for targeting: strategic vision/motivation; operational guidance/ direction; and tactical direction.



Safe Havens. One of the most important resources to extremists is safe haven. Safe havens provide the enemy with relative freedom to plan, organize,

train, rest, and conduct operations. Safe havens can be physical or non-physical. Terrorists benefit from physical safe haven when states grant them access to territory, or when they gain access to ungoverned, ill-governed, or under-governed space within states that lack effective control over



their own territory. Terrorists sometimes conceal themselves in remote hideouts, with minimal contact with authorities and limited access to transportation and communication lines. Other illicit groups, such as insurgents, drug lords, and smugglers, have already identified territory with these characteristics, and some groups may “rent” attractively prepared sites to enemy groups for financial gain or out of ethnic, religious, or ideological sympathies. Urban areas are also used by terrorists for meeting, planning, and hiding in smaller numbers. Suitable urban environments for such activity share few characteristics with remote sites except, in some cases, poor government control. Non-physical safe havens for terrorists can exist within cyber, financial, and legal systems. These “virtual” safe havens allow enemy networks to enjoy relative freedom from disruption, as in physical sanctuaries, since states often make them available or are unable to deny their use. These areas may create opportunities for cooperation by criminal elements and extremists. All instruments of national and international power can play a role in disrupting or denying terrorists access to such safe

havens. State-sponsored safe havens may be vulnerable to diplomatic, military, economic, and informational instruments. Ungoverned space may be vulnerable to military and intelligence instruments. Virtual safe havens may be vulnerable to financial, economic, informational, and intelligence instruments. Safe havens provide the following foci for targeting: specific physical safe havens; specific virtual safe havens; facilities; and safe haven/sanctuary providers.

Finance. Extremists fund operations by using unofficial banking systems, legitimate businesses, front companies, wealthy backers, state sponsors, non-governmental organizations, and criminal activities. Drug trafficking is a growing source of criminal funding for many enemy organizations. Though other U.S. Government and international entities have the lead role in attacking this key resource, the military can assist in many ways. Finance provides the following focus for U.S. government targeting: illicit trade/criminal activity; embezzlement; donors; money exchange; safekeeping; couriers; front companies;



Communications. The ability to receive, store, manipulate, and communicate and/or disseminate information. All instruments of power play a part in attacking the vulnerabilities associated with communications. The military instrument can assist by collecting

intelligence on communications, attacking computer systems, and denying intelligence to the enemy through operational security (OPSEC) and force protection measures. Communications includes: foreign electronic media; commercial telecommunications; trade/field craft; Internet/chat/email; OPSEC and signal security.




Movement. Extremists must move and have supporting documentation to elude detection, maintain flexibility and access targets. Terrorist access to targets includes the ability to move weapons to desired target locations. Principal means are to use existing methods for smuggling contraband to deliver weapons and operatives to desired target locations. Law enforcement and diplomatic instruments lead the effort to deny enemy transit across borders and to protect likely targets in the United States. The military contributes to this effort by deterring, detecting, and interdicting terrorists before they can



reach the United States and protecting potential military targets in the homeland. Movement includes: couriers; movement corridors/transit points; relative anonymity; organic and commercial transportation; popular support; and illicit/criminal trade mechanisms.

Intelligence. Extremist networks require specific and detailed information to achieve their ends. They gather this information from open sources, human contacts (both witting and unwitting), reconnaissance and surveillance, and technical activities. Terrorists use the resulting intelligence to plan and execute operations, and secure what they need to operate and survive. The intelligence component of extremist networks includes counter-measures to protect against infiltration or attack. Terrorist entities perform counterintelligence, apply operational security measures, use denial and deception, and exercise great care in determining the loyalty and reliability of members, associates, active supporters and other affiliates. The intelligence capabilities of terrorist entities must be systematically, broadly and consistently countered and attacked by unremitting attention to and steady efforts at force protection, counterintelligence, counter-denial and counter-deception, among other measures. U.S. and partner nation



counterterrorist efforts must take full account of and constantly seek to counter the abilities of terrorist entities to acquire and use the intelligence required for their activities. Overseas, the military uses force protection, counterintelligence, and OPSEC to combat terrorist access to targets. Access to intelligence can be disrupted or eliminated by actions derived from: passive/active human intelligence; open source collection; technical intercept; and counterintelligence.

Weapons. Extremists employ existing technology (explosives, small arms, anti-tank missiles, and other weapons/devices) in conventional and unconventional methods to terrorize and achieve mass effects. In addition, terrorists may use non-weapon technologies as weapons. The best examples of asymmetric uses of technologies would be the use of commercial aircraft as missiles during the 9/11 attacks and the use of industrial chemicals to induce casualties and panic among the public. Components for WMD/E and the scientific expertise that enable them are available on the world market, often from states that support terrorist extremist groups. Stockpiles in the former



Soviet Union and “WMD for profit” activities such as the AQ Khan network could be the source of WMD/E for terrorists. Diplomatic efforts seek greater control over weapons by responsible parties, especially weapons with significant potential to create

multiple casualties such as man portable air defense missiles (MANPADs) and WMD. Financial efforts seek to stop the flow of funds that fuel procurement. The military in concert with other instruments of national power will conduct interdiction operations in all mediums (air, land, sea, and cyber) to prevent the proliferation of WMD, associated components, knowledge, or technology. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global initiative aimed at stopping shipments of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials worldwide. PSI is best understood as a set of partnerships that establishes the basis for cooperation on interdiction activities when the need arises. Access to weapons can be disrupted or eliminated by targeting: conventional weapons procurement/manufacture; movement of conventional weapons; WMD/E finance, technology, technical experts, material and equipment procurement; material and equipment movement; processing and production facilities; training; and delivery platforms.

Personnel. This critical capability incorporates terrorist recruitment, indoctrination, and training of enemy operatives. Extremists use religious facilities, schools, refugee camps, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the media as vehicles for recruitment, reinforced by the educational and indoctrination efforts. Recruitment can



be disrupted by countering the appeal of extremist ideology. The military plays a critical role in that effort, as well as in operations to capture or kill individual terrorist foot soldiers. Personnel targets include: operatives; technical experts; personnel recruiters; personnel movement; and ideological legitimacy.

Ideology. Extremist ideology motivates violent action and inspires individuals to provide material resources. Ideology is the component most critical to extremist networks and movements and sustains all other capabilities. This critical resource is the enemy's strategic center of gravity,

Ideology

- A systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture. It can be thought of as a comprehensive vision, as a way of looking at things
- There are many different kinds of ideology: political, social, spiritual, epistemological, ethical, and so on.

and removing it is key to creating a global antiterrorist environment.

It is ideological belief, reinforced by propaganda operations, that convinces recruits and supporters that their actions are morally justifiable. All instruments of national power play a role in undermining ideological support and propaganda operations that defends and promotes the use of terrorism. The principal responsibility for this important mission lies outside the Department of Defense. Countering ideological support and the enemy's propaganda operations involves action as well as words. There can be value in actions demonstrating that the United States possesses, and is willing to use, overwhelming force against terrorists and other extremists. At the same time, the United States must be aware and should

show respect for all religions, cultures, customs, language, and philosophies of affected populations. Targeting ideology includes: amplifying the voices of those who promote alternative ideas that emphasize tolerance and moderation; promoting freedom and democracy; de-legitimizing extremist ideological leaders; and providing alternatives to extremist education systems (e.g., some madrassas), among others.

III. NATIONAL GUIDANCE

Guidance in the Global War on Terrorism is derived from appropriate National Security Presidential Directives, the National Defense Strategy, Contingency Planning Guidance, and the National Military Strategy. The NMSP-WOT is the military component of the greater U.S. Government efforts in the GWOT. The following summarizes the national strategic aims, strategy, and the end-state for the GWOT.

National Strategic Aims

- Defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society, and
- Create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.

National Strategy

The U.S. Government strategy for GWOT is to continue to lead an international effort to deny violent extremist networks the resources and functions they need to operate and survive. The strategy animating this broad international effort has three key elements: *protect and defend the homeland; attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at home and abroad; and support mainstream*

efforts to reject violent extremism. The latter element is the decisive element of the strategy and is focused on the enemy’s strategic center of gravity -- extremist ideology. Systematically denying the enemy ideological support while supporting mainstream efforts could lead to the enemy’s defeat. In the meantime, protecting and defending the homeland, and attacking terrorist networks are essential to protect the center of gravity of the United States and disrupt enemies of the United States. Each partner country has a special interest in protecting and defending its own homeland, attacking terrorists and their capacity at home and abroad, and in supporting mainstream efforts to reject violent extremism.




Figure 2

Protect and defend the homeland.

These efforts protect and defend economies, society, and systems of government from the effects of terrorist attacks. This element includes efforts internal and external to the homeland; in other words, protecting and defending the homeland requires efforts abroad.

Attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at home and abroad.

These offensive efforts of the strategy are designed to disrupt terrorists’ operations, affecting terrorists’ ability to execute their attacks effectively or sustain



their ideology. These efforts include killing and capturing key enemy leaders and foot soldiers, destroying training centers, and denying the enemy access to each of the eight categories of resources and functions critical to the enemies' operations. Ultimately, continuous and successive network-wide attacks against the enemy can cause enemy networks to fail.

Support mainstream Muslim efforts to reject violent extremism. These efforts are achieved through countering extremist ideology and encouraging democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity in societies. For instance, take the primary threat, represented by the AQAM. A decisive point in countering



ideological support for terrorism occurs when moderate Muslims lead the fight against the extremists. Key to this is Muslim populations' belief that terrorism is

not a legitimate means to pursue political goals. The strategy is to encourage and enable moderates to promote the view that violent extremist efforts undermine the wellbeing of the Muslim community on a local, regional, and global level. The belief that violent extremist efforts are harmful to the Islamic community, and contrary to the teachings of Islam, must come from within Islam itself. As the Muslim community progressively recognizes violent extremist actions as a threat to itself through introspection, mainstream moderates may become more active in stopping the violent extremists. The U.S. role in this effort is to support, where appropriate, and encourage and amplify the voices of moderates who oppose extremists and continue to encourage democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity in societies.



The three strategic elements of the U.S. government strategy for the GWOT are enabled by three crosscutting elements that represent critical efforts for achieving success in the war. These enablers include: expanding foreign partnerships and partnership capacity; enhancing capacity to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of WMD; and institutionalizing domestically and internationally the strategy against violent extremists.

End-State

Violent extremist ideology and terrorist attacks eliminated as a threat to the way of life of free and open societies. A global environment that is inhospitable to violent extremism, wherein countries have the

capacity to govern their own territories, including both the physical and virtual domains of their jurisdictions. Partner countries have in place laws, information sharing, and other arrangements, that allow them to defeat terrorists as they emerge, at the local and regional levels.

IV. STRATEGIC ASSUMPTIONS

Long-term war of varying intensity.

Defeating extremism can be expected to require decades of effort.

Violent extremists will use any means of attack.

The United States and other free and open societies will remain principal targets of the extremists. They may seek to use all means of attack, including WMD/E, against targets at home and abroad.

Internal struggle within societies.

Extremists are waging a global war to gain control over their communities and freedom is seen as a primary obstacle to their success. Violent extremists are hostile to the United States and the West for philosophical, political, and other reasons. The world, in general, has a large stake in the defeat of violent extremists. The AQAM is the immediate strategic threat to mainstream Muslims, the United States and our partners.

Ideology matters.

Violent extremist movements can make new terrorists faster than the anti-terror coalition can capture or kill them. Ideological support and propaganda operations are a foundation for extremist success and a key to recruitment and indoctrination.

Enemies within friends.

The networks of terrorist groups and others who support their violent extremist ideologies will influence, and in some cases penetrate,

the governments and civil and religious institutions of partner nations

Together and alone. The United States leads a coalition of more than 80 countries to combat violent extremism, but will act alone, as necessary.

All instruments of power. The United States is at war, and success in the war will require the coordinated efforts of all instruments of U.S. and partner national power. In fact, the principal thrust, must come from instruments of national power and influence outside the Department of Defense. The United States will also promote freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity around the world to mitigate those conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.

Divided responsibilities. Responsibility for protecting the United States is divided among Federal, state, and local governments and the private sector will remain divided. The DOD will need to coordinate closely with other government agencies to achieve integrated plans and operations. A detailed understanding of this division of responsibility may be necessary for developing campaign plans. This division of responsibility is subject to change as the U.S. Government addresses the 9/11 Commission recommendations, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and other reviews of GWOT strategy.

V. CONSIDERATIONS

Close neighbors. To protect the U.S. homeland, cooperation with neighbors in this hemisphere is especially important.

Enemies are trans-national. The enemies do not respect national boundaries. The U.S. Government will need to use its country teams abroad in

new ways to execute a global strategy. Violent extremists cooperate with opportunists -- other extremists, criminal elements, proliferators, and drug cartels -- based on self-interest.

Common assessment of threat. U.S. Government agencies will not automatically adopt a common assessment of the threat or a common understanding of the nature of the war; nor will U.S. coalition partners. Greater commonality of view, however, can be achieved through effort.

A “networked enemy” has certain vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Although some nodes of the network are difficult to see, others may be identified and acted upon. Perturbations of nodes in the network may present intelligence collection and attack opportunities. Networked enemies have different vulnerabilities than hierarchical enemies. There may be vulnerabilities especially in network links with opportunists whose motivations are not ideological.

VI. MISSION FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

The Department of Defense, as authorized under its chain of command and in coordination with other government agencies and coalition partners, will develop plans and, when directed:

- Thwart or defeat terrorist attacks against the United States, its allies, and interests;
- Attack and disrupt terrorist networks abroad so as to cause the enemies to be incapable or unwilling to attack the U.S. homeland, allies, or interests;

- Deny terrorist networks the possession or use of WMD/E;
- Establish conditions that allow partner nations to govern their territory effectively and defeat terrorists; and
- Contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.

VII. MILITARY STRATEGIC APPROACH

The military strategic approach is to focus military operations in such a way as to assist other elements of national power to undermine the enemy center of gravity – violent extremist ideology. The Armed Forces of the United States will pursue direct and indirect methods to support activities to counter the enemy’s ideology, support moderate alternatives, build capacities of partners, and attack the enemy to deny its key components. This strategy is expressed in terms of ends, ways, and means. (Figure 3 depicts this military strategic approach.)

Military Strategic Framework for the GWOT




Figure 3

Ends

The Contingency Planning Guidance establishes four termination objectives as the military contribution to achieving the national strategic aims and end-state in the GWOT. These objectives and the mission expressed in this strategy account for the comprehensive military contribution to the GWOT. The CPG termination objectives can be found in the classified version of this document.

Ways

DoD achieves these termination objectives and complements other U.S. Government activities by accomplishing six military strategic objectives that focus on the strategic elements of the national GWOT strategy. These military strategic objectives call for both direct and indirect military approaches to the end-state. Direct approaches focus on protecting our interests while attacking the enemy. Indirect approaches focus on establishing conditions for others to achieve success. The military strategic objectives are:

Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive. Key to this is understanding the critical nodes and linkages of the terrorists' networks. At the national military level, efforts are focused to identify global linkages among terrorist networks, and then to arrange regional actions that will achieve network-wide effects. Because the enemies are located in countries around the world with whom the United States is not at war, much of the effort against the terrorists will have to be made by those countries with the encouragement and assistance as necessary of the United States.

Enable partner nations to counter terrorism. As 9/11 demonstrated, a

terrorist group based in a remote, relatively inaccessible country can still pose a major threat to the United States and its interests. Thus, victory requires a worldwide, continuous, and comprehensive effort to create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them. The United States must also continue to encourage and assist bilateral and multilateral regional partnerships among states that can work together in combating terrorism.



Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and increase capacity for consequence management. Important for the enemy's success is its ability to maintain itself as a credible opponent. The enemy gains credibility in supporters' eyes if it is able to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction or successfully employ technology to achieve mass effects as occurred in New York and against the Pentagon. Joint Publication 3-40 describes the military contributions to combating WMD, including nonproliferation (NP), counterproliferation (CP), and consequence management (CM). Military activities include efforts to: detect and monitor acquisition and development; and conduct counterproliferation operations, security cooperation activities, WMD active and passive defense, and coordination of consequence management operations (CM logistics, health service support, and

decontamination activities). All of these efforts serve to protect the homeland.

Defeat terrorists and their organizations. This military strategic objective directly addresses the enemy's ability to continue global terrorist operations. This requires continuous military operations to develop the situation and generate the intelligence that allows us to attack global terrorist organizations. This becomes the first object of military operations against the terrorists -- find the enemy. Once the situation is effectively developed, military operations may be authorized to: capture or kill senior leadership and senior operatives; eliminate safe havens; destroy training camps and resources; capture or kill cell members ("foot soldiers"); and disrupt recruiting and indoctrination efforts. As always, emphasis is on operating with and training partner nations to achieve this objective, while always being prepared to operate independently, if necessary.



Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations. State sponsorship provides extremists access to key resources, including fronts for illegal activities. Non-state entities may also provide some of these same benefits to the enemy. Non-state supporters may be financial

supporters, such as charities and criminal organizations that directly or indirectly support terrorist organizations. The military contributes by setting conditions for the success of other U.S. Government agencies and coalition efforts. The range of military activities includes: intelligence operations to identify state sponsors and non-state supporters of terrorism; capturing/killing terrorists and their direct supporters; interdiction operations to intercept terrorist resources (including WMD/E and components); coordinated counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and counter-narcotics efforts; and exercises and capability demonstrations to dissuade and coerce states and non-state entities. In extreme circumstances, the military leads efforts toward cessation of state and non-state support of terrorism, as exemplified by operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, to oust regimes that supported terrorists and stabilize the countries afterward.

Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism. Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism attacks the enemy's strategic center of gravity -- extremist ideology. Although the Department of Defense is not the lead Federal agency for this effort, the U.S. military can contribute significantly. DoD can take actions to help build up, for example, the security, confidence, and other institutional capabilities of those who oppose violent extremists'. DoD can also take actions to shake the confidence of violent extremists, expose their false statements and corruption and otherwise affect the extremists' ability to convey effectively their messages of antagonism, violence, and intimidation.

To ensure unity of effort, DoD will coordinate closely with the Federal agencies assigned primary responsibility

for this effort in the U.S. Government. Actions to counter ideological support should be designed to de-legitimize the enemy's ideology (center of gravity) and create conditions that isolate nodes and connections of the network. Once isolated, these nodes or connections may be treated as regional or local threats, vulnerable to local partner nation efforts. The most effective efforts in the ideological struggle are likely to be partner efforts.

The military's role in contributing to the establishment of conditions that counter enemy ideologies and propaganda operations is critical. The U.S. Military's extensive professional military education programs are key to fostering leadership at every level that exercises judgment



informed by these considerations. Success in the GWOT, both in the near-term and future, will largely depend on the cultural education and understanding of senior leaders and military professionals. Among the ways that the military contributes are:

- **Security.** The Armed Forces of the United States and indigenous forces provide security as a critical condition for countering enemy ideologies and propaganda operations. The U.S. armed forces often contribute best by helping train the forces of other countries for the skills needed to combat terrorism. A secure environment allows

moderates to express themselves without fear of intimidation. Security is also an important condition for the success of many of the counter ideology efforts of other government agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.



- **Humanitarian Assistance.** The considerable capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States to alleviate suffering in times of hardship provide opportunities to influence the way people perceive their situation and their environment. These efforts are often key to demonstrating benevolence and goodwill abroad, reinforcing support for local governments and mitigating problems that extremists exploit to gain support for their cause.
- **Military-to-Military contacts.** The military's extensive footprint and access to foreign military leaders



influence the way they think about the GWOT and the actions they take to counter violent extremists and promote moderates. These contacts include: International Military Education and Training (IMET), Offices of Military Cooperation and other train-and-equip efforts, foreign participation in Regional Centers, combined training activities and exercises, and senior military contacts.

- **Conduct of Operations.** The way we conduct operations -- choosing whether, when, where, and how - - can affect ideological support for terrorism. Knowledge of indigenous population's cultural and religious sensitivities and understanding of how the enemy uses the U.S. military's actions against us should inform the way the U.S. military operates. The U.S. military prefers to work in a supporting role where indigenous forces are capable of leading operations. Where effects can be achieved by means other than direct U.S. military actions, the U.S. Government may seek to do so.



Where U.S. military involvement is necessary, military planners should build efforts into the operation to reduce potential negative effects. At the same time, we must, by



our military actions, convey the sense that our power cannot be defeated and that, under the right circumstances, we are willing to use it. This will require careful balancing. The conduct of military operations should avoid undercutting the credibility and legitimacy of moderate authorities opposed to the extremists, while defeating extremists' ability to spread their ideology.

- **Military Information Operations (IO).** Amplifying the voices of moderates and countering the



extremists can be supported by DoD. These operations are coordinated with other Department and agencies, principally the State Department, as a component of DoD's contribution to public diplomacy and public affairs.

Means

The combination of the Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, the Combat Support Agencies, and the programs and resources of the Department of Defense constitute the military means for fighting the GWOT.

VIII. MILITARY PRIORITIES IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Military priorities can be characterized as being of the "first" or "second" order, or as "enablers." First order priorities orient Combatant Commands, Military Departments, and Combat Support Agencies toward achieving current critical objectives of the GWOT. Although these priorities are temporal in nature, these tasks are expected to consume a majority of resources that are dedicated to the GWOT for the near future. Second order priorities provide direction for important but not critical aspects of the war, and guide the application of capacities not dedicated to first order priorities. The ability to commit resources to these second order priorities will differ from combatant command to combatant command and by each Military Department and agency. Enabling priorities identify parallel efforts that affect accomplishment of GWOT near-term and future objectives, but are not unique to the

GWOT effort. Enabling priorities identify the application of resources in GWOT that are more directly tied to the national military strategy as a whole. The priorities serve to translate the military strategic framework, described in the preceding section, into focused efforts against the enemy.

CONCLUSION

This National Military Strategic Plan is the result of close cooperation between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands and Services. Building on the lessons learned over the past four years, it maps DoD's way ahead for the next few decades of this long struggle.

It is of supreme importance that the United States Military understand the nature of the threat and the nature of this war. This understanding is critical to the implementation of this strategy. Integral to the National Military Strategic Plan for the GWOT is the concept of "supporting mainstream efforts to reject violent extremism." All military members need an understanding of this critical element of the strategy. We must be aware of the culture, customs, language and philosophy of affected populations and the enemy, to more effectively counter extremism, and encourage democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity abroad.

NMSP-WOT ANNEXES

It remains vital that the United States, our allies and partners face this enemy with a force of intelligent and culturally attuned professionals. Now is the time to invest in the human capital needed to combat this enemy for the coming decades.

The classified version of this strategy can be found on the Joint Staff classified website (<http://j5.js.smil.mil/> under [National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism](#)). Alternatively, contact The Joint Staff, Deputy Directorate for the War on Terrorism at (703) 693-2023.

The classified version of this document supersedes the NMSP-WOT dated 19 October 2002. The document will be updated biennially, or as required.

The following annexes exist in full form in the classified version of the NMSP-WOT. This unclassified version includes excerpts from those annexes. Additionally, expanded excerpts of Annexes C, H, R, and V are included to help illustrate issues and concepts of particular interest in the GWOT for those who may not have access to the full annexes in the classified NMSP-WOT.

- **Annex B, Intelligence:** Describes the threat, concept of intelligence operations, and intelligence activities.
- **Annex C, Operations:** Provides tasks, coordinating instructions for implementing the base plan, and assigns DoD-wide responsibilities. It establishes Commander of the United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) as the supported command for the GWOT.
- **Annex D, Logistics:** Provides tasks, coordinating instructions for supporting the base plan, and assigns DoD-wide responsibilities.
- **Annex E, Legal Considerations:** Provides guidance and DoD-wide responsibilities.
- **Annex F, Public Affairs:** Coupled with the Strategic Communications guidance in Annex H, offers guidance for implementing Public Affairs campaigns in support of GWOT.
- **Annex G, Coalition Management:** Provides tasks, coordinating instructions for the international efforts of the GWOT.
- **Annex H, Strategic Communication:** Coupled with the Public Affairs guidance in Annex F, offers guidance for implementing strategic communication campaigns in support of GWOT.
- **Annex J, Command Relationships:** Describes the supported/supporting commander relationship for the GWOT.
- **Annex L, Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and Civil Support:** Describes the military's role in each mission area as it relates to the GWOT.
- **Annex R, Implementation:** Describes how DoD will implement, assess, and measure progress in the GWOT.
- **Annex T, WMD/E:** Describes WMD/E terrorism and the principles for combating WMD/E.

- **Annex V, Interagency Coordination:** Addresses interagency coordination process at the strategic and operational levels.

ANNEX C: OPERATIONS

In addition to articulating classified tasks and coordinating instructions for the Defense Department, Annex C implements the Secretary's designation of the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) as the supported combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks.

CDRUSSOCOM leads a global collaborative planning process leveraging other combatant command capabilities and expertise that results in decentralized execution by both USSOCOM and other combatant commands against terrorist networks. In this role, USSOCOM's specific responsibilities include:

- Integrating DoD strategy into GWOT plans and establishing intelligence priorities against terrorist networks; Leading the development and synchronization of plans against terrorist networks;
- Prioritizing and synchronizing those parts of security cooperation activities, deployments, and capabilities that support campaigns against terrorist networks in coordination with geographic combatant commanders;
- Exercising command and control of CT operations, as directed;
- Providing representation, in addition to other military commands, to U.S. national and international agencies

for matters related to United States and multinational campaigns against terrorist networks;

- Creating, implementing and directing global operational preparation of the environment (OPE) to integrate operations to find, fix, and capture terrorists and other High Pay Off Targets (HPTs);
- Supporting other combatant commanders for operational planning as required against terrorist network targets;
- Developing and leading a time sensitive planning (TSP) process to rapidly propose courses of action and to provide operational recommendations to the Secretary of Defense considering the full spectrum of military options;
- Interface with national, Military Department, and commercial laboratories to maintain awareness of promising state-of-the-art GWOT technology for the warfighter; and Lead the development of a GWOT Intelligence Campaign Plan (ICP) for DoD.

ANNEX H: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Violent extremists are using the Internet and some mass media as a safe haven for organizational support, intelligence gathering and offensive operations. The organizational uses of the Internet include command and control, training, dissemination of information and ideology, perception management and propaganda as well as intelligence gathering. Mass media and other influence networks are used to deliver

disinformation and propaganda to further extremist objectives. Extremists have been resourceful and adaptive in using information operations in support of their own strategic communication strategy to gain and maintain ideological support and influence key audiences. Because they are not constrained to be truthful or accurate, they can exploit the information domain with considerable effect. At the operational and tactical level of extremist networks, various centers of gravity exist, including key leaders, popular support, organizational support (state sponsors and non-state supporters) and key operational elements of the organization.

The U.S. military, in coordination with interagency and Coalition partners, will support a U.S. Government strategic communication strategy for the Global War on Terrorism. This strategy will guide Public Affairs (PA), Information Operations (IO), military support to public diplomacy (MSPD), and military diplomacy (MD) toward GWOT strategic goals.

The Defense Department's strategic communication objectives in the GWOT are to align Coalition and partner nations against violent extremism, provide support for moderate voices, dissuade enablers and supporters of extremists, deter and disrupt terrorist acts, and counter ideological support for terrorism. Achieving these objectives requires a sustained, proactive strategic communication effort. Combatant Commanders should harness all strategic communication capabilities, including public affairs, public diplomacy (military support to public diplomacy and military diplomacy) and information operations, and work with the interagency to implement a synergistic strategic communication effort. A successful strategic communication strategy will insure maximum beneficial impact on the perceptions of target audiences, capitalize on truthful information,

and exploit enemy exorbitance.

The Chairman and Combatant Commanders will implement aggressive PA, IO, MSPD, and MD plans to support a comprehensive strategic communication process for the war on terrorism. The U.S. military will consider how *actions* can affect

Strategic Communication defined as “the transmission of integrated and coordinated U.S. Government themes and messages that advance U.S. interests and policies through a synchronized interagency effort supported by public diplomacy, public affairs, and military information operations, in concert with other political, economic, information and military actions.”

the debate between extremists and their opponents. The intent is to ensure all areas of communication are fully coordinated and synchronized, while not subordinating one area to another. The lead for coordination will depend on the individual commander's mission. Effective planning and execution of strategic communication is critical to accomplishing the commander's mission. The success depends on sound leadership, guidance and organizational rigor. The U.S. military will participate, as appropriate, at the strategic level (within DoD, with the Interagency, and among coalition partners) to provide coordinated support for U.S. Government efforts to achieve strategic communication objectives for the GWOT.

The DoD elements of strategic communication are PA, PD, and IO, as shown in figure H-1. The U.S. military specific disciplines are also shown; military PA, MSPD, MD, and military IO. The chart shows the need for integration and informed interaction among the four disciplines. While some actions occur in isolation of the others, it remains key that coordination and synchronization take

DoD Strategic Communication Elements				
Function	PA	Diplomacy		IO
Audience	Military PA US & Foreign Audiences	MSPD Foreign Audiences	Military Diplomacy Foreign Defense Officials	Military IO Adversaries & Associated Foreign Audiences
Example	Media Affairs	Web Initiatives	Coalition Building	Leaflets Commando Solo
Lead	PA	PA	J5	J3
	← <i>Coordination Across the Disciplines</i> →			

Figure H.1. Notional Guide for Seamless Strategic Communication Elements

place within and among the four military strategic communication disciplines. It is important for commanders to consider that maximum effectiveness for all aspects of strategic communication may rest upon a successful public affairs program. Roles and responsibilities in the strategic communication discipline should be assigned with this in mind.

DoD components will coordinate closely with the Department of State and other Federal agencies assigned primary responsibility for strategic communication, to ensure unity of effort. Success relies heavily on the close cooperation among U.S. Government agencies, Coalition, and partner nations to integrate all instruments of U.S. and partner national power -- diplomatic, information, military, economic,

financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL)

ANNEX R: IMPLEMENTATION AND ASSESSMENT

The GWOT requires innovative, flexible tools and processes for tracking the war, assessing the progress of the United States and its partner-nations, and developing ways to overcome challenges. Appendix 1 provides guidance on the GWOT Assessment process and Appendix 2 outlines the metrics used to make the assessment. The metrics serve a two-fold purpose, first, to measure progress in the GWOT via the effectiveness of NMSP-WOT strategic framework, and, second, to use criteria in the GWOT Assessment process to identify issues/shortfalls that

will be subsequently integrated into DoD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process for resource resolution.

On a semi-annual basis, Combatant Commands, Services, and selected Combat Support Agencies (CC/S/SAs) are required to assess their progress in the global war on terrorism against the system of metrics. This semi-annual process measures the Department of Defense's progress in the global war on terrorism and identifies issues that inhibit progress.

The metrics for the GWOT provide a snapshot of progress in the war and feedback on the efficacy of the U.S. strategy. When implemented through the Assessment process, these metrics will be used to revise the U.S. strategy in light of lessons from prosecuting the war and in response to changes in the enemy's

strategy.

As outlined in the base plan, the metrics reflect an "ends, ways and means" approach. The Termination Objective is the military end-state, or 'ends,' and the Military Strategic Objectives in conjunction with the three elements of the national strategy comprise the 'ways' to achieve the ends. When the metrics are implemented as part of the GWOT Assessment process, as described in Appendix 1 of this annex, the metrics provide feedback to the agencies responsible for supplying the 'means,' namely the Combatant Commands, Services and Combat Support Agencies. These metrics are directly linked to other DoD processes such as the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPB&E), Joint Quarterly




Figure R-1. GWOT Assessment Process

Readiness Review, the CJCS Assessment of Risk, the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Secretary of Defense's Balanced Scorecard (currently under development).

ANNEX V: INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

As described elsewhere in this plan, the GWOT requires a joint, interagency effort in support of a sustained global war plan. DoD needs to achieve unprecedented levels of coordination (at both the strategic and operational levels) to effectively deal with this complex requirement and accompanying interdependence. This effort also requires an end to unilateral "stove piping" of actions within departments, agencies, and staff directorates.

DoD will monitor and guide the implementation of this plan through a set of processes that include, but are not limited to the following: The Joint Staff GWOT Federation, CJCS's GWOT Senior Leader Review Board, GWOT Strategic Review, and Periodic Secure Video teleconferences (SVTCs).

X. GLOSSARY

Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement

(ACSA). Assigns for controlling the negotiation and the conclusion of agreements with foreign governments and international organizations by personnel of the DoD, its components or other organizational elements.

Alliance. An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.

Antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, including limited response and containment by local military forces.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN). The association is made up of 10 member states and 12 "dialogue" partners in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Consists of 20 Asian countries and one regional organization (European Union), institutionalized as a regional security organization with multilateral discussions.

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

Forum to discuss Asia-Pacific regional economic issues.

Assure. A range of actions taken both at home and abroad to solidify resolve and demonstrate commitment.

Australia Group (AG).

The Australia Group (AG) was founded in 1984 in the aftermath of the massive use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war. During the 1980s, evidence surfaced that several countries, including Iraq, were producing chemical weapons using supplies from the international trade in chemicals and related equipment. Thirty countries participate in the AG: Australia, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the United States. The AG has no charter or constitution and operates by consensus. The group meets annually in Paris.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives-Consequence Management (CBRNE-CM).

Essential services and activities required for managing or mitigating damages or other consequences or problems resulting from the employment of CBRNE.

Civil Support (CS).

DoD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.

Also see Homeland Security and Homeland Defense definitions.

Coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.

Combating Terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Term is being redefined. Intent is to treat “C4” as “battlespace communications” or simply “communications” and address “ISR” as “battlespace awareness.”

Compel. A range of actions taken to achieve a change in behavior or activity through the use of all instruments of national power.

Computer Network Attack (CNA). Intrusion or disruption of computer network.

Computer Network Defense (CND). Defensive measures to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction.

Consequence Management (CM). Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents.

Contain. Efforts taken to limit freedom of action, minimize the effects of terrorist activities, preclude the regeneration of lost capabilities, and/or limit terrorist influence.

Counterintelligence (CI). Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage,

or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.

Counterterrorism (CT). Offensive measure taken to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism.

Critical Infrastructures. Designated capabilities, facilities and systems considered essential to the maintenance of the stability and good order of a nation.

Defeat. Decisive actions taken to render ineffective, destroy, or eliminate the capabilities of terrorist organizations or their state and non-state sponsors.

Defend. Actions taken to deter, preempt, or prevent attacks against the homeland. Can include conducting preemptive attacks to protect U.S. interests.

Destroy. To physically render an entity ineffective or incapable of conducting activity unless it is reconstituted or regenerated.

Deter. Actions taken to disrupt, prevent, or preclude acts of aggression. Includes preemptive actions to unhinge the ability to conduct operations.

Direct Action (DA). Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel.

Disrupt. Actions taken to interrupt, temporarily prevent, or desynchronize a terrorist network’s capability to conduct operations.

Dissuade. The focused application of all elements of national power to convince or persuade an organization, state, or non-state entity.

DIMEFIL: Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law

Enforcement instruments of national power articulated in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003).

Extremist. Those who (1) oppose -- in principle and practice -- the right of people to choose how to live and how to organize their societies and (2) support the murder of ordinary people to advance extremist political purposes.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Congressionally appropriated funds granted to foreign governments to finance the purchase of American-made weapons, services and training.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS). That portion of U.S. security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and service transferred.

Fundamentalism. A movement or point of view characterized by adherence to fundamental or basic principles. Radical Islamic movements are frequently referred to in the West as fundamentalist, but in fact the use of this term is an intellectual error. In a purely scriptural sense all Muslims are fundamentalists, since all believing Muslims, whether Sunni or Shi'a, hold that the Qur'an is the literally revealed word of God. Therefore, the word fundamentalist does not represent a useful distinction in discussing Islam.

Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT). A broad range of products including imagery, imagery intelligence, geospatial information, imagery-derived MASINT, and imagery-derived products.

Global Information Grid (GIG). A globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating,

and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel.

High Pay-Off Target (HPT). A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander's mission. (JP 3-60)

Homeland Defense (HD). The protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. Also see Homeland Security and Civil Support.

Homeland Security (HS). IAW National Strategy for Homeland Security, "Homeland Security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur."

International Military Education and Training (IMET). Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units and forces on a non-reimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians and contractors.

Isolate. To separate from a larger whole and set apart, denying freedom of movement and access to external support.

Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET). Program to train Special Operations Forces.

Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC). Provide full-spectrum information to combatant commanders.

Madrasa. A building or group of buildings used for teaching Islamic theology and religious law, typically including a mosque.

Maritime Interception Operation (MIO). The capability to conduct vessel boarding/seizure on an uncooperative, underway ship suspected of carrying contraband.

Military Assistance for Civil Authorities (MACA). The broad mission of civil support consisting of the three mission subsets of military support to civil authorities, military support to civilian law enforcement agencies, and military assistance for civil disturbances.

Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS). A mission set of civil support involving Department of Defense support, normally based on the direction of the President, to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence, and provide Federal supplemental assistance to the states to maintain law and order.

Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). A mission of civil support consisting of support for natural or manmade disasters and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield explosive consequence management, and other support as required.

Moderate. The terms “moderates” or “mainstream,” refer to those individuals who do not support the extremists. The term “moderate” does not necessarily mean unobservant, secular or Westernizing. It applies to people who may differ from each other and from the average American in any number of ways except that they oppose the killing of ordinary people.

Multinational. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners.

Preparation of the Environment (PE). Definition for this term can be found in USSOCOM Directive 525-5 dated 4 Oct 04 (S/NF).

Partner nation. Countries associated with another in some activity or common interest.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). A Presidential initiative focused on the air, ground, and maritime interdiction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD/E), ballistic missiles, and related materials/equipment moving to or from countries and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

Salafism. A movement comprised of Sunni extremists who believe they are the only correct interpreters of the Qur’an and consider moderate or mainstream Muslims to be infidels. Salafists seek to convert all Muslims and to insure their own fundamentalist version of Islam will dominate the world. “Salafi” comes from the word “Salaf” which means ancestors in Arabic. This worldview holds that the Righteous Ancestors were the Prophet, his companions, and the Four Caliphs who succeeded him: Abu-Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali (the nephew of the Prophet). This movement has influenced the rise of Wahhabism.

Security Cooperation (SC). Integrate various agencies, U.S. Governmental, nongovernmental agencies and allies to create a secure environment.

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). An agreement, which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state.

Strategic Communication. The transmission of integrated and coordinated U.S. Government themes and messages that advance U.S. interests and policies through a synchronized interagency effort supported by public diplomacy, public affairs, and military information operations (IO), in concert with other political, economic, information and military actions.

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). Over arching system used to control and manage functions in various environments.

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. The term “terrorist” refers to those who conduct terrorist acts.

Terrorist Extremist. An extremist that uses terrorism -- the purposeful targeting of ordinary people -- to produce fear to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of political, religious, or ideological goals. Extremists use terrorism to impede and undermine political progress, economic prosperity, the security and stability of the international state system, and the future of civil society.

Terrorists with global reach - transnational terrorists. Terrorist organizations with an operational and support network in multiple countries that possess the capability to recruit, plan, resource, and execute terrorist acts worldwide.

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Elements of the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center and the Department of Defense will form a Terrorist Threat Integration Center to fuse and analyze all-source information related to terrorism.

Ungoverned Space. Territory lacking effective, organized, and/or responsible governance, affording secure sanctuary for illicit criminal organizations, terrorist network(s), and/or antigovernment paramilitaries. Includes under-governed areas within a country with a functioning government. Government may be witting or unwitting.

Wassenaar Arrangement. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was established in July 1996

by 33 Participating States. Meetings are held in Vienna, Austria, where the Arrangement is based. The Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States.

Weapons of Mass Destruction or Effect (WMD/E). WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical “weapons.” They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on U.S. commercial information systems or attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent.

(Footnotes)

¹ A key danger in this war is that terrorist extremists will obtain and use WMD/E. The 2004 National Military Strategy introduces the concept of weapons of mass effect (WME) to emphasize the mass “effects” of an attack to produce strategic outcomes, using other than the standard WMD weapons (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and in some cases High Yield Explosives). The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. The enemy can exploit the fear and disruptive impact these weapons instill and not just their destructive kinetic effects.

² The NMS introduces the concept of weapons of mass effect (WME) to emphasize the mass “effects” of an attack to produce strategic outcomes, using

other than the standard WMD weapons (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and in some cases High Yield Explosives). The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts.