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**National Defense University
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**Five Deficits and a Physics Problem:
Restructuring the Military Services**

Longer Essay

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INTRODUCTION

"People who grew up in the '50s and '60s think a large standing force has always been on duty, but it was an aberration. I really, truly believe this is a militia nation." ¹

General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAR
CINC U.S. Transcom
Commander, U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command
January 26, 1994

"Until recently, stationing troops forward was the best, maybe even the only way to monitor events, to show the flag, to guarantee a rapid response. Air and space power now promises a more elegant solution to the presence requirement. If you are sitting in country 'Y' and you're holding a council of war, you've got to think about the 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale (Air Force Base Louisiana) or the 509th Bomb Wing with its B-2s at Whiteman (Air Force Base) in Missouri as being as less than a day away. That is presence." ²

General Merrill A. McPeak
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
February 18, 1994

These two quotations frame the most important military capability issues facing the United States military services in the coming decade---the "right" mix between Active duty and Reserve forces and the "right" balance between service roles and functions---a balance that reduces redundancy and preserves combat capability at lower cost.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols law mandates a review of military roles and functions every three years. The two previous reports, submitted by Admiral William Crowe and General Colin Powell, recommended only modest adjustments to traditional service roles.

Changing service roles is made incredibly difficult by individual service cultures, strong personalities, genuine professional differences, and bureaucratic politics. However, as budgetary shortfalls challenge implementation of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR),³ the imperative for the Congressionally-mandated 1994 Roles, Missions, and Functions Commission is to find ways to maintain military capability at lower cost.⁴ To examine roles anew, the Active/Reserve force mix is an essential first step in the process.

Historically, America has placed greater reliance on the Reserve during peacetime. Reliance on the Reserve has come with acceptance of a greater security risk as long as the nation's survival is not threatened. The notable exception to America's 350 year militia history was the Cold War. After World War II, America kept the economy on a war-footing to rebuild Europe and Japan and to produce manufactured goods for the world. The post World War II demobilization and return to a militia force was reversed by the outbreak of the Korean War. After the war, the Active military force was gradually expanded to "contain" the Soviet threat. However, in today's post-Cold War world, the threat of warfare on a global scale is greatly diminished. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense (DOD) Base Force and the BUR force structures persist in maintaining a *proportionally larger Active force* in the face of declining resources. Contrary to the American militia tradition, the Army and the Navy have substantially cut their Reserve forces while the Air Force has made more modest reductions. How does this "share the pain" approach square with America's post-Cold War domestic priorities and resource limitations?

There are reasons to be pessimistic about the prospects for arriving at a new balance between the military Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC) or about the prospects for a meaningful restructuring of military roles and functions. In periods of dwindling resources, thinly veiled service rivalries rekindle as each service tries to protect its piece of the budget pie. This includes the active lobbying by powerful Reserve and National

Guard trade associations. During this process, bureaucratic in-fighting normally prevents radical adjustments to the percentage of the defense budget allotted to each service.⁵

Moreover, the uncertainty of the post-Cold War period has created political confusion as the nation gropes for a compass suited to the "new world order" that President Bush so boldly but prematurely proclaimed. Meanwhile, the American public has turned inward, concerned more about economic competitiveness and social decay than international security issues.

This essay provides a framework for debating force mix and roles, missions, and functions by asking: *can the United States military adapt efficiently and effectively to the resource-limited demands of the post-Cold War world, or will the services simply be salami-sliced into smaller versions of the existing services?*

To examine the issues, first, changes in the international and domestic political environments are described to provide a decision-making context. Second, the American historical experience and ethos are examined to understand the nation's proclivities and enduring national interests. Third, the limitations of multiple deficits are discussed. And finally, given this background, several observations and recommendations are offered to stimulate further, hopefully innovative thinking, on force mix and roles and functions.

THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CONTEXT

Political Confusion. It has been nearly five years since the fall of the Berlin wall. Yet the consolidation phase in international politics continues, as governments search for familiar cues or new guidelines suited to the "new world order." In the United States, the 1992 election of President Clinton, and the rise of populist sentiment embodied by the candidacies of Ross Perot and Patrick Buchanan, made it clear that the American public was seeking a new order as well. Paradoxically, the 1990s focus of the American people has turned decidedly inward as the United States Government (USG) continues to be engaged worldwide at near the Cold War pace.⁶

An effort toward multilateralism in Somalia initially garnered public support when American involvement was cast as a humanitarian effort. However, support evaporated when 18 American lives were lost, and American involvement in Somalia became a confusing case of protracted nation-building. In Haiti, support for the democratically-elected government and the United Nations (UN) seemed appropriate until a confrontation with the military-led government developed. When the use of force seemed imminent in order to support UN objectives, U.S. forces were withdrawn to Guantanamo Bay while policy options were reconsidered.

Bosnia provides the most dramatic example of political and domestic confusion. Despite widely reported atrocities on all sides and the prospect of an internationally brokered peace plan (Vance-Owen), America has been reluctant to become involved in what Americans seem to regard as a "European" problem. Yet, despite public reluctance, the United States is now involved in this difficult situation, made intractable by the historical cycle of ethnic discrimination and retribution. Whether public support can be sustained remains an open question.

Richard Rosecrance wrote in the Spring of 1992: "it now appears that while American leaders are still willing for the nation to exert itself abroad, intervene in foreign conflicts and give large amounts of foreign assistance, the American public is more reluctant."⁷ Nonetheless, he goes on to argue that a relatively efficient and cost-effective international order, *united by economic interests* in an open and growing world economy, is likely to have U.S. public support over the long term.⁸ This is distinctly an economic-based approach that differs from the political-security-based strategy of the past order. Despite the foreign policy confusion of the Clinton Administration's first year in office, an economic-based, free market approach to foreign policy appears to be the emerging national security strategy.

The Uncertainty Angst and Economic Interests. The familiarity of the Cold War bipolar confrontation and nuclear standoff provided a perverse sense of order to international affairs. Issues were often viewed as a zero-sum balance between the Soviet bloc and the West. Foreign governments and political entities that would not otherwise be candidates for U.S. support, received aid under a containment policy designed to thwart communism and Soviet expansionism. For example, in the 1970s and 80s, the United States largely ignored Chinese ideological and cultural differences that now inhibit smooth bilateral relations in order to play the Cold War "China Card" against the Soviet Union. In El Salvador, the United States supported both efforts to build a civilian democratic government and measures to strengthen the military (a potential threat to a democratic government) despite evidence of misconduct by the Salvadoran military.⁹ American foreign policy during the Cold War was largely driven by the policy of Soviet containment and national-interest-based realism as opposed to the reemerging American liberal *idealism* characteristic of the Wilsonian period (and some Clinton Administration pronouncements).

The hope for a new world order in the post-Cold War period (1990-1994) has been clouded by persistent political crises characterized by ethnic animosities, social and economic inequalities, and regional and internal political competition. Competition between a more moralistic U.S. foreign policy and the need for pragmatic decision-making has created controversy and conflict in the foreign policy community. This controversy has delayed the publishing of the 1994 National Security Strategy document. The Goldwater-Nichols law requires that the Administration publish a National Security Strategy every January to guide the development of plans and programs and the execution of foreign policy. However, the 1994 strategy document has been the subject of intense debate between the departments of State and Defense,

delaying its release. The State Department is placing greater emphasis on "soft power," such as diplomacy and economic and cultural relationships, while the Defense Department is concerned about the role of the military as guardian of U.S. interests abroad. Some military officers see the "soft power" approach as a bid by the State Department for budgetary resources, while others considered the draft text "fuzzy" on the use of force.¹⁰

The struggle over the National Security Strategy reflects both the continuing uncertainty about how to deal with the changes of the past five years and the military's reluctance to surrender its dominant Cold War position in political decision-making. Some scholars suggest that in the post-Cold War period, decision-making power is shifting from a political-military decision-making coalition to a political-economic coalition--further evidence that economic issues will be central to future policy formulation.¹¹ Candidate Clinton even went so far as to proclaim: "In this era our first foreign policy priority and our domestic priority are one and the same: reviving our economy."¹²

The United Nations and Regional Fora. Deciding when and where to become involved militarily has been complicated by the lack of consensus on what U.S. national interests are in the 1990s. With the end of the bipolar world, there was an initial enthusiasm, particularly among the American intellectual elite, for collective security arrangements and strengthening the United Nations' (UN) means for providing a stable world order. Consensus and cooperation among the members of the Security Council during the Gulf War seemed to increase the feasibility of the body taking on a broad spectrum of responsibilities. However, the United Nation's record since 1991 has been mixed.

A very successful, but expensive, intervention in Cambodia has been offset by a failed policy in Somalia. Moreover, growing UN involvement around the world is straining the international community's willingness to finance a more activist UN. For example, the United States is \$1.4 billion in arrears to the United Nations. In addition, the Clinton Administration is currently seeking emergency funding from Congress to cover \$697 million in 1993 peacekeeping debts. In a separate initiative, the administration has bid to include \$300 million in the FY95 budget for *anticipated* peacekeeping operations, an unprecedented action that is not likely to be supported by Congress.¹³

The difficulties NATO has experienced in trying to reach a consensus for action in Bosnia illustrate the difficulty of regional collective security arrangements supplanting the UN. NATO has enjoyed more than 40 years of cooperative efforts against a perceived common threat. However, in Bosnia varied national interests have confounded efforts at cooperative action. If the tightest and longest standing regional organization can be paralyzed in the face of enormous international pressure to intervene, what does that say about the potential for effective regional collective security arrangements among nations with disparate national interests? American leadership to resolve the Bosnia conflict appears essential if consensus is to be achieved. American leadership will also be crucial in other areas of the world. But will the American people pay for an active internationalist or interventionist foreign policy over the long term?

The Domestic Agenda. President Clinton was elected largely on the strength of the Democratic Party's domestic agenda. The now overused sound bite "it's the economy, stupid" resonated well enough to bring a new Administration to Washington. For the most part, President Clinton has stuck to the domestic agenda espoused by candidate

Clinton. He has devoted little time to foreign policy or national security matters, preferring instead, to leave formulation of foreign policy to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretaries of Defense Les Aspin and William Perry, and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake.¹⁴

The growing importance of the domestic agenda is reflected in President Clinton's foreign policy strategy of "enlargement" of the democratic community of nations through diplomatic means, economic incentives, and contracts with non-government groups such as labor unions, human rights movements and women's organizations.¹⁵ Underpinning the foreign policy agenda is a commitment to free markets, witnessed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The Administration is also pressuring Japan for better market access for American products in an effort to increase American exports, create jobs, and reduce the American-Japanese trade imbalance. Structural weaknesses in national infrastructure and education plague the nation. Crime and immigration issues also concern Americans.

Nevertheless, Joseph Nye argues that U.S. domestic problems have not yet caused decline. However, the deficiencies require investment for the future both in physical and human capital. Yet despite the Administration's focus on domestic issues, domestic and foreign policies are becoming blurred in a world of interdependence.¹⁶ Private actors and transnational groups deal economically on a global basis. Monetary capital flows more freely across borders, with less government control. The emergence of the information age is connecting citizens of nations across the globe. Increasingly, American businesses are becoming more important transnational actors and partners in international business arrangements. The airline industry provides a visible example of this trend as links are built between

government-supported European companies and private U.S. airlines. Moreover, U.S. exports now make up nearly 11% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP).¹⁷

This global trend means America is internationally entwined economically and cannot return to an old-style isolationist strategy. Once again, though, the key test for government involvement is to find the balance between an activist policy that supports national interests and the will of the American people to support and pay for such a policy.

The Bottom-Up Review (BUR). The BUR also reflects the Administration's commitment to economic and domestic issues. Although the BUR still defines defense requirements in traditional ways, identifying potential threats as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, and instability in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern Europe, for the first time, *economic dangers* have also entered the national defense calculus. To combat economic dangers, the BUR calls for productive reinvestment of defense resources, support for maintaining the defense industrial base, emphasis on key technology and acquisition reform, and sustaining free trade and economic growth.¹⁸ Giving economic issues a prominent place in a defense document is an *unprecedented indicator of the shift in emphasis to domestic issues that recognizes economic strength as THE key element of lasting national power. It also reflects a de facto shift from threat-based defense planning to resource-based planning.* In other words, future defense planning will be based less on the perceived threat (on which there is little agreement anyway) and more on projected resources and how to maximize military combat capability given more constrained budgets. For example, during the entire period of Pax Britannia, the British military was constrained by a budget of approximately 2% of Gross National Product (GNP). The military defense planners' task was to determine how to best leverage combat

capability given a fixed budget allotment. The defense budget would grow only if the British economy grew.¹⁹ Similarly, Australia has made force structure decisions in the face of an ambiguous threat for years. American military leaders must learn from these methods of force structure planning.

While the Bottom-Up Review reduced military forces below the Base Force recommended by the Bush Administration and saved \$91 billion over five years, the BUR did not fundamentally change the focus of DOD or the military services because force structure planning was still threat-based, predicated on fighting two Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) *nearly* simultaneously.²⁰ But, when confronted with an emerging global economy, and economic and other domestic problems, the dilemma is how to balance forces and resources. As Paul Kennedy precisely defines the problem in The Rise and Fall of Great Powers:

No general rule will provide the decision-makers of the time with a universally applicable course of action. If they neglect to provide adequate military defenses, they may be unable to respond if a rival Power takes advantage of them; if they spend too much on armaments—or, more usually, upon maintaining at growing cost the military obligations they had assumed in a previous period— they are likely to overstrain themselves, like an old man attempting to work beyond his strength.²¹

The nation's defense leaders have been aggressive at downsizing America's military infrastructure abroad, although there are still questions raised about why two divisions, 2+ fighter wings, and 100,000 soldiers are needed in Europe. Nonetheless, progress has been made at reducing military "armaments" and infrastructure. In contrast, the high operations tempo of American forces around the globe suggests that America is still maintaining Cold War military and foreign policy obligations in the face of severe budgetary restraints.²² The issue is not what military involvement is desirable, but what can be sustained financially for the long term without undue risk. It is argued in the sections below that resource shortfalls will drive a less active national security strategy and will result in resource-based defense planning rather than

threat-based planning. Yet, in contrast, it is clear that for the near term at least, DOD continues to do threat-based planning based on the BIG war.

THE AMERICAN ETHOS AND ENDURING NATIONAL INTERESTS

Why focus on the American ethos? Because understanding the American ethos is particularly important in a period of uncertainty and confusion. As Henry E. Eccles writes, ". . . the ultimate source of strategy lies in the values of the people of a nation."²³ When the American public is confronted with change that is little understood, it is likely to react based on core values and fundamental national interests. Ignoring the American ethos could result in a misguided policy that fails to garner long term domestic support.

The American Ethos. The United States was forged by idealism and war. The American national character and its distinguishing attitudes toward the military and the political use of force are the product of these shared historical experiences, reinforced by the constitutional structure of our government. America offered a fresh start to those who sought to escape oppression and the difficult conditions of 17th century Europe. Many early settlers were Quakers, Puritans, or other protesting religious adherents who sought freedom to practice their "good versus evil" theology.²⁴ The English dominance of colonial affairs led to the American Revolution and provided Americans with a deep and lasting mistrust of strong central governments. The debate between central control and states' rights is endemic in our system and is embodied in the philosophies of our two prominent political parties. It is significant that America's first attempt at governance failed because of the loose association between the states and the lack of central authority under the Articles of Confederation. By 1787, the strong American distrust of government and political control was offset by the need

for a stronger central government that could provide "for the common defense." This was rectified by a Constitution that gave more power to the central government, but retained significant state rights, and protected individual freedoms through the Bill of Rights. American democracy, and the individual freedom it produced, also gave rise to the feeling that there were no limits to what man could achieve through individual effort.²⁵ By tracing historical influences such as those described above, Anita Arms carefully develops, in "Strategic Culture: The American Mind," the values that best define America. These values are summarized in Table 1.²⁶

-Table 1 The American Ethos

- o the tendency toward *isolationism*
 - o an ideology based on *individual* rights and freedom
 - o a balance between Protestant *work ethic* and *capitalism*
 - o a *moralistic* approach to politics²⁷
 - o *ethnocentrism* based on the belief Americans occupy the moral high ground and provide the world a "*city on the hill*" example²⁸
 - o a chauvinistic opinion that the *world aspires to be American*
 - o an overwhelming need for *immediate action* and *gratification*, Americans look ahead, not back²⁹
-

-Enduring National Interests. The DOD/State Department debate over the 1994 National Security Strategy indicates that America's national interests in the post-Cold War period may not be clearly defined or universally accepted. Donald Neuchterlein describes the *public interest* as the well-being of the American people and American enterprise within the territorial boundaries of the United States, and he distinguishes *national interest* as the well-being of American citizens and enterprise *outside* the United States and thus beyond the administrative jurisdiction of the U.S. government. This distinction is salient because it captures the essence of why the American public, with its historical biases and peculiar ethos, does not always pay close attention to international affairs. Rather, American public opinion tends to act as a centering force when foreign policy matters deviate too far from accepted historical practices or threaten more important domestic issues. The Viet Nam War experience is an

example of how American *public interest* got out of balance with U.S. *national interests*. The imbalance altered national policy and ended involvement in an unpopular war. Despite the current disagreement over what our national interests are, the four enduring national interests described by Donald Neuchterlein in the mid-1980s remain relevant and can be used to describe America's *fundamental* 1990s national security *interests* and foreign policy *goals*.³⁰ These interests are summarized in Table 2.

-Table 2 Enduring National Interests

1. *Defense of the Homeland* (national defense interest): Protection of people, territory, and institutions of the United States against potential foreign dangers.

2. *Economic Well-being* (national economic interest): Promotion of U.S. international trade and investment, including protection of private interests in foreign countries.

3. *Favorable World Order* (international order): Establishment of a peaceful international environment in which disputes between nations can be resolved without resort to war and in which collective security rather than unilateral action is employed to deter or cope with aggression.

4. *Promotion of Values* (ideology): Promulgation of a set of values that U.S. leaders believe to be universally good and worthy of emulation by other countries.

The problem with national interests, as Neuchterlein describes it, is to assess the country's *intensity* of interest---or stake---at different moments in history. President Bush, in the 1993 National Security Strategy, continued to describe the nation's interests largely in security terms, "the United States must ensure its security as a free and independent nation, and the protection of its fundamental values, institutions, and people."³¹ In contrast, Secretary of State Warren Christopher has defined foreign policy priorities of the Clinton Administration as promoting democracy and human rights, and aiding conflict resolution.³² The Defense Department has identified security interests as dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction, regional dangers, dangers to democracy, and economic dangers.³³ The current Administration's policy pronouncements and actions thus far signal a shift in *intensity* away from

national defense interests and defense of the homeland, toward national economic interests and ideology--a shift in intensity that seems to match the public's stake in domestic issues.

A key question arises: is this a fundamental shift in intensity brought on by the collapse of the bipolar world order and domestic frailties, or is it just a difference in philosophy between administrations? The next section argues that a fundamental shift has taken place.³⁴ The likely result will be the inexorable decline of the defense budget.

FIVE DEFICITS AND A PHYSICS PROBLEM

A fundamental shift of American public interests toward domestic problems and economic revival and the lack of a global threat have combined to create enormous pressure to continue defense budget cuts. Should this trend continue, defense spending could drop well below 3.0 % of Gross Domestic Product by the end of the decade, making a major restructuring of the military inevitable. Indeed, restructuring seems inevitable because of the five deficits--debt, trade, social, threat and public support for military spending. With fewer defense resources, it is difficult to justify the BUR force or the current Active/Reserve force mix. Moreover, the fortuitous geography that isolated and insulated America in the past, reinforcing an isolationist attitude, is now working against us. The physics problem, simply stated, is that America is a long way from the areas of greatest threat, Korea and the Middle East, without the airlift or sealift to execute the two MRC strategy without significant risk.³⁵

The Budget Deficit. This story is now so familiar that the press is touting an extended 1995 budget deficit of *only* \$176 billion as *good* news.³⁶ But despite persistent

large deficits, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 has made a difference. Coupled with low interest rates and other factors, the budget deficit has turned down. Optimists point out that the deficit was 4.9% of the GDP in 1992 and is projected to go to 2.5% in 1995, not an enormous drain on a \$6.5 trillion economy.³⁷ Moreover, the economy has continued to improve, growing at 2.8% in FY93 and 4.0% in the first quarter of FY94.³⁸ Corporate profits are growing again after a decade of restructuring by American industry. For defense, President Clinton in his 1994 State of the Union address declared that his FY95 budget "draws the line against further defense cuts."

From the pessimist's perspective, the budget deficit is due to increase again before the end of the decade, so, the Reconciliation Act was only a start. Debt service alone for 1992 reached \$199 billion, a drain of 3.4% of GDP. Even with Reconciliation Act cuts, debt service is expected to remain at about 3% of the GDP through 1998.³⁹ Still, Congress shows little inclination to attack the root of the future deficit problem: the growth of Medicare and Medicaid and the government entitlement programs for the elderly, handicapped, and poor. But the political imperative to cut spending and reduce caps remains, particularly for House members elected in November, 1992, who will face voters again this fall.⁴⁰ So, cuts, if there are to be any, will have to come out of the discretionary spending pot, where defense holds nearly a 50% share. In addition, discretionary spending is frozen by the Budget Reconciliation Act at about \$540 billion a year through 1998, *regardless of inflation.* Meanwhile, some members of Congress are actively seeking further budget cuts; for example, one proposal called for the services to absorb the Federal pay raise voted by Congress.⁴¹ Also, the political imperative cannot be ignored. To deliver on campaign promises and create new programs, President Clinton must take money from other areas of the discretionary budget because the law requires new programs to be offset

by savings elsewhere.

What is the impact of continued debt accumulation and debt service? Former Commerce Secretary Peter Peterson argues that the \$4.5 trillion debt is driving the United States to ruin by draining capital from productive investments and mortgaging the future.⁴² Deficit awareness and public concern has led to increased Congressional support for a balanced-budget amendment to counter spending policies that are too difficult to curtail in a political context.

What are the budget deficit's implications? Prior to the Cold War, American defense expenditures averaged less than 2% of GDP. Americans have historically paid federal taxes of about 19% of GDP, with a total tax of about 31-32% of GDP when state and local taxes are considered. Federal taxes reached 20% in 1968 and 1980, and the American people responded by voting out Democratic administrations.⁴⁶ So the prospect of any significant increase in the federal income tax is small. On the other hand, the likelihood of defense expenditures continuing to erode to less than 3% of GDP is high, assuming there is no fundamental change in the security environment that would threaten America's survival. Such a change in the next 10-15 years appears unlikely. Today, the security threat to America's survival is at the lowest level since the 1920s.

Adding to the budget problems is the mismatch between what the military services are being asked to field under the BUR and the resources to finance the force. This gap, between strategy and resources, has been variously estimated at between \$20-50 billion by 1997 and could go significantly higher if assumptions for inflation prove overly optimistic.⁴³ As Congressman Floyd Spence, the ranking Republican on the Armed Services panel, characterized it:

"When one looks at the force structure called for by the bottom-up review and then the level of budgetary resources dedicated to sustaining this force structure, it becomes

painfully clear that the administration's plan suffers from fundamental mismatches between strategy, forces and resources."⁴⁴

There has always been a gap between the ideal force desired by DOD to meet the postulated threat and the resource-constrained force supported by the DOD budget. However, the potential impact of a large planning and resource mismatch after seven years of declining budgets is worrisome. Without a rational process to reconcile how to design a smaller force *across DOD*, each individual Services will independently divest itself of missions it feels are less important. This process has already begun. For example, the Air Force intends to reduce the BUR bomber force from 184 to 100 and the Navy has announced it will have 16 fewer ships than called for by the BUR.⁴⁵

Despite the President Clinton's State of the Union pronouncement, it seems certain that DOD's budget will continue to shrink significantly. It is against this eroding budget imperative that the 2005 military must be planned.

The Trade Deficit & Economic Competitiveness. Jobs, jobs, jobs has been a common media refrain going back to the 1992 election campaign. Acrimonious debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was fueled by the erosion of high wage jobs and the emotion of 20 years of stagnate wages. In addition, many white collar middle managers have lost their jobs in the 1990s recession and have found it difficult to find equivalent employment elsewhere. This trend has emerged from corporations restructuring to both reduce cost and to delayer hierarchical levels of management (horizontal restructuring) to better meet global economic challenges.

Polls in early 1993 by "The Wall Street Journal" and NBC News found that 66% of voters felt that the United States was "in a state of decline" and most felt the next generation would not live as well as the current one. Respondents rated American economic power very pessimistically. Only 17 % still believed America was the world's leading economic power while 43% did not even feel it was in the top tier.⁴⁷ Low private savings, moderate rates of

research and capital investment, declining work habits, drugs in the work force, and an expanding gap between the rich and the poor have all contributed to a perception of decline in *relative* American economic strength. Trade deficits with Japan, China and the newly industrialized countries of East Asia are tangible indicators to the American people that the nation is no longer capable of competing in certain industries, such as electronics and textiles. The widely covered decline of the American auto industry, and the troubles of former industry giants such as IBM, contribute to a feeling of decline even though these companies are now showing signs of recovery.

Although the perceptions do not necessarily square with the facts, this dismal picture of America's standing in the world dominates the public consciousness and creates a reality of its own, making it is easy to understand why Americans are focused on domestic issues.

The Social Deficit. The list of social problems troubling the American people is long. Table 3 captures just some of the concerns.

Unfortunately, there has been a dramatic growth in the number of families headed by a single female. In 1960, only 5% of all births in the United States were to unmarried mothers; in 1988 more than 25% were. Today, nearly 65% of black children and 20% of white children start life in a household that does not contain both parents.⁴⁸ This weakening of family structure, particularly in the inner cities, has led to insitutionalized poverty and welfare. Seventy-two per cent of American's surveyed say that families in America are changing for the worse, and that it is harder for a child today than a decade ago.⁴⁹

Table 3 American Social Concerns

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| o to the need for welfare reform | o growth in health care costs |
| o widespread availability of drugs | o increase in violent crime |
| o decay in urban centers | o low education performance |
| o collapsing infrastructure | o high divorce rates |
| o erosion of traditional values | o teenage pregnancy |
| o illegal immigration | o fewer black males in college |

- o child abuse
 - o domestic violence
 - o sexual harassment
 - o homeless in the society
-

The globalization of the world economy, best represented by the free flow of information, monetary capital, and production facilities, makes a skilled workforce a major national asset. Yet last year, the high school graduation rate in America was 73.4%.⁵⁰ The following assessment is from President Clinton's proposed 1995 budget:

Fewer than two in five students in Grade 12 can move beyond surface understanding of a text, make inferences or draw conclusions from what they have read. These skills are essential for success today and into the next century.

Fewer than one in five students in Grade 12 demonstrate an understanding of algebraic, statistical, geometric and spatial reasoning. These are kinds of mathematical skills needed by our workforce to compete successfully in the global economy.⁵¹

Solutions to American education problems remain problematic because of professional disagreement over how to best improve educational performance, and resistance from the large and powerful education lobby to national education standards and other substantial changes.

More than a million immigrants a year entered the United States during the 1980s. Pressure from illegal immigrants has resulted in 85% of those Americans polled favoring changes in the federal law to reduce immigration.⁵²

As in the case of economic pessimism, it is not hard to understand why many American's are focused close to home, given the plethora of problems in American society. Put starkly, even if a good case for maintaining defense expenditures at 3 % of GDP or higher could be made, it is irrelevant as long as a large percentage of the American people are "distracted" by fundamental social and economic problems that represent a *survival public interest* that outweighs *national interests* that appear far less vital.

The Threat Deficit. The domestic focus of the American people is further reinforced by a perceived threat deficit. Secretary Richard Cheney captured the new threat perception well in

his 1992 report to the President and Congress:

"There is no country capable of mounting a global military challenge to our security, except with strategic nuclear forces. No country is our match in conventional military technology and the ability to apply it. There are no significant alliances hostile to our interests, and the strongest and most capable countries in the world are our friends. No region of the world critical to our interests is under hostile, non-democratic domination."⁵³

As early as December, 1991, Secretary Cheney announced that Russia no longer had the capability to project substantial military power beyond its borders. Cheney's 1992 report made it clear that Russia is no longer a substantial threat to the U. S. even though Russia is a capable nuclear power.

The greatest threat of conventional conflict comes from North Korea, which has 1.2 million people under arms. More than 100,000 North Korean Special Operations troops are trained to disrupt operations in South Korea should war occur. The North Korean military has 10,000 artillery pieces, 2000 rocket launchers, 4500 armored personnel carriers, 3500 tanks, and over 700 combat aircraft. No other threat in the world today begins to approach the conventional North Korean threat. But despite vast quantities of arms, most of North Korea's equipment is old and inferior to U.S. equipment.

On the other side of the Demilitarized Zone, South Korea has 655,000 people under arms, supplemented by 35,900 American troops.⁵⁴ Although at a disadvantage in the amount of equipment and the number of troops, the South Korean military is trained and capable and can handle the North Korean threat with strong U.S. support. As the top U.S. commander in South Korea, General Luck, recently observed "we would certainly win any war in the region, (but) the price in human lives and monetary value would be staggering." As a deterrent, defeat of the North Korean military would likely end North Korea as it exists today. Hopefully, North Korean government survival is enough incentive to avoid war.

There is also a credibility issue, tied to the threat deficit, that undermines the defense

budget. After eight years of declining defense budget authority, the \$260 billion U.S. defense budget for 1995, which represents 3.7% of the U.S. GDP, is still more than 40% of the world's total defense expenditures. Adding to the American advantage, America's NATO allies spent approximately half what the U.S. spends giving the U.S. and NATO a 55-60% share of the world's military expenditures. The next largest defense budget after the U.S. or Russia, is less than \$40 billion, a mere 15% of what America spends alone. Further, the U.S. continues to spend four times as much as non-Russian Asia combined.⁵⁵ U.S. military capability and expenditures outclass any single threat or plausible coalition of threats, making it difficult to justify defense spending at the rates projected by the BUR regardless of the threat scenario used in force planning (one MRC, two MRC, etc.).

The credibility of maintaining defense expenditures at current levels is further undermined by America's clear qualitative superiority in military equipment and training. The United States holds several technical advantages that are unmatched in the world. First, is the control and exploitation of space for intelligence collection and navigation. Second, the U.S. fields the only operational stealth aircraft, which allows unopposed strategic bombing. The U.S. has more fourth generation fighters than the rest of the world combined. Third, the U.S. can fight day or night with all services. Fourth, is the advantage of precision guided and standoff weapons. Fifth, is the targeting capability embodied by the Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft (AWACS) and the Joint STARS ground moving target identification aircraft. For training, the large force exercises that are routinely conducted at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California and in Louisiana, and the large air exercises at Nellis Air Force Base and Fallon Naval Air Station in Nevada, and Yuma Marine Corps Air Station, all provide training that is unmatched in the world. Moreover, the United States clearly leads the world in computer simulated training, from multiple participant air combat training to personnel weapons qualification.

The threat deficit and the public perception that the U.S. military is already vastly superior to likely threats challenge the need for BUR forces.

The Public Support Deficit. Beyond the threat deficit there is questionable public support for the use of force. Bruce Jentleson does a good job of capturing the body of scholarly work about American public opinion when he argues that the American public is actually "pretty prudent." Prudence means that the public is more pragmatic than it is given credit for, and the public generally shows good judgment in the use of resources and caution in the use-of-force. This "risk aversion" in the use of force can be overcome if force is used quickly and decisively as in the Just Cause operation in Panama. However, public support must be cultivated--it will not just be there--and, when use-of-force is concerned, it must be tied to important U.S. interests or public support will not be lasting. Jentleson concludes by arguing that the public will follow the President initially on international matters, but the public is less supportive of intervening in the *internal affairs of other countries*. The decided lack of public support for intervention in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia may best be explained in this way.⁵⁶

A Wall Street Journal/NBC poll in September, 1991 found that 42% of the American public felt U.S. defense spending was too high, and more than four in 10 believed that defense spending could be halved.⁵⁷ Former CIA Director William Colby also supported drastic cuts to as little as \$150 billion by the end of the decade.⁵⁸ *Given a 2% annual growth in the American economy, a defense budget of \$150 billion would represent approximately 2% of GDP in the 7.5 trillion dollar economy that is projected for the year 2000.*⁵⁹

Representative Lee Hamilton captured the shift in public mood from security issues toward domestic issues, saying, "On the one hand, my constituents are very proud of the fact that we are a superpower, and maybe the only superpower. But on the other hand, they are not sure they want to pay for it."⁶⁰

The Physics Problem--The Distant Fight. The five preceding deficits taken together with the fortuitous geography that insulated the United States from outside conflicts in the nation's formative years (for the most part), now work against an internationalist foreign policy. The United States is steadily withdrawing from overseas bases, leaving U.S. forces a long way from the most probable sites of conflict. Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S) showed it takes months to deploy U.S. heavy forces half way around the world. Ninety-five per cent of U.S. equipment moved by sea during ODS/S. Using fast sealift ships, it takes 14 days to reach the Persian Gulf, and 9 days from San Francisco to Korea. An additional 10 days or so, needs to be added to these figures to account for movement to the port of embarkation, loading, unloading and moving to fighting positions. Most war plans allow 4-5 days for negotiation and decision-making. Physics means that it will take at least 25 days to position heavy troops in the Persian Gulf or Korea--not responsive enough to directly meet aggression.⁶¹

Any attempt to meet two nearly simultaneous MRCs involves a high risk strategy *even with a large Active duty force*. Prepositioning large quantities of equipment for heavy forces has proven to be very expensive, which limits the utility of prepositioning. Facing multiple deficits, the nation cannot afford the large Active forces of the Cold War period and even with a large Active force, it cannot be deployed to a crisis area in time. Moreover, as Colonel (retired) C. R. Krieger, a former professor at the National War College, has written, "maintaining a large active force drains money and readiness from those specific forces we need to intervene in small crises and to be the leading edge of any response to a major regional contingency. We need to recognize our position as an island nation, a long distance from any likely conflict. The best we can do it is to help hold a defensive position until we can mobilize and deploy sufficient U.S. forces to defeat and roll back aggression."⁶²

FACING THE TOUGH CHOICES

The Congress shall have the Power. . .
To raise and support Armies. . . ;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the
United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of
the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress;

The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8
Signed September 17, 1787
Effective for ratifying states June 21, 1788

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

The Constitution of the United States, Bill of Rights, Amendment II
December 15, 1791

A Militia Nation.⁶³ Just as the American ethos and enduring national interests are derived from historical experiences, so is the nation's attitude toward the militia and the military. The origins of the militia stem from units formed by the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636. By 1671, all of the colonies had militias. The mission of the early militia was to defend the settlement and the colony against attack. Militiamen drilled as a group several times a month and maintained arms and equipment individually. During the French and Indian War, several hundred militia officers gained valuable experience they would later use during the Revolutionary War. The Revolutionary War saw more than 164,000 militiamen from the thirteen colonies serve under the former Virginia militia colonel, George Washington.

From this early community defense force, the militia grew to play a significant role in all of the nation's wars. Eighteen National Guard divisions fought in World War I (48% of the American combat force) along with 160,000 Army Reservists. Of eight World War I American divisions rated as "superior" by the Germans, six were Guard divisions. Nineteen

Guard divisions were mobilized during World War II along with over 200,000 Army Reservists. Roughly a quarter of all Army officers serving during the war were Reservists. A Guard division was the first American unit in combat. The Korean War saw two National Guard divisions and four Air National Guard fighter squadrons engage in combat, and more than 200,000 Army Reservists were mobilized. More than 12,000 Reservists were mobilized during the Viet Nam War and the Pueblo Crisis. The most recent experience in the Persian Gulf "tested" the Total Force Policy. More than 106,000 Reservists served in the area of operations, including Guard and Reserve Army, Marine and Air Force combat units. The "Total Force Policy, although not without some problems and not without some controversy, was effective in the Persian Gulf Conflict."⁶⁴

Force Mix.

". . . it is no secret that Reserve and Guard units contain skills and perform functions that are not available in the Active forces. . . this especially important now since our Reserve Components will assume even more importance in the Total Force, as changes in the threat, as well as budget constraints, will require greater utilization of and reliance on the Reserve Components."

Senator Sam Nunn
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
August 22, 1990, on the call-up of the reserve for Desert Shield

"They performed very well. . . I'm absolutely truthful about this: I cannot tell the difference between active, guard, and reserve. And that's the way it ought to be."

Lt. Gen. Charles Horner
Desert Storm Allied Air Component Commander

In 1990, there were over 2,000,000 Active duty people and 1,100,000 reservists. During the Persian Gulf War, the Reserve Component was approximately 36 % of the force.⁶⁵ By the end of FY95, the RC will be 39 % of the Total Force despite the rhetoric on the RC's increased importance.⁶⁶

The force mix must be reexamined for the following reasons. First, the international

context, although potentially chaotic, is less threatening to the national survival of the United States than at any time since the 1920s. A reduced survival threat makes returning to the nation's militia tradition feasible without undue risk. The choice is not necessarily how much security risk the nation is willing to accept by reducing the Active force. Rather, the choice is about how selective the nation is going to be in the use of force in the future; with a smaller Active force, the nation will have to choose more carefully when to use force as an instrument of national power. Moreover, through greater reliance on the Reserve, the American people will participate with Congress in the escalation to war as the Constitution's Framers provided for in Article 1, Section 8.

Second, the importance of America's history as a militia nation and the American ethos of ethnocentrism and isolationism cannot be underestimated. Previously discussed poll results (notes 6 & 7) and Jentleson's analysis of American public opinion indicate the American people are unwilling to pursue an interventionist foreign policy. Moreover, because of the social and public support deficits, the American people are unlikely to pick guns over butter (notes 57 & 58).

Third, the domestic exigencies created by the five deficits suggest a continuing decline in the defense budget toward 2 % of GDP. And finally, the lack of airlift and sealift means a large Active force cannot meet a major threat in a timely way regardless of readiness. Therefore, Reserve forces should be used to respond to Major Regional Contingencies. An examination of the deployment schedules for Desert Shield/Storm, shows there is time to mobilize and increase Reserve combat force readiness while awaiting transportation.

The BUR force mix debate centered on the Desert Storm experience, risk, mobilization, warning time, deployment time, and Reserve readiness. The two MRC or two nearly simultaneous MRC cases were the basis for most of the analyses about force mix.⁶⁷ The two MRC planning notion *assumes* the need for a large Active force. The presumption

of a large Active force seems untenable, given public concern over the domestic issues that are undermining America's society and economic strength--the long term basis of national power. Furthermore, justifying a two MRC force as a "hedge" against uncertainty ignores the enormous difficulty of explaining to a "sound bite" society what the "hedge" is against, what the country gets for it, and what it should cost.

Confronted with the prospect of a 2-3% of GDP budget, the *force mix should be inverted* . Rather than 40% of the force in the RC, there should be approximately 60% of the force in the RC. Why? Because affordability counts and the threat risk is relatively low. Active forces should be structured to handle the most likely Lesser Regional Conflicts (LRCs) (see Table 4) with minimal Reserve Component support.

Table 4 Use of Force by the United States, 1950-1994

<u>Korean War</u> , 1950-1953	Lebanon, 1982-1984
<i>Viet Nam</i> , 1950-1975	Grenada, 1983
Taiwan Straits, 1954-55 and 1958	Achille Lauro, 1985
Lebanon, 1958	Libya Bombing Raid, 1986
<i>Cuban Missile Crisis</i> , 1962	Persian Gulf Tanker Escort '87-88
Airlift to India, 1962	Philippine Coup Attempt, 1989
Congo/Zaire, 1964, 1967, 1968, 1991	Panama, 1989-1990
Dominican Republic, 1965-1966	Liberia, 1990
India-Pakistan War Deployment, 1971	<u>Persian Gulf War</u> , 1990-1991
Nuclear Alert, Middle East War, 1973	Kurd Assistance, 1991
Mayaguez, 1975	Somalia, 1992-1994
Libya/Gulf of Sidra, 1981, 1986, 1989	Bosnia, 1994

In 1992, the Congressional Research Service, at the request of Representative Les Aspin, studied 22 cases in which the United States used force from 1950-1993. Since that time, force has also been used in Somalia and Bosnia (added in Table 4). Use of force was defined as "showing the flag," logistical operations involving security, limited military interventions, and full-scale wars. The two wars (underlined in Table 4) indicate a major

Reserve call-up (8% of the cases) while *italics* indicate a limited call-up (8% of the cases).⁶⁸ Table 4 illustrates, in a simple way, a salient point. During this 44-year period, there were 24 cases where force was used more than 30 times, but only two cases required a major call-up of Reserves. Since 1950, Active military forces have been used predominantly in Lesser Regional Contingencies.

Concerning affordability, the Army RC operations tempo cost is normally about 27 % of the Active cost in the Reserves and 36 % in the Guard. Reserve training costs are 50-75 % of Active costs. When costing individuals, an Active per capita cost is \$52,100, while the corresponding Reserve "individuals" cost \$11,700 in the Guard and \$12,200 in the Reserve.⁶⁹ Even though direct costs are sometimes difficult to compare on a unit basis, the 1990 DOD Total Force Policy Study found that like-structured armored and infantry divisions cost 74 % less in the Army Guard than in the Active Army.⁷⁰ Shifting two divisions from the AC to the RC would save approximately \$1.5 billion per year or \$7.5 billion over the five year BUR period.⁷¹ Costs in the Air Force Reserve are lower than the Active Component because Reserves use less full-time manning (approximately 30 % of Active manning) and fly fewer hours per year (approximately 75 %) but the economies are less than for Army units. Generally, the cost of an Air Reserve or Guard squadron is 1/3 less than an Active squadron.⁷²

 Table 5 Year 2000 Force Options

<u>Option 1</u> MRC(LRC)	<u>Option 2</u> MRC+LRC	<u>Option 3</u> MRC+Hold MRC	<u>Option 4</u> Nearly 2 MRC+LRC
6+Army active div. 8- reserve divisions	8 active divisions 6 reserve divisions	10 active divisions 5 reserve divisions	10 active divisions 5+ reserve divisions
7 carrier groups CVBG 280 ships	8 CVBG 300 ships	10 CVBG 325 ships	11+1 Reserve CVBG 346 ships

8 active wings 10 active wings 13 active wings 13 active wings
6 reserve wings 6 reserve wings 7 reserve wings 7 reserve wings

Notes:

1. Options 2-4 are derived from BUR studies. Ship numbers are representative of scaled reductions.
2. 7 CVBGs allow 1xCVGB each to Pacific and Atlantic with six a month cruise in each 18 month period.
3. For options 1-3, the Marine Corps' total contribution would remain constant at 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces+Marine Air Wing with 50,000 people total for the MEF/MAW combination.
4. Reserve Army divisions are division-equivalents, may not be organized into reserve divisions. One active division in Asia, <1division in Europe.

Table 5 shows several year 2000 force options ranging from the BUR "nearly" two MRC force (Option 4) to a force structured for one MRC or multiple LRCs (Option 1).⁷³ Option 1 provides a force capable of handling Lesser Regional Contingencies primarily with Active forces. Major Regional Contingencies could be handled with the call-up of the Reserve. Structuring a force such as in Option 1 or 2, along with reducing overlap and redundancies between the Services in other areas, can provide sufficient and assured defense at lower cost. Although beyond the scope of this essay, changes within the Reserve component in roles and functions can also contribute to a more efficient and effective Total Force. For example, moving the RC away from fighter missions toward more larger aircraft missions preserves active fighter squadrons to support overseas basing and peacetime deployments.

The Dual Role of the Reserve Component Counts Too. As the largest portion of the Reserve Component, the National Guard also performs a valuable state mission. Enactment of the Posse Comitatus Act, and the Dick Acts of 1903 and 1908, established a federal-state relationship the gives the Guard the responsibility for both federal national defense and state law enforcement and public safety and order. The legislation specifically addresses the Guard's "preeminent role as the first responder in cases of domestic disasters, disorders, and other emergencies."⁷⁴ Approximately 75% of reservists are also productive members of the nation's economy while serving as Reservists part-time. Moreover, as the nation's community-based defense force,

Reserve and Guard units in more than 5000 communities add value to the community through drug interdiction and drug demand reduction programs, youth enhancement programs, and environmental programs. Location of Reserve units in many communities also fosters military awareness and "grass roots" support for both Active and Reserve military issues. The dual role of Reserve units provides an important community return-on-investment .

Roles and Functions. In addition to force mix issues, the military Services need to look beyond the BUR force to handle the decline in defense funding. Each Service's unique heritage and culture influences how it reacts to change. Each Service will try to preserve its own Service's budget, yet each is also dedicated to the security of the nation and is accustomed to working in an environment of priority tradeoffs and compromise. The problem with addressing the military of 2005 and roles and functions issues is the imperative of day-to-day staff operations. Put simply, it is difficult to get someone to pay attention to something around the corner when there are short-term pressures and crises to handle. The challenge then, is to structure a meaningful review that recognizes the natural service rivalries, the political issues, and the dynamics of Pentagon life.

To insure fresh thinking, it is reasonable to depart from previous practices and it is prudent to attack these tough issues from more than one direction.

A dual-path approach could help overcome the bureaucratic inertia and the sincere Service differences over force mix, roles and functions. First, the Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff should embrace the Roles & Missions Commission chartered by Congress as a way to identify potential solutions that would be difficult for the Services to recommend while the Vice Chairman simultaneously work roles and functions issues in the joint arena. Second, the Chairman should charter a new organization to look at long range planning excursions beyond the year 2005 (to start with) with different DOD funding levels as low as 2% of GDP or \$150 billion as well as force mix and roles and function

issues. This organization must be independent of existing federally funded research and development centers, multi-service, multi-component (Active and Reserve), staffed on a one year cycle, and, ideally, not located in the Pentagon.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A fresh approach is needed to guide the debate over what the "right" mix of Active and Reserve forces is and what are the "right" roles and functions of the military Services in the next century. Currently, the Services are downsizing by making individual Service choices about which roles and functions to eliminate as the budget pressures mount. This independent approach does not coordinate decisions very well and will probably leave the nation with smaller versions of Services that were previously structured for the Cold War. The Cold War mindset is reinforced by DOD's continued use of threat-based defense planning. The credibility of this approach is undermined by the lack of a conventional threat to national security, by the vast superiority of American technology and training, and by the disproportionately high U.S. defense spending compared to the rest of the world.

This essay's thesis is that regardless of what the military Services feel is needed for the defense of U.S. interests and security, the defense budget will continue to erode to 2-3 % of GDP. The key imperative driving defense spending down is the domestic focus of the American people. The existence of the five deficits--debt, trade, social, threat and public support--and the importance of addressing the deficits are today's reality for the American people. Americans are not driven by international issues but by important domestic issues. This inward turn is reinforced by history and the peculiar American ethos of ethnocentrism and isolationism. Moreover, the American desire for immediate action and gratification fires the shift of money from defense to serious social and

economic issues rather than raising taxes to try to do both. In the absence of a clear national security threat and with a superior military forces already, the American people are going to chose butter over guns until they again feel threatened. It is important to remember that Jentleson's prudent American public is one that is risk-averse in the use of force and reluctant to be involved in international intervention.

The military's part in reviving the nation is to recognize a public mood shift has taken place and to accept the fact that defense resources will continue to decline toward 2-3% of GDP. The Services must adapt by making hard choices across the Services in force mix and roles and functions to preserve combat power so that the nation's security and interests can be protected effectively at lower cost.

Notes

1. Poindexter, G. W., "Wanted: New Reservists, Shortfalls Evident in Some Job Fields," The Air Force Times February 7, 1994, 20.
2. Watkins, Steven, "Bombs Away! McPeak Eyes Navy's Air Mission," The Air Force Times March 7, 1994, 3.
3. There DOD budget shortfall has been characterized as from \$20-50 billion dollars short. Representative Murtha, chairman of the House defense appropriations panel, has projected a \$20 billion shortfall, see Defense Daily February 25, 1994, 293. The Air Force Times, January 31, 1994, 6, identified a five year gap of \$50 billion between the defense budget and the real cost of the military. There could be a gap of as much as \$31 billion in overly optimistic inflation estimates. Further complicating the issue is an unfunded DOD pay raise, an \$11.5 billion dollar sum that the White House has agreed to pay outside of the defense department budget. However, the Office of Management and Budget is balking at finding \$11.5 million elsewhere in the budget. Some members of congress have called for DOD to take the pay raise out of the projected budget.
4. The FY94 Defense Authorization Act requires an out of cycle Department of Defense Roles & Missions study. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates a report every three years. Two previous reports have been submitted under Goldwater-Nichols, a report in 1989 by Admiral Crowe and a 1992 report submitted by General Powell. Powell's report was criticized by some on Capitol Hill as merely "tinkering at the margins," and not going far enough to significantly reduce duplication among the services. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is putting together a commission of people outside of the service, including retired flag officers, for the 1994 study, see Inside the Pentagon, February 3 94, pg. 1. The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Tony McPeak, has been an outspoken advocate of the need for roles and mission adjustments. He has opened the debate by challenging the need for the twelve carriers called for by the Bottom-Up Review, see, Air Force Magazine, 7 March 1994.
5. Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision. Harvard University, Massachusetts: Harper Collins, Publishers, 1971, 144-184. As Graham Allison so aptly describes, government decisions do not necessarily reflect *solutions* to a problem but instead are results from compromise, conflict and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence. Paul Bracken argues that strategies are easier to change than institutions, see "The Military After Next", Center for Strategic and International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Washington Quarterly, 16:4, 158-159. For a discussion of military service personalities and bureaucratic politics see, Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, 3-43. Builder discusses service inertia in the "engines for stability," pages 39-43.
6. The United States as the world's only superpower clearly cannot disengage from foreign entanglements overnight. And as the world's "honest broker," there are situations that cannot be solved without American leadership. Examples are the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and

Europe's failure to make progress in Bosnia without a major commitment from the United States (and ultimately Russian peacekeepers as well). However, the reduction in resources for the Department of Defense and the State Department will inevitably lead to decisions about what not to do. As evidence of continued engagement, the United States Air Mobility Command flew missions to all but seven of the 193 independent countries in the world during 1993. See, G. W. Poindexter, "Wanted: new reservists," The Air Force Times February 7, 1994. Also, a National War College lecturer in March, 1994, related that during recent interviews with the regional Commanders in Chief (CINCs), each expressed concern about the high operational tempo being maintained by U.S. forces in their areas of operation. Further, the United States has been involved in more than 25 joint force operations since 1989, see, Adam B. Siegel and Scott M. Fabbri, "Overview of Selected Joint Task Forces, 1960-1993," Center for Naval Analysis, September, 1993. The Army had 25,000 soldiers deployed on missions in 60 countries as of February 7, 1994, see Lee Ewing, "The Shrinking Army," Army Times February 7, 1994, 13. In contrast, during the 1992 presidential election campaign, polls suggested a combination of six major themes: economy (jobs), education (global competitiveness for jobs), environment (as long as it does not cost jobs), expectations (for health, safety, homes, quality of life, all reinforced by the politically powerful senior community), extraction (from foreign commitments associated with the cold war and more burden sharing by Allies). See, Gary L. Guertner, "The Armed Forces in a New Political Environment," Strategic Studies Institute Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, March 2, 1992, 2-3.

7. American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1991, John E. Reilly, ed., Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago: Chicago Press Corp., 1991.

8. Rosecrance, Richard, "A New Concert of Powers'," Foreign Affairs Vol. 71, No. 2, Spring 1992, 82.

9. From discussions at the National War College with Dr. Howard Wiarda, a former member of the Reagan/Bush administrations and a Latin and South American area expert.

10. Lancaster, John and Barton Gellman. "National Security Strategy Paper Arouses Pentagon, State Department Debate," The Washington Post March 3, 1994, A-14.

11. Huntington, Samuel. "America's Changing Strategic Interests," Survival, vol. XXXIII, no. 1, January/February 1991, 15. Huntington argues, "military capabilities are likely to be less important than in the past. Economic measures will be central in dealing with the Japanese challenge and diplomacy and economic measures will be crucial to promoting a political-military equilibrium in Eurasia." The power shift from a political-military coalition to a political-economic coalition was also persuasively argued by a lecturer at the National War College during a non-attribution session in early 1994.

12. Maynes, Charles William, "The Nature of the Post-Cold War World," Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993, 26.

13. Doherty, Carroll J. "The Price of Peacekeeping," The Congressional Quarterly February 26, 1994, 485.
14. A lecturer at the National War College, stated that President Clinton spends as little as one hour a week on foreign policy matters primarily because of his commitment to important domestic issues and his apparent lack of interest in foreign affairs.
15. Lancaster, A-14. William G. Hyland, "Reexamining National Strategy," Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 26-27.
16. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. The New World Order: Rethinking America's Global Role. Flagstaff, Arizona: Arizona Academy Press, 1992, 13-15.
17. Excerpts From Clinton FY 1995 Budget Submitted to Congress Feb. 7, 1994, Special Supplement, Washington D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Report No. 25, February 8, 1994, S-155.
18. Defense 93. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Issue 6, 3, 8-9.
19. Barnett, Jeffrey R., "Trends Affecting Strategic Planning, The Three Revolutions," Department of the Air Force briefing prepared by AF/XOXP, October 14, 1992.
20. Silverberg, David, "Ominous Omens, The Next Defense Budget Holds A Lot of Heartache," The Armed Forces Journal January, 1994, 19.
21. Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Vantage Books, 1989, 540. Kennedy's book is highly regarded as a historical work however, as others have pointed out, it was not America that was in "imperial overstretch" during the Cold War, it was Russia, see Joseph S. Nye, "The Misleading Metaphor of Decline," The Atlantic Monthly March, 1990, 92.
22. A lecturer at the National War College (March, 1994) related that in recent conversations with the Commanders in Chief (CINC) of the nation's regional combat commands, that he was impressed by the high operational tempo being maintained by U.S. military forces around the globe despite the reduction in overseas presence. Moreover, the U.S. Air Mobility Command has become the 911 number for the world when disaster strikes, see "Just Call 911," The Air Force Times January 31, 1994.
23. Eccles, Henry E. "Strategy--Theory and Application," Naval War College Review 32 (May/June 1979), 13.
24. De Wilde, Jan. "Concepts of Man and Public Policy," Essay on Strategy VIII edited by Thomas C. Gill, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991, 121-122.

25. De Wilde, 126.
26. Arms, Anita. "Strategic Culture: The American Mind," Essays on Strategy IX edited by Thomas C. Gill. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993, 3-29. This essay is an important contribution toward understanding the filters and biases that shape how the American public views domestic and international issues.
27. Alexis de Tocqueville observed that Americans need to use their religion to instill morality into the affairs of their government. See, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated by George Lawrence, New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 514. Studies of American life in the 20th century report a gradual move toward secularism, caused by increased mobility, more leisure time, and the increasing role of the mass media, among other factors; these same factors have influenced American religious attitudes and values as well. See, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, general editors, The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytical Study. Boston: Little and Brown, Company, 206. Remarkably though, despite the fact that Gallup polls over the last 40 years have documented an overall decline in the ways Americans perceive the importance of religion in their lives, poll results in 1989 show Americans have never doubted the existence of God, and roughly 90% pray at least once a week! See, George Gallup, Jr. and Jim Castelli, The People's Religion: American Faith in the 90s. New York: MacMillan, 1989, 33, 45, 48, 75.
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