



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**BEYOND HEARTS AND MINDS:  
EVALUATING U.S. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE  
DOCTRINE**

by

Paul D. Brister

December 2005

Thesis Advisor:  
Second Reader:

Erik Jansen  
Hy Rothstein

**Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.**

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
<b>1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)</b>		<b>2. REPORT DATE</b> December 2005	<b>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</b> Master's Thesis	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:</b> Beyond Hearts and Minds: Evaluating U.S. Unconventional Warfare Doctrine			<b>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR:</b> Paul D. Brister				
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> N/A			<b>10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
<b>12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			<b>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</b>	
<b>13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)</b> The United States is and will continue to be engaged in a form of warfare in which the enemy finds shelter among and gains intelligence from the population. This is not a new form of warfare, but, given the advances in technology and increased globalization of the modern age, it has become an exponentially more lethal form of conflict. This thesis examines current U.S. unconventional warfare doctrine to determine its origins and assess its feasibility in different environments. Drawing upon the military theories of Clausewitz, this paper attempts to lay out a new approach and broaden the spectrum of American unconventional doctrine and irregular response. An examination of the American "hearts and minds" approach to unconventional warfare, based largely upon British colonial experience, suggests that current doctrine could be based on a faulty interpretation of history. Newly emerging knowledge points to the need to adopt an unconventional strategy focused more on establishing authority than gaining popularity. This approach, dubbed "authoritative control," has both a historically successful track record and is fairly easy to implement. For the United States to be successful in future unconventional conflict, an expansion of doctrine must occur immediately.				
<b>14. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Unconventional Warfare, Hearts and Minds, Counterinsurgency, Malaya, Mau-Mau, Clausewitz, Mao Tse-Tung, Irregular Warfare			<b>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 95	
			<b>16. PRICE CODE</b>	
<b>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified	<b>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> UL	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

**Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.**

**BEYOND HEARTS AND MINDS:  
EVALUATING U.S. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DOCTRINE**

Paul D. Brister  
Captain, United States Air Force  
B.S., US Air Force Academy, 1998

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
December 2005**

Author: Paul D. Brister

Approved by: Erik Jansen  
Thesis Advisor

Hy Rothstein  
Second Reader

Gordon McCormick  
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## **ABSTRACT**

The United States is and will continue to be engaged in a form of warfare in which the enemy finds shelter among and gains intelligence from the population. This is not a new form of warfare, but, given the advances in technology and increased globalization of the modern age, it has become an exponentially more lethal form of conflict. This thesis examines current U.S. unconventional warfare doctrine to determine its origins and assess its feasibility in different environments. Drawing upon the military theories of Clausewitz, this paper attempts to lay out a new approach and broaden the spectrum of American unconventional doctrine and irregular response. An examination of the American “hearts and minds” approach to unconventional warfare, based largely upon British colonial experience, suggests that current doctrine could be based on a faulty interpretation of history. Newly emerging knowledge points to the need to adopt an unconventional strategy focused more on establishing authority than gaining popularity. This approach, dubbed “authoritative control,” has both a historically successful track record and is fairly easy to implement. For the United States to be successful in future unconventional conflict, an expansion of doctrine must occur immediately.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	BACKGROUND OF THESIS .....	1
B.	APPROACH TO RESEARCH.....	2
II.	VIEWING WARFARE IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT .....	7
A.	CLAUSEWITZ REVISITED .....	7
B.	CLAUSEWITZ’S MODERN INTERPRETATION .....	9
C.	LUTTWAK’S TWO APPROACHES TO WAR .....	12
D.	KNOW THYSELF: KILL, CAPTURE, DESTROY.....	14
E.	KNOW THY ENEMY: THE RESPONSE TO U.S. MILITARY SUPERIORITY .....	17
F.	TRENDS OF FUTURE WAR.....	18
III.	NEW FOCUS, NEW APPROACH .....	23
A.	SHIFT FIRE.....	23
B.	A FAULTY INTERPRETATION: THE “HEARTS AND MINDS” APPROACH.....	24
C.	TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: AUTHORITATIVE CONTROL.....	32
D.	THE ‘CULTURE’ COP-OUT.....	39
IV.	COMPARING HEARTS AND MINDS AND AUTHORITATIVE CONTROL..	45
A.	LAYING THE FOUNDATION.....	46
B.	UNDERSTANDING THE UNCONVENTIONAL ENVIRONMENT.....	52
V.	CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	55
A.	SUMMARY .....	55
B.	RECOMMENDATIONS .....	56
	1. Creation of an Organization Designed Specifically for Unconventional Warfare .....	56
	2. Properly Educate Unconventional Strategists .....	59
	3. Conduct Analysis of Proper Resource Allocation Based on Threat Assessments .....	60
	4. Stringent Selection of Commanders.....	61
	5. Properly Delegate Mission Sets .....	62
	APPENDIX: USING GAME THEORY TO ANALYZE RESOURCE ALLOCATION.....	65
	BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	81
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	85

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

# **I. INTRODUCTION**

## **A. BACKGROUND OF THESIS**

In July of 2004, I was assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School to pursue a Master's degree in the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum from the Department of Defense Analysis. I was asked by the leadership of my career field to begin thinking about possible roles and future missions of a new organization that is being created within the Air Force. This new organization, dubbed the Battlefield Airmen (BA), would need to combine four different Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs), each of which has unique missions and skill sets. It also would need to effectively support both conventional and special operations units in missions that cover the entire spectrum of conflict.

Initially I began to focus on taking these four AFSCs and researching how to best organize to fill mission sets that were required in several past conflicts. My approach dramatically changed after a half year of study at NPS when I began to realize that the skills needed in past conflicts may not be the ones needed to confront the enemy that we will face in the future. In the past, the combat control, pararescue, combat weather, and tactical air control parties existed as force enhancers, each with a special niche to fill in helping find, fix, and destroy enemy military forces. This piece argues that, while these skills may remain relevant in the future, the military as a whole needs to realize that new skills and strategies must be developed and implemented to fight a shadowy enemy who achieves victory by avoiding the conventional conflicts in which the United States excels. Because of this approach, the main focus of my thesis changed from simply merging four existing career fields to an entirely different topic of reevaluating how future conflicts will be waged and the necessary strategy and reorganizations needed to best implement this new style of war. The initial intent of proposing a redesign of Air Force career fields is only briefly addressed in the conclusion, while the majority of attention goes to a style of war likely to dominate the future of warfare: unconventional warfare.

## **B. APPROACH TO RESEARCH**

To develop a compelling argument for the need to make major adjustments within the Department of Defense, I felt it necessary to draw upon long-established theories and views of warfare. Naturally, I turned to the writings of Carl Von Clausewitz as the foundation of my argument. While reading Clausewitz, I began to feel that, while his approach to developing grand strategy remained valid, several of the assumptions he made about the nature of warfare have changed to such a degree that it is necessary to adopt a new approach to developing operational strategies. While he stated that war consists of three main actors (military, government, and population), the majority of his writing deals exclusively with how to target just one: the opposing military force. I felt that in today's environment another Clausewitzian actor, that of the population, has gained such a degree of power and significance that we are forced to research methods in which to confront an enemy that knows how to harness its power.

Where Clausewitz serves as the theoretical base for my argument, I chose to use the writings of Dr. Edward Luttwak, who has served as a consultant to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Department of State, as my model on how to approach this new style of warfare. While his writings also deal mainly with methods on how to best approach the targeting of an enemy military force, I felt they also could be applied to approaches needed to target the base of an enemy's support among the population. Where the types of weapon systems and intelligence techniques change when targeting the population, the characteristics applied to the two approaches to war remain unchanged. By taking the foundations of his two approaches, I felt it possible to incorporate his ideas into the unconventional fight.

Of course, when dealing with terms like conventional and unconventional warfare, interpretations vary wildly and often cause great confusion when debated. In an attempt to lessen the ambiguity of the terms, I felt it most appropriate to classify each conflict based on its primary targeting priorities. Discussed at length within the thesis, an unconventional conflict is one in which

both side place primacy on targeting the population in an attempt to garner support (both physically and politically). Relying upon the courses taught in the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, an argument is made that this type of conflict is the one likely to dominate future battlefields.

After establishing my interpretation of future war, I felt compelled to provide the reader with the strategic changes required by this new focus and the tactical implications that follow. The writings of men like Mao Tse-Tung, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, and Vo Nguyen Giap proved essential in explaining the strategy of waging a war in which the primary focus shifts from the military toward the population. Case studies that include the Cuban Revolution, the Vietnam War, the Malayan counterinsurgency, the Mao-Mao revolt, the Philippine counterinsurgency, and the Chinese Revolution provided excellent details on the driving forces behind unconventional conflicts and the tactics necessary to combat them. The relevance of these examples are called upon several times throughout my writing to highlight several variables the United States tends to overlook or discard because of our historical interpretations.

While I thought it was important to overview the changing nature of war and the methods to best confront that change, I also felt it important to expose the current weaknesses within the American unconventional doctrine by exposing the widely accepted “hearts and minds” approach as a misinterpretation of historical evidence. I present the reader with an alternative explanation, one that has had both a historical record of success and is fairly easy to implement given the current hierarchy of military forces, with the hope of expanding the boundaries of unconventional warfare doctrine. Drawing again on Luttwak, an argument is made for a strategy capable of adapting quickly to externalities and forces capable of operating between the widened right and left boundaries of doctrine.

In the final chapter, I hope to provide the reader a concise conclusion and several courses of action that should be considered when developing future roles

of unconventional forces. Using the argument I developed in previous chapters, I recommend pursuing skills, education, and training that de-emphasize targeting an opposition's military, and empower strategies and develop skills that harness the power of the opposition's people. While I risk putting the cart before the horse promoting the implementation of these recommendations, I hope to convincingly argue that moving in this direction now, despite the fact of current engagements throughout the Middle East, will prevent dysfunctional inertia in the future.

The appendix of this thesis is a very simplistic game theory analysis that could be used to determine the amount of resources dedicated to unconventional warfare based on future threats. The analysis was inspired by a project conducted in *Models of Conflict*, a Master's level class on game theory analysis.<sup>1</sup> While the approach to estimating the costs of future war are open to debate, the conclusions reached by the analysis could have a lasting impact on future resource allocation.

Admittedly, few of the ideas in this thesis are original. I owe a tremendous amount to the genius and high-caliber instruction of each professor within the Naval Postgraduate School's Defense Analysis program.<sup>2</sup> Much of my argument is a continuation of themes and ideas cultivated in several classroom discussions and lectures, and despite my best efforts, proper credit will probably not be given to this fine cadre of professionals. Saying that, several points of my thesis actually disagree with some ideas exposed at NPS, and they therefore should not be interpreted as an indication of lessons taught there. The primary goal of this thesis was not to create new, untested concepts that could be debated *ad nauseum*, but instead to draw on well-established doctrine and update these teachings with new approaches and organizations. Understandably, some

---

<sup>1</sup> Frank Giordano. *Classroom Instruction: Models of Conflict*. Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School (Spring 2005).

<sup>2</sup> Of particular importance to the origin and development of my ideas were the teachings and concepts of Dr. Gordon McCormick in the *Seminar on Guerrilla Warfare* course and Dr. Anna Simons in *The Military Advisor* course and in personal discussions. Both courses are core classes within the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School.

approaches recommended require further research and experimentation, but they have such a strong record of success that they can no longer be ignored. The overall aim is to provide the reader with a document that identifies a current military weakness and proposes a method by which to rectify the problem. While I understand that several recommendations could be asking too much in terms of military reorganization and alteration of political thought, it is my wish that my work provides at least a starting point for future discussion on how to best develop the United States military in the unconventional domain.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



## II. VIEWING WARFARE IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT

### A. CLAUSEWITZ REVISITED

Most pieces written on military doctrine inevitably draw on the teachings and theory of renowned military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz. This discussion is no different, but attempts to blend Clausewitz's timeless lessons with modern-day approaches to warfare in order to reveal and possibly correct flaws inherent to the American war-making structure. While several great minds have made a strong case that Clausewitzian thought no longer applies because of the rise of non-state actors and the fundamental changes in the concept of the Westphalian nation-state<sup>3</sup>, I feel that his approach to creating grand strategy is still applicable and requires reevaluation in light of current threats.

One of the most important contributions Clausewitz made to the development of proper military strategy is the recognition of three main aspects, or actors, that must be considered when developing military theory.<sup>4</sup> As Clausewitz states "the first of these aspects concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government."<sup>5</sup> Clausewitz contends that when developing theory to defeat future opponents, one must realize that these three aspects are interrelated and that each opponent has a center of gravity that can be exploited based on the opponent's type of government and the

---

<sup>3</sup> This line of thought predominates in Martin Van Creveld's *Transformation of War* (1991). In it, Van Creveld argues that Clausewitzian thought has become almost irrelevant due to the fact that Clausewitz wrote under the assumption that a Westphalian nation state would retain a monopoly on violence in the future. As we see today, because technology and communications have empowered small groups (through increased efficiency in terrorism) and globalization has been able to bring them together, the state no longer has a monopoly. Therefore, according to Van Creveld, Clausewitz's basic assumptions are no longer applicable. While I agree that the world we live in today is dramatically different than the one in which Clausewitz lived, the nature of war and the need to balance passion, chance, and reason while targeting an opponents population, army, or government remains a valid foundation on which to develop military theory.

<sup>4</sup> The three actors in warfare should not be confused with the three variables Clausewitz describes in his "paradoxical trinity." This trinity consists of passion (blind natural force), chance, and reason (making war subordinate to policy, and therefore, constrained by political factors). While Clausewitz's writings are open to wide ranging interpretation, it has become a common error to associate the "paradoxical trinity" with the three actors that participate in warfare.

<sup>5</sup> Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 89.

relationship of that government to its population and armed forces. He goes on to state that, “the task, therefore, is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.”<sup>6</sup> A military strategist must be able to assess the nature of future warfare and begin to structure his forces to best target his opposition’s center of gravity, be it the army, the population, the government, or some distinct blending of the three. It is impossible for the strategist to tailor his force to perfectly target *every* possible opponent’s center of gravity, so he must be willing to accept a force that is capable of targeting what he see as the predominant aspect of the *majority* of his possible future foes. The nation most capable of properly foreseeing these future aspects and preparing its force to confront them will hold a huge advantage in the majority of its military conflicts. Those military powers unable to foresee and adapt its forces to the predominant aspects of warfare will either be immediately destroyed or be slowly drained of power until it becomes irrelevant in the international arena.

While Clausewitz acknowledges three aspects in creating military theory, he devotes most of his time to discussing how to target an opponent’s military force structure. It is fully understandable why Clausewitz focuses on the army aspect of warfare, as it tended to fully dominate the style of wars fought up to and during the early nineteenth century. Clausewitz, although likely uncomfortable with the nuances and possible powers of a people’s war, does slightly acknowledge a type of conflict that is dominated by the aspect of the population. In Book 6, Chapter 26 of *On War*, Clausewitz tips his hat to the notion of a people’s war, and writes that, “any nation that uses it [people’s war] intelligently will, as a rule, gain some superiority over those who disdain its use.”<sup>7</sup> He closes his assessment of a people’s war by hinting that he, personally, does not feel this type of warfare would ever gain primacy, but leaves the door open by stating that it would be possible if criteria were met that allowed an army to “gain by the

---

<sup>6</sup> Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 89.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 479

further expansion of this element of war.”<sup>8</sup> I argue (and support this argument in the following chapter) that, due to the empowerment of individuals and small groups through globalization, the criteria are now in place for conflicts to be dominated by the aspect of war Clausewitz pays relatively little attention to: that of the population.

## **B. CLAUSEWITZ’S MODERN INTERPRETATION**

Modern military thought also acknowledges differing types of war and uses the term conventional warfare to describe conflicts that focus primarily on the military aspect of war, while the term unconventional warfare is used to describe conflicts that revolve around targeting the opposing population. When talking of conflicts dealing with the primary targeting of an opposition’s government, the term revolutionary warfare is often used. The problem with the use of these terms is that, in light of current threats, the terms are often twisted to mean different things in different situations, and they begin to lose their original meanings when debated.

In this discussion, the term conventional warfare is used to refer to a style of warfare that revolves around the premise that an opposition’s center of gravity lays very close to its military power, and once this military power is defeated, the government and its people will acquiesce to the demands of the victor. Conversely, the use of the term unconventional warfare is used to describe conflicts in which the opponent’s center of gravity rests closely with the population, and, by targeting and gaining the support of that population, one is able to gain the clarity of intelligence necessary to target the leadership and military forces of the enemy. The primary differences between unconventional and conventional war, therefore, are in targeting priorities. When discussing conventional war, it is appropriate to assume a targeting list that gives utmost importance to destroying the military infrastructure, communication systems, and troop formations of the enemy. The importance given to Clausewitz’s three

---

<sup>8</sup> Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 479.

actors naturally become: (1) military targets, (2) government, and (3) population. In conventional warfare, intelligence, weaponry, and tactics are designed to best degrade the military capacity of the opponent. While the primary targeting priority of conventional war is the opposition's military, it is quite possible to also include the opponent's population and government in target lists, but only with the understanding that the primary goal is to degrade the power of the enemy's military.<sup>9</sup> It also is possible to conduct conventional warfare using unconventional forces as long as the primary objective of those forces is to support a strategy in which the overarching objective is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces.<sup>10</sup>

When discussing unconventional war, a polar opposite targeting priority arises. The unconventional strategy stresses the following priorities in targeting an opposition: (1) population, (2) government, and (3) military. This definition, based on targeting priorities, is a departure from the "official" definition provided by the Department of Defense. According to Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, unconventional warfare is:

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape (E&E).

Due to the vague nature of the DoD definition and the constraints it inevitably places on strategists, defining warfare based on targeting priorities helps

---

<sup>9</sup> Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki can be viewed as targeting the opponent's population in pursuit of a conventional strategy. The Allies believed that the best way to win the war was to force the military to surrender, and the best way to do so was to demonstrate the ability to use powerful weapons that were capable of destroying the entire nation.

<sup>10</sup> For example, using the population (militia or guerrilla forces) to destroy transportation lines that support an adversary's military, or conducting hit and run ambushes to whittle away the morale and resources of the enemy military. The initial U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, in which Special Forces soldiers supported the Northern Alliance to destroy the Taliban forces serves as an example of this.

delineate conventional strategy from unconventional.<sup>11</sup> Although this definition may not encompass all of the specific nuances, overlap, or underlap of terms such as irregular warfare, partisan warfare, insurgency, or counterinsurgency, I feel it better allows a reader to distinguish between styles of warfare. Just as a conventional strategy can include the people on target lists, so too can an unconventional strategy attempt to target an opponent's armed forces. The difference between an unconventional strategy and a conventional one is what end state these attacks have. Insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns, a hot topic in today's discussions on warfare, are just two subsets of unconventional warfare. As stated before, in a conventional strategy, targeting is geared to destroying the military actor of an opposing nation in an attempt to render that nation powerless. An unconventional strategy targets an opposition's military forces only when assured of success; it does not expect to destroy the enemy's military, but to convince the population of its enemy's impotence. The point of every major attack is to gain support of the population and degrade the status of its opposition in the eyes of its people. One must also remain cognizant of the fact that it is possible to wage an unconventional campaign with conventional troops as long as the use of these troops is to gain control of the population, not to destroy the enemy's military.<sup>12</sup>

In conclusion, when discussing conventional or unconventional strategy, this paper focuses on the overall objective of the strategy and not the tactics or personnel used to prosecute it. A war strategy always should focus on how to best target an opponent's center of gravity; it gains its title on which of the three actors it deems most important. For a conventional strategy, the military is most significant; for an unconventional, the population is paramount; and for a revolutionary, the government is the main target.

---

<sup>11</sup> The following thesis, published in June of 2004, supports this line of thought: Stephen P. Basilici and Jeremy Simmons, "Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare" (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004).

<sup>12</sup> For example, using conventional troops to conduct village security, internal policing, or rebuilding infrastructure in an attempt to win the support of a given population. General Douglas MacArthur's occupation of Japan serves as another example of using conventional troops in an unconventional strategy.

### C. LUTTWAK'S TWO APPROACHES TO WAR

Once a nation has determined the aspect of war (people, army, or government) that is likely to dominate future conflicts, it must then determine what approach to take to wage that particular type of war. I now turn to the writings of a more modern thinker, Dr. Edward N. Luttwak, to propose a method for determining the proper approach.

One of the most thought-provoking articles written on approaches to warfare is a short piece published in a 1987 book titled *Dimensions of Military Strategy*. The article, *Notes on Low Intensity Conflict*, describes two approaches a nation may take in developing its military forces in order to face future threats and adversaries. The first method, what he dubs attritional warfare, has enough literature written on it to fill several American libraries. The second, relational-maneuver warfare, has comparatively little written on the subject despite the fact that it is the style of warfare most likely to dominate the future battlefield.

Attritional warfare, as describe by Luttwak, is characterized by a nation's attempt to efficiently win conflicts by bringing "superior material resources, by their transformation into firepower, and by application of the latter upon the enemy."<sup>13</sup> He describes how, as a military becomes more oriented to this style of warfare, it tends to be focused more on internal efficiency, administration, and daily operations. While this approach is excellent in mass production of weapons systems, formalization of military education, and maximizing the utility of command lines, it tends to give less importance to the external environment and the specific nuances of the particular enemy. The external environment encompasses several variables: the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy, the terrain (both cultural and physical) upon which the war will be fought, and the specific phenomena of any one particular conflict. An attritional army cannot be expected to adapt quickly to these variables, as it could possibly violate some of the internal processes that have been established in past confrontations. Other environmental factors are only considered insofar as they "present obstacles to

---

<sup>13</sup> Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low Intensity Conflict" in *Dimensions of Military Strategy*, ed. George Edward Thibault (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1987), p. 336.

the transportation, deployment, and efficient application of firepower on an enemy force.”<sup>14</sup> Armed forces molded in the attritional style are known for being more interested in their own inner workings in order to “maximize process efficiencies all around.” Relating this back to Clausewitz’s theories, it would seem possible for a military force to adopt an attritional style of warfare directed at an opposition’s military actor (e.g. Napoleonic warfare) or adopt an attritional approach to war focused on the opposition’s population (e.g. British Mau Mau Counterinsurgency).

The second style of warfare discussed in Luttwak’s piece is the relational-maneuver approach to conflict. This is not to be confused with the term “maneuver warfare” (which actually describes an attritional tactic); the relational-maneuver approach to warfare instead describes a military that tends to be outer-regarding and capable of adapting to environmental externalities. Armed forces of this nature seek to obtain victory by identifying the, “specific weaknesses of their particular opponent, and then reconfiguring their own capabilities to exploit these weaknesses.”<sup>15</sup> Consequently, relational-maneuver armies usually cannot maximize internal efficiency and do not develop optimal organizational formats, methods, or tactics. “Instead, each must be relational, *i.e.* reconfigured ad hoc for the theater, the enemy and the situation.”<sup>16</sup> The key to victory for a relational-maneuver army does not lie in the realm of overwhelming effective firepower, but instead, upon the ability to “interpret the external environment” and alter their own organizational format, operational methods, and battlefield tactics to best fit the specific problem they are in conflict with<sup>17</sup>. Instead of applying a well-proven model to a particular enemy, a relational maneuver unit looks to create a new model to fit the particular nuances of that enemy. Again tying back into Clausewitzian thought, a nation could adopt a relational maneuver force focused on defeating an opponent’s military (e.g.

---

<sup>14</sup> Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low Intensity Conflict” in *Dimensions of Military Strategy*, ed. George Edward Thibault (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1987), p. 336Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

Desert Storm) or develop a relational maneuver force focused on an opponent's population (e.g. British Malayan counterinsurgency).

Luttwak argues that neither style of warfare holds any inherent value over the other, only that most nations have historically developed, according to their relative position of power, to best achieve the strategic goals of their country. It is appropriate, then, for countries rich in resources to pursue an attritional style of warfare, where poorer countries adopt a relational-maneuver style that offers high payoffs with minimal material cost. Luttwak also states that is nearly impossible for any nation to achieve a pure style of attritional or relative maneuver warfare, and that their approach should be viewed as lying somewhere along a continuum between the two. Therefore, if we combine both Clausewitz's actors in war with Luttwak's approaches to conflict, we can describe a nation's style of warfare in four different ways: militarily focused, attritional approach; militarily focused, relational maneuver approach; population focused, attritional approach; population focused, relational maneuver approach.<sup>18</sup>

#### **D. KNOW THYSELF: KILL, CAPTURE, DESTROY...**

The Post-Cold War U.S. military is a glowing example of what a balanced approach to defeating an opponent's military can accomplish. The same military also serves as an example of how a singularly focused force can be exploited in an unconventional fight. By formalizing internal acquisition processes, establishing formal, standardized education channels for all personnel, and strictly managing promotion procedures, the current U.S. military has proven to be an almost invincible force on the modern battlefield. These same processes and procedures have unfortunately opened gaping holes in American power. Characterized by stealth bombers, huge battleships, armored tanks, large formations of technologically advanced soldiers, and remotely piloted weapons, the US military has accomplished some of the most complete and stunning

---

<sup>18</sup> One could also argue for government focused, attritional approach; or government focused, relational maneuver approach, but for the sake of brevity and clarity, I will limit the discussion to the two predominant actors in modern war.



defeats of its adversaries. While the development of this force was perfectly rational in a historical sense, the defense structures implemented in the past may prove extremely costly against future opponents.

Like all great military powers, the United States has developed its doctrine by carefully scrutinizing historical theories, interpreting them, and then modernizing these concepts to coincide with the increased lethality of modern weapon systems. Early in American history, a set of prescriptions were generated by top decision makers to specify how U.S. military forces would be structured and employed in order to respond to recognized threats to national security.<sup>19</sup> These prescriptions, steeped deeply in Clausewitzian strategy, have been highly successful in numerous conflicts and have provided great support in America's climb towards superpower status. Unfortunately, the American interpretation of Clausewitzian strategy also may serve as the impetus for a fall from this status.

In his famous piece *On War*, Clausewitz goes into great detail on how a commander should structure an army, the methods he should take in employing them, and tactics one should use when confronted with several different situations. In fact, over 90 percent of his writing dealt with maximizing efficiency within a military unit in order to achieve synergy of military effort on a given military target. Unfortunately, most American military advisors reflect far too long on the tactical military application of Clausewitz and lose sight of his most profound contribution to military thought; that of maintaining a balanced force capable of targeting all three war actors. Because the majority of *On War* is focused on targeting an opponent's military, the majority of take away lessons deal with conventional warfare. In the past, the notion of the Westphalian nation state<sup>20</sup> permitted conflicts between countries in which the nation with higher attritional capability usually emerged victorious. Today, however, with increasing

---

<sup>19</sup> Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*. (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 181.

<sup>20</sup> The concept of a Westphalian nation state is one in which the government possesses a monopoly on violence, has sovereignty in a given territory, and is recognized in the international arena.

globalization, the rise of non-state actors, and a boom in technological advances, the superiority of a military focused, attritional-leaning army has taken a severe, possibly even fatal, reduction of power when facing an unconventional opponent.

It is easy to demonstrate that the American military, operating under the assumptions of perpetual Westphalian nation-state supremacy, chose to hone its skills on defeating Clausewitz's second variable, the opposing military, and create the most formidable battlefield force the world has ever known. After the end of World War I and World War II, American policy makers bore witness to the terrible consequences a military defeat could have upon a country. In the eve of World War I, the Ottoman Empire was carved up by the victors and essentially ceased to exist. Germany, suffering much the same fate as the Ottomans, became impossibly indebted and was forced to dismantle its entire military apparatus. World War II held nearly the same consequences for those defeated, and required implementation of efficient procedures to transform national resources into military firepower. In the aftermath of these brutal conflicts, American decision makers deemed it necessary to create a military force that could achieve victory on any conventional battlefield and project power anywhere on the globe. What evolved over the next half-century was the formation of the most powerful militarily focused force the world has known. An argument promoted by Donald Vandergriff in *The Path to Victory* is that the decisions made during this development were made during and immediately following desperate situations that are fundamentally different from the situations we currently face. This now leaves us prepared to face an enemy who we are unlikely to confront directly and ill-prepared to battle the new enemy that has grown out of globalization and technological advances.<sup>21</sup> While the U.S. created the most capable force to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess an opposing military enemy (Clausewitz's second variable), it neglected the ability to properly engage and control Clausewitz's first and, given current trends, most important variable: the opposing population. Because of the interpretation of history, the United

---

<sup>21</sup> Donald Vandergriff, *The Path to Victory*. (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, Inc., 2002): 11.

States began to focus exclusively on just one of the Clausewitzian actors, inadvertently forming a weakness in military might that has and will be exploited in the future.

#### **E. KNOW THY ENEMY: THE RESPONSE TO U.S. MILITARY SUPERIORITY**

Like the country forced to adopt a relational-maneuver approach to warfare because of resource limitations, the United States has effectively placed the rest of the world in the position of relative deprivation in terms of military might. No other country in the world, save China, could possibly imagine devoting as many resources to a military force as does the United States. By gaining an overwhelming advantage in conventional warfare, the U.S. has left the world with only two options: (1) become allies with the U.S. or other international alliances and be subjected to possible long-term control and manipulation<sup>22</sup>, or (2) develop a military strategy capable of defeating an exceptional militarily-focused army in order to openly oppose the U.S. in the international arena. According to Luttwak, the natural choice becomes a relational-maneuver force that targets the gaps in American power instead of confronting the invincible military it possesses.

Where Clausewitz serves as the foremost strategic authority on conventional based warfare, Mao-Tse Tung appears to best capture the spirit of the unconventional approach in his writing *On Guerilla Warfare*. In this, he outlines the primary steps to properly conduct an unconventional campaign. These seven steps are as follows: (1) arouse and organize the people; (2) achieve internal political unification; (3) establish bases; (4) equip forces; (5) recover national strength; (6) destroy the enemy's national strength; and (7) regain lost territory.<sup>23</sup> Vietnam should have served as an eye-opener to the

---

<sup>22</sup> Although a country could be subjected to manipulation from a superpower or alliance, it does stand the chance to benefit from the arrangement. Not all aspects of this option are bad, but the country does lose a bit of long-term power in these arrangements.

<sup>23</sup> Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith II. (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 43.

United States military that this form of war is extremely powerful. It was a conflict in which the enemy's center of gravity rested with the population and proved capable of defeating even the most technologically superior military. I believe General Vo Nguyen Giap put it most succinctly when he wrote, "they [the Americans] believe that the adversary's backbone is its armed forces, and that if they can defeat those, they can end the war, but if they cannot do so, the war will last a long time, and they will be defeated."<sup>24</sup> Giap, the legendary Vietnamese general, understood that the United States was incapable of deviating from a strategy that favored the targeting of military forces. He also understood that he could push the conflict into the realm of the unconventional, and by using a relational-maneuver approach in targeting Vietnam's population, he could sidestep the American military and exhaust the psychological and political will of the United States. Instead of learning that this form of war exposed a fundamental weakness in American power and that steps should be taken to address this power gap, the United States chose to avoid these types of wars. Unfortunately for the US, its enemies learned that this was exactly the style of warfare that they needed to bring to the American doorstep.

While no nation can afford to confront the American military directly, several states (and a few non-state actors as well) are now engaged in an indirect targeting campaign intended to pull the U.S. into a protracted war that requires a deep understanding of unconventional warfare and the ability to rapidly adapt to specific threats and environments. Future enemies will continue to exploit the weaknesses of the militarily focused strategy the U.S. employs, and, much like the Germans circumvented the Maginot Line in WWII, simply side-step the overwhelming conventional power of the American military.

## **F. TRENDS OF FUTURE WAR**

The modern paradigm for warfare, in which nation-states wage war for reasons of state, using formal militaries...[is] being eclipsed by a post-modern approach..National sovereignties are being

---

<sup>24</sup> Vo Nguyen Giap, *Big Victory, Great Task*. (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), 24.

undermined by organizations [terrorists and other non-state armed groups] that refuse to recognize the state's monopoly over armed violence.<sup>25</sup>

The use of the term fourth-generation warfare (4GW) has become a hot issue in many military circles. In some camps, 4GW is not accepted as a true “generation” as the strategy that drives it has been around since the beginning of warfare itself. In other camps, 4GW is a form of warfare that has arisen and been empowered through modern technology and worldwide communication. I tend to agree with both camps, and I would argue that, while it is true that the strategy of 4GW is nothing new, the environment that it now operates in is fundamentally different than anything the world has known. Because of that, perhaps it is necessary to discuss 4GW as a new “generation” in warfare and something the US military should begin to adopt.

While the use of the term 4GW is subject to debate, the trends that it promotes are clearly being used throughout the world against the United States today. Some of these trends include:

- operations are highly irregular, unconventional and decentralized in approach
- operations are employed to bypass the superior military power of nation-states to attack and exploit vulnerable political, economic, population, and symbolic targets, thus demoralizing the government and its populace
- enemies wear no uniforms and infiltrate into the populations of their targets. Old distinctions between civilian and military targets become generally irrelevant.<sup>26</sup>

Despite the subtle nuances espoused by different advocates of 4GW, the underlying trend in each is that the importance of the population has grown dramatically when compared to previous conflicts.<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*. (New York: Free Press, 1991), 224.

<sup>26</sup> Schultz, R.H. and R.M. Beitler. (June 2004). Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al'Qai'da's Operations. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*. Volume 8, No. 2.

Several examples exist in which unconventional strategies were used to mobilize the support of a population and defeat a militarily superior adversary. Mao Tse Tung used this strategy to defeat the Japanese during the 1930's and 1940's. Che Guevara also supported this strategy when he (along with Fidel Castro) first overthrew the Batista regime in Cuba and then set out (unsuccessfully) to spark a people's revolution throughout Latin America. Most well known to the American population was the North Vietnamese use of the population to erode military and national will during the Vietnam War. While each of these examples were successful, they occurred in a time in which the ability to communicate with the entire population at once and personally command the entire conflict was inconceivable. Today, as Al Qaeda is demonstrating, it is possible for an enemy to communicate with the population with relative ease, while simultaneously remaining concealed among the populace.<sup>28</sup> This new product of the information age, instantaneous global communication, elevates the unconventional strategy to the same level, if not higher, than that of conventional strategy.

Whether or not one wants to actually use the term 4GW, the fact that globalization and technological advances have empowered small groups enough to achieve global reach must be recognized and dealt with. Drawing back to Clausewitzian thought, it is important that the United States begin to take the measures necessary to understand strategies and operational methods for targeting an enemy's population. These methods and strategies must go well beyond the often muttered, but hardly understood, mantra of "hearts and minds" to develop a force that is as capable of operating in the realm of the unconventional as well as it is in the conventional. To do so, a base of

---

<sup>27</sup> Some excellent reading on 4GW can be found at the website for Defense and the National Interest located at [http://www.d-n-i.net/second\\_level/fourth\\_generation\\_warfare.htm](http://www.d-n-i.net/second_level/fourth_generation_warfare.htm) Accessed 20 September 2005. There are several articles and presentations that argue for the acceptance of the term 4GW, as well as quite a few after action reports and governmental speeches that support the use of the terminology. In each of these readings, the importance of targeting the population is noted and deemed of great importance.

<sup>28</sup> The numerous videotapes and messages broadcast over the Al Jazeera network are just one example of mass communication while remaining concealed.

understanding must be gained about unconventional warfare, and past operational methods must be updated to achieve success in a highly-connected information-driven environment.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



### **III. NEW FOCUS, NEW APPROACH**

#### **A. SHIFT FIRE**

If one accepts that the focus of future war is shifting away from one of Clausewitz's actors (the military) and closer to another (the population), then it is critical that a discussion on the grand strategy and approaches necessary to be successful within this realm begin. The United States would then need to move its resources and personnel away from the militarily-focused style of warfare at which it excels, and implement strategies capable of capturing the support of a population.<sup>29</sup> It also means that the United States must reevaluate its approach toward unconventional warfare to determine its historical track record and future feasibility. To do so, the foundations of unconventional doctrine must first be examined. Finally, the future threat that unconventional warfare holds must be assessed. This chapter argues that while unconventional warfare has been viewed as nothing more than a sideshow in the past, the environment and technology exist today to place unconventional conflicts squarely at center stage.<sup>30</sup>

It would be unfair to claim that the United States military does not deal at all in the unconventional realm. In fact, several careers in the American military stress the importance of harnessing the power of the population.<sup>31</sup> Unfortunately, these career tracks are currently undermanned, under funded, and viewed as irrelevant when compared to their conventional front line counterparts. The most disconcerting aspect of these careers is that they typically have been educated by a conventional-minded system that teaches an approach that is both

---

<sup>29</sup> Undoubtedly, the United States cannot afford to move too many resources towards unconventional warfare as it could lose its stature as a superpower in conventional warfare. To determine this distinct blend, leaders must conduct a detailed game theory analysis to determine the amounts allocated to both conventional and unconventional warfare. A simplistic example of how to do so is included in the appendix of this thesis.

<sup>30</sup> During World War I, the Arab unconventional campaign directed by T.E. Lawrence was routinely described as nothing more than a "sideshow to a sideshow."

<sup>31</sup> These career fields include, but are not limited to, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Foreign Internal Defense units, FAO programs, and Army Special Forces.

faulty and, in most cases, impossible to implement. This flows directly from the education of the vast majority of American military officers.

Whenever American military leaders are asked how to win an unconventional conflict, the immediate answer is overwhelmingly to “win the hearts and minds of the people.” In fact, a recent testimony given to the United States House of Representatives highlights the population as the predominant center of gravity in the current war on terror, and goes on to outline the ‘hearts and minds approach’ as the key to attaining victory.<sup>32</sup> This approach asserts that victory can be won by addressing the grievances of the population in an effort to win their affection and support. Because the United States has become so attached to this one strategy, it has lost its ability to look externally and adapt to environments that require different strategies. Once the United States realizes that gaining the support of the population is a battle for outright authority instead of a popularity contest, serious strides can be made towards making an unconventional force capable of behaving in the proper relational-maneuver approach, instead of operating within the constraints of an ineffective model.

## **B. A FAULTY INTERPRETATION: THE “HEARTS AND MINDS” APPROACH**

“That nauseating term I think I invented”- Sir Gerald Templar, when referring to the term “hearts and minds” 15 years after the Malayan Emergency <sup>33</sup>

When comparing the successful unconventional campaigns of the United States to several other countries, it becomes painfully obvious that America does not perform well in these conflicts. In its partial defense, the United States has had relatively little experience in the unconventional domain and, for the most part, has had bad experiences in those instances. Adding to the problem is the American knack for losing any experience or lessons learned during these

---

<sup>32</sup> Andrew Krepinevich, “Are We Winning In Iraq?” *Testimony before United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services*. (17 March 2005).

<sup>33</sup> Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 1.

conflicts. This lack of experience has forced the US to turn to other nations with far more experience to develop their unconventional strategy.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, one can begin to understand the faults of the American model by understanding how the United States has interpreted the lessons learned from past unconventional conflicts, usually waged by other countries.

Much of American unconventional doctrine has come from Great Britain and their approach to targeting a population. For centuries, the Brits, due in large part to past imperialistic aspirations, have been forced to quell popular uprisings around the world. The British have witnessed both overwhelming successes and devastating defeats in unconventional conflicts that span almost every imaginable environment. The fortunate aspect of these experiences is that we have a recorded history and tactical examples on how to conduct an unconventional campaign. The unfortunate aspect is that the British routinely 'edited out' several aspects of their campaign if they proved too inhumane or too embarrassing for public disclosure. Perhaps more unfortunate is the fact that the United States based its "hearts and minds" approach to unconventional warfare (UW) on this carefully edited literature without a full comprehension of the methods used to successfully win these conflicts.

Scholars and military leaders routinely point to the British counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and Kenya as the foundation for the current American "hearts and minds" UW model. Although the term "hearts and minds" first appeared in a letter authored by John Adams in February of 1818 to describe the foundation of the American Revolutionary War, it became a mainstay in military vernacular after extensive literature was produced describing the British approach to winning the unconventional conflict in Malaya.<sup>35</sup> Because the victors often write military history, several variables in this British

---

<sup>34</sup> The 1960 Special Forces Manual *Counter-Insurgency Operations* combined several strategies developed by colonial powers, mainly British, to form the roots of American unconventional warfare doctrine.

<sup>35</sup> The date of John Adams quote was obtained through communication with the E Pluribus Union Project, a body of scholars dedicated to understanding communications in the Revolutionary War. The exact phrase in which "hearts and minds" can be found is located at <http://www.assumption.edu/ahc/1770s/pintro.html>. Last accessed 20 November 2005.

model were omitted. Today, evidence has emerged supporting the argument that the British cared more about establishing authority by targeting the minds and altering the environment of the population than they were about gaining popularity through winning hearts.<sup>36</sup> This new information alone must force the United States into reevaluating its interpretation of British and, in turn, current American unconventional strategy.

Fueled by the success in Malaya, British generals Sir Gerald Templar and Sir Robert Thompson became the foremost authorities in conducting counterinsurgency campaigns. These campaigns were designed primarily to gain the support of the population which, in turn, garnered the intelligence necessary to defeat an unconventional enemy. Perhaps the clearest explanation of British focus was written by Thompson in his 1966 book *Defeating Communist Insurgency*. In it, he writes:

An insurgent movement is a war for the people...the battle in the populated areas represents a straight fight between the government and the insurgents for the control of the rural population<sup>37</sup>

It is apparent through these writings that the British understood that the focus of these conflicts was squarely in the realm of the populous, but somehow most written history focused on the widely-accepted 'hearts' aspect of gaining popular support despite the fact that the sometimes brutal 'minds' aspect was of the utmost importance.

This observation is best supported by the popular historical view of the British Malayan and Kenyan experiences, one in which the British gained victory by winning the support and hearts of the population. Newer pieces on the subject reveal a much darker side to the British approach and they make one wonder how the 'hearts' approach was ever interpreted from these harsh

---

<sup>36</sup> An excellent history on the development of the term "hearts and minds" can be found in the introduction of the following book:

Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

<sup>37</sup> Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*. (London: Palgrave, 1966). 51, 116.

campaigns. Most pieces written on Malaya attribute the British victory to resettlement programs, the building of a bottom-up intelligence system, and pacification through economic and infrastructure development. While the resettlement of rural peasants to state-controlled “new villages” certainly helped separate the insurgents from the popular support base, the notion that this method was aimed at the hearts of the people is ludicrous. The basic strategy of this resettlement program was to take a largely Chinese rural population, move them from their remote jungle farmlands, and relocate them in “new villages” that could be protected and supported by the British. This resettlement is often portrayed in literature as a benevolent act on the part of the government, aiming to protect the people from the roaming bands of communist insurgents. By the time the conflict had ended, between 500,000 and 650,000 people had been relocated into these well-secured villages.<sup>38</sup> While this initially comes across as a humane act and one that would win the hearts of any person looking for security, details have surfaced that indicates this perception could not be further from the truth. These resettlements are now described as being carried out “with little regard to the feelings of the Chinese” resettlers. The following excerpt from John Newsinger’s *British Counterinsurgency* provides the best description of these harsh British methods:

Settlements were encircled by large numbers of troops before first light, then occupied at dawn without warning. The squatters were rounded up and allowed to take with them only what they could carry. Their homes and standing crops were fired, their agricultural implementations were smashed and their livestock were either killed or turned loose. Some were subsequently to receive compensation, but most never did. They were then transported by lorry to the site of their ‘new village’ which was often little more than a prison camp, surrounded by barbed wire fence, illuminated by searchlights. The villages were heavily policed with the inhabitants effectively deprived of all civil rights.<sup>39</sup>

Another study comments on the resettlement and regrouping programs implemented by the British.

<sup>38</sup> John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland*. (Palgrave: New York, 2002), 50-51.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. p. 50.

Keeping in mind the economic distress villagers faced, the deterioration in conditions in the NV's [New Villages] and the restrictions which circumscribed everyday life, one is nonetheless forced to conclude that they were indeed pacified. But this is very different from saying that their hearts and minds had been won.<sup>40</sup>

Within these camps, food was closely supervised and could be either withheld or generously distributed based on the support the inhabitants gave the Brits. Food denial programs also were implemented throughout the country and produced extraordinary results in gaining intelligence and isolating the insurgents.<sup>41</sup> While the primarily British-authored literature seems to paint a much kinder picture, one begins to realize that gaining popularity was of secondary importance to the establishment of an authoritative force.

The second aspect in which the Malayan (and Kenyan) model may have been misinterpreted is in the increase in human intelligence networks used to reveal and target the insurgent forces. Soon after his appointment as High Commissioner and Director of Operation of Malaya, General Templar expressed that he gave the highest priority to intelligence when he remarked to a newspaper correspondent that Malaya "will be won by our intelligence system."<sup>42</sup> Most work gives credit to the British ability to develop a network of informers and agents among the population to reveal the location and identity of the insurgents. Again, this viewpoint seems very agreeable until the methods used to develop this network are exposed. Many of the agents and informers that provided information were at one time prisoners of the British, who were turned during interrogations. Unfortunately for the advocates of the 'hearts' approach, these turnings were accomplished through some very cruel methods.

To many of these sergeants [police interrogators] every Chinese was a bandit or potential bandit, and there was only one treatment for them, they were to be 'bashed about.' If they would not talk a

---

<sup>40</sup> Francis Kok-Wah Loh, (1988). *Beyond the Tin Mines: Coolies, Squatters, and New Villagers in the Kinta Valley*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 161.

<sup>41</sup> Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 167.

<sup>42</sup> Harry Miller, *Jungle War in Malaya: The campaign against communism, 1948-1960*. (London: Arthur Barker, Ltd, 1972), 90.

sock on the jaw or a kick in the guts may have the desired result. I myself once saw a British sergeant encouraging a heavy-booted policeman to treat a suspect like a football. The young Chinese was kicked all around the room until a threat to report this treatment brought the game to a stop.<sup>43</sup>

This style of interrogation was also later used in Kenya to suppress the “Mau Mau” Revolt. According to Wunyabari Maloba, “the chief characteristic of the war against the Mau Mau was brutality.”<sup>44</sup> British interrogation methods in Kenya were hardly aimed at winning hearts, as Robert Edgerton describes in his piece *Mau Mau: An African Crucible*.

If a question was not being answered to an interrogator’s satisfaction, the suspect was beaten and kicked. If that did not lead to the desired confession, and it rarely did, more force was applied. Electric shock was widely used, and so was fire. Women were choked and held under water; gun barrels, beer bottles, and even knives were thrust into their vaginas. Men had beer bottles thrust up their rectums, were dragged behind Land Rovers, whipped, burned, and bayoneted. Their fingers were chopped off and sometimes their testicles were crushed with pliers...Some police officers did not bother with more time consuming forms of torture; they simply shot any suspect who refused to answer, then told the next suspect who had been forced to watch the cold blooded execution to dig his own grave. When the grave was finished, the man was asked if he would now be willing to talk. Sometimes suspects were forced to watch while others were killed, often slowly, with knives instead of bullets.<sup>45</sup>

While it is hard to argue against the fact that the British were able to gain intelligence superiority by forcing the people to support them, it must be understood that the methods by which they accomplished it in no way resembled an effort to win the “hearts” of the population.

Next, the need to dedicate tremendous amounts of resources toward stabilization efforts and infrastructure rebuilding when waging an unconventional fight may prove to be an improper interpretation of history. While the British did

---

<sup>43</sup> Harry Miller, *Menace in Malaya*. (London: Praeger, 1954), 89.

<sup>44</sup> Wunyabari O Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya: An analysis of peasant revolt*. (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), 91.

<sup>45</sup> Robert B Edgerton, *Mau Mau: An African Crucible*. (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 152-153.

push money and resources into public works projects and rebuilding governmental infrastructures, it appears that this was done more to help maintain an indefinite presence in the region than it was to improve the welfare of the people. Infrastructure was only built if it would later serve the interests of the British Empire, consequently establishing long term control over a nation through indirect economic, agricultural, diplomatic, or informational pressures. While defeating the uprising was the primary concern, the British were taking steps to gain political footholds, never losing sight of their future interests. This is seen in a directive put forth by the British Prime Minister in which he states, “even after a self-Government has been attained, the British in Malaya will have a worthy and continuing part to play.”<sup>46</sup> Although craftily worded, it seems apparent that the British had their own interests in mind by establishing a working government in their colonies. In Malaya, for example, the most important public work projects included the establishment of competent police forces (to maintain control), the creation of banking organizations (to take advantage of the tin and rubber boom, both major exports of Malaya), the creation of better roads (to deliver these goods), and contracting organizations (to ensure all public works projects had a British fingerprint on them). Templar saw these public works as a means of establishing “a strong Malayan state that was accepted by the population and remained loyal to the Empire.”<sup>47</sup> Further works, such as building churches, sanitary systems, entertainment venues, and improving medical services, were later accomplished “to give the Malays a sense that their grievances were recognized, even if not as much was being done to redress them as most desired.”<sup>48</sup> While there is certainly nothing wrong with fulfilling overlapping interests, to view these improvements in infrastructure and public works as an act of overwhelming kindness on the part of the British is almost laughable given newly emerging data and the track record of the British Empire.

---

<sup>46</sup> Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 141.

<sup>47</sup> John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland*. (Palgrave: New York, 2002), 56.

<sup>48</sup> Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 178.



Turning to a more recent example, an example that has received far too little attention in light of current events, we must consider the strategies used to defeat terrorism in Punjab during the late 1980's and early 1990's. Like Malaya, a myth has propagated that it was political reform (not the use of coercive violence) that won the day in India. In fact, it was a large-scale imposition of martial law, strict internal policing, and a very concerted effort between Indian police, military, and para-military forces that curbed terrorist activity in Punjab. According to a recent *Faultlines* article written by K.P.S. Gill, each time a political solution was sought in Punjab and "through measures referred to as 'winning the hearts and minds of the people'- usually an euphemism for a policy of appeasement of terrorist elements- terrorism escalated."<sup>49</sup> It was only through the use of very authoritative measures (an approach that will be discussed at length in the following section) that terrorist activity was diminished and eventually defeated. Due to the human tendency to believe what one wants to believe, the very authoritative measures used in Punjab were somehow bent to portray a much kinder picture than what really happened.

Looking through the annals of history, this researcher has been unable to find even a single case study that was actually won by implementing a true, American-style "hearts and minds" approach. From the ancient Romans to the imperialistic French, history shows success is gained by establishing authority, not popular affection, when attempting to gain the support of a population.<sup>50</sup> Perhaps the British are viewed as benevolent only because their methods were not nearly as harsh as their imperial counterparts. Regardless of its origin, it becomes painfully obvious that the "hearts and minds" approach towards unconventional warfare was meant for domestic consumption only, and that the

---

<sup>49</sup> K.P.S. Gill, "Endgame in Punjab," *Faultlines: Writings on Conflict and Resolution*. Vol. 1 No 1. (New Delhi: Institute for Conflict Management, May 1999), 2.

<sup>50</sup> An excellent reading on the Roman methods of conquest include: Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century AD to the Third*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). Pieces written on the French methods of population control and conquest include: Douglas Porch, *The Conquest of the Sahara*. (New York: From International Publishing Corporation, 1986). Douglas Porch, *The Conquest of Morocco*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1982).

campaign implemented in far off countries was much more an exercise in establishing authority and maintaining control over critical resources than it was in targeting hearts.

### **C. TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: AUTHORITATIVE CONTROL**

It is not my intent to advocate the use of tactics that blatantly violate human rights or cross the line into the realm of immorality, but it is necessary to understand that most unconventional victories have been extremely brutal affairs and have required extraordinary measures in which to gain the support of a population. Before beginning this discussion, it is necessary to make a distinction between basic human rights (those of security, shelter, and sustenance) and the rights afforded to people living in an operating, established democracy (freedom of speech, freedom to bear arms, freedom to protest, freedom of movement). It is my opinion that the latter freedoms only come after security has been established and a *de facto* government is in place and capable of controlling the masses.

Drawing on a Machiavellian notion of power, it could prove more effective to be feared than to be loved when attempting to gain a population's active support, and it, therefore, may be necessary to limit some of the more advanced human rights. Where it is possible to gain support by conducting exercises aimed at winning the hearts of a populace and participating in goodwill activities, all efforts should be made to do so. Most times, however, the American military will go into an environment in which it is impossible to gain the hearts of the population, calling for efforts to establish a local authority and control the environment in which they operate. The first problem with this strategy is that the American military (and political structure) is organized, trained, and educated to perform only missions aimed at gaining "hearts" and routinely shy away from campaigns designed to establish outright authority. The second obstacle to this strategy is determining whether or not the international political system,

combined with the ever-watchful eye of the global media, would allow for the implementation of several techniques necessary to win an unconventional conflict.

Returning to Dr. Luttwak's two approaches to warfare, it is appropriate to describe American unconventional warfare doctrine as lying extremely close to the "attritional" approach as it tends to focus on internal efficiency instead of the dynamics of the external environment. The United States routinely attempts to use the cookie cutter "hearts and minds" approach in every unconventional environment, and should the results be less than desirable, instead of changing strategy, the US simply does more of the same. When asked to conduct an unconventional campaign designed to win the support of the population, the US military immediately begins efforts to capture the "hearts" of the population, although the environment may dictate that these efforts will have little to no effect in gaining that support. In American doctrine, missions to build schools, roads and wells, along with efforts to provide food, books, and candy for children immediately surface as necessary tasks without truly understanding whether or not they will have their intended effect. In areas that are already open to the thought of American intervention, these efforts may produce solid results. In areas that hold serious reservations about American involvement, these missions only produce 'daytime friends,' while the population continues to support the unconventional enemy and serve as 'nighttime enemies.' The American military, therefore, must develop doctrine flexible enough to respond to both psychologically permissive and non-permissive environments. A relational-maneuver approach, capable of adapting to the specific nuances of our enemy, must be adopted and doctrine must support operations that range from the "hearts and minds" (addressing grievances) to the Machiavellian (establishing outright authority).

The current situation in Iraq shows that the American approach works fairly well in locations that are receptive to American involvement.<sup>51</sup> Unfortunately, this approach does little to gain the support of a population in areas that have a fundamental hatred for all things Western. In environments such as these, it may be more important to develop a Machiavellian style doctrine instead of one relying on appealing to the “better nature of men.” In a recent article published in *Special Warfare*, a Civil Affairs sergeant makes a strong case for adopting this approach in certain environments. In the article he claims “psychological studies have long held fear of loss and promise of reward to be among chief behavioral influences.”<sup>52</sup> He goes on to say that tactical variations of the stick and carrot approach have produced desired results. The trick now is to take these tactical successes and fit them into a strategy designed to take tactical victories and weave them into overall success. Although difficult, this is not impossible, as historical models exist to suggest the power an authoritative approach can have. As shown above, if Malaya is interpreted as more recent history suggests, it serves as a successful model of establishing outright authority to gain the support of the population. Again, gaining support is far different than gaining popularity among the people. Often, coercive techniques may need to be used in order to control, secure, and care for the overall welfare of the populous. This use of force should never be shied away from, as many see it as a responsibility of the government (or occupying force) in times of crisis. Turning again to the successful counter-terror campaign in Punjab, this concept is expressed beautifully in a *Faultlines* piece written in May of 1999. It states:

The ‘liberal’ mind has always remained ambivalent when confronted by the fact that the State, among other things, is a coercive instrument, and that it must, from time to time, exercise its option of the use of force- albeit of judicious, narrowly defined and

---

<sup>51</sup> In Iraq, of the 18 provinces, 17 are pacified in Shia/Kurd dominated areas. The problems occur in 4 of them where Sunni’s are located. It is the Shia population that are open to American involvement in creating a new democracy. The Sunni’s, however, stand to lose a tremendous amount of political power, and create a non-permissive environment for American forces.

<sup>52</sup> J.P. Pruett, “Good Cops, Bad Cops, Carrots and Sticks,” *Special Warfare*, Vol 18, No.2 (September 2005): 18.

very specifically targeted use of force- if it is not to be overwhelmed by the greater violence of the enemies of freedom, democracy, and lawful governance. To fail in this legitimate coercive authority is, thus, not an act of non-violence or of abnegation; it is not a measure of our humanity or civilization. It is, rather, an intellectual failure and an abdication of the responsibility that randomizes violence, alienating it from the constitutional constraints of the state, and allowing it to pass into the hands of those who exercise it without the discrimination and the limitations of law that govern its employment by the State. In doing this, it make innocents the victims of criminal violence, instead of making criminals the targets of its own legitimate and circumspect punitive force.<sup>53</sup>

To fully pursue this approach, a serious paradigm shift must be made in the ways America approaches unconventional war. This shift pushes the United States closer to the ideas and theories proposed by Niccolo Machiavelli, a 15<sup>th</sup> century political advisor and diplomat.

The approach espoused by Machiavellian thought will be referred to as the “authoritative control” approach for the remainder of this discussion. This approach tends to be much more direct and, in some cases, harsher than the hearts and minds approach. The primary goal of the “authoritative control” approach is to create an environment of security and order in which forces may begin to plant the seeds of democracy. In entering this discussion, it is important to remember that the point of this paper is not to espouse one approach over the other, but to present the pure right and left limit to approaching unconventional warfare, attempting to widen the theoretical space in which the United States can maneuver. Where “hearts and minds” attempts to gain support by addressing grievances and expecting the population to give support as reciprocation, the “authoritative control” approach builds upon the notion that humans will look to and support an authority figure, for a certain amount of time, in an altered environment. Currently, American doctrine does not recognize the latter approach and continues to implement the first. In simple parlance, when playing poker, one should not pursue a flush when dealt a full house. The United States is currently attempting this as it pursues a “hearts and minds” approach when we

---

<sup>53</sup> K.P.S. Gill, “Endgame in Punjab,” *Faultlines: Writings on Conflict and Resolution*. Vol. 1 No 1. (New Delhi: Institute for Conflict Management, May 1999), 69.

are in better position to play an “authoritative control” strategy. In most instances, America should play its stronger hand and pursue a Machiavellian approach by implementing the “authoritative control” approach.

First, history suggests that a major variable in gaining authority may be remaining detached, in several specific ways, from the population you are intending to target. This is a polar opposite view to that of the “hearts and minds” approach that preaches that soldiers must become one with the population in order to be effective. Throughout history, whenever a colonial power wished to gain control over a population and gain their active support, the colonial power presented itself as superior to the population, and took great care in not “playing their games.” Great Britain, for example, took great pains to avoid engaging in any activities in which the local population could possibly diminish their authority by doing either better or a comparable job as the Brits. Turning to the man most view as the poster-child of unconventional warfare, T.E. Lawrence acted in precisely this manner and even documented this line of thought in his writings. Simply looking at his word choice reveals a great deal about Lawrence, and suggests he was more influential by remaining disassociated with the Arabs than he was by blending in with them. In his writing *Twenty-seven Articles*, Lawrence talks of “handling” the Arabs, not meshing with them.<sup>54</sup> He suggests that close relations with anyone but the top leaders will undermine efforts and recommends maintaining an aura of superiority over everyone but the top Sharifs. The myth that Lawrence was able to blend in with the Arabs and, in his efforts become one, is a Hollywood fabrication and distortion of the truth. Although not desirable on the silver screen, the ability to remain detached, present oneself as an authority figure, and remain true to one’s own nationality has had much more success than the often portrayed dramas of blending into other cultures.

Secondly, it is important to consolidate control and authority in as small a group of people as possible and, ideally, in only one central figure. Historical examples and theory support the establishment of one leader as both the military

---

<sup>54</sup> T.E. Lawrence. “Twenty Seven Articles,” *The Arab Bulletin*, 20 August 1917. <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1917/27arts.html>. Accessed 2 October 2005.

and political head of the unconventional campaign until order has been established and a functioning democracy is in place. Machiavelli supports this idea when he argues:

A prudent Organizer of a Republic, therefore, who has in mind to want to promote, not himself, but the common good, and not his own succession but his [common] country, ought to endeavor to have the authority alone: and a wise planner will never reprimand anyone for any extraordinary activity that he should employ either in the establishment of a Kingdom or in constituting a Republic.<sup>55</sup>

Little has changed since the 15<sup>th</sup> century in this respect. It was the utmost desires of several groups in Malaya to have one 'Supremo' or 'strong man' appointed to consolidate power and establish control over the country. In one instance, a nervous resident of Malaya wrote to the Secretary of Colonies:

To us who are getting very disheartened, the appointment of one strong man who would give orders and see them carried out would be like a breath of fresh air as we battle vaporous mists.<sup>56</sup>

It was added that the man charged with this duty should have an air of authority about him, and should be "someone like Alexander [the Great]."<sup>57</sup> The British adopted this line of thought and combined the offices of High Commissioner and Director of Operations under General Templar, a move that gave Templar "the most comprehensive powers ever given a British colonial official."<sup>58</sup> This consolidation of power produced immediate and extraordinary success in combating the unconventional threat in Malaya. Since one man was charged with almost unchallenged power, he was able to blend a grand strategy into tactical executions. Since power rests with one leader, this strategic apex is capable of altering strategies depending on feedback of commanders and the

---

<sup>55</sup> Niccolo Machiavelli, *Discourses: Upon the First Ten (Books) of Titus Livy*. <http://www.constitution.org/mac/disclivy1.htm#1:09>. Accessed 1 October 2005.

<sup>56</sup> Letter from unknown European woman in Malaya to Viscountess Davidson enclosed with Davidson to Secretary of State for the Colonies Oliver Lyttelton. 1 November 1951.

<sup>57</sup> Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 139.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. p. 140.

constantly changing environment. Again, we can turn to the Malayan campaign to see the benefits to adopting this approach:

As the Malayan Government's hearts and minds approach slowly took shape, it became clear that the strategy entailed the use of both the stick and the carrot. Initially, at least, the stick appeared to be given more public prominence; however, the balance shifted as the strategy evolved<sup>59</sup>

Only in an organization that limits bureaucracy by consolidating power in its top leader can rapid shifts like this be made.<sup>60</sup> This approach would make it much easier for political rhetoric to match up with military and law enforcement missions as both politics and operations are consolidated in one office. Of course, a downside of this organization could be that the leadership is given an incorrect picture of the environment in which to base his decisions on. The pinnacle of leadership should, therefore, ensure he remains well connected to the external political environment. If we look to Iraq as an example of decentralized political and operational control, we can see that the political rhetoric stating that Americans will not be 'occupiers' of Iraq did fundamental damage to the necessary tasks the military must accomplish to create a democracy. Military commanders should have immediately corrected this view, as it was absolutely paramount to establish authority in Iraq, a mission that required 'occupation' of several areas. Unfortunately, as we witness today, our inhibitions towards being occupiers could serve as a fatal flaw in our strategy.

Another important aspect towards consolidating power in one entity is the already mentioned aspect that an organization of this nature is capable of altering course fairly quickly depending on the environment. Again, turning to the current situation in Iraq, we see that the hearts and minds approach is producing desired effects in certain areas. Unfortunately, in the areas where it is failing, the US does not possess the flexibility or fundamental understanding to implement a more authoritative strategy. Since the US pursues a policy of addressing

---

<sup>59</sup> Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 165..

<sup>60</sup> Henry Mintzberg, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit," *Harvard Business Review*, (January 1981).



grievances in order to gain popular support (the hearts and minds approach), how can it expect to win in situations where US presence is the main grievance?<sup>61</sup> I argue that there are only two options: (1) address the grievance and pull forces out of the region or (2) develop and implement a new strategy. The US is sitting far too close to the attritional side of the Luttwak continuum, when it is absolutely critical to be butting up against the relational maneuver side. Once capable of developing a relational maneuver approach, it becomes much easier to deal with pockets of resistance and approach different scenarios with different operational methods.

#### **D. THE 'CULTURE' COP-OUT**

Should the United States ever implement the “authoritative control” approach, then it must reconsider the methods in which it attempts to understand various cultures throughout the world and the rationale behind the attempt to become ‘culturally-intelligent.’ History suggests that ‘cultural knowledge’ is most important in determining how to influence power structures among a population, not in the attempt to work within it. With that knowledge, power structures can either be manipulated or destroyed in order to meet the strategic goals of the occupying force. My investigation of the historical evidence, indicates that the notion of ‘culture-centric’ warfare should either come under serious scrutiny or be scrapped all together.

A major proponent of developing ‘culture-centric warfare,’ Major General (ret.) Robert Scales, has gone before the House Armed Services Committee to argue the military must begin to implement programs that require every soldier to undergo culture and language instruction. In several of his writings, he expands on this idea and suggests “the Department of Defense should be required to build databases that contain the religious and cultural norms for world populations...so that soldiers can download the information quickly and use it

---

<sup>61</sup> This line of thought obtained through a personal interview with Dr. Anna Simons, professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum on 10 October 2005.

profitably in the field.”<sup>62</sup> Gen. Scales also argues that “every young soldier should receive cultural and language instruction” in order to enhance his abilities to be a “diplomat in uniform.”<sup>63</sup> Dr. Montgomery McFate, an avid supporter of Gen. Scale’s viewpoint, argues that “cultural knowledge and warfare are inextricably bound.”<sup>64</sup> McFate contends that an increase in anthropological-like knowledge of various cultures is the key to future success in unconventional conflicts.<sup>65</sup> To support her claims, she uses the campaigns of T.E. Lawrence, the British experience in Malaya, and, strangely enough, the American Indian Wars, as successful models. Finally, McFate insinuates that the Department of Defense should hire a large number of anthropologists to act as advisors and culture-repositories for their respective area of study (a suggestion that, in my opinion, would better serve the State Department). Although the study of culture is important in helping one avoid embarrassing situations, how the United States ever interpreted ‘culture-centric warfare’ as a primary variable in waging a successful unconventional conflict must be called into question.

Calling upon some of the examples McFate uses as support for her increased cultural knowledge programs, it becomes apparent that knowledge of culture may not be as important as McFate asserts. Her statement “anthropological knowledge contributed to the expansion and consolidation of British power during the era of empire” is only true if one views the ‘anthropological knowledge’ she talks of as an understanding of how to manipulate social and power structures.<sup>66</sup> Again, the historical interpretation of British imperialism as something that required cultural finesse must be called into question when the often-brutal historical examples are fully examined. The

---

<sup>62</sup> Robert Scales, “The Second Learning Revolution,” in Anthony D. McIvor’s (Ed.) *Rethinking the Principles of War*. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2005), 51-52.

<sup>63</sup> Robert Scales, “The Second Learning Revolution,” in Anthony D. McIvor’s (Ed.) *Rethinking the Principles of War*. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2005), p. 47.

<sup>64</sup> Montgomery McFate, “The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture” *Joint Forces Quarterly*. Issue 38. 2005. [http://ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq\\_pages/i38.htm](http://ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq_pages/i38.htm). Accessed 2 October 2005.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

opening portion of this chapter has (hopefully) refuted the notion that the British used any type of 'cultural sensitivity' in their unconventional campaigns. McFate's mere mention of the American Indian War as a model of 'cultural knowledge' is another major indicator that our current interpretation of 'culture centric warfare' is based on incomplete data. With any degree of research, a student of unconventional warfare discovers that, quite contrary to McFate's statements, American settlers understood very little about American Indians and made much more progress in their campaigns by killing off their main source of sustenance (buffalos) than they ever did by 'culturally sensitive' initiatives.<sup>67</sup>

McFate's use of T.E. Lawrence as a man who could "immerse himself deeply in local culture" can be refuted by writings produced by Lawrence himself. While it is hard to argue that Lawrence was unsuccessful in dealing with the Arabs during World War I, to claim that he was immersed and embraced by the Arabic culture is highly questionable. Reading Lawrence's *Twenty Seven Articles*, it becomes apparent that although Lawrence was schooled in the Middle East, spoke several dialects of Arabic, and spent considerable time in the region, he was unable to fully penetrate Arab culture and made more ground by disassociating himself with subordinates, portraying himself as British, and remaining "present and not noticed."<sup>68</sup> Lawrence himself argues against the attempt to blend with the population, stating that the attempt to become fully immersed is a costly exercise in futility and that greater gains can be made by letting it "be clearly known that you are a British officer and a Christian" at a much lower cost.<sup>69</sup> In fact, Lawrence's writings reflect a greater understanding of how to control forces through indirect measures and manipulate power structures than they do of deep cultural understanding. One should also remain cognizant of the fact that Lawrence had a gift at inflating both his own importance and the overall

---

<sup>67</sup> An excellent argument on America's lack of cultural knowledge about American Indians can be found in the following piece: Simons, A. (2005). Seeing the Enemy (or Not). In Anthony D. McIvor's (Ed.) *Rethinking the Principles of War*. U.S. Naval Institute: Annapolis, MD. Pages 326-329.

<sup>68</sup> T.E. Lawrence. "Twenty Seven Articles," *The Arab Bulletin*, 20 August 1917. <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/www/1917/27arts.html>. Accessed 2 October 2005.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

importance of his campaign in every media outlet he could tap into. A separate thesis could be written on whether Lawrence's influence among the Arabs or his influence among high-level British officials was more of a factor in his legendary status.

Lastly, the urgent need for all soldiers to speak native languages must also be reconsidered given that some of the most successful guerrilla campaigns were directed by soldiers who spoke little to none of the native language of the people they were advising. During 1943 to July 1945, Colonel W.R. Peers commanded Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services. During this time, he oversaw what could arguably be called "America's most successful guerrilla force" by directing Chinese resistance to a Japanese occupation in northern Burma.<sup>70</sup> The remarkable aspect of this overwhelming success is that neither Colonel Peers nor any of his top officers spoke any Chinese. American guerrilla advisors in Yugoslavia and Korea also proved highly successful with no linguistic capability.<sup>71</sup> While communication was difficult at times, it did not significantly hinder the ability to gain strategic success nor did linguistic barriers serve as a major obstacle to waging successful operations. While linguistic capability is certainly helpful in certain situations, the United States should remain cognizant of these campaigns before it goes dumping millions of dollars into language training for masses of armed forces members (who may or may not even have the capacity to learn it).

In a recently published piece found in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, Dr. Anna Simons of the Naval Postgraduate School provides a compelling argument that attempting to gain cultural knowledge in pursuit of a "hearts and minds" approach may be "more of a problem than a solution."<sup>72</sup> In the discussion, Dr.

---

<sup>70</sup> A detailed account of Burmese guerrilla operations can be found in the following book. W.R. Peers and Dean Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*. (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1963).

<sup>71</sup> For an account of the American guerrilla campaigns in Yugoslavia and Korea see the following books. Lindsay, F. and J.K. Gailbraith. (1995). *Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia*. Stanford University Press: CA. Malcolm, B.S. and R. Martz. (1995). *White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea*. Brassey's: WA.

<sup>72</sup> Anna Simons, "Seeing the Enemy (or Not)," In Anthony D. McIvor's (Ed.) *Rethinking the Principles of War*. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2005), 338.

Simons contends that, by adopting a strategy closer to the “authoritative control” approach, “destroying non-Western social structures, and, thus, non-Westerness, wouldn’t be as difficult as many might assume.”<sup>73</sup> She goes on to argue that “forcing people to *have* to change” is far easier than trying to “encourage people to *want* to change in the wake of surgical attacks.”<sup>74</sup> As stated in previous chapters, most successful unconventional campaigns were won by establishing authority by force, not through the attempt to gain friends among the population.

Only after control had been established did attempts to pacify and win the hearts of the locals begin. The French, another country we routinely view as culturally educated, won their conflicts in precisely this manner. In William Hoisington’s book *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, the following statement reveals how unimportant ‘culture-centric warfare’ really was.

Pacification came everywhere through armed and bitter contests with resistant townsmen and tribesmen. Pacification was war, not peace. Politics and economics did little to pacify the people of Morocco’s cities or tribes of the Middle Atlas until they were subdued by the threat or use of force.<sup>75</sup>

It was only after the population submitted to the authority of the colonial power did culture even begin to become an important variable in pacification. It should also be noted that when it was important to use culturally related variables during pacification, it was easier to use indirect control of previously recognized political leaders than it was to ‘fit in’ and control the population directly.

In conclusion, to use ‘a lack of cultural understanding’ as an excuse for failing in a campaign is highly disputed by historical examples. Most ancient empires knew little, nor cared to learn more, about the culture of the enemy they were attempting to subjugate. They instead immediately established authority and *changed* the environment in which the population lived. The British and French, in many instances, found it far easier to change the environment than to

---

<sup>73</sup> Anna Simons, “Seeing the Enemy (or Not),” In Anthony D. McIvor’s (Ed.) *Rethinking the Principles of War*. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2005), p. 339.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> William Hoisington, Jr, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*. (New York, NY: St. Martins Press, 1995), 205.

work within the existing one. Instead of pandering their operations to specific cultural distinctions, they developed campaigns targeting variables deemed important to every human (such as security, shelter, food, water, and medical care). This is not to say that cultural awareness is not important (as it helps to prevent one from sparking major incidents), it is just not as important as the American military is currently attempting to make it. Where 'culture centric warfare' has few examples (if any) of success, history is replete with examples of nations successfully using the "authoritative control" approach to gain the support of the population. As Samuel P. Huntington stated in *The Clash of Civilizations*;

The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.<sup>76</sup>

Perhaps the United States would be wise to remember that concept and begin to expand its current unconventional warfare doctrine to include approaches that use the views of non-Westerners to its advantage. As most view the American military as a superior force, the United States is holding a full house if it decides to play its cards right. Unfortunately, America continues to chase the flush by implementing the "hearts and minds" approach to unconventional warfare.

---

<sup>76</sup> Samuel P Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, v72 n3. (Summer 1993), 26.

#### **IV. COMPARING HEARTS AND MINDS AND AUTHORITATIVE CONTROL**

As stated earlier, this paper does not wholeheartedly support either the “hearts and minds” or the “authoritative control” approach, it only argues that the United States must be able to acknowledge that there is more than one way to conduct unconventional warfare. In fact, it would be nearly impossible to execute either the “hearts and minds” approach or the “authoritative control” approach in their purest forms due to environmental, media, and political restraints. The degree to which one uses either approach must be based on environmental considerations, calling for the United States to adopt a relational-maneuver approach and develop leaders flexible enough to adjust to the constantly changing environmental externalities. It is the environment, not established doctrine, that should dictate the particular unconventional strategy in a given conflict. To best educate leaders on the differences of these strategies, I first present a ‘pocket chart’ to better understand the major points of the two approaches, followed by a more detailed comparison of the two. One must also keep in mind that what is presented are the two approaches in their purest forms, and that there are an infinite number of possible variations and combinations that can be formulated from the two.

The two will be compared on seven dimensions: strategy; types of interaction with the targeted population; cognitive foundations; effectiveness; mission types; possible shortfalls; and supporting moral theories. While there are probably other relevant dimensions, these seven seem to be especially important in understanding the basic differences between the two approaches. The following chart and explanation of variables hopefully serves as a solid foundation in understanding these differences.

## A. LAYING THE FOUNDATION

	Hearts and Minds	Authoritative Control
<b>Strategy</b>	Achieves victory by addressing the grievances of the people	Achieves victory by establishing a dominant authority
<b>Type of Interaction w/ People</b>	People are treated as equals of police/soldiers	Soldiers/police maintain aura of superiority over population
<b>Cognitive Foundation</b>	Builds on notion that humans feel the need to reciprocate kindness or good deeds	Builds on cognitive foundation that humans comply with authority figures in unfamiliar environments (Milgram experiments)
<b>Effectiveness</b>	Effective only in environments that already welcome American presence: fails in psychologically 'non-permissive' environments	Effective in environments in which population possesses a negative predisposition to Western influences; fails in 'permissive' environments if prolonged
<b>Mission Types</b>	Building roads, schools, wells, etc., humanitarian aid, economic aid	Strict internal policing, resettlement programs, control of food distribution, curfew enforcement
<b>Possible Shortfalls</b>	If done in wrong environments, wastes efforts and resources by implementing a strategy that cannot work; prolongs conflict and whittles away at domestic support if results are not visibly evident	If not strictly overseen, may lead to human rights violations that find their way into the media; cannot implement harsh authority for too long, as it could worsen situation
<b>Supporting Moral Theories</b>	Deontological viewpoint; treat people as an ends to themselves, never as a means to an end	Utilitarian viewpoint; do what is necessary for the greater good of the people

Table 1. Pocket Chart Comparison of Hearts and Minds to Authoritative Control

The first variable that must be compared is the overall strategy that drives the two approaches. On the left side of the spectrum, we have the “hearts and minds” approach that aims to gain the support of the population by addressing the grievances of the people. The rationale is that if we can show the population that a better future is capable with their support and gain that support by performing civil action and benevolent deeds, then they will naturally choose that course of action over whatever other option is presented. This approach attempts to give the population a vision of a better future and change their preference from supporting the enemy to supporting the efforts of the United States. The strategy of the second “authoritative control” is to gain the support of



the population by establishing an authority figure and controlling the environment in which the people live. This approach does not need to consider the pure preferences of the people, as the environment is so drastically altered that they are not given any alternatives but to give their support.

The next dimension to be compared is the types of interactions that U.S. forces must have with the population in order to succeed. According to the “hearts and minds” approach, it is necessary for soldiers to treat the population as equals and attempt to fit into their culture as best as possible. This notion is best captured by the mantra “with, by, and through the population” that is often espoused by Army Special Forces troops. This approach rests on the notion that if the people view Americans as their equals, they are more likely to respond to and assist American forces. The “authoritative control” approach calls for American forces to maintain an aura of superiority over the population to solidify their position as a local authority. This means that soldiers should avoid, at all costs, engaging in activities in which they know that they will be bested. While it is crucial that Americans treat the population humanely with this approach, it is of utmost importance that the population understand that American forces are the authority in the area and not necessarily their friends.

The third, and possibly most important, dimension to be compared is the cognitive foundation on which of these two strategies are built. To do so, I turn to the writings and ideas of Dr. Robert Cialdini and his book *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*. In this book, Dr. Cialdini provides his audience with six different variables that play a part in the psychology of compliance. The variable upon which the “hearts and minds” approach is built is that of reciprocation. When defining reciprocation, Cialdini explains that humans attempt “to repay, in kind, what another person has provided us.”<sup>77</sup> What makes this variable so appealing to use as the basis of an approach that can be implemented globally is that “it is so widespread that after intensive study, sociologists such as Alvin Gouldner can report that there is no human society

---

<sup>77</sup> Robert B Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*. (New York: Quill, 1993), 17.

that does not subscribe to the rule.”<sup>78</sup> Basically, humans feel obligated to repay or give support to another human that has provided them a favor, gift, or invitation. It is upon the notion that humans attempt to avoid feeling obligated to another that the “hearts and minds” approach is built. Where “hearts and minds” uses reciprocation as a foundation, the “authoritative control” strategy uses the notion of authority. Cialdini states that “we are trained from birth that obedience to proper authority is right and disobedience is wrong.”<sup>79</sup> Humans have a predisposition to believe that adherence to authority will increase the “development of sophisticated structures for resource production, trade, defense, expansion, and social control that would otherwise be impossible.”<sup>80</sup> Humans also strive, at almost all costs, to avoid the alternative to authority, that of anarchy as it “is hardly known for its beneficial effects on cultural groups.”<sup>81</sup> The power of using authority as a driving variable in human compliance is that it is not necessary for the human to actually want to give the support requested. Stanley Milgram’s experiments with authority conclude that, in order not to defy the wishes of an authority figure, humans will perform tasks to which they are initially opposed.<sup>82</sup> Both the fear of anarchy and punishment from a superior make the cognitive factor of authority a powerful one indeed. While both authority and reciprocation can be applied universally, there are some environments in which one is superior to another. Because of this, the compliance variables of reciprocation and authority will play a huge role in determining the effectiveness of each strategy in different environments.

A strategy is not worth implementing if it is known that it will ultimately lead to defeat. Keeping this in mind, one must realize both the “hearts and minds” and “authoritative control” will lead to defeat if implemented in the improper environment. When implementing the “hearts and minds” strategy, it must be

---

<sup>78</sup> Robert B Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*. (New York: Quill, 1993, 18.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. p.220.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. p. 216

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. p. 213.

realized that a humans desire to reciprocate goes only so far. To illustrate this concept, consider the following example:

You and your family walk into a local shopping mall where you are immediately met by a 6-year old, blond haired, blue eyed boy wearing a blue outfit with a yellow scarf. He greets you with a toothy hello and gives you and every member of your family a pencil and a sticker and explains that the gifts are free of charge. He goes on to explain that he is here today to help raise money for hurricane relief efforts on behalf of the Boy Scouts of America. If you are like most Americans, you will probably give the young boy some money, most likely equaling or exceeding the value of the gifts he gave you “free of charge.” You are driven to do so because of the need to reciprocate a good deed and because you have a generally positive predisposition towards the organization he represents and a feeling the money will go to good use. Now, rewind the scenario and play it again under different circumstances. Again, you and your family walk into the same mall and are greeted by the same 6-year old boy wearing a uniform. He again greets you warmly and passes out pencils and stickers to each member of your family. When asked to explain his gifts, he responds that he is there to raise money for hurricane relief efforts on behalf of the local Nazi-youth. Now, like most Americans, a red flag immediately goes up in your head and you probably ask the boy to confirm the organization he represents, just to make sure you heard him correctly. Although you feel the need to reciprocate his generosity, a different urge overwhelms you and you either return his gifts or walk away in disgust. Why do the reactions differ from the first example to the second? Largely because of the predispositions we hold towards the organization each little boy represented.

I argue that a good-intentioned America often goes into an environment wishing to play the reciprocation card to gain support, but is often viewed in the same light as we in the US view Nazi youth. Although the US is there to give the population a gift and a promise of better days ahead, the US represents something very wicked to several societies around the world, and therefore, not to be trusted or supported. In this type of environment, the “hearts and minds” approach is unlikely to produce the desired results. Only in a psychologically permissive environment, one in which a generally good predisposition towards American involvement is held, can a dominant “hearts and minds” approach be viable. Conversely, if the US pursues a pure “authoritative control” strategy in an

environment that actually wants to give us support, it could fail miserably and produce a revolutionary backlash. As the environment shifts from psychologically permissive to non-permissive, so should the American UW strategy shift from the strategy of “hearts and minds” towards “authoritative control” to ensure an increased probability of success. This environment can change from, country to country, town to town, or even street to street depending on the dynamics of the population. It is for this reason America must understand the environment into which it enters and maximizes its chances of victory by adopting an approach that is both flexible, and easily adaptable.

Naturally, as a strategy differs, so too will the missions required to properly implement them. In a purely “hearts and minds” strategy, typical missions will revolve around providing humanitarian aid and improving the living conditions of the population. These include, but are not limited to, building roads, churches, sanitary systems, religious structures, schools, or providing medical, dental, or psychological care. On the other side of the spectrum, the “authoritative control” strategy revolves around missions designed to maintain control and give an appearance of an altered environment. These missions include strict internal policing, resettlement programs, food distribution measures, population movement controls, and curfew enforcement. American forces should be trained and educated enough to implement each mission properly, according to the dynamics of the particular environment.

While both strategies have tremendous strengths, they also possess some serious shortfalls that must be understood and avoided. For the “hearts and minds” strategy, it is far too easy to become too liberal and waste resources and manpower in an effort that is doomed to failure. If this strategy is adopted, constant feedback must be provided to both the domestic American audience and military decision makers to prevent the deterioration of political and domestic support. If “hearts and minds” is applied in the improper environment, it will prolong the conflict and may cause more casualties than the implementation of a harsher strategy would. The “authoritative control” approach revolves around maintaining an aura of superiority and, due to this, is prone to producing human

rights violations. If not properly and strictly overseen, power often goes to the heads of young troops and could produce incidents of torture and abuse. If these incidents are captured by media outlets, which they are sure to do, they can have disastrous effects upon the credibility of the US and forever doom the outcome of the conflict.

Finally, the variable of morality must also be addressed. It is far too easy for the casual critic to look at the “authoritative control” strategy and dismiss it as immoral. In fact, there is a strong moral theory that supports the “authoritative control” strategy as long as it produces harmony as an endstate. The “hearts and minds” approach is widely accepted by Americans as moral, as we in the US tend to place a primacy on individuality and personal freedoms. The “hearts and minds” approach is supported by a popular moral theory promoted by eighteenth century philosopher Immanuel Kant. Dubbed deontological ethics, Kant preached that humans should always be treated as an end to themselves, and never as a means to an ends. This means that humans should always strive to do what is right for a particular individual in a particular situation and stresses the primacy of individual human rights.<sup>83</sup> Deontology preaches that an action should be judged as moral or immoral regardless of the outcome it may produce in the future. This line of thought is the polar opposite of the theory supporting the “authoritative control” strategy. The “authoritative control” strategy is supported by the ideas of John Stuart Mills and the moral theory of utilitarianism. According to utilitarianism, the notion of moral correctness is based on the outcomes of choosing one policy over another.<sup>84</sup> According to this theory, morality is only judged by the consequences of an action, not by the actual action taken. Basically, if one must do something immoral to produce a moral endstate, then utilitarianism states that the immoral action is rectified by the moral outcome.

---

<sup>83</sup> The section on the deontological viewpoint was influenced by the following: George Lober, *Classroom instruction: Critical Thinking and Ethical Decisionmaking*. (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005). Johnson, R.N. *Deontological Ethics*. <http://showme.missouri.edu/~philrnj/deon.html>. Accessed 20 October 2005.

<sup>84</sup> The section covering utilitarianism was influenced by the following: Online Guide to Ethics and Moral Philosophy. *Utilitarian Theories*. <http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/80130/part2/sect9.html>. Accessed 18 October 2005.

Popular in countries that hold the overall welfare of the society over the promotion of individual freedoms, utilitarianism is both well established and widely used as a moral foundation. Again, the intent of this paper is neither to side with either theory, nor promote one over the other, but simply to suggest that both strategies have strong moral theories that both support and refute their implementation.

## **B. UNDERSTANDING THE UNCONVENTIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

As with everything in life, it is necessary to understand the environment one is operating in before blindly pursuing a strategy for obtaining a given goal. It would be foolish for a football coach to continue running the football if the opposition's defensive unit continually stuffed their running back near the line of scrimmage, stopping any chance of a running game. Only an unsuccessful boxer would continue to throw jabs against an opponent with longer reach and quicker hands. Success, therefore, lies in the ability to quickly read the opponent and operating environment and to implement the strategy that gives the highest probability of success.

Unfortunately for the United States, the ability to read the unconventional operating environment is, at the present time, an underdeveloped skill. This stems from the predominantly conventional education of both military strategists and political leadership. A popular saying among military members is that one must "train for the known, and educate for the unknown." It is the educated commander who can foresee possible situations and draw upon historical examples to give his forces the best chance for victory. American military leaders such as Washington, Grant, Lee, Patton, Eisenhower, Schwarzkopf and Powell serve as great examples of well-educated conventional military officers capable of exploiting an opposition's weaknesses on any given battlefield. When one tries to conjure names of successful unconventional commanders, the task becomes much more difficult and the list of names becomes much smaller. I argue that this is, in large part, due to the limited education and experience in the art of unconventional warfare. Without an education on the matter,

unconventional commanders remained constrained by doctrine and blind to opportunities each environment presents.

As conventional battles require varying degrees of maneuver warfare and straight attrition to defeat a fielded force, unconventional conflicts require a blend of outright authority with acts of goodwill in order to gain popular support. It is only the commander who is appropriately educated that can acutely implement the proper actions to the given environment. This commander cannot remain tied to only one approach, as the unconventional domain demands constant innovation and adaptation to be successful. A commander must also have a force of personality that can range from a dictator to a beacon of peace as the environment deems necessary. Leaders must be able to simultaneously command respect while remaining on friendly terms to the population and coalition partners.

It may also be important to consider the capacity for a commander to implement the necessary strategy in the proper sequence. Although little work has been done on the matter, the proper timing of each method may be a dominant variable in determining success. I would argue, like the kindergarten teacher that is too lenient on her first day of instruction, that it becomes impossible to become 'harder' in ones approach if one initially presents oneself as soft. As the saying goes, "start off hard and work back from there." Again, it would be interesting to see the outcome had American troops been used as a police and occupying force immediately to establish order in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad, instead of presenting ourselves as 'liberators' and allowing the country to fall into anarchy. Perhaps a great deal of the current problems would have been avoided by this simple line of thought.

In conclusion, it is important for students of unconventional warfare to realize that a broad spectrum exists in which to maneuver towards success. This chapter argues that American unconventional policy has been constrained by an improper interpretation of history and that it is possible to be more successful by implementing a authoritative approach in certain environments. To do so, a

grand strategy must be developed that promotes a relational-maneuver approach to irregular warfare that allows the American response to vary according to the environment it faces. In an unconventional conflict, history shows it is more important to have a military force that is opportunistic than one that is capable of efficiently executing a rigid strategy. Again, the relational maneuver approach demonstrates superiority over the attritional approach in this aspect. It is also necessary to develop a force capable of reading different environments and quickly adapting their strategy to fit best within it.



## **V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. SUMMARY**

For the foreseeable future, it has become apparent that the United States will be engaged in conflicts far different than the ones it is used to. The predominant change in these conflicts is where military efforts must be focused in order to achieve success. In the recent past, the American military proved highly successful in conflicts where the opposition's center of gravity rested with its military force. In these battles, American forces proved almost invincible, easily targeting and destroying any fielded force put before it. In campaigns where the opponent's center of gravity rested closer to the population, the American military has floundered and was often forced to withdraw under waning political and public support. Unfortunately for the United States, the trend of warfare is beginning to shift to exactly this style of war.

Due to this change, it has become necessary for the American military to begin shifting resources away from defeating a fielded military force and begin to research and invest in methods used to capture the support of the population. Current American unconventional doctrine, a faulty interpretation of British "hearts and minds" campaigns, is both historically unsuccessful and too inflexible to continue universally implementing in the future. The United States must be willing to expand the boundaries of its unconventional strategy to include methods used in an approach that history suggests is far more powerful than the current American approach. This method, dubbed the "authoritative control" approach in this discussion, requires a serious change in both political and military thought to be implemented successfully. It also requires a deep understanding of history and a willingness to accept the often ugly ground truths, devoid of personal beliefs or interpretation, associated with successful unconventional strategies.

Should the United States decide to undertake this difficult task, a startling revelation could occur that forever alters future unconventional strategy. History

reveals the need for an approach that is responsive to each unconventional environment and that the victors in these environments are the ones best suited to adapt to and exploit the moves of their opponents. This approach calls for the ability to change from a very strict and controlling presence (often to the initial displeasure of the population) to one that begins to build rapport with the populace in order to gain long-term trust and support. The proper execution of these different approaches requires leadership that are in tune with the environment, that understand and are educated for the complexities of irregular warfare, and that are patient enough to develop and wait for the desired outcomes.

While these conclusions sound relatively obvious and painfully straight forward, the repercussions of pursuing this line of thought are extremely broad and could greatly affect the long-established hierarchy within the Department of Defense. To properly adapt to the changing nature of warfare, it is necessary to break several old establishments, create a few new ones, and conduct honest strategic analysis on where resources should be placed in the future. While the recommendations below are necessary starting points, the scope of this thesis limits the detail on which each recommendation can be analyzed. It, therefore, becomes necessary for further research to be done on each of these recommendations to determine a more exacting fit within the American governmental and military structure.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. Creation of an Organization Designed Specifically for Unconventional Warfare**

To properly execute an unconventional strategy, an organization must exist that has the ability to create the proper strategy, command the forces necessary to do so, and remain focused on their primary mission sets. This organization must also have enough status to stand on equal footing with their conventional counterparts when the conflict deems necessary. To realize this concept, it becomes necessary to move the career fields dedicated to

unconventional warfare out from under a conventional umbrella. An organization must be created that significantly raises the importance of unconventional warfare, and puts the leaders of the organization in a position to advocate their needs and strategies at the highest levels. While current doctrine gives this responsibility to United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), even a cursory review of organizational structure immediately reveals its operational impotence as related to developing and implementing unconventional strategy. To name just a few variables that limit SOCOM's effectiveness in developing unconventional strategy:<sup>85</sup>

- Although tasked with global responsibility, SOCOM does not dictate strategy in any given theater of command. In fact, SOCOM is subordinate to theater commanders and is tasked to 'synchronize' their efforts with the larger campaign plan. The Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) also belong to the (predominantly conventionally grown) theater commanders and have limited strategic input in the creation of theater plans.
- The majority of senior SOCOM leadership was cultivated in units that stressed the importance of quick, offensive, direct action special operations missions. The type of leadership mentality cultivated in this environment is often far different from the one needed to successfully implement unconventional strategy.
- Based in Tampa, SOCOM's presence in the Pentagon is severely limited, restricting the organization from participation in informal decision making channels (usually the most productive channels for

---

<sup>85</sup> The variables that follow have been developed through personal experiences, discussions with several SOF officers currently working in SOCOM leadership positions, former Special Forces generals, and classroom discussions and lectures focusing on the possible weaknesses of SOCOM. For obvious reasons, each member requested to speak on the condition of anonymity. While each variable can be dismissed as my personal opinion several sources support my views. Among those include: RAND Study. *Translating Lessons Into Future DoD Policies*. (Memo to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dated 7 February 2005). Bradley Graham, "Shortfalls of Special Operations Command are Cited," *Washington Post*. (17 November 2005).

making decisions). Also, the SOCOM officials present in the Pentagon are simply representatives of SOCOM, not their top decision makers.

- Even the Army Special forces are becoming the units of choice in conducting raids, direct action missions, and reconnaissance missions. While this is well within their capability, SOF units are being used for very conventional, surgical strikes while the long-difficult tasks of unconventional warfare are given lesser priority. The fact that SOF units are usually highly rewarded and recognized for quantifiable mission sets like these only reinforces the notion that conventional missions are, far and away, the most desirable.
- SOCOM has a growing tendency to rely upon technology and new equipment to solve problems. Several billions of dollars have gone to SOCOM to assist in the acquisition and development of these new systems. Unfortunately, history points towards the ability to innovate with bare bone resources and minimal technology as the key to unconventional success. An increase in funding could actually prove to be detrimental to the basic innovation necessary to confront unconventional enemies with minimal resources themselves.

While this assessment of current military structure and SOCOM may seem harsh, the pinnacle of current military leadership offers supporting statements. In an August 2003 interview, American Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged the need for organizational changes when he stated:

The militaries of the world are organized to fight armies, navies and air forces, and they get good at that. They organize, they train, they equip, they practice and have exercises; and all of a sudden we are in a world where the problem is not so much with armies, navies or air forces but with terrorist networks, terrorist organizations, asymmetric threats, cyber attacks, problems with attacks on space capabilities. What that does is it suddenly changes circumstances for the military, and what they have to do is to pause and recognize

that they have to adjust how they organize, how they train, how they equip, how they maneuver, how they operate, and it calls for a more agile military.<sup>86</sup>

In a memo addressed to General Dick Meyers, Paul Wolfowitz, General Pete Pace and Doug Feith, Rumsfeld again discusses the need for reorganization within the Department of Defense when he writes:

DoD has been organized, trained and equipped to fight big armies, navies and air forces. It is not possible to change DoD fast enough to successfully fight the global war on terror; an alternative might be to try to fashion a new institution, either within DoD or elsewhere — one that seamlessly focuses the capabilities of several departments and agencies on this key problem.<sup>87</sup>

Due to the constraints of time and focus, this thesis cannot fully provide the details necessary to create a new organization, only to suggest that a highly dedicated cadre of counterinsurgency leaders be cultivated and empowered to lead future unconventional engagements. This organization must be independent of a conventional chain of command to prevent the strategic intent from being altered before being presented as an option. Ideally, the strategy promoted by the unconventional strategists should compete with the conventional strategy and should be decided upon by an informed, educated leadership corps. Once the strategic decision has been made, one organization would be deemed the supported organization, while the other supports the strategic plan in any way possible. Admittedly, much additional research must be done on organizational design, environmental considerations, and interagency operability before this organization can be brought to life.

## **2. Properly Educate Unconventional Strategists**

Where it is relatively easy to create and reorganize institutions, the changes made will have little impact if the leadership of these organizations are not educated in the style of war they intend to engage in. This education of

---

<sup>86</sup> News Transcript. (August 19, 2003). *Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with El Tiempo, Bogota, Columbia*. Retrieved 5 October, 2005 from: <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030819-secdef0603.html>

<sup>87</sup> *Rumsfeld's War on Terror Memo*. (16 October 2003). Retrieved 3 October, 2005 from: <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm>

military officers currently proves to be a shortfall as the vast majority of military education was written and developed for conventional warfare. Even when unconventional warfare is taught, little detail is actually given towards the differing variables that surround each conflict. Military officers usually walk away with simple lessons learned instead of a deep understanding of how variables interact with one another to determine an overall victor. For those officers tagged as future unconventional commanders, a separate education system should be developed that fully delves into the complexities of unconventional warfare. One such system of instruction, the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum, Irregular Warfare track at the Naval Postgraduate School currently exists to do exactly what is being recommended. Unfortunately, only approximately 130 students graduate from this program a year, with many of the graduates being international students, information operation officers, and Air Force intelligence officers who may have a minimal impact upon US unconventional strategy as their career progresses. It would be safe to say that only 50-70 graduates a year are of an American Special Forces or special operations background and could have an impact at the strategic level where UW doctrine can be developed. To expand the importance of unconventional warfare within DoD, a larger body of unconventional experts must be educated and elevated to positions that promote the advocating of unconventional approaches.

### **3. Conduct Analysis of Proper Resource Allocation Based on Threat Assessments**

Every four years, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Board meets to determine the focus of future military training and operations. At this meeting, military commanders advocate their needs and recommendations are made on how to properly fund each service on how it can best fill the needs of these focuses. Although irregular warfare and combating terrorism was a main focus of the most recent QDR, the funding for large-conventionally focused weapons systems drove many of the debates. The Air Force remains focused on F-22s and Joint Strike Fighters, the Army advocates more mobile and lethal Stryker brigades and armored vehicles, and the Navy and Marine Corps focus on large sea-basing complexes in which to forward deploy troops. If one believes the

future threat to American security is to be found in unconventional warfare and irregular threats, then serious scrutiny should be given to the proposals of the services. To win unconventionally, history points to the need for greater human intelligence gathering capability, greater troop strength, population control capability, and quick logistical response. In fact, a review of unconventional conflicts suggests that technologically oriented conventional weapons platforms prove almost useless in the unconventional realm. To rectify the problem, a serious analysis must be performed to determine the potential threats to American interests, how this has evolved in relation to American capability, and game theory analysis should then drive the resource allocation towards confronting each threat. Although extremely simplistic in its approach, a possible example of how this can be done is included in the appendix of this thesis. With more research and manpower dedicated to the subject, a much more precise recommendation could be made on which American decision makers could act upon.

#### **4. Stringent Selection of Commanders**

Finally, the concept of 'time in service' and other 'box-checking' notions should be given the utmost scrutiny when dealing with leadership positions in unconventional warfare. In this environment it is necessary to promote commanders primarily on the basis of merit and capacity to develop unconventional strategy. As stated earlier, it is necessary for commanders to have a unique personality that may be pinpointed through psychological evaluations, IQ testing, and problem solving tasks. Those deemed unable to perform in this environment should be immediately replaced and reassigned out of unconventional organizations. As many unconventional conflicts have been won or lost by the personality of a charismatic leader, it proves paramount to carefully screen officers for their capacity in the unconventional realm. Again, research must be done on the psychological factors that make certain individuals successful unconventional warriors while other (often extremely capable) officers fail miserably. Several units within the military currently screen applicants on

several of these factors, so, as the precedent already exists for testing, the major task becomes revealing the traits needed to achieve success.

## **5. Properly Delegate Mission Sets**

A major problem that must be addressed is the proper mission sets for different units. As the war on terror continues, we are beginning to see Marines, Army infantry units, and Navy SEALs begin to take on unconventional warfare tasks for which they were not trained nor strategically prepared for.<sup>88</sup> A clear delineation must be made on what each unit is capable and not capable of, and a single appointed commander must utilize these units in a manner that best increases the probability of success. Additionally (and possibly most importantly), is the need to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the State Department and the Department of Defense in an unconventional realm. The U.S. must destroy the adversarial existence of these two organizations and come to the realization that soft power and hard power are not mutually exclusive in an unconventional environment. As Frederick Kagan writes, "Diplomacy is not the opposite of war, and war is not the failure of diplomacy."<sup>89</sup> The sooner that these organizations realize that each have tools that greatly benefit the other, the sooner the United States can begin to achieve synergy in fighting unconventional foes.

While this list of recommendations is far from all-inclusive, I sincerely hope it serves as an intellectual springboard towards deeper discussion on the topic of unconventional warfare. If my opinion in this thesis has any merit to it, it is time America begins making some major muscle movements, both politically and militarily, to put it in a position to attain future success in warfare. A system must

---

<sup>88</sup> For example, Navy SEAL teams are being used more and more in creating low level networks, Marines are being used to train local armies and security forces, and Army Special Forces teams are routinely being used for direct action missions. Additionally, a recent counterinsurgency doctrine draft from the Army War College promotes the Army Infantry as the primary proponent for counterinsurgency operations. Due to this serious overlap of responsibility, a detailed look at skill sets must be accomplished to delineate proper mission sets.

<sup>89</sup> Frederick Kagan, "Power and Persuasion," *The Wilson Quarterly* 29 no 3. (Summer 2005) : 65.



be created that minimizes the mechanistic thinking that currently plaques the DoD, and instead focuses on environmental externalities and uses innovation to garner victory.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## **APPENDIX: USING GAME THEORY TO ANALYZE RESOURCE ALLOCATION**

In order for any country to survive, top political decision makers must constantly make decisions on how best to overcome future obstacles and threats. The same can be said for the respective generals of these country's armed forces. Whether deliberate or not, political and military decision makers often use several variations of game theory to decide upon the force structure of their armed services. These military strategists base these resource allocations on the types of threats most likely to be encountered and the probable costs associated with defeating them. Since the end of World War I, the United States has proven quite adept at this, elevating the United States to the sole superpower status in the world. Up until OPERATION DESERT STORM, the American military seemed almost perfectly tailored to swiftly and decisively defeat almost any enemy threat that opposed it. This can be attributed largely to the threat assessments and cost analyses of military and political leaders of the past.

For the most of the past 50 years, the American military has been structured, trained, and equipped to deter and defeat the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1990s, however, the ability to make force structure decisions based on perceived future threats have proven a bit trickier for defense strategists because we foresaw no predominant, symmetric, and immediate threat to the US. The optimal fit for countering threats during the time of the Soviet Union was gained through heavily funding large weapon systems, such as Air Force stealth fighter jets, Navy aircraft carriers, and Army tanks. The strategy and steps taken to achieve it were derived from the belief that the greatest threat to the United States' national security lay in the ideologies and military power of rival countries (Nazi Germany, Communist Soviet Union, and Baath'ist Iraq) and their corresponding conventional armies. Unfortunately, due to technological and

communications improvements, and the trend towards higher globalization, the United States has fallen behind on adapting its military to today's threat and opportunity environment.

Today, the US must adopt two overarching strategies based on conventional threats and unconventional threats. The first strategy relies on the ability to defeat another country's armed forces on the battlefield with the understanding that, once defeated, the leadership and population of the defeated country will acquiesce and the conflict will be resolved according to the demands of the victor. This conventional strategy relies on the ability to confront the threat's military formations and places a great degree of emphasis on internal efficiency, large and powerful weapon systems, and a strict, traditional hierarchical and command structure. Examples of this style of warfare abound, from the wars of ancient Greece, the conquests of the Roman Empire, the tragic World Wars, up to the almost instantaneous defeat of the Iraqi military in 1991. A conventional strategy requires a country to invest a huge portion of its resources and economy towards the creation and maintenance of this structure (formations of tanks, ships, air wings, etc.). As previously stated, the country capable of fielding a formidable conventional army must also possess the force projection capability necessary to influence the international environment in the pursuit of long-term prosperity.

The second strategy is the unconventional strategy. This approach acknowledges the inability to confront the enemy's formations and focuses on targeting the population of a country in order to mobilize the support needed to defeat an asymmetric threat. It must be made clear that the term "targeting a population" does not mean attacking a population (like Dresden or Hiroshima) but, on garnering the support of a population and turning that support into near-perfect intelligence, resources for sustenance, and a supply of manpower. Unlike the conventional approach, unconventional strategy does not focus on attriting the threat because, often, the threat can not be easily found. Instead, the focus is on creating a conflict that costs so much to the aggressor, in terms of will, ideology, casualties, and resource depletion that the opponent has no other

option but to acquiesce to the demands of its unconventional foe. The most respected proponent of this theory, Mao Tse-Tung, adopted this approach in his protracted war against a militarily superior Japanese force. Over the course of almost two decades, Mao won over the support of the Chinese population and was able to prosecute a costly hit-and-run campaign against a tiring Japanese force that ultimately lost the will and morale needed to achieve success. Today we can see the embodiment of Mao's concepts in the several current insurgencies. While the United States did not consider these conflicts to be major threats against national security in the past, today's environment gives asymmetric threats, like smaller countries and non-state actors, the ability to wage effective campaigns against large military formations (like the US) without having to face the lethality of the American military. Two examples of this asymmetric, unconventional threat, are the Marine Barracks attack in Beirut and the near-sinking of the USS Cole in Yemen.

The fundamental purpose of this discussion is to point to the need for American military and political decision makers to reassess the costs and benefits of these two types of conflicts. After doing so, as we will show in this paper, it will become obvious that, through both the increased lethality of unconventional enemies and the conventional skills attained by the American army, the United States must adopt a strategy that creates a much more balanced military force structure. Game theory, and its associated variants, provide a user a very helpful tool in determining this mixture and provide several insights into American enemies' most probable courses of action.

## **DOES FUTURE WAR HAVE EQUILIBRIUM?**

To begin the discussion on the proper force structure of the American military and how mixed game theory can drive it, it is necessary to show that future threats force the US military into struggles in which there is no equilibrium or arbitration point. To illustrate this, we must look at a simplified matrix in which both the United States and its future enemies have two options. The first option, focusing resources to train, equip, and sustain forces in a conventional war, is

costly, but if funded correctly, provides that country a substantial amount of international credibility that results in a deterrent capability against other countries with strong militaries. In order to consider this an option, a country must have an economy and infrastructure strong enough to sustain the almost insatiable demands a powerful military force requires. The large military formations that are projected often can persuade other actors to succumb to US wishes simply by being “seen.”

The second option is less costly and very effective in countering a conventional threat: that of an unconventional strategy. Unconventional strategy focuses on securing the popular support of a target population and then using that support to mobilize the population in a military struggle against its enemy. While this option works well at deterring invasion by militarily strong countries, it does not afford the unconventional user the ability to project international power in the pursuit of strategic objectives. Countries and even non-state actors, whether constrained by poor economies, lack of technology, or weak infrastructures, are more frequently relying upon this strategy to counter the aggressive postures of the few countries possessing strong conventional forces.

Looking solely at the strengths and abilities of the United States military, we can show that there are certain scenarios the United States would prefer to face in a conflict. Below is a matrix outlining these preferences. A “4” represents a conflict scenario the United States is most prepared for and capable of winning – military formations against military formations – and a “1” represents a scenario in which the American military is incapable or unlikely to win.

		Enemy Strategy	
US Strategy	Conventional	Conventional	Unconventional
	Unconventional	4	2
		1	3

Next we must take the opposing viewpoint, that of a probable future enemy of the United States. To do this, an honest assessment must be made of


the most likely enemy the United States will have to face until another superpower arises creating another bipolar (or tripolar) world. A large number of military analysts predict future threats to come from militarily weak countries whose strategy is to use terrorism to draw the United States into lengthy wars that severely strain American political and military resolve. Because these countries do not have a robust economy, the only time a conventional option is feasible is if the United States commits to an unconventional strategy and commits troops under this pretext. Keeping this in mind, the preference matrix (4 being best and 1 being worst) for a future American adversary is as follows:

		US Strategy	
Enemy Strategy		Conventional	Unconventional
	Conventional	1	4
	Unconventional	3	2

By combining the two preference matrices we are able to properly assess the “game” and determine if an equilibrium point exists in which it is possible for both the United States and its enemies to achieve an outcome acceptable to both. That combined matrix is represented below (American preference is first, followed by enemy preference):

		Enemy Strategy	
US Strategy		Conventional	Unconventional
	Conventional	(4,1)	(2,4)
	Unconventional	(1,3)	(3,2)

After graphing this data, a better understanding can be gained about the nature of this “game,” and techniques developed by Dr. John Nash can assist in developing a force structure and strategy for the American military.



As the graph and matrix shows, there is no equilibrium point to this contest, and each opponent is forced to adopt a mixed strategy that maximizes the probability of victory while minimizing the costs associated with the type of war encountered.

### **ADOPTING A MIXED STRATEGY: PROPOSALS FOR A FUTURE MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE**

The cost of building and maintaining a military force can be calculated in many ways – monetary costs, social costs, costs to national prestige and objectives, costs to the environment, and costs to human lives are but just a few.

The Cold War was waged by two Superpowers, each armed with thousands of nuclear weapons, hundreds of large military formations, and millions of combatants. Though the monetary cost associated with the Cold War military was exorbitant, there were few choices of how to confront the large symmetric Soviet threat; it required equally large and superior symmetric formations. In retrospect, suppose the US strategy during the Cold War was to counter the Soviet conventional threat in Europe with much smaller formations but much larger unconventional forces. This strategy would have most likely failed to deter the USSR and the US would not be the global power it is today.



Conversely, confronting a Soviet asymmetric threat, Angola for example, with US conventional or unconventional forces, though not necessarily successful, would not have proved overly detrimental to US objectives.

Today, the military is recognizing that the Cold War model must change. The US Army, for example, is moving away from large corps and division-sized formations toward smaller, more independent, brigade “units of action.” In order to model this shift, values will be given to certain national criteria and variables normally associated with “costs” to a particular country during a time of war. For this discussion, we will look at five different variables (with varying weights) and attempt to assign overall values to the four possible types of wars. Admittedly, attempting to calculate the cost of a major conflict using only five variables is highly questionable, but, as the reader will hopefully see, the numbers reveal quite a bit and serve as a foundation on which more extensive research can be done.

### **Determining the Cost of War<sup>90</sup>**

Perhaps one of the best ways to calculate the costs of wars would be to first determine the major costs a country incurs when it enters into a conflict. The five variables we deemed most appropriate were: political costs, economic costs, military personnel required for the given conflict, force development costs (the cost associated with the research and development necessary to build the force), and a variable we labeled as “other” intended to catch miscellaneous costs such as activation of the reserves, costs incurred by local communities, and other miscellaneous social costs. We next looked at those variables and used a sliding scale from one to five to assess the costs a country could be expected to pay in this category. The scale is interpreted as follows:

- 5- Major Impact on Overall Cost
- 4- Substantial Impact
- 3- Moderate Impact

---

<sup>90</sup> In the following section, Lt Colonel Steve Whitmarsh, USA and Lt Col Ron Walters, USA provided the idea on how to determine the cost of each type of war. When I use the term “we” I am referring to Col Whitmarsh, Col Walters and myself.

2- Low Impact

1- Little to No Impact

After assigning a ranking to the impact of that cost, we multiplied it with a “relevance” factor in order to give more weight to what we saw as the more important variables. These “relevance factors” are as follows:

5- Political Costs

4- Economic Costs

3- Personnel Required

2- Force Development Costs

1- “Other” Social Costs

We finally looked at historical data to determine how heavy a price a country paid to fight four different types of wars, a conventional vs. conventional war, a conventional vs. unconventional war, an unconventional vs. unconventional war, and finally, an unconventional vs. conventional war. What follows is the data we developed to assess the historical costs associated with each type of conflict.

### **Conventional Force vs. Conventional Force:**

This form of conflict can be viewed as two major conventional armies squaring off against one another on an open battlefield. Best characterized by what the world witnessed during World War I and World War II, these types of conflict prove to be the most costly to the countries fighting them.

Variable	Cost Factor	Weight	Total
Political	5	5	25
Economic	4	4	16
Personnel Required	5	3	15
Force Development	4	2	8
Social	4	1	4
Total cost			68

### **Conventional Force vs. Unconventional Force:**

This type of conflict can best be summarized by the American involvement in Vietnam. In this conflict, the United States measured success by determining casualty rates inflicted upon the North Vietnamese fighters. Unfortunately, the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces adopted an unconventional strategy and were able to affect the will of American policy makers without ever actually defeating American military forces in any direct engagement. This strategy ultimately forced the Americans to pull its forces out without declaring victory. As shown below, the cost of this type of war is still significant, but still less than a conventional vs. conventional conflict.

Variable	Cost Factor	Weight	Total
Political	3	5	15
Economic	4	4	16
Personnel Required	3	3	9
Force Development	4	2	8
Social	4	1	4
Total cost			52

### **Unconventional vs. Conventional:**

This conflict was by far the hardest to calculate because there are simply no historical examples of it ever happening. For a country to actually engage in this type of war would end in utter disaster for the unconventional invading force. We ask the reader to use his imagination a bit in this calculation and envision an “alternate” World War, where instead of the United States sending over an armada of tanks, infantry, aircraft, and naval assets looking to engage the German military, we instead sent over several lightly armed Special Forces groups that were tasked to live in and around the German population in an attempt to win their support. Needless to say, it would only be a matter of time before the German army rooted out and destroyed the American forces pursuing an unconventional strategy.

Variable	Cost Factor	Weight	Total
Political	4	5	20
Economic	3	4	12
Personnel Required	5	3	15
Force Development	2	2	4
Social	3	1	3
Total Cost			54

### Unconventional vs. Unconventional:

While little is ever written on these types of wars, they are actually the most frequently occurring type of conflict. A good example of this type of war would be the American involvement in El Salvador during the 1980's. If asked today, most Americans would be ignorant of the fact that the United States was even involved in a conflict with El Salvador's insurrection forces. This type of war costs little, and, if conducted correctly, requires little more than a handful of "advisors" that train indigenous forces in security and guerrilla tactics.

Variable	Cost Factor	Weight	Total
Political	3	5	15
Economic	1	4	4
Personnel Required	2	3	6
Force Development	2	2	4
Social	2	1	2
Total Cost			31

### Assessing the American Situation (1950-1989):

It must be reiterated that the values we attained in the previous sections were calculated using a historical look at several different countries and many different wars. Keeping this in mind, it stands to reason that the United States can "cut" the costs of specific types of conflicts by developing technology, tactics, techniques, and procedures that can dramatically reduce the duration and intensity of the conflict. For instance, as shown above, a conventional vs. conventional war is by far the most costly type of war (with a cost value of 68). It must be kept in mind that in conducting these cost analysis's, we operated under

the assumption that the US military would be operating as an expeditionary force, never having to fight on American soil, and therefore, never truly blending into the population is an unconventional approach were adopted.

Following World War II, the United States focused its efforts on developing a military force that could swiftly and efficiently defeat another country's military. To accomplish this, military strategists developed a long-term approach that would provide the resources necessary to develop technology and weapon systems that ultimately bolstered the United States as a superpower in the world. With a power only countered by the then Soviet Union, it can be argued that the United States, though its singular state-on-state military focus, was able to "cut" the average cost of conventional war by a great percentage. Using this train of thought, we decided to assign an "American readiness value" to the already calculated costs of wars to determine the costs American could be expected to pay in different types of wars, and the force structure analysis that falls out of these calculations. For these calculations, a readiness factor of less than one is a good thing, as the United States has the expertise in this type of conflict to actually decrease the average cost (i.e. a factor of .75 means the US can cut the cost of a war by 25%). We felt that the American military of the 1950's -1980's was best prepared to wage a conventional fight against another conventional army, and that the small core of unconventional warriors was better trained and focused than the average unconventional forces of other countries. We assigned a readiness factor of 2 to the unconventional vs. conventional conflict simple because to send an unconventional force to fight a conventional army is, by doctrine, an act of suicide. What follows are the costs we deemed appropriate for the 1950-1989 American military force structure.

Type of War	Average Cost	US Readiness	Cost to US
Conv. Vs. Conv.	68	.8	54
Conv. Vs. Unconv.	52	1.1	57
Unconv. Vs Conv.	54	2	108
Unconv. Vs. Unconv	31	.9	28

### **Reassessing the American Situation (1989-present):**

One can easily argue that the threats encountered in the Cold War era vary differently from those encountered after the fall of the Soviet Union. A significant upward trend in globalization, huge technological developments, and worldwide communications capability empowered several state and non-state actors that had previously enjoyed only second-tier status. Conversely, the American military has “pulled away from the pack” in terms of conventional military technology, effectively lowering the costs of conventional wars even more (see DESERT STORM for an example of a low-cost war). These two factors, an increase in an unconventional opponent’s effectiveness and the conventional skills almost perfected by today’s military, make it necessary to reevaluate the costs of war to the United States. Below is a summary of that recalculation, showing the improvement of the American conventional forces, and the newfound advances of an unconventional threat (making it harder to defeat). Again, attempting to invade another country and adopt an unconventional strategy while the opponent has the means and desire to conduct a conventional fight would lead to unparalleled disaster for an American force.


Type of War	Average Cost	US Readiness	Cost to US
Conv. Vs. Conv.	68	.6	41
Conv. Vs. Unconv.	52	1.25	65
Unconv. Vs Conv.	54	2	108
Unconv. Vs. Unconv	31	1.1	34

### **How Costs of War Should Drive Future Resource Allocation:**

As stated in the opening lines of this discussion, whether intentional or not, military and political decision makers actively utilize principles in game theory in order to make decisions on the allocation of resources to different strategies. As this analysis will suggest, the allocation of resources from 1950-1989 proved to be an almost exact fit, while present allocations do not seem to fit the current realities of war. Our analysis, which utilizes already established


theories of game strategy, could serve as a foundation on which to base future resource allocation and force structuring.

From an American perspective, it would be useful to graph the costs of war when the enemy adopts a purely unconventional strategy and a purely conventional strategy. The resulting graph should show policymakers the correct percentage of resources that need to be devoted to both the unconventional and conventional strategies in order to maximize the chance of success against any enemy and minimize the costs of war to the American population. The graph below is the representation of the proper American military resource allocation from 1950-1989 (based off the costs calculated earlier in the paper).



Although the graph is not 100% precise in scale, one can see that game theory dictates that the US military should devote over 90% of its resources to a conventional strategy. By doing this, the US can minimize the cost of war to an average of 56 while maximizing its chance of success against almost any enemy.

When we graph this same scenario using the numbers we calculated for the current costs of war to the US (1989-present), we see that a much different outcome emerges.



As one can see, the combination of the unconventional strategy becoming harder to defeat, combined with the absolute dominance of the American conventional military have resulted in a need for the US to rethink the way it approaches warfare. Whereas a very high percentage of conventional makeup (9:1 conventional to unconventional) fit during the cold war, a more balanced (4:1) approach needs to be adopted in the current threat environment. While one can strongly argue about the methods we used to calculate “costs” of war, there is empirically little foundation for an argument against our ultimate conclusion. The fact that we, as an American military, continue to devote over 90% of our time and resources to perfecting the conventional fight do nothing but make it more costly to win the most likely conflicts we will face tomorrow.



## What the Numbers Mean

The most surprising revelation about this method of thought is that resource allocation and future strategy are driven from the differences in the costs of war. If we call the difference of costs in war if the US adopts a purely unconventional allocation  $\Delta U$ , and the difference in costs of wars in America adopts a purely conventional allocation  $\Delta C$ , then we find that the conventional force allocation (%Conv) percentage to be:

$$\%Conv = \Delta U / (\Delta C + \Delta U)$$

If we use this equation to find the proper conventional resource allocation for the 1950-1989 American military, we find:

$$\Delta U = 108 - 28 = 80$$

$$\Delta C = 57 - 54 = 3$$

Therefore:

$$\%Conv = \Delta U / (\Delta U + \Delta C) = 80 / (80 + 3)$$

$$\%Conv = .9638 \text{ or } 96\%$$

We see that the costs of war, and the skill sets possessed by the American military during the timeframe 1950-1989 called for a 96% resource allocation to a conventional strategy. If we look at the numbers for the present situation, we discover a startling outcome.

$$\Delta U = 108 - 34 = 74$$

$$\Delta C = 65 - 41 = 24$$

Therefore:

$$\%Conv = \Delta U / (\Delta U + \Delta C) = 74 / (74 + 24)$$

$$\%Conv = .7551 \text{ or } 75\%$$

While the outcome seems highly counter-intuitive, the equation suggests that the percentage of resources you dedicate to a conventional strategy is driven largely by the difference in costs in adopting an unconventional approach.

If we were to make future policy strictly from these numbers, it would be wise to devote 25% of our time and resources to developing our unconventional strategy and tactics. By doing this, we could would also improve our “lesser” skill, which actually allows us to play our “better” skill (conventional) more often.

### **Concluding Thoughts**

We, in the military profession, are always taught that we are no longer operating under the auspices of the Cold War and a bi-polar world. Unfortunately, it seems as though our teachings do not match our actions. Although military leaders are keenly aware of the merging threats posed from asymmetric enemies, we continue to invest time and resources into weapon systems and tactics that are only useful on a conventional battlefield. The proof in this lies in just a few numbers of our current resource allocation. Special Operations Command, the owner of the vast majority of unconventional capability and expertise, receives an annual budget of just under 5 billion dollars. The development of just *one* conventional weapon system, the F-22, has already cost the United States in excess of \$30 billion dollars, a sum that would fund SOCOM for almost 7 years. Looking at the even larger picture, the DoD receives an annual budget around \$400 billion dollars. The portion afforded to SOCOM totals less than 2% of the funding allocation, a resource allocation that fits closer to the Cold War analysis discussed and a far cry from the percentage deemed necessary by our analysis of the current threat situation. Until proper resources are dedicated to understanding and learning how to deal with unconventional wars, the United States will continue to pay much more than is necessary to defeat future threats.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basilici, Stephen P. and Jeremy Simmons, "Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare." Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004.

Chaliand, Gerard. *Guerrilla Strategies: A Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982.

Cialdini, Robert B. *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*. New York: Quill, 1993.

Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Edgerton, Robert B. *Mau Mau: An African Crucible*. New York: Macmillan, 1990.

Giap, Vo Nguyen. *Big Victory, Great Task*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1968.

Giordano, Frank. *Classroom Instruction: Models of Conflict*. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Spring 2005.

Gill, K.P.S. "Endgame in Punjab." *Faultlines: Writings on Conflict and Resolution*. Volume 1 No 1. (May 1999).

Graham, Bradley. "Shortfalls of Special Operations Command are Cited," *Washington Post*. (17 November 2005).

Guevara, Ernesto. *Guerrilla Warfare (includes "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method," 1963 and "Message to the Tricontinental," 1967)*. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1960 (1985).

Hoisington, William. *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*. New York, NY: St. Martins Press, 1995.

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, v72 n3. (Summer 1993): 26.

Johnson, R.N. *Deontological Ethics*.

<http://showme.missouri.edu/~philrnj/deon.html>. Accessed 20 October 2005.

Kok-Wah Loh, Francis. *Beyond the Tin Mines: Coolies, Squatters, and New Villagers in the Kinta Valley*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Krepinevich, Andrew. "Are We Winning In Iraq?" *Testimony before United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services*. (17 March 2005).

Lawrence, T.E. "Twenty Seven Articles." *The Arab Bulletin*, 20 August 1917. <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1917/27arts.html>. Accessed 2 October 2005.

Lindsay, F. and J.K. Gailbraith. *Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Lober, George. *Classroom instruction: Critical Thinking and Ethical Decisionmaking*. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005.

Luttwak, Edward N. "Notes on Low Intensity Conflict" in *Dimensions of Military Strategy*, edited by George Edward Thibault. Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1987.

Luttwak, Edward. *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century AD to the Third*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. "Discourses: Upon the First Ten (Books) of Titus Livy." <http://www.constitution.org/mac/disclivy1.htm#1:09>. Accessed 1 October 2005.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Prince*. Translated and Edited by Daniel Donno. New York: Bantam Dell, 1966.

Malcolm, B.S. and R. Martz. *White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea*. Washington: Brassey's, 1995

Maloba, Wunyarabi O. *Mau Mau and Kenya: An analysis of peasant revolt*. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1993.

McCormick, Gordon. *Classroom Instruction: Seminar on Guerrilla Warfare*. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005.

McFate, Montgomery. "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture." *Joint Forces Quarterly*. Issue 38. (2005). [http://ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq\\_pages/i38.htm](http://ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq_pages/i38.htm). Accessed 2 October 2005.

Miller, Harry. *Jungle War in Malaya: The campaign against communism, 1948-1960*. London: Arthur Barker, Ltd, 1972.

Miller, Harry. *Menace in Malaya*. London: Praeger, 1954.

Mintzberg, Henry. "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit." *Harvard Business Review*. (January 1981).

News Transcript. *Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with El Tiempo, Bogota, Columbia*. (August 19, 2003).

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030819-secdef0603.html>.

Accessed 5 October 2005.

Newsinger, John. *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland*. Palgrave: New York, 2002.

Online Guide to Ethics and Moral Philosophy. *Utilitarian Theories*.  
<http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/80130/part2/sect9.html>.

Accessed 18 October 2005.

Peers, W.R. and Dean Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1963.

Porch, Douglas. *The Conquest of Morocco*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1982.

Porch, Douglas. *The Conquest of the Sahara*. New York: Fromm International Publishing Corporation, 1986.

Posen, Barry. *The Sources of Military Doctrine*. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.

Pruett, J.P. "Good Cops, Bad Cops, Carrots and Sticks." *Special Warfare, Volume 18, No.2* (September 2005): 18.

RAND Study. *Translating Lessons Into Future DoD Policies*. Memo to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dated 7 February 2005.

*Rumsfeld's War on Terror Memo*. (16 October 2003).

<http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm>.

Accessed 3 October 2005.

Scales, Robert. "The Second Learning Revolution," in Anthony D. McIvor's (Ed.) *Rethinking the Principles of War*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2005.

Schultz, R.H. and R.M. Beitler. "Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al'Qai'da's Operations." *Middle East Review of International Affairs*. Volume 8, No. 2. (June 2004).

Simons, Anna. *Classroom Instruction: The Military Advisor Course*. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, October 2005.

Simons, Anna. "Seeing the Enemy (or Not)." In Anthony D. McIvor's (Ed.) *Rethinking the Principles of War*. U.S. Naval Institute: Annapolis, MD, 2005.

Stubbs, Richard. *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Sturgill, Claude C. *Low-Intensity Conflict in American History*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.

Taber, Robert. *The war of the flea: a study of guerrilla warfare: theory and practice*. New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Lyle Stuart, 1965.

Thompson, Robert. *Defeating Communist Insurgency :Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*. London: Palgrave,1966.

Tse-Tung, Mao. *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith II. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000.

Vandergriff, Donald. *The Path to Victory*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, Inc., 2002.

VanCreveld, Martin. *The Transformation of War*. New York: Free Press, 1991.

## **INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST**

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California
3. The Honorable Thomas W. O'Connell  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)  
Washington, DC
4. 720<sup>th</sup> Special Tactics Group/ Director of Operations  
Hurlburt Field, Florida