

NWC
Seminar Essay
92-50

MODEL III DECISION MAKING
CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS
AND
FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS

Pauline M. Froebel
20 December 1991

Report Documentation Page

*Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 20 DEC 1991	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED 20-12-1991 to 20-12-1991			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Model III Decision Making. Congressional Politics and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S)		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National War College, 300 5th Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319-6000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT see report					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 17	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS
AND
FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS (FFRDCs)

In his book, ESSENCE OF DECISION Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison, when describing the Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Paradigm (Model III decision making) states that,

"The decisions of governments are intranational political resultants: resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; political in the sense that the activity from which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government."¹

The bureaucratic struggle underlying the Congressional compromise on FY 91 and FY 92 appropriations for Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)--especially for the largest: the MITRE Corporation, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, and Aerospace Corporation--bears ample witness to the accuracy of Allison's observation that governmental decisions result from conflict, confusion, and political bargaining.

To understand how politics played in Congressional decisions on FFRDC appropriations, some background information is first needed. Federally Funded Research and Development Centers are private, publicly funded, public-service organizations. They are structured as industrial, academic, or other non-profit type organizations to perform research and development tasks under contract to government sponsors. Founded during the 50's and 60's, at government request, their charter is to provide unique, special research and development capability to the government which it can not obtain through its own existing organic (in-house) resources or from private, commercial contractors. In short, they furnish technical expertise (primarily to DOD) of a type and character which cannot be provided as effectively by any other sector: government, academic, or commercial.²

Today, there are eleven FFRDCs, the newest was established in FY 91; ironically, in the midst of the Congressional campaign to curb FFRDC growth.³ Ten are sponsored by DOD; five of these are managed by the Air Force.⁴ They are basically of two distinct types. Systems analyses (e.g., Rand) houses are funded as discrete, individual line items in

annual appropriations bills. Systems engineering type FFRDCs (e.g., MITRE, Aerospace) are industrially funded by each of their many customers; and, therefore, their workload is subject to individual buyer demand. As such, they are not identified as specific line items in appropriations bills.

FFRDCs have a unique relationship with the government and they enjoy special privileges. Specifically, they are exempt from the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act (CICA)--per Title 10, US Code, Section 2304(C)(3)--and have access to government proprietary information. Conversely, they also "enjoy" certain restrictions. They are constrained from competing with private contractors for government work; they must be non-profit; they are subject to annual ceiling limitations; and they must agree, contractually, to hardware exclusion clauses and other types of conflict of interest language to assure their non-competitiveness with private industry.

It is important to underscore that FFRDCs were established at government instigation. They were born during the 50's and 60's in response to national reaction to the explosion of technology and the Soviet nuclear threat. MIT Lincoln Laboratory was the first; founded in 1951 after the Soviet's exploded their atomic bomb in 1949. At that time, the Air Force requested MIT to form this laboratory to specialize in research and development of the technology needed to build large radar systems for national defense. The MITRE Corporation, a spin-off of Lincoln Lab, was founded in 1958 to support the Air Force with technical expertise in the development of the SAGE air defense and DEWLINE radar systems. These, too, were deployed to defend against the Soviet nuclear threat. Following Soviet successes with Sputnik and ICBMs, the Aerospace Corporation, a congressionally directed spin-off of TRW, was established in 1960 to support space-related defense initiatives.⁵

At the time that these initial FFRDCs were chartered, the government had tried, unsuccessfully, to enlist private industry in the venture to provide "special" research and development expertise which it required to counter the Soviet threat. However, commercial, for-profit organizations were unwilling to abide with governmental constraints: non-profit, non-competitiveness, contract hardware exclusion clauses, etc.⁶ FFRDCs, then, can be viewed as a logical outgrowth of the government's inability to obtain required technical expertise from the private (commercial) sector.

During the FY 91 Appropriations Hearings, FFRDCs came under attack

from Congress and, specifically, from the Senate Appropriations Committee. All of them, with the exception of [one] the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, suffered funding cuts⁷. These cuts were, in the terms of Allison, the "political resultant" of the compromise of influential stakeholders in the Congressional decision process. What follows is an examination of how that political [resultant] decision was reached with regard to the three largest systems engineering FFRDCs which took the brunt of the FY 91 reductions--Mitre, Lincoln Laboratory, and Aerospace.

THE FY 91 STRUGGLE

The bureaucratic struggle commenced in August 1990 after the Professional Services Council (PSC)--a lobbying group representing the services contract, or "beltway bandits," industry⁸--began a frontal assault on FFRDCs with an extremely effective lobbying effort targeted at the Senate Appropriations Committee. In its 16 August 1991 letter to Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.V.; Chairman, SAC) and other members of the SAC, including Senator Ted Stevens, R-Alaska; the ranking minority member of the Defense Subcommittee of the SAC, the PSC alleged that "Pentagon procurement officials use the centers as an easy escape from complex acquisition regulations."⁹ By providing budgetary data that specifically tracked MITRE and Aerospace Corporation expenditures from FY 84 through FY 90, the PSC charged that there had been a substantial increase in the use of FFRDCs since the enactment of the 1984 CICA. They also contended that FFRDCs continued to grow while private sector providers were experiencing intense competition for fewer available defense dollars; and that declining defense budgets dictated the need to reduce FFRDC expenditures.¹⁰

The Senate Actors

These allegations captured the attention of at least two powerful actors in the Senate. First was Senator Stevens. As the ranking minority member of the Defense Subcommittee, he played a key role¹¹ in securing a SAC FY 91 mark which--if left standing--would have reduced the "big three" FFRDC FY 91 funding by approximately \$165 million (Aerospace Corp. -\$53,980M; Mitre Corp. -\$55,560M; and MIT-Lincoln Laboratory -\$65,590M).¹² He was also the driver¹³ behind language in the FY 91 Appropriations Conference Report which portended a further reduction to 1992 FFRDC appropriations: "The conferees further direct the Defense Department to include in its fiscal year 1992 budget request for each FFRDC not less than a ten percent reduction in total funding for each

measured from fiscal year 1991 appropriated level...." ¹⁴

The second, powerful actor in the Senate play on FY 91 FFRDC funding was Peter Lennon¹⁵. A principal staffer for the SAC, Mr. Lennon was the leading expert on the DOD, Research and Development (R&D) Appropriation. As such, he was tremendously influential in convincing Senator Byrd (and others) as to the "merit" of the PCS allegations against the FFRDCs. Hence, the SAC Chairman's support for FY 91 FFRDC reductions¹⁶ was secured.

By virtue of their powerful positions, then, these players in the "regularized"--Congressional--decision process were able to exert influence backed by a strong lobbying effort by PCS on the SAC and to persuade it to reduce FY 91 FFRDC funding and to direct the DOD to further reduce its FFRDCs budgets in FY 92.

Was their campaign for these funding reductions based on some rational evaluation of the role that FFRDCs should continue to play in the national defense arena or on a thorough evaluation of the validity of the PCS charges? Were they performing in accordance with the "rational actor" theory in the decision process? No! Rather, the forces of the bureaucratic Model III were at play. Each actor brought his own "political" baggage, interests and stakes to the decision process. The Model I rational decision was no where in evidence.

Interests

Senator Stevens' political interest was to free up FFRDC monies for universities and other institutions (the University of Alaska, for one) which traditionally had been excluded from a share in defense spending.¹⁷ He was upset that FFRDC funding seemed always to be funneled to the more prestigious, well-known Eastern schools such as MIT-Lincoln Lab, Carnegie Mellon-Software Engineering Institute.¹⁸ He held the conviction that the "big name" schools habitually received all the money; while the smaller, less well known schools were systematically shut out of the lucrative defense research market. His position on this issue is clear in his remarks during the hearings when he argued that funding for the centers (FFRDCs) should be rolled back to the 1987 levels to erase efforts by the "good old boy league [to] continue to throw money at these 10 major centers." ¹⁹

His primary interest, then, in reducing the FFRDC funding was not based on some overriding concern about national defense; but, rather, it was based on constituency concerns. His aim was simply to free up defense research dollars; some of which could then be allotted to schools

in his home state. Obviously, his personal stake in the process was re-election; and what better way to foster that than to demonstrate strong support for his constituents.

Peter Lennon, too, did not attack this issue from some rational or noble concept of what was best for national defense. Rather, his interest was in controlling the growth and accountability of FFRDCs, since most of their funding came from R&D appropriations. As mentioned earlier, he was recognized as being the SAC's singular expert on DOD, R&D funding.²⁰ His goal was to get Congress to assert control over the FFRDCs which he personally believed were "out of control."²¹ In short, he was predominately interested in stopping what he perceived to be FFRDC funding growth. Further, by challenging the DOD on this issue, he could flex his considerable muscle to obtain information from the Department relative to its FFRDC expenditures and use it as he saw fit.

In the opinion of many of the Air Force people involved in this issue, he had been "captured" by the PCS lobbyists. He was obviously persuaded by their data, which alleged tremendous growth levels in FFRDCs since 1984, that the DOD process for controlling FFRDC spending was not rigorous enough.²² The fact that Lennon was swayed by the PCS data was evident in later discussions between him and Air Force representatives during which he cited PCS data to support his allegations that the Air was not controlling its FFRDCs. It was obvious that he was convinced of the validity of this assertion. Further, he berated the Air Force for suggesting that he may have been unduly influenced by inaccurate PCS data and was unreceptive to Air Force data which refuted the PCS allegations of unrestrained growth and circumvention of the CICA.²³

Lennon's influence on the SAC, and ultimately the FFRDC decision, is manifest in the FY 91 SAC Report which states: "The Committee believes that further increases in defense FFRDC spending are unjustified, and that action must be taken to return this funding to a much more reasonable level."²⁴ His influence also carried over to the conference as evidenced by language in the FY 91 Appropriations Conference Report: "The conferees strongly support the Senate initiative to reduce exorbitant funding growth in the Defense Department's FFRDCs."²⁵

Lennon's stake in the decision was twofold. First, he was simply doing his job by providing the SAC with information which he was convinced would permit them to make an "informed" decision on FFRDCs. Secondly, one could argue, he also had an interest in promoting his personal, professional image. By being able to successfully influence

powerful members of the SAC, he was, in effect, advancing his personal reputation as a premier staffer; someone with whom to be reckoned.

e House Opposition

Allison notes that a decision resulting from the bureaucratic political model is one of compromise. Since the two key players on the Senate side of the FFRDC debate were in basic agreement, who, then, held the opposing view, the alternate conviction which required that a compromise be reached? For that answer one must look to the House of Representatives.

After the Senate mark, Hq USAF submitted a "heartburn appeal" to the legislative liaison office of Secretary of the Air Force which forwarded it to the Appropriations Conference Committee.²⁶ This caught the attention of Representative Silvio Conti; a powerful delegate from Massachusetts. Representative Conti (R-Pittsfield, Ma.) was, at the time, the ranking minority member on the powerful House Appropriations Committee. He became the key "champion" to protect the two, Massachusetts-based, FFRDCs--MITRE and Lincoln Laboratory--from FY 91 reductions.²⁷

Opposing Interests

During the fall of 1990, at the time of the Conference Committee Hearings, Massachusetts was already in the throws of a recession that would hit the rest of the country later the next year. Faced with unemployment rates already higher than the national average, Representative Conti recognized immediately the implications of the proposed Senate FFRDC reductions--loss of more jobs in Massachusetts.²⁸ Conti's primary interest, then, was in preserving as much funding as possible for MITRE and Lincoln Laboratory in order to save FFRDC-related jobs. Like Senator Stevens, his overriding concern, then, was parochial. It was for Massachusetts he fought; not necessarily for the "national defense."

Using to advantage his powerful position in the House, he was successful in Conference Committee in mitigating---but not eliminating entirely--the proposed Senate reductions. The success of his efforts to reverse the Senate position is attested by the following Conference Committee marks:²⁹

	Senate	Conference
MITRE C(3)/FFRDC	-55,690	-20,000
Lincoln Laboratory/FFRDC	-54,590	-20,000
Aerospace Corporation/FFRDC	-53,980	-53,980

It is noteworthy to mention, here, that the Aerospace Corporation, based in California, had no similar Congressional champion; hence the its recommended for Aerospace by the Senate mark withstood. Part of the explanation for this can be attributed to the fact that California, at the time, was not facing the severe economic decline in which Massachusetts found itself. The California Congressional delegation, then, was not mobilized and lacked interest in the outcome of the FFRDC decision.³⁰

The Timing

The timing of the Appropriations Conference Committee debate can also be credited with the solidification of a compromise. Here it was, late October 1990. The fiscal year commenced on 1 October and still there was no signed Appropriations Bill. The government was running on a "Continuing Resolution." Agreement was needed soon on the FY 91 Appropriations Bill. So it was that the compromise between the Senate and the House was executed.

The Compromise

Every influential player shared a little in the victory; but no one completely achieved everything they sought--this is the essence of compromise. Senator Stevens succeeded in reducing FFRDC funding; thus, theoretically freeing up monies for Alaskan and other schools. Peter Lennon brought Congressional attention to a problem which he perceived to be uncontrolled FFRDC growth. Representative Conti was able to mitigate the impact of the Senate reductions on MITRE and Lincoln Laboratory thereby preserving jobs in Massachusetts. Ironically, the PCS was the big loser.³¹ Because of the manner in which the cuts were taken, the overall defense appropriation was reduced; funds were not available as PCS had hoped for purchase of services from other, non-FFRDC activities.

While, in the past, Congress had expressed interest in FFRDCs, there had not been a concerted assault on them until the FY 91 Senate Appropriation Hearings. So, the FY 91 battle over FFRDC funding came as somewhat of a surprise to the Air Force (and other DOD FFRDC managers). As such, they were not mobilized for combat until after the October Senate mark when it was almost too late to recoup. The attack can be partially explained by the success of the PCS lobbying effort for it provided the catalyst to focus Congressional attention on the issue. However, climate was also a major factor in the FY 91 campaign for FFRDC reductions.

FY 91 Conclusion

The Congressional environment was ripe for the onslaught. It is true that defense spending was declining and competition for DOD business was intense prompting increased lobbying efforts on the part of private concerns. However, FFRDCs might still have escaped unscathed except that the makeup of Congress had changed in the over forty years since FFRDCs were conceived. As a result, their preeminent position in Congressional favor had eroded. In short, FFRDCs were no longer well understood. The current body of lawmakers was unfamiliar with their history and purpose, and this lack of understanding gave credence to the PCS lobbying campaign. Misunderstanding and misinformation about their purpose also guided Senator Stevens' attack on what he perceived to be the elitist MIT's and Carnegie Mellon's of the world. Confusion and misconception, more than other factors, set the stage for the FY 91 appropriations wrangle. This was confirmed by William Scott, a member of Congressman Hefley's staff, in a meeting with members of the Air Force on 1 Nov 90.³²

Setting the Stage for FY 92

Congressman Hefley (R-Colorado Springs, Co.), a member of the Committee on Small Business, got involved in the FFRDC issue as a result of a letter from one of his constituents, a small business in his district. The letter expressed concern that MITRE was doing work in Colorado that it was capable of doing.³³ In response to this complaint, Congressman Hefley issued a Congressional inquiry, and sent a couple of his staffers, including Mr. Scott, to the Air Force to obtain a briefing on FFRDCs and their role.³⁴

Luckily for the Air Force, Scott was a retired Navy Captain with a background in government contracting and was familiar with the FFRDC concept.³⁵ The 1 Nov 91 meeting at which the Air Force briefed him on the purpose of FFRDCs went extremely well. It was clear that Scott left that meeting with a renewed appreciation of the value of MITRE, Lincoln Lab, and Aerospace to the systems engineering activity of the Air Force. In fact, his statement [to the effect] that "The Appropriations Committee's FFRDC reduction might have been averted if Congress were better informed on the role of FFRDCs in the Air Force"³⁶ attests to the fact that he had been persuaded by the Air Force's defense of its FFRDCs.

Favorably disposed, then, Scott committed to help the Air Force "get the word out" to Congress on FFRDCs in an endeavor to lessen future reductions.³⁷ He understood the Air Force position and sympathized

with their plight. He believed in the concept of FFRDCs, and his interest, then, became one of "brotherhood;" one might argue that he was -opted to help the Air Force counter the PCS lobbying effort.

THE FY 92 CONTEST

Congressman Hefly, influenced by the positive reports from Scott, joined in supporting the Air Force FFRDCs in the FY 92 battle. Although his initial inquiry came in response to a constituent complaint, he was equally persuaded by the fact that MITRE operated a sizable facility in his Colorado district which employed over a hundred of his constituents--more than the small business.³⁸

For its part, the Air Force resolved to educate members of Congress on FFRDCs and developed a gameplan to present a clear, factual and accurate picture of FFRDCs in an attempt to mitigate future budget reductions.³⁹ In preparation for the FY 92 appropriations hearings, Air Force representatives conducted numerous meetings throughout 1991 with both House and Senate staffers to explain the value of FFRDCs and to correct the erroneous and misleading data presented to Congress by the PCS lobby. Several sessions, in fact, were held specifically with Lennon in an attempt to reverse his negativity and to convince him that the Air Force did have its FFRDCs under control and that the PCS allegations were misleading.

Old Players

It is evident, however, that the Air Force failed to completely convince Lennon of the merits of its argument that PCS had presented inaccurate and misleading data to Congress since the FY 92 SAC Report, again as the result of Lennon's influence, called for a further 10% cut in FFRDC appropriations.⁴⁰ This figure (10%) was a moderate surprise to the Air Force. Based on their discussions with Lennon in May 91, the Air Force believed it had swayed him, at least partially, to its position. At the conclusion of that May meeting, Lennon seemed receptive to Air Force arguments as evidenced by his query as to "what level of FY 92 reductions could the Air Force and its FFRDCs tolerate without forcing the FFRDCs to eliminate jobs." The Air Force told him that a [more reasonable] 4% reduction⁴¹ could be absorbed through normal attrition.

However, as in FY 91, Lennon had a personal stake in the FY 92 process. He appears to have found himself in a situation where, for the sake of his personal prestige, he could not afford to reverse himself going into the FY 92 SAC Hearings. So, during the SAC deliberations he held firm to a larger FFRDC reduction; convincing, once again, the SAC to

stick to its previous (FY 91) position calling for a 10%, FY 92 cut.⁴² A point can also be made that Lennon all along planned to concede to a lesser reduction and simply pushed for the 10% as a "going in" position. He surely recognized by this time that the Conference Committee would reach compromise on a lesser percentage cut.

The face of the issue also seems to have changed for Senator Stevens. During the FY 92 SAC hearings, he bowed out of the play and was not a major factor in the [FY 92] debate⁴³. This could be attributed to the fact that his compatriots--the Massachusetts and California Senatorial delegations--were pressing him to reverse his previous opposition to FFRDCs [see comments below].

New Players - The House

The battle for FY 92 FFRDC appropriations was joined this time in a "full-court press" by the entire Massachusetts delegation of both House and Senate.⁴⁴ They [in turn] enlisted the aid of the California delegation, including Senators Cranston and Seymour,⁴⁵ to ward off the coming attack. While the earlier FY 91 Aerospace cuts may not have raised the eyebrows of these California Senators, by the time of the FY '92 Appropriations Hearings, California had begun to be affected by the recession and saving Aerospace jobs became an important interest.

Silvio Conti, the hero of the FY 91 conference committee, died in February 1991. His strong voice was missed in the FY 92 debate, but the baton had been picked up by Representative Chester Atkins (D-Concord, Ma.) and Representative Joseph Moakley (D-S. Boston). As Chairman of the House Rules Committee, Representative Moakley's intercession was especially significant, since he was the most powerful and influential Massachusetts Representative and held one of the most powerful positions in the House.

Clearly, the interests of these Massachusetts delegates were parochial. They recognized the need to coalesce to save jobs in a state that was especially hard-hit by the recession. There was no apparent thought being given to broader, national issues.

Representative Moakley, it could be argued, had an additional motive. In a 2 Oct 1991 letter to the Congressman, Massachusetts' Republican Governor, William F. Weld, urged Rep. Moakley's "personal support for the Defense Department's Federally Funded Research and Development Centers...."⁴⁶ [Democrat] Moakley, then, had an interest in demonstrating to the Republican Governor of Massachusetts that he would work with him by using his prestige and influence to the support

the Governor's request to help Massachusetts.

Rep. Moakley enlisted the support of [the] powerful Representative John Murtha (D-Pa), Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, to stave off the SAC attack. Murtha committed to Moakley that he would "fight the Senate on it."⁴⁷ Why? Rep. Murtha shared a mutual interest in preserving as much funding as possible for FFRDCs since the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (SEI), an FFRDC, is located in his district. Interestingly, because of his powerful position, Murtha was able during the FY 91 FFRDC debate to fend off reductions to SEI funding (the only one of ten FFRDCs to escape the FY 91 budget ax).⁴⁸ Thus, his support to the Massachusetts delegation was important.

Evidence of the success of the Massachusetts-led effort to save FFRDC funding, [especially Rep. Moakley and Rep. Atkins] bolstered by Rep. Murtha's support, is found in the FY 92 HAC Report, dated 7 June 91, which states: "Based on its review, the Committee recommends maintaining the fiscal year 1991 appropriated level of funding in 1992....."⁴⁹ In short, no FY 92 cuts were recommended out of the HAC.

New Players - The Senate

On the Senate side, Senators Kennedy and Kerry went to work. In a letter initiated by them, but co-signed by the Senators from California, they urged Senator Daniel Inouye (Chairman, Defense Subcommittee, SAC) to provide his assistance

"in avoiding action in the conference on the FY 1992 Defense Appropriations Bill that in our judgment would be harmful to the interests of the Department of Defense and of several first-rate research and development facilities. We refer specifically to the provision in the Senate version of the FY 1992 Defense Appropriations Bill that would direct a 10 percent reduction....."⁵⁰

An identical letter was also sent to Senator Stevens, the previous year's major opponent of FFRDC funding.

Additionally, Senator Kennedy, a member of the SASC which had supported level-funding [no reductions] for FFRDCs, personally approached each of the SAC members who would sit on the conference committee to enlist their support of level FFRDC funding. Representative Moakley did the same on the HAC side. Further, Senator Kerry arranged for MITRE to give a private demonstration before the Defense Appropriations subcommittee of a classified project used in Operation Desert Storm. The influential SASC Chairman, Senator Nunn, was also in attendance. The

President of MITRE [Barry Horowitz] later remarked that he thought they were impressed.⁵¹

As in the House, the Senators from Massachusetts and California shared a mutual interest in preserving FFRDC funding. They were convinced that FFRDCs provided a valuable service to the government and were driven by the parochial motivation to save FFRDC jobs in their respective states. Again, just as in the FY 91 debate, the overriding issue was not national defense and what was in its best interests, but, rather, it evolved around the political interests and personal stakes of the key players [influencers] in the decision process.

The FY 92 Compromise

In the end, just like FY 91, the FY 92 decision on FFRDCs was a result of political compromise. Everyone involved shared a degree of success as well as a little failure in the outcome. The evidence of compromise is contained in the language of the Congressional Record, H10454, 18 Nov 91 where ultimate agreement on a 4% reduction from FY 91 funding levels is documented. This cut applied across the board to all but two FFRDCs with Murtha's SEI being one of the two so exempted.⁵²

More significant than the actual, lesser amount of the reduction (4%), is that through the FY 92 process, the face of the issue changed very subtly. Rather than an outright Congressional criticism of FFRDC growth as had been reflected in the FY 91 report language, the FY 92 conference committee affirmed a more positive view of FFRDCs. The Congressional Record states: "The conferees have reviewed the Department's use of FFRDCs and found that these institutions provide essential support for the Department and the nation."⁵³ For the champions of FFRDCs, this language constituted a victory for it re-establishes a Congressional consensus that FFRDCs are, in fact, a valuable national resource. The Air Force lobbying effort was successful. However, in the spirit of concession [if you will, a "give me" to Peter Lennon's influence] the report also states, "To insure the proper and predictable operation of this important national resource, we direct the Department to submit a plan...to insure effective and predictable management of FFRDCs."⁵⁴ So while Congress reaffirmed its support of FFRDCs, it also exercised its authority to review how they are being managed by the DOD.

SUMMARY

In conclusion, clearly, the FY 91 and FY 92 Congressional debate on FFRDC funding personified Model III, bureaucratic (political) decision-

making, at work. Just as Allison described, players in powerful positions (influential members of Congress), with parochial interests and personal stakes (constituencies and personal prestige), using established channels (Appropriations Committee Meetings and Joint Conferences), effected decisions (Appropriations Bills) which were the result of compromise and political maneuvering. Model III was alive and well.

Did these decisions serve the national interest? One would have to argue that ["yes"] they did. Congress had not "reviewed" its decision to create FFRDCs for some years. In a time of diminishing resources, the debate was healthy. It forced a new consensus that FFRDCs had not outlived their usefulness while also focusing attention on DOD management procedures to ensure use in compliance with public laws such as CICA. Furthermore, it demonstrated once again that Congress works just the way our founding fathers had intended--through debate, compromise and ultimately by establishing consensus.

END NOTES

1. Allison, Graham T. ESSENCE OF DECISION Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. USA: Harper Collins Publishers, 1971. 162.
2. Federal Acquisition Regulation. Part 35.017. 7 Mar 90.
3. Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) letter 84-1, dated 4 Apr 84, and Federal Acquisition Regulation 35.017, dated 7 Mar 90, provide policy on establishing, using, reviewing, and terminating FFRDCs.
4. Axtel, Richard. Director of Contracted Support Management. USAF. Air Force Systems Command. Hq Electronic Systems Division/ENK. Telephone Interview. 2 Dec 91.
5. Hq AFSC/ENS Briefing. "AFSC Federally Funded Research & Development Centers." 22 Mar 91. 22.
6. Axtel, Richard. Telephone Interview. 4 Dec 91.
7. Weible, Jack. "Pentagon's 10 Research Centers Suffer \$120 Million Budget Cut." Defense News. 12 Nov 90: 40.
8. Axtel, Richard. Telephone Interview. 4 Dec 91.
9. Weible, Jack. Defense News. 40.
10. Hq AFSC/ENS Briefing. 22 Mar 91. 10.
11. Axtel, Richard. Telephone Interview. 4 Dec 91.
12. United States. Senate. Senate Appropriations Committee Report 101-521. 12 Oct 90. 222.
13. Miga, Andrew. "Mystery Shrouds Origin of Cut." Boston Herald 12 Nov 91. 6.
14. United States. Congress. Appropriations Conference Report 101-938. Oct 90. 96.
15. Axtel, Richard. Telephone Interview. 4 Dec 91.
16. Axtel, Richard. Telephone Interview. 4 Dec 91.
17. Miga, Andrew. "Mystery Shrouds Origin of Cut." 6.
18. Axtel, Richard. Telephone Interview. 4 Dec 91.
19. Weible, Jack. Defense News. 12 Nov 90. 40.
20. Axtel, Richard. Telephone Interview. 4 Dec 91.

21. Axtel, Richard. Telephone Interview. 4 Dec 91.
2. Panzarella, Philip. "Annual MITRE/Aerospace Spring Review." Memorandum. 29 May 91. 1.
23. Axtel, Richard. Telephone Interview. 4 Dec 91.
24. SAC Report 101-521. 169.
25. Congress. Appropriations Conference Committee Report 101-938. Oct 90. 96.
26. Hq AFSC/ENS. Position Paper. "Protecting FFRDCs from Further Reductions." 15 Nov 91. 1.
27. Graser, John (Col. ret.). Former Director of Budget. USAF. Air Force Systems Command. Telephone Interview. 6 Dec 91.
28. Axtel, Richard. Telephone Interview. 4 Dec 91.
29. Congress. Appropriations Conference Report 101-938. Oct 91. 98.
30. Axtel, Richard. Telephone Interview. 4 Dec 91.
31. Graser, John. Telephone Interview. 6 Dec 91.
32. Hq AFSC/ENS, Memorandum for Hq AFSC/CC, 15 Nov 91, Subj: FFRDC Congressional Request.
33. Hq AFSC/ENS, Memorandum for Hq AFSC/CC, 15 Nov 91, Subj: FFRDC Congressional Request.
34. Congressman Joel Hefly, letter to Brigadier General Brett M. Dula. 22 Oct 90.
35. Hq AFSC/ENS, Memorandum, 15 Nov 91.
36. Hq AFSC/ENS, Memorandum, 15 Nov 91.
37. Hq AFSC/ENS, Memorandum, 15 Nov 91.
38. Axtel, Richard. Telephone Interview. 4 Dec 91.
39. Hq AFSC/ENS. Position Paper. "Protecting FFRDCs from Further Reductions." 15 Nov 91. 1.
40. Boston Herald. 12 Nov 91. 6.
41. Axtel, Richard. Telephone Interview. 4 Dec 91.
42. Miga, Andrew. Boston Herald. 12 Nov 91. 6.
43. Miga, Andrew. Boston Herald. 12 Nov 91. 6.

44. Miga, Andrew. Boston Herald. 12 Nov 91. 6.
45. Senators Edward M. Kennedy, John F. Kerry, Alan Cranston, John Seymour letter to the Honorable Daniel Inouye, Chairman Subcommittee on Defense, 18 Oct 1991.
46. Governor William F. Weld letter to the Honorable John Joseph Moakley, 28 Oct 91.
47. Miga, Andrew. Boston Herald. 12 Nov 91. 6.
48. Weible, Jack. Defense News. 12 Nov 90. 40
49. United States. Congress. House Appropriations Committee Report 102-95. 170.
50. Senators Kennedy, Kerry, Cranston, and Seymour letter to Honorable Daniel Inouye, 18 Oct 91.
51. Miga, Andrew. Boston Herald. 12 Nov 91. 6.
52. United States. Congress. Congressional Record H10454. 18 Nov 91.
53. Congressional Record. H10454. 18 Nov 91.
54. Congressional Record. H10454. 18 Nov 91.