



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

Interagency National Personnel Recovery Architecture: Final Report

Anil N. Joglekar, Project Leader
David J. Baratto, Deputy Project Leader
Kenneth J. Benway
Devol Brett
James T. Doherty
Robert Mohan
Samuel H. Packer
J. Douglas Sizelove
Joseph W. Stahl

July 2004

Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited.

IDA Paper P-3890

Log: H 04-000627

This work was conducted under contract DASW01 04 C 0003, Task BB-9-2143 for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Affairs. The publication of this IDA document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of that Agency.

© 2004 Institute for Defense Analyses, 4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882 • (703) 845-2000.

This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (NOV 95).

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

IDA Paper P-3890

**Interagency National Personnel Recovery
Architecture: Final Report**

Anil N. Joglekar, Project Leader
David J. Baratto, Deputy Project Leader
Kenneth J. Benway
Devol Brett
James T. Doherty
Robert Mohan
Samuel H. Packer
J. Douglas Sizelove
Joseph W. Stahl

PREFACE

This final report of the National Personnel Recovery Architecture (NPRO) 2-year study has been prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for the Honorable Jerry Jennings, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs), and Director, Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO). DPMO received direction and funding from the U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, to accomplish the study, with specific direction to consider all Service personnel, Government civilians, and Government contractors.

The objectives of this effort are to document the current NPRO baseline capability, to develop a strategic vision for personnel recovery (PR), to compare the baseline and the strategic vision to identify shortfalls and gaps in the personnel recovery architecture, to suggest potential solutions, to cost the proposed solutions, and to organize recommendations in order of priority.

IDA assembled a team of analysts with significant experience as military commanders, as senior military staff officers dealing with non-DoD departments/agencies, and as personnel with extensive backgrounds in personnel recovery and combat search and rescue. IDA made numerous visits to the Services, Combatant Commands, Embassies, and U.S. Federal departments and agencies to collect data for the study. IDA also conducted two interagency workshops to gather data and increase the awareness of PR in these agencies.

IDA would like to thank Col John Hobble of DPMO and his staff, who provided access and support to IDA for the conduct of this study. Numerous individuals from the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) also provided valuable input for this study. All other interagency departments and agencies contacted also provided excellent cooperation and support. The study team would particularly like to thank the Honorable Lincoln Bloomfield, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, and his staff in the Department of State.

The IDA review committee was chaired by Mr. Robert Soule, Director of OED, and consisted of Dr. David Graham, Dr. John Shea, Dr. Gary Comfort, Dr. Rex Rivolo, LCDR Mike Sheahan, and Ambassador (Ret.) Lauralee Peters.

INTERAGENCY NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECOVERY ARCHITECTURE: FINAL REPORT

Table of Contents

SUMMARY	1
A. Introduction	1
1. Methodology	2
2. Scope.....	2
3. Data Collection	3
4. Personnel Recovery Definition	3
5. Personnel Recovery Tasks	4
6. Two Distinct Personnel Recovery Situations	5
7. Report Outline.....	6
B. Strategic Vision	6
C. NPRA Analyses when Chief-of-Mission is in Charge	7
1. Baseline.....	7
2. Shortfalls.....	8
3. Finding.....	9
4. Potential Solutions	10
a. Policy/Doctrine.....	10
b. Organization	10
c. Training, Education, and Leader Development.....	10
d. Materiel.....	11
5. Costs and Recommendations	12
D. NPRA Analyses When Combatant Commander Is in Charge	13
1. Baseline.....	13
2. Shortfalls.....	14
a. Policy/Doctrine.....	14
b. Organization	14
c. Training and Leader Development.....	14
d. Materiel and Equipment	15
e. Personnel	15
f. Facilities.....	16
3. Finding.....	16
4. Potential Solutions	16
a. Policy/Doctrine.....	16
b. Organization and Personnel.....	16
c. Training and Leader Development.....	17
5. Costs and Recommendations	17
E. Key Recommendations.....	19

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	I-1
	A. Background.....	I-1
	B. Methodology and Objectives.....	I-2
	C. Definition.....	I-4
	D. Scope.....	I-4
	E. Data Collection.....	I-5
	F. Paper Outline.....	I-6
II.	BASELINE NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECOVERY ARCHITECTURE.....	II-1
	A. Two PR Situations.....	II-1
	1. Chief of Mission in Charge.....	II-2
	2. COCOM in Charge.....	II-4
	B. DOTMLPF Template.....	II-5
	C. Baseline Capability – Chief of Mission In Charge.....	II-6
	1. Doctrine and Organization.....	II-6
	a. Department of State Policy and Organization.....	II-6
	b. National Search and Rescue Plan.....	II-11
	2. Training and Leader Development.....	II-12
	3. Materiel.....	II-13
	4. Personnel and Facilities.....	II-13
	a. Personnel Involved in PR.....	II-13
	b. Contractors.....	II-13
	c. Facilities.....	II-14
	D. Baseline Capability – Combatant Commander In Charge.....	II-14
	1. Doctrine.....	II-14
	a. Missing Persons Act.....	II-14
	b. DoD Directive 2310.2, Personnel Recovery.....	II-15
	c. Current Personnel Recovery Definition.....	II-15
	d. Code of Conduct.....	II-16
	e. Joint and Service Doctrine.....	II-17
	2. Organization.....	II-18
	a. Personnel Recovery Advisory Group.....	II-18
	b. Personnel Recovery Response Cell.....	II-19
	c. Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery.....	II-19
	3. Training and Leader Development.....	II-20
	a. SERE Training for Personnel at Risk.....	II-20
	b. Training for Commanders and Staff.....	II-22
	c. Training for Recovery Forces.....	II-22
	d. Personnel Recovery Exercises.....	II-23
	e. Training Transformation Initiative.....	II-23
	f. Leader Development.....	II-24
	4. Materiel and Technology.....	II-24
	a. Isolated Personnel Systems.....	II-24
	b. Command and Control Systems.....	II-25

c.	Recovery Force Systems	II-26
5.	Personnel.....	II-26
a.	Personnel Involved in PR	II-26
b.	Contractors on the Battlefield.....	II-27
6.	Facilities.....	II-28
a.	SERE Training Facilities	II-28
b.	Continental U.S. Replacement Center	II-28
E.	BASELINE PR – COSTS (DoD).....	II-28
III.	PERSONNEL RECOVERY STRATEGIC VISION	III-1
A.	Background.....	III-1
B.	Objectives	III-2
C.	National Personnel Recovery Vision.....	III-2
1.	Strategic Context.....	III-2
2.	In Pursuit of Our National Goals	III-3
3.	Full-Spectrum Dominance and Protection.....	III-4
4.	Proposed Strategic National Task.....	III-5
D.	Transformation	III-5
1.	Path to Transformation	III-6
2.	Personnel Recovery Assessment Methodology.....	III-7
E.	Desired End States.....	III-8
1.	Direct and Guide	III-8
2.	Plan and Prepare Force Elements	III-11
3.	Execute the Mission.....	III-12
F.	The Bottom Line.....	III-12
IV.	PR ARCHITECTURE ANALYSES: CHIEF-OF-MISSION IN CHARGE.....	IV-1
A.	Shortfalls.....	IV-2
1.	Doctrine.....	IV-2
a.	National Policy and Doctrine	IV-2
b.	DoS Policies	IV-3
c.	DoD Policies.....	IV-4
d.	Contractor Policies	IV-4
e.	Host Nation Sovereignty	IV-5
2.	Organization.....	IV-5
a.	DoS Organizations.....	IV-5
b.	Role of JFCOM in Providing Interagency Support.....	IV-7
3.	Training and Education.....	IV-8
4.	Materiel	IV-10
5.	Leader Development.....	IV-10
6.	Personnel and Facilities	IV-11
B.	Findings	IV-11
C.	Potential Solutions.....	IV-12
1.	Doctrine/Policy	IV-12

a.	NSPD	IV-12
b.	Strategic Plan/MPP/EAP	IV-14
2.	Organization.....	IV-16
3.	Training, Education, and Leader Development	IV-18
4.	Materiel	IV-21
D.	Costs	IV-22
E.	Recommendations	IV-26

V.	PR ARCHITECTURE ANALYSES: COMBATANT COMMANDER IN CHARGE.....	V-1
A.	Shortfalls.....	V-2
1.	Doctrine.....	V-2
a.	Policy	V-2
b.	Joint and Service Doctrine.....	V-3
c.	Universal Joint Task List.....	V-3
d.	Intelligence	V-3
e.	Contractor Policies	V-4
2.	Organization.....	V-5
a.	Joint Staff.....	V-5
b.	OSD/DPMO.....	V-5
c.	JFCOM and JPRA	V-6
d.	Combatant Commands	V-6
e.	Organizations That Support Deployments	V-7
3.	Training and Leader Development	V-7
a.	PR Force Training	V-7
b.	PR Staff Training.....	V-7
c.	PR Exercises.....	V-8
d.	Isolated Personnel Training.....	V-9
e.	SERE Training Capacity	V-10
4.	Equipment and Technology	V-11
a.	Requirements	V-11
b.	R&D and Acquisition	V-12
5.	Personnel and Facilities	V-13
a.	PR Staff and Forces	V-13
b.	SERE Training Specialists and Schools.....	V-13
B.	Findings.....	V-15
1.	DoD PR Architecture Needs To Be Rationalized.....	V-15
2.	Some Solutions Are More Effective and More Efficient Than Others.....	V-15
C.	Potential Solutions.....	V-15
1.	Doctrine/Policy	V-16
a.	DoDD 2310.2.....	V-16
b.	DoDI 2310.3	V-16
c.	Joint and Service Doctrine.....	V-16
d.	Universal Joint Task List.....	V-17

e.	JFCOM and JPRA	V-17
f.	Intelligence Directive	V-18
2.	Organization.....	V-18
a.	Joint Staff.....	V-18
b.	DPMO.....	V-19
c.	JFCOM	V-19
d.	JPRA.....	V-19
e.	Combatant Commands	V-20
f.	Services.....	V-20
g.	CONUS Replacement Centers.....	V-20
3.	Training and Leader Development	V-21
a.	PR Staff Training.....	V-21
b.	PR Exercises	V-22
c.	Isolated Personnel Training	V-22
4.	Equipment and Technology	V-24
a.	Requirements	V-24
b.	R&D and Acquisition	V-24
5.	Personnel and Facilities	V-25
a.	PR Staff and Forces	V-25
b.	SERE Training.....	V-25
D.	Costs	V-26
1.	Doctrine.....	V-27
2.	Organization.....	V-27
a.	Joint Staff.....	V-27
b.	DPMO.....	V-27
c.	JFCOM	V-27
d.	JPRA.....	V-27
e.	Combatant Commanders	V-28
f.	Services.....	V-28
3.	Training and Leader Development	V-28
a.	PR Staff Training.....	V-28
b.	PR Exercises	V-29
c.	Isolated Personnel Training	V-29
4.	Equipment and Technology	V-29
a.	Requirements	V-29
b.	R&D and Acquisition	V-29
5.	Personnel and Facilities	V-30
a.	PR Staff and Forces	V-30
b.	SERE Training.....	V-30
6.	Cost of Addressing Contractor Coverage	V-30
E.	Recommendations	V-31

References.....	R-1
-----------------	-----

Appendix A – Acronyms

Appendix B – Glossary

- Appendix C – IDA Team Data Collection Interviews, Meetings, Visits, Conferences, Workshops and Other
- Appendix D – Additional Information for Baseline Capability for Training and Equipment
- Appendix E – Personnel Recovery Planning Guide
- Appendix F – Personnel Recovery Issues for USG Contractors
- Appendix G – Draft National Security Presidential Directive (Limited distribution, provided under separate cover)
- Appendix H – Suggestions for PR Exercise Improvements

List of Figures

1.	NPRO Assessment Methodology	3
2.	Full Dimensional Personnel Recovery.....	4
3.	Complexities of Diplomatic, Military, and Civil Coordination When Chief of Mission in Charge.....	9
I-1.	Architecture Components	I-3
I-2.	NPRO Assessment Methodology	I-3
I-3.	National Personnel Recovery Architecture Vision.....	I-4
II-1.	Diplomatic, Military and Civil Chains of Command – Chief of Mission in Charge.....	II-2
II-2.	Baseline PR Organization Chart – COCOM in Charge.....	II-5
II-3.	Air Force PR Budget.....	II-29
II-4.	Air Force CSAR Personnel.....	II-30
II-5.	Air Force Additional Resource Requirements.....	II-31
III-1.	National Strategy to Task Relationship Proposed for Personnel Recovery... ..	III-4
III-2.	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System	III-7
III-3.	Personnel Recovery Assessment Methodology	III-8
III-4.	Full-Spectrum Personnel Recovery	III-10
IV-1.	Template of PR Participants and Actions	IV-7
V-1.	Core Captivity Curriculum	V-23

List of Tables

1.	Costs for Items Recommended in NSPD.....	13
2.	Recommended Solutions for COCOMs.....	18
II-1.	SERE Service Training Requirements.....	II-21
II-2.	Current Level C Training Capacity.....	II-22
IV-1.	NFATC PR Related Courses	IV-9
IV-2.	Costs of Adding PR to NFATC Courses	IV-24
IV-3.	Costs for Implementing NSPD Recommendations.....	IV-26
IV-4.	Recommendation #1: NSPD Implementation.....	IV-27
V-1.	SERE Training Shortfalls Within Services.....	V-12
V-2.	Throughput Limiting Factors.....	V-15
V-3.	Recommendation #1	V-32

V-4.	Recommendation #2	V-33
V-5.	Recommendation #3	V-34
V-6.	Recommendation #4	V-35
V-7.	Recommendation #5: Contractor FAR	V-36
V-8.	Recommendation #6: Contractor Database	V-37
V-9.	Recommendation #7: Improve CONUS Replacement Centers	V-38

SUMMARY

A. INTRODUCTION

The House Appropriations Committee recommended in 2001 that the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) “conduct a government wide interagency needs assessment in order to define the components of a fully integrated national personnel recovery architecture. The assessment should include a consideration of Service personnel, civilians and contract personnel, and examine possible consolidation of training programs.” In April 2002, the DPMO tasked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to conduct a 2-year study addressing the congressional tasking. In July 2003, IDA provided an interim report, IDA Paper P-3779; this paper is the final report of this effort. DPMO has asked IDA for continued support to implement the recommendations of this report.

With increased requirements of peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, counter-narcotics operations, Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF), and the global war on terrorism, numerous U.S. military, civilian, and contractor personnel have been deployed overseas in harm’s way. The Department of Defense provides an implicit promise to Service personnel that they will be returned home in the event they are isolated or taken hostage. This study assesses increasing the scope of personnel recovery from military only to include Government civilians and Government contract personnel. This study assesses the policy and planning implications of broadening personnel recovery operations.

The broader interagency personnel recovery focus in this study is not merely a matter of congressional interest. Joint Vision 2020, which describes the Department of Defense vision for the year 2020, and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) memorandum of 17 September 2002 espouse the critical importance of interagency and coalition partnership with the military. In fact, the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Joint Operations Concept¹ approved by the SecDef stresses the requirement for full

¹ Joint Operations Concepts, Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Vision and Transformation Division, November 2003.

coordination and interoperability with interagency and multinational partners in addition to all military Services.

In this paper, the term *interagency* refers to all U.S. Government departments and agencies including the DoD.

1. Methodology

The study defines the National Personnel Recovery Architecture (NPRA) in three components: 1) direct and guide, 2) plan and prepare, and 3) execute the mission. The major emphasis of this study has been on the first two components of the architecture. The architecture components and the assessment methodology are shown in Figure 1. The direct and guide component includes doctrine and policy. The planning and preparing component includes three elements: potential isolated personnel, commanders or leaders and staff, and recovery forces.

The study methodology employed a four-step process. The first step was to document the National Personnel Recovery Architecture as it exists today, that is, to identify the NPRA baseline. The second step was to develop a strategic vision of where the U.S. should be in personnel recovery by the year 2020. The third step was to compare the baseline with the strategic vision to identify shortfalls and gaps in the current NPRA. These shortfalls and gaps are comprehensive and cover the entire spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities (referred to in this study as DOTMLPF). The fourth step was to identify potential solutions to improve the architecture, cost these solutions, and then recommend only a subset of the solutions in order of priority.

2. Scope

The basic purpose of the study is to identify ways to improve coordination and use of existing or planned personnel recovery capabilities of the DoD, other Government departments and agencies, and host nations where the U.S. personnel may be operating. Ultimately this study seeks to derive synergy between DoD and other Government departments and agencies in developing the national capability. The study does not examine options to increase the force structure or change roles and missions among Services and other Government agencies.

The study focuses on the recovery of U.S. personnel abroad in high-risk areas, and not on the homeland defense area. Similarly, the study does not focus on recovery of

personnel stationed overseas in low-risk, permissive environments, or on civil search and rescue (SAR).




Figure 1. NPRA Assessment Methodology

3. Data Collection

Data were collected from a wide variety of sources that included documents and on-site interviews with numerous offices in the National Security Council (NSC), the State Department, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), General Services Administration (GSA), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Justice, and other departments and agencies. Information was also gained from two interagency workshops at IDA, and from visits to Embassies in Colombia, Indonesia, and the Republic of the Philippines. IDA documented all visits, workshops, and country visits in memoranda to Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office, which are on file at IDA. Details on data collection are provided in Appendix C.

4. Personnel Recovery Definition

IDA found that there are several DoD definitions and interpretations of the term “personnel recovery.” Additionally, the term is neither codified nor understood by other government organizations.

IDA found that there are several activities, such as medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), combat search and rescue (CSAR), evacuation, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), non-conventional assisted recovery (NAR), unconventional assisted recovery (UAR), and hostage rescue (as shown in Figure 2) that relate in some way to personnel recovery. The present tendency is to consider each activity as a unique mission, to define each activity separately, and to consider these capabilities in isolation. Personnel recovery doctrine should seamlessly integrate all personnel recovery environments and scenarios across the entire spectrum of operations.




Figure 2. Full Dimensional Personnel Recovery

The NPRA study proposes the following definition of personnel recovery:

Personnel recovery is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery of U.S. military, Government civilians, and Government contractors who become isolated from friendly control while participating in U.S. sponsored activities abroad, and of other persons as designated by the President.

5. Personnel Recovery Tasks

DoD uses a common task system and language (referred to as the Universal Joint Task List, or UJTL) to describe the tasks associated with any given mission. Tasks are divided into categories by level of war: strategic, which is further broken down into strategic-national and strategic-theater, operational, and tactical. This hierarchy serves as

an important reference system for commanders, operational planners, combat developers, and trainers in communicating mission essential tasks, conditions, and standards. Just as there were several definitions of the mission area, IDA found multiple versions of the top-level strategic-national task that is intended to describe tasks necessary to accomplish national military strategy. Derivative of the proposed personnel recovery mission area defined above, IDA proposes the following description of the associated personnel recovery strategic-national task for DoD. This task emphasizes the role that DoD should have in coordinating personnel recovery efforts interagency-wide and worldwide on a strategic-national level.

*Coordinate Personnel Recovery Worldwide – This task requires **national, (interagency), and multinational coordination** to develop **strategic direction, policy, and plans** for support missions in all operational and threat environments. This task includes reporting, locating, and supporting the person(s) and their family, recovery, and return of the isolated person(s) to their family or duty. It includes related mission planning areas such as Search and Rescue (SAR), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR), Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR), and Hostage Rescue; it includes support to the relevant planning of the other departments and agencies such as the Department of State Mission Performance Planning (MPP), Emergency Action Planning (EAP), and NEO. It is an integral part of Force Protection Planning.*

6. Two Distinct Personnel Recovery Situations

After the visits to Colombia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, IDA realized that there are two distinct situations that would have an impact on the National Personnel Recovery Architecture. The first situation is primarily what we have seen in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, where the Combatant Commander (COCOM) has been in charge of personnel recovery, and all other Government departments and agencies and contractors work through the COCOM. All U.S. and coalition personnel were recovered both in Afghanistan and Iraq from October 2001 until about March 2004, largely as a result of thorough planning and adequate resources. After March 2004, the enemy in Iraq changed tactics to target soft targets, such as contractors and civilians from coalition countries, and the success rate declined.

On the other hand, for other countries, the Chief of U.S. Mission (CoM) is in charge of personnel recovery incidents. Besides the State Department offices, other agencies present such as FBI, DoD, Drug Enforcement Agency, Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Peace Corps would be involved in a personnel recovery incident. In addition, host nation sovereignty issues are factors that must be considered in conducting personnel recovery operations and that might at times impose constraints. Although each Embassy has an Emergency Action Plan that could be applied to a personnel recovery incident as a generic crisis response, it is not exercised often and most personnel recovery responses are *ad hoc*. In fact, the current Emergency Action Plan includes evacuation and hostage rescue, but not personnel recovery in the sense of an early, near immediate response necessary for evading or isolated individuals. From the study team’s perspective, this situation requires significant improvement in developing the National Personnel Recovery Architecture and improving planning and readiness to deal with such incidents.

There are a number of complex situations still to be dealt with in personnel recovery planning. Factors that must be considered include the Chief of Mission’s security responsibilities contained in the President’s letter of instructions, State Department policy guidance, and the nature of American communities overseas that include non-U.S. Government American citizens, Foreign National Employees, and third-country national (TCN) contractors of the USG. Combatant Commands similarly will find themselves needing to consider issues related to third-country national contractors.

7. Report Outline

This report consists of this Summary and five chapters:

- I. Introduction
- II. Baseline National Personnel Recovery Architecture
- III. Personnel Recovery Strategic Vision
- IV. Personnel Recovery Architecture Analyses: Chief-of-Mission in Charge
- V. Personnel Recovery Architecture Analyses: Combatant Commander in Charge

This report generally is organized along the lines of the two personnel recovery situations – when the Chief of Mission is in charge and when the Combatant Commander is in charge. Both situations require a fully integrated national architecture.

B. STRATEGIC VISION

The strategic vision links personnel recovery to the National Security Strategy and provides end states for a National Personnel Recovery Architecture in the next 10 to

15 years. The vision builds upon supporting national-level strategic plans such as the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development Strategic Plan and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004. A full-dimensional PR capability will require national (interagency) and multinational coordination to develop strategic direction, policy, and plans across the entire range of threat environments, response processes, and potential scenarios.

The vision describes the requirements generation process and desired end states for each of the three architectural components. These end states are summarized below:

- Personnel recovery policy and doctrine that are coherent and cover all Government departments and agencies and their contractors. Policy and procedures that will support execution by a joint task force commander, by a unified combatant commander, or by a Chief of Mission. PR scope and mission requirements identified to seamlessly integrate all PR methods across the entire spectrum of operations.
- PR force elements adequately programmed, organized, trained, equipped, and resourced. Communications, location, identification, authentication, and signaling capabilities for isolated personnel, which are operationally effective, suitable, and available when/where needed.
- Adequate PR policies, guidance, planning, and preparations such that PR missions are executed successfully, quickly, and seamlessly.

Finally, the vision requires a transformation in PR planning and training by leveraging a diversity of capabilities and means throughout the interagency community that includes a more inclusive definition of "jointness" (e.g., all Federal agencies, international coalition partnering nations, and international organizations).

C. NPRA ANALYSES WHEN CHIEF-OF-MISSION IS IN CHARGE

1. Baseline

The Ambassador, or Chief of Mission, bears overall responsibility for the safety and security of U.S. Government personnel and American citizens abroad. The U.S. Government has diplomatic relations with about 160 countries. In most of these countries, the U.S. maintains an embassy, which usually is located in the capital. The U.S. also might have branches of the embassy, called consulates, in other locations within the country. When the U.S. does not have full diplomatic relations with a nation, the U.S. might be represented by only a Liaison Office or Interest Section. In addition, the U.S.

has representation or missions at international organizations. There are more than 250 missions or posts throughout the world.

The Ambassador leads the Embassy in furthering U.S. National Security objectives abroad by implementing the Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Strategic Plan. The DoS and USAID Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2009² sets forth the Secretary of State's direction and priorities for both organizations. In considering the security and safety of U.S. Government personnel, the Chief of Mission is governed by a number of complex region/country specific policy factors that include, for example, U.S. National Security Strategy, foreign policy and policy toward the region or country, host/partner nation sovereignty issues, and human rights considerations. The Emergency Action Plan³ process guides the Chief of Mission in contingency planning for a broad range of situations that consider various threat conditions, deteriorating security environments, and feasible response options, including evacuation of U.S. Government personnel and American citizens.

2. Shortfalls

Extensive research by the IDA team revealed that there is *no specific policy or guidance at the interagency level concerning personnel recovery*. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1 abolished previous groups and authorities concerning oversight of personnel recovery matters, and there is no current consensus on interagency definition and scope of personnel recovery. Lack of guidance at the national level coupled with traditional views of personnel recovery tends to reinforce the flawed notion that personnel recovery is a mission performed exclusively by a DoD rescue force, normally in the context of a downed pilot situation. Additionally, while the Emergency Action Planning process is in place, it focuses primarily on force protection, evacuation, and hostage rescue, and fails to adequately deal with personnel recovery. Further, the concept that personnel recovery policies, procedures, and capabilities must already be in

² Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009, U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, DoS/USAID Publication 11084, Released August 2003.

³ The Emergency Action Plan is developed by each Foreign Service post to serve as a reference in dealing with any situation or occurrence of a serious nature; developing suddenly and unexpectedly; typically posing a threat to U.S. lives, property, or interests; and demanding action. The plan should outline useful organization structures for emergency management; discuss response mechanisms within the DoS and other U.S. Government agencies; highlight the kinds of information the post will need to plan for specific emergencies; contain checklists to ensure rapid, clear, and complete responses; and identify post emergency responsibilities.

place to respond quickly in the event of an isolated, evading, or captive person is not clearly understood outside DoD. Complicating this situation even more is the organizationally complex environment surrounding any personnel recovery incident. The organization chart shown in Figure 3 portrays the environment, showing the multiple Government departments and agencies that are a part of the coordination or notification process for personnel recovery. Because personnel recovery or hostage rescue plans are not frequently exercised, accomplishing necessary coordination could take hours to days when an event occurs. Planning for personnel recovery operations is often approached without timeliness considerations, in an *ad hoc* manner, and from a U.S. unilateral perspective, by failing to properly consider the complex issues of host nation sovereignty, and the host nation’s professed capability as opposed to its actual capability. Contingency plans for personnel recovery incidents are not required as a part of the emergency action plan, and therefore not in place.




Figure 3. Complexities of Diplomatic, Military, and Civil Coordination When Chief of Mission in Charge

3. Finding

As a result of a lack of national guidance and the lack of consensus on the definition and scope of personnel recovery, planning and preparations for potential personnel recovery incidents by U.S. Missions abroad are inadequate as evidenced by a lack of contingency plans.

4. Potential Solutions

a. Policy/Doctrine

In conducting this study, it became apparent that a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) is required to ensure a common understanding of personnel recovery policy across the U.S. Government, and to establish a national policy with defined interagency roles and responsibilities. The NSPD would define *personnel recovery*, establish policy on who is covered under what conditions, describe the conditions of who is in charge (Chief of Mission or Combatant Commander), and delineate responsibilities and actions to be taken interagency-wide to establish and sustain a viable National Personnel Recovery Architecture.

b. Organization

- Assign the National Security Council Counterterrorism Security Group the authority for personnel recovery policy oversight and interagency policy coordination at the national level.
- Establish personnel recovery offices within DoS and other affected non-DoD departments and agencies that will plan for personnel recovery incidents and prepare their personnel with survival training and equipment.
- Establish a personnel recovery focal point located in 30 to 50 U.S. Missions in selected countries, based on the Department of State Travel Warning List. These could be established in a phased manner, with two to five being established each year over the 10- to 15-year vision period.
- Develop other innovative organizational approaches to addressing current shortfalls such as those being implemented by International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)/Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

c. Training, Education, and Leader Development

Survival, evasion, and resistance training must be provided to interagency personnel deployed overseas. There are three possible avenues to provide such training:

- The Department of State National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC) should develop PR-related course material utilizing the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency course material, to be added to the training for USG personnel deployed overseas, and train managers on risk assessment, risk mitigations, and planning skills to respond in a time sensitive manner. Maximum throughput training capacity is estimated to be 7,500 students per year based on course size and frequency provided by NFATC.

- The Joint Personnel Recovery Academy in Spokane, Washington, trains selective customers in specialized evasion and resistance skills based on the customer organization mission profile. Courses should be appropriately tailored for specific interagency departments and agencies.
- Courses and instructional material could be outsourced to private companies, whose courses are accredited by a responsible Government agency.

U.S. Government departments and agencies that have people at risk or have personnel recovery-capable assets should participate in a regular series of interagency personnel recovery workshops and exercises to address major areas of concern and topical issues. The Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy (ICAP), managed by the General Services Administration, is an excellent example of how a more formalized forum can serve purposes far beyond merely the exchange of information, resulting in the development of codified interagency policy. In addition, each of the 30 to 50 selected missions discussed in Organization section should conduct annual personnel recovery exercises to maintain personnel readiness standards.

While policy and doctrine can describe what can and should be done, leaders make it happen and actually serve as the prime movers for change. In order to foster leader development and involvement, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), in collaboration with DoS, should develop a version of its Fundamentals of PR course that is tailored for the interagency community incorporating the Emergency Action planning process and personnel recovery assessment process described in Chapter IV and Appendix E for Chief of Mission action. The National Defense University (NDU)⁴ and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center should also collaborate and incorporate a version of JPRA's Personnel Recovery course into their curricula.

d. Materiel

DoD, Department of State, and selected other departments and agencies should develop an Interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to establish a forum and a mechanism to ensure unity of effort and mutual support on matters of research, development, and acquisition.

Resource pooling between the Department of State and DoD should be explored. Focus should be placed on reorienting and supplementing Security Assistance programs

⁴ The National Defense University Interagency Transformation, Education, and After-Action Review (ITEA) Program is well suited for this type of initiative.

and leveraging U.S. Agency for International Development programs to improve host nation personnel recovery equipment. Such improvements should be accomplished in conjunction with the addition of personnel recovery focal points in specific U.S. Missions.

5. Costs and Recommendations (Details in Chapter IV)

Table 1 provides the recommendations selected from the potential solutions in the order of priority for the situation when a Chief of Mission is in charge, including the cost estimates to implement the NSPD. Today most of the PR costs are borne by the Air Force – about \$430 million for FY04 – which can serve as a benchmark for comparison purposes. Because other Services do not have a dedicated PR mission, costs are not easily identifiable; PR costs are assumed to be less than 10 percent of the Air Force costs.

The following recommendations are made:

- Assign personnel recovery policy oversight and interagency policy coordination at the national level to the National Security Council Counterterrorism Security Group.
- Establish personnel recovery offices within DoS and other affected non-DoD departments and agencies.
- Transform the DoS National Foreign Affairs Training Center to develop PR-related course material and add it to training for those deploying overseas and for managers. Note that the cost estimate for this recommendation does not include salaries of trainees.
- Establish personnel recovery focal points in 30 to 50 U.S. Missions based on the DoS Travel Warning List. Implementation can be phased over time to ease workload and funding issues.
- Reorient/supplement current Security Assistance Programs to improve host nation personnel recovery equipment. Implementation should be done in conjunction with establishment of focal points in previous bullet.

Table 1. Costs for Items Recommended in NSPD

	Initial Cost to Set Up or Prepare for New Facility	Average Yearly Costs^a
Support for National Security Council Counter-Terrorism Security Group		\$1.0
PR Offices in DoS and 12 agencies ^b		\$4.9
SERE Training pipeline for 7,500 non-DoD personnel		\$1.3 ^c
Chief of Mission PR focal points and exercises for 30 to 50 countries ^d	\$4.5 - \$7.5	\$7.5 - \$12.5
Security Assistance Program for 2 to 5 countries to improve PR equipment		\$2 - \$5
Total	\$4.5 - \$7.5	\$16.7 – \$24.7

^a All costs are in millions of U.S. dollars

^b Three-person DoS office, one person in other agency offices

^c Salaries of personnel being trained are not included.

^d 1 person PR focal point per CoM

D. NPRA ANALYSES WHEN COMBATANT COMMANDER IS IN CHARGE

1. Baseline

The Combatant Commander normally delegates the personnel recovery responsibility to the Joint Forces Air Component Commander, who establishes a Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC). Each Combatant Command component establishes a Rescue Coordination Center (RCC), and Special Operation Forces (SOF) establish an Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Center (UARCC). The Combatant Command that is in combat (e.g., Central Command, or CENTCOM) normally gets adequate personnel and assets to execute the mission. Thus CENTCOM has about 27 rescue coordination centers in and around Iraq and Afghanistan, and about 17 personnel to staff the JSRC. Other Government agencies generally work with the Joint Search and Rescue Center or UARCC to accomplish their objectives.

2. Shortfalls

The NPRA shortfalls, for the situation when the Combatant Commander is in charge, are presented in the DOTMLPF construct below.

a. Policy/Doctrine

The DoD doctrine based on the Missing Persons Act (MPA) is narrow; currently it is applicable only to DoD personnel, and not to other U.S. Government, contractor, or allied personnel. The DoD Joint Publication 3-50.2, Doctrine for Combat Search and Rescue, is outdated and focused only on CSAR, and not on Personnel Recovery. Similarly DoD Directive 2310.2, Personnel Recovery, does not directly apply to other Government agencies. The GAO has cited a lack of standardization of necessary contract language and a failure to integrate contractors into plans and operations.

b. Organization

The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, which is funded and staffed by the Air Force, is not yet a joint agency.

The current Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG) is primarily focused on information sharing rather than management and oversight of national personnel recovery capability. The Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC), primarily an *ad hoc* group convened by DPMO upon report of a personnel recovery incident, lacks sufficient knowledge, training, and infrastructure support to fulfill its charter “to facilitate informed decision-making by DoD principals.”

The intelligence support agencies do not clearly understand the Joint Search and Rescue Centers’ needs, and JSRCs do not understand the capabilities and limitations of intelligence agencies.

CONUS Replacement Centers, which process contractors being deployed, are not providing basic personnel recovery training.

c. Training and Leader Development

Many senior leaders within DoD and other Government agencies do not have an adequate appreciation of the personnel recovery problem faced by their personnel when deployed overseas. Most senior managers and Flag Officers, when briefed by the IDA study team, concurred that more senior leader education and awareness were needed.

Currently, Services conduct unit level personnel recovery training. However, there are no comprehensive Joint Staff sponsored personnel recovery exercises conducted today.

Together the Services and the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency provide excellent survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training. However, the capacity and throughput are significantly limited for both DoD and other Government departments and agencies. The Level C training designed for the high-risk of capture personnel consists of three types: wartime, peacetime government detainees, and hostage resistance training. The distinction among these types of training is diminishing. This specialized training is no longer suited for the 21st century environment, and is inefficient.

d. Materiel and Equipment

After the Scott O’Grady incident in 1995, DoD bought Hook-112 survivor radios as the short-term fix and initiated the Combat Survivor Evader Locator (CSEL) program to develop a long-term solution for locating and communicating with isolated individuals. Three systems are available for fielding: Hook, Global Personnel Recovery System (GPRS), and CSEL. It appears that over the next decade, all three systems will be operating in DoD because there are not adequate numbers of any one type. The issue for the non-DoD interagency will be what system to buy, which could be very confusing. Similarly, theaters use different automated tools for personnel recovery command and control. However, the bottom line is that systems are not available in adequate numbers and that multiple systems result in interoperability problems.

Based on Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Central Command would like to have a miniature survival radio that includes biometric measurements in addition to locations. Such a radio, however, does not exist today.

e. Personnel

Because personnel recovery command and control is not a career field in any of the Services, when the need arises in a combat theater, people have to be trained on the job. With the exception of Central Command, all other combatant commands lack sufficient numbers of adequately trained personnel. Central Command is augmented by personnel from other Combatant Commands. The contractor recovery issue is common both to combatant commander and Chief of Mission situations in that contractors are generally not adequately prepared for personnel recovery situations if they arise, and no procedures exist to recover these personnel.

f. Facilities

The majority of facility shortfalls are in survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps lack adequate facilities for SERE training and have limited growth capability. The Air Force and Joint Personnel Recovery Agency facilities are adequate.

3. Finding

Because Joint doctrine on personnel recovery does not exist and current Service doctrines are conflicting, joint personnel recovery requirements are not identified and programmed.

4. Potential Solutions

a. Policy/Doctrine

DPMO needs to update DoD Directive (DoDD) 2310.2, Personnel Recovery, and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 2310.3, Personnel Recovery Response Cell Procedures, to reinvigorate the Personnel Recovery Advisory Group and Personnel Recovery Response Cell and to address non-DoD interagency participation in the DoD process. Second, JPRA needs to update Joint Publication 3-50, Doctrine for Combat Search and Rescue, to synchronize it with the Personnel Recovery NSPD, including a change of the definition of *joint* to include interagency and coalition personnel. JPRA needs to develop the Personnel Recovery Universal Joint Task List (UJTLs) and Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs), and ensure that Combatant Commands are using these in their exercises. Similarly, development of draft DoD Directive 3115.9aa, Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery, should be expedited.

The issues related to contractor personnel recovery coverage require addressing, modifying, and standardizing the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) with regard to risk assessment, risk mitigation planning, contractor accountability, training, survivability, and recoverability.

b. Organization and Personnel

JPRA should be made a truly joint organization and should be funded jointly. IDA recommends that Personnel Recovery-related organizations at the Joint Staff, DPMO, JFCOM, JPRA, COCOMs, and Services be strengthened with more personnel and resources.

CONUS Replacement Centers should be properly resourced to meet basic pre-deployment Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training for individual military, civil, and contractor replacements.

c. Training and Leader Development

The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency should develop a one-hour Personnel Recovery briefing for senior leaders of DoD and other Government departments and agencies. A seminar and a day-long tutorial should be given by the National Defense University and National Foreign Affairs Training Center for leader development regarding personnel recovery. Interagency, coalition, and contractor personnel should be trained in the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency fundamentals of PR course. IDA suggests that Desert Rescue and Northern Edge exercises be sponsored by the Joint Staff, and restructured to include Personnel Recovery end-to-end exercises in realistic operational environments. Those exercises must ensure the participation of commanders and staffs and tactical players in the Personnel Recovery process.

DoD survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training needs to be transformed to a core resistance training curriculum with increased throughput capacity for both DoD and interagency personnel.

5. Costs and Recommendations (Details in Chapter V)

Table 2 summarizes the recommendations selected from the potential solutions for the COCOM in charge situation along with their costs. These recommendations listed below in priority order are focused on improving personnel recovery capabilities within DoD as well as making improvements in the non-DoD interagency community.

Because current personnel at the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands are part-timers, their capabilities are overstretched. With implementation of NSPD, DPMO would have to accomplish increased Interagency coordination, which would require that some personnel be added to DPMO. The same is true for the Joint staff and Combatant Commands. The JPRA staff would be increased primarily to develop Interagency courses and improve awareness within DoD. The JFCOM staff would be increased primarily to plan and conduct personnel recovery focused exercises. The proposed personnel do not have to be dedicated to the task. However, for costing purposes, they are costed as dedicated. Thus overall the numbers are not exact but reasonable for cost purposes.

- Add two additional personnel each to DPMO and the Joint Staff to support new interagency coordination responsibilities and to develop a PR strategy and modernization plan.
- Add one additional personnel to each of four COCOM staffs to plan and execute PR operations as a full-time job.
- Supplement the JPRA staff with 10 additional personnel to develop versions of its PR 200, 300, and 400 series courses suitable for use by the non-DoD interagency community and coalition partners.
- Provide 20 contract personnel to the JFCOM staff to coordinate, plan, conduct, evaluate, and conduct after-action reviews for improved PR Exercises Desert Rescue and Northern Edge.

Table 2. Recommended Solutions for COCOMs

Recommendation	Average Yearly Costs^a
Improve PR Capabilities of DPMO, the Joint Staff, and JPRA	\$1.0
Improve PR Capability of Combatant Commanders	\$0.8
Improve PR Unit and Commander Training With JPRA Support (10 Persons)	\$1.6
Improve PR Exercises Desert Rescue and Northern Edge	\$6.0
Total:	\$9.4

^a in millions of U.S. dollars

To improve contractor personnel recovery coverage, the following steps (with their associated estimated costs) should be taken:

- DoD in cooperation with DoS and the General Services Administration should develop standardized Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) language for Government contracts that includes deliberate consideration of risk assessment, risk mitigation planning, force protection measures, and personnel recovery requirements. Associated costs would be negotiated in the solicitation process between the Government and the contractor, on a case-by-case basis, depending on the statement of work, the risk mitigation plan, and the level of risk acceptable to both parties. An effort is already underway to review, revise, and update the DoD FAR; personnel recovery issues are currently under consideration. Since this effort is part of the normal function of various agencies, it is not expected to cost additionally.

- General Services Administration in cooperation with DoD, DoS and the CONUS Replacement Centers should establish and sustain a contractor database for those deploying to and working overseas. These data would be shared among parent and gaining commands and organizations, Joint Search and Rescue Centers, and/or personnel recovery focal points. Costs for the necessary computer systems, servers, and secure network connections, based on projects of similar type and scale, are estimated to be \$1.5 million for development and acquisition, and \$700,000 for annual maintenance.
- CRCs should improve the personnel recovery related training they provide. The need for this improvement is based on the study team's visit to the CRC at Fort Benning, GA and observation of training sessions. While it is possible to identify the course material that must be added, it is extremely difficult to estimate the throughput requirements for contractors. The United States General Accounting Office in its report titled, "Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DoD Plans" (GAO Report 03-695, June 2003), stated that DoD could not provide any information on the total cost of contractor support to deployed forces. Likewise, IDA was not able to determine the number of contract personnel deployed or being deployed. Improving this training is a recognized requirement that has a cost that cannot be estimated at this time.

E. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

- The proposed NSPD is essential to establish a coherent and cohesive National Personnel Recovery Architecture that include U.S. Government departments and agencies. The NSPD will provide a clear definition of the term "personnel recovery" as it applies to the interagency community. It will provide a succinct statement of our national policy with regard to personnel recovery of all U.S. personnel participating in a Government-sponsored activity or mission overseas. The NSPD will set in place the essential elements of the needed organizational infrastructure. Also, the DoD doctrine document, Joint Pub 3-50, should be made compatible with the NSPD and published. The NSPD must be supported with adequate funding and personnel resources.
- Department of State, in collaboration with DoD, should initiate a program to assess and enhance U.S. Embassies' readiness for personnel recovery incidents. The program could be implemented in a phased manner in two to five Embassies per year extending over the next 10 to 15 years. Emphasis will be on leveraging all available programs and resources, including Security Assistance, USAID, and host nation assets.
- If U.S. Government contractors are to be provided the same considerations for personnel recovery that are afforded to U.S. military and Government

civilians, a comprehensive review and standardization of the Government contracting process would be needed. Revising Federal Acquisition Regulations is one option to clarify Government versus contractor responsibilities, risk assessment, and risk mitigation planning. In addition, the Joint Staff is already promulgating joint policy and doctrine to integrate contractors into military force planning and operations based on the Missing Personnel Act.

- The approach to and the content of Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training should be totally revised. Core Captivity training, which combines the unique curricula for prisoner of war, terrorist hostage, and peacetime governmental detention situations into a common captivity situation curriculum, should be implemented as soon as possible. Both DoD and non-DoD requirements need to be better identified; however, pipeline training for non-DoD deployable personnel should be implemented as soon as possible.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The expansion of transnational and international threats over the past decade has caused a greater demand on multinational and interagency participation in the conduct of operations today. This is a fundamentally new challenge. It requires the active participation and unity of effort on the part of all interagency groups within Government, as well as non-governmental partners. Recognition of vulnerabilities (including asymmetric vulnerabilities such as soft targets and seemingly low value targets), attendant force protection measures, and personnel recovery requirements are the first steps in a transformational planning process that addresses these expanded threats.

This new set of environments has resulted in expansion of U.S. commitments with increased numbers of Americans being stationed overseas to carry out the National Security objectives of the Government. The broad nature of those commitments, coupled with the concerns and requests of host nation governments, results in the overseas assignments of military personnel, USG civilians, and USG contractors. While assignment of Americans overseas is not a post-Cold War phenomenon, the numbers of Americans overseas who are vulnerable and the threat types and levels in the areas in which they are deployed have increased dramatically.

Many of these Americans, particularly the civilians and contractors, are now at significant risk of becoming isolated, captured, and exploited. The Department of Defense (DoD) has made a commitment to military members who become missing or isolated to make all efforts to locate them, to secure their recovery, and to return them to freedom with honor. Currently, the USG is not structured to accomplish that task of personnel recovery in an efficient and effective manner for all those official civilians and contractors engaged in support of U.S. missions or activities. The main obstacle to accomplishing the task appropriately is the lack of a coherent national policy, which precludes the development of a comprehensive set of plans, procedures, and agreements between agencies.

Congress has recognized the increased risk faced by Americans overseas and tasked the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) to “conduct a

government-wide interagency needs assessment in order to define the components of a fully-integrated National Personnel Recovery Architecture (NPRAs). The assessment should include a consideration of Service personnel, civilians and contract personnel and examine the possible consolidation of training programs....” DPMO selected the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to conduct this study because of IDA’s past experience in the study and analysis of various aspects of combat search and rescue and personnel recovery (PR). IDA completed an interim study report, IDA Paper P-3779, on NPRAs in July 2003. This paper constitutes the final study report.

The broader interagency personnel recovery focus is this study is not merely a matter of congressional interest. Joint Vision 2020, which describes the Department of Defense vision for the year 2020, and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) memorandum of 17 September 2002 espouse the critical importance of interagency and coalition partnership with the military. In fact, the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Joint Operations Concept¹ approved by the SecDef stresses the requirement for full coordination and interoperability with interagency and multinational partners in addition to all military Services.

In this paper, the term *interagency* refers to all U.S. Government departments and agencies including the DoD.

B. METHODOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES

This study has defined the NPRAs as consisting of the three components shown in Figure I-1. Those components are the guidelines and policies that address national personnel recovery, the planning and preparations required of recovery force elements (isolated personnel, commanders and staffs, and recovery forces), and the elements of mission execution (report, locate, support, recover, return/repatriate). The architecture components and the assessment methodology are shown in Figure I-2.

The study employed a four-step methodology. The first step was to document the present capability or baseline national personnel recovery architecture. The second step was to define a strategic vision of NPRAs appropriate for the 2015-2020 timeframe. Figure I-3 represents the scope of the NPRAs vision, with all appropriate Government agencies operating under a common set of policies and guidelines. The third step was to compare the baseline with the vision to identify gaps in the architecture. These gaps or

¹ Joint Operations Concepts, Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Vision and Transformational Division, November 2003.

shortfalls are broad in scope and cover the entire spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). The fourth step was to identify and cost those viable options for filling the gaps. The overall objective of this effort is to make realistic, tangible improvements to the NPRA.




Figure I-1. Architecture Components




Figure I-2. NPRA Assessment Methodology




Figure I-3. National Personnel Recovery Architecture Vision

C. DEFINITION

Personnel Recovery is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery of U.S. military, Government civilians, and Government contractors, who become isolated from friendly control while participating in U.S. sponsored activities abroad, and of other persons as designated by the President.

This definition was developed by the study team during the conduct of the study as a working definition since there was no common definition of the term “Personnel Recovery.” While the working definition has gained informal consensus among the interagency members participating in this study, it is not yet codified throughout the Government. The U.S. Central Command has expanded this definition to include coalition partners.

D. SCOPE

A basic premise of this study was to maximize the coordination and use of existing and planned DoD, other USG, and host nation recovery assets, forces, and personnel. As a result, for example, this study has not attempted to determine whether existing search and rescue helicopters or supporting command and control platforms need to be supplemented or replaced.

This study is focused most strongly on the rescue of U.S. personnel abroad in high risk of isolation/capture areas. Although the study does not focus on those personnel stationed overseas in low-risk, permissive environments, the findings and recommendations are also applicable in those locations should the need arise.

Although the study does not address making changes in DoD or other interagency roles and missions, it does address what the IDA team considered to be major joint, interagency, and coalition issues. (For more detail on coalition issues, refer to IDA Paper P-3705, *Improving PR in a Coalition Environment*, May 2002.) The study makes no attempt to alter assigned roles and missions. For example, determining whether a recovery should be accomplished by conventional or special forces is beyond the scope of the study.

E. DATA COLLECTION

Data were collected from a wide variety of sources that include available documentation, on-site interviews, and two interagency workshops, hosted by IDA, structured to exchange and collect information. Documents contributing to the study are listed in References. Details on specific interviews – 32 with non-DoD interagency organizations and 27 with DoD organizations – are contained in trip reports provided to DPMO and on file at IDA. Study team members also participated in 23 conferences, meetings, and workshops, and observed five training exercises and related events.

One of the difficulties faced by the study team was the limited knowledge of personnel recovery within the non-DoD interagency community. The majority of interagency members are familiar with the evacuation process controlled by the Department of State (DoS), and they have become increasingly concerned with the potential for hostage taking and the need for force protection and risk mitigation. However, insofar as DoD views the concept of personnel recovery, the requirement to place a premium on a timely response is currently not an explicit part of most non-DoD interagency thinking and planning. Accordingly, it was necessary to explain personnel recovery in some detail to many in our interview audiences.

Several key components of the data collection effort were critical to the conduct of this study:

- Visits to the Embassies in Colombia, Indonesia, and the Republic of the Philippines
- Personnel Recovery Interagency Workshops, cochaired by the DoS and DoD, in February 2003 and February 2004

- Meetings with the General Services Administration (GSA) regarding the non-DoD fleet of aircraft and the status of contractors deployed overseas
- Meetings with the organizations that provide training on survival, evasion, resistance, and escape to those potentially at risk
- Visits to operations centers and coordination cells in various unified and component commands, U.S. Coast Guard, Joint Interagency Task Forces, DoS, and other agencies to observe capabilities related to planning and command and control of PR missions.

The details of this data collection effort are contained in Appendix C, Data Collection. All those contacted during the conduct of the study were extremely responsive to the team's needs and candid during discussions. The information provided by this wide range of sources formed the basis for the description of the baseline PR capability and the analysis documented in the following chapters.

F. PAPER OUTLINE

The report is organized in a summary, five chapters, and appendices. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II describes the current national personnel recovery capability baseline, presented in two general personnel recovery environments – a situation where a U.S. Chief of Mission (CoM) is in charge and a situation where a Combatant Commander (COCOM) is in charge. Chapter III is the strategic vision of where the U.S. national personnel recovery capability needs to be in 10 to 15 years. In Chapter IV, the *CoM in charge situation* is analyzed, comparing the baseline to the vision. Shortfalls, findings, potential solutions, and recommendations are identified. Similarly, Chapter V documents the analysis of the *COCOM in charge situation* with the identification of shortfalls, findings, potential solutions, and recommendations. The appendices contain detailed information that supports and expands upon the contents of the main paper.

CHAPTER II

BASELINE NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECOVERY ARCHITECTURE

II. BASELINE NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECOVERY ARCHITECTURE

IDA made two overarching and significant observations while studying the national PR architecture. First we found two distinctly different situations that impact national PR architectures. We also found that the planning, organization, and mission execution requirements and capabilities differ dramatically for each of those situations.

A. TWO PR SITUATIONS

The IDA study team has determined that there are two conditions that circumscribe responsibilities and authorities associated with personnel recovery. The first is the condition where the Chief of Mission is the principal authority in charge, which is the normal, default condition. In this situation, the considerations are often quite complex, as many USG agencies, including the military, are frequently involved in planning for and addressing personnel recovery events. The second is a special condition in which a Combatant Commander is in charge of a hostile or contested area in which there is no Chief of Mission. In this latter situation, the U.S. policy means and mechanisms are dominated by the attainment of military objectives, the use of DoD forces, and the application of a fairly sophisticated, highly technical body of knowledge commonly referred to as “doctrine.”¹ IDA observed that, although there are some shortfalls in DoD’s capability to handle wartime PR incidents, the DoD was for the most part handling them successfully as evidenced by Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF) up until March of 2004. CENTCOM had recovered 100 percent of American military, civilian, and coalition personnel prior to March 2004. After March 2004, the enemy in Iraq changed tactics to include the specific targeting of contractors and civilians including those from coalition countries, and the success rate declined.

Under certain conditions, when and where a transfer of authority is taking place from DoD to DoS (such as in Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom),

¹ Doctrine is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”

there could be a temporary situation or phase where the DoD and DoS determine their respectful responsibilities, but that situation should be resolved between the Combatant Commander and Chief of Mission through an MOU.

1. Chief of Mission in Charge

Figure II-1 is an organization chart showing representative chains of command for diplomatic, military, and civil PR options, respectively, in a non-combat situation. Specifically, the chart shows the relationship among the State Department entities and the Defense Department entities, and illustrates the role of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) as lead agency for civil search and rescue events. The chart shows the organizations, as well as the command, control, and coordination relationships among those organizations, with regard to personnel recovery.




Figure II-1. Diplomatic, Military and Civil Chains of Command – Chief of Mission in Charge

The chart is banded into three levels: strategic/national, operational, and tactical. Organizations operating on the strategic/national level typically plan for the long term – months to years. Organizations operating on the operational level typically plan for the mid-term – days to weeks. Organizations operating on the tactical level typically plan for the short term – hours to days.

During an isolated personnel incident, the State Department's support for a diplomatic recovery effort would center on the regional desk for the respective region. The regional office would be supported by the Crisis Management Support (CMS) center and the Political-Military Action Team (PMAT). The Political-Military (POL-MIL) Bureau within the DoS is the primary coordination channel through which the DoS and DoD communicate. Depending on the nature of the incident, a task force would be organized to coordinate and facilitate those elements.

The DoS maintains a CMS center within its headquarters. CMS facilitates task forces for crisis situations (including hostage/prisoner situations). As an example of facilitation, CMS provides training and exercises, procedures, facilities, communications and information technology, after-action reports, and task force personnel selection and organization. CMS develops a hostage situation standard operating procedure (SOP) that is included in every Embassy's Emergency Action Plan.

Within the State Department's headquarters, there is a PMAT center that is manned around-the-clock to provide diplomatic and political support for ongoing military operations. The PMAT mission is to coordinate diplomatic support 24/7 for deployment and use of U.S. and coalition forces, other actions in the global war on terror, and other POL-MIL and military actions worldwide.

Almost every overseas U.S. embassy and consulate has a Consular Affairs section responsible for Overseas Citizens Services. This office becomes the focal point for diplomatic expertise during an isolated personnel situation in the respective region. In cases where there is no Consular section someone is designated to provide those services. Upon request of the Ambassador, additional support and augmentation might be available. The State Department's Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) provides augmenting teams of subject matter experts and additional communications capabilities to embassy staffs for crisis management functions, including hostage situations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides expertise in hostage matters. If the situation portends an impending Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), a Joint Interagency Working Group is normally convened to facilitate interagency coordination of NEO requirements among the interagency organizations and specifically between DoS and DoD.

For matters of national security, the national architecture is headed by the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC operates out of the Situation Room during national security crises. The NSC is supported by the Director of Central Intelligence

(DCI). Within the NSC, the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) oversees incidents that might be the result of terrorism and might lead to a hostage rescue situation.

Under the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual and its U.S. Supplement (also called the National SAR Plan), the USCG is the agency responsible for civil search and rescue (SAR) in U.S. maritime regions and serves as lead agency in coordinating international civil SAR responsibilities with other nations. At the strategic level, the Commandant of the USCG is the senior operating officer, and the Commandant's command center in Coast Guard Headquarters is capable of monitoring the Service's worldwide operations. The USCG is responsible for SAR within its assigned search and rescue regions (SRRs) as assigned within the IAMSAR Manual and U.S. National SAR Plan. Day-to-day operational responsibility for these search and rescue regions is tasked to the Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs) within the two Area Commands and their nine subordinate District Commands. These commands coordinate, when appropriate, with the Rescue Coordination Centers of other nations responsible for adjoining search and rescue regions. Most tactical level USCG SAR assets are assigned to Group Commands within the Districts. Open-ocean SAR operations are generally directed from Rescue Coordination Centers within Districts' operations centers, while operations near U.S. shores are managed by the Groups' operations centers. When the time comes to execute a SAR mission, the RCC delegates responsibility for the mission to a SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC).

2. COCOM in Charge

Figure II-2 is an organization chart showing representative chains of command for diplomatic, and military personnel recovery options, respectively, in a combat situation. This chart is tailored to the scenario in which there is no U.S. Mission (Embassy or Consulate) in the region where military operations would be taking place. Real-world examples include Iraq and Afghanistan. The chart shows the organizations, as well as the command, control, and coordination relationships among those organizations, with regard to personnel recovery.

A few general observations can be discerned from this chart. First, the DoD has created a systematic organization and command and control (C2) structure that is more complex than other USG agencies. This is understandable, given the size of the DoD relative to other agencies and given that PR has been a part of military operations since the Civil War. Second, there are almost no C2 relationships between USG department and agencies. Most relationships are coordination channels. Third, even within the DoD,

most of the lateral relationships are coordination channels. This condition results in a C2 structure that is very vertical in nature. Relationships are “stovepipes” rather than “networks.”




Figure II-2. Baseline PR Organization Chart – COCOM in Charge

B. DOTMLPF TEMPLATE

In order to ensure a thorough and comprehensive description of current PR capabilities, IDA employed the use of the DoD DOTMLPF template. DOTMLPF consists of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities. It was assumed that, by assessing each of these aspects of PR capabilities for the two situations, the resultant description would be complete. As you will see in Chapters IV and V, the DOTMLPF structure is used to identify and organize deficiencies and develop solutions.

A full understanding of the term *doctrine* as used in the study is crucial. Doctrine forms a codified basis for standardized procedures, processes, operational concepts, and mission execution. It embraces everything from high-level policy to procedural manuals. It becomes the basic reference for “time-tested best practices” taught in schoolhouses and in the training bases, as well as what is exercised and evaluated in the “field.” In the military, written doctrine is normally considered the driver for other requirements. The

application of doctrine in the field might actually lead or lag what is written because of adaptation for or circumstances.

With regard to the documentation of the two baselines, when appropriate, some DOTMLPF factors were combined. This was done to facilitate the documentation process but did not impact thoroughness. Also, the level of detail to which each of the DOTMLPF factors has been addressed in the two situations varies greatly because of the variation in capabilities.

C. BASELINE CAPABILITY – CHIEF OF MISSION IN CHARGE

This section describes the PR capabilities when the Chief of Mission is in charge for U.S. personnel abroad. Ultimately the Chief of Mission relies on the host nation for PR because of the host nation sovereignty.

1. Doctrine and Organization

a. Department of State Policy and Organization

“The State Department takes the lead in managing our bilateral relationships with other governments. And in this new era, its people and institutions must be able to interact equally adroitly with non-governmental organizations and international institutions.... Our diplomats serve at the front line of complex negotiations, civil wars, and other humanitarian catastrophes.”² *National Security Strategy of the United States*

A key document for each Chief of Mission is the President’s Letter of Instruction which outlines the authority, responsibilities, and duties of the Chief of Mission. Among other things, the chief of mission bears overall responsibility for the safety and security of USG personnel and American citizens abroad.³ The USG has diplomatic relations with about 163 countries. In most of these countries, the U.S. maintains an embassy, which usually is located in the capital. The U.S. can also have branches of the embassy, called consulates, in other locations within the country. When the U.S. does not have full diplomatic relations with a nation, the U.S. might be represented by only a Liaison Office

² National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17 September 2002, pages 30,31.

³ Secretary of State message, Subject: Revision of President Bush’s Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission, date/time-group 081830Z July 2003, paragraph 4(a) states the following: “As Chief of Mission, you have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive branch employees in country/at international organization, regardless of their employment categories or location, except those under command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization.”

or Interests Section. In addition, the U.S. has representation or missions at international organizations. There are more than 260 missions or posts throughout the world.

The Ambassador leads the Embassy in furthering U.S. National Security objectives abroad by implementing the DoS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Strategic Plan. The DoS and USAID Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2009⁴ sets forth the Secretary of State's direction and priorities for both organizations. The Strategic Plan supports the policy positions set forth by the President in the National Security Strategy and presents how the DoS and USAID will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance. The Strategic Plan defines the primary aims of U.S. foreign policy and development assistance, priorities in the coming years, and strategic objectives and goals. The plan affirms that *"protecting and assisting American citizens abroad is among the oldest and most important responsibilities. It specifies that the Department will disseminate safety and security information to Americans through all available means, including the latest technologies; and during crises, including evacuations, take all requisite steps to protect and assist Americans, in cooperation with host governments, the private sector, other U.S. Government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)."*⁵

The strategic objectives and goals constitute the strategic planning framework for both agencies and serve as the basis for both organizations' annual Mission Performance Plans (MPPs), which complete the strategy to task planning process. MPPs are prepared by each mission for the upcoming fiscal year and contain a brief description of the country (or mission), a Chief of Mission statement of the assessment of progress in meeting the previous year's goals, and a summary of the strategic goals for the upcoming year. MPPs are a means to establish priorities in the achievement of national goals as well as to identify requirements for funding and resourcing.

The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) handles overall operational issues. The sections of the embassy or mission are assigned responsibility for specific issues:

- **Regional Security Officers (RSO)** are responsible for all security and protective intelligence operations within the mission and for coordination with

⁴ Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009, U.S. DoS and U.S. Agency for International Development, DoS/USAID Publication 11084, Released August 2003.

⁵ Ibid, Appendix A describes Protection of American Citizens as a Strategic Goal with attendant performance goals.

host governmental organizations, U.S. citizens, businesses, and other embassies and international organizations in the area of security preparedness.

- **Consular Officers** are responsible for issuance of visas (both nonimmigrant and immigrant), for provision of services to U.S. citizens abroad, and for facilitating the protection of U.S. citizens and their property.
- **Commercial, Economic, and Financial Affairs Officers** assist U.S. businesses abroad as well as analyzing and reporting on economic and financial policies and their impact on U.S. policies, programs, and interests.
- **Agricultural Officers** promote the export of U.S. agricultural products and report on agricultural production and market developments in their area.
- **Environment, science, technology, and health officers** analyze and report on developments in these areas and their potential impact on U.S. policies and programs.
- **Political officers** analyze both internal and external political developments and their potential impact on U.S. interests.
- **Labor officers** promote labor policies in countries to support U.S. interests and provide information on local labor laws and practices.
- **Legal attachés** serve as Department of Justice (DoJ) representatives on criminal matters.
- **Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services** officers are responsible for administering the laws regulating the admission of foreign-born persons (aliens) to the United States and for administering various immigration benefits.
- **USAID** mission directors are responsible for USAID Programs including dollar and local currency loans, grants, and technical assistance.
- Many posts have **Defense Attachés** and **Military Assistance Groups**⁶ from the DoD.
- Depending on the country or area, personnel from the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the USCG, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and other Government agencies might be assigned to an Embassy or mission.

In considering the security and safety of USG personnel, the Chief of Mission is governed by a number of complex region/country specific policy factors that include, for

⁶ The DoD Military Assistance Group (MAG) assigned to an Embassy is sometime referred to by various other names, including Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), or Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG).

example, U.S. National Security Strategy, foreign policy and policy toward the region or country, host/partner nation sovereignty issues, and human rights considerations. The Emergency Action Planning (EAP) process guides the Chief of Mission and RSO in contingency planning for a broad range of situations that consider various threat conditions, deteriorating security environments, and feasible response options, including evacuation of USG personnel and American citizens. Evacuation scenarios might range from assisted (authorized) evacuation as a situation deteriorates, to directed (ordered) evacuation (which in latter stages might include a request for DoD support), to the rare worst case in which the mission is closed. In an evacuation, the Chief of Mission might also have responsibility for certain non-U.S. personnel, such as third country nationals, based on prior agreements. Of interest, a particular concern at DoS are the “TDY’ers,” those personnel who might be official USG, or contractors, or others, who come to a country for a short period, often with inadequate prior security indoctrination and sometimes with limited contact with the Diplomatic Post, but for whom the Chief of Mission has responsibility. The policy of “no double standard” requires that the Chief of Mission provide equal priority for all American citizens in dealing with security situations including evacuation. A Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Regional Combatant Commander and each Chief of Mission, establishes DoS responsibilities for the security of DoD personnel assigned or attached to an Embassy, and is reviewed periodically.

The Chief of Mission plays an important role in risk mitigation planning of all USG personnel. All USG personnel other than those under the command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization must obtain country clearance before entering country and/or visiting international organizations on official business. The Chief of Mission can refuse country clearance or might place conditions or restrictions on visiting personnel as determined necessary.⁷

The principal means to identify potential numbers of personnel for evacuation at diplomatic posts is the DoS F77 Report, which lists numbers of personnel in a country in various administrative categories. Recently, DoS and other non-DoD agencies have begun to think more seriously about identifying and planning for those personnel “potentially at risk for personnel recovery.” It must be noted that the term itself – “personnel recovery” – does not exist within the DoS lexicon.

⁷ Secretary of State message, Subject: Revision of President Bush’s Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission, date/time-group 081830Z Jul 03, paragraph 4(h).

The principal means of informing U.S. citizens in country of threat conditions and advising them of emergency actions to be taken is the Warden System. The Warden System is a network of American volunteers who assist the embassy or mission in rapidly disseminating official USG information to American citizens. Most Warden Systems are organized geographically with Wardens assigned to a number of geographic areas or zones. The Warden undertakes to provide official information from the embassy/mission to the registered American citizens in his/her zone when the system is activated. Where zones are either physically large or contain many American citizens, the embassy might enlist the aid of other Americans living in the zone to serve as Sub-Wardens. The system, ideally, is a contact “tree” in which Wardens and Sub-Wardens each undertake to contact 10 to 15 American families. The Warden System is used to convey information in an emergency or crisis, including natural disasters and terrorist threats. Information disseminated through this system reaches only those families that have registered with the embassy or mission.

Embassy Emergency Action Plans are formulated to address deteriorating security situations, including evacuations. Capabilities required for an evacuation range from use of regularly scheduled commercial air to commercial charter air to military air or naval shipping, and in some scenarios, evacuation could be overland by bus, privately owned vehicle (POV), rail, or military vehicle. Because none of these capabilities are organic to a post (except, perhaps, some vehicles and very limited air assets), they would be arranged by the DoS at the Ambassador’s request. If a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) is required, the Regional Combatant Commander would be tasked to provide necessary military support. In a hostage situation, the Chief of Mission might employ diplomatic means, might request host nation or DoD assistance, and/or employ civil or other assets that might be available. In a hostage detention scenario, the Chief of Mission might coordinate the release process, or request and authorize the use of force. **In all cases, U.S./host nation relations are critically important**, because the host nation, in exercising its rights of sovereignty, can choose the method and the means to be used, which might not necessarily incorporate U.S. considerations, options, or capabilities. Needless to say, policy considerations for personnel recovery are normally very complex, and are both case-by-case and country-specific.

Although the DoS has policies and procedures that are related to emergency action planning and organizations that would be involved in any operation, there is nothing specific to personnel recovery. Also, within the non-DoD interagency community no one has assumed a leadership role to formulate an overarching PR

strategy. This results in planning shortfalls, a lack of realistic exercises to enhance proficiency, and a lack of readiness to react to personnel recovery incidents.

b. National Search and Rescue Plan

“We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations... In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment.”⁸ *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*

The National Search and Rescue Conference of 1973, when considering the need to establish a continuing interagency group to oversee the United States National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP),⁹ established a standing interagency committee to oversee the NSP and to act as a coordinating forum for national SAR matters. Originally called the Interagency Committee on Search and Rescue, this group is currently referred to as the National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC).

The NSP¹⁰ is formulated and maintained for the purpose of coordinating civil SAR services to meet both *domestic* and *international* commitments of the USG, and to document related basic national policies. The plan is intended to integrate all available resources into a cooperative network for greater protection of life and property, to ensure greater efficiency and economy, and to provide guidance for development of SAR-related systems. The National Plan integrates the U.S. civil SAR system into the global SAR system.¹¹

U.S. SAR coordinators are designated, and agency responsibilities are established, with overall direction to support civil SAR operations of other countries in territory and international waters beyond recognized U.S. aeronautical and maritime search and rescue

⁸ National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17 September 2002.

⁹ United States National Search and Rescue Plan 1999, as amended 2 November 2000.

¹⁰ Signatory Federal Agencies for the 1999 plan include the Department of Transportation, DoD, Department of Commerce, Federal Communications Commission, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the land managing components of the Department of the Interior. A Federal Agency that is not a participant to the plan may become a participant by unanimous vote of the National Search and Rescue Committee.

¹¹ A wealth of valuable reference material is available in the area of civil SAR. These include, but are not limited to, the SAR-related conventions, the IAMSAR Manual (three volumes), the National Search and Rescue Plan Supplement, information about the AMVER ship reporting system, and many documents of COSPAS-SARSAT, IMO, ICAO, etc. Some of these references are available in languages other than English.

regions. DoD combatant commands are directed to provide such support, as appropriate and within their capabilities, to their respective geographic areas of responsibility.¹²

DPMO is the policy lead for civil SAR for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); as such DPMO is responsible for developing and publishing a DoD directive (in progress) covering this mission area. DPMO also participates in both the NSARC and the Mass Rescue Working Group.

2. Training and Leader Development

The National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC) is the Federal Government's primary training facility for personnel of the foreign affairs community. In addition to the DoS personnel, it provides training for more than 43 other Government agencies.

The DoS pays for NFATC training by funding the salaries of the permanent staff and providing a lump sum allotment of funds appropriated to the DoS. Therefore, DoS bureaus/students are not directly charged for training. Federal employees of executive branch agencies, the legislative and judicial branches, and the military Services, members of Congress and the Judiciary, and private sector individuals who are admitted to NFATC training pay for the training according to the tuition schedule published in the Center catalog under the provisions of the Economy Act and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act. Agencies may request special programs; however, they will be required to pay for them according to associated curriculum development, administration, and instructional costs. Recently NFATC has worked with the Overseas Security Advisory Council to make security awareness training available to U.S. private business members that operate overseas. This training is provided on a reimbursable basis.

The School of Professional and Area Studies (SPAS), specifically the Orientation Division, provides new Foreign Service Officers a 7-week orientation program to introduce them to the Foreign Service environment and prepare them for their first overseas assignment. SPAS also provides a 3-week orientation course for Foreign Service Specialists. In addition, short courses are offered to employees of other USG agencies being assigned to an overseas mission. Within SPAS, the Division of Curriculum and Staff Development conducts a series of courses designed to provide professional training and education for DoS trainers.

¹² United States National Search and Rescue Plan – 1999, page 5.

The Transition Center (TC) deals with preparing DoS employees for the career transitions they will encounter throughout their careers, and presents the Security Overseas Seminar (SOS), an Advanced Security Overseas Seminar (for those who have already taken the SOS course once), and an SOS for Temporary Duty (TDY) personnel. Currently, this personnel security awareness training is mandatory for DoS personnel, is highly recommended for personnel of other Government agencies who are deploying overseas, and is encouraged for adult family members, as well. A special session of SOS for children in grades 2 through 12 is offered during the summer months.

The NFATC provides a broad range of training for non-DoD USG personnel deploying overseas, including security awareness. However, no specific training is provided to prepare an individual for the conditions faced after capture or detainment. PR-related training for non-DoD USG personnel and USG contractors is very limited at best and nonexistent in most cases.

3. Materiel

The non-DoD interagency community has not made an effort to develop specific equipment to support their PR related requirements. No single organization has the resources to undertake any sort of development effort, and there has been no leadership role exercised within the interagency community to consolidate any potential effort. Some in the non-DoD interagency community utilize materiel developed by the DoD when appropriate as well as equipment available in the commercial market.

4. Personnel and Facilities

a. Personnel Involved in PR

As has been noted previously, there are many in non-DoD departments and agencies whose responsibilities include PR, but very few who have that as a primary job element. As a result, these personnel become active in PR after an event has occurred. Often this means that the first time many of them learn about the PR process is while engaged in supporting an actual event. Expertise is gained on the fly with valuable response time being lost.

b. Contractors

USG contractors provide vital services and service support to official United States activities worldwide. With few exceptions, contractors perform their tasks pursuant

to laws, rules, regulations, and procedures outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). With U.S. strategic policy in transition since the early 1990s, and given the concerns of many host nation governments, contractors are now ubiquitous in those areas where USG personnel perform their missions. Contractors are operating in overseas locations where they are increasingly exposed to the threat of isolation, capture, or detention and to subsequent exploitation by terrorism threats.

c. Facilities

The National Foreign Affairs Training Center and the Diplomatic Security Center provide training and education on security awareness and risk mitigation planning and techniques. The DoS maintains both a Crisis Management Support Center and a Political-Military Action Team (PMAT) to provide support to crisis situations and provide political and diplomatic support to military operations.

D. BASELINE CAPABILITY – COMBATANT COMMANDER IN CHARGE

1. Doctrine

a. Missing Persons Act¹³

The first Missing Persons Act (MPA), which was passed in 1814, pertained only to the Army but has been updated several times over the years expanding its scope to DoD writ large. The MPA provides many of the foundational elements of the current personnel recovery architecture. Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 1501, “Missing Personnel,” establishes an office (DPMO) within DoD to have responsibility for matters relating to missing persons – including the policy, control, and oversight of the entire process for investigation and recovery related to missing persons – and for coordination with other departments and agencies of the United States on all matters concerning missing persons. In addition, the Act specifies: “The office shall establish policies, which shall apply uniformly throughout the Department of Defense, for personnel recovery (including search, rescue, escape, and evasion).” Personnel “covered” by the Missing Persons Act

¹³ United States Code, Title 10. Armed Forces, Subtitle A – General Military Law, Part II – Personnel, Chapter 76 – Missing Persons, Commonly Referred to as “The Missing Persons Act”, Current through Public Law 105-153.

are DoD personnel, including uniformed, civilian, and DoD contractors.¹⁴ Its primary application today is in the determination of DoD personnel and DoD contractor legal status as a missing person; however, recent history suggests that most of the tough current-day questions are referred to DoD General Counsel for adjudication.

b. DoD Directive 2310.2, Personnel Recovery

DoD Directive (DoDD) 2310.2, Personnel Recovery, was reissued on 22 December 2000 to update policy and realign responsibilities for personnel recovery in accordance with Section 1501 of title 10, United States Code. It designates the Commander of United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as the DoD executive agent for PR (less policy) and for coordinating and advancing personnel recovery capabilities. The Commander USJFCOM has designated the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) as the Office of Primary Responsibility for DoD-wide personnel recovery matters. Responsibility for policy, control, and oversight over personnel recovery matters remains with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Planning and execution of personnel recovery operations is the responsibility of the Commanders of the Combatant Commands.

c. Current Personnel Recovery Definition

The definition of personnel recovery, as currently documented in DoDD 2310.2,¹⁵ is “the aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas. Personnel recovery could occur through military action, action by non-governmental organizations, other USG-approved action, and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of these options. Although personnel recovery could occur during NEOs, NEO is not a subset of personnel recovery.”

Our analysis of this definition, along with other related documents and practices, concludes that a scenario or incident must successfully pass four tests, as shown below, to be considered a personnel recovery incident. This current DoD PR definition is quite restrictive.

¹⁴ The Secretary of Defense shall determine, with regard to a pending or ongoing military operation, the specific employees, or groups of employees, of contractors of the Department of Defense to be considered to be covered.

¹⁵ Although there are several “official” definitions of PR, DoDD 2310.2 is the most commonly referred to and accepted within DoD.

- The first test is focused on the “target set,” or individual who is the subject of the incident. The individual must be a member of the U.S. military, a DoD civilian, a DoD contractor, or must be designated by the Secretary of Defense or the President.
- The second test is focused on the status of the individual. The individual must be captured, detained, beleaguered, evading, isolated, or missing. Each of these statuses is defined in DoD guidance. Hostages, evacuees, and persons who are besieged do not pass the test for personnel recovery.
- The third test is focused on the environment. The individual must be in an uncertain or hostile environment, or in a denied area. Each of these environments is defined in DoD guidance. Individuals in permissive environments do not pass the test for personnel recovery.
- The final test is focused on the duty status of the individual. The individual must be engaged in an official U.S.-sponsored activity or mission.

Although the aforementioned tests might well be necessary to determine the legal status of an individual being rescued or recovered, the technically restrictive DoD definition also constrains proactive, cooperative, integrated efforts that could lead to successful personnel recovery operations. The PR community is very much compartmented today, impeding the achievement of full dimensional PR.

d. Code of Conduct

The Code of Conduct (CoC) guides the actions of every member of the Armed Forces during peacetime or wartime. The CoC not only establishes standards of conduct, but also provides the basis of training and instruction as to the proper procedures to be employed when isolated, evading or captured. The CoC forms the basis of SERE training for the Armed Forces, which is described in the training section.

Although the CoC is founded on the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which allows the military to take punitive action when the situation warrants, instruction on the CoC is primarily motivational. Past experience of captured Americans reveals that honorable survival in captivity requires a high degree of dedication and motivation and a strong belief in the following:

- Love of and faith in the United States and a conviction that the U.S. cause is just.
- The values of American democratic concepts and institutions.
- Faith and loyalty to fellow captives.
- Maintaining the highest standards of integrity.

e. Joint and Service Doctrine

Doctrine is constantly evolving based on lessons learned, changes in operational concepts, organization, materiel, infusion of technology, and by adoption of best practices. Doctrine for personnel recovery is in the major throes of transforming from a Service-centric, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) foundation, to a Joint¹⁶ personnel recovery doctrine. As such, it draws on a number of related doctrinal subject areas such as search and rescue (SAR), Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR), Nonconventional Assisted Recovery (NAR), NEO, and others. Personnel recovery practice in both OEF and OIF has far outstripped the formal written doctrine in terms of both scope¹⁷ and depth¹⁸ of operations. Notwithstanding, practice has proven to be relatively successful in terms of both effectiveness and total human lives saved, up to March 2004.

The importance of doctrine as a catalyst for the implementation and management of change cannot be overstated. Doctrine is the engine of change that drives requirements; at the same time, it establishes the parameters for orderly change. Doctrine embraces everything from policy to multi-Service manuals and publications, to unit tactics, techniques, and procedures. Unfortunately, baseline doctrine for PR is rooted in outmoded service CSAR concepts and lags seriously behind joint warfighting concepts and current successful operational missions. JPRA is working diligently to fill the void and has a draft Joint Publication 3-50 on PR doctrine out for staff coordination.

If there is a conflict between a joint publication and a Service publication, the joint doctrine takes precedence for joint forces. Military doctrine, which is based on time-tested principles intended to shape the employment of Armed Forces, is authoritative in nature. References contain a list of policy documents, directives, and doctrinal publications that pertain to PR.

¹⁶ Contemporary use of the term “joint” implies interagency, coalition, and multinational considerations.

¹⁷ Successful rescues have included DoD, interagency, and coalition partners in benign, uncertain, and hostile operational environments.

¹⁸ The vast territory covered by rescue operations far exceeded any operation before and entailed some 27 Rescue Coordination Centers.

2. Organization

Within the DoD, the organization of PR ranges from the policy level to the strategic level to the operational level to the tactical level. The PR mission encompasses those at risk of capture or isolation, PR forces, and commanders and staffs.

At the lowest, or tactical level, all U.S. Services, some other USG agencies, such as the USCG, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), FBI, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and some of our coalition partners have units capable of performing the tactical tasks of PR to varying degrees of effectiveness. Among the Services, only the Air Force has units dedicated to the PR mission, although all Services conduct PR. At the operational level, COCOMs have supplemented their staffs in times of need with personnel from other commands including JPRA (a part of JFCOM) to accomplish the mid-range planning and coordination for PR. Other USG agencies and coalition partners can perform basic operational tasks such as deployment, sustainment, redeployment, and assessment. If called upon, however, to perform other PR tasks, such as preparation of PR intelligence support products for an operation, or development of PR Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) and Special Instructions (SPINS), they would have to use organizations that lack requisite resources and expertise, and the tasks would be attempted in an *ad hoc* manner. At the strategic level the PR tasks fall to a few HQ organizations within DoD, specifically DPMO, DIA, JFCOM, and JPRA. Even in combination, these organizations still lack the needed manpower, resources, expertise, and authority to effectively conduct all of the PR tasks at the national level. The U.S. Military Services, particularly the USAF, have sufficient organization to perform more of the strategic tasks, because PR is a Service responsibility. However, the Service PR organizations differ in capability and joint interoperability.

a. Personnel Recovery Advisory Group

In accordance with the Missing Persons Act (MPA), DPMO is responsible for DoD coordination with other departments and agencies of the United States on all matters concerning missing persons. DoDD 2310.2 establishes the purpose, composition, and tasks for the Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG), a group that includes members from outside the DoD. “The purpose of the PRAG is to review DoD progress toward developing a fully integrated personnel recovery architecture that ensures its ability to recover isolated personnel.”¹⁹ The PRAG provides a forum for DPMO to

¹⁹ DoDD 2310.2, dated 22 December 2000, para 5.2.9.

exercise this aspect of its responsibilities under the MPA at a senior level. The PRAG's primary focus is on long-term, enduring issues central to PR planning. However, the PRAG might also be convened at the request of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/Missing Personnel Affairs) or any of the PRAG's principal members to address problems of a more immediate nature or provide crisis support to the Secretary of Defense.

b. Personnel Recovery Response Cell

Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 2310.3 establishes authorities and responsibilities for the Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) and lists the following specified tasks:

- In the event of a PR incident, facilitate the development of coordinated policy options for the SECDEF and the National Command Authority (NCA).
- Provide a PR incident report within 3 hours of the cell convening; provide updates and spot reports throughout the incident
- Write a PR lessons learned report for OSD distribution and a PR after-action report for DoD historical files

An incident report will be provided to the SECDEF through the USD(P). This initial report shall provide, as time permits, a status report on the situation, legal status of those involved, public affairs guidance, and shall recommend policy options for managing the incident. The PRRC shall provide update and spot reports covering significant developments throughout the duration of the incident.

c. Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery

The USG contains a large number of intelligence agencies, many of which can make significant contributions to PR. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the NSA, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) have the capabilities to support personnel recovery operations. The Intelligence Community (IC) has established a POW/MIA cell at the Bolling AFB. However, this cell operates at a strategic level rather than at the operational and tactical levels.

The CIA and the U.S. Special Operations Command have unconventional assisted recovery (UAR) capabilities that vary from theater to theater. Additionally, the military community, consisting of JFCOM and each of the Services, has capabilities that support the mission planning and mission execution phases of personnel recovery. These

capabilities were described and discussed at an Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery (ISPR) Conference²⁰ sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), from 16 to 18 March 2004, in Alexandria, Virginia.

3. Training and Leader Development

a. SERE Training for Personnel at Risk

DoD has defined three major levels of SERE training:

- **Level A** – Academics on the Code of Conduct (unclassified)
- **Level B** – Academics on Survival, Evasion, and Resistance (confidential). Minimal academics on escape and recovery.
- **Level B+** – Level B training augmented with practical field exercises.
- **Level C** – Level B academics, plus thorough practical field exercises, plus experiential training in a resistance training laboratory (secret). No practical escape or recovery exercises.
- **Level C+** – Graduate level resistance academics and practical exercises, tailored to specific missions and needs (secret+). Limited to resistance training only.

The Army offers its Level C course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and a satellite level B+ course at the Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama; the Navy conducts its Level C course at North Island Naval Air Station, California, and Brunswick Naval Air Station, Maine; and the Air Force provides Level C training at Fairchild AFB, Washington. The Air Force also runs a separate Level B+ course at the Air Force Academy, which is completed at Level C by attendance at the resistance training laboratory portion of the Fairchild course. JPRA offers advanced resistance training at the PR Academy, Fairchild AFB. Training is tailored for peacetime government detention and hostage detention. The Marine Corps is discussing the possibility of providing SERE training at its Mountain Warfare Training Center in Bridgeport, California.

Table II-1 provides the Service definition SERE training requirements. Combatant Command defined requirements still do not exist.

²⁰ For more details please see IDA memo to DPMO dated 1 April 2004.

Table II-1. SERE Service Training Requirements

Wartime Level C SERE Training	
Service/Component	Annual Requirement
Army	4,300
Navy	2,140
Air Force	4,000
Marine Corps	1,300
Total	11,740
Peacetime Detention/Hostage Level C Resistance Training	
Army	4,300
Navy	2,140
Air Force	4,000
Marine Corps	1,300
SOCOM	2,000
Total	13,740

Source: JFCOM Report to the Congress 108-46, as requested by the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 1 March 2004.

SERE training documentation varies greatly in format and detail from Service to Service; however, training content and objectives are consistent across the spectrum and are driven by compliance to the JPRA Executive Agent Instruction (EAI). Level C course content was assessed based on the 1996 EAI and found to be in compliance for all Service schools. JPRA/J7 has significant responsibilities beyond conducting specialized resistance training programs. Oversight and standardization functions for the SERE training community, in addition to normal training program coordination duties, place the JPRA Director in a position of both conducting and overseeing training programs. Specialized training conducted by JPRA provides advanced and tailored joint peacetime resistance instruction to selected personnel of all Services as well as USG agencies outside DoD.

Table II-2 shows the current throughput capacities of DoD's SERE schools. The Air Force Academy's SERE facility has the capacity to conduct level C SERE training for 1,200 students every 90 days. The Academy's requirement to train cadets can be completed in one 90-day cycle in the summer, leaving capacity for up to 3,600 more students (depending on weather and land use permits) to address other DoD or U.S.

Government requirements. The Academy is not currently manned or funded to run its facility at this throughput level.

Table II-2. Current Level C Training Capacity

Service	Wartime SERE	Peacetime Governmental Detention/Hostage Detention Resistance
Air Force	4,000	100
Navy	2,140	134
Marine Corps	1,060	66
Army	960	960
SOCOM	960	300
TOTAL	9,120	1,560

Source: JFCOM Report to the Congress 108-46, as requested by the U.S. Senate Armed Service Committee, 1 March 2004.

b. Training for Commanders and Staff

JPRA and the Air Force provide all of the available PR training for commanders, controllers, and planners. JPRA’s courses are taught at Fredericksburg, Virginia, or by mobile training teams. The Air Force teaches an RCC Controller Course at the C2 Warrior School, Hurlburt AFB, Florida, and is in the process of standing up a Special Operations Force (SOF) RCC Controller Course at the Special Operations School, Hurlburt AFB.

JPRA/J7 is cognizant of training requirements for OSD, the Services, and Combatant Commands, as well as training capability and capacity within JPRA’s Personnel Recovery Education and Training Center (PRETC). JPRA/J7 publishes a periodic PRETC policy message that summarizes training quotas by Command, provides course descriptions and prerequisites, provides the schedule for each course, and updates the status of courses in development.

c. Training for Recovery Forces

The Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Special Operations Command all conduct advanced training for rescue forces. The Air Force conducts CSAR training at the USAF Weapons School and Red Flag exercises at Nellis AFB, Nevada. The Navy conducts CSAR training at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at NAS Fallon, Nevada. The Marine Corps conducts Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel

(TRAP) training at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Sqdn-1, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma, Arizona. Army Special Forces conduct unconventional assisted recovery training at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), Fort Bragg. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps view PR as a functional responsibility for all of their combat units.

Since DoD's interagency and coalition partners that have a PR capability typically have only a single unit, PR training is conducted in-unit, as opposed to through a formal training pipeline.

d. Personnel Recovery Exercises

All of the U.S. Military Services make some effort to exercise some of their units in PR periodically, or just prior to deployment. However, most of these exercises are significantly limited. The Air Force conducts CSAR events during its Red Flag exercises. The Army conducts PR events at the National Training Center. The Navy conducts CSAR events during Carrier Air Group (CAG) workups at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center. The Marines conduct TRAP scenarios during Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) workups. Not all military units get to participate in these PR exercise events; only the units "most likely" to be called upon to perform a PR mission or, in some cases, the units "most available" to participate in the exercise.

Although all of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) make some effort to incorporate PR events into their annual exercise programs, most of them are limited. Participation of coalition forces in PR events at Combatant Command exercises has been steadily increasing, with the growing interest of our coalition partners in PR. The CIA is the only other USG agency that IDA has found that regularly participates in PR exercises.

e. Training Transformation Initiative

The *Training Transformation Initiative*²¹ emphasizes that capabilities-based training in support of our national security strategy must develop individuals and organizations that intuitively think jointly and strive to achieve unity of effort from a diversity of means. It further elaborates that diversity of means is derived not only from active and Reserve components of the Services but also from Federal agencies;

²¹ Department of Defense Training Transformation Implementation Plan, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness, 10 June 2003, page 1.

international coalitions; international organizations; and state, local, and nongovernmental organizations. “The new strategic environment requires orchestration of the wider diversity of means and a broader, more inclusive definition of ‘jointness.’”²²

f. Leader Development

Currently, there are no specific PR courses for senior leaders. Neither the National Defense University nor JPRA provides instruction for those in senior leadership positions. Senior leaders must rely on the advice and recommendations of their staffs, as tempered by PR experience they might have gained personally at lower levels of command.

See additional details on training in Appendix D.

4. Materiel and Technology

a. Isolated Personnel Systems

Equipment for isolated personnel is broken down into three categories: survival equipment, evasion aids, and signal devices. Isolated personnel use survival equipment to stay alive in severe environments until they are recovered. Survival equipment includes medical kits, emergency shelters, water and water procurement tools, food and food procurement tools, and basic tools such as a knife, compass, and matches. Most survival tools are readily available as commercial-off-the-shelf products. Survival kits are tailored to the expected survival environment.

Isolated personnel use evasion aids to assist them in avoiding capture, gaining assistance from the local populace, and returning to friendly control. Evasion aids include an Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) used for authentication; an Evasion Plan of Action (EPA) used to communicate an isolated person’s intentions to the recovery force; a pointee-talkie used to communicate an isolated person’s needs in different languages; a blood chit used to barter for assistance; an Evasion Chart (EVC) used for navigation and movement to water, shelter, or friendly territory; and camouflage used for concealment. Like survival equipment, camouflage is environment-specific, and is available commercially. The remaining evasion aids, which are region-specific, are produced by DoD and coalition military forces. Some non-DoD USG agencies, such as Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE), employ evasion aids.

²² Ibid.

Isolated personnel use signal devices to aid in their recovery by search and rescue forces. There are signal devices for daytime use and nighttime use. There are also covert signal devices that isolated personnel can use to avoid detection by adversaries.

b. Command and Control Systems

PR command and control systems are divided into two categories: communications systems and information management systems. Most PR communications systems are designed to allow communications either between isolated personnel and rescue C2 elements or between isolated personnel and rescue forces, but not among all three components. Information management systems are designed for rescue C2 elements. Because PR communications systems and PR information management systems are designed and developed separately, they are not necessarily interoperable or compatible.

PR communications systems include beacons capable of one-way radio signals or data communications, radios capable of two-way line-of-sight voice communications, satellite phones capable of two-way over-the-horizon voice communications, and advanced survival radios capable of two-way line-of-sight voice communications and over-the-horizon data communications. Beacons include Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT), Personal Locator Beacons (PLB), and Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRB). Many survival radios are available for both private/commercial use and Government use. Although not developed with PR specifically in mind, satellite phones are well suited for use in emergency, survival, and isolation situations. Satellite phones are simple to use and operate in remote areas independent of terrestrial mobile phone “cells.” All departments of the USG and many of our coalition partners are currently using satellite phones.

DoD has fielded PRC-90, PRC-112, and PRC-112B survival radios. DoD is currently developing two advanced survival radios: the Boeing PRQ-7 known as “CSEL” and the General Dynamics PRC-112G known as “Hook.” While the two systems were developed independently using different R&D methods, and each has unique features, both systems have the same core functions. Advanced survival radios have a two-way line-of-sight voice radio capability to communicate with SAR forces. They have an internal GPS receiver with the ability to display present position, perform basic navigation functions, and transmit position coordinates via databurst. Advanced survival radios also have the ability to transmit messages via databurst over-the-horizon to SAR C2 elements.

USG departments and agencies use a number of different information management systems as crisis management tools. Information management systems support PR incident management through collection, organization, filtering, and distribution of critical incident and mission data.

c. Recovery Force Systems

Around the world, search and rescue capabilities are founded on the helicopter. For 50 years, the best way to get to a remote area quickly, stop, extract a person – even from rough terrain or water – and quickly return him/her to safety has been by helicopter. Despite their limitations, helicopters continue to prove themselves useful for many missions, including PR, and governments at all levels, in all parts of the world, continue to acquire them. Their ubiquitous presence around the world makes them the foundation of PR capability. Because of the limited speed, range, and endurance of helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft are still essential pieces of equipment for conducting searches over large areas for isolated personnel or persons in distress who cannot be located by satellite. Many U.S. Government departments and agencies, friendly governments, and non-governmental organizations own or operate aircraft capable of conducting searches in a peacetime environment. Conducting searches with manned aircraft in a hostile environment, however, is not considered operationally desirable with current technology.

Even combat-capable helicopters cannot conduct PR operations in hostile territory without support. To perform a difficult CSAR mission, a helicopter might need support in the way of air refueling; airborne command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C2ISR); force protection; electronic warfare; and information warfare. The specific equipment and technology needed are based on the threat and the circumstances of a particular CSAR mission. The assembly of these essential assets for a CSAR mission is referred to as a CSAR Task Force (CSARTF).

Additional details on materiel and technology can be found in Appendix D.

5. Personnel

a. Personnel Involved in PR

The DoD has numerous personnel involved in PR. They range from those developing policy to those training SERE techniques to those actually accomplishing rescue missions. They also range from civilians and certain military personnel, mainly Air Force, who have spent years building an expertise in personnel recovery to others

who are assigned to personnel recovery only for one tour of duty. But the bottom line is that there is a cadre of people who have personnel recovery as their primary mission.

b. Contractors on the Battlefield

As has been mentioned earlier, USG contractors provide vital support to official U.S. activities worldwide, for the most part within the framework of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Changes in U.S. strategic policy and host nation concerns have resulted in contractors operating in overseas locations where they are increasingly exposed to the threat of isolation, capture, or detention and to subsequent exploitation by asymmetrical threats. Additionally, the sheer numbers of contractors, often dispersed over vast areas, have far-reaching implications for the potential demands placed on existing national PR capabilities.

Although efforts are underway to develop DoD policy and joint publications to more fully integrate contractors in support of USG plans and objectives overseas, currently there is wide variance among the Military Services in their policies and procedures for mitigating and managing the risk to contractors. Among the Services, the U.S. Army has the most comprehensive body of policy and regulations governing the integration of contractors into operational and tactical support plans, thereby increasing the depth of interoperability and, by extension, increasing the likelihood of contractor survivability and recoverability should personnel recovery operations be required. The Army's expanding body of knowledge holds the potential for adaptation across DoD and the interagency community as a set of best policy and best practices in support of contractor protection and in PR.

Similarly, the U.S. commercial contracting community is gaining an increased understanding of contractor vulnerabilities, and is undertaking to apply those lessons learned, albeit often on an *ad hoc* basis.

The FAR, however, appears to have the greatest potential as the joint-interagency-industry medium with which to effect needed transitional changes to many of the contractor accountability, survivability, and recoverability issues through the development of enabling contract language. The GSA is postured to produce interim and permanent FAR rules and contract language to support enhanced contractor protection and to promote the conditions for successful personnel recovery. The acquisition environment provides a logical venue for development and sustainment of a national USG database to enhance accountability.

6. Facilities

a. SERE Training Facilities

SERE training facilities and their training capacities have been described previously in section 3.a.

b. Continental U.S. (CONUS) Replacement Center (CRC)

Currently, all military units and individual replacements are required to go through deployment processing prior to being sent into a hostile environment. Units typically are processed at Fort Dix or Camp McCoy, while individuals and small groups are processed at one of the two active CRCs at Fort Benning or Fort Bliss. Government civilians and Government contractors are all processed through one of the CRCs.

Processing includes issuance of clothing and equipment, medical checks and inoculations, updating of financial and legal documentation, issuance of a Common Access Card (CAC), provision of a Level 1 threat and anti-terrorist briefing, a course on unexploded ordnance, a course on use of a protective mask, and familiarization with the Laws of Land Warfare. There could be additional “country specific” subjects covered depending on the intended destination. A variety of record-keeping systems are used to store data on each person as the processing is accomplished. *However, none of the CRC data reaches the JSRC or the RCC.*

E. BASELINE PR – COSTS (DoD)

In the DoD budget, there is only one place where the specific costs for a part of the cost of “Personnel Recovery” can be identified. This is in the Air Force Program Element (PE) for the costs of Combat Search and Rescue, PE 0207224F. The other Services (Army, Navy, and Marine Corps) all have costs including survival school costs; because PR is not a dedicated mission, however, these costs cannot be readily separated since they do not have unique PEs assigned to them. All Services, except the Air Force, take the position that the forces and personnel used for “Personnel Recovery” are not dedicated to that mission, and all of them are assigned for multi-mission. The Air Force has more than 10 to 20 times the equipment and personnel as compared to other Services. IDA estimates that the other Services’ costs combined are less than 10 percent of the Air Force costs shown. The funding for the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, which is funded by the Air Force, in fiscal years 2002 through 2004 ranged between \$17 million to slightly over \$18 million. Since the Air Force has the largest component of the PR

forces, its costs are a reasonable starting point for developing a baseline cost primarily to place the NPRA enhancement costs in the context of the baseline costs. Although non-DoD departments and agencies have costs associated with force protection activities, none have any significant costs associated with personnel recovery specifically.

The Air Force Combat Search and Rescue costs as extracted from the FY04 President’s Budget are used as the baseline. Figure II-3 presents the proposed budgets for the years 2005 through 2009 with the previous 5 years for comparison. The budget has been split into major cost elements:

- Research and Development
- Procurement
- Military Construction
- Operations and Maintenance
- Military Personnel Costs.

Air Force Combat Search and Rescue Program Element 0207224F




Figure II-3. Air Force PR Budget

Other elements contain small amounts of money that are not visible on this scale. These costs are in then-year dollars. Note the significant growth in the R&D account. This covers the costs for a new Personnel Recovery Vehicle (PRV) program designed to replace HH-60G helicopters. By the end of the period, the CSAR Program Element will be approximately \$900 million per year, primarily to develop the PRV. The Air Force PR

capability also requires rescue escort (RESCORT), airborne mission commander platforms (AMC), and rescue Combat Air Patrol (CAP) capabilities. Once again these capabilities are not dedicated for PR and are not counted toward the PR baseline costs.

In addition to the costs, the Program Element has the numbers of personnel assigned to it. These data are shown in Figure II-4. Note that there are small increases in the numbers of officers and enlisted personnel in Fiscal Years 05, 06, and 07, after which the number is basically constant. The peak personnel strength is approximately 3,400. There are only a very small number of civilians included in this number as shown in the chart.




Figure II-4. Air Force CSAR Personnel

The Air Force has recently moved the responsibility for the CSAR mission from the Air Combat Command to the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). This move involved both the mission responsibility and the forces, including equipment and personnel. During the Study Team visit to AFSOC on 12 January 2004, AFSOC provided additional budget information. AFSOC would like to see the budget increased to cover some items that they feel need additional funding. These items include personnel, training increases, material improvements, and new training courses. These proposed budget increases are shown in Figure II-5. The costs are in three major areas: to cover the recommended increase in personnel; to improve the performance of the

existing force by, for instance, increasing the flying hour program and increasing the spares; and to improve the capability of the existing vehicles by modifying them.




Figure II-5. Air Force Additional Resource Requirements

CHAPTER III

PERSONNEL RECOVERY STRATEGIC VISION

III. PERSONNEL RECOVERY STRATEGIC VISION

A. BACKGROUND

In order to pursue America's national security goals and protect its vital interests, U.S. military, USG civilian, and contract personnel are operating today in dynamic and dangerous environments. Inevitably, whether in a theater of war or in the course of peacetime cooperation, some of the U.S. personnel will become isolated and will be placed in life-threatening situations. The intent of this chapter is to describe in broad terms a strategic vision for personnel recovery – where the U.S. PR capability needs to be in 10 to 15 years – and a roadmap to get there. Although at present the DoD possesses the preponderance of Personnel Recovery assets, this vision recognizes that PR in the future must integrate interagency and coalition requirements and capabilities.

The United States faces a world in which adversaries have the ability to attack the American homeland, coalition partners, and allies with little or no warning. Further, achieving the goals of the National Security Strategy¹ requires that substantial numbers of U.S. military personnel, Government civilians, and Government contractors be deployed overseas in dangerous security conditions. America, in its vital role of providing leadership to the free world, is called upon to execute a wide range of operations in asymmetrical threat environments. These environments and missions place a large number of Americans at risk for isolation, capture, and exploitation. The United States must be prepared to respond decisively in the first hours of a personnel recovery event with tailored capabilities that can be sustained as long as necessary.

The current architecture for personnel recovery is DoD-centric and does not adequately consider the capabilities and requirements of other USG agencies and coalition partners. A comprehensive doctrine/policy for PR is needed to address both the numbers and types of potentially isolated U.S. personnel and to integrate the various agencies' capabilities into a full-dimensional national capability to execute PR missions. Current PR doctrine is Service-centric and primarily combat-focused in the form of CSAR doctrine. It lacks cohesiveness in that a number of closely related missions – for

¹ National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, 17 September 2002.

example, Civil Search and Rescue, Hostage Rescue, and Combat Search and Rescue – are treated as separate missions.

B. OBJECTIVES

This chapter first defines the strategy-to-task relationship in order to illustrate the relevance of PR to the National Security Strategy, the need for a National Personnel Recovery Architecture, and the proper relationship to current Joint Vision 2020² and the Joint Operational Concepts.³ This chapter then presents a vision for “Full Dimensional Personnel Recovery” as a functional concept. In addition to having a much broader mission scope, Full Dimensional PR proposes a national architecture with supporting articulated doctrine and desired end state capabilities.

The PR capabilities that the USG currently possesses, which are dated and primarily CSAR-related, must be transformed to be relevant. The Nation must address the nature of global, joint, interagency, and coalition operations. The United States’ singular objective is abundantly clear: to return isolated personnel to friendly control as soon as possible; no one will be left behind.

In order to achieve this transformation, the U.S. must first establish a common understanding of mission requirements and doctrine; then Government agencies must plan for PR missions and prepare PR force elements with the ability to effectively execute those missions. Materiel solutions by themselves are likely to fall short of the mark unless they are introduced with the full recognition of the interdependencies and potential synergies of the DOTMLPF model, which we have selected for use throughout this analysis.

C. NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECOVERY VISION

1. Strategic Context

The U.S. joint force, including its interagency and coalition partners, must be prepared to face a wide range of threats across the full range of military operations in any part of the world, including transnational threats such as global terrorism and drug trafficking. Success in protecting against and responding to these threats will require the

² Joint Vision 2020, Published by USG Printing Office, June 2000

³ Joint Operational Concepts, Department of Defense, November 2003

skillful integration of Service and Government agency PR capabilities into a coherent and effective national capability. Complex contingencies, such as humanitarian relief, peace operations, and operations other than war, will require DoD to operate not only as one element of a national PR effort, but also in concert with multinational forces, international organizations, international governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Collaborative planning and interoperability will be the mandates that carry the day, especially in terms of communications, standard operating procedures, and shared information systems. Figure I-3 in the Introduction Chapter portrays the organizational scope of this NPRA Vision.

2. In Pursuit of Our National Goals

Our National Security Strategy (NSS) reflects the nation's values and interests and sets the priorities for the employment of all our elements of national power toward certain defined ends.⁴ The NSS is complemented by supporting, national-level strategic plans, the most prominent of which are the U.S. DoS and U.S. Agency for International Development "Strategic Plan"⁵ and the "Military Strategy of the Department of Defense."⁶ Combating terrorism, providing homeland security, and protecting American citizens abroad are major themes that run through both strategies.

The vision for PR recognizes the need for a transformed national capability that will meet the above challenges. It builds on the concepts set forth in Joint Vision 2020 and applies the principles and constructs of Department of Defense Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) that are designed to guide transformation. Figure III-1 shows the proposed PR strategy-to-task relationship. In order to perform the PR mission in the future, America must have a national PR capability across the full range of operations and activities, ensuring full dimensional protection to isolated personnel in any environment. At the same time, we must recognize that we will not be able to afford the luxury of a standing PR capability in all situations and environments. As such, we must leverage all our interagency and coalition assets and be adaptable, as well as responsive, in any environment.

⁴ National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, 17 September 2002.

⁵ Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009, U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, DoS/USAID Publication 11084, Released August 2003.

⁶ Military Strategy of the Department of Defense (Draft), 11 Sep 03.




Figure III-1. National Strategy to Task Relationship Proposed for Personnel Recovery

3. Full-Spectrum Dominance and Protection

The goal of U.S. military forces is to be able to achieve full-spectrum dominance (FSD). FSD is defined as “the defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full range of military operations.”⁷ FSD emphasizes adaptability, balancing capabilities and managing risks within a global perspective to protect the United States,⁸ preventing conflict and surprise attack, and prevailing against all adversaries.⁹ The Joint Force will require an “expeditionary mindset” that reflects a greater level of deployability and versatility, and it must remain committed to full coordination and interoperability of capabilities with interagency and multinational partners to ensure complementary

⁷ Joint Operations Concepts, Department of Defense, November 2003.

⁸ “An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution In the 21st Century” White Paper (Washington, D.C. Joint Staff, J7: 28 January 2003).

⁹ Military Strategy of the Department of Defense (Draft), 11 September 2003.

effects.¹⁰ Accordingly, PR must be considered in the context of FSD. PR is directly linked with the joint functional concept of protection. Functional concepts amplify a particular military function and apply broadly across the range of military operations.

4. Proposed Strategic National Task

DoD uses a common task system and language (referred to as the Universal Joint Task List, or UJTL) to describe the tasks associated with any given mission. Tasks are divided into categories by level of war: strategic, which is further broken down into strategic-national and strategic-theater, operational, and tactical. This hierarchy serves as an important reference system for commanders, operational planners, combat developers, and trainers in communicating mission essential tasks, conditions and standards. Just as there were several definitions of the mission area, IDA found multiple versions of the top-level strategic-national task that is intended to describe tasks necessary to accomplish national military strategy. Derivative of the proposed personnel recovery mission area defined above, IDA proposes the following description of the associated personnel recovery strategic-national task for DoD. This task emphasizes the role that DoD should have in coordinating personnel recovery efforts interagency-wide and worldwide on a strategic-national level.

This task requires **national (interagency) and multinational coordination** to develop **strategic direction, policy, and plans** for military support missions across the entire range of military operations in all operational and threat environments. This task includes reporting, locating, supporting the person(s) and his or her family, recovery, and return of the isolated person(s) to his or her family or duty. It includes related mission planning areas such as SAR, CSAR, NAR, UAR, and Hostage Rescue; it includes support to the relevant planning of the other departments and agencies of the USG such as the DoS's MPP, EAP and NEO. It is an integral part of Force Protection Planning.

D. TRANSFORMATION

“The major institutions of American National Security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed.”¹¹ In DoD's *Transformation Planning Guidance*, Secretary Rumsfeld states, “We must transform not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also the way we think, the way we

¹⁰ Joint Operations Concepts, DoD, November 2003.

¹¹ The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, 17 September 2002, page 29.

train, and the way we exercise, and the way we fight.” The *Training Transformation Initiative*¹² emphasizes that capabilities-based training in support of our national security strategy must develop individuals and organizations that intuitively think jointly and strive to achieve unity of effort from a diversity of means. It further elaborates that diversity of means are derived not only from active and Reserve components of the Services but also from Federal agencies, international coalitions, international organizations, and state, local and nongovernmental organizations. “The new strategic environment requires orchestration of the wider diversity of means and a broader, more inclusive definition of ‘jointness.’”¹³

1. Path to Transformation

The Joint Operational Concept guides future joint force planning and serves to clarify the conduct of joint operations across the range of military operations in a multinational and interagency context. Transformation is a continuous process that validates capabilities based on the entire gamut of DOTMLPF¹⁴ solutions with the intent of advancing joint warfighting and fielding the capabilities required to deter and defeat the adversary. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) illustrated in Figure III-2 is the process for converting requirements into capabilities through a Functional Capabilities Board (FCB). JCIDS implements a capabilities-based approach to leverage the expertise of all Government agencies, industry, and academia to identify improvements to existing capabilities and to develop new warfighting capabilities. This approach requires a collaborative process that utilizes joint concepts and integrated architectures to identify prioritized capability gaps and integrated DOTMLPF solutions (materiel and nonmateriel) to resolve those gaps. Materiel and non-materiel capability improvements are recommended in accordance with JCIDS,¹⁵ which is overseen by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) focusing on programmatic, joint experimentation, and joint resource change recommendations.

¹² DoD Training Transformation Implementation Plan, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness, 10 June 2003, page 1.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Joint Operational Concept, DoD, November 2003, pgs 24-27.

¹⁵ Refer to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170 and CJCSI 3180.

2. Personnel Recovery Assessment Methodology

Figure III-3 shows the PR assessment methodology for DOTMLPF changes in terms of the three national architectural components: (1) direct and guide (doctrine, mission requirements), (2) plan and prepare (isolated personnel, recovery forces, and commanders/staff), and (3) execute the mission. The baseline effectiveness of these three components is then compared with the desired end states to determine the gaps in DOTMLPF categories. Enhancements to DOTMLPF first will be identified to mitigate these gaps, after which will be assessed for effectiveness and costs. The enhancements will then be prioritized to achieve the maximum effectiveness within the allowable budget. This process will have to be repeated over years to reach the end states.




Figure III-2. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)




Figure III-3. Personnel Recovery Assessment Methodology

E. DESIRED END STATES

The desired end states are categorized in terms of the three architectural components: Direct and Guide, Plan and Prepare Force Elements, and Execute the Mission. Associated end states for each component are as follows:

1. Direct and Guide

1. *Personnel recovery policy and doctrine shall be coherent throughout the interagency community to cover all government departments and agencies and their contractors who have personnel potentially at risk, who can serve as force providers, and who are responsible for planning and budgeting for PR. Policies and procedures will support execution conducted jointly by a joint task force (JTF) commander, a unified combatant commander, or by a Chief of Mission.*

Currently there is no PR doctrine *per se*. The existing military doctrine is for the CSAR mission and needs to be broadened across the full PR spectrum. Because PR is currently a Service responsibility, there is a different version of doctrine found in each Service. PR needs to be a national responsibility, reflected by a *single* version of PR doctrine. Additionally, there is no national policy addressing this issue. Yet, most future U.S. military operations will be conducted in a joint and combined environment, with multiple USG agencies, and with the support of coalition/allied forces. Significantly,

most USG civilian and contract personnel operate overseas under conditions where the U.S. CoM is responsible for their security and for engaging with the host nation. Hence, PR services must be extended through national policy to mission participants, including interagency personnel, coalition personnel, and contractors, all of whom are essential to the success of USG operations.

2. *The PR **scope** shall be articulated and **mission requirements** shall be identified to seamlessly integrate all PR methods across the entire spectrum of operations and the spectrum of conflict.*¹⁶

As shown in Figure III-4, there are several categories or types of PR operations that might be conducted across the spectrum of friendly to hostile operational environments:

- SAR – Search and Rescue
- J/CSAR – Joint/Combat Search and Rescue
- CASEVAC – Casualty Evacuation
- MEDEVAC – Medical Evacuation
- NEO – Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
- UAR – Unconventional Assisted Recovery
- NAR – Nonconventional Assisted Recovery
- Hostage Rescue.

¹⁶ The spectrum of conflict includes security cooperation, small-scale contingencies, and major combat operations.




Figure III-4. Full-Spectrum Personnel Recovery

The units that have traditionally conducted these operations are compartmented to support different missions, although many times the same resources have been used for multiple missions. The PR scope should be broad enough to encompass all of these missions, so that the decision-maker is not confused as to how to task these missions. Therefore, the PR requirements must be well articulated. Similarly, there is confusion as to who receives many of these PR-like services – that is, whether and under what circumstances Government personnel, contractors, and coalition partners are eligible. In today’s increasingly complex and interconnected security situation, the same level of personnel recovery services should be afforded to all personnel whom the USG places in harm’s way. Otherwise, there will be a lack of cohesion.

Note that all the terms shown in Figure III-4 are defined within various DoD and Service documents. It is appropriate to highlight several examples of the overlaps and see how transforming to a full dimensional PR thought process would help. What are the differences among Civil SAR, SAR, and CSAR? For DoD PR forces, the real differences are that Civil SAR and SAR are performed in dangerous (generally natural, such as in jungles, in mountainous terrain, and at sea) circumstances, while CSAR is performed in hostile or denied areas (land, sea, and air) and might involve actual combat operations. In the actual event, planning, command and control, and execution elements are all similar along a continuum from dangerous to hostile. Skills developed and capabilities acquired for one type operation can often be applied to the others. One can make similar comparisons regarding mass rescue and NEO. When considering more than just U.S.

military isolated persons, the differences blur considerably. It is appropriate to think of full-spectrum PR as spanning all these.

2. Plan and Prepare Force Elements

3. *The PR force elements consisting of isolated personnel, military commanders/civilian leaders/staffs, and recovery forces shall be adequately programmed, organized, trained, and equipped.*

The operational commanders, civilian leaders and their staffs at all levels must be educated in PR doctrine, requirements, and mission execution. The commanders, leaders, and staffs must also be trained in relevant strategic and operational C4ISR capabilities. Individuals at risk of being isolated should receive SERE training appropriate to the expected level and types of risks. In order to support this, the national infrastructure of SERE schools must be expanded and standardized, become completely joint in nature, and adapt to the evolving nature of captivity in the 21st century. Also, the PR units and forces from all Government agencies must receive periodic training in end-to-end mission execution involving the six PR core tasks (prepare, report, locate, support, recover, and return). PR must become an integral element of the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) and our Joint Exercise Program. Finally, the senior national leadership must establish readiness standards for all the elements of the national capability to effect PR, and then, on a routine basis, review, assess, and report the readiness of the overall PR system.

4. *The PR force elements consisting of isolated personnel, military commanders/civilian leaders/staffs, and recovery forces shall be adequately **resourced**.*

The current DoD PR capability can provide only limited PR support for two Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs), or for the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) along with one MRC. The capability is fragmented among Services, Special Operations Forces, and the National Guard. PR forces are inadequately supported by a skeleton architecture of PR command, control, and coordination staff. A national policy document must provide adequate focus for the PR mission and Government agencies must budget for PR force, modernization, readiness, and training via their respective Planning Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) processes. Without resources, PR capability will not improve.

5. *The communication, location, identification, authentication, and signaling capabilities for **isolated personnel** shall be operationally effective, suitable, and available when/where needed.*

The present capabilities to locate, identify, and authenticate isolated personnel are limited in effectiveness and reliability and must be improved in terms of timeliness, accuracy, security, and worldwide availability. Because other Government agency, contractor, and coalition personnel need PR support, this area must be reexamined to provide simpler and more reliable systems and to integrate requirements so that the system is established on an interagency basis to which all relevant agencies have appropriate access.

Military personnel, such as aircrew members, carry survival radios that include secure and/or low probability of intercept communications, military (encrypted) GPS, and other capabilities useful in combat environments. Other personnel in hazardous non-combat situations, such as USCG boat crews conducting at-sea boardings, carry radios and personal locator beacons. It would be useful to examine elements of these systems, as well as other capabilities, for diplomats, other civilians, contractors, and coalition partners to provide them a means to be more effectively located should they become isolated. Such equipment could include, at least, cellular or satellite telephones and hiker/trekker-type GPS receivers (with integrated local maps and perhaps designated/coded “safe” waypoints).

3. Execute the Mission

6. *The PR policies, guidance, planning, and preparations shall be adequate such that PR missions are executed successfully, quickly, and seamlessly.*

Although it is understood that no mission goes exactly according to plan, it is expected that up-front planning will significantly reduce the time between any incident and the execution of the recovery mission. The ultimate objective is a responsive, seamless mission execution that results in successful recovery of U.S. personnel including U.S. military, USG civilians, and USG contractors. A subset of this objective is to provide the necessary coordination with coalition partners to achieve successful recoveries of coalition personnel.

F. THE BOTTOM LINE

There is a new world security situation, which significantly increases the likelihood and the scope of PR operations. Although the U.S. military has the best PR system in the world, it is fragmented within the DoD and limited mostly to DoD combat-related operations. Transformational improvement is needed. There is also an increased

need for interagency, as well as multinational, preparation and training for PR. The remainder of this paper suggests in more detail the means to achieve the transformational vision.

CHAPTER IV

PR ARCHITECTURE ANALYSES: CHIEF-OF-MISSION IN CHARGE

IV. PR ARCHITECTURE ANALYSES: CHIEF-OF-MISSION IN CHARGE

This chapter describes the shortfalls and gaps found in the PR architecture¹ when the CoM is in charge, and also presents potential solutions to correct the shortfalls, costs of these potential solutions, and the study team's recommended priorities for these solutions. Both the shortfalls and solutions are organized in the comprehensive DOTMLPF categories.² The recommendations, however, are a subset of the potential solutions which the study team believes will make a significant improvement in PR capability while being affordable. Chapter V follows addressing the architecture analyses for the situation when the Regional Combatant Commander is in charge.

There are more than 260 U.S. Missions in 163 countries around the world.³ The IDA study team conducted visits to and extensive data collection on three countries: Colombia, Indonesia, and the Republic of the Philippines. Our finding is that each mission is unique, primarily because each host nation is different in terms of its PR awareness, capabilities, and sovereignty issues, as well as the U.S. foreign policy toward it. Although the shortfalls and potential solutions are based on a small sample size, there are common denominators in these missions that should apply generally to other missions as well. However, specific analysis has to be done on a country-by-country basis. Appendix E provides generic guidance on how a strategy-to-task mission analysis can be accomplished for each U.S. mission.

The U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Overseas Citizens Services routinely issues information regarding the potential safety of Americans traveling to specific countries. The information is in the form of Current Travel Warnings (countries that the DoS recommends that Americans avoid) and Current Public

¹ Architecture includes all three components, i.e., Direct and Guide; Plan and Prepare; and Execute the Mission.

² DOTMLPF is a DoD paradigm used in translating a concept or capability into its constituent elements. While there is no known comparable construct used in the rest of the Interagency, it can be easily adapted and applied for the same purposes.

³ Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009, U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, DoS/USAID Publication 11084, Released August 2003.

Announcements (information on terrorist threats and other short-term conditions that pose significant risks to Americans). The most recent information provided by the DoS lists 40 countries – 26 to be avoided and 14 with short-term risks.

The current DoS lists represents a snapshot in time. The specific countries on the lists and the number of countries listed change as threat conditions change. For purposes of analysis, the study team has assumed that there will always be between 30 and 50 countries that pose high risks for Americans.

A. SHORTFALLS

1. Doctrine

In this chapter, doctrine and policies are addressed as follows: National, DoS, and DoD. Because the contractor issue is common to both when the Chief of Mission is in charge and when the Combatant Commander is in charge, the contractor issue will be covered in detail in Chapter V.

a. National Policy and Doctrine

Extensive research by the IDA team revealed that there is *no specific policy or guidance at the interagency level concerning PR*. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1 promulgated on 13 February 2001, establishes that NSPDs shall replace both Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) and Presidential Review Directives (PRDs) as an instrument of communicating presidential decisions about national security policy; it also establishes Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) with specific regional or functional national policy responsibilities. The directive states that “except for those established by statute, other existing NSC interagency groups, ad hoc bodies, and executive committees are also abolished as of March 1, 2001, unless they are specifically reestablished as subordinate working groups within the new NSC system as of that date.” Additionally, “the Counter-Terrorism Security Group (CSG), Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group, Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Group, Consequences Management and Protection Group, and the Interagency Working Group on Enduring Constitutional Government are reconstituted as various forms of the NSC/PCC on Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness.”

NSPD 1 further establishes that the “management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the U.S. Government shall usually be accomplished by the National Security Council Policy Coordination

Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day interagency coordinator of national security policy. They shall provide policy analyses for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. Each NSC/PCC shall include representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the NSC/Deputy Committee.”⁴ While the Counter-Terrorism Security Group continues to play a prominent role in hostage recovery, its purview and authorities in the broader realm of personnel recovery are not well codified or understood. The bottom line is that PR is not specifically addressed in the context of PCC or Sub-PCC in the NSPD. Lack of guidance at the national level, coupled with traditional views of PR, tends to reinforce the flawed notion that personnel recovery is a mission performed exclusively by DoD rescue forces, normally in the context of a hostage recovery situation.⁵ There is little appreciation for the fact that knowledgeable leaders and trained and equipped personnel at risk are also an integral part of the equation and that risk assessment/mitigation, prior planning, and preparation are the keys to success. Further, the notion that PR is conducted to recover an isolated and perhaps evading person prior to his or her capture is not clearly understood outside DoD.

The current DoD definition of *PR* and the criteria associated with the determination of an isolated person’s status are restrictive and preclude comprehensive, integrated approaches to PR. Much of the unnecessary compartmentalization with which organizations approach the issue has to do with the categorization of roles, missions, methods, options, and the legal status of personnel.

b. DoS Policies

DoS policy, which includes the President’s Letter of Instruction to the Ambassador, the Strategic Plan, and Emergency Action Planning, is focused on force protection. It does not emphasize the importance of personnel recovery planning, and the need to have a system, operating procedures, and capability already in place to respond should an incident arise. While the National Security Strategy, the DoS/USAID Strategic Plan, the President’s Letter of Instruction to the Ambassador, and country-specific Mission Performance Plans all allude to the need for personnel recovery planning, none

⁴ National Security Presidential Policy Directive #1, Subject: Organization of the National Security Council System, dated 13 February 2001.

⁵ President Bush has signed NSPD-12 related to hostage taking, but it does not specifically improve the planning, preparation, and readiness for with PR or hostage rescue.

specifically mention it. DoS might intuitively associate personnel recovery under the general rubric of “evacuation” as a part of Emergency Action Planning; however, it is interesting to note that evacuation and hostage situations are addressed in some detail in the Emergency Planning Handbook, while personnel recovery is not addressed.

c. DoD Policies

While the Missing Persons Act (MPA) was instrumental in establishing the baseline architecture for DoD, it is largely outdated and outmoded for considerations of the operational environments, threats, and challenges the interagency community faces today. Additionally, the MPA applies only to DoD personnel; no such corollary exists in the DoS, or non-DoD interagency community. DoS policies with respect to missing persons are to use whatever local resources (embassy and host country) are available and appropriate. For decades, DoS and embassies have followed the policy that the U.S. Government does not negotiate for hostage release.

While DoD has a codified “Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” promulgated in Joint Publication 1-02, DoS and other non-DoD departments and agencies have no common lexicon except as defined in national level directives. The term “personnel recovery” *per se* does not exist within the interagency community. While one might argue that the lack of precise and common definitions usually does not present major obstacles in the execution of a mission when human lives hang in the balance, lack of common terminology can lead to a lack of understanding and ability to adequately plan and prepare, and to make timely decisions. Additionally it can create considerable angst or disappointment for affected families, and have serious implications in determining legal status and attendant responsibilities, pay, and medical benefits.

DoD’s policy related to the Code of Conduct (CoC) forms the basis for resistance training. For DoD civilians, non-DoD interagency official personnel, or Government contractors, there is no equivalent document to form the basis of the resistance training or equivalent.

d. Contractor Policies

The contractor security issue is common to both situations when a Chief of Mission or Combatant Commander is in charge. The April 2004 events of contractors taken hostage in Iraq reemphasized USG contractor security issues. The USG lacks a comprehensive policy to ensure that contractors are adequately protected when supporting the USG overseas or that the risks to them are adequately managed in high-

threat, overseas locations. The interagency community currently shares little or no common policy or procedures with respect to contractor risk assessment, mitigation, or management.

e. Host Nation Sovereignty

Most nations feel very strongly about their sovereignty, and many do not intend to allow other nations (including the U.S.) to conduct rescue missions, regardless of whether or not the nation itself has an adequate capability. According to international law, search and rescue is a host nation responsibility, the exception being Non-combatant Evacuation Operations.⁶ Depending on conditions, personnel recovery operations could sometimes be considered a Humanitarian Assistance operation; as such, intervention and/or assistance might be perceived in a more receptive light than military assistance or military operations. Notwithstanding, most nations are eager to receive training and equipment from the U.S. military and USG agencies. Although USAID programs could be applied (indirectly) toward the enhancement of Host Nation PR capabilities, the IDA team did not observe that to be the case. Similarly U.S. Security Assistance, FBI, DEA, Secret Service, INL, and Diplomatic Security Programs might be leveraged in improving host nation personnel recovery capabilities.

2. Organization

a. DoS Organizations

The Crisis Management Support Center at Headquarters DoS is a pivotal reach-back link for the CoM in responding to crises; however, because there is a lack of common knowledge on personnel recovery, it is not organized to handle personnel recovery incidents. Likewise the roles of the Political-Military Action Team (PMAT) and the Federal Emergency Support Team (FEST) are not well defined in how they should respond to or support PR incidents. Both can, and do, provide important functions or services, but their use is normally on an *ad hoc* basis rather than a consistently evolving and integral piece of the PR architecture. Organizational knowledge of JPRA, its functions, and services varied widely among the above DoS organizations, suggesting that synergy between DoS and DoD had not yet reached its full potential.

⁶ Non-combatant Evacuation Operations, which are based on the fact or presumption that the Host Nation no longer has the capability to provide for the security of American citizens, are normally conducted after the situation has severely deteriorated.

While multiple bureaus and agencies in the U.S. Government and within DoS are involved in various aspects of personnel recovery,⁷ there is no single coordinating office or focal point for matters concerning personnel recovery at the national level. Varying degrees of involvement by various agencies over time have led to confusion about who has the lead and who is in support.

Similarly, confusion over the roles and responsibilities at the NSC and DoS Headquarters level cascades down to the operational and the country team level. Lack of policy and procedures is conducive to the creation of *ad hoc* organizations, which generally are inefficient and based on the functions and dynamics of trial and error, rather than on the principles of best practice.

Although there is no standard or “template” for a country team organization, IDA observations and data collected from our visits suggest that a “typical” organizational diagram for a medium-to-large-sized embassy looks like the one described in Figure IV-1. The issues in responding to personnel recovery incidents, as reported to us in our visits, were not necessarily with the organizational structure itself, but with confusion over the authorities and roles concerning task organizing for the mission, i.e., which organization or staff member had the lead and what individuals, agencies, and/or departments were in support. We observed that confusion (and frustration) seemed to reign not only at the country team level, but also at the Washington D.C., or NSC, level. Without clear USG policies and procedures, host nation coordination and sovereignty issues immensely compound the situation, resulting in loss of important time that might never be regained.

⁷ DoS/Political-Military Bureau, DoS/Office of Diplomatic Security, USAID, Federal Bureau of Investigation, DoS/Office of Counterterrorism, DoS/Foreign Emergency Support Team, DoS/Management, DoS Consular Affairs, DoS/INL, and others.




Figure IV-1. Template of PR Participants and Actions⁸

The National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC) is responsible for preparing DoS and other non-DoD departments and agencies for deployment overseas. NFATC offers more than 425 courses, including some 60 languages, which range in length from several days to 2 years. In addition to DoS personnel, NFATC provides training for more than 43 other Government agencies.⁹

With the exception of the U.S. Mission to Colombia, none of the U.S. missions in high-threat countries have a PR Coordination Center (PRCC). The Colombia PRCC was established after the PR event of 13 February 2003.

b. Role of JFCOM in Providing Interagency Support

In order for PR capabilities to meet the demands of the new operational environments that are upon us today, the USG and the interagency community must utilize the relevant transformational opportunity that JFCOM provides. JFCOM is DoD’s force trainer, requirements integrator, and transformation agent. The Executive Agent for

⁸ Acronyms in chart: HN – Host Nation; NSPD – National Security Presidential Directive; JUSMAG – Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group; RA- Regional Affairs; MG – Military Group.

⁹ Schedule of Courses (1 October 2002 – 30 September 2004), George P. Shultz, National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Department of State Publication, Foreign Service Institute, Revised June 2002, p. 1.

JFCOM for PR is the JPRA. Given that today's transformational developments are dynamic, fast moving, and complex, DoS does not have the capability to do transformational planning and experimentation. DoS needs help in the PR related personnel training and requirements generation process. Thus, PR transformation is occurring without the full participation of DoS. Currently, there is no official conduit or mechanism for the integration of interagency PR requirements.

3. Training and Education

Because PR SERE training¹⁰ in DoS is extremely limited, there is no common knowledge base upon which to assess requirements or capabilities. Some Diplomatic Security personnel have been trained at DoD facilities, and some receive training with the FBI and Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). DoS is further handicapped by sparse funding, and "one-level-deep" manning; there is almost no staffing reserve either to staff teaching faculties or to provide student flows. As a result, professional training and education are neither progressive nor continuous. Senior leaders, managers, and staff, who are normally filling two or three functional positions simultaneously, feel they can ill afford to dedicate specialized staff toward planning and preparing for PR.

NFATC is the primary training institution for preparing DoS and other non-DoD departments and agencies for deployment overseas. After several data collection visits to the center, the IDA team formed a general impression that the training provided by NFATC is intended more for acclimation and orientation rather than PR training *per se*. The Security Overseas Seminar (SOS) is one example. Although mandatory for DoS Foreign Service Officers and USAID personnel headed overseas, it is not mandatory for other departments or agencies. Some agencies, such as Peace Corps, run their own training, which takes place sometimes prior to deployment and sometimes after assignment in the host country. A variety of courses are also taught at Embassies; some at DoS feel overseas training is quite effective, but there is no centralized direction, and effectiveness depends on external support. The overall presumption reported was that any serious investment in PR and/or SERE training for country team personnel would have a very low return on investment. Nevertheless, standardization of instruction and requirements for those who should receive training did not appear to be of great concern. The Crisis Management Training conducted by NFATC, which focuses more on country

¹⁰ PR training here refers to any and all forms of training, e.g., individual, collective, SERE, management, staff, and recovery force.

team tasks and uses table-top exercises on Emergency Action Planning, covers more than 250 posts on a biennial schedule. Pre-deployment exercises are conducted with Marine Expeditionary Units.

Requirements for non-DoD interagency SERE training have not been identified. IDA tried to identify the requirements using the DoS F-77 form for all countries, which has been developed for evacuation purposes. However, we learned that the F-77 data are often inaccurate. Instead, the study team estimated the non-DoD SERE training requirement by determining the throughput capacity of appropriate courses taught by the National Foreign Affairs Training Center. The throughput capacity for the initial 7-week orientation course for Foreign Service Officers is approximately 700 students per year. That figure is based on seven courses per year with a maximum class size of 98 students per class. The 2-day SOS course throughput is calculated to be 2,700 personnel per year. That figure is based upon 18 courses per year with a maximum class size of 150 students per class. The one-day Advanced SOS course throughput is calculated to be 2,240, based on 14 courses per year with a maximum class size of 160 students per class. The one-day temporary duty SOS course throughput is computed to be 1,125, based on 15 courses per year with a maximum class size of 75. The 3-week orientation for Foreign Service Specialists throughput is computed to be 675, based on 9 courses per year with a maximum class size of 75. Thus the total maximum NFATC throughput capacity possible for those non-DoD departments and agencies being deployed for duty with overseas mission is approximately 7,500 per year as shown in Table IV-1. IDA is assuming that 7,500 students could be the pipeline capacity for non-DoD agency PR training.

Table IV-1. NFATC PR Related Courses

Course Title	Courses per Year	Students per Class	Students per Year	Course Length
Initial Orientation for Foreign Service Officers	7	98	686	7 weeks
Security Overseas Seminar	18	150	2,700	2 days
Advanced Security Overseas Seminar	14	160	2,240	1 day
TDY Security Overseas Seminar	15	75	1,125	1 day
Orientation for Foreign Service Specialists	9	75	675	3 weeks

IDA conducted three case studies at U.S. Embassies in countries on the high-threat list: Colombia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. At each Embassy, IDA observers asked the staff for a head count of Americans in the country at that particular time. Several offices in each Embassy thought that they had accurate information, but the result in every case tied back to the F77 report. So, while each U.S. Mission could, with standard guidance, define the type and level of SERE training required for Americans operating in its respective country, it is unreasonable to expect that any U.S. Mission can determine with any accuracy the number of Americans who need the survival training. There are few exceptional agencies, such as the CIA, with robust accountability procedures already in place, that can accurately quantify their needs.

The DoS Form 77, in its current configuration and format, is of little use in estimating the number of personnel at high-risk of capture because it is not designed for that purpose. Certain bureaus, such as Diplomatic Security, are making an effort to train a few of their personnel in SERE related subjects; however, they are almost totally reliant on DoD to provide the training.

Overall, IDA could not estimate the number of non-DoD agency personnel, and the level of training each individual needs. IDA assumes that a pipeline capacity can be developed for up to 7,500 non-DoD individuals.

4. Materiel

Properly equipping those who are potentially at high risk of isolation or capture with communications and survival gear is an essential step in mitigating the risk. Before this can be done, those personnel at risk need to be identified. Additionally, DoD research and developmental efforts and equipment experiences are not being shared effectively throughout the interagency community. There are many DoD tools, such as survival radios, blood chits, signaling devices, evasion plans of action, ISOPREPs, and pointee-talkies, that interagency personnel could procure. However, most non-DoD personnel are not aware of their existence, nor are they aware of how to procure them or how to use them.

5. Leader Development

Senior leadership in non-DoD agencies lack knowledge and awareness with regard to personnel recovery. The IDA team found invariably that data collection visits needed to be preceded with rather extensive tutorials on fundamental aspects of PR including its inherent concept of recovery in a rapid manner from an isolated or evading

situation. Very few senior leaders and managers within the interagency demonstrated a good grasp of the basic concept, let alone the more sophisticated implications and nuances of full dimensional personnel recovery and the urgent need to respond rapidly while the person at risk is evading capture. The same proved to be true at the intermediate levels of management. Junior leaders and managers were normally averse to accepting any broader view than what they had already learned or come to accept.

6. Personnel and Facilities

There are few trained PR personnel in non-DoD agencies. This situation is particularly problematic to the Ambassador in charge of an Embassy or Mission. Although National Defense Directive 38 might provide a process for substantiating additional staffing of the country team, there seemed to be a great degree of skepticism about its effectiveness in attaining any additional personnel, especially for the purposes of staffing personnel recovery requirements. There are no dedicated facilities for PR in the non-DoD interagency community.

B. FINDINGS

After aggregating the shortfalls and deficiencies stated above, the IDA study team concluded that, *as a result of a lack of national guidance, and the lack of consensus on the definition and scope of personnel recovery; planning and preparations for potential personnel recovery incidents by U.S. missions abroad are inadequate as evidenced by a lack of contingency plans.* The DoD PR definition from DoDD 2310.2 is directly applicable to interagency PR, if the term “personnel” were taken in a broader context. There are no accepted guidelines for determining or limiting the scope of interagency personnel recovery efforts. In the absence of such, this study proposes a broad interpretation of interagency PR responsibilities to recover U.S. military personnel, Government civilians, and contractors without regard to the situation or environment. Until there is an interagency policy that defines PR in terms of vision, scope, and goals, deliberate planning and preparation will continue to be *ad hoc* and inefficient.

PR, which is not specifically addressed in NSPD 1, has not, as indicated in our research, been addressed specifically in the context of a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) or Sub-PCC. Failure to do so, combined with the exclusionary nature of NSPD 1, leaves a serious policy void in the NPRA. The Missing Personnel Act provides many of the foundational elements of the current DoD PR architecture; however, no such

corollary exists on the DoS, or non-DoD interagency side, again contributing to a void in policy.

Without national level policy and clear supporting doctrine, the flawed notion that DoD will always be there to respond will persist, and personnel recovery will continue to default to DoD capabilities on an *ad hoc* basis without the benefit of supporting capabilities and efforts from other agencies.

C. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

1. Doctrine/Policy

a. **NSPD (The latest version of the coordinated NSPD draft is provided in Appendix G)**

An NSPD would provide a major contribution to a common understanding of PR policy across the USG, and to establish a national policy with defined interagency roles and responsibilities. IDA developed a draft NSPD for PR in coordination with JPRA, the Joint Staff (JS), and DPMO. DPMO is now coordinating this draft within OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services. DPMO will provide a draft to NSC for coordination with DoS and selective departments and agencies within the interagency community. When signed, the NSPD should stimulate the development of a coherent and cohesive policy/doctrinal infrastructure in the form of supporting directives, instructions, doctrine, and procedures. Essential features and intent of the draft NSPD are as follows:

- To provide an interagency definition for the term *PR* that describes full-dimensional PR as proposed below:

*PR is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for, plan, and execute the recovery of U.S. military, Government civilians, and Government contractors, who become isolated from friendly control while participating in U.S.-sponsored activities abroad, and of other persons as designated by the President.*¹¹

¹¹ This definition of PR includes all options and defines specifically those personnel deserving priority, planned recovery services. It broadens the definition to include the other agencies than DoD and obviates the legalistic and discrete tests mentioned in Chapter II. Yet the definition provides sufficient guidance to develop, focus, and sustain capabilities, while providing personnel involved in day-to-day recovery operations and crisis management the flexibility to exercise good judgment in making decisions about when and how to execute PR operations.

- To describe the two general, but distinctly different, situations in which Americans could be isolated, missing, detained, or captured while serving the nation overseas.
 - Where the CoM or Ambassador is responsible for the safety, welfare, and recovery of isolated USG personnel.
 - Where the Geographical Combatant Commander has full responsibility of protecting U.S. Military, USG civilians, and contractors, and coalition partners participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission in theater.
- To establish U.S. Policy as follows:

It is the policy of the USG to recover all U.S. military, Government civilians, Government contractors, and other persons as designated by the President who are isolated from friendly control as a result of participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity and to return them to a safe environment.

- To establish a code of behavior for Americans in service of their country that is primarily motivational, underpinned by the oath of office taken by Government employees when assuming office and legislation concerning the unauthorized release of classified information. The code will provide a basis for SERE-like training designed so that captives can survive and return with integrity and honor. An initial draft for such a code is provided as follows:
 - As Americans, they should assist other Americans with whom they are isolated to the best of their abilities and do nothing that may harm a fellow American.
 - U.S. personnel should resist attempts by their captors to exploit them to the utmost of their ability, and at all times protect classified information. At no time should they accept special treatment from a detaining element, unless such treatment comes with no conditions and is given equally to all Americans in the same situation. They should be aware that their captors will attempt to use them to shape world opinion and that their actions while in captivity will impact our ability to recover them safely.
 - Americans should not make written, oral, or videotaped statements harmful to the U.S.; however, after carefully assessing their risk, Americans should make generic written, oral, or videotaped statements that could provide information regarding their status (i.e. proof of life).
 - Americans isolated from friendly control should carefully plan their actions and realize that their decisions can profoundly impact the Government's ability to affect their recovery or release.
- To direct the following policy initiatives and implementing actions:

- Establishes the Counterterrorism Security Group as the national agency responsible for policy oversight and coordination for PR, and for recommending options to the President.
- Delineates responsibilities for diplomatic, military, and civil recovery options.
- Directs USG departments and agencies to establish personnel recovery focal point offices within each organization for the purpose of preparing PR procedures and planning and preparing for PR incidents.
- Directs all departments and agencies to identify their high-risk-of-isolation, -capture, or -exploitation personnel, training and support requirements, and PR capabilities and limitations (including funding requirements).
- Requires the CoM to identify host nation needs that would enhance personnel recovery capabilities and to assist them in meeting the requirements of international Search and Rescue agreements.

b. Strategic Plan/MPP/EAP

The DoS Strategic Plan (discussed in some detail in Chapter II) places a clear emphasis and priority on protecting American citizens abroad and improving protection of soft targets.¹² However, it fails to specifically mention personnel recovery for doing so and fails to establish development of a personnel recovery capability as a performance goal. Consequently, the supporting Mission Performance Plans (MPPs) do not address development of PR capabilities. In order to have a coherent “strategy-to-task” organizational plan with corresponding measures of performance, PR ought to be mentioned, defined, and established as a performance goal in the Strategic Plan. Supporting MPPs should then include goals, requirements, and performance measures for the development of PR plans and capabilities. The DoS Emergency Action Planning Handbook should be revised to include specific mention of PR and provide guidance on how to develop plans and capabilities for responding to PR incidents. Appendix E to this paper serves as initial guidance, but must be further developed and refined through exercises and workshops. Such plans should include crisis action responses as well as the

¹² Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009, U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, DoS/USAID Publications 11084, Released August 2003, p. 37. Soft targets are loosely defined within the Strategic Plan as locations and persons outside diplomatic grounds deemed at risk because of their real or perceived association with American interests making them targets for anti-American violence.

development of long-term capabilities through security assistance programs and USAID and other developmental programs.

Accomplishing the above will be a seminal step in institutionalizing a *three-pronged strategy* for developing and sustaining effective PR mechanisms within DoS and U.S. Missions:

- Plan and prepare for PR by establishing top-down performance goals.
- Evaluate progress and effectiveness using DoS evaluation tools and methods.¹³
- Routinely exercise the capability.

At the CoM level, PR planning can take place within the context and processes of the EAP. However, *before meaningful planning can begin, a thorough personnel recovery assessment* for each mission that would involve the following general considerations (see Appendix E for a detailed U.S. mission guide that includes an assessment logic and solution framework) is necessary:

- Baseline Policy Objectives
 - Assess U.S. national interests in the country/region, e.g., foreign policy objectives, treaties, alliances, and international agreements, security assistance and developmental programs.
 - Assess Host Nation goals and objectives relative to personnel recovery.
- Assess the Operational Environment
 - Threat, indicators, trends, *modus operandi*.
 - Number of U.S. personnel at risk.
 - Force Protection and risk mitigation plans/procedures in place.
 - Communications and coordination constraints in dealing with the host nation on personnel recovery and humanitarian assistance matters.
- Assess and improve PR Capabilities
 - Host nation SAR, CSAR, and hostage rescue; DoD, DoS, other in-country departments and agencies, and International Organizations, International Government Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).

¹³ Ibid. Appendix B, pg 45. Several evaluation tools and methods, e.g., Mission Performance Plans, Bureau Performance Plans, Internal Bureau Assessments, Office of the Inspector General and General Accounting Office Evaluations, are described.

- Command, control, communications capabilities and authorities (U.S. and host nation; vertical and horizontal).
- Operations Center, Intelligence Center, Common Operating Picture.

2. Organization

Lack of USG policy and doctrine results in fragmented organizational responsibilities for personnel recovery, which, in turn, contributes to the lack of interagency oversight, cooperation, and capabilities. The aforementioned top-level policy enhancements will provide a solid blueprint for an improved structural design that would be well understood across the interagency, and would provide the following essential organizational entities with improved functionalities:

- A National Security Council Counterterrorism Security Group with authority for policy oversight and interagency policy coordination at the national level.
- PR focal point offices residing within DoS and major interagency departments and agencies responsible for coordination and planning.
- A reengineered interagency Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG) with responsibility for oversight of experimentation, acquisition, training and exercises.
- An expertly focused interagency Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) with responsibility for determining the legal status of covered persons¹⁴ who are reported as isolated, missing, or in distress while participating in a U.S. sponsored activity or mission overseas

Additionally, the following section suggests reengineering considerations and/or considerations of designs of existing organizations as best practices.

As mentioned in the shortfalls section, with exception of the U.S. Mission to Colombia, none of the U.S. Missions in high-threat countries have a PR coordination center. Given existing and foreseeable personnel shortages, it is not reasonable to propose a personnel recovery cell or office as a template solution for all missions even though it would be most efficient from an operational viewpoint. However, the IDA team came to the conclusion that funding one-person focal points at Embassies in 30 to 50 high-threat countries would be a prudent and efficient step, with two to five being established each year for the next 10 to 15 years. Staffed by trained and qualified

¹⁴ Covered persons should include U.S. military, Government civilians, and Government contractors, who are isolated, missing, or in distress while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission overseas and other persons as designated by the President.

personnel, these cells would be focused on implementing – at country team level – the three-pronged DoS personnel recovery strategy (Plan and Prepare, Evaluate, and Exercise) mentioned earlier in this chapter. As normal personnel rotations occur, this would also provide continuous trained cadre to populate other offices and higher levels of management within DoS with PR field experience. Costs related to this option are covered in Section D of this chapter.

The U.S. Army CONUS Replacement Centers (CRCs), which currently operate at Forts Benning and Bliss, provide predeployment administrative processing and combatant command-directed training to individual military replacements (all Services except the USMC), Government civilian employees, selected non-DoD agencies, and Government contractors bound for Iraq, Afghanistan, Cuba, and Kuwait. The CRC is a critical focal point for deployment preparation and, with some maturing, could serve as an excellent primer for force protection and personnel recovery collective and individual training. Further, with its pending move to much larger quarters, the Fort Benning CRC, with appropriate resourcing, could serve as a joint and interagency CRC, with the potential to significantly enhance the accountability, survivability, and recoverability of a major segment of overseas personnel that would include non-DoD USG contractors.

However, the IDA team determined that a strictly organizational approach to contractor issues would be shortsighted in addressing the myriad of challenges that face contractors in the future. IDA concluded that any personnel recovery contractor solution set would have to address shortfalls in the following general areas: contractor accountability, contractor survivability, and contractor recoverability. Additionally, these issues have implications for USG contractors in the interagency arena in the context of the national PR architecture. The team further determined that the contracting process was a key channel through which shortfalls could be addressed and where deliberate planning discipline could be reinforced, based on solid referential ties to joint and Service doctrinal principles. In essence, we wanted to enable an increase in the level of operational influence over the solicitation and contract execution process for contractors in high-threat operational environments. A comprehensive approach to a solution set for Contractor Issues is located at Appendix F.

Given DoS shortfalls in staffing and in experience in PR and transformation planning, DoS should consider leveraging JPRA as its Center of Excellence through transformational organizational design initiatives such as cross-attaching personnel, internships, and liaison offices. As a minimum, DoS should establish a coordination conduit to JPRA, and a mechanism for the integration of interagency PR requirements.

In our visit to Colombia, the IDA team learned of what might be considered a significant (perhaps transformational) approach to resourcing PR requirements, which seems to be working well. International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) represented by Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in Colombia conducts DoS herbicide spray operations from remote, forward operating bases for the eradication of the coca crop in Colombia. The mission is conducted by several OV-10s flying at low level, subjected routinely to gunfire from defending narcotics-growers and traffickers. In an unusually close arrangement between DoS, Government of Colombia, and a U.S. Government contractor, a tailored PR capability (including U.S. piloted helicopters, medics, survival radios) was contracted for and “built into” the spray mission package. Mission success rates of almost 100 percent suggest that this type of approach might be worthy of consideration in other types of operational environments.¹⁵

The former U.S. Customs Service (USCS), now included under the Office of Homeland Security in the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), is another agency that consistently flies in hostile, or potentially hostile, environments. Drawing from their own lessons learned and from ex-military aviator experience, and out of their own necessity, Customs has established an impressive PR architecture. This includes their own Code of Behavior as a basis for their training, survival radios, special instructions and ISOPREP procedures, Standard Operating Procedures,¹⁶ and Evasion Charts. The combined and *shared experiences* of JPRA, INL/NAS, and ICE could go a long way toward providing adaptive, innovative, and cost-effective solutions that could be implemented over time without major program support. An *interagency forum* similar to the Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy (ICAP), run by the GSA, could be the mechanism to allow sharing experiences.

3. Training, Education, and Leader Development

NFATC is an excellent venue and facility that provides tailored, high quality training and education for USG employees involved in Foreign Service. Its mission is “to develop the men and women our nation requires to fulfill our leadership role in world

¹⁵ For more information on the INL Air Wing and NAS Personnel Recovery capabilities, read “Bureau Fights Drugs from the Sky” and “Boondock Training Hones Survival Skills” in January 2001, DoS State Magazine, pages 16-19.

¹⁶ U.S. Customs, “South American Air Operations, Standard Operating Procedures,” 25 September 2000.

affairs and to defend U.S. interests.”¹⁷ Meeting the demands of today’s asymmetrical and global threats requires a transformational change in NFATC approach to training. (It should be noted that even in today’s environment, there is a concern that painting a bleak security picture for newly hired personnel might reduce volunteerism for overseas assignments.) This change should include modifying its approach to cover important security topics (e.g., Force Protection, Emergency Action Planning, Non-combatant Evacuation, Consequence Management, and Hostage Rescue) in other than seminar fashion. Specific courses should be developed that not only provide an awareness for those deployed overseas, but also train managers on required risk assessment/mitigation and planning skills and educate leaders on evaluating PR capabilities and responding to PR incidents in a time-sensitive manner. Outsourcing of courses and instructional material could be looked at as viable alternatives provided the outsourced training is certified by JPRA. Commercial/private sector capabilities are available, but they currently lack certification.

The study team perceives that there are two general categories of non-DoD interagency personnel who require personnel recovery related training. The first category includes all personnel who are likely to be in situations where there is a high risk of being taken captive. The second category includes all others, who while still at risk, face a significantly lower risk of being taken captive.

The high risk of capture category is partially defined by the threat conditions or degree of stability within a specific country. The category also is defined by the job requirements of each person. For example, those personnel conducting crop-spraying missions in support of counter narcotics operations are in the high risk of capture category. Similarly, an Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission could be in this category just due to the high profile nature of his/her job. Personnel in this category should be trained through courses that mirror the DoD family of SERE courses since their likelihood of targeting and capture is somewhat equivalent to that for DoD personnel. Their training requirements will not be discussed further in this paper.

The general risk of capture population also requires training to provide an awareness of the threat situation to be faced and measures they can take to mitigate risks both before and after capture. Training must be focused on three distinct phases of the

¹⁷ Schedule of Courses (1 October 2002 – 30 September 2004), George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, DoS Publication, Foreign Studies Institute, Revised June 2002, Director’s Message.

threat situation: the normal, day-to-day threat environment, having become a target, and having been captured. The training for each of these situations is described in the following paragraphs; necessary course material can be developed by using appropriate course material from NFATC and JPRA.

All persons being assigned overseas need to be made aware of the threat environment into which they will be placed. The training needs to address topics such as the stability of the government, the stability of the economy, the activity of any rebel organizations, and the activity of any terrorist organizations. Training also must include a recent historical perspective regarding the treatment of U.S. Government officials, to include details on any specific incidents and any lessons learned. Course material must include information regarding the actions that can be taken by all personnel overseas to lessen their chances of being targeted by a rebel or terrorist group. This includes limiting information shared with strangers, varying schedules and routes to avoid patterns, keeping co-workers and family informed of your plans, being alert to strange activity, and knowing how to signal distress and request assistance.

Given the current world threat environment, all those being sent overseas need to be trained to recognize if they are being targeted and to take steps to disrupt that targeting. In practically all cases, politically-based hostage taking is preceded by planning and surveillance. At this point, the most important thing an individual can do to prevent being taken captive is to disrupt the surveillance. Training should be focused on increasing awareness of possible surveillance, on verifying suspected suspicious behavior, on reporting suspected surveillance, and on alerting co-workers. This training also should address the steps that can be taken to evade potential captors should a person be pursued.

Should the steps outlined above fail to be effective, a person may be taken captive. Training related to this situation could be a part of a general overseas training curriculum or it could be prescribed only for those being assigned to countries where this is more likely to occur. The Department of State should make that judgment. This training must address the basic guidelines that should be followed to reduce personal risk and enhance chances of survival. Course content should include the dynamics of a capture situation (volatile, unpredictable, high level of danger), the need to protect sensitive and classified information, the need to continually collect information about the situation, the need to assess opportunities for escape, the techniques to cope with isolation, and the techniques for interfacing with one's captors.

USG agencies who have people at risk or who have PR-capable assets should participate in a regular series of interagency PR workshops that address major areas of concern and topical issues. These interagency workshops serve as means of sharing lessons learned and best practices among interested agencies. ICAP is an excellent example of how a formal forum can serve purposes far beyond the mere exchange of information, resulting in the development of codified interagency policy.

The IDA study team fully appreciates that this study alone cannot chart the course for the future of PR for the USG. It is essential that interagency leadership understand Full Dimensional PR, be involved in identifying the issues, and be willing to address them. While policy and doctrine can describe what can and should be done, leaders make it happen and serve as the prime movers for change. In order to foster leader development and involvement, JPRA, in collaboration with DoS, should develop a version of its PR-101 course that is tailored for the interagency community in the context of the EAP planning process and PR Assessment process described earlier. The National Defense University (NDU)¹⁸ and the NFATC should also collaborate and incorporate a version of JPRA's PR-189 course into their curricula.

4. Materiel

After USG agencies have assessed the numbers of people at risk, and the levels of that risk, then those agencies should define their PR equipment requirements to complement their training requirements. As DoD replaces legacy equipment, selected items can be transferred to the interagency based on identified requirements and suitability.

An interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)¹⁹ between the DoD and selective non-DoD departments and agencies should be developed to establish a forum and a mechanism to ensure unity of effort and mutual support on matters of R&D and acquisition.

¹⁸ The Interagency Transformation, Education, and After Action Review (ITEA) Program is well suited for this type of initiative in that it already is engaged in interagency matters and instruction on crisis planning and response. It is also supporting development of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group Concept.

¹⁹ A DRAFT Memorandum of Agreement Concerning DOD-Treasury Mutual Support in Policy, Research and Development, Training, Planning, and Operations for Personnel Recovery. between the Secretary of Treasury and the Secretary of Defense attempted to accomplish the same goal and more, but was put on hold due to reorganization.

Explore resource pooling between the Department of State and DoD. Focus should be placed on reorienting and supplementing Security Assistance programs and leveraging U.S. Agency for International Development programs to improve host nation personnel recovery equipment. Such improvements should be accomplished in conjunction with the addition of personnel recovery focal points in specific U.S. missions.

D. COSTS

- **NSC Counter-terrorism Security Group Support:** To support the NSC CSG there should be funding to allow the group to develop policy and conduct the oversight function. This could involve conducting PR readiness assessment exercises for high-threat countries, ensuring that adequate planning and preparations are done, and updating policies as necessary. A support budget of \$1 million is postulated for this purpose to hire support personnel and travel.
- **Establish PR Offices:** The draft NSPD requires that key departments and agencies that do not have a PR office need to establish an office.
 - The dedicated person(s) assigned to this office would become the most knowledgeable contact for all PR matters within the parent organization, would be the principal focal point and point of contact within that department or agency for participating in PR planning, preparation, and readiness in close coordination with other PR organizations (including DoD) and offices both in CONUS and at the overseas Missions, and would attend individual training on PR (e.g., attend JPRA run courses such as PR fundamentals and fundamentals of PR for allies).
 - The departments and agencies identified below for consideration were those that for the most part demonstrated particular interest in the improvement of PR within the USG during interviews for the NPRA study and by their attendance at Interagency PR workshops.
 - Using the DPMO office as a benchmark, a full office would consist of approximately seven people. However, DPMO has many more responsibilities because of the size of DoD. Hence, the office at the Department of State should consist of three personnel billets; and other departments and agencies should consist of one each.
 - We recommend that the following departments and agencies establish a PR Contact Office: Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, General Services Administration, Drug Enforcement Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department

of Energy, U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Commerce, and the Department of Agriculture. Note: although not contacted during the conduct of this study, it has been reported that the last two on this list (DOC and USDA) have significant numbers of personnel overseas and should be considered as logical participants. In that same vein, there might well be other departments and agencies that would also be interested in establishing a PR Contact Office.

- The DoS office would consist of a GS-15 and two GS-13s or their Foreign Service equivalent. Using composite pay rates, these personnel require funding of approximately \$350,000 per year. This could be doubled to cover such additional costs of facilities, travel, procurements, and office supplies. This results in a yearly funding requirement of approximately \$700,000. Assuming that 12 other agencies/departments are involved at the one-person level, it is estimated that about \$350,000 each is required for their support. This results in a total yearly funding requirement of \$4.9 million for the USG.
- **SERE Training for Non-DoD:** To support the SERE training requirement of the non-DoD departments and agencies, we have used the throughput capacity of the National Foreign Affairs Training Center as a foundation. The throughput capacity for the initial 7-week orientation course for Foreign Service Officers is approximately 700 students per year. That figure is based on seven courses per year with a maximum class size of 98 students per class. The tuition cost is \$4,100 per student. Extending this course by two days to provide SERE training is an efficient and effective vehicle to deliver Core Captivity pipeline training to all Foreign Service Officers at the beginning of their career. The 2-day extension would cost an additional \$240 per student (not including students' salaries), for a total cost of \$165,000. The two-day Security Overseas Seminar course throughput is calculated to be 2,700 personnel per year. That figure is based upon 18 courses per year with a maximum class size of 150 students per class at a tuition cost of \$350. IDA recommends extending this course by one day and adding appropriate SERE training. The one-day extension would cost an additional \$175 per student, for a total cost of \$472,500. The one-day advanced SOS course throughput is calculated to be 2,240 based on 14 courses per year with a maximum class size of 160 students per class at a tuition cost of \$170. IDA again recommends extending this course by one day to include SERE training. This one-day extension would cost an additional \$170 per student, for a total cost of \$380,800. The one-day TDY DoD course throughput is computed to be 1,125 based on 15 courses per year with maximum class size of 75 and a tuition cost of \$170. We also recommend adding another day to this course for SERE training. The cost of this addition is \$170 per student for a total cost of \$191,250. Additionally, there are nine Orientations for Foreign

Service Specialist courses with a capacity of 75 students per class for a throughput of 675 students at a tuition cost of \$1,450. IDA recommends extending this course by two days to provide SERE training. The 2-day extension would cost an additional \$193 per student for a total cost of \$130,500. These course extensions result in a yearly increased cost of approximately \$1.34 million. (Refer to Table IV-2). Note that these costs do not include salaries of those being trained.

Table IV-2. Costs of Adding PR to NFATC Courses*

Course Title	Courses per Year	Students per Class	Students per Year	Course Length	Course Cost per Student	Cost of Course Extension per student	Yearly Cost of Extension
Initial Orientation for Foreign Service Officers	7	98	686	7 weeks	\$4,100	\$240	\$165,000
Security Overseas Seminar	18	150	2,700	2 days	\$350	\$175	\$472,500
Advanced Security Overseas Seminar	14	160	2,240	1 day	\$170	\$170	\$380,800
TDY Security Overseas Seminar	15	75	1125	1 day	\$170	\$170	\$191,250
Orientation for Foreign Service Specialists	9	75	675	3 weeks	\$1,450	\$193	\$130,500
TOTAL							\$ 1.340 M

* Based on NFATC 2003-2004 course schedule.

- PR Offices for CoM:** The draft NSPD requires that critical CoMs that do not have a personnel recovery office need to establish a Personnel Recovery focal point. We have assumed the focal point will probably be a dedicated single person, a GS-14 or Foreign Service equivalent. This would require yearly funding of approximately for a total of \$250,000 per year per cell. If only high-threat locations require this cell, then the total cost would be, assuming 30 to 50 cells, approximately \$7.5 million to \$12.5 million per year. However, the first year each cell is established, there would probably be

additional costs to cover communications and computer equipment. Depending on the requirements, this might be an additional \$150,000 per cell for a total of \$4.5 million to \$7.5 million.

- **Security Assistance to Improve PR Capabilities:** The final area that the NSPD discusses is the use of the Security Assistance Program (SAP) to provide one-time incentive and start-up funding for host nations to initiate or improve their PR capabilities. A one-time payment would be provided from the SAP to every host nation (2-5 per year) that cooperates with and participates in a CoM PR assessment to improve the host nation PR capability. The SAP payment would serve to encourage critical host nations to improve their PR capabilities by purchasing new PR equipment and conducting PR training. The CoM should have the authority to determine how to disburse the fee among the relevant agencies of the host nation government. The Security Assistance Program is a U.S. Government sanctioned program that authorizes and controls government-to-government transfer of defense articles and services. Authority and procedures for the program come from several levels of the USG. These include Congressional legislation, Presidential Determinations (PD), and rules, regulations, and procedures published by the DoS, Department of Commerce, and DoD. Within the DoD, each of the Services issues its own Security Assistance Program rules, regulations, and procedures. Each Service is identified as an Implementing Agency (IA) or a Sponsoring United States Service when it administers Security Assistance Program functions. The Security Assistance Program is divided into two subprograms: the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program and a collection of Grant or Grant Aid programs. For comparison purposes, the total Security Assistance Program for International Military Education and Training (IMET) was \$50 million in FY 99, and the Economic Support Fund (ESF) was \$2,594 million also in FY 99. Because these are actual budget numbers, adding \$1 million to these funds for each host nation involved in a CoM PR assessment would be a small percentage increase. The total annual cost for PR security assistance would be between \$2 million and \$5 million, based on the recommendation in this study to accomplish two to five CoM PR assessments each year for the next 10 to 15 years. Since the SAP funds are spread among many countries, the individual amounts are not necessarily large. For comparison, the budget for IMET for Indonesia and the Philippines combined was \$1.8 million in FY99, and the ESF was \$5.3 million.
- **Total NSPD Implementation Costs:** Adding all these funding requirements up results in a yearly increase of approximately \$17.25 million per year, based on the assumptions as to the number of offices, personnel, and training. The split can be seen in Table IV-3. There would be the additional cost to set these capabilities up of approximately \$4.5 million to \$7.5 million. The key

point is that this is much less than what DoD is already spending, and most of these funds would be in other agencies' budgets.

Table IV-3. Costs for Implementing NSPD Recommendations

	Initial Cost to Set Up or Prepare for New Facility	Average Yearly Costs^a
Support for National Security Council Counter-Terrorism Security Group		\$1.0
PR Offices in DoS and 12 agencies ^b		\$4.9
SERE Training pipeline for 7,500 non-DoD personnel		\$1.3 ^c
Chief of Mission PR offices for 30 to 50 countries ^d	\$4.5 - \$7.5	\$7.5 - \$12.5
Security Assistance Program for 2 to 5 countries		\$2 - \$5
Total	\$4.5 - \$7.5	\$16.7 - \$24.7

^a All costs are in millions of U.S. dollars

^b Three-person DoS office, one person in other agency offices

^c Salaries of personnel being trained are not included

^d 1 person PR focal point per CoM

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

Table IV-4. Recommendation #1: NSPD Implementation

Recommendation #1		Implement the provisions of the IDA Draft NSPD
Discussion		Implements comprehensive and transformational changes to our National Personnel Recovery Architecture.
Requires changes to:		
Policy and Doctrine	X	Codifies U.S. Policy with respect to personnel recovery; compels a major shift in DoS policy and propels evolution of joint and Service doctrine to embrace Joint/Interagency/Multinational.
Organization	X	Requires supporting focal point coordinating offices in selective departments and agencies in the non-DoD interagency.
Training	X	Provides senior leader training, staff and SERE training to selective non-DoD departments and agencies.
Materiel	X	
Leadership Awareness	X	Requires leader awareness and education programs for the Interagency
Personnel	X	Identifies and provides manpower support for implementation of PR provisions
Facilities	X	
Costs:		Cost breakdown for each major provision is indicated in Table IV-3
Total One-time Costs	\$4.5M - \$7.5M	Set-up Costs
Total Annual Costs	\$16.7M - \$24.7M	

CHAPTER V

PR ARCHITECTURE ANALYSES: COMBATANT COMMANDER IN CHARGE

V. PR ARCHITECTURE ANALYSES: COMBATANT COMMANDER IN CHARGE

This chapter addresses the PR architecture when a COCOM is in charge. A comparative analysis of the baseline capability of Chapter II and PR end states of Chapter III identifies shortfalls or gaps in the current DoD PR capability. The baseline consists primarily of DoD requirements and capabilities. DoD capability is the foundation of infrastructure upon which the initial NPRA will be built. Shortfalls, findings, potential solutions, costs, and recommendations are discussed here both for DoD specifically and as they relate to a national architecture for PR. Within the context of a NPRA, there are still many improvements that DoD must make to establish a robust foundation for the NPRA. This chapter proposes doctrine, organization, training, materiel, personnel, and facilities potential solution sets in the context of the same DOTMLPF construct described and used in Chapter IV. As in Chapter V, recommendations are a subset of the potential solutions which the study team believes will make a significant improvement in PR capability while being affordable.

In this chapter, the doctrine section examines policy, doctrine, and requirements. The organization section looks at the DoD PR infrastructure. The training section examines training for command and control; planning staffs; forces; personnel at risk of isolation, capture, and exploitation; exercises, and infrastructure. The materiel section looks at equipment and technology for isolated personnel, management and staff, and PR forces. The personnel and facilities section examines DoD PR force structure at the operational and tactical levels. Information in this chapter is based on findings of recent studies; visits to U.S. Embassies overseas, Services, Combatant Commands, USG departments and agencies, SERE Schools, and acquisition centers; and interviews of PR subject matter experts. This study benefited from several prior studies, although none of them focused on the interagency aspects.^{1,2,3,4,5,6}

¹ Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape and Code of Conduct Training Assessment, sponsored by Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, 2000-2001.

² Joint Combat Search and Rescue Mission Area Analysis, sponsored by Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Tate, Incorporated, June 2001.

A. SHORTFALLS

Until April 2004, PR operations in Operation Allied Force (OAF), OEF, and OIF were adequate in meeting the Combatant Commander's needs; unfortunately, our adversaries have since resorted, more and more, to asymmetric attacks involving taking hostages for political exploitation – including uniformed as well as non-uniformed personnel, Government and non-Government personnel, DoD contractors, coalition and partner nation personnel, and third-country nationals, among others.⁷ Recognizing the gravity and implications of those conditions, the IDA team in this study has set a high threshold for determining shortfalls.

PR does not have a priority internally in any military service for the personnel, equipment, and funding commensurate with its frequently stated importance. Both within the Combatant Commands and the Services, PR occupies an across-the-board, low-priority of importance except in the Central Command. The U.S. Central Command has pooled resources from other commands to have 27 rescue centers, and the JSRC is staffed with about 17 personnel. But that has degraded other commands' PR capabilities.

1. Doctrine

a. Policy

The DoD doctrine based on the Missing Persons Act (MPA) is applicable only to DoD personnel.

With exception of the DoDD 2310.2 and DoDI 2310.3, other Directives and Instructions are inadequate in implementing “existing” PR policy – given that formal current DoD PR policy itself is lacking. However, even those two documents are outmoded with regard to current practice as employed in OEF and OIF.

³ IDA Paper P-3705 *Improving Personnel Recovery in a Coalition Environment*, Dr. Mike Burlein, Project Leader, Lt Gen Devol Brett, USAF (Ret.), Mr. Robert B. Mohan, Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2002.

⁴ Personnel Recovery Mission Area Analysis, sponsored by Defense POW/Missing Persons Office, 1999-2001.

⁵ Combat Search and Rescue Requirements Study, sponsored by Joint Combat Rescue Agency, Veda Corporation, 1999.

⁶ Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint Test and Evaluation, sponsored by OUSD(AT&L) DTSE&E/T&E, 1994-1999

⁷ The exact numbers, nationalities, and types of personnel as of this writing are not known.

b. Joint and Service Doctrine

Currently, there is no approved Joint Doctrine for PR. The present doctrine, Joint Publication 3-50.2, Doctrine for Combat Search and Rescue, is for CSAR rather than for PR. The DoD capabilities and requirements generation process is Service-centric. Mission success in OIF/OEF is encouraging, and JPRA is working diligently on updating the doctrine, but it will take time to educate the leadership and evolve a doctrine that is both coherent among the Services and transformational at the interagency and international level. The Navy and Air Force have CSAR doctrine. The Marines have TRAP doctrine. The Army has UAR doctrine. There are significant seams between the various Services' doctrines. There are enough differences among Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and SOF doctrines to cause interoperability problems.

c. Universal Joint Task List

Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Mission Essential Tasks (METs) for PR have been developed for the strategic national, strategic theater, operational, and tactical levels; however they do not seem to be well understood or applied. PR related METs in existing Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs) vary widely among the combatant commands. There is no DoD guidance on standardizing METLs.

d. Intelligence

While each of the baseline intelligence organizations has the potential to contribute to personnel recovery, often those capabilities are not leveraged or fused in an efficient or effective manner. All too often the requirements for intelligence support are not well defined, leading to gaps in the knowledge base of those working personnel recovery actions. Also, the intelligence produced does not appear to be shared with others involved in the recovery operation and appears to be kept in the traditional intelligence stovepipes. In order to rapidly respond to a missing person incident, timely and actionable intelligence information must be available to those effecting the rescue operation. In the case of a long-term hostage-taking situation, continuous intelligence information is required to template the activities of hostage takers and locate sites such as prisons or guerrilla camps. This continual intelligence effort over time leads to the development of activity patterns and the prediction of opportune times for rescue attempts. Either case requires a well-integrated intelligence collection and dissemination plan. Joint doctrine for converting Requests for Information (RFIs) into Collection

Requirements is unclear. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for where fusion of actionable PR intelligence should take place are also unclear.

e. Contractor Policies

The contractor security issue is common to both situations when a Chief of Mission or Combatant Commander is in charge. The April 2004 events of contractors taken hostage in Iraq reemphasized USG contractor security issues. The USG lacks a comprehensive policy to ensure that contractors are adequately protected when supporting the USG overseas or that the risks to them are adequately managed in high-threat, overseas locations. A June 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO) report⁸ on contractor issues within DoD found the Services are either silent on or at variance with each other's policies for contractor integration and protection. The report cited a general lack of continuity in how contractors are integrated into the plans of the supported units or agencies, which affects the ability of commanders to provide adequate force protection as well as the ability of contractors to do what should be expected of them. This condition detracts from contractor PR planning, preparation, and execution and decreases the likelihood of successful recovery.

IDA conferred with a large contracting corporation⁹ on these matters, and gained anecdotal corroboration of this GAO finding. In some instances, contract language for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was a direct lift from existing USG contracts in Kosovo, essentially a more permissive environment, with language that proved insufficient for the purpose of properly assessing and managing OIF risk. These shortfalls disproportionately increased the potential for contractors to be captured, detained, or isolated from U.S. control. Additionally, contractors, as potential PR candidates, had not been prepared prior to deployment to assist or facilitate recovery forces in their own recovery and reintegration. While the GAO study and our related research in this area were mainly in the context of DoD/Regional Combatant Commander, presumably many of these same issues would apply in DoS/CoM context as well.

⁸ GAO, 03-695, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans, June 2003.

⁹ Corporation X, requesting anonymity, has employed more than 3,000 contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

2. Organization

a. Joint Staff

The Joint Staff lacks organizations at the strategic level with authority, and oversight responsibility for joint PR strategy, and joint PR requirements. Without coordination of PR processes at the DoD level, the Services have not formed a coherent DoD PR capability that supports a NPRA.

b. OSD/DPMO

The stated purpose of the Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG) is vague – promoting an uncertain and inconsistent process that tends more toward information sharing rather than management *per se*. Although many agencies throughout the Government, especially within DoD, are undertaking significant initiatives to improve USG PR capabilities, information sharing within (and outside) the PR community remains a major challenge. The PRAG normally meets biannually, but it can be convened at any time at the call of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, USD(P), to address issues or provide crisis support to the SECDEF.¹⁰ For the periodic meetings, agenda compression usually results in information briefings on initiatives rather than decision briefings on policy or programmatic issues. There is neither an evaluation process nor any performance metrics in place to measure progress toward developing a fully integrated personnel recovery architecture that ensures the USG’s ability to recover isolated personnel.

DoDI 2310.3, regarding the Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC), lacks sufficient structure to enable it to perform its specified crisis response tasks; it has limited value as a viable organizational entity within the architecture. One of the major problems with the PRRC is that, because it is convened only when a personnel recovery incident takes place, members are on call, as necessary. The reality of the matter is that there might be long periods of time, because of an absence of personnel recovery incidents, during which the PRRC does not meet. During such periods, it has been determined that the essential knowledge of PR requirements, processes, and issues perishes over time because of personnel turnover or operational tempo. In order for the PRRC to be an effective body in the execution of its crisis mission, it needs to be fully informed and up

¹⁰ To the knowledge of any member of the IDA team, the PRAG has never been convened to provide crisis support to the SECDEF.

to speed on personnel recovery policy and procedures, as well as tied in to real-time intelligence systems. Since the PRRC is not a standing body and since most PR responses are conducted at a decentralized level, it is questionable whether the PRRC could or should be held responsible for any or all of the tasks specified in the DoDI.

DPMO has insufficient manpower and resources to effectively plan and execute non-DoD interagency coordination or to formulate forward-looking policy for a national PR capability. Consequently, formal multi-agency and coalition integration into the PR mission area is not keeping pace with activities in the field.

c. JFCOM and JPRA

JPRA is not a true “joint” agency. It is staffed with USAF personnel; other Services have yet to fill their assignments.

In order for PR capabilities to meet the demands of the new operational environments that exist today, the PR community must avail itself of every transformational opportunity that JFCOM provides. JPRA, as the Executive Agent for JFCOM, needs to increase its presence at JFCOM (J-7, J-8, J-9) to ensure that JFCOM adequately addresses PR issues in JFCOM training, force structure developments, and experimentation.

JPRA/J3 has insufficient manpower and resources to effectively support Combatant Commanders with liaisons, exercise support teams, and operations support teams. JPRA/J7 has insufficient manpower and resources to effectively develop PR tasks for the UJTL, develop standard guidance for Joint and Component PR Mission Essential Task Lists, and meet validated requirements for PR education and awareness training. Because effective education, training, training standards, and training oversight are lacking, the Services and Combatant Commands have not formed a coherent DoD PR capability. The PR Academy, under JPRA/J7, has inadequate instructor staff to support any additional resistance training requirements of the Services and other USG organizations.

d. Combatant Commands

Because of the general perception that PR is a low priority mission, Combatant Commands have insufficient manpower and resources to effectively plan and conduct PR operations, plan and conduct PR exercises, and assess readiness of PR forces assigned to the command. Combatant Commands, in effect, are borrowing capability from each other to manage crises as they arise. CENTCOM currently has sufficient staff to execute

PR operations, because of augmentees from the other commands. This augmentation negatively impacts other commands' ability to effectively plan for PR.

e. Organizations That Support Deployments

CONUS Replacement Centers (CRCs) are responsible for both the administrative and operational/tactical preparation of individual military, DoD civilians, DoD contractors, and selected other USG agency personnel deploying to and redeploying from high-risk areas overseas. IDA visited the CRC at Fort Benning, Georgia, to examine its organization, functional concept, and manner of implementation. A second CRC operates at Fort Bliss, Texas. CRCs are the final stop for the more than 16,000 personnel (approximately 30 percent contractors) deploying to and from high-risk operational areas annually. The IDA team observed that the CRC at Fort Benning was commanded and manned by a highly professional team; however, the presented subject matter was outdated (still using Kosovo material) and was devoid of any Code of Conduct training. Procedures for considering and factoring interagency input for both subject matter and numbers/types of students were unknown to the Commander of the CRC, and the IDA team was not able to determine whether such an overarching policy existed. Personnel returning from overseas deployments were not being debriefed as to the value of the preparatory instruction they had received or the need for additional instruction required based on their experiences.

3. Training and Leader Development

a. PR Force Training

Prior studies and tests found that training and exercises for joint rescue forces are inadequate because of low priority for PR. The training needed to accomplish joint CSAR missions is significantly more complex than component CSAR training, yet there are few Combatant Commands with specific requirements for joint CSAR training or exercises.

b. PR Staff Training

JPRA/J7 lacks the Executive Agent (EA) authority over PR staff training that it has over CoC training. Without EA direction, the Services have not developed an interoperable, effective joint PR C2 capability. JPRA/J7 has insufficient manpower and resources to effectively develop and conduct joint PR C2 training. Without proper

training, component RCC staffs have been inadequately prepared by the Services for RCC duties in real-world operations.

Training and exercises for rescue staffs are inadequate. Rescue C2 training throughput is insufficient to sustain Theater JSRCs and RCCs. Training for intelligence personnel is inadequate, contributing to the problem of a shortage of intelligence personnel who support PR. There is a lack of education regarding classified information and releasability, particularly in the realm of foreign disclosure. The lack of training makes it difficult to identify continuing interoperability problems. Professional Military Education (PME) and PR education programs are insufficient to educate combatant commanders, their staffs, and DoD components on PR doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP). Joint PR training needs to be integrated into the PME system and standardized throughout the components and Services.

c. PR Exercises

There is no joint management of PR exercises at the Joint staff level. There are no joint standards or criteria for assessment of PR force readiness based on exercise performance. There is no exercise oversight in the PR community to ensure that PR units are properly matched to exercise objectives and events.

The IDA study team found that the current situation for PR training exercises has not changed much from that reported in previous studies, which had reported a number of significant shortfalls.¹¹ The PR community does not train its people to use the Joint Strategic Planning System. There is a lack of PR training for personnel assigned at all levels on joint, theater, and Service staffs. There is a lack of validated or prioritized training requirements for PR. Joint PR events are not included in the training plans. Assessment of training and exercise adequacy is ineffective. Unit preparedness and training deficiencies are not resolved because they are not entered into the DoD readiness reporting system.

Generally joint CSAR/PR events are not included in either Service or Joint exercises. The only exception is Desert Rescue, which is a unit level exercise. The CSAR/PR events during Theater exercises are usually add-ons without operational realism.

¹¹ Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape and Code of Conduct Training Assessment, sponsored by Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, 2000-2001 and Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint Test and Evaluation, sponsored by OUSD(AT&L) DTSE&E/T&E, 1994-1999

d. Isolated Personnel Training

While Level A training on the Code of Conduct is provided at a number of locations to everyone entering the military, it is strictly academic, with limited practical application, since the training is not procedural in nature. Its purpose is to indoctrinate soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines as to the fundamental values that should be adhered to should one become captive. Lessons learned from OEF and OIF strongly indicate that current Level A training is no longer sufficient for anyone who deploys for any military operation. Hence, CENTCOM provided Level B training to 5,000 soldiers in theater.

Level B training throughput requirements remain largely undefined. The recent development and distribution of video presentations for minimum Level B training provide a starting point for program development and implementation; however, a process for fully identifying the types and numbers of personnel requiring Level B training is lacking. According to JPRA and the SERE school staffs, the multimedia training materials currently available are not sufficient to support SERE training.

The most rigorous level of training, Level C, is also the most resource-intensive. It builds on the lower levels of training with field scenarios that stress the potential isolated person and subject him/her to conditions replicating those found in actual PR situations. Several aspects combine to lower its priority in resourcing. It is primarily designed within and focused on sub-community SERE requirements within the Services.¹² Requirements are hard to quantify, since the training is an “insurance policy” that many ought to have, but few will have to use. It is particularly difficult to justify the cost of three separate training courses to learn resistance techniques for three different captivity situations when there is strong evidence of significant overlap in captivity curricula.

Together, the Services and JPRA provide an excellent set of training courses on survival, evasion, and resistance for a good variety of environments and situations. The Services and JPRA acknowledge that practical training and exercises on escape techniques and procedures are lacking, and practical exercises on recovery procedures for both conventional and unconventional recovery methods are inadequate. Conventional recovery training is limited by the high cost and limited availability of recovery forces. Students at the SERE schools do not get an opportunity to train with actual PR forces or

¹² The sub-communities referred to here, for example, are Air Force, Navy, and Army pilots (all with slightly different mission profiles), Army forces, Marine Force Reconnaissance, and Special Operations Forces.

command and control elements; this situation has an impact on interoperability during actual PR operations. There are a number of significant challenges to synchronizing training for all three PR force elements.

Previous PR studies support the study team's findings. Training for High Risk of Capture (HRC) personnel, including training on evasion plan of action development, communications training for isolated personnel, and authentication training for isolated personnel, is inadequate. Signaling and recovery training for isolated personnel is deficient. The result of these training deficiencies is that most potential downed aircrews are not prepared to effect their own recovery. SERE Training for high-risk personnel is not standardized across Services. Requirements for SERE training are inconsistently applied across the Services and Commands.

e. SERE Training Capacity

The total throughput of the DoD Wartime Level C SERE schools is about 8,200 students per year. Current capacity satisfies about 70 percent of the total DoD requirement (see Table II-1 and Table II-2), leaving a shortfall of roughly 3,540 training slots annually. This shortfall does not address the significant backlog of untrained SOF and aviation personnel that already exists in the Services, and which grows daily. As previously indicated, the IDA study team estimates the total requirement for DoD's wartime Level C SERE training at the same level of 11,740 students per year.

It is important to note that these shortfalls are for uniformed military personnel in the aviation and special operations career fields and predominantly within the Army. Any requirements for other military career fields determined to be high-risk, as well as similar DoD civilian, DoD contractor, and USG occupations, must be considered as added shortfalls over and above those listed on Table V-1. Also, much of the non-wartime training is based on outdated material and is unnecessarily fragmented, contributing to the shortfall. Data in Table V-1 are based on the differences between Service and SOCOM requirements and Service SERE school training capabilities. Thus, training is a significant shortfall. The study team believes these shortfall are valid, but did not verify the numbers.

4. Equipment and Technology

a. Requirements

There is no joint PR capability requirement documented within DoD. There is no joint, coordinated, PR modernization, or acquisition strategy within DoD. R&D and acquisition of PR command and control systems are not managed as an integrated joint program within DoD. Consequently, the myriad PR communication and information management systems (e.g., CSEL, Hook, PRMS, GPRS, Have CSAR, ADOCS, MTX, CDAS, and PRATK.)¹³ provide duplicate capabilities, have interoperability problems and required C2 to have multiple capabilities, are not adequately integrated with the Common Operational Picture, Blue Force Tracking (BFT), and Combat ID technology, and, when combined, still fail to provide sufficient capability to PR staffs. The lack of joint PR requirements and a DoD-wide modernization strategy have prevented a joint R&D effort for the next-generation PR communications system within DoD. Based on Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Central Command would like to have a miniature survival radio that includes biometric measurements in addition to locations. Such a radio, however, does not exist today.

¹³ CSEL-Combat Survivor Evader Locator, Hook-Talon Hook survival radio initiative, PRMS-Personnel Recovery Mission Software, GPRS-Global Personnel Recovery System, Have CSAR-Talon Hook real-time information in the cockpit initiative, ADOCS-Army Deep Operations Control System, MTX-Mayer Miniature Transmitter, CDAS-Cognitive Decision Aided System, PRATK-Personnel Recovery Application Toolkit.

Table V-1. SERE Training Shortfalls Within Services

Wartime Level C SERE Training		
Service/Component	Backlog	Annual Shortfall
Army	25,200	3,340
Navy	0	0
Air Force	0	0
Marine Corps	1,623	240
Specialized Code of Conduct Training		
Service/Component	Requirement	Backlog
Army	2,160	1,910
Navy	1,000	60
Air Force	2,038	632
Marine Corps	0	0
SOCOM	12,619	9,235
Level B SERE Training		
Service/Component	Requirement	Backlog
Army	489,710	483,410
Navy	385,000	381,321
Air Force	552,978	497,978
Marine Corps	116,753	89,561
SOCOM	23,722	0

Source: JFCOM Report to the Congress 108-46, as requested by the U.S. Armed Services Committee, 1 March 2004.

b. R&D and Acquisition

Most PR upgrade programs have low priority in the Services, and, unless the Joint Staff and JFCOM increase priority for PR modernization programs, PR R&D is going to be significantly deficient and uncoordinated.

There are a number of other gap-filler systems and technologies, under alternative procurement programs mentioned above, that various PR organizations are attempting, unsuccessfully so far, to field and sustain. All of the programs, including CSEL, are stovepipes, with little interoperability and compatibility, and no integration efforts.

Within the Air Force, several modernization requirements have been identified for both the HH-60 and the HC-130. These initiatives have consistently fallen below the funding line at Air Combat Command (ACC). Unfunded initiatives include 701C helicopter engine upgrades, Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL), Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) upgrades for the HH-60 and HC-130, aircraft armor, HC-130 simulator, and HC-130 Universal Aerial Refueling Receptacle Slipway Installation (UARRSI).

Since the transfer of Air Force CSAR forces from ACC to AFSOC, HQ AFSOC has identified concerns with the following areas: yearly funding shortfalls, funding shortfall for the Personnel Recovery Vehicle, and funding for fleet modernization.

5. Personnel and Facilities

a. PR Staff and Forces

There is no longer a clearly defined PR command and control career field in any Service. The Air Force provides enlisted controllers to RCCs for a single assignment from another career field, which limits continuity and severely impacts training. Many Air Force RCC officer controllers serve a single tour as a career broadening assignment from a completely unrelated career field. The other Services draw personnel from other career fields. None of the Services are providing enough adequately trained and experienced personnel for combatant command PR staffs or PR command and control elements. There is no joint PR command and control training facility within DoD. With the advent of CSEL fielding, each Service and SOCOM are in the process of establishing or expanding a Service PR command and control training facility in addition to training for currently fielded PRC radios. There is no central oversight to ensure commonality or compatibility of training.

b. SERE Training Specialists and Schools

Only the Air Force has a SERE specialist career field. As a result, the other Services have insufficient continuity and expertise needed for demanding and highly specialized PR training.

Each of the SERE schools occupies permanent facilities that are adequate for current throughput. Under the current scheme of class scheduling, none of the schools have facility capacity (e.g., classroom, resistance training (RT) facilities) to accommodate a significant increase in throughput. Any such increase in the near term must be met by increased use of overlapping class schedules or other workarounds. Training areas are

inadequate for current throughput, although constraints on their use (e.g., lease and land use agreements) place limitations on both instructional modes (e.g., limitation on pyrotechnic devices) and class sizes.

Throughput at the Army SERE School is constrained to current levels by the limitations of manning, facilities, training area development, and resistance training spaces. Although temporary surge requirements can be accommodated through scheduling adjustments, major increases in throughput demands would require equivalent investments in staffing, available facilities, and renegotiation or extension of training area agreements.

The Navy SERE school staff believes its maximum student load per class of 60 represents the current maximum student production level. This limitation is based on the number of interrogation huts (six at Brunswick), isolation cells (72 at Warner Springs and 62 at Brunswick), assigned manpower capabilities, equipment quantities, and classroom seating capacity (60 at North Island). Student production beyond 3,360 for both Navy SERE Schools combined would require increases in facilities, manpower, and funding. Student production beyond 4,000 for both schools would require extension of training area agreements and additional land leases. The Marine Corps SERE school is not operating yet.

Although the Air Force SERE School is currently operating with a small manpower shortfall, the school is sustaining its throughput with increased student-to-instructor ratios. There are no constraints in meeting the currently programmed throughput because of facility limitations at the Air Force Survival School. Any increase in student production beyond 3,500 per year would require manning increases and proportionate investment in base and school infrastructure, such as billeting, transportation, and training equipment. The seven training areas can handle significant increases in student throughput.

JPRA's PR Academy current instructor cadre can sustain its current throughput, but cannot increase its capacity without added manpower funding. In the summer of 2003, the PR Academy occupied its new resistance training facility, which can support significant increases in throughput. Proportionate manning has not been funded. Table V-2 summarizes the factors limiting capacity at each of the SERE schools.

Table V-2. Throughput Limiting Factors

	Army	Navy	Air Force	JPRA
Instructor Staff	RED	RED	RED	RED
Training Facilities	RED	RED	YELLOW	GREEN
Training Ranges	GREEN	YELLOW	GREEN	N/A

SERE Training capacity for High Risk of Capture (HRC) personnel cannot be increased primarily because of a lack of instructor staff and facilities (for Army and Navy). There is a lack of SERE training for many DoD career fields as well as DoD civilians and contractors.

B. FINDINGS

To summarize, IDA has aggregated and framed the DoD shortfalls into two central findings that serve to scope the solution sets and then recommend a course of action to implement the most important solutions. DoD PR capability will serve as the foundation for the NPRA.

1. DoD PR architecture needs to be rationalized.

PR is not yet a joint capability, common among Services, and seamless across Service lines. PR capability must become “joint” *including interagency and coalition aspects*. Current PR doctrine must be brought in synchronization with the doctrine that is being employed in the field by the warfighter.

2. Some solutions are more effective and more efficient than others.

The IDA study has identified DOTMLPF deficiencies in all areas of the PR mission area. This includes deficiencies among HRC personnel, PR staff, and PR force elements of the PR community. Some of the most significant deficiencies, such as equipment for PR forces, are being effectively addressed. IDA has focused on solution sets that address critical foundational issues, a national PR architecture, and those that offer a quick, high return on investment.

C. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

The purpose of IDA’s proposed solution set is twofold. The first purpose is to further the development of DoD’s PR infrastructure to provide a robust foundation for an NPRA. The second purpose is to develop a cooperative interagency/international

environment that will promote education, awareness, and training to facilitate collaborative planning, preparation, and readiness. IDA uses the DOTMLPF construct to describe the solution set and ensure that it provides a necessary and sufficient implementation.

1. Doctrine/Policy

a. DoDD 2310.2

PR policy should be revised with sufficient structure and process to ensure a better, more focused, and more efficient output. Membership and participation in the Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG) should be expanded to more of the interagency community in addition to DoD, CIA, and DoS. Oversight of major issues concerning PR experimentation, acquisition, training, and exercises is the most important function the PRAG could and should perform. Accordingly, the PRAG should be redesignated as the PR Oversight Group (PROG).

Under the authority of the MPA, DoDD 2310.2 should explicitly direct the COCOMs to provide support to all DoD civilians and contract personnel in their respective Areas of Responsibility (AORs).

b. DoDI 2310.3

DoD Instruction 2310.3 should be revised to eliminate all crisis response tasks for the Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) except determination of legal status and reintegration issues. Membership and scope should expand to include more interagency membership, nonvoting participation, and appropriate legal support. Quarterly meetings should focus on a review of personnel recovery policies, trends, and rulings pertaining to the determination of legal status and reintegration. Under the direction of DPMO, facilitators should plan and execute a quarterly tabletop exercise for the PRRC to develop and sustain PRRC task effectiveness. Periodic reports should be provided to the CSG or PROG as appropriate.

c. Joint and Service Doctrine

The development and publication of Joint Publication (JP) 3-50, currently in the staff coordination process, should incorporate lessons learned from OAF, OEF, and OIF, regarding the rapidly expanding dimensions of PR in multinational and multiagency environments. JPRA should synchronize JP 3-50 development and coordination with the

PR NSPD so that joint doctrine accurately reflects national PR policy. The Services should cease developing Service-specific doctrine for various forms of PR and devote those efforts to more effective and efficient development of joint PR doctrine. If the Services identify a need for specialized doctrine to support a sub-task of PR (such as UAR or hostage recovery), then JPRA should designate a lead Service to develop it and promulgate it as Multi-Service TTP.

d. Universal Joint Task List

The UJTL should be expanded by JPRA/J7 in accordance with the proposed definition of Full Dimensional Personnel Recovery to include PR-related missions, and broadening the scope to include interagency and coalition/multinational operations, expanding the personnel target set, and including all operational environments. As stated earlier in the Vision Chapter III, the following Strategic National Task is proposed:

SN Task 3.4.X Coordinate Personnel Recovery Worldwide

This task requires national (interagency) and multinational coordination to develop strategic direction, policy, and plans for military support missions across the entire range of military operations in all operational and threat environments. This task includes reporting, locating, supporting the person(s) and his or her family, recovery, and return of the isolated person(s) to his or her family or duty. It includes related mission planning areas such as SAR, CSAR, Nonconventional Assisted Recovery (NAR), Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR), and Hostage Rescue; it includes support to the relevant planning of the other departments and agencies of the USG such as the Department of State Mission Performance Planning (MPP), Emergency Action Planning (EAP) and NEO. PR planning is an integral part of Force Protection Planning.

e. JFCOM and JPRA

In coordination with the Joint Staff, the Commander, JFCOM, should revise JPRA's charter to provide JPRA with the necessary authority to establish guidance for standardizing PR JMETLs among COCOMs, and for establishing common PR metrics and standards.

JFCOM should take the lead in developing a standard formal requirements definition process that accommodates all theater SERE training requirements for assigned or deploying Joint forces of all Services. The Services should develop a common requirements review process that identifies and validates requirements for both combat

and peacetime SERE training. This process should be incorporated into the EA Instruction for joint Code of Conduct training and JPRA's charter.

f. Intelligence Directive

The USD(I)-sponsored ISPR Conference at IDA from 16 to 18 March 2004 developed three significant solutions to improve the intelligence community's support to PR, which the IDA team endorses and for which urges priority follow-up action. The first was to improve the state of PR education and training for intelligence personnel by increasing awareness of what JSRCs should ask for, and knowing what intelligence agencies can provide to JSRCs. The specifics of this solution were to assign JFCOM the responsibility for joint interoperability and standardization, require and resource the Services and Defense agencies to provide appropriate continuing and progressive intelligence PR-focused and standardized education and training, and resource and require Combatant Commands to provide theater-specific training and education. The second solution was to incorporate NAR and the PR mission into the existing HUMINT architecture through USD(I) direction and appropriate HUMINT guidance and doctrine. The third solution was to provide specific guidance describing intelligence relationships and tasks supporting PR, which is currently lacking in DoD Directive 2310.2. This solution would be implemented through the issuance of DoD Directive 3115.9aa. At the ISPR Conference, a draft version of such a DoD Directive was circulated for consideration. Finally, intelligence support to PR must be exercised periodically during Combatant Command exercises.

2. Organization

A lack of policy and doctrine has resulted in fragmented organizational responsibilities for PR, which, in turn, have contributed to the lack of focus, oversight, cooperation, and capabilities. The aforementioned top-level policy and doctrine enhancements will provide a blueprint for an improved structural design that is coherent across the DoD, providing the essential organizational entities with improved functionalities. The following organizational changes also are suggested.

a. Joint Staff

A Joint Staff PR Strategy Office within J5 could coordinate development of a Joint PR Strategy and the development of a Joint PR Modernization Plan. The Joint Staff J3/SOD should coordinate PR Requirements with the JS/J8.

b. DPMO

The PR Directorate within DPMO should be expanded to accomplish the following:

- Effectively support the PROG with oversight responsibility for experimentation, acquisition, training, and exercises
- Support and facilitate an expertly focused interagency PRRC with responsibility for recommending policy changes in the determination of the legal status and reintegration of covered persons¹⁴ who are reported as isolated, missing, or in distress while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission overseas.

c. JFCOM

JFCOM should make taking steps to improve PR a major issue for the command and all permanent staff agencies. Currently, PR does not appear anywhere as an independent standalone item for transformation.

d. JPRA

JPRA should be better integrated into USJFCOM, its parent command, to leverage the JFCOM staff while having increased situational awareness on joint intelligence, operations, training, experimentation, assessment, integration, interoperability, and requirements. JPRA should implement organizational design initiatives, such as assigning liaison officers, or JPRA personnel, in key directorates of the JFCOM staff.

JPRA Training Directorate (J7) should implement their responsibilities for UJTL development, sustainment, standardization, and oversight of COCOM JMETLs. This office should also develop joint task metrics and standards. JPRA/J7 should also organize to effectively conduct joint training for PR staff elements.

HQ USJFCOM J7 should plan and execute an annual CONUS-based joint PR exercise and a series of joint PR training events in conjunction with key JFCOM-sponsored geographic combatant commander exercises in the AORs. Appendix H of this

¹⁴ PROG and PRRC responsibilities were more specifically defined earlier in this chapter. Covered persons should include *U.S. military, Government civilians, and Government contractors, who are isolated, missing, or in distress while participating in a U.S. sponsored activity or mission overseas and other persons as designated by the President.*

report outlines the basic tasks for JFCOM/J7. IDA has identified the Navy's *Desert Rescue* exercise as one suitable venue for an annual CONUS-based joint PR exercise, and cited the Pacific Command (PACOM's) *Northern Edge* exercise as an example of a COCOM exercise suitable for integration of PR events.

e. Combatant Commands

Lessons learned from OEF and OIF show that actual wartime JSRC and RCC staffs are an order of magnitude larger than indicated in published PR doctrine. Lessons learned also showed that the Services cannot supply sufficient numbers of qualified planners and controllers. The Combatant Commands should increase their PR staff offices appropriately to effectively plan and execute PR operations across the operational continuum and to assist CoM in the development, planning, and preparation of PR capabilities within host nations

f. Services

IDA has determined that DoD needs to make organizational changes in order to increase its experiential SERE training capacity significantly. Since a considerable increase is needed to address DoD requirements, DoD should address and include joint and interagency requirements.

g. CONUS Replacement Centers

The U.S. Army CONUS Replacement Centers (CRCs), which currently operates at Forts Benning and Bliss, provides predeployment administrative processing and combatant command-directed training to individual military replacements (all Services except the USMC), Government civilian employees, selected non-DoD agencies, and Government contractors bound for Iraq, Afghanistan, Cuba, and Kuwait. The CRC is a critical focal point for deployment preparation and, with some maturing, could serve as an excellent primer for force protection and personnel recovery collective and individual training. Further, with its pending move to much larger quarters, the Fort Benning CRC, with appropriate resourcing, could serve as a joint and interagency CRC, with the potential to significantly enhance the accountability, survivability, and recoverability of a major segment of overseas personnel that would include non-DoD USG contractors.

However, the IDA team determined that a strictly organizational approach to contractor issues would be shortsighted in addressing the myriad of challenges that face contractors in the future. IDA concluded that any personnel recovery contractor solution

set would have to address shortfalls in the following general areas: contractor accountability, contractor survivability, and contractor recoverability. Additionally, these issues have implications for USG contractors in the interagency arena in the context of the national PR architecture. The team further determined that the contracting process was a key channel through which shortfalls could be addressed and where deliberate planning discipline could be reinforced, based on solid referential ties to joint and Service doctrinal principles. In essence, we wanted to enable an increase in the level of operational influence over the solicitation and contract execution process for contractors in high-threat operational environments. A comprehensive approach to a solution set for Contractor Issues is located at Appendix F.

3. Training and Leader Development

In addition to training for personnel at risk of isolation, capture, and exploitation, other training components need to be addressed, such as training for PR staffs and training exercises. DoD needs to develop a robust training infrastructure to serve as a foundation upon which the interagency community can build a PR training program. Concurrently, DoD should expand its joint training to include the interagency community, and the interagency partners should participate in PR training courses and exercises. As an interim solution, USG agencies with the resources could participate in Joint Exercise *Desert Rescue*, an annual unit-funded exercise hosted by the Navy and devoted to PR. Initially JFCOM should initiate a program to make senior officials, leaders, and management personnel aware of non-DoD interagency community PR capabilities, support requirements, and issues.

a. PR Staff Training

At the Interagency PR Workshop in February 2003, agency representatives made it clear that they would rather use DoD PR guidance than “re-invent the wheel.” Based on that premise, IDA recommends that DoD, led by JPRA, should provide the doctrinal foundation for interagency PR training. JPRA should continue to move doctrine and tactics techniques and procedures (TTPs) along the joint, interagency, and coalition vectors simultaneously. Foreign disclosure is key to this concept of progress. JPRA/J7 should develop exportable versions of its PR 200, 300, and 400 series courses, suitable for USG and coalition PR staffs, just as it has done for its PR 100 series courses. The study team also recognizes that doctrine and TTPs are living products, and that the current TTP document does partially address the interagency void. Therefore, DoD

should promulgate current Joint PR TTP to those USG agencies who have expressed a desire for training guidance. Those agencies should incorporate PR TTPs into their own procedural guidance. As an example, DoS should incorporate PR TTPs into its Emergency Action Plan handbook and training courses at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center. The TTP should enable training and exercises for U.S. missions in high-threat countries.

To complement the training of the interagency, JPRA should lead the effort to improve the interagency dimension of PR training within DoD. JPRA should include expanded blocks of instruction on diplomatic and civil PR options in all of its PR courses. For example, JPRA should include instruction on DoS organization in its PR-101 course and the DoS EAP process in its PR-301 course.

JPRA should develop and provide an Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery (ISPR) course designed to provide PR mission qualification to basic qualified intelligence specialists.

b. PR Exercises

If the USG is to leverage any PR capability that resides in the interagency community, that capability must first be exercised. The IDA study team has not found any exercise venue outside DoD where interagency assets could conduct PR training. The exercise infrastructure for PR training within DoD falls well short of its own needs, let alone interagency or coalition needs. The Joint Staff and JFCOM should begin the development of a DoD PR exercise infrastructure by establishing a set of joint mission essential tasks for PR. This JMETL should reflect the requirement to operate in interagency and coalition environments. The Joint Staff should direct the Combatant Commands and Joint Forces Command jointly to integrate a PR JMETL into every combatant command JMETL, integrate PR events into MSELs for JCS-sponsored exercises, and provide resources for Joint PR exercise events.

Transformation wargames such as Unified Quest and JFCOM experiments such as Millennium Challenge should also be considered as appropriate venues for developing joint doctrine and educating associated senior leaders, interagency, and coalition audiences on PR.

c. Isolated Personnel Training

It is the IDA study team's assessment that the Services are migrating toward a Joint SERE course curriculum in an evolutionary fashion. Several recent initiatives by

both the Services and JPRA suggest the transformation from user-based focus to a trainer-based focus as a means of most effectively and efficiently improving the overall posture of the SERE training. The IDA study team has seen that this is already occurring at an accelerated rate. Examples are the Navy’s and Army’s initiatives to develop Peacetime Governmental Detention/Hostage Detention (PGD/HD) resistance training programs and the new Joint Resistance Training Instructor Course. Each of these initiatives reflects a productive application of JPRA’s expertise and effort toward providing support and services to the Service schools – an appropriate role for a joint agency. Similar opportunities exist in the shift of responsibility for in-depth core resistance training from JPRA to the Service schools; in the development of common core training materials, such as the core captivity curriculum illustrated in Figure V-1; in the development of new SERE training concepts and techniques; in the role as subject matter expert for Service self-evaluations of training; and in providing the SERE training community ready access to current and background information sources. The IDA study team agrees that JPRA must shift its user-based training capabilities to the Services in order to address the identified shortfalls and backlogs in peacetime resistance training.




Figure V-1. Core Captivity Curriculum

The core captivity curriculum is an example of improved training that can be obtained for no added cost, or even at a reduced cost. JPRA, in concert with the Service SERE schools, is **developing and implementing** a curriculum that teaches the core

resistance techniques for all three capability environments. The curriculum should require less time than the sum of the three separate resistance courses that it replaces.

IDA concurs with JPRA that DoD's CoC training program be overhauled to reflect the current needs of the warfighter. JPRA already briefed the core curriculum to the PRAG and obtained concurrence. **A core curriculum course structure has been developed by a Joint working group, and validation will take place through two pilot courses in August and September 2004.** IDA suggests that the current paradigm of four levels, informally referred to as Level A, Level B (and level B+), Level C, and Level C+, could be restructured.

SERE training is a perishable skill that needs to be periodically renewed to remain effective. JPRA should establish a joint requirement and standard for SERE continuation training. SERE continuation training should be a unit responsibility, supported by joint SERE instructors.

4. Equipment and Technology

a. Requirements

Together, the Services with Joint Staff (J5) assistance should develop a Joint PR Modernization Plan. This plan will identify DoD PR equipment programmed for replacement and the associated timelines. Processes and procedures should be developed so that, as DoD replaces legacy equipment, such capability can be transferred to the interagency based on requirements identified through an established, formalized interagency process.

b. R&D and Acquisition

The Services should establish a Joint Program Office to support the PR mission, pooling scarce resources. There is an opportunity for cost savings by integrating PR C2 systems in the early stages of development, as opposed to a more expensive and difficult integration effort associated with fully developed legacy systems. There is also an opportunity to reduce programmatic costs by such means as eliminating duplicative program management efforts (such as for location and identification), separate certification efforts for separate systems, and separate test and training programs. Such a program office should consider development of a miniature survival radio that includes biometric measurements in addition to just location. The U.S. Central Command has issued this requirement based on Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Future PR-specific C2 systems and technologies including, but not limited to, CSEL, Hook (all PRC-112 variants), PRMS, GPRS, HAVE CSAR, and PRATK should be tested more rigorously even if they are low acquisition category programs. The Joint Program Office should develop a system or family of systems that leverages and fully integrates into Blue Force Tracking systems (e.g., COBRA), operational planning systems (e.g., JOPES, GCSS), and operational C2 systems (e.g., GCCS, TBMCS).¹⁵

5. Personnel and Facilities

a. PR Staff and Forces

All uniformed SERE instructors should be from a dedicated career field. Every Service has documented a sufficient SERE training requirement to justify its own SERE career field. Alternatively, one Service could provide SERE instructors from its career field to all SERE schools. Either way, the career field(s) should be a joint SERE instructor career field, allowing uniformed SERE instructors to rotate among SERE schools. As the SERE training infrastructure expands with the growth of the Level C training facilities, there will be financial pressure to commercially outsource instructor billets. This practice is acceptable in moderation, but it is important that a proper balance of military and contract SERE instructors is found to ensure a continuing supply of trained and seasoned instructors.

HQ USJFCOM/J7 should establish and sustain a Joint PR Exercise Facility and Staff to execute the joint PR exercise program described above. Suggestions on staff responsibilities are contained in Appendix H, Suggestions for PR Exercise Improvements.

JPRA should expand its joint PR staff and training facilities within JPRA/J7 to adequately support the joint PR staff training programs described above. JPRA should review all staff and facility requirements to determine necessary trade-offs.

b. SERE Training

Although there is a perception of significant shortfalls for SERE training requirements because not all COCOMs have stated their requirements quantitatively

¹⁵ COBRA – Collection of Broadcasts from Remote Assets, JOPES – Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, GCSS – Global Combat Support System, GCCS – Global C2 System, TBMCS – Theater Battle Management Core Systems.

(except SOCOM), we cannot identify exact shortfall numbers. We also know that many non-DoD agency personnel need SERE training, but again that number has not been quantified. In attempting to estimate that number based on NFATC throughput, we had estimated the number to be 7,500.

Therefore, IDA feels that DoD needs to increase Core Captivity resistance training capacity and throughput as a replacement for current peacetime and wartime resistance training. DoD should resource the PR Academy to match its new facility with appropriate instructor staff in order to optimize its student throughput. JPRA's manpower study reported in 2002 that the PR Academy needed 93 additional personnel. Even those will represent only a partial fix to the overall DoD shortfall. All of the Service survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) schools should be resourced for the manpower needed to optimize their capacity for SERE training, and JPRA and the Services should make a concerted effort to get core captivity resistance courses up and running at every SERE school to increase their throughput.

Once JPRA and the Services have addressed immediate critical shortfalls in core captivity resistance training, they should methodically expand DoD's survival, evasion, resistance and escape training infrastructure to address such issues as academic for all uniformed military.

Capacity shortfalls notwithstanding, the IDA study team has assessed that SERE training for personnel at risk is the forte of DoD's PR community, and is the best PR program that DoD has to offer others in the interagency community. To exploit the value of the available training, the interagency community should identify those USG personnel at risk, determine the level of risk they face, and provide the appropriate training required for that risk. That then is an add on cost to the agencies.

IDA suggests considering the SERE training facility infrastructure as depicted in Figure V-2. Facilities at Fort Rucker, Air Force Academy, and USMC Marine Warfare Training Center (MWTC) could provide additional capacity. The SERE staff should be a composite of uniformed military, Government civilian, and contractor personnel.

D. COSTS

Over the past few year, the Services and JPRA have identified training facility and personnel shortfalls. Although, IDA generally recognizes these shortfalls, they are not costed or repeated here. The focus of the study is on the primary integration of the national architecture, and the funds cited here are relatively small.

1. Doctrine

IDA assumes that JPRA and DPMO are adequately funded for development of new doctrinal Publication 3-50, and for changes to existing publications related to the DoDD 2310 series. For cases where the promulgating office of a new publication does not exist, the cost to establish and man the office is covered under organization, personnel, or facilities.

2. Organization

a. Joint Staff

Establishing a Joint PR Strategy Office within JS/J5 to develop and sustain joint PR strategy and a joint PR modernization plan results in the requirements for one individual: one O-6 or O-5. Requiring the J3/Special Operation Division (SOD) to develop and sustain Joint PR requirements in coordination with J-8 will add one additional individual: one O-5 or O-4. Using composite pay rates, these personnel require funding of approximately \$250,000 per year. This could be doubled to cover such additional costs of facilities, travel, procurements, and office supplies. This results in a yearly funding requirement of approximately \$500,000 per year.

b. DPMO

The PR Directorate within DPMO should expand its organization to effectively support several additional interagency coordination responsibilities. There is a requirement for two additional billets. These consist of one GS-14 and one O-5. Using composite pay rates, these personnel require funding of approximately \$250,000 per year. This could be doubled to cover such additional costs of facilities, travel, procurements, and office supplies. This results in a yearly funding requirement of approximately \$500,000.

c. JFCOM

HQ USJFCOM should establish and maintain a Joint PR Exercise Office within HQ USJFCOM/J7. The associated costs are covered under facilities.

d. JPRA

IDA suggests that the transition of JPRA from the Air Force funding and manning to joint funding and manning should be expedited. JPRA should aggressively seek to become a true joint agency with the addition of both officers and enlisted personnel of all

four Services. In addition, it would be preferable to have the Commander and Deputy Commander from two different Services.

IDA assumed that relocating some JPRA personnel from HQ JPRA to the major directorates within HQ JFCOM could be done without added people and costs.

IDA assessed that JPRA should expand its Training Directorate (J7) significantly to perform the multiple roles and responsibilities that it is already attempting to do without the requisite manpower. The resources required are identified in the Training and Leadership Development section which follows.

e. Combatant Commanders

The Combatant Commands should increase their PR staff offices appropriately to effectively plan and execute PR operations. The Combatant Commands currently have a PR staff of one O-4, who has other responsibilities not related to PR. An addition of one O-3 to each of four COCOM PR staffs is required. Using composite pay rates, these personnel require funding of approximately \$400,000 per year. This could be doubled to cover such additional costs as facilities, travel, procurements, and office supplies. This results in a yearly funding requirement of approximately \$800,000.

f. Services

IDA assessed that there are no direct costs associated with reorganizing the Services' respective training facilities into a joint training architecture. The Air Force and Navy have repeatedly shown that reduced travel costs justified the need for multiple SERE training facilities.

3. Training and Leader Development

a. PR Staff Training

JPRA/J7 should develop versions of its PR 200, 300, and 400 series courses suitable for USG and coalition PR staffs, just as it has done for its PR 100 series courses. The study team also recognizes that doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are living products, and that the current TTP partially address the interagency void. JPRA is funded for the current development of new courses. JPRA/J7 is already developing the PR intelligence support course that the PR intelligence community recommended. IDA is assuming that 10 additional billets or contractors (retired noncommissioned officers) at about \$160,000 per man-year would cost \$1.6 million per year.

b. PR Exercises

JFCOM/J7 should sponsor a joint PR exercise program, consisting of an annual CONUS-based 2-week joint exercise devoted specifically to PR, and a series of robust PR events integrated into major COCOM joint training exercises. IDA assessed that the dedicated PR exercise will cost approximately \$1 million per week, including travel and per diem costs for all participants. Therefore, a 2-week CONUS PR exercises will cost \$2 million per year. Transportation costs of CONUS-based air assets to the exercise are assumed to be covered under unit flying hour programs.

c. Isolated Personnel Training

IDA assessed that no direct costs are associated with the recommended changes to existing SERE and CoC training curricula. JPRA and the Services already have standing training course development offices, and the vast majority of the training material already exists. The recommendations are primarily straightforward (albeit extensive) repackaging efforts. IDA estimates the one-time cost of developing a resistance training curriculum at \$300,000. IDA assessed that the training courses will require additional training time, and the costs for which are covered under personnel. Direct costs for transformation of the PR Academy from a user-based focus to a trainer-based focus are covered under personnel and facilities. IDA has assessed that there are no direct costs associated with development of SERE continuation training curricula, which is a derivative of initial training curricula and what has already been covered. The infrastructure of joint SERE instructors to support SERE continuation training is covered under personnel and facilities.

4. Equipment and Technology

a. Requirements

IDA has assessed that no direct costs are associated with the development of joint requirements or a joint modernization plan. The cost of a joint requirements activity is covered under organization.

b. R&D and Acquisition

The Services should consolidate their acquisition and R&D funds into a new Joint PR System Program Office. There may be opportunities for programmatic cost savings as other systems are rolled into the Joint System Program Office.

5. Personnel and Facilities

a. PR Staff and Forces

Because IDA's recommendation does not result in a net change of personnel, IDA has assessed that there are no direct costs associated with transferring Rescue Coordination Center controller billets among career fields, for either officers or enlisted personnel. Likewise, IDA has assessed that there are no direct costs associated with establishment of a new career field within the Army or the Navy. Direct costs associated with the expansion of SERE instructor career fields are covered below.

To establish, man, and equip the joint PR exercise facility, IDA estimates that HQ JFCOM/J7 would need 20 contractors to coordinate, plan, conduct, evaluate, and conduct after action reviews for the annual PR exercise program. This is a total of \$4 million per year for personnel and facility costs, at a rate of \$200,000 per year per contractor. This is in addition to the \$2 million annual operations costs covered under training. If these funds are not available, IDA recommends initiating only one exercise per year at one-half the cost.

b. SERE Training

Because the PR Academy has already opened its new facility and is using it at reduced capacity, IDA fully supports the JPRA efforts to hire extra instructors to increase the training throughput. Because the JPRA has already costed this option, these costs are not considered additional, and not estimated here.

6. Cost of Addressing Contractor Coverage

Contractor costs are estimated in the components:

- To develop the Interagency Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) that will cover all Government contractors. DoD in cooperation with DoS and the General Services Administration should develop standardized FAR language for government contracts that includes deliberate consideration of risk assessment, risk mitigation planning, force protection measures, and personnel recovery requirements. Associated costs would be negotiated in the solicitation process between the Government and the contractor, on a case-by-case basis, depending on the statement of work, the risk mitigation plan, and the level of risk acceptable to both parties. An effort is already underway to review, revise, and update the DoD FAR; personnel recovery issues are currently under consideration. Since this effort is part of the normal function of various agencies involved, it is not expected to cost additionally.

- To develop a U.S. contractor database and make it available to JSRCs in the theater of operations, DPMO, and other responsible agencies. Costs for the necessary computer systems, servers and secure network connections to link GSA, the CONUS Replacement Centers (CRC) and agencies responsible for personnel recovery, based on similar type and scale projects, are estimated to be \$1.5 million for development and acquisition, and \$700,000 for annual maintenance, using about three contractors.
- To improve the personnel recovery related training provided by the CRCs. The need for this improvement is based on the study team’s visit to the CRC at Fort Benning, GA and observation of training sessions. While it is possible to identify the course material that must be added, it is extremely difficult to estimate the throughput requirements for contractors. The United States General Accounting Office in its report titled, “Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DoD Plans” (GAO Report 03-695, June 2003), claimed that DoD could not provide any information on the total cost of contractor support to deployed forces. Likewise, IDA was not able to determine the number of contract personnel deployed or being deployed. Improving this training is a recognized requirement that has a cost, which cannot be estimated at this time. See Tables V-7 through V-9.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

IDA recommends seven solutions in the order of importance as outlined in Tables V-3 through V-9.

Table V-3. Recommendation #1

Recommendation #1		Improve PR Strategic Capability	
Discussion		Improve PR capability within OSD and Joint Staff to perform strategic tasks	
Requires changes to:		Notes	
Doctrine	X	International and interagency PR engagement policies, joint PR strategy, joint PR modernization plan	
Organization	X	DPMO, JS/J5, J3/SOD	
Training			
Materiel	X	Joint PR requirements documents	
Leadership Awareness			
Personnel	X	4 personnel	
Facilities			
Costs:		Notes	
One-time Costs	None		
Annual Costs	\$1,000,000	Personnel costs	

Table V-4. Recommendation #2

Recommendation #2		Improve PR Operational Capability
Discussion		Improve PR capability within the Combatant Commands to perform operational tasks
Requires changes to:		Notes
Doctrine	X	Theater PR operations plans and contingency plans
Organization	X	HQ USEUCOM, HQ USFK, HQ USPACOM, HQ USSOUTHCOM
Training		
Materiel		
Leadership Awareness		
Personnel	X	Add one O-3 (4 COCOMs)
Facilities		
Costs:		Notes
One-time Costs	None	
Annual Costs	\$800,000	Personnel costs

Table V-5. Recommendation #3

Recommendation #3		Improve PR Staff Training
Discussion		Improve JPRA authority and capability to train PR staff and establish joint training standards
Requires changes to:		Notes
Doctrine	X	JFCOM PR EA Instruction, JPRA Charter, UJTL, JMETLs, JTTP for PR Staff
Organization	X	JPRA/J7
Training	X	Joint PR staff training
Materiel		
Leadership Awareness	X	National PR leadership awareness courses
Personnel	X	+10 personnel
Facilities	X	Fredericksburg, VA
Costs:		Notes
One-time Costs	None	PR staff training course development
Annual Costs	\$1,600,000	Personnel and facility costs

Table V-6. Recommendation #4

Recommendation #4		Improve PR Exercises	
Discussion		Improve USJFCOM authority and capability to plan and conduct joint PR exercises	
Requires changes to:		Notes	
Doctrine	X	USJFCOM PR EA Instruction, UJTL, JMETLs, joint PR exercise plan	
Organization	X	USJFCOM/J7 Joint PR Exercise Office	
Training	X	1 joint PR exercises annually (Desert Rescue, Northern Edge)	
Materiel			
Leadership Awareness			
Personnel	X	+20 personnel at JFCOM for exercise planning and analysis	
Facilities	X	Norfolk, VA	
Costs:		Notes	
One-time Costs	None		
Annual Costs	\$6,000,000	Operating, personnel, and facility costs	

Table V-7. Recommendation #5: Contractor FAR

Recommendation #5		Develop FAR contract language, language oversight, and remediation mechanisms for USG contractors in high-risk, overseas efforts.
Discussion		FAR language can create contract conditions that enhance USG contractor risk management, survivability, and recoverability, contributing to successful National PR efforts.
Requires changes to:		All USG Contracts
Doctrine	X	FAR
Organization	X	A PR-focused FAR council
Training		
Materiel		
Leadership Awareness	X	Threat assessments
Personnel		
Facilities		
Costs:		Normal GAO process
One-time Costs	None	
Annual Costs	None	

Table V-8. Recommendation #6: Contractor Database

Recommendation #6		Establish and sustain a central USG contractor database
Discussion		Provides on-demand data for national decision making, and supports the DOTMLPF functions of a national PR establishment.
Requires changes to:		
Doctrine		
Organization	X	Integration into national C4I architecture
Training	X	Database operations and maintenance
Materiel	X	Hardware and software
Leadership Awareness	X	Orientation on capability, techniques, and procedures.
Personnel	X	Database development and sustainment personnel
Facilities	X	Server and Systems Admin location
Costs:		
One-time Costs	\$1.5 million	
Annual Costs	\$700,000	

Table V-9. Recommendation #7: Improve CONUS Replacement Centers

Recommendation #7		Develop interagency PR training program for implementation at CRCs
Discussion		CRC can impart up-do-date, theater-specific knowledge for risk management, survivability, and recoverability.
Requires changes to:		
Doctrine	X	Training Guidance
Organization	X	Interagency training development
Training	X	Training standards for non-DoD contractors
Materiel		
Leadership Awareness		
Personnel	X	Interagency training Cadre at CRC
Facilities	X	Added CRC infrastructure
Costs:		
One-time Costs	Undetermined	
Annual Costs	Undetermined	

REFERENCES

STUDIES

1. Joint Combat Search & Rescue Joint Test Evaluation, sponsored by OUSD (AT&L) DTSE&E/T&E, 1994-1999.
2. Combat Search & Rescue Requirements Study, sponsored by Joint Combat Rescue Agency, Veda Corporation, 1999.
3. US Central Command Personnel Recovery C3I Architecture, sponsored by ASD (C3I), TRW, Incorporated, 1998.
4. Combat Search & Rescue Analysis of Alternatives, sponsored by HQ Air Combat Command/DR, Pioneer Technologies Corporation, 2001.
5. Personnel Recovery Mission Area Analysis, sponsored by Defense POW/Missing Persons Office, 1999-2001.
6. Mission Area Analysis (MAA) and Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for Personnel Accounting and Recovery, ANSER, October 2000.
7. Joint Combat Search & Rescue Mission Area Analysis, sponsored by Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Tate, Incorporated, June 2001.
8. Survival, Evasion, Resistance & Escape and Code of Conduct Training Assessment, sponsored by Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, 2000-2001.
9. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency Manpower Study, sponsored by Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Tate, Incorporated, March 2002.
10. "Improving Personnel Recovery in a Coalition Environment," Dr. Mike Burlein, Project Leader, Lt Gen Devol Brett, USAF (Ret.), Mr. Robert B. Mohan, Institute for Defense Analyses. IDA Paper P-3705 Log: H 02-000207, May 2002.
11. "Department of Defense Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Personnel Recovery – "A National Imperative,"" Dr. Anil Joglekar, Project Leader, MG (Ret) Dave Baratto, Mr. Robert Mohan, RADM (Ret) Sam Packer, Lt Gen (Ret) Devol Brett, Dr. Dave Spalding, CAPT (Ret) Jim Doherty, Mr. Ken Pribyla, Mr. John Sandoz. Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Document D-2775 Log: H02-001902/1, October 2002.

STATUTORY AND POLICY DOCUMENTS

1. Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A General Military Law, Chapter II Personnel, Part 76 Missing Persons.
2. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) 12 August 1949.

3. House Appropriations Committee Report, 107th Congress, Second Session, 2002 Defense Appropriations Bill.
4. National Security Presidential Directive 1, "Organization of the National Security Council System". February 13 2001.
5. National Security Presidential Directive 12, "United States Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad". 18 February 2002.
6. Presidential Decision Directive 56, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations". May 1997.
7. Presidential Decision Directive 29, "Security Policy Coordination". 27 September 1994.
8. Executive Order 12656, "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities". 18 November 1988.
9. Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency, "Memorandum of Agreement Concerning DoD-CIA Mutual Support in Policy, Research and Development, Training, Planning, and Operations for Personnel Recovery". (U) 17 July 1998.
10. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17 September 2002.
11. United States National Search and Rescue Plan 1999, as amended 2 November 2000.

NON-DOD INTERAGENCY DOCUMENTS

1. Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009, U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, DoS/USAID Publication 11084, Released August 2003.
2. Secretary of State message, Subject: Revision of President Bush's Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission, date/time-group 081830Z July 2003.
3. General Accounting Office Report 03-695, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans, June 2003.
4. Schedule of Courses (1 October 2002 – 30 September 2004), George P. Schultz, National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Department of State Publication, Foreign Service Institute, Revised June 2002.
5. U.S. Customs, "South American Air Operations, Standard Operating Procedures," 25 September 2000.
6. Mission Performance Plan FY 2005, US Mission to Indonesia, Department of State.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DOCUMENTS

1. Department of Defense Instruction 1000.1, "Identity Cards Required by the Geneva Conventions." with changes (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 5 June, 1991).
2. DoD Directive 1300.7, "Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct". (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 8 December 2000).
3. Department of Defense Directive 2310.2, "Personnel Recovery" (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 22 Dec 2000).

4. DoD Instruction 2310.3, "Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) Procedures". (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 June 1997).
5. DoD Directive 5110.10, "Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office (DPMO). (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 16 July 1993).
6. Contingency Planning Guidance
7. Defense Planning Guidance
8. Memorandum, Secretary of Defense, Top Ten Priorities, 17 September 2002.
9. Department of Defense Training Transformation Implementation Plan, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness, 10 June 2003.
10. Military Strategy of the Department of Defense (Draft), 11 September 2003.

JOINT DOCUMENTS AND DOCTRINE

1. CJCSI 2410.01B - Guidance for the Exercise of Right-Of-Assistance Entry, 1 May 2001.
2. CJCSI 3010.02A – Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan, 15 April 2001.
3. CJCSI 3100.01A - Joint Strategic Planning System, 1 September 1999.
4. CJCSI 3121.02 - Rules on the Use of Force by DOD Personnel Providing Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Conducting Counterdrug Operations in the United States, 31 May 2000.
5. CJCSI 3137.01B - The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process, 15 April 2002.
6. CJCSI 3170.01B - Requirements Generation System, 15 April 2001.
7. CJCSI 3180.01 - Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Programmatic Processes for Joint Experimentation and Joint Resource Change Recommendations, 31 October 2002.
8. CJCSI 5123.01A - Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 08 March 2001
9. CJCSM 3500.04B, Universal Joint Task List, Version 4.0, October 1999.
10. Joint Vision 2020, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC: US GPO, June 2000.
11. JP 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 9 January 2003 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001)
12. JP 3-50.2 Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) -- 26-Jan-96
13. JP 3-50.21 JTTP for Combat Search and Rescue -- 23-Mar-98
14. JP 3-50.3 Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery -- 6-Sep-96
15. JS Guide 5260 - Service Member's Personal Protection Guide: A Self-Help Handbook to Combat Terrorism While Overseas, 01 April 2000

16. Joint Operations Concepts, Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Vision and Transformation Division, November 2003.
17. "An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution In the 21st Century" White Paper (Washington, D.C. Joint Staff, J7: 28 January 2003).
18. Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) Development Handbook, January 1999.

MULTI-SERVICE DOCTRINE DOCUMENTS

1. FM 90-18/FMFRP 2-70/MACP 64-3/ACCP 50-51/CI M16120.8/ USAFEP 50-51/PAC AFP 50-52, Multi-Service Procedures for CSAR (rescinded)
2. AFM 200-3/FM 21-77A/NWP 43(A), Joint Worldwide E&E Manual (rescinded, superceded by 3-50.3)
3. FM 21-76-1/MCRP 3-02H/NWP 3-50.3/AFTTP(I) 3-2.26, Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, & Recovery

ARMY DOCTRINE DOCUMENTS

1. Field Manual 1-111, Aviation Brigade (Appendix D, CSAR)
2. Army Regulation 525-90, CSAR Procedures
3. Field Manual 3-50.2, CSAR (draft)
4. Field Manual 3-05.231, Special Forces Personnel Recovery (draft)
5. USAJFKSWCS Pub 525-5-14, Unconventional Assisted Recovery

NAVY DOCTRINE DOCUMENTS

1. Naval Warfare Pub 19-2, Navy CSAR Supplement

MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE DOCUMENTS

1. FMFM 5-70, MAGTF Aviation Planning (Chapter 9, TRAP)

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENTS

1. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.6, CSAR

EXERCISE AND TEST REPORTS

1. JCSAR WOODLAND COUGAR 97, End-to-End Test Report, Prepared By: JCSAR Joint Test Force, Assisted By: SENTEL Corporation, Joint Combat Search and Rescue, Joint Test and Evaluation, August 1998.
2. JCSAR CURRENT CAPABILITY, SURFACE-BASED C4I, TEST REPORT, Prepared By: JCSAR Joint Test Force, Assisted By: SENTEL Corporation, Joint Combat Search and Rescue, Joint Test and Evaluation, August 1998.

3. JCSAR ENHANCED CAPABILITY, TEST REPORT, Prepared By: JCSAR Joint Test Force, Assisted By: SENTEL Corporation, Joint Combat Search and Rescue, Joint Test and Evaluation, March 1999.

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS

1. International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, Volume I Organization and Management (IMO/ICAO London/Montreal, 2003).
2. International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, Volume II Mission Co-ordination (IMO/ICAO London/Montreal, 2003).
3. International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, Volume III Mobile Facilities (IMO/ICAO London/Montreal, 2003).
4. International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, Volume I Organization and Management (IMO/ICAO London/Montreal, 2003).
5. Admiralty List of Radio Signals, Volume 5 (NP 285) 2003/4, Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), United Kingdom Hydrographic Office.

APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS

APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS

ABCCC	Airborne Command, Control, and Communications
AC2ISRC	Aerospace Command & Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Center
ACC	Air Combat Command
ACT	Aircrew Coordination Training
ACTD	Advanced Concept & Technology Demonstration
ADOCS	Army Deep Operations Control System
AEF	Air Expeditionary Force
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AF	Air Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AFRES	Air Force Reserves
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
AFSOF	Air Force Special Operations Forces
AID	Agency for International Development
AIRNORTH	Air Forces, Northern Region
AIRSOUTH	Air Forces, Southern Region
AMC	Airborne Mission Commander
ANG	Air National Guard
ANGB	Air National Guard Base
AOA	Analysis of Alternatives
AOB	Air Order of Battle
AOC	Air Operations Center
AOG	Air Operations Group
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AOS	Air Operations Squadron
APAF	Aircraft Procurement Air Force
ARCT	Air Refueling Control Time
ARL	Army Reconnaissance-Low
ARSOC	Army Special Operations Command
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASR	Advanced Survival Radio
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force
ATAHS	Advanced Terrorism Abduction and Hostage Survival
ATO	Air Tasking Order
ATO/ITO	Air Tasking Order/Integrated Tasking Order

ATP	Allied Tactical Publication
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
AWFC	Air Warfare Center
BCAOC	Balkans Combined Air Operations Center
BFT	Blue Force Tracking
C2	Command and Control
C2ISR	Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
C2TIG	Command and Control Training and Innovation Group
C2WS	Command and Control Warrior School
C3I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CA	Consular Affairs
CA/OCS	Consular Affairs/Overseas Citizens Services (DoS)
CAC	Common Access Card
CAF	Combat Air Forces
CAG	Carrier Air Group
CAOC	Combined Air Operations Center
CAP	Combat Air Patrol
CARD	Cost Analysis and Research Division (IDA)
CAS	Close Air Support
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CAX	Computer-Aided Exercise
CBT	Computer Based Training
CC	Component Commander
CDAS	Cognitive Decision Aided System
CD-ROM	Compact Disc-Read Only Memory
CENTAF	Central Command Air Forces
CENTCOM	Central Command
CFACC	Combined Force Air Component Commander
CFC	Combined Force Commander
CG00	Cobra Gold 2000
CGHQ	Coast Guard Headquarters
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJCSM	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual

CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CMS	Crisis Management Support (DoS)
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COBRA	Collection of Broadcasts from Remote Assets
CoC	Code of Conduct
COCOM	Combatant Commander
CoM	Chief of Mission
COMACC	Commander, Air Combat Command
COMCENTAF	Commander, Central Command Air Forces
COMPACAF	Commander, Pacific Air Forces
COMSEC	Communications Security
COMSOUTHAF	Commander, Southern Command Air Forces
COMUSAFE	Commander, United States Air Forces Europe
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
CONUS	Continental United States
COS	Chief of Staff
CPA	Chairman's Program Assessment
CPG	Contingency Planning Guidance
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRC	CONUS Replacement Center
CRCC	Combined Rescue Coordination Center
CRD	Capstone Requirements Document
CRO	Combat Rescue Officer
CSAF	Chief of Staff Air Force
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CSAREX	Combat Search and Rescue Exercise
CSARTF	Combat Search and Rescue Task Force
CSEL	Combat Survivor Evader Locator
CSG	Counterterrorism Security Group
CSRC	Combined Search and Rescue Center
CTAPS	Contingency Theater Automated Planning System
CTF	Combined Task Force
DA	Department of the Army
DAR	Designated Area for Recovery
DART	Downed Aircraft Recovery Team (DoD) and Disaster Assistance Response Team (USAID)
DASD	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DC	Deputies Committee
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS	Department of Homeland Security

DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DO	Director of Operations
DOC	Desired Operational Capabilities
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
DoE	Department of Energy
DoHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
DoT	Department of Transportation
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, Facilities
DOTr	Department of the Treasury
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DPMO	Defense POW and Missing Personnel Office
DS	Diplomatic Security
DSN	Defense Switched Network
DTSE&E	Director, Test, Systems Engineering and Evaluation
DUSD	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
DUSD(AS&C)	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems & Concepts
E&E	Escape and Evasion
E&R	Evasion and Recovery
EA	Executive Agent
EAF	Expeditionary Air Forces
EAI	Executive Agent Instruction
EAP	Emergency Action Plan (DoS)
EFX	Expeditionary Force Experiment
ELT	Emergency Locator Transmitter
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency; also Evasion Plan of Action
EPIRB	Emergency Position Indication Radio Beacon
ESC	Electronic Systems Command
ESF	Economic Support Fund
EUCOM	European Command
EVC	Evasion Chart
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAC	Forward Air Control
FAO	Forward Air Operations
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FASOTRAGRULANT	Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group, Atlantic Fleet

FASOTRAGRUPAC	Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group Pacific
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCB	Functional Capabilities Board
FEST	Foreign Emergency Support Team
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
FLIR	Forward Looking Infrared
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FS	Fighter Squadron
FSD	Full Spectrum Dominance
FSI	Foreign Service Institute, renamed National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC)
FTX	Field Training Exercise
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	General Accounting Office
GCC	Geographic Combatant Commands
GCSS	Global Combat Support System
GOB	Ground Order of Battle
GPRS	Global Personnel Recovery System
GPS	Global Positioning System
GS	General Schedule
GSA	General Services Administration
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
GWP	Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
HD	Hostage Detention
HHQ	Higher Headquarters
HHR	Hand Held Radio
HLD	Homeland Defense
HLS	Homeland Security
HMMWV	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HN	Host Nation
HQ	Headquarters
HRC	High Risk of Capture
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IA	Implementing Agency
IAMSAR	International Aviation and Maritime Search and Rescue
IAP	International Airport
IC	Intelligence Community
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICAP	Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy

ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICSAR	International Civil Search and Rescue
ID	Identification
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
IDCAOC	Interim Deployable Combined Air Operations Center
I-FOR	Implementation Forces
IGO	International Governmental Organization
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INL	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IO	International Organization; also Information Operations
IP	Isolated Personnel
ISA	International Security Affairs
ISOPREP	Isolated Personnel Report
ISPR	Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
ITO	Integrated Tasking Order
IW	Information Warfare
J/CSAR	Joint/Combat Search and Rescue
JAC2C	Joint Air Command & Control Course
JAWP	Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (IDA)
JCET	Joint-Combined Exchange Training
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JCRA	Joint Combat Rescue Agency
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSAR	Joint Combat Search and Rescue
JEFX	Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JFSOCC	Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JIATF	Joint Inter-Agency Task Force
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JIMP	Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan
JMETL	Joint Mission Essential Task List
JNTC	Joint National Training Capability
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOpsC	Joint Operations Concept
JP	Joint Publication
JPO	Joint Program Office

JPra	Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JS	Joint Staff
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSRC	Joint Search and Rescue Center
JSSA	Joint Services SERE Agency
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance, Tracking, and Reconnaissance System
JT&E	Joint Test and Evaluation
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTIMS	Joint Training Information Management System
JTTP	Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group
JV2020	Joint Vision 2020
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment
JWE	Joint Warfighting Experiment
KCRCC	Korean Combined Rescue Coordination Center
K-FOR	Kosovo Forces
KTO	Korean Theater of Operations
LD	Low Density
LNO	Liaison Officer
LOC	Location
LOS	Line-Of-Sight
LPD	Low Probability of Detection
LPE	Low Probability of Exploitation
LPI	Low Probability of Interception
MAG	Military Assistance Group
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MAJCOM	Major Command
MARLO	Marine Liaison Officer
MAS	Military Agency for Standardization
MC	Mission Commander
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MCM	Multi-Command Manual
MDS	Mission Designator Series
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MET	Mission Essential Task
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MEU(SOC)	Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
MHz	Mega Hertz
MIA	Missing in Action
MIJI	Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference

MilCon	Military Construction
MILGRP	Military Group
MilPer	Military Personnel
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPA	Missing Persons Act
MPP	Mission Performance Plan (DoS)
MRC	Major Regional Contingency (preceded Major Theater War)
MRO	Mass Rescue Operations
MSEL	Master Scenario Events List
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MTW	Major Theater War
MTX	Mayer Miniature Transmitter
MWTC	Marine Warfare Training Center
NAR	Non-conventional Assisted Recovery
NAS	Naval Air Station; Narcotics Affairs Section
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSPECWAR	Naval Special Warfare
NAVSPECWARCOM	Naval Special Warfare Command
NCA	National Command Authority
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NCOIC	Non-Commissioned Officer-In-Charge
NDU	National Defense University
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NFATC	National Foreign Affairs Training Center, formerly Foreign Service Institute (FSI)
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIC	National Intelligence Center
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NOB	Naval Order of Battle
NORTHCOM	Northern Command
NPRA	National Personnel Recovery Architecture
NRAS	Naval Reserve Air Station
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NSARC	National Search and Rescue Committee
NSARC	National Search and Rescue Committee
NSC	National Security Council
NSD	National Security Directive
NSP	National Search and Rescue Plan

NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NSS	National Security Strategy
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OAD	Operational Aviation Detachment
OAF	Operation Allied Force
OB	Order of Battle
OCONUS	Outside Continental United States
OCPP	Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping (DoS)
OCS	Overseas Citizens Services
ODC	Office of Defense Cooperation
ODS	Operation Desert Storm
OED	Operational Evaluation Division (IDA)
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OG	Operations Group
OIC	Officer-In-Charge
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OJCS	Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OL-A	Operating Location A
ONW	Operation Northern Watch
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
OPSEC	Operational Security
OPSTEMPO	Operations Tempo
ORD	Operational Requirements Document
OSC	On-Scene Commander
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSW	Operation Southern Watch
OTH	Over The Horizon
PA	Public Affairs
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACOM	Pacific Command
PCC	Policy Coordination Committee
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PD	Presidential Determination
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PE	Program Element
PERSTEMPO	Personnel Tempo
PGD	Peacetime Governmental Detention
PGD/HD	Peace-Time Governmental Detention/Hostage Detention
PJ	Pararescue Jumper

PKO	Peace Keeping Operation
PLB	Personnel Locator Beacon
PLS	Personnel Location System
PMAT	Political Military Action Team
PME	Professional Military Education
POC	Point of Contact
POI	Program of Instruction
POL-MIL	Political-Military
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
POV	Privately Owned Vehicle
POW	Prisoner of War
PPBS	Planning, Programming, Budgeting System
PR	Personnel Recovery
PRAG	Personnel Recovery Advisory Group
PRATK	Personnel Recovery Application Toolkit
PRCC	Personnel Recovery Coordination Center
PRD	Presidential Review Directive
PRETC	Personnel Recovery Education and Training Center
PRMAA	Personnel Recovery Mission Area Analysis
PRMS	Personnel Recovery Mission Software
PROG	Personnel Recovery Oversight Group
PRRC	Personnel Recovery Response Cell
PRTFG	Personnel Recovery Technology Focus Group
PRTWG	Personnel Recovery Technology Working Group
PRV	Personnel Recovery Vehicle
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PVO	Private Volunteer Organization
R&D	Research and Development
RA	Regional Affairs
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCC	Rescue Coordination Center
RCT	Rescue Coordination Team
RECCE	Reconnaissance
RESCAP	Rescue Combat Air Patrol
RESCORT	Rescue Escort
RFI	Request for Information
RJ	Rivet Joint
RMC	Rescue Mission Commander
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
RQG	Rescue Group
RQS	Rescue Squadron

RQW	Rescue Wing
RSAF	Royal Singapore Air Force
RSO	Regional Security Officer
RT	Resistance Training
RTIC	Real-Time Information in the Cockpit
SA	Situation Awareness
SAASM	Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module
SADL	Situational Awareness Data Link
SAFE	Selected Area For Evasion
SAID	SAFE Area Intelligence Description
SAP	Security Assistance Program
SAR	Search and Rescue; Synthetic Aperture Radar
SARDO	Search and Rescue Duty Officer
SARDOT	Search and Rescue Dot
SARIR	Search and Rescue Incident Report
SARLO	Search and Rescue Liaison Officer
SARNEG	Search and Rescue Numeric Encryption Grid
SARPO	Search and Rescue Planning Officer
SARREQ	Search and Rescue Request
SARSAT	Search and Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking
SARSIT	Search and Rescue Situation Report
SATCOM	Satellite Communications
SCANIC	Scandinavia & Iceland
SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SCSR	School for Combat Survival & Recovery
SE	Survivor-Evader
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SEAL	Sea-Air-Land
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SED	System Evaluation Division (IDA)
SER	Survival, Evasion, and Recovery
SERE	Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape
SF	Special Forces
SFG	Special Forces Group
S-FOR	Stabilization Forces
SFRD	Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division (IDA)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIPRNET	Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
SIREN	Secure Information Releasability Environment
SMC	Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SN	Strategic National

SO/LIC	Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (DoD)
SOAR	Special Operations Aviation Regiment
SOCCENT	Special Operations Command, Central Command
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command, Europe
SOCKOR	Special Operations Command, Korea
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOCPAC	Special Operations Command, Pacific
SOCSOUTH	Special Operations Command, Southern Command
SOD	Special Operations Division
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFRCC	Special Operations Forces Rescue Coordination Center
SOG	Special Operations Group
SOLE	Special Operations Liaison Element
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SOR	Statement of Requirements
SOS	Special Operations Squadron
SOUTHAF	Southern Command Air Forces
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SPECAT	Special Category
SPINS	Special Instructions
SPO	System Program Office
SRR	Search and Rescue Region
SSN	Social Security Number
ST	Special Tactics
SWA	Southwest Asia
TAC-EVAL	Tactical Evaluation
TACON	Tactical Control
TBMCS	Theater Battle Management-Core Systems
TDY	Temporary Duty
TEP	Theater Engagement Plan
TES	Test and Evaluation Squadron
TOA	Transfer of Authority
TOT	Time on Target
TRAP	Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel
TS	Top Secret
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
U.S	United States
UAR	Unconventional Assisted Recovery
UARCC	Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Center
UARM	Unconventional Assisted Recovery Mechanism
UARRSI	Universal Aerial refueling Receptacle Slipway Installation
UART	Unconventional Assisted Recovery Team

UBS	UHF Base Station
UFL	Ulchi Focus Lens
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
UK	United Kingdom
UNC	United Nations Command
USA	United States of America; also United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Forces Europe
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAJFKSWCS	United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCS	United States Customs Service
USD	Under Secretary of Defense
USD(A&T)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
USD(I)	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USD(ISA)	Under Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
USD(P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USEC	United States European Command
USFK	United States Forces Korea
USG	United States Government
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USNR	United States Navy Reserves
USOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UTC	Unit Type Code
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VHF	Very High Frequency
WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WG	Wing
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WS	Weapons School

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

accounted for – With respect to a person in a missing status the person is returned to United States Control; the remains of the person are recovered and, if not identifiable through visual means as those of the missing person, are identified as those of the missing person by a practitioner of an appropriate forensic science; or credible evidence exists to support another determination of the person’s status.¹

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) – A demonstration of the military utility of a significant new capability and an assessment to clearly establish operational utility and system integrity.

airborne mission commander – The commander serves as an airborne extension of the executing component’s rescue coordination center (RCC) and coordinates the combat search and rescue (CSAR) effort between the combat search and rescue task force (CSARTF) and the RCC (or joint search and rescue center) by monitoring the status of all CSARTF elements, requesting additional assets when needed, and ensuring the recovery and supporting forces arrive at their designated areas to accomplish the CSAR mission. The airborne mission commander (AMC) may be designated by the component RCC or higher authority. The AMC appoints, as necessary, an on-scene commander. Also called AMC.

alliance (DoD)—An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. See also **coalition; multination.**

assistance mechanism (DoD) – Individuals, groups of individuals, or organizations, together with material and/or facilities in position, or that can be placed in position by

¹ United States Code Title 10. Armed Forces Subtitle A – General Military Law Part II – Personnel Chapter 76 – Missing Persons

appropriate US or multinational agencies, to accomplish or support evasion and recovery operations. See also **evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery; recovery operations.**

assisted recovery (DoD) – The return of an evader to friendly control as the result of assistance from an outside source. See also **evader.**

blood chit – A small piece of material depicting an American flag and a statement in several languages to the effect that anyone assisting the bearer to safety will be rewarded. See also evasion aid. JP 1-02.

capability – The ability to execute a specified course of action. It is defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational terms in the format of an initial capabilities document or a DOTMLPF change recommendation. In the case of material proposals, the definition will progressively evolve to DOTMLPF performance attributes identified in the CDD and the CPD.

Chief of Mission – The senior diplomatic representative of the United States assigned by the President and residing in a country/location. Usually refers to the Ambassador, or but can be lower ranking DoS official (chargé d' affaires, or head of interest section) based on locale and current policy.

civil search and rescue (civil SAR) (DoD-specific term) – military assistance to civil (i.e., civilian) search and rescue authorities in non-hostile, non-denied environments.

Coalition (DoD) – An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also **alliance; multination.**

coalition action (DoD) – Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. See also **alliance; coalition; multinational operations.**

coalition force – (DoD) A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose.

combat search and rescue (DoD) – A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called **CSAR.**

combat search and rescue mission coordinator (DoD) – The designated person or organization selected to direct and coordinate support for a specific combat search and rescue mission. Also called **CSAR mission coordinator**. See also **combat search and rescue; component search and rescue controller; search and rescue; search and rescue mission coordinator**.

combat search and rescue task force – All forces committed to a specific combat search and rescue operation to search for, locate, identify, and recover isolated personnel during wartime or contingency operations. This includes those elements assigned to provide command and control and protect the rescue vehicle from enemy air or ground attack. Also called **CSARTF**.

combat survival (DoD, NATO) – Those measures to be taken by Service personnel when involuntarily separated from friendly forces in combat, including procedures relating to individual survival, evasion, escape, and conduct after capture.

combined operation – An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

component search and rescue controller – (DoD) The designated search and rescue representative of a component commander of a joint force who is responsible for coordinating and controlling that component's search and rescue forces. See also **combat search and rescue; combat search and rescue mission coordinator; search and rescue; search and rescue mission coordinator**.

conventional recovery operation – Evader recovery operations conducted by conventional forces.

covered persons – The Missing Persons Act (MPA) covers any member of the armed forces on active duty who becomes involuntarily absent as a result of a hostile action or under circumstances suggesting that the involuntary absence is a result of hostile action and whose status is undetermined or who is unaccounted for. The MPA also covers any other person who is a citizen of the United States and a civilian officer or employee of the Department of Defense who serves in direct support of, or accompanies, the armed forces in the field under orders and becomes involuntarily absent as a result of hostile action or

under circumstances suggesting that the involuntary absence is a result of a hostile action and whose status is undetermined or unaccounted for. The MPA allows the Secretary of Defense to determine, with regard to a pending or ongoing military operation, the specific employees, or groups of employees, of contractors of the Department of Defense to be considered covered by the MPA provided they meet the same criteria as specified above for civilian officers and employees of the Department of Defense.² The term “covered persons”, in the context of the MPA, refers to the determination of the legal status of DoD personnel only and should not be construed to mean covered in any other sense of the word.

Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office – Established by Congress in Title 10, US Code, this office is responsible for policy development and coordination with respect to prisoners of war and missing DoD personnel. The office also has statutory lead authority for coordination of DoD positions within the interagency process.

Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2009 – The DoS and USAID Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2009 sets forth the Secretary of State’s direction and priorities for both organizations in the coming years. The Strategic Plan supports the policy positions set forth by the President in the National Security Strategy and presents how the DoS and USAID will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance. The Strategic Plan defines the primary aims of U.S. foreign policy and development assistance, priorities in the coming years, and strategic objectives and goals. The strategic objectives and goals constitute the strategic planning framework for both agencies and serve as the basis for both organizations’ annual performance plans.

Doctrine – Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. See also multinational doctrine, joint doctrine, and multi-service doctrine. JP 1-02.

² United States Code Title 10. Armed Forces Subtitle A – General Military Law Part II – Personnel Chapter 76 – Missing Persons

DoD civilian work force – United States citizens or foreign nationals employed by the Department of Defense and paid from appropriated or non-appropriated funds under permanent or temporary arrangement. This includes employees filling full-time, part-time, intermittent, or on-call positions. Specifically excluded are Government contractors in accordance with DoD Instruction 1400.2. DoD Instruction 3020.37 covers contingency and emergency planning for contractor employees.

DoD Contractor – Any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal non-Federal entity that enters into a contract directly with the Department of Defense to furnish services, supplies, or both, including construction. The term “DoD contractor” may include U.S. nationals, local citizens, or third-country nationals, but shall not include foreign governments or representatives of foreign governments that sell to the Department of Defense, a DoD Component, or foreign corporations owned wholly by foreign governments.

Emergency Action Plan – The Emergency Action Plan is developed by each Foreign Service post to serve as a reference in dealing with any situation or occurrence of a serious nature, developing suddenly and unexpectedly, typically posing a threat to U.S. lives, property or interests and demanding immediate action. The plan should outline useful organization structures for emergency management, discuss response mechanisms within the DoS and other USG agencies, highlight the kinds of information the post will need to plan for specific emergencies, contain checklists to ensure rapid, clear and complete responses and identify post emergency responsibilities.

evacuation – a DoS function to remove U.S. citizens and others from deteriorating security situations overseas. (see Noncombatant Evacuation Operation)

evader – Any person isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory who eludes capture.

evasion – **(DoD)** The process whereby individuals who are isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. See also **evasion and recovery**.

evasion aid – **(DoD)** In evasion and recovery operations, any piece of information or equipment designed to assist an individual in evading capture. Evasion aids include, but

are not limited to, blood chits, pointee-talkies, evasion charts, barter items, and equipment designed to complement issued survival equipment. See also; **evasion; evasion and recovery; evasion chart; recovery; recovery operations.**

evasion and escape – (DoD, NATO) The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control.

evasion and escape intelligence – (DoD) Processed information prepared to assist personnel to escape if captured by the enemy or to evade capture if lost in enemy-dominated territory.

evasion and escape net – (DoD) The organization within enemy-held or hostile areas that operates to receive, move, and exfiltrate military personnel or selected individuals to friendly control. See also **unconventional warfare.**

evasion and escape route – (DoD) A course of travel, preplanned or not, that an escapee or evader uses in an attempt to depart enemy territory in order to return to friendly lines.

evasion and recovery – (DoD) The full spectrum of coordinated actions carried out by evaders, recovery forces, and operational recovery planners to effect the successful return of personnel isolated in hostile territory to friendly control. See also **evader; evasion; hostile; recovery force.**

evasion chart – (DoD) Special map or chart designed as an evasion aid. See also **evasion; evasion aid.**

evasion plan of action – (DoD) A course of action, developed before executing a combat mission, which is intended to improve a potential evader's chances of successful evasion and recovery by providing recovery forces with an additional source of information that can increase the predictability of the evader's actions and movement. Also called **EPA.** See also **evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery force.**

Full Spectrum Personnel Recovery – The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for, plan and execute the recovery of U.S. military, government civilians, and government contractors, who are isolated, missing, or in distress while participating in a

U.S.-sponsored activity or mission overseas, and other persons as designated by the President.

functional area – A broad scope of related joint warfighting skills and attributes that may span the range of military operations. Specific skill groupings that make up the functional areas are approved by the JROC.

Functional Area Analysis (FAA) – It identifies the operational tasks, conditions, and standards needed to achieve military objectives. It uses the national strategies, JOCs, JFCs, integrated architectures and the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) as input. Its output is the tasks to be reviewed in the follow-on functional needs analysis. The FAA includes cross-capability analysis and cross-system analysis in identifying the operational tasks, conditions and standards.

Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) – A permanently established body that is responsible for the organization, analysis, and prioritization of joint warfighting capabilities within an assigned functional area.

high-risk-of-capture personnel – U.S. personnel whose position or assignment makes them particularly vulnerable to capture by hostile forces in combat, by terrorists, or by unfriendly governments.

Hook-112 – Officially the PRC-112B, which has all the characteristics of the PRC-112, but with added commercial Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver that provides the user with location and navigation capability and also has one-way, line of sight, commercially encrypted databurst communications capability with properly equipped aircraft. Databursts provide radio identification, GPS position, and text messages.

hostage rescue – is typically employed after diplomacy or negotiations have failed or been deemed unwarranted. It typically involves very specially trained forces who only attempt a rescue after detailed planning has been completed. Rescue attempts often require coordination between the governments of the hostages and of the nation in which the incident occurs.

inland search and rescue region (DoD) – The inland areas of continental United States, except waters under the jurisdiction of the United States. See also **search and rescue region**.

interoperability – The ability of systems, units or forces to provide data, information, materiel and services to and accept the same from other systems, units or forces and to use the data, information, materiel and services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. NSS and ITS interoperability includes both the technical exchange of information and the end-to-end operational effectiveness of that exchanged information as required for mission accomplishment.

isolated personnel (DoD) – Military or civilian personnel that have become separated from their unit or organization in an environment requiring them to survive, evade, or escape while awaiting rescue or recovery. See also **combat search and rescue; search and rescue**.

isolated personnel report (DoD) – A DoD Form (DD 1833) that contains information designed to facilitate the identification and authentication of an evader by a recovery force. Also called **ISOPREP**. See also **evader; recovery force**.

Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) – The JCB functions to assist the JROC in carrying out its duties and responsibilities. The JCB reviews and, if appropriate, endorses all JCIDS and DOTMLPF proposals prior to their submission to the JROC. The JCB is chaired by the Joint Staff, J-8, Director of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment. It is comprised of Flag Officer/General Officer representatives of the Services.

Isolated Personnel Training, Level A – Initial entry training. DoD civilian work force members and DoD contractor employees must demonstrate knowledge of survival, evasion, and recovery techniques, tactics, and procedures. They must demonstrate a knowledge of the captivity environments: Combat, peacetime and hostage/detention. Level A isolated personnel training requirements may be accomplished by completing anti-terrorism and force protection training prior to entry into the theater. Augmentations by JPRA to the pre-deployment preparations briefing may be required. Training may be accomplished through computer-based training.

Isolated Personnel Training, Level B – Unit level training – survival and resistance; minus hands-on/practical exercises. The DoD civilian work force members and DoD contractor employees must apply survival, evasion, and recovery techniques, tactics, and procedures. The DoD civilian work force members and DoD contractor employees must

comprehend principles and concepts relating to surviving all captivity environments. Training may be accomplished through computer-based training.

Isolated Personnel Training, Level C – Institutional training – survival, escape, resistance, and evasion; hands-on/practical exercises. The DoD civilian work force members and DoD contractor employees must apply survival, evasion, and recovery techniques, tactics, and procedures. Level C training will be a hands-on derivative of the current prisoner of war camp training captivity environment conducted by the DoD. All phases of captivity environments plus basic survival skills will be trained. Level C cannot be conducted solely by computer-based training.

joint combat search and rescue operation (DoD) – A combat search and rescue operation in support of a component’s military operations that has exceeded the combat search and rescue capabilities of that component and requires the efforts of two or more components of the joint force. Normally, the operation is conducted by the joint force commander or a component commander that has been designated by joint force commander tasking. See also **combat search and rescue; search and rescue.**

joint exercise control group – Typically, the combatant command staff will form a joint exercise control group to plan, direct, and control joint exercises. The organization and responsibilities of the joint exercise control group may vary from combatant command to combatant command; however, the joint exercise control group will generally be composed of five major parts: Observer/Trainer Group; Controller Group; Modeling and Simulations Group; Role Players; and the Opposition Force. Also called JECG. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside of this publication.)

joint experimentation – An iterative process for developing and assessing concept-based hypotheses to identify and recommend the best value-added solutions for changes in DOTMLPF required to achieve significant advances in future joint operational capabilities.

joint force – The term “Joint Force” in its broadest sense refers to the Armed Forces of the United States. The term “joint force” (lower case) refers to an element of the Armed Forces that is organized for a particular mission or task. Because this could refer to a joint

task force or a unified command, or some yet unnamed future joint organization, the more generic term “a joint force” will be used, similar in manner to the term “joint force commander” in reference to the commander of any joint force.

Joint Functional Concept (JFC) – An articulation of how a future joint force commander will integrate a set of related military tasks to attain capabilities required across the range of military operations. Although broadly described within the Joint Operations Concepts, they derive specific context from the joint operating concepts and promote common attributes in sufficient detail to conduct experimentation and measure effectiveness.

joint mission-essential task – A mission task selected by a joint force commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the common language of the universal joint task list in terms of task, condition, and standard. Also called JMET. (JP 1-02)

joint mission-essential task list – A list of joint mission-essential tasks selected by a commander to accomplish an assigned or anticipated mission. A joint mission essential task list includes associated tasks, conditions, and standards and requires the identification of command-linked and supporting tasks. Also called JMETL. (CJCSI 3500.02C)

Joint Operating Concept (JOC) – An articulation of how a future joint force commander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain a joint force against potential adversaries’ capabilities or crisis situations specified within the range of military operations. Joint Operating Concepts guide the development and integration of JFCs to provide joint capabilities. They articulate the measurable detail needed to conduct experimentation and allow decision makers to compare alternatives.

Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) – A concept that describes how the Joint Force intends to operate 15 to 20 years from now. It provides the operational context for the transformation of the Armed Forces of the United States by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities.

Joint rescue coordination center (JRCC) – An RCC responsible for more than one primary type of SAR services, e.g., both aeronautical and maritime SAR incidents.

NOTE: The term “JRCC” will not be used for civil SAR purposes solely on the basis that an RCC is staffed by personnel from, or is sponsored by, more than one organization.³

joint search and rescue center (DoD) – A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint search and rescue and combat search and rescue operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. The facility is operated jointly by personnel from two or more Service or functional components or it may have a multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations (multinational search and rescue center). The joint search and rescue center should be staffed equitably by trained personnel drawn from each joint force component, including U.S. Coast Guard participation where practical. Also called **JSRC**. See also **combat search and rescue; joint search and rescue center director; rescue coordination center; search and rescue**.

joint search and rescue center director (DoD) – The designated representative with overall responsibility for operation of the joint search and rescue center. See also **combat search and rescue; joint search and rescue center; search and rescue**.

life support equipment (DoD) – Equipment designed to sustain aircrew members and passengers throughout the flight environment, optimizing their mission effectiveness and affording a means of safe and reliable escape, descent, survival, and recovery in emergency situations.

maritime search and rescue region (DoD) – The waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; the territories and possessions of the United States (except Canal Zone and the inland area of Alaska) and designated areas of the high seas. See also **search and rescue region**.

missing person – a member of the armed forces on active duty who is in a missing status; or a civilian employee of the DoD or an employee of the DoD who serves in direct

³ United States National Search and Rescue Plan -- 1999

support of, or accompanies, the armed forces in the field under orders and who is in a missing status.⁴

missing status – the status of a missing person who is determined to be absent in a category of any of the following: missing, missing in action, interned in a foreign country, captured, beleaguered, besieged, detained in a foreign country against that person’s will.⁵

Mission Performance Plans – Mission Performance Plans are prepared by each mission for the upcoming fiscal year. Mission Performance Plans contain a brief description of the country, a Chief of Mission Statement, an introduction to goal papers and the goal papers. The Chief of Mission Statement contains an assessment of the country, an assessment of progress in meeting the previous year’s goals and a summary of the strategic goals for the upcoming year. The introduction provides a prioritized listing of the policy-related performance goals for the planning year. Goal papers are prepared for each of the strategic goals which contain the performance goal desired and the strategies that will be followed to achieve the goal.

multination (DoD) – Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. See also **alliance; coalition**.

multinational operations (DoD) – A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. See also **alliance; coalition; coalition action**.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operation – There are several phases to a Chief of Mission led evacuation of U.S. personnel from a host nation. Initially, as a situation appears to become more threatening, U.S. personnel (particularly dependents) are assisted (cautioned but not directed) to leave. As the situation further deteriorates, U.S. personnel are directed to leave to include a drawdown of the Embassy staff. If the situation prevents evacuation through civilian means the Chief of Mission may request that DoD

⁴ United States Code Title 10. Armed Forces Subtitle A – General Military Law Part II – Personnel Chapter 76 – Missing Persons

⁵ Ibid

conduct a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation. NEO is defined in Joint Pub 3-07.5 as “operations directed by the DoS, the DoD, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States.”⁶ Personnel subject to evacuation include all noncombatants such as U.S. citizens, nonessential military personnel, selected host-nation citizens and third country nationals. “NEOs usually involve the swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of an objective and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission. During NEOs, the US Ambassador is the senior authority for the evacuation and is ultimately responsible for the successful completion of the NEO and the safety of the evacuees.”⁷ “It is imperative that the Ambassador’s evacuation plan and the joint force commander’s plan for the NEO be supportive, coordinated, and fully integrated.”⁸

non-conventional assisted recovery – term for methods used by US Government Agencies to set up, maintain, and operate what used to be called Escape & Evasion networks. Also called NAR.

nonmateriel solution – Changes in doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel or facilities to satisfy identified functional capabilities.

on-scene commander – The person designated to coordinate rescue efforts at the rescue site.

overseas search and rescue region (DoD) – Overseas unified command areas (or portions thereof not included within the inland region or the maritime region). See also **search and rescue region**.

Pararescue team – Specially trained personnel qualified to penetrate to the site of an incident by land or parachute, render medical aid, accomplish survival methods, and rescue survivors.

⁶ Joint Pub 3-07.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 September 1997

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Ibid

personal locator beacon (DoD, NATO) – An emergency radio locator beacon with a two-way speech facility carried by crewmembers, either on their person or in their survival equipment, and capable of providing homing signals to assist search and rescue operations.

personnel recovery – Personnel recovery is the umbrella term for operations focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from danger. It is the sum of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing, or isolated. That includes U.S., allied, coalition, friendly military, or paramilitary, and others designated by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Personnel recovery includes, but is not limited to, theater search and rescue (SAR); Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR); Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE); Evasion and Recovery (E&R); and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options. Personnel recovery may occur through military action, action by non-governmental organizations, other U.S. Government-approved action, and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of those options (DoD Directive 2310.2). Though it could be construed as a form of personnel recovery hostage rescue or other “rescues” associated with terrorism or counter-terrorism do not come under the personnel recovery umbrella overseen by DPMO. Additionally, personnel recovery is not the same as non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) though a personnel recovery incident could certainly occur during a NEO. ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for counter-terrorism activities and NEO. DPMO is responsible for personnel recovery as defined above.

Pointee-talkee –A language translation aid containing selected phrases in English opposite same statements in local language. It is used by pointing to appropriate phrases. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, programmable digital devices with sound recognition and speaker capability were also used.

PRC-90 – Survival radio carried by military aircrew members. Vietnam-era system providing two-way, line of sight, non-secure voice communications on two fixed frequencies. Also has a distress beacon.

PRC-112 – Survival radio carried by military aircrew members. Provides two-way, line of sight, non-secure voice communications on two programmable frequencies. Equipped with a distress beacon. A coded transponder can be interrogated by properly equipped aircraft, providing the range and heading to the survival radio.

precautionary search and rescue/combat search and rescue (DoD) – The planning and prepositioning of aircraft, ships, or ground forces and facilities before an operation to provide search and rescue or combat search and rescue assistance if needed. The planning of precautionary search and rescue or combat search and rescue is usually done by plans personnel with search and rescue or combat search and rescue expertise and background on a J-3 (operations) staff, a joint search and rescue center, or a rescue coordination center. Also called **precautionary SAR/CSAR**. See also **combat search and rescue; joint combat search and rescue operation; search and rescue**.

recovery (DoD, NATO) – In evasion and recovery operations, the return of evaders to friendly control, either with or without assistance, as the result of planning, operations, and individual actions on the part of recovery planners, conventional/unconventional recovery forces, and/or the evaders themselves. See also **evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery; recovery force**.

recovery activation signal (DoD) – In evasion and recovery operations, a pre-coordinated signal from an evader that indicates his presence in an area to a receiving or observing source that indicates "I am here, start the recovery planning." See also **evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery operations**.

recovery force (DoD) – In evasion and recovery operations, an organization consisting of personnel and equipment with a mission of seeking out evaders, contacting them, and returning them to friendly control. See also **evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery operations**.

recovery operations (DoD) – Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security.

Regional Security Office – The RSO is responsible for all security and protective intelligence operations within the mission. The RSO is responsible for the safety and

security of all official American facilities, employees and their families from the various U.S. Federal Agencies residing in country. RSO responsibilities range from developing contingency plans, to supervising guards, to improving physical security at the embassy/mission, the CoM's residence and the mission-leased residences within country. RSOs coordinate with local police, military, and Overseas Security Advisory Councils, and wardens in developing mission plans and assist in non official American citizens with their planning. RSOs work on criminal investigations, extraditions, counter-terrorism activities, internal affairs investigations, background investigations, police training and other related security and law enforcement related matters.

Report of Potential Evacuees Abroad (F-77) – The F-77 report is a crisis management tool, maintained by the State Department's Office of Crisis Management Support, that is used to size the population potentially requiring evacuation from a country or region. It is particularly useful to the military in their planning and execution of a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), when required. The F-77 report contains the best information available on Americans in each country worldwide and lists them by numbers, not names. The report is both a snapshot and an informed guess. The F-77 reports are updated by posts annually, but immediate updates – crisis reports – can be done anytime by the post. Potential evacuees are placed in one of two broad categories; those who can be ordered to leave by the Chief of Mission (US Government personnel and their family members excluding DOD personnel under the command of a combatant commander) and those who can be assisted but not ordered to leave) private American citizens and certain foreign nationals). The numbers are compiled by direct registration as well as by contributions from the mission staff, through their contacts with host country immigration, tourist, airline, hotel, school and business officials, and third country diplomatic missions.

rescue combat air patrol (DoD) – An aircraft patrol provided over a combat search and rescue objective area for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft. Its primary mission is to protect the search and rescue task forces during recovery operations. Also called **RESCAP**.

Rescue coordination center (RCC) – A unit, recognized by ICAO, IMO or other cognizant international body, responsible for promoting efficient organization of civil SAR services and for coordinating the conduct of SAR operations within an SRR.⁹

rescue coordination center (DoD) – A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for coordinating and controlling search and rescue and/or combat search and rescue operations. The facility is operated unilaterally by personnel of a single Service or component. For Navy component operations, this facility may be called a rescue coordination team. Also called **RCC (or RCT for Navy component)**. See also **combat search and rescue; joint search and rescue center; search and rescue**.

rescue ship (DoD, NATO) – In shipping control, a ship of a convoy stationed at the rear of a convoy column to rescue survivors.

Rescue sub-center (RSC) – A unit subordinate to an RCC established to complement the latter according to particular provisions of the responsible authorities.¹⁰

safe area (DoD) – A designated area in hostile territory that offers the evader or escapee a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until he can be evacuated. Also called **selected area for evasion**.

SAFE area intelligence description (DoD) – In evasion and recovery operations, an in-depth, all-source evasion study designed to assist the recovery of military personnel from a selected area for evasion under hostile conditions. Also called **SAID**. See also **evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery operations; Safe Area**.

SANDY – Callsign for a U.S. Air Force pilot specially trained in search procedures, aircrew survival and authentication techniques, and helicopter support tactics.

search and rescue (DoD, NATO) – The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. **(DoD)** Also called **SAR**. See also **combat search and rescue; combat**

⁹ United States National Search and Rescue Plan -- 1999

¹⁰ Ibid

search and rescue mission coordinator; component search and rescue controller; isolated personnel; joint combat search and rescue operation; joint search and rescue center; joint search and rescue center director; rescue coordination center; search and rescue mission coordinator.

search and rescue alert notice (DoD) – An alerting message used for United States domestic flights. It corresponds to the declaration of the alert phase. Also called **ALNOT**. See also **search and rescue incident classification, subpart b**.

Search and rescue coordinator – A federal person or agency with overall responsibility for establishing and providing civil SAR services for a search and rescue region(s) for which the U.S. has primary responsibility.¹¹

search and rescue incident classification (DoD) – Three emergency phases into which an incident may be classified or progress, according to the seriousness of the incident and its requirement for rescue service: a. Uncertainty phase – Doubt exists as to the safety of a craft or person because of knowledge of possible difficulties or because of lack of information concerning progress or position; b. Alert phase – Apprehension exists for the safety of a craft or person because of definite information that serious difficulties exist that do not amount to a distress or because of a continued lack of information concerning progress or position; c. Distress phase – Immediate assistance is required by a craft or person because of being threatened by grave or imminent danger or because of continued lack of information concerning progress or position after procedures for the alert phase have been executed.

search and rescue mission coordinator (DoD) – The designated person or organization selected to direct and coordinate support for a specific search and rescue mission. Also called **SAR mission coordinator**. See also **combat search and rescue; combat search and rescuer mission coordinator; component search and rescue controller; search and rescue**.

Search and Rescue Region – An area of defined dimensions, recognized by ICAO, IMO or other cognizant international body, and associated with a rescue coordination center

¹¹ Ibid.

within which SAR services are provided.¹² See **inland search and rescue region; maritime search and rescue region; overseas search and rescue region.**

Search and rescue services – The performance of distress monitoring, communication, coordination and SAR functions, including provision of medical advice, initial medical assistance, or medical evacuation, through the use of public and private resources including cooperating aircraft, vessels and other craft and installations.¹³

tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel – A U.S. Marine Corps term describing a mission performed by an assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue (SAR) assets from responding and when survivors and their location have been confirmed. Also called **TRAP**.

types/conditions of recovery –

- **Unassisted** – the evader simply walks out on his own, unassisted...military personnel train for it, it works, but it doesn't do much to bolster morale.
- **Opportune** – a matter of being in the right place at the right time...a guy bails out and lands in front of a HUMM WV that gets him back to U.S. control.
- **Component** – in accordance with current joint doctrine, each service component is responsible for the recover of its own forces within its capability.
- **Joint** – components are also required to contribute PR capability to the joint effort when needed.
- **Multinational** – U.S. capability to recover an isolated person of a coalition partner, coalition partners' capability to recover U.S. isolated personnel, and the capabilities of a multinational force to recover any coalition isolated personnel.
- **Interagency** – a new category to capture some old and some emerging relationships with other government agencies with respect to PR.

unconventional assisted recovery (DoD) – Evader recovery conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine

¹² Ibid

organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders to friendly control. See also **assisted recovery; evader; recovery.**

unconventional assisted recovery mechanism (DoD) – That entity, group of entities, or organizations within enemy-held or hostile areas, which operates to receive, support, move, and exfiltrate military personnel or selected individuals to friendly control. See also **assisted recovery; recovery; unconventional assisted recovery.**

unconventional recovery operation (DoD) – Evader recovery operations conducted by unconventional forces. See also **evader; recovery operations.**

unconventional warfare (DoD) – A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called **UW.**

unconventional warfare forces (DoD) – United States forces having an existing unconventional warfare capability consisting of Army Special Forces and such Navy, Air Force, and Marine units as are assigned for these operations.

Universal Joint Task List – A menu of capabilities (mission-derived tasks with associated conditions and standards, i.e., the tools) that may be selected by a joint force commander to accomplish the assigned mission. Once identified as essential to mission accomplishment, the tasks are reflected within the command joint mission essential task list. Also called UJTL. (JP 1-02)

Warden System – The Warden System is a network of American volunteers who assist the embassy or mission in rapidly disseminating official U.S. Government information to American citizens. Most Warden Systems are organized geographically with Wardens assigned to a number of geographic areas or zones. The Warden undertakes to provide official information from the embassy/mission to the registered American citizens in

¹³ Ibid

his/her zone when the system is activated. Where zones are either physically large or contain many American citizens, the embassy may enlist the aid of other Americans living in the zone to serve as Sub-Wardens. The system, ideally, is a contact “tree” in which Wardens and Sub-Wardens each undertake to contact 10-15 American families. The Warden System is used to convey information in an emergency or crisis, to include natural disasters and terrorist threats. Information disseminated through this system only reaches those families that have registered with the embassy or mission.

APPENDIX C

**IDA TEAM DATA COLLECTION INTERVIEWS, MEETINGS,
VISITS, CONFERENCES, WORKSHOPS, AND OTHER**

APPENDIX C
**IDA TEAM DATA COLLECTION INTERVIEWS, MEETINGS,
VISITS, CONFERENCES, WORKSHOPS, AND OTHER**

INTERVIEWS

Date	Location
17 April 2002	Defense Prisoner of War, Missing Personnel Office (DPMO)
26 April 2002	Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA)
2 May 2002	Defense Intelligence Agency (PR Cell)
29 May 2002	U.S. Joint Forces Command (Director of Operations/J3)
31 May 2002	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict/SOLIC)
5 June 2002	Department of State (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, International Security Operations)
7 June 2002	Joint Staff (J-3, Special Operations Division)
1 July 2002	Federal Bureau of Investigation (Office of International Operations)
3 July 2002	Department of Justice (Criminal Division, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program)
9-11 July 2002	U.S. Special Operations Command
12 July 2002	Department of State (7 offices) and US Agency for International Development
15 July 2002	HQ Marine Corps (Aviation Programs and Policy)
22 July 2002	Department of State (Operations Center, Crisis Management Support)
23 July 2002	Central Intelligence Agency (Special Activities Division)
25 July 2002	Army Staff (Special Operations Division)
30 July 2002	U.S. Southern Command (Joint Interagency Task Force – East)
1 August 2002	U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters (Office of Search and Rescue)
27 August 2002	Department of State (Bureau of Diplomatic Security)

Date	Location
11 September 2002	Department of State (National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Security Overseas Seminar))
26 September 2002	Department of Treasury (Customs Service)
3 October 2002	U.S. European Command
8 October 2002	Department of State (National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Crisis Management Training Team)
11 October 2002	National Security Agency (Special Support Activity)
25 October 2002	Department of State (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement)
12 November 2002	U.S. General Services Administration (Aircraft Management Division)
4 December 2002	U.S. Agency for International Development (Asia and Near East Bureau)
10 December 2002	Department of State (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and Crisis Management)
17 December 2002	Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration)
20 December 2002	Office of the CNO (Plans, Policy, and Operations, and Resources, Requirements, and Assessments)
10 February 2003	Patrick AFB FL (301st Rescue Squadron, DoS-INL, Manned Space Flight Office, and AirScan, Inc.)
19 February 2003	U.S. Navy Fleet Aviation Specialized Training Group (SERE School Section)
18 March 2003	JPRA SERE School, Fairchild AB, WA
19 March 2003	USAF SERE School Fairchild AB, WA
31 March – 2 April 2003	USA SERE School Fort Bragg, NC
1-2 April 2003	USA JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC
15 April 2003	Joint Staff, J-8
1 May 2003	Joint Staff, J-7
28 May 2003	National Security Council Staff
28 May 2003	NSC Staff – RADM (s) McRaven
2-5 June 2003	American Embassy Bogotá Colombia
5 June 2003	USSOUTHCOM Briefing Plan Colombia
5 June 2003	Department of State (DoS)

Date	Location
12 June 2003	USSOUTHCOM Debrief Colombia Trip
13 June 2003	Department of State (P-M, etc.) Debrief Colombia Trip
9 July 2003	USEUCOM J-3
9 July 2003	NDU/ITEA
1 August 2003	Department of State, Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism (S/CT)
26 August 2003	USCENTCOM Staff
2 September 2003	Department of State, S/CT – FEST
22 September 2003	Department of State, P-M Bureau, Ass't. Secy. Bloomfield
1 October 2003	NSC Staff – CAPT Harward
20 October 2003	Department of State, Office of Management Policy, and Consular Affairs Bureau
7 November 2003	Department of State, Bureau of Management, Human Resources Div. (M/HR)
17 November 2003	USPACOM
17 November 2003	USCG 14th district
20-21 November 2003	American Embassy Jakarta, Indonesia
24-25 November 2003	American Embassy Manila, RP
27 November – 10 December 2003	Federal Deployment Center, Ft. Belvoir & Kuwait
2 December 2003	Fort Sherman Academy
9 December 2003	U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command
10 December 2003	Corporation X
11 December 2003	GSA, Office of Governmentwide Policy
12 January 2004	AFSOC
14-15 January 2004	USJFCOM/JWFC
2-3 March 2004	CONUS Replacement Center
10 March 2004	DPMO, General Counsel

CONFERENCES/MEETINGS/WORKSHOPS

Date	Location
9-11 July 2002	Special Operations Command, Personnel Recovery Working Group
23-26 July 2002	USSOUTHCOM, Soto Cano AB, Honduras (JTF BRAVO and Central American Search and Rescue Workshop)
6-8 August 2002	2002 DoD Personnel Recovery Conference
4 September 2002	DPMO (In progress NPRA study review)
15 November 2002	Pre-PRAG Meeting
21 January 2003	DoD Personnel Accounting Conference
28 January 2003	Personnel Recovery Technology and Interoperability Forum (PRTIF)
5-6 February 2003	Interagency Workshop at IDA
13 February 2003	General Services Administration (Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy)
21 February 2003	Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC)
25 February 2003	Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG)
4 March 2003	PRRC
14 March 2003	NSA (CSEL Review)
27 March 2003	OSD C3I (CSEL Program Review)
15 April 2003	Department of State, DS – PR Training (Ed Guard)
14-16 May 2003	NATO CSAR Conference, Naples, Italy
31 July 2003	JRA PR Technology and Interoperability Forum
21 August 2003	DIA, Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery Working Group
25 September 2003	GSA/ICAP briefing Update
6 November 2003	JPRA PR Technology and Interoperability Forum
21 January 2004	USSOUTHCOM Personnel Recovery Conference
10-11 February 2004	2nd Interagency Personnel Recovery Workshop
16-18 March 2004	USD (I) Conference – Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery
16 April 2004	Personnel Recovery Response Cell

OTHER (TRAINING, EXERCISES, ETC.)

Date	Location
9-11 April 2002	PR-101, Ft. Belvoir
23-28 June 2002	Joint Exercise Desert Rescue X, NAS Fallon NV
29 May 2003	Andrews AFB, RAF EH-101
28-29 July 2003	Nellis AFB demo of Personnel Recovery Application Tool Kit
12 August 2003	Gander AB, 103rd SAR Squadron, CH-149
2 February 2004	Exercise Blue Advance USSOUTHCOM
24-27 March 2004	Exercise Foal Eagle/UNC&CFC Korea

APPENDIX D

**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR BASELINE CAPABILITY
FOR TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT**

APPENDIX D
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR BASELINE CAPABILITY
FOR TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT

A. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

For purposes of the NPRA, every USG department and agency that IDA contacted during the course of this study recognized that some portion of their organization's personnel was at risk of isolation or capture in certain overseas locations, and consequently identified a training requirement of some sort. Every USG department and agency that participated in either of the IDA workshops agreed that training and leader awareness were important first steps to improving USG preparedness for PR.

B. DOD SERE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL AT RISK

DoD has defined three major levels of SERE training:

- **Level A** – Academics on the Code of Conduct (unclassified).
- **Level B** – Academics on Survival, Evasion, and Resistance (confidential). Minimal academics on escape and recovery.
- **Level B+** – Level B training augmented with practical field exercises.
- **Level C** – Level B academics, plus thorough practical field exercises, plus experiential training in a resistance training laboratory (secret). No practical escape or recovery exercises.
- **Level C+** – Graduate level resistance academics and practical exercises, tailored to specific missions and needs (secret+). Limited to resistance training only.

Current policy requires that the Combatant Commands determine the level of SERE training required for personnel assigned or deploying to their theaters. The process for determining these requirements is ongoing, but it is likely that SERE training throughput requirements will increase significantly. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has identified its current level C SERE training requirements for wartime and peacetime training. Other Combatant Commands are in the process of identifying their SERE training requirements. According to the JPRA, there is currently no uniform

requirements process that reviews, defines, and validates requirements throughout the SERE training community. Because the combatant commands have not exercised their authority to define their Level C training requirements, the Services have identified specific career fields that have been historically categorized as high risk, and have, in most cases, programmed for their SERE schools to train those career fields. Service guidance currently requires Level C combat training for personnel in 54 identified occupational fields or assignments, and the major portion of Level C training is provided to aviation, special operations, and special mission personnel.

There are no established criteria or direction for determining who requires specialized or advanced SERE training. Attendance at these courses, while open and offered to a variety of military and other USG agency users, is largely determined by user perception of need and the availability of user resources. Although this arrangement satisfies the need for narrow and well-defined audiences, it might not fully recognize the peacetime risk level inherent in military operations other than war for a potentially large number of military personnel. The changing battlefield environment, including asymmetry, non-state actors, transnational threats, terrorists, and narco-trafficking, further complicates the training requirements determination effort.

The IDA study team estimates the total requirement for DoD's wartime Level C SERE training at about 13,600 students per year. Based on a new understanding of the modern battlefield, SOCOM and the Army have determined that the requirements for wartime and peacetime governmental detention/hostage detention (PGD/HD) resistance training are roughly the same. If all Services apply the same standard, then the total requirement for DoD's peacetime Level C PGD/HD resistance training is also about 13,300 students per year, as shown in Table D-1.

Table D-1. SERE Training Requirements

Wartime Level C SERE Training	
Service/Component	Annual Requirement
Army	4,300
Navy	3,430
Air Force	4,540
Marine Corps	1,300
Peacetime Detention/Hostage Level C Resistance Training	
Army	4,100
Navy	3,460
Air Force	4,420
Marine Corps	1,300

1. USG Estimates of Personnel at Risk

The DoS F77 Report of Potential Evacuees Abroad contains a wealth of information as to numbers of personnel in countries worldwide and can assist the DoS in calculating the number of people (largely American citizens) potentially requiring assisted or directed evacuation if the local situation should require such a drawdown. The personnel are listed by several categories including USG officials and estimates of tourists, among many others. Every country team updates its F77 report routinely, but the actual situation is far more dynamic, with American citizens coming and going every day.

IDA did an assessment based on DoS travel and other Warning Advisories to develop an arbitrary list of high-, medium-, and low-threat countries. Then the number of personnel including primarily USG employees, USG contractors, and USG “TDY’ers” was estimated from the F77 Report. It was anticipated many of these people will be in the embassy and other secure locations; however, many will also be out in the field doing tasks in the national interest. Of interest, serious concern was expressed during several interviews for those in the TDY group, since these often arrive in country with little specific country indoctrination and often find their tasks take them a distance away from the Post compound. The F77 Report does not contain an assessment of relative risk to personnel (e.g., those who primarily work in the embassy as compared with those out in

the field. In some situations, one might argue those in the embassy might be at higher risk for such things as terrorist attack than those in more distant locations).

IDA conducted three case studies at U.S. Embassies in countries on the high-threat list: Colombia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. At each Embassy, IDA observers asked the staff for a head count of Americans in the country at that particular time. Several offices in each Embassy thought that they had accurate information, but the result in every case tied back to the F77 report.

So, while each U.S. Mission could, with standard guidance, define the type and level of SERE training required for Americans operating in its respective country, it is unreasonable to expect that any U.S. Mission will be able to determine with any accuracy the number of Americans who need the training. By association, it is equally unreasonable to assume any USG Department will be able to make an accurate determination. There are a few exceptional agencies, such as the CIA, with robust accountability procedures already in place that can accurately quantify their needs.

2. USG Estimates of SERE Training Requirements

DoD uses a training paradigm that divides SERE training into three levels (Level A, B, and C) and identifies three types of resistance training (wartime, peacetime, hostage). While the USG has not yet determined what training is appropriate, IDA has determined, through feedback from the interagency via the IDA workshops, that DoD's current paradigm would not be appropriate Government-wide. Wartime resistance training clearly does not apply to noncombatants outside the military, and DoD has acknowledged, based on lessons learned in OEF and OIF, that Level A code of conduct training is no longer suitable.

3. Capability

a. SERE Training for Personnel at Risk

The DoD has a training capability for all three components of the PR force structure. The Army offers its Level C course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and a satellite level B+ course at the Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama; the Navy conducts its Level C course at North Island Naval Air Station, California, and Brunswick Naval Air Station, Maine; and the Air Force provides Level C training at Fairchild AFB, Washington. The Air Force also runs a separate Level B+ course at the Air Force Academy, which is completed at Level

C by attendance at the resistance training laboratory portion of the Fairchild course. The Joint PR Agency offers advanced resistance training at the PR Academy, Fairchild AFB. Training is tailored for peacetime government detention and hostage detention. The SERE schools at the Air Force Academy and Fort Rucker are considered Level B+ schools because they do not conduct the resistance training laboratory, although the Academy has the facility. The Marine Corps is discussing the possibility of providing SERE training at its mountain warfare training center in Bridgeport, California. The Marine Corps already teaches two environmental survival courses there (mountain and winter). Figure D-1 shows the locations of the DoD SERE/Code of Conduct facilities within the U.S.




Figure D-1. DoD SERE/Code of Conduct Training Infrastructure

The Air Force Academy Course MT-220 program completes the Survival, Evasion, and Recovery requirements of the Basic Combat Survival Training course taught at Fairchild AFB, Course SV-80-A. In November 1997, the Air Force Academy and Air Education and Training Command established a Memorandum of Understanding to conduct the resistance laboratory portion at Fairchild. This “top-off program” requires that all Air Force Academy graduates going to career fields that demand Level C training receive their resistance training at the Air Force Survival School.

The Air Force Survival School has several new facilities recently constructed, soon to be constructed, or planned. A Phase II Academic Facility (70-seat planetarium and environmental training room), with a computer-based training (CBT) laboratory, video teleconference center with unclassified uplink, and administrative offices, was recently completed. Another building under design is a consolidated water training facility to allow all water survival training to be done at one location. This new water training facility will accommodate underwater egress training, all of the water survival non-parachuting training devices, and parachute descent trainers, parachute water drags, and helicopter water recovery training devices.

The new state-of-the-art Phase II academic training building deserves special mention. The new planetarium and wraparound viewing screens present environmental training through multi-imagery and stereo-sound presentation. Each of the student desks has a computer station to facilitate CBT. The 336 TRSS Training Technology Flight is responsible for creating, developing, and programming new training modules. A second feature of this training facility is a distance learning unclassified uplink that provides a new capability for the survival school to export training programs and courseware to DoD or other agencies. However, manning for distant learning studio presentations and additional personnel for computerized modular development are still needed.

The USAJFKSWCS at Fort Bragg, has developed an ambitious plan to expand its SERE training facility. The plan includes an expanded support base, additional survival training areas, evasion lanes, advanced resistance laboratories, and three new resistance training facilities. This will effectively quadruple the school's throughput from its current level of 960 students per year, to meet its requirement to train 4,300 students per year for the aviation and SOF branches. The plan will also address the requirement for PGD/HD training for 4,100 students per year. The Army has not funded the plan yet. Also, Army Special Operations Command has developed an exportable Level B SERE Program of Instruction (POI) that can be taught in 3 to 5 days. The POI includes academics and practical field exercises.

The Navy SERE school at NAS North Island, California, has developed a PGD/HD resistance course with the assistance of JPRA. The Navy's course evolved from the Advanced Terrorism Abduction and Hostage Survival (ATAHS) course that was developed at the specific request of NAVSPECWARCOM. This 5-day course provides instruction in antiterrorism, knowledge of terrorist actions, threats, global hot spots, and concepts to make an individual a hardened target against act of terrorism. A decision was made to amend the course to comply with the Executive Agent Instruction (EAI) (July

99) for Level C peacetime training, and to provide training for detention by hostile governments during peacetime operations other than war or captivity by a terrorist group. A pilot course of the new curriculum has been developed, and the Navy is prepared to offer it at both Navy schools. Quota procurement for this course is by message or letter to the Commanding Officer Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group Pacific (FASOTRAGRUPAC) or Commanding Officer Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group, Atlantic Fleet (FASOTRAGRULANT). The course serves as a model for similar peacetime training courses at other Service schools.

JPRA/J7 has significant responsibilities beyond conducting specialized resistance training programs. Oversight and standardization functions for the SERE training community, in addition to normal training program coordination duties, place the Director in a position of both conducting and overseeing training programs. Specialized training conducted by JPRA provides advanced and tailored joint peacetime resistance instruction to selected personnel of all Services as well as USG agencies outside DoD. Approximately 1,000 personnel received specialized training in 2002, including a class specifically for students from the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Mobile Security Deployments.

SERE training documentation varies greatly in format and detail from Service to Service; however, training content and objectives are consistent across the spectrum and are driven by compliance to the JPRA EAI. Level C course content was assessed based on the 1996 EAI and found to be in compliance for all Service schools.

Table D-2 shows the current throughput capacities of DoD's SERE schools. The Air Force Academy's SERE facility has the capacity to conduct level C SERE training for 1,200 students every 90 days. However, only 700 potential aircrew members are trained each year. The Academy's requirement to train cadets can be completed in one 90-day cycle in the summer, leaving capacity for up to 3,600 more students (depending on weather and land use permits) to address other DoD or USG requirements. The Academy is not currently manned or funded to run its facility at this throughput level.

Table D-2. SERE Training Capacity

SERE School	Wartime SERE	PGD/HD Resistance
USAF, Fairchild AFB	3,500	
USAF Academy	700	
USN, San Diego	1,680	168
USN, Brunswick	1,680	
USA, Fort Bragg	960	
JPRA, Fairchild AFB		924
TOTAL	8,520	1,092

b. Training for Commanders and Staff

JPRA and the Air Force provide all of the available PR training for commanders, controllers, and planners. JPRA's courses are taught at Fredericksburg, Virginia, or by mobile training teams. The Air Force teaches an RCC Controller Course at the C2 Warrior School, Hurlburt AFB, Florida, and is in the process of standing up a SOFRCC Controller Course at the Special Operations School, Hurlburt AFB. Table D-3 lists the JPRA courses available for commanders and staff.

Table D-3. JPRA Courses for Commanders & Staff

Course Number/Series	Title/Category
100-109	Fundamentals (General)
PR 101	Fundamentals of PR
PR 102	Fundamentals of PR (on CD-ROM)*
PR 103	Fundamentals of PR for Allies
110-119	Professional Military Education
PR 110	Joint Force Staff Course
120-139	Joint Force Staff
PR 120	Joint Task Force Staff
PR 121A	Public Affairs officer Qualification Course
PR 121B	Joint Public Affairs Operations Workshop
170-179	Commanders
PR 171	SOF Commanders
180-189	Joint Force Senior Leaders
PR 180	Capstone*
PR 189	Joint Force Senior Leaders
200-209	PR Planners
PR 201	Crisis Action Planning for PR (Execution/Operations)*
PR 1/2xx	SOF Weapons School
210-219	PR C2
PR 210	JSRC/RCC Controllers*
220-229	PR Intelligence
PR 220	PR for Intelligence Specialists*
240-249	PR Debriefing and Reintegration
PR 240	Reintegration Debriefing
300-3xx	PR Program Management
PR 301	PR Program Management
PR 303	Non-conventional Assisted Recovery Plans and Operations
* Indicates courses in development	

JPra/J7 is cognizant of training requirements for OSD, the Services and Combatant Commands, as well as training capability and capacity within JPRA's Personnel Recovery Education and Training Center (PRETC). JPRA/J7 publishes a periodic PRETC policy message that summarizes training quotas by Command, provides course descriptions and prerequisites, provides the schedule for each course, and updates the status of courses in development. Fully manned, the PRETC has only enough capacity to meet 20 percent of validated Combatant Command training requirements for commanders and staff. This does not include any training requirements that may be validated for Service HQ staffs, interagency staffs, or multinational staffs. As of 1 December 2003, the PRETC was manned at 66 percent of authorized strength, further challenging their ability to meet valid training requirements.

c. Training for Recovery Forces

The Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Special Operations Command all conduct advanced training for rescue forces. The Air Force conducts CSAR training at the USAF Weapons School and Red Flag exercises at Nellis AFB, Nevada. The Navy conducts CSAR training at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at NAS Fallon, Nevada. The Marine Corps conducts Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) training at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Sqdn-1, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma, Arizona. Army Special Forces conduct unconventional assisted recovery training at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), Fort Bragg. The Army has no doctrinal foundation for conventional PR training, such as SAR, CSAR, or TRAP. The Air Force has rescue squadrons that are assigned the CSAR mission as a primary responsibility. Because of this responsibility, the Air Force can more clearly articulate and quantify recovery force training requirements, capability, and capacity. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps view PR as a functional responsibility for all of their combat units. This means that any unit called upon to conduct PR for one of their own is expected to put forth their "best effort." This standard makes it challenging to quantitatively compare requirements and capabilities. Special Operations Forces, including Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs, train to conduct UAR as a task of unconventional warfare, one of their primary missions. However, the requirement for a UAR capability is not tied to SOF force structure, but to funding of UAR programs, which is independent of force structure. Funding for UAR programs has been steadily decreasing.

Because our interagency and coalition partners that have a PR capability typically have only a single unit, PR training is conducted in-unit, as opposed to through a formal training pipeline. Those that train to a standard usually train in accordance with DoD's Joint Publication 3-50.2 *Joint CSAR Doctrine* because it is readily available and unclassified.

d. Personnel Recovery Exercises

All of the U.S. Military Services make an effort to exercise some of their units in PR periodically, or just prior to deployment. The Air Force conducts CSAR events during its Red Flag exercises. The Army conducts PR events at the National Training Center. The Navy conducts CSAR events during CAG workups at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center. The Marines conduct TRAP scenarios during MEU(SOC) workups. Not all military units get to participate in these PR exercise events; only the units "most likely" to be called upon to perform a PR mission or, in some cases, the units "most available" to participate in the exercise.

All of the Combatant Commands make an effort to incorporate PR events into their annual exercise programs, with varying degrees of success. With manpower support from JPRA, each Combatant Command attempts to make PR a major objective of one in-theater exercise annually. Success at meeting this objective varies from command to command, and from year to year, depending upon funding levels, recovery force availability, and personalities involved. Participation of coalition forces in PR events at Combatant Command exercises has been steadily increasing, with the growing interest of our coalition partners in PR.

Exercise Desert Rescue is the only venue for examining interoperability for Joint CSAR. Units fund their own attendance at this Navy exercise. This exercise is limited in that it focuses only on the planning and execution of Joint CSAR from the unit level.

The CIA is the only other USG agency that IDA has found that regularly participates in PR exercises. No other USG department or agency conducts exercises to the extent that DoD does.

C. EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY

1. Requirements

The DoD's requirements and acquisition processes are quite different from the other DoD requirements processes discussed in this appendix, and different from other

off-the-shelf acquisition processes within the USG. The DoD requirements process is very formalized and structured. This is because it is the most expensive endeavor in the world; there is a great deal of money at stake. As a result, the process is also very cumbersome and slow. Currently, acquisition is a Title 10 authority and responsibility of the Services. The Joint Staff is in the embryonic stage of creating a joint capability-based requirements process, but for the equipment currently fielded and currently in acquisition, the requirements are system-based and established by the Services, either individually, or in cooperation on joint programs.

For example, the Air Force initiated an effort to replace its Sikorsky HH-60G Pave Hawk in 1999. The Pave Hawk is the Air Force's primary recovery vehicle for the CSAR mission. In 2003, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated the Air Force's Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for a Personnel Recovery Vehicle (PRV). The PRV is a piece of equipment, but not a PR capability. The PRV requires support from a number of other elements (e.g., C2, air refueling, force protection, strategic airlift) in order to provide a PR capability, and these elements are beyond the scope of the ORD. This situation is by design, in an effort to keep the program from growing out of control. The system requirement articulated in the ORD is based on the Air Force's analysis of the future threat and a clear definition of the mission. Because the Air Force is paying for the PRV, it is in the Air Force's best interest to bound the mission to address only the Air Force's needs to avoid unnecessary costs. The Air Force's definition of the mission scopes the program in terms of the number of PRVs to be acquired, and their capability. This requirements paradigm is endemic of all Services and all mission areas.

Since DoD has only recently embraced the concept of capabilities-based requirements, there is not yet a defined requirement for a DoD-wide PR capability. Without directive guidance, there has been no effort to define a USG-wide PR capability. Many of our coalition partners have a CSAR system requirement on the books (typically an Air Force or Army helicopter variant). Only a few countries have sufficient funding to address the requirement.

2. Capabilities

A discussion of PR technical capability is not possible without a frame of reference. This brings us back to the basic issue that has plagued the PR community since before the beginning of this study: What is PR? Without the context of a definition of PR, it is impossible to determine what equipment and technology, particularly that

used by SAR forces, falls within the scope of PR capability. For purposes of a discussion of equipment and technology, IDA arbitrarily defined PR as “search and rescue by conventional means of persons in distress or isolated persons in any physical environment and any threat environment.”

a. Isolated Personnel Systems

Equipment for isolated personnel can be broken down into three categories: survival equipment; evasion aids; and signal devices. Isolated personnel use survival equipment to stay alive in severe environments until they are recovered. Survival equipment includes medical kits, emergency shelters, water and water procurement tools, food and food procurement tools, and basic tools such as a knife, compass, and matches. Most survival tools are readily available as commercial-off-the-shelf products. Survival kits are tailored to the expected survival environment. Figure D-2 shows a representative sample of survival equipment.



Figure D-2. Survival Equipment

Isolated personnel use evasion aids to assist them in avoiding capture, gaining assistance from the local populace, and returning to friendly control. Evasion aids include an Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) used for authentication; an Evasion Plan of Action (EPA) used to communicate an isolated person’s intentions to the recovery force; a pointee-talkie used to communicate an isolated person’s needs in

different languages; a blood chit used to barter for assistance; an Evasion Chart (EVC) used for navigation and movement to water, shelter, or friendly territory; and camouflage used for concealment. Like survival equipment, camouflage is environment-specific, and is available commercially. The remaining evasion aids are region-specific and are produced by DoD and coalition military forces. IDA has seen some evasion aids employed by other USG agencies, such as ICE. Figure D-3 shows a representative sample of evasion aids.



Figure D-3. Evasion Aids

Isolated personnel use signal devices to aid in their recovery by search and rescue forces. There are signal devices for daytime use and nighttime use. There are also covert signal devices that isolated personnel can use to avoid detection by adversaries. Combat recovery forces are specially equipped to detect covert signal devices. Figure D-4 shows a representative sample of signal devices.



Figure D-4. Signal Devices

b. C2 Systems

PR C2 systems are divided into two categories: communications systems and information management systems. Most PR communications systems are designed to allow communications between isolated personnel and rescue C2 elements or between isolated personnel and rescue forces. Communications between rescue C2 elements and rescue forces are not currently PR-specific. Information management systems are designed for rescue C2 elements. Because PR communications systems and PR information management systems are designed and developed separately, they are not necessarily interoperable or compatible.

PR communications systems include beacons capable of one-way radio signal or data communications, radios capable of two-way line-of-sight voice communications, satellite phones capable of two-way over-the-horizon voice communications, and advanced survival radios capable of two-way line-of-sight voice communications and over-the-horizon data communications. Beacons include Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT), Personal Locator Beacons (PLB), and Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRB). The latest beacons are miniaturized, waterproof, floating, and can transmit a databurst on the 406 MHz international SAR frequency to satellites. The databurst contains a device ID used to identify the isolated person, and a very accurate device location from a data-linked or internal Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. Beacon signals picked up by satellite are transmitted to rescue C2

elements. Specially equipped SAR aircraft and ships can home in on beacon signals. Figure D-5 shows a representative sample of beacons.




Figure D-5. Beacons

A modern variation on the beacon concept is the Blue Force Tracker (BFT). The BFT was developed primarily as a means of providing situational awareness to commanders on the whereabouts of their forces. BFT devices transmit signals regularly (every 10 seconds to every hour) that provide ID, location, and status. The signals are collected and combined on a common operational picture for display to the commander, who can visualize his forces on a spatial display. The application to the PR mission lies in the status message. Personnel with a BFT who find themselves isolated, in distress, or otherwise in trouble can change their status signal to a commonly-recognized “911” status, informing the commander and his staff that some one is in need of recovery. Figure D-6 shows a representative sample of BFT.




Figure D-6. Blue Force Trackers

There are many survival radios available for both private/commercial use and government use. Commercially available survival radios operate in the VHF band and use the 121.5 MHz international SAR frequency. Military survival radios operate in the UHF band and use the 243.0 MHz SAR frequency. The most common U.S. military survival radios are the PRC-90 and the PRC-112. The PRC-90, which is from the Viet Nam era, is no longer in production. The PRC-112 is more modern and is still available for purchase directly from General Dynamics. Because of their limitations in a combat environment, DoD is procuring advanced survival radios to replace the PRC-90 and PRC-112.

Although not developed with PR specifically in mind, satellite phones are well suited for use in emergency, survival, and isolation situations. Satellite phones are simple to use and operate in remote areas independent of terrestrial mobile phone “cells.” Interestingly, all of the widely used satellite phones were developed commercially, rather than by governments for military use. Satellite phone systems include Iridium; Globalstar; Thuraya; ACEs; and INMARSAT. Some satellite phones have internal GPS, and have fax and data capabilities as well. Some satellite phones have global or worldwide capability while others have regional capability. All departments of the USG and many of our coalition partners are currently using satellite phones. Figure D-7 shows a representative satellite phone.



Figure D-7. Satellite Phone

DoD is currently fielding two advanced survival radios: the Boeing PRQ-7 known as “CSEL” and the General Dynamics PRC-112G known as “Hook.” While the two systems were developed independently using different R&D methods, and each has unique features, both systems have the same core functions. Advanced survival radios have a two-way line-of-sight voice radio capability to communicate with SAR forces. They have an internal GPS receiver with the ability to display present position, perform basic navigation functions, and transmit position coordinates via databurst. Advanced survival radios also have the ability to transmit messages via databurst over-the-horizon to SAR C2 elements. Isolated personnel can put identification, location, and authentication information into the data messages. Advanced survival radios are expensive to purchase and maintain, require significant manpower to support and sustain, require significant training to operate, and require in-depth understanding of the personnel recovery mission to properly employ. Only DoD uses these radios in the USG. Other countries, notably Great Britain, are procuring Hooks for their military forces. Figure D-8 shows U.S. advanced survival radios.



Figure D-8. Advanced Survival Radios

USG departments and agencies use a number of different information management systems as crisis management tools. There are a number of systems that are tailored for SAR and PR incidents, including SARMaster, PrecisionSAR, and Personnel Recovery Mission Software (PRMS). Information management systems support PR incident management through collection, organization, filtering, and distribution of critical incident and mission data.

c. Recovery Force Systems

Around the world, personnel recovery capability is founded on the helicopter. For 50 years, the best way to get to a remote area quickly, stop, extract a person – even from rough terrain or water – and quickly return him to safety, has been by helicopter. Helicopters, however, have a number of limitations. Compared to fixed-wing aircraft, they lack speed, range, and endurance. They are expensive and laborious to maintain, and are not fuel-efficient. They are as fragile as any aircraft, and are particularly vulnerable to attack when hovering motionless. Despite their limitations, they continue to prove themselves incredibly useful for many missions, including PR, and governments at all levels, in all parts of the world, continue to acquire them. Their ubiquitous presence around the world makes them the foundation of PR capability. While any helicopter may be suitable for a benign SAR incident, some helicopters are better equipped to perform PR than others. Specialized equipment such as a hoist, medical treatment suite, direction-finding equipment for homing on beacons, and night vision systems improve their PR

capability. Also, military helicopters have the necessary systems to operate in a combat environment, with some able to operate in more hostile environments than others. The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Special Operations Forces have the most capable combat helicopters. The intent of the PRV program is to provide a new aircraft that will extend combat rescue capability beyond 2010, and be capable of defeating the next generation of threats. Many USG departments and agencies own or operate helicopters capable of conducting PR in a peacetime environment. Outside the USG, the British and French military forces operate helicopters with a combat recovery capability. Figure D-9 shows a representative sample of helicopters.



Civil SAR

Combat-capable

Figure D-9. Helicopters

Because of the limited speed, range, and endurance of helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft are still essential pieces of equipment for conducting searches over large areas for isolated personnel or persons in distress who cannot be located by satellite, and for performing medical evacuation from improved airfields. As with helicopters, any aircraft is capable of conducting a basic visual search, or a medical evacuation from an airport. Aircraft with specialized equipment such as direction-finding equipment, surface search radar, sophisticated communications suites, night vision systems, medical treatment suites, and the ability to airdrop personnel and supplies are more PR capable. Larger aircraft have more range and endurance, and can carry more observers for visual searches. Amphibious aircraft provide additional PR capability over water. Many USG

departments, USG agencies, friendly governments, and NGOs own or operate aircraft capable of conducting searches and medical evacuation in a peacetime environment. Conducting searches with manned aircraft in a hostile environment is not considered operationally feasible with current technology. Casualty evacuation, or medical evacuation from a hostile environment, is normally done with helicopters, rather than aircraft. The USAF has some C-130 variants capable of casualty evacuation from hostile environments. Figure D-10 shows a representative sample of search aircraft.



Figure D-10. Search Aircraft

As discussed above, even combat-capable helicopters cannot conduct PR operations in hostile territory without support. To perform a difficult CSAR mission, a helicopter might need support in the way of air refueling; airborne C2; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C2ISR); force protection; electronic warfare; and information warfare. The specific equipment and technology needed are based on the threat and the circumstances of a particular CSAR mission. The assembly of these essential assets for a CSAR mission is referred to as a CSAR Task Force (CSARTF). All four Services and SOF are capable of assembling a CSARTF with organic assets. When a Service draws assets from another Service, another Government agency, or a foreign military, the mission becomes a Joint CSAR mission. Some USG departments and agencies have assets that could support a CSARTF, particularly with airborne C2ISR systems. No other nation has yet demonstrated the ability to assemble a CSAR Task

Force unilaterally, but many of our coalition partners have participated in Joint CSAR missions with U.S. forces. Figure D-11 shows a representative CSARTF.



Figure D-11. Air Force CSAR Task Force Elements

Two-thirds of the Earth’s surface is covered with water. There are regions of the oceans that are more than 1,000 miles from dry land in all directions. As a result, there are many PR incidents where a maritime asset is the only reasonable (or feasible) means of successfully affecting a recovery. In this instance, the international SAR community relies heavily on the commercial sector for assistance with rescue on the high seas. Commercial vessels routinely respond to distress calls from other vessels. Remarkably, all U.S. Military Services operate boats capable of conducting PR in littoral areas, some of which are equipped to operate in hostile environments. The Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Merchant Marine operate ocean-going vessels capable of PR operations in “blue water.” Navy ships can perform PR missions in hostile environments. Submarines deserve special mention because they are stealthy and can remain on station for extended periods. These characteristics make them well-suited for conducting PR in hostile littoral environments. Figure D-12 shows representative maritime assets.



Figure D-12. Ships, Submarines, and Boats

D. PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES

1. Requirements

The operational environment model shown in Figure D-13 describes the three spectrums of the operational environment:

- Spectrum of Military Operations – humanitarian operations to major theater war
- Spectrum of Threat Environments – permissive areas to non-permissive and denied areas
- Full Dimensional Battlespace – all physical environments, including space, and the information domain.

The PR community is required to provide PR capability in any combination of the three spectra that make up the operational environment.




Figure D-13. Operational Environment Model.

In addition, the PR community is required to have sufficient personnel and force structure to provide PR support to all ongoing DoD operations. There is no such documented explicit requirement for other USG departments and agencies, although a requirement to make a “best effort” is implied in high-level policy. Our coalition partners have similar policies. In order for the Services to sustain the required personnel and force structure, there is a derived facilities requirement for garrison, sustainment (logistics and maintenance), training, and RDT&E. Because the Air Force has forces assigned to conduct PR, AFSOC has clearly articulated its requirement for force structure, personnel and facilities.

“USAF must provide the CC/JFC with a responsive, full spectrum, scalable, survivable, compact, and flexible PR capable force that is self-contained (communications, force protection, medical support, etc.) and presents a small enough footprint to facilitate access in politically sensitive areas. This concept must maximize economy of existing force structure and integrate with the air component commander through a seamless C4ISR structure. A mixture of forces should be forward-based. Training and execution should be IAW standard TTPs and directives to increase interoperability.”

Of note is the absence of an explicit USAF requirement to provide force structure for PR C2 elements. The other Services and SOCOM have made PR an inherent functional capability of all of their combat forces, thus avoiding the need to articulate a requirement for additional force structure, personnel, and facilities. Other USG departments and agencies and other nations have not articulated explicit requirements for

PR capability. Consequently, they have no derived requirements for PR personnel or facilities.

The one exception is the requirement for SERE training. All four Services have a requirement for SERE training, and have derived requirements for SERE training facilities. Of note, the Air Force is the only Service that matches the facility requirement with a parallel personnel requirement. The Air Force has a SERE Specialist career field, while the other Services draw personnel for SERE instructor duty from other career fields. Many coalition partner nations have SERE training facilities, which they man in a similar fashion.

2. Capabilities

a. Air Force Recovery Forces

The Air Force has taken several steps in recent years to help improve the situation for rescue forces by reorganizing existing force structure and making marginal increases. An Air Staff level office (HQ AF/XOOP) had been established to work rescue issues, but was disbanded with the transfer of rescue forces from ACC to AFSOC. HQ AF/XOOS now works rescue and special operations issues. The consolidation of offices resulted in a net drawdown of personnel.

The Air Force established the Combat Rescue Officer (CRO) career to provide officer level leadership and advocacy for Pararescue and SERE forces, as well as provide a source of PR expertise to combatant command and service staffs. Several CRO-led squadrons have been activated, and CROs have been assigned to some HQ staffs within the Air Force and the air components of combatant commands.

On 1 October 2003, the Air Force transferred rescue forces from ACC to AFSOC. The transfer resulted in the cancellation or discontinuation of a number of modernization and improvement programs, and generated a cost savings for the Air Force. The Air Force's position is that there are a number of advantages to the transfer. The stated advantages of the transfer are:

“Renewed AF focus on PR mission area; highlighted modernization and sustainment initiatives; increased focus on the need for AFSOF-CSAR interoperability; identified need to continue efforts to tailor UTCs to improve rapid response capability; and emphasized untapped roles and missions AF PR can accomplish to expand into a full spectrum combat force.”

AFSOC intends to transform the CSAR force into a force that provides flexible and versatile combat capability to conduct collateral missions including: NEO; Disaster Relief; Infiltration/Exfiltration/Resupply; NASA support (space shuttle rescue); Air Medevac; PSYOPS; Homeland Defense; Humanitarian Relief Operations; and aviation Foreign Internal Defense (FID). IDA noted that of the nine stated collateral missions, five missions fit within IDA’s definition of full spectrum PR.

The Air Force has four rescue wings, plus three rescue squadrons, based at 12 different locations from Iceland to Okinawa. Rescue force structure is assigned to active duty, reserve, and guard components under three major commands within the Air Force. Figures D-14 and D-15 show the organizational structure of the rescue forces.




Figure D-14. AFSOC Personnel Recovery Force Structure



** Composite Wing w/other assets – C-130 Sqdn in addition to Rescue

Figure D-15. USAFE and PACAF Personnel Recovery Force Structure

Table D-4 lists the aircraft and personnel assigned to the PR mission in the Air Force, broken down by component.

Table D-4. USAF Personnel Recovery Aircraft and Manpower

Aircraft				
Active Duty	HC/C-130	19 ^a	HH-60	45 ^b
AFRC	HC/C-130	6	HH-60	15
ANG	MC/HC/C-130	10	HH-60	12
Total	MC/HC/C-130	35	HH-60	72
UTCs				
Active Duty	13 Aircraft UTCs		18 PJ UTCs	
AFRC	4 Aircraft UTCs		0 PJ UTCs	
ANG	4 Aircraft UTCs		0 PJ UTCs	
Total	21 Aircraft UTCs		18 PJ UTCs	
Manpower				
Active Duty	3993			
ANG/AFRC	2886			
Total	6879			

^a As of 1 October 2003 includes 11 HC-130 at Moody and 3 HC-130 at Davis-Monthan

^b Includes 5 HH-60 on loan to USAFE (56 RQS, Keflavik)

b. DoD SERE Training

All Services appropriately view SERE training as an integral part of inherent PR responsibilities. Other than the Air Force, Service representatives share responsibilities for PR matters other than SERE training. This assignment of responsibilities relies heavily on the schools to represent their Services in identifying, advocating, and resolving training issues. In the Army and Navy programs, lacking a career specialty or formal assignment policies that promote the accrual of multiple-tour experience in SERE CoC training, staff qualifications cannot require extensive mandatory prior experience.

For three of the Services, SERE is normally a one-tour assignment, with second assignments to SERE training positions a relatively rare occurrence. As the exception, the Air Force has a long-established career field for enlisted personnel and has a new Combat Rescue career field for officers, which will encompass SERE training.

A significant disparity exists between the Air Force and other Services in the areas of personnel and infrastructure devoted to Level C SERE training and training management. The JPRA and Army SERE schools both have plans for significant expansion in capacity. JPRA's new resistance training facility will have an unconstrained throughput capacity of 7,488 students per year. The Army's planned facility will have a throughput of approximately 4,000 students per year. However, neither plan is currently funded.

APPENDIX E

PERSONNEL RECOVERY PLANNING GUIDE

APPENDIX E

PERSONNEL RECOVERY PLANNING GUIDE

This Appendix is intended to provide the Chief of Mission (CoM) and country team with a guide to assessing and improving strategy-to-task policies and capabilities for personnel recovery. It explains the meaning and importance of personnel recovery in the context of U.S. National Strategy and his/her overall mission responsibilities. Section A lays out relevant policies and procedures for review. Section B provides a guide for assessing operational conditions, circumstances, and influences that should be considered when planning for personnel recovery. Section C lists factors and elements to improve personnel recovery architecture and force element capabilities in country. In collaboration with the National Foreign Affairs Training Center and through exercises conducted with selective Chiefs of Mission, IDA expects to refine this guide for possible inclusion as part of the Department of State Emergency Planning Handbook and Security Overseas Seminar program.

A. CONDUCT A BASELINE POLICY ASSESSMENT

1. National Strategy

Perhaps no single document better describes what America and American values are all about than our National Strategy – a strategy that is based on a distinctly American internationalism and is a reflection of the union of our values and interests. Essentially, it provides the rationale for and frames all organized efforts on the part of the U.S. Government both domestically and abroad. Protecting American citizens and our way of life rings through loud and clear in the strategy – but so too does protecting our allies abroad against threats by developing cooperative relationships and shared capabilities. Personnel recovery, in the context of a host nation, is both a shared responsibility and a shared capability.

2. DoS Strategic Plan and Foreign Policy Objectives for the Region and Country

The DoS Strategic Plan supports the policy positions set forth by the President in the National Security Strategy and presents how the DoS and USAID will implement

U.S. foreign policy and development assistance. The Strategic Plan defines the primary aims of U.S. foreign policy and development assistance, priorities in the coming years, and strategic objectives and goals. The plan affirms that *“protecting and assisting American citizens abroad is among the oldest and most important responsibilities.”* It specifies that *“the Department will disseminate safety and security information to Americans through all available means, including the latest technologies; and during crises, including evacuations, take all requisite steps to protect and assist Americans, in cooperation with host governments, the private sector, other USG agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).”*

The Ambassador leads the Embassy in furthering U.S. National Security objectives abroad by implementing the DoS and USAID Strategic Plan. The DoS and USAID Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2009¹ sets forth the Secretary of State’s direction and priorities² for both organizations.

3. President’s Letter to the Chief of Mission

The President’s personal letter to each Chief of Mission, upon assignment, contains detailed instructions for his personal representative. The text of that letter begins with the following overarching responsibility and authority: “As Chief of Mission, you have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive branch employees in country/at international organization, regardless of their employment categories or location, except those under command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization. Except for the activities of the personnel exempted above, you are in charge of all executive branch activities and operations in your Mission/international organization.”

It further directs the following: “...take full responsibility for the security of your Mission and all the personnel for whom you are responsible, whether inside or outside the chancery gate. Unless an interagency agreement provides otherwise, the Secretary of State and you as CoM must protect all USG personnel on official duty abroad other than those under the protection of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an

¹ *Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009*, DoS and U.S. Agency for International Development, DoS/USAID Publication 11084, Released August 2003.

² *Ibid*, Appendix A describes Protection of American Citizens as a Strategic Goal with attendant performance goals.

international organization and their accompanying dependents. You and the U.S. area military commander should consult and coordinate responses to common threats.”

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the Regional Combatant Commander and each CoM, which establishes responsibilities for DoD personnel assigned or attached to an Embassy, is reviewed periodically. U.S. European Command, because of the rapidly changing situation in that theater, has taken the initiative of placing these MOUs on a web site so they can be easily referred to and updated.

4. Country Mission Performance Plan

Each mission, for the upcoming fiscal year, prepares a Mission Performance Plan (MPP). The MPP contains a brief description of the country, a Chief of Mission Statement, an introduction to goal papers, and associated performance goals. The Chief of Mission Statement contains an assessment of the country, an assessment of progress in meeting the previous year’s goals, and a summary of the strategic goals for the upcoming year. The introduction provides a prioritized list of the policy-related performance goals for the planning year. Goal papers are prepared for each of the strategic goals, which also contain the performance goal desired and the strategies that will be followed to achieve the goal.

5. Treaties

For agreements to which the United States is a party, Treaties in Force (TIF) is the most common starting point for library research or web/internet searches.³ It provides references to various official treaty text compilations, such as Treaties and Other International Acts Series (IIAS) and United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), required for proper citations. Bilateral and multilateral treaties are covered in separate sections. Subject indexing is provided by TIF but is not always adequate, particularly for locating multilateral agreements. Hein’s U.S. Treaty Index on CD-ROM provides more thorough indexing of the information in TIF. This CD-ROM index might also provide information about treaties not yet included in TIF as well as

³ See the following website for a basic guide to treaty research:
<http://www.aallnet.org/sis/ripssis/treaty.html> (Legal Research Guide Series, Basic Research Guide #7, A Guide To Treaty Research, The George Washington University, National Law Center, Jacob Burns Law Library.)

treaties no longer listed in TIF because they have gone out of force. The CD-ROM index also might provide citations to additional sources of treaty texts, such as Senate documents. One of the best and most highly regarded unofficial sources is International Legal Materials (ILM) from the American Society of International Law. ILM is a bimonthly journal that provides selected texts of documents of interest concerning international law, including many treaties. Access to ILM is also available for recent years through LEXIS as the ILM file in the INTLAW library. For U.S. treaties, another source of recent treaty texts is Hein's United States Treaties and Other International Agreements Current Microfiche Service. The above-mentioned CD-ROM index from Hein includes indexing information for the microfiche set.

6. International SAR Agreements

Under the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) plan and the U.S. Supplement to this plan (also called the National SAR Plan), the USCG, as the agency responsible for civil search and rescue in U.S. maritime regions, serves as lead agency in coordinating international civil SAR responsibilities with other nations. Bilateral or multilateral SAR agreements with other U.S. agencies or organizations, or with authorities of other nations, could be of practical value not only to civil SAR, but also to personnel recovery, including:

- Helping to fulfill U.S. domestic or international obligations and humanitarian assistance needs
- Enabling more effective use of all available infrastructure and resources for PR
- Improving integration of U.S. SAR services with the global SAR system
- Building stronger coalition commitments to support civil SAR and personnel recovery requirements
- Resolving SAR and PR procedures and sensitive matters in permissive environments, in advance of time-critical distress situations
- Identifying types of cooperative matters and efforts that could enhance or support SAR and/or personnel recovery operations, such as access to medical or fueling facilities; training and exercises; meetings; information exchanges; use of communications capabilities, or joint research and development projects.

7. Status of Forces Agreements

In every foreign country where substantial numbers of American troops are stationed for any appreciable length of time the United States will have a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the host country. SOFAs define areas of legal responsibility held by a host country over U.S. military personnel stationed within its borders. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of International Security Operations, in cooperation with other DoS representatives, drafts the necessary cables and memos to facilitate SOFA negotiations between foreign governments and the DoD.

Status-of-forces agreements generally come in three forms: administrative and technical staff status under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Privileges, commonly referred to as A and T status; a “mini” status-of-forces agreement, often used for a short-term presence, such as an exercise; and a full-blown, permanent status-of-forces agreement. The appropriate arrangement depends on the nature and duration of U.S. military activity within the host country, the maturity of our relationship with that country, and the prevailing political situation in the host nation. In some cases, where we do not have air and maritime forces conducting visits on a routine basis, or where we have a rapidly changing situation, there might not be a SOFA in place.

The purpose of such an agreement is to set forth rights and responsibilities between the United States and the host government on such matters as criminal and civil jurisdiction, the wearing of the uniform, carrying of arms, tax and customs relief, entry and exit of personnel and property, and resolving damage claims.

Most SOFAs recognize the right of the host government to “primary jurisdiction,” which is to say the host country exercises jurisdiction for all cases in which U.S. military personnel violate the host country’s laws. There are two exceptions, however, which generally apply only in criminal cases involving U.S. forces personnel: when Americans commit offenses against Americans (“inter se” cases), and when Americans commit the offense in carrying out official duty. In these situations, the United States has primary jurisdiction over the accused American. Differences in culture and differences in legal approach can cause problems. SOFAs may or may not be relevant to personnel recovery situations, depending on the situation and circumstances.

8. USAID Programs

USAID is an independent Federal Government agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. USAID supports long-term and equitable economic growth and advances U.S. foreign policy objectives by supporting:

- Economic growth, agriculture, and trade
- Global health
- Democracy, conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance.

With headquarters in Washington, D.C., USAID also maintains field offices in many countries around the world. It works in close partnership with private voluntary organizations, indigenous organizations, universities, American businesses, international agencies, other governments, and other USG agencies. USAID has working relationships with more than 3,500 American companies and more than 300 U.S.-based private voluntary organizations. USAID Programs are contained in the DoS Strategic Plan mentioned above. USAID personnel are a source of personnel recovery requirements (potentially isolated personnel), but USAID programs, under certain conditions, can be a source for leveraged capabilities.

9. Security Assistance and Military-to-Military Relationships

The term “security assistance” applies to a range of programs through which the U.S. endeavors to assist other nations in defending and preserving their national security. It includes grant and sales programs of military equipment and training, as well as other programs such as Peacekeeping Operations. The DoS is the program manager for security assistance, while the DoD implements the program. DoS and DoD share responsibilities, along with benefactor foreign officials, for planning, development, and execution of training programs. Congress exercises legislative and oversight responsibilities in security assistance matters, including training. Security assistance programs should be leveraged as required to bolster host nation personnel recovery capabilities.

The Pentagon has historically used International Military and Education Training (IMET) to train foreign troops in the use of U.S.-supplied equipment and in U.S. military doctrine and tactics. Congress can prohibit or place restrictions on IMET for some governments with poor human rights records, for example, as it did with Indonesia in 1992. Another program, the Joint Combined Exercises and Training (JCET) program, allows Special Operations Forces to train and exercise with military forces of nation-

states. U.S. Special Forces, for example, trained African soldiers in peacekeeping under the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) launched in 1996. In addition, the Defense Department conducts foreign military training as part of counter-narcotics assistance, and the Pentagon has created the Joint Contact Team Program to train Partnership for Peace militaries in Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics. These training and exercise programs can be instrumental in developing shared knowledge, experience, and capabilities that enhance host nation personnel recovery capabilities.

Embassies, who are in the front line of assessing host nation capabilities, need to pay attention to orienting their assessments and training programs towards personnel recovery capabilities. For example, other training programs provided by FBI, DEA, Secret Service, INL, and Diplomatic Security (DS) offer various types of training to host nation agencies. Some of them may be relevant to and leveraged for personnel recovery capabilities.

10. Existing Memorandums of Understanding with Host Nation

The Ambassador, with guidance and assistance of the DoS, has the authority to enter into specific agreements with the host nation, providing it is not in contravention of international law and is in accordance with U.S. law. For example, the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá is currently in the process of negotiating an MOU with the Government of Colombia on the establishment of a Combined Recovery Coordination Cell.

11. International SAR Agreements (Host Nation)

Search and Rescue Regions (SRR) are established areas recognized by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to ensure provision of adequate land-based communications infrastructure, efficient distress alert routing, and proper operational coordination to support SAR services. By definition, there must be one Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) associated with each recognized SRR (as part of the global SAR system), which must conform to comprehensive standards and guidance developed by the IMO and the ICAO.

Host nation obligations under the ICAO and the IMO should be reviewed and corresponding capabilities should be assessed. Under provisions of the 1999 U.S. National Search and Rescue Plan, U.S. SAR Coordinators are designated and responsibilities are established with overall direction to support civil SAR operations of other countries in territory and international waters beyond recognized U.S. aeronautical

and maritime SRRs. DoD combatant commands are directed to provide such support, as appropriate, and within their capabilities, to their respective geographic areas of responsibility.⁴ Doing so enhances host nation personnel recovery capabilities and reduces the burden on U.S. capabilities in the long term.

12. Host Nation Objectives, Priorities, and Values

Host nation objectives, priorities, and values must be carefully considered in the design and development of a personnel recovery architecture and capability. The capabilities of the host nation might be limited, but normally many can make a significant contribution in terms of providing situational awareness, intelligence, and infrastructure. As much as possible, sovereignty issues should be factored in such a way as to harmonize cooperation toward common personnel recovery objectives.

13. U.S. Policy with Regard to PR

At this time, U.S. national policy is lacking with regard to PR. A National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) is currently in the coordinating stages. Until such a policy is approved and promulgated, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) National Personnel Recovery Architecture (NPRA) study can serve as a good primer. It addresses the subject from a national level perspective, in a CoM context, as well as a Combatant Commander context. The study also proposes an interim, or working definition, of “national personnel recovery” and a description of the associated national task, which will be described and discussed further in the following section.

B. ASSESS THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

While the term “operational environment” does not exist within the DoS lexicon, the concept itself has application and importance in emergency action and personnel recovery planning. The *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines operational environments and provides three nonexclusive examples, which are a composite of the **conditions, circumstances, and influences** that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander:

- Permissive environment – Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.

⁴ United States National Search and Rescue Plan – 1999, page 5.

- Uncertain environment – Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area.
- Hostile environment – Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct.

Especially in today’s environment, conditions, circumstances, and influences that frame our planning process are in constant flux and need to be continually assessed as part of the planning process. The level of common knowledge, overall awareness, special training, and experience with regard to personnel recovery are factors to consider when assessing the operational environment.

1. Level of Awareness of PR

A full understanding of National PR and its associated Strategic National Task is a prerequisite to making any assessment as to personnel recovery requirements or capabilities.

Absent a national definition, the NPRA study proposes the following definition for *National Personnel Recovery*: *The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for, plan, and execute the recovery of U.S. military, Government civilians, and Government contractors, who are isolated, missing, or in distress while participating in a U.S. sponsored activity or mission overseas, and others as designated by the President.*

Likewise, absent a common understanding of the associated Strategic National Task, the NPRA study offers the following interagency description of the task:

*Coordinate Personnel Recovery Worldwide – This task requires **national, (interagency), and multinational coordination** to develop **strategic direction, policy, and plans** for military support missions across the entire range of military operations in all operational and threat environments. This task includes reporting, locating, and supporting the person(s) and their family, recovery, and return of the isolated person(s) to their family or duty. It includes related mission planning areas such as Search and Rescue (SAR),⁵ Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)⁶ Non-Conventional*

⁵ **Search and rescue** is described in the *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms* as “the use of aircraft, surface craft (land or water), submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. Also called SAR. See also combat search and rescue; combat search and rescue mission coordinator; component search and rescue controller; isolated

Assisted Recovery (NAR),⁷ Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR),⁸ and Hostage Rescue; it includes support to the relevant planning of the other departments and agencies of the USG such as the Department of State Mission Performance Planning (MPP), Emergency Action Planning (EAP) and NEO. It is an integral part of Force Protection Planning⁹.

2. History, Trends, and Nature of the Threat

The dominant variable in assessing the operational environment is the threat. Threat assessment is a continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning potential groups that could target persons or facilities. A threat analysis will review the factors of any group's existence, capability, intentions, history, trends, strategies, operational modes, techniques, and targeting, as well as the security environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in identifying the nature and likelihood of personnel recovery incidents.

3. Total “At-Risk Population” (F-77 Report Estimate)

The F-77 report is a crisis management tool, maintained by the State Department's Office of Crisis Management Support, that is used to size the population potentially requiring evacuation from a country or region. It is particularly useful to the military in their planning and execution of a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), when required. The F-77 report contains the best information available on Americans in each country worldwide and lists them by numbers, not names. The report is both a snapshot and an informed guess. Posts update the F-77 reports annually, but the post can do immediate updates – crisis reports – anytime. Potential evacuees are placed in one of two broad categories – those who can be ordered to leave by the CoM (USG

personnel; joint combat search and rescue operation; joint search and rescue center; joint search and rescue center director; rescue coordination center; search and rescue mission coordinator.”

⁶ A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called CSAR. DoD Dictionary of Military Terms.

⁷ **Non-conventional assisted recovery** – The term for methods used by US Government Agencies to set up, maintain, and operate what used to be called Escape and Evasion networks. Also called **NAR**. NPRA study, Glossary.

⁸ **Unconventional assisted recovery – (DoD)** Evader recovery conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders to friendly control.

⁹ **Force Protection** - Referred to here as actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against U.S. facilities or personnel.

personnel and their family members excluding DoD personnel under the command of a combatant commander) and those who can be assisted (but not ordered) to leave, private American citizens, and certain foreign nationals. The numbers are compiled by contributions from the mission staff, through their contacts with host country immigration, tourist, airline, hotel, school and business officials, and third country diplomatic missions.

The F-77 report, in its current form, is of little value in determining those personnel who are at risk of isolation or capture; however, if the categories of personnel were better defined with regard to their vulnerability to the risks of isolation or capture and monitored more closely, it could have potential as a risk management tool.

4. Risk Mitigation Measures

a. Country Team Composition (Number of Agencies, Capabilities, and Experience) and Organization for PR

Overall accountability of personnel is the first step in assessing risk. Time-sensitive reporting and/or accounting requirements should be based on the operational environment and the threat conditions. Volatile operational environments and increased threat conditions equate to higher risks, which require shorter reporting periodicities. For example, in a relatively stable and secure environment, a weekly accounting/personnel and threat update may be sufficient. However, if the threat picture changes rapidly overtime, a more frequent accounting of personnel may be required.

Organizing for personnel recovery missions will most likely build off the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) as a function of the Emergency Action Planning process, but it will vary based on the individual knowledge, skill, and experience of country team members and the nature of the threat and the operational environment.

Operational procedures for responding to personnel recovery incidents must be in place and well exercised before the incident in order to have the maximum chance of succeeding.

In cases where the Embassy is reliant on host nation support, the host nation should have an awareness of the concept of personnel recovery and its associated requirements for rapid response, and play a significant role in the organizational design.

b. Identifying Individuals Potentially “At High Risk” (from Departments and Agencies)

Not all personnel are subject to the same level of risk, even though they may be in the same environment. Risk must also take into consideration such things as target value, vulnerabilities, awareness, training, and experience. Low value or soft targets (including dependants) cannot be dismissed, for those might actually be prime targets for an asymmetric attack.

c. Accuracy, Availability, and Accessibility of High-Risk Personnel Data

Once those personnel determined to be at High-Risk are identified, they should be carefully tracked and monitored. ISOPREP-type data should be maintained in a shared, but restricted database, available to anyone in the crisis response system.

d. U.S. Military Support and Assistance Available

U.S. military presence on the country team could vary from none or a one-man cell, usually referred to as the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), to the rather robust Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) that we have in Korea and the Philippines. The scope of responsibilities and functions varies widely as well. The ODC serves within limited capabilities to facilitate cooperation and coordination between the U.S. and host nation on defense matters, whereas a JUSMAG is manned by a contingent of joint Service personnel to coordinate and manage a variety of substantial military assistance programs to the host nation.

The Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group in the Republic of the Philippines (JUSMAGPHIL), for example, functions as the U.S. Security Assistance Organization (SAO) in the Philippines. The Chief of JUSMAGPHIL is also the Commander U.S. Pacific Command Representative (CDRPACOMREP). In addition to the military chain of command, JUSMAGPHIL/CDRPACOMREP is also responsible to the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines. JUSMAGPHIL has responsibility for administering security assistance missions in addition to non-security assistance missions. These include Joint Combined Bilateral Exercise Programs, the second largest International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in the world, as well as coordination of joint U.S. and Republic of the Philippines military-to-military engagement programs.

U.S. military support will vary widely depending on the size of U.S. military security assistance office and the type of military assistance programs in place.

e. In-place Risk Management Procedures

The *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms* defines “risk management” as follows: The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits.

5. Country Clearance Procedures

The CoM plays an important role in risk mitigation planning of all United States Government personnel in that all USG personnel other than those in country under the command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization must obtain country clearance before entering country and/or visiting international organizations on official business. The CoM can refuse country clearance or can place entry requirements, conditions, or restrictions on visiting personnel as he/she determines necessary.

a. Pre-deployment Training

Pre-deployment training is usually provided by a variety of organizations in an equally wide variety of forms. Standardization of training is seldom the rule, and all incoming personnel should be queried as to the focus, nature, and extent of their training.

b. In-country Training

In-country training is an option that some USG departments and agencies resort to in lieu of pre-deployment training. Non-governmental agencies sometimes factor in a period of on-the-job training under closer supervision before allowing personnel to assume their full duties in the organization. Here again, the focus, nature, and extent of the training should be examined.

c. Threat Briefings, Orientations and the Regional Security Officer (RSO)

The RSO is responsible for all security and protective intelligence operations within the mission. The RSO normally provides a threat briefing and orientation to employees upon arrival in country.

The RSO also effects liaisons with the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) and in that capacity both provides and collects information on the security situation and preparations of non-governmental organizations in country.

d. Travel Authorizations and Restrictions

The RSO is also responsible for the safety and security of all official American facilities, employees, and their families from the various U.S. Federal Agencies residing in country. RSO responsibilities range from developing contingency plans to supervising guards to improving physical security at the embassy/mission, the CoM's residence, and the mission-leased residences within country. The RSOs scope of work includes criminal investigations, extraditions, counter-terrorism activities, internal affairs investigations, background investigations, police training, and other related security and law enforcement matters.

The RSO plays a key role in risk management in that he not only is responsible for assessing the risk, but also is responsible for recommending threat warnings and implementing travel authorizations/restrictions and other security measures to the CoM.

6. Force Protection Policies and Plans

In the event there is a sizable military assistance group in country, some of the duties of the RSO could be conducted by the ODC or MILGROUP security officer. Military forces in country, under the command of the Combatant Commander and designated in the Force Protection MOU (mentioned above) will have their own force protection policies and procedures.

USG departments and agencies might be given certain special authorities or restrictions, but they should all adhere to a coordinated and overarching Embassy security policy.

7. Host Nation Security Measures and Services

Under the Vienna conventions establishing diplomatic practice, the host nation has the primary responsibility for providing for the safety and protection of USG personnel and facilities, as well as American citizens in country. In the early stages of a deteriorating security situation, the CoM might undertake an evacuation with the assistance of the host nation. Only when security conditions deteriorate beyond what the host nation is capable of handling, does international law permit the Ambassador to undertake the conduct of a NEO.

Host nation intelligence services and Command and Control capabilities are key and essential elements that need to be in place to be able to respond to a recovery incident.

The host nation might have a Counterterrorism force or Hostage Rescue force that it plans to use in the event of a personnel recovery incident. Depending on its capabilities, it could be an asset or a liability. Capabilities need to be assessed and monitored.

8. Warden System

The Warden System is a network of American volunteers who assist the embassy or mission in rapidly disseminating official U.S. Government information to American citizens. Most Warden Systems are organized geographically with Wardens assigned to a number of geographic areas or zones. The Warden undertakes to provide official information from the embassy/mission to the registered American citizens in his/her zone when the system is activated. Where zones are either physically large or contain many American citizens, the embassy may enlist the aid of other Americans living in the zone to serve as Sub-Wardens. The system, ideally, is a contact “tree” in which Wardens and Sub-Wardens each undertake to contact 10 to 15 American families. The Warden System is used to convey information in an emergency or crisis, including natural disasters and terrorist threats. Information disseminated through this system reaches only those families who have registered with the embassy or mission.

Warden Systems vary widely in their effectiveness from country to country and need to be examined and evaluated for usefulness and effectiveness.

9. Emergency Action Planning (EAP)

The EAP is developed by each Foreign Service post to serve as a reference in dealing with any situation or occurrence of a serious nature, developing suddenly and unexpectedly, typically posing a threat to U.S. lives, property or interests and demanding immediate action. The plan should outline useful organization structures for emergency management (including names and contact information), discuss response mechanisms within the Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies, highlight the kinds of information the post will need to plan for specific emergencies, contain checklists to ensure rapid, clear and complete responses and identify post emergency responsibilities.

The plan normally includes procedures for the conduct of evacuation and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and Hostage Rescue operations.

The DoS Emergency Action Planning Handbook is a useful guide in the development of these plans. Personnel recovery, per se, is not addressed, but should be.

10. Accountability/Reporting Procedures

Accountability and reporting procedures will vary among departments and agencies. Accurate and timely accounting and reporting are critical in responding to a personnel recovery incident and in determining the legal status of the individuals involved. While legal status might directly inhibit short-term recovery efforts, a legal status determination ultimately determines the manner and extent of Government benefits and services provided to the individuals and their families. A centralized database is required to be responsive to personnel recovery decision-making at chief of mission, combatant command, and national PR tiers.

USG policies and procedures concerning deployment, employment, accountability, force protection, and personnel recovery services afforded to contractors is not clear; in-country procedures need to be established and understood in order to have an effective personnel recovery system.

11. Exercises and Drills

Given the high day-to-day “business” and operational tempo of U.S. Embassies, there is usually little opportunity, focus, or emphasis on the conduct of exercises, in general, let alone on PR. Yet, the quickest and most efficient way to assess existing personnel recovery procedures and capabilities is to conduct an exercise.

Exercises can take a variety of forms, from end-to-end field exercises (which can be quite costly, involve a significant number of players/forces, and test the entire gamut of operations) to tabletop exercises (which are relatively inexpensive, involve only a few key players, and test only essential aspects of a plan) to real- and compressed-time constructive simulation-driven exercises that could be executed in phases, over time (crawl-walk-run), and permitting analysis of the outcomes of decisions based on the variables developed for the specific scenario. Exercises should be tailored to fit political and budget constraints, operational tempo, and current state of evolutionary capabilities under development.

Once exercises have achieved their purpose of demonstrating and maturing desired skills and capabilities, drills provide a low-cost and effective means of testing selective skills, procedures, and capabilities. Drills are also an effectual means of keeping a sharp edge on desired capabilities.

C. IMPROVE PR CAPABILITIES IN COUNTRY

Once the baseline policy and the operational environment assessments indicated above are completed, planning can proceed with a focus on building and/or improving the existing personnel recovery architecture. Three critical components of the architecture deserve first order attention:

1. Improve policy, guidance, and Direction

The lack of national-level policy with regard to PR places a premium, as well as a heavy burden, on the CoM in establishment of clearly defined and articulated mission policies and procedures. Conducting a rigorous assessment of baseline policies, as indicated in Paragraph A above, followed by an assessment of the operational environment, as indicated in Paragraph B above, will point to personnel recovery shortfalls and gaps that require suitable and appropriate remedial action.

2. Improve the capability of Force elements

PR force elements are described in Joint Military Doctrine in terms of three elements: 1) The Isolated Person, 2) Commanders and Staff, and 3) Recovery Force.

While the concept is still valid in a CoM context, the key role of the host nation deserves equal consideration. Therefore, a fourth major element with sub-components as listed below should be added. This list is, by no means, comprehensive but is intended to serve as an initial checklist of personnel recovery force elements that need to be explored for both requirements and capabilities. These force elements are, in varying degrees, interrelated and interdependent and they will vary from country to country. In order to have a credible overall personnel recovery capability, each force element capability needs to be evaluated, improved, and integrated to balance and complement each other.

a. Potential Isolated Personnel

- DoS
- DoD
- Other USG Departments and Agencies
- International and Government Organizations
- Non-governmental Agencies
- Contractors

- b. Leaders/Commanders and Staff (Host Nation)**
 - PR awareness and leader development
 - Armed forces, police, coast guard, other departments and agencies
 - Rescue Coordination Center (Civil SAR), Combined rescue coordination cell
 - Command and control
 - Intelligence and reporting services
 - Mobility
 - Counter-terrorism units

- c. Leaders/Commanders and Staff (Chief of Mission/Country Team/DoD)**
 - PR awareness and leader development
 - High risk personnel data and communications
 - Host nation linkages (with both U.S. and neighbor countries)
 - Combined Rescue Coordination Cell
 - Common operating picture with host nation
 - C2 and intelligence fusion
 - Augmentation required and planned
 - Federal Emergency Support Team
 - JPRA
 - FBI Hostage Negotiation Teams
 - DoS/CT

- d. Potential Recovery Forces**
 - Host nation all Government departments, agencies, and Services
 - All USG departments and agencies
 - Country team UAR/NAR capabilities
 - DoD
 - Non-governmental agencies
 - Contract PR services

3. Improve Mission Execution (joint, interagency and host nation)

Adopting and embracing a three-pronged strategy (proposed in the NPRA study) can significantly improve mission execution on an institutional basis. Most importantly, personnel recovery needs to be included in the CoM's MPP, with corresponding measures of performance. Secondly, progress on the development and maturity of personnel recovery capabilities (including capabilities to report, locate, support the person(s) and their family, recover, and return of the isolated person(s) to their family or duty) needs to be evaluated and monitored on a continual basis by both the CoM and DoS. Finally, personnel recovery capabilities (a combination of joint, interagency, and host nation capabilities) need to be routinely exercised.

APPENDIX F

PERSONNEL RECOVERY ISSUES FOR USG CONTRACTORS

APPENDIX F

PERSONNEL RECOVERY ISSUES FOR USG CONTRACTORS

A. SUMMARY

This appendix examines U.S. Government (USG) contractor Personnel Recovery (PR) vulnerabilities while operating in high-threat, overseas environments; examines approaches to mitigating and managing risk of contractor capture, injury, and isolation; and recommends regulatory and systemic options to enhance survivability and increase the likelihood of successful contractor recovery, should PR operations be required.

1. The Central Issue

The USG lacks a comprehensive policy to ensure that contractors are adequately protected when supporting the USG overseas, or that the risks to them are adequately managed in high-threat, overseas locations. This condition detracts from contractor PR planning, preparation, and execution, and decreases the likelihood of successful recovery, if they are captured. In the final analysis, USG human capital is at risk and ways must be developed to manage the risks.

The June 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO) report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, cited a general lack of continuity in how contractors are integrated into the plans of the supported units or agencies, and how those conditions affect the ability of commanders to provide adequate force protection.¹

2. Contractors in the Area of Responsibility (AOR)

USG contractors are a long-standing historical fixture in support of U.S. military and other governmental operations. World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm have witnessed an increasing dependence on contractors for mission accomplishment. In large measure, however, their contributions to mission success came from exercising technical capabilities in the relatively secure zone in rear areas of the linear battlefield.

¹ GAO, 03-695, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DoD Plans, June 2003.

The present conflicts, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) are very complex, asymmetrical operations and might become models for the future. The asymmetry of threats within any given AOR makes truly secure areas the exception rather than the rule. Contractors providing services and service support must pass daily through varying, sometimes invisible, security states in order to perform their contract tasks. Service and local command policies often conflict as the contractors move along this spectrum of risk.

Contractors will continue to provide critical levels of support as the DoD and the interagency transform into a more tightly integrated and strategic whole. Operating on the leading edges of national security policy and in venues where terrorists choose the place and time of their activities, supported commanders will need to task, organize, and integrate contractors in the context of operational art, and not, as has been too often the case, as an add-on requirement to be deconflicted with current operations instead of integrated with them. Contractors will be a significant element in the supported command's capabilities mix, providing service and other types of support to free up organizations and personnel to exercise their core capabilities in operations designed to aggressively pursue the enemy.

Increasingly, contractors are being exposed to more hostile action previously restricted to combat arms elements of the military. They will more frequently be subject to the same asymmetrical threats as our military forces. Approximately 10 to 12 percent of the roughly 200,000 coalition personnel in Iraq are comprised of contractors. This figure will most surely blossom as upwards of \$20 billion in U.S. funded reconstruction contracts to service U.S. joint-coalition-interagency requirements flows into the region beginning in 2004. If not provided with a deliberate standard for achieving viable levels of risk assessment, risk mitigation, and risk management, this population of potential PR *eligibles*, will offer up a *smorgasbord* of high value human assets for capture, detention, and isolation with the potential for exploitation and leveraging U.S. policy on the world stage.

USG contractors are potentially high-value targets, exploitable on several levels, and highly vulnerable to capture, detention, and isolation. These concentrated numbers of PR *eligibles*, unless otherwise integrated into a risk-management architecture based on threat estimates and deliberate planning, present the potential to overwhelm existing personnel recovery assets, should hostile forces capture or detain them in significant numbers.

B. GAPS AND SHORTFALLS IN CONTRACTOR COVERAGE

The GAO report cited a lack of standardized contract language that might enhance the posture of the commander providing force protection for contractors, and provide him with information to develop complementary plans.² As a result, some commands provided for integrating contractors into their force protection profiles, whereas others left it to the contractor to develop and execute protection plans in an *ad hoc* manner.

IDA conferred with a large contracting corporation³ on these matters and gained anecdotal corroboration of this GAO finding. In some instances, contract language for OIF was directly lifted from existing USG contracts in Kosovo (essentially a permissive environment) and that language proved inadequate to produce the level of risk assessment, planning, and risk management required.

As of now (March 2004), 30 USG contractors, employees of the U.S. corporation interviewed and embedded down to infantry company and platoon levels, have been killed in the *line of duty*. The few corporate officers, all of whom had extensive service as career military personnel and as USG contractors overseas, cited: accountability, integration, interoperability, and equipping as the key problem areas resulting from inadequate solicitation and vague contract language. For example, contract language did not require the supported command to make periodic threat assessments and warnings available to contract managers, which left contract managers without essential elements of information (EEI) with which to assess, mitigate, and manage risks while accomplishing their contract “deliverables.”

These shortfalls disproportionately increased the likelihood that contractors might be captured, detained, or isolated from U.S. control. Additionally, as potential PR candidates, contractors had not been prepared prior to deployment to assist or facilitate recovery forces on their own behalf during recovery operations and reintegration.

C. EXAMINING SOLUTIONS FOR CONTRACTOR ISSUES

The GAO report highlighted the Army’s efforts, singular among the Services, to comprehensively treat the issue of contractors in high-risk environments, citing *Army Field Manual 3-100.21, Contractors on the Battlefield*.⁴ Examination of this manual

² Ibid, p. 28

³ Corporation X, which requested anonymity, has employed over 3,000 contractors in OIF.

⁴ GAO Report, p. 25.

revealed a comprehensive, doctrinal approach to the employment, management and protection of contractors in high-risk environments. The manual represents, in addition to being an authoritative source document, a set of *best practices* that are potentially adaptable to the interagency arena and supportive of any eventual NPRA. Army and Joint policy documents addressing the issues were slated for publication,⁵ but limited to addressing contingency operations instead of the broader context of day-to-day contract support to country team efforts, found, for example, in Central America and the Far East.

An initial draft of a joint publication under the auspices of the Joint Staff J4, Joint Pub 4-xxx series, to expand on the Army's FM 3-100.21 to become joint doctrine is planned for FY05. It will begin to provide for some standardization of contractor employment in support of operational objectives, and will drive further doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities considerations to institutionalize these emerging concepts across DoD.

1. Accountability, Survivability, Recoverability and PR Enablers

The IDA team determined that any PR contractor solution set would have to address shortfalls in the following general contractor areas: accountability, survivability, and recoverability. Additionally, these issues have implications for USG contractors in the interagency arena and a National Personnel Recovery Architecture (NPRA). The team further determined that the contracting process was a key channel through which shortfalls could be addressed and deliberate planning discipline could be reinforced, based on solid referential ties to joint and Service doctrinal principles. In essence, we wanted to increase the level of operational influence over the solicitation and contract execution process for contractors in high-threat operational environments.

2. Contract Language

The IDA study team met with the General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Acquisition Policy, to discuss options to resolve the more immediate GAO-cited language issue. The GSA administrator immediately understood the operational implications of enhanced contractor language and its potential to affect joint contractor-command threat assessments and deliberate planning. He offered assistance in generating interim and final Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Rules that will apply to most of

⁵ As of March 2004, DoDD/DoDI, subject: Management of Contractor Personnel During Contingency Operations (Draft) were sent to the combatant commands, the Services, and the Joint Staff for comment and subsequent issuance.

the USG to drive contract language crafted to enhance contractor integration with supported Command force protection plans, and to better prepare contractors for successful PR should PR operations be mounted. A straightforward process of developing and validating language requirements submitted to GSA would be developed into the appropriate enabling language and a Rules change would be generated for comment, adoption, and implementation in the FAR. When urgently needed, an Interim rule change may be developed and implanted, pending the more lengthy and deliberate rule change process.

Contract language changes via GSA and the FAR can potentially correct much of the procedural shortfall in accountability, in deliberate risk management planning for survivability, and in pre-deployment preparation for PR operations at both collective and individual levels.

3. Federal Travel Regulations

Also under the GSA, Federal Travel Regulations (FTR) can be developed to complement FAR rules changes and serve as a means for gathering contractor data within the interagency when no other authoritative process will accomplish that task. This data collection FTR requirement can be invoked for both deployment and redeployment to and from high-risk areas. Additionally, the FTR can be used to route selected contractor categories through specified training and orientation to provide them with the latest combatant command-specific force protection and PR information and training.

FAR language and FTR requirements may be used in complementary ways to tailor a specific solicitation to the desired level of individual contractor risk management and PR readiness.

4. Develop Contractor Database

We have yet to know the full extent of contractor activity across the interagency in high-risk overseas locations around the world on any given day. That data is currently fragmented among the relevant agencies in a variety of formats and media. A central PR contractor database, accessible by each agency within an NPRA, would serve to provide national planners and decision makers with a means for informed decision making on a wide variety of PR programmatic functions as well as provide the immediacy required in a current operations scenario.

GSA agreed in principle to host a PR contractor database.

Also discussed were ways to collect, maintain, and manage contractor data to solve the persistent accountability issues cited both in the GAO report and in the corporate interview.⁶ GSA recognized the accountability issue as key to determining legal status and PR eligibility; beyond that, the data could be used to support many day-to-day functions of a NPRA.

5. Pre-deployment Contractor Preparation

The U.S. Army CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) currently operates at Fort Benning, in Georgia, and Fort Bliss in Texas and provides pre-deployment administrative processing and combatant-command-directed training to individual military replacements (all Services except the USMC), DoD civilian employees, selected non-DoD agencies, and some USG contractors bound for Iraq, Afghanistan, Cuba, and Kuwait. The CRC is a critical focal point for deployment preparation and, with some maturing, could serve as an excellent primer for force protection and PR collective and individual training. Further, with its pending move to much larger quarters and appropriate resourcing, the Fort Benning CRC could serve as a joint and interagency CRC to potentially enhance the accountability, survivability, and recoverability of a major segment of overseas personnel, including USG contractors.

D. IMPROVING CONTRACTOR PR PROCESS

The following describes the developed processes and applied rules to improve the USG Contractor PR process. Although DoD is prominent in this proposed process, it applies across the interagency.

The typical USG contract process applies to the organizational level, solicitation/request for proposal phase, actual proposal phase, pre-deployment phase, and deployment and performance phases as shown in Figure F-1 below.

1. Personnel Recovery Contract Environment

Figure F-1 shows the typical USG contract environment. The time dimension is represented by the general phases of the high-risk contract life cycle; and the organizational dimension is represented by the three general organizational levels involved in that life cycle.

⁶ GAO Report, p. 33




Figure F-1. Improving Contractor Personnel Recovery Readiness

2. The Organizational Level

The organizational (actor) levels in this process are depicted generally as a National/Interagency, where the Directing and Guiding functions are performed. Other functions conducted at this level include planning, training, educating, exercise development, exercise and operational evaluation, and operational response and remediation. Supporting all these functions to varying degrees is the PR database, which is maintained by the GSA in both collateral and compartmented schemas to support both the latter functions and national decision making. The GSA, DoD, and NASA comprise the FAR Council, which is charged with reviewing and promulgating rules and contract language. The FAR, and by extension the FAR Council, drives the contracting process across the interagency. Changes to the FAR, including those capable of improving USG contractor accountability, survivability, and recoverability in high-threat locations overseas are nominated, coordinated, and approved for either interim or final implementation.

On the next organizational level are the Supported Units or Agencies, and the Supporting Contractor Community. The actors within this stratum are collectively the

customer and the contractor and the remaining actors are DoD policymakers and doctrine developers who describe the parameters for employing contractors to support overall mission requirements. These actors include the commands where contract requirements are developed and where technical solutions are formulated in response to those requirements.

On the timeline, and for simplicity's sake, we have divided the contract life cycle into five phases:

- Solicitation/Request for Proposal (RFP)
- Proposal
- Pre-Deployment
- Deployment and Performance
- Redeployment.

The study proposes a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD), which if adopted, provides the authoritative basis and charter for the NPRA, and focuses the actors on the process.

3. Solicitation/Request for Proposal Phase

During the Solicitation/Request for Proposal (RFP) phase of the contract life cycle (Figure F-2), the FAR council has issued contract solicitation rules and language to achieve a comprehensive solicitation and RFP adequate to convey a clear picture of the friendly and enemy situations; the environment within which contract tasks will be accomplished. The Threat Estimate will most often be provided in an unclassified form. Concern was expressed by GSA as to the advisability of providing classified friendly and threat information, effectively eliminating from competition small firms lacking the in-house capability to conduct such an analysis or without the appropriate security arrangements to work with classified information of this nature. In developing the solicitation, these considerations will have to be deliberately weighed against the possibility of awarding a contract to a vendor unfamiliar with, and therefore highly vulnerable to, lethal threats in executing the contract tasks. The potential for masking the threat reality by reflexively using unclassified data as part of the proposal development process, and operating under a disproportionately noble desire to promote competition, might skew any risk management efforts that are developed only to find them inadequate on the ground.




Figure F-2. Improving Contractor PR Readiness – Overseas, High-Threat Environment

In some special circumstances, when a limited solicitation is envisioned, the friendly and enemy situations may be presented in classified form.

The solicitation directs potential contractors to factor these Government-provided estimates into their technical proposals, and to develop cost estimates accordingly.

Further, the Federal Travel Regulations (FTR) may provide solicitation guidance on the movement of personnel and material. When appropriate, they may direct en route attendance at appropriate training venues, and submission of travel related reports.

DoD Directives and Instructions, when finalized and coordinated with national policy, will provide guidance to the Services in context with the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR), a military subset of the FAR. These Directives and Instructions will set in motion a series of doctrine, organization, training, material, personnel, and facilities (DOTML-PF) enabling activities to institutionalize the approach to contractor accountability, survivability, and recoverability.

4. Proposal Phase

Based on the provided friendly and threat information, the contractor will develop a technical approach to accomplishing risk assessment, risk mitigation, and risk management activities while accomplishing contract deliverables (Figure F-3). In a transformed strategic environment, the traditional adversarial relationship between supported and supporting players in the contracting arena must give way to mutual pursuit of mission accomplishment. This is no simple task, and one that likely requires an iterative collaborative process between the USG and the potential contractor. Pending development of joint publications addressing contractors in high-risk environments, The existing FM 3-100.21, *Contractors on the Battlefield*, can provide a solid basis in doctrine to which all parties may refer in this iterative and disciplined process.

Over time, the concepts of employment matured in this disciplined doctrinal framework should be leveraged into a set of *best practices* that are adaptable and applicable to the broader interagency arena within a national PR framework.

The desired outcome of this phase is a thorough understanding of the tasks to be contracted, and a best-value, cost-effective, technical concept for performing within the anticipated threat environment. This phase is completed upon selection of the contractor and award of the contract.

5. Pre-Deployment Phase

Upon contract award, classified threat assessment and friendly force updates are provided by the Government along with a contract tasking for delivery of an integrated risk management plan to execute in the operational area (see Figure F-4). The risk management plan should address required pre-deployment personnel preparation, orientations, training, and special equipment beyond the standard issue TA-50-901 equipment provided at CRC. The risk management plan should include the methodology for coordinating with force protection and PR assets at the overseas location, and an assessment of the anticipated interoperability levels with any known shortfalls for subsequent remedy. This plan, along with costs, must be validated with the supported command or agency at the overseas location.

Of particular importance during this phase is the en route preparation and training conducted at the CRC. This is the first opportunity to get the contractor's head in the current joint operational and tactical situation. The CRC's already-comprehensive administrative processes may be enhanced to consolidate both contract-related data on individuals and physical data for identification in preparation of eventual recovery

operations. These current PR-specific data are then transmitted to the PR contractor database maintained by GSA.




Figure F-3. Improving Contractor Personnel Recovery Readiness – Overseas, High-Threat Environment

A key aspect of a mature CRC is its ability to adjust the curriculum to validated combatant command or country team requirements.⁷ Since CRC is the systemic *gateway* for contractors deploying and redeploying from high-threat overseas areas, it presents the potential to function as a center for gathering data for further development into contractor lessons learned, and for requirements articulation to be used as the basis for curriculum development as well as a key input into the joint-interagency DOTML-PF process.

Force protection is an enabler of personnel recovery. CRC has the potential to become the primer for theater specific force protection and personnel recovery readiness of contractors en route from CONUS to high-threat overseas venues. It also has the potential, with interagency commitment, to mature into a key risk mitigation asset as the global war on terrorism turns more and more lethal for USG contractors across the joint

⁷ See IDA trip report to CRC on 2-3 March 2004 (dated 16 March 2004).

interagency community. This phase is completed with deployment from CRC into the AOR for contract performance.

6. Deployment and Performance Phase

With a validated/vetted risk management plan in place, both the supported command/agency and the contract manager continuously monitor the threat, evaluate the risk and develop options to establish priorities for work based on threat assessments and the mission essential tasks of the commander (see Figure F-5). Scheduled in-progress reviews (IPR) evaluate risk management activities versus mission accomplishment and remedy shortfalls when possible.

In highly complex environments, such as the current contracting surge in Iraq, the command may establish a joint or component contract operations cell to provide the commander with staff visibility and with operational over watch of contractor activities to ensure integration of the force protection and PR concepts.




Figure F-4. Pre-Deployment




Figure F-5. Deployment and Performance

When contract venues cross operational or diplomatic boundaries, Federal Travel rules may dictate that notification be sent to both the losing and gaining commands/agencies via the PR contractor database, or by arrangements established during development of the validated risk management plan. In the event of a PR incident involving a contractor, procedures established for reporting/activation of information gathering assets are set in motion, the joint recovery center is notified, and a liaison is established. Both the Command and the supporting contract manager closely coordinate to provide the needed information in decision making, and to affect safe recovery in the most rapid manner. At the national level, legal status is determined and official identification data is made available to all concerned agencies, with estimates and courses of action developed in accordance with established crisis planning guidelines. Operational units are alerted and prepped for movement and employment in personnel recovery operations. When appropriate, a family liaison is established, and public affairs plans are activated. On successful recovery of the contractor, reintegration assets are set in motion in accordance with repatriation and reintegration plans. The recovered person is interviewed for lessons learned and current intelligence production.

7. Redeployment Phase

At the conclusion of the contract, redeployment back to CONUS is accomplished via the CRC gateway, where the contractor reverses the deployment process, turns in equipment, and finalizes administrative matters as shown in Figure F-6. This is an ideal opportunity, without creating an inordinate additional time burden, to gather critical information from the returning contractor about the force protection and PR readiness conditions experienced in the AO.




Figure F-6. Redeploy & Debrief

The following are examples of general information of importance to the development of lessons learned in the CRC program:

- How well did the CRC prepare you for the conditions you found in-country?
- What two things would you like to see added to the CRC course?
- How confident were you that rescue forces could find and recover you if you were separated from friendly control?

- In the event of capture or detention, would you have been confident in knowing what actions to take?

The answers to these questions may provide data applicable across the DOTML-PF arena.

This also presents an opportunity to *close out* the contractor's active position in the national PR contactor database.

E. SUMMARY

Contractors are essential to successful mission accomplishment both in joint and interagency activities.

Given the asymmetrical nature of today's threat, USG contractors are potentially high-value, soft targets for capture, detention or isolation. Contractors are combat support and service support assets that must be integrated in the commanders' operational plans. Included in this approach is the obligation to protect assigned contractors in a high-threat environment, and to be prepared to affect their recovery if required. This can come about only through collaborative, integrated planning, and the exercise of those plans.

Within the interagency, contractors will continue to play vital roles. Well established and emergent *best practices* can be adopted from the DoD planning models by the interagency, practices that can enhance contractor protection profiles, and increase the likelihood of safe recovery should PR operations be required.

Many varied agencies of the USG will have to come together in ways never attempted if a National PR capability is to become a reality, and become a factor in the global war on terrorism. A sense of operational integration must become part of the U.S. Government contracting culture.

APPENDIX G

DRAFT NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE

APPENDIX G
DRAFT NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE

NOTE: Distribution of the draft NSPD (13 February 2004) is limited and will be made under separate cover.

APPENDIX H

SUGGESTIONS FOR PR EXERCISE IMPROVEMENTS

APPENDIX H

SUGGESTIONS FOR PR EXERCISE IMPROVEMENTS

JOINT EXERCISE DESERT RESCUE (DR) IMPROVEMENTS

- Make DR an official exercise
 - Component of Joint National Training Capability (JNTC)
 - JCS sponsorship
 - JFCOM oversight
- Provide assured funding
 - JCS funding for
 - Permanent-party white force
 - Dedicated recovery forces (e.g., USAF rescue squadrons)
 - Recovery-capable assets (e.g., Navy HH-60G)
 - Direct support assets (e.g., tankers, SEAD)
 - Opposing Forces
 - Air Threat (IADS)
 - Surface Threat (Aggressors)
 - Electronic/Information Warfare
 - Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence
 - Airlift/Sealift
- Make exercise mandatory for rescue units
 - Scheduled rotation (once every 1-3 years)
 - Pre-deployment requirement
- Establish linkage between exercise and capabilities requirements
 - Develop joint mission essential task list (JMETL)
 - List should address all capabilities under full-spectrum PR
 - Complex Contingency Environment

- Multi-Agency
- Multi-National
- Contractors
- Gray Players (PVOs, NGOs, Trans-National Corps)
- Develop exercise scenarios based on JMETL
 - CSAR/JCSAR
 - NAR/UAR
 - NEO/Evacuation
 - MEDEVAC/CASEVAC
 - SAR
 - Mass Rescue
 - Hostage Recovery
 - Negotiated Recovery
- Use exercise results to report unit readiness to go to war
- Establish mechanisms for documenting lessons learned
- Establish office at JFCOM for DR
 - Resourced, Responsible, and Accountable
 - Dedicated White Force
 - Dedicated Opposing Force
 - Blue Force Mentors
- Develop and maintain proper rescue exercise facilities
 - Rescue C2 facility
 - Capable of hosting JAOC or JFHQ
 - Survivor Operations facility
 - Academics, life support, mission planning
 - White Force Helicopter Unit
 - Opposing Force facility
 - Support for ground and air assets
 - Networking capability and bandwidth to incorporate appropriate virtual players (LD/HD C4ISR assets or C2 nodes)
 - RCC, JSRC, AWACS, Rivet Joint, JSTARS, etc.

- Improve range communications and instrumentation
 - Provide radio communications at low level throughout entire range
 - Secure voice
 - Secure broadband for datalinks
 - Separate bandwidth for Blue Force, White Force, Opposing Force
 - Provide GPS-based Time-Space-Position Instrumentation (TSPI) for all players
 - Provide TSPI relay coverage at low level throughout entire range
 - Feed TSPI data into network for virtual players
- Provide adequate training time/space
 - Contract for 24/7 range time
 - Contract for all necessary range space
 - Remove limits on ground personnel movement
 - Remove limits on helicopter landings
 - Remove limits on ground vehicle operations

JOINT EXERCISE NORTHERN EDGE (NE) IMPROVEMENTS

- Make NE a permanent exercise
 - Component of Joint National Training Capability (JNTC)
 - JCS sponsorship
 - JFCOM oversight
- Provide assured funding
 - JCS funding for:
 - Permanent-Party White Force
 - All types of forces
 - Airlift/Sealift
- Make exercise mandatory for rescue units
 - Scheduled rotation (once every 1-3 years)
- Establish linkage between exercise and capabilities requirements
 - Develop joint mission essential task list (JMETL)
 - List should address all capabilities

- Complex Contingency Environment
 - Multi-Agency
 - Multi-National
 - Contractors
 - Gray Players (PVOs, NGOs, Trans-National Corps)
- Develop exercise scenarios based on JMETL
 - Capability to support any complex contingency scenario
 - Use exercise results to report unit readiness to go to war
 - Establish mechanisms for documenting lessons learned
- Establish office at JFCOM for NE
 - Resourced, Responsible, and Accountable
 - Dedicated White Force
 - Dedicated Opposing Force Cadre
 - Blue Force Mentors
- Develop and maintain proper rescue exercise facilities
 - Rescue C2 facility
 - Capable of hosting JAOC or JFHQ
 - Survivor Operations facility
 - Academics, life support, mission planning
 - White Force Helicopter Unit
 - Opposing Force facility
 - Support for ground and air assets
 - Networking capability and bandwidth to incorporate appropriate virtual players (LD/HD C4ISR assets or C2 nodes)
 - RCC, JSRC, AWACS, Rivet Joint, JSTARS, etc.
- Improve range communications and instrumentation
 - Provide radio communications at low level throughout entire range
 - Secure voice
 - Secure broadband for datalinks
 - Separate bandwidth for Blue Force, White Force, Opposing Force

- Provide GPS-based Time-Space-Position Instrumentation (TSPI) for all players
- Provide TSPI relay coverage at low level throughout entire range
- Feed TSPI data into network for virtual players
- Provide adequate training time/space
 - Contract for 24/7 range time
 - Contract for all necessary range space
 - Remove limits on ground personnel movement
 - Remove limits on helicopter landings
 - Remove limits on ground vehicle operations

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 10 06 2004		2. REPORT TYPE Final		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) April 2002-May 2004	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Interagency National Personnel Recovery Architecture: Final Report				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER DASW01-04-C-0003	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Anil Joglekar, David Baratto, Kenneth Benway, Lt Gen Devol Brett USAF (Ret.), James Doherty, Robert B. Mohan, Sam Packer, Douglas Sizelove, Joseph Stahl				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER BB-9-2143	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Institute for Defense Analyses 4850 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER IDA Paper P-3890	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Director, Personnel Recovery Policy Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA (DPMO) Suite 800, Crystal Square 4 1745 Jeff Davis Highway Arlington, Virginia 22202				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) DPMO	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review, 19 August 2004.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
The Interagency National Personnel Recovery Architecture (NPRA) is a congressionally directed and funded study to define the baseline personnel recovery architecture, shortfalls and gaps in the architecture, identify potential solutions to improve the architecture, assess costs of improvements, and then recommend solutions in the order of priority. The study found two distinct situations for interagency personnel recovery: 1) when a combatant commander is in charge and 2) when a chief-of-mission is in charge. The report is organized according to these two distinct situations, and all personnel recovery capabilities, limitations, and solutions are categorized in comprehensive categories of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) categories. The major findings of the study are as follows: 1) A National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) is required to develop the interagency architecture, such an NSPD must be resourced. 2) About 40 U.S. embassies around the world must be improved to respond PR incidents within less than 2 hours. 3) U.S. Government contractors must be provided with the same PR coverage provided for the U.S. government employees. 4) The survival, evasion and resistance throughput capacity must be increased for both DoD and non-DoD agency and department personnel.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Combat Search and Rescue; Personnel Recovery; Code of Conduct; Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape; Search and Rescue; Joint Search and Rescue Center; Unconventional Assisted Recovery; Interagency; DPMO; JPRA; CSEL					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: Unclassified			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 298	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Col John M. Hobble, USAF
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 703-602-2202