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The Freedom to Say No:
Using America's Military in the New Era

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Class of 1993

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A new era in international relations presents the United States with a fresh opportunity to redefine and restrict the terms under which it will use military force. Unlike the Cold War period, military considerations should no longer dominate American foreign policy. An early lesson from the end of the Cold War seems to be simple logic: United States military forces were built up for the Cold War; that era is now over; therefore, the military can be scaled down. However, the conclusion is only supportable if the United States adopts a fundamental change in its national security policy¹ and raises the threshold for using the military.

The consequences of choosing to be less active with the military are dramatically different than before. A reduced reliance on the military is consistent with both domestic political realities and security concerns in the post-Cold War era. Certainly, the United States has a new freedom not to use its military unless vital interests are directly at stake; and significantly, those interests can be more narrowly defined.

During the Cold war period, the superpower struggle deteriorated to a zero sum contest in which every prospective gain for the Soviet bloc was perceived as a loss for the West. The goal of the United States became absolute containment,² rather than a discriminate policy of engagement.³ The nation was poised for military action on a global scale.⁴ The Soviet Union had a powerful military to support its expansionist ideological aspirations.⁵ The countering policy of containment gave a broad

dimension to international issues, and the United States became almost reflexively involved against the perceived threat of communist hegemony.⁶ Containment held a bipartisan consensus⁷ as much of the world grew comfortable with the easy equation of Cold War superpower politics.

Stability in the Cold War era did not mean the absence of war; it meant avoidance of direct superpower conflict. Europe remained at peace because the threat of a conventional war risked escalation to the nuclear level. Other areas, however, were susceptible to costly conventional wars, often proxy battles that did not involve direct confrontation between the superpowers.⁸

The Cold War ended suddenly, without a cataclysmic military clash. Democratic ideology triumphed over communism; an exhausted Soviet Union retreated and then collapsed.⁹ The clarity of the Cold War policy, in which the failure to engage could lead to international disaster, is now gone.¹⁰ But the lodestar of containment has not yet been replaced, and a certain disorientation has resulted.¹¹

Americans have turned their attention¹² to economic concerns and are especially interested in reducing both government spending and the national debt. As political leaders choose to allocate less money for defense, they must realize that doing so means fewer options for the use of the military as an instrument of national policy. Clearly, a smaller military cannot perform all of the taskings of a larger military. But the move to a new policy is timely. The security environment has changed to

support policies which are less dependent on the military for success. While the world remains a dangerous place, the scope of the military threat to the United States no longer covers the periphery of a hostile Soviet empire.¹³ It is now appropriate for American leaders to develop policies that do not depend on the military unless truly vital national interests are at risk.

LESS CONCENTRATION ON THE MILITARY

Decisions made at the close of this century could well define the next. The United States is turning from a perceived need to be militarily involved on a global basis to concentration on domestic matters.¹⁴ The modern age of interdependent economies, instantaneous communications, and fast transportation dictates that the United States will remain actively engaged in an ever-shrinking world. However, while the United States will retain its keen interest in international affairs, the standard for using American military forces should be substantially modified.

As the world power structure moves through an epochal transition, citizens of the United States are in an enviable position. A stable democratic government secures substantial personal freedoms. The world's biggest economy provides a high standard of living. The world's best military guarantees physical security. Today, however, the primary global competition lies in the political and economic spheres, and the

relative value of military power has diminished.¹⁵

It would be a mistake to disparage the decisive role military power can assume.¹⁶ Economic power alone can seldom provide the ultimate pressure necessary to change an adversary's actions. Diplomatic efforts may be disregarded when not backed by military power. After Saddam Hussein made his attempt to dominate the world's oil reserves by invading Kuwait in 1990, he showed a willingness to endure economic sanctions rather than relinquish his hold on Kuwait. Military force was required to remove the Iraqis.¹⁷

When vital national interests are at stake, a dominant military power can simply choose to enforce its will. The mere existence of a strong military can deter potentially hostile acts. Unless diplomatic initiatives can be accompanied by at least the threat of force,¹⁸ significant concerns may be dismissed with relative impunity.¹⁹ As Stalin said in his famous retort to an expression of displeasure by the Vatican: "The Pope! How many divisions has he got?"²⁰

The Cold War was defense centered; foreign policy focused on the military containment of communism, and military power was an essential element of influence.²¹ The Soviet Union was accepted as a superpower because of its powerful military and hegemonic ambitions. The role of military strength has now been reduced,²² and the bipolar world of superpower engagement has been replaced by a more complex power structure.²³ The measures of power have also changed,²⁴ and many more nations have a meaningful level of

influence than was the case during the Cold War. While the United States clearly has today's leading military, it is but one of several nations with a significant political, economic, and cultural presence.²⁵ Economically, the United States shares power with the Europeans and the Japanese. Politically, no nation dominates the world, although the forces of democracy appear to be expanding.

The problem of providing leadership is exacerbated when political and economic²⁶ issues dominate. During the Cold War, the United States was able to exert significant influence over allies because of their need for protection under the American military umbrella. Now, because those nations view American military strength as substantially less relevant, the vast military strength of the United States no longer provides the same leverage. Even friendly nations are willing to joust freely over economic and diplomatic concerns. In a world of complex, intertwined dependencies among nations, coercive actions on one issue can affect constructive relationships on others.²⁷

Most of the powerful military and economic nations share a basic compatibility.²⁸ The likelihood of a large-scale military confrontation among the industrialized nations is very slight.²⁹ None of the global powers--the United States, Russia, Japan, China, or the Europeans--are unsatisfied in the sense that they are bent on significant territorial expansion.³⁰ A predominant military, then, seems to be less important in the post-containment era.

IMPROVISING IN THE EARLY POST-CONTAINMENT YEARS

Of all nations, the United States has the best combination of political, economic, and military power³¹ to determine its own destiny. Since the end of the Cold War, the nation has taken an ad hoc approach to the military aspects of foreign policy. The crises in which the United States has chosen to intervene have been manageable on the tactical level.³² At issue is whether the nation should continue that unfocused approach or establish a coherent plan.

The situational, case-by-case approach taken over the past few years to military involvements in foreign affairs has succeeded, in part, because of the excess of military capabilities the nation possessed at the end of the Cold War. Forces that had been built up for a major war against a powerful enemy could easily be used for less rigorous missions. But as defense budgets diminish, the surplus capacity is also reduced.³³ As lower spending trends continue, a new equilibrium will be reached. Leaders may not be able to turn to a smaller force to perform all of the tasks that could be demanded of a larger force.³⁴ Thus, even absent a carefully developed new strategy, America's military options are being restricted.

National strategy depends on making choices, which requires matching ends with means.³⁵ Interests must be prioritized³⁶ and priorities must be enforced. The United States cannot commit military force to every situation in which the military may help

to reach a policy goal.³⁷ A new, more pragmatic approach to national security strategy should be adopted.³⁸ As one author has admonished: "Ends, or goals, are not all that matter, because the cost of reaching them can be so high that they are not worth securing."³⁹

Injustices do occur in the world--but unless the United States is truly to become the world's policeman, this country cannot respond with military force to every undesired act.⁴⁰ Even if the United States intervenes and things do improve, most changes will last only as long as this nation is willing to actively enforce them. Most often, the real problems will not be solved. Once the United States leaves, the underlying discontent will resurface.⁴¹

The capacity of American military power to influence an outcome must not be permitted to overdrive American policy.⁴² The post-containment period provides the opportunity to act from a new framework. The former policy of countering every Soviet-inspired venture can no longer provide the justification for an American military response. Also, public support will be lacking if American forces are sent to an area when it is perceived that others have a higher stake in the problem but are unwilling to act, perhaps in part because of their belief that American forces will save the day.⁴³

Ad hoc approaches must not cause capabilities to disproportionately influence policy. The United States should use its military only after clear decisions establish political

goals for the military to accomplish.⁴⁴ Political objectives will provide the framework for military strategy; the military simply offers a means to policy ends.⁴⁵ Unless the military instrument can help attain a specific objective, leaders should not resort to military force.

WHICH INTERESTS SHOULD THE MILITARY PROTECT?

In 1848, a British legislator made an observation that has become an axiom of foreign policy : "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow."⁴⁶ It is now appropriate for the United States to reconsider its fundamental interests and to reorient its strategy accordingly. After the Second World War, the United States accepted a broad definition of national interests which could trigger a military response. Today, the terms for engagement can be dramatically restricted. This nation has the freedom not to be engaged militarily under far more circumstances than during the Cold War period. Choosing not to commit American military force must now be recognized as a legitimate option: Disaster will not ensue, communism will not bury us, all of the dominoes will not fall.

It has been suggested that the "real question facing Americans in the 1990s is not whether or not our country should remain engaged in the world, but on what terms and for what purposes?"⁴⁷ An active political and economic involvement in

world affairs is favored even by military isolationists, who would reserve American military forces for the direct defense of the nation. Many internationalists, on the other hand, would commit the United States to take on various crusades as part of a more active worldwide engagement, with a lower threshold for military involvement. It is critical to decide which American interests in the world will be protected by armed force.

The fundamental national interest is to preserve and protect American freedom and prosperity. That core interest must be secured at any cost.⁴⁸ However, when less than vital interests are at stake, leaders must recognize that the United States is not committed to "pay any price"⁴⁹ in hopes of achieving favorable results. The United States has a substantial interest in promoting free trade and encouraging free markets throughout the world, for example. However, those objectives should almost always be sought without direct reliance on the military. It has been asserted that Americans "have generally preferred that their values, practices, and institutions be promoted and protected throughout the world by the force of the American example, as in the nineteenth century, rather than by use of American armed forces, as has been the pattern of the second half of the twentieth century."⁵⁰ When less than vital national interests are at stake, a cost-benefit analysis can help determine the level to which their pursuit is worthwhile.

While not every controversy can be quickly resolved to this nation's satisfaction, many problems can be maneuvered to more

desirable outcomes. It has been suggested that "the process of conflict resolution is often more important than the result."⁵¹ Not even a nation at the height of power should try to solve every global dispute. But the United States need not simply disengage in frustration from the tough issues. Less emphasis should be placed on trying to "solve" disagreements that often have proven intractable for years, sometimes centuries. The effort should be placed on carefully choosing the issues most important to this nation and then managing the problems as effectively as possible under the circumstances. The strategy calls for flexibility, which precludes open-ended commitments except for those issues that directly affect this nation's vital interests.⁵² In this regard, it should be recognized that most localized conflicts are simply not relevant to the security interests of the United States,⁵³ especially in the absence of a powerful rival to exploit them.

Foreign policy should not be dogmatic. Before American military forces are sent into a situation, leaders must decide both goals and a termination strategy. Engagements must be reassessed frequently and compromises must often be made. Only those situations which continue to justify the commitment of military forces should be pursued with the military instrument.

The United States must live in a world of disorder. Intrastate and regional conflicts may well multiply in the coming years. The forces of disintegration are reemerging in the muck of the Cold War thaw.⁵⁴ Some of the buffers⁵⁵ that had

artificially restrained ethnic, religious, territorial, and political conflicts are now gone. People with historic grievances against others are now actively fighting.⁵⁶ Serious consequences can follow even when major powers are not directly involved in the fighting.⁵⁷

A stable world order is important to the United States. Stability, however, should not connote the absence of change; it must provide for an orderly evolution of changes. The United States is not committed to static national boundaries, for example, but is opposed to the use of military force to cause changes in those boundaries.⁵⁸ While the United States should seek solutions to global disputes, Americans should realize that solutions can be elusive and should not be overly frustrated when efforts are unsuccessful. The United States can work to make things better than they otherwise would be. Although it can be useful to attempt dramatic solutions, a patient and tolerant approach should be developed.⁵⁹

Americans must adapt to a world order in which the United States is not always in charge. The United States does not have to dominate the world to be secure in it. American leadership is frequently needed, but American control of its bloc of allies has become anachronistic. The United States can decline to be as active militarily as it was in the Cold War years,⁶⁰ but still work to restrain global tensions. Some situations can be improved with diplomatic or economic pressures. Others are simply impervious to any form of pressure by the United States;

even efforts motivated by the best of intentions will be doomed to failure. In the post-Cold War era, this nation should refrain from getting militarily involved in such predicaments.

Regional accommodations are being made around the globe in the effort to maintain order. For those situations that remain confined to a limited area but seem to call for a military solution, nations in the vicinity should be primarily responsible for establishing order. Absent a response by nations with a higher stake,⁶¹ the propriety of American military engagement is very dubious; certainly, unilateral American military commitments in those circumstances should usually be avoided. If nations are unwilling to fight problems in their own backyards, common sense should also preclude military involvement by the United States.⁶² Even when such a situation worsens, unless America's vital interests become threatened, the United States need not intervene with its military.⁶³

A tremendous range of humanitarian situations beckons political leaders, who may call on the military for assistance. Certainly, the military can help assure that food gets to the starving in Somalia or that relief supplies reach the needy in Bosnia. But the underlying interests of the United States must be understood. Once American forces enter a conflict, even in the role of peacekeepers, this nation may be seen as a party to the dispute.⁶⁴ The United States may then have to either retreat⁶⁵ or significantly increase its military commitment.

During the Cold War period, American leaders abhorred the

prospect of withdrawal after engaging its military. Policy was often polarized to extremes, and the military options were sometimes portrayed in uncalibrated terms.⁶⁶ But today's choices are not limited to either staying on the sidelines or intervening with massive military force.⁶⁷ At his confirmation hearing, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin discussed the issue in these terms:

What bothered us during the Cold War was that every instance of the use of force by the United States was watched by our friends and our enemies to see whether we had our resolve. So if we went into an operation, and it didn't work, we couldn't back off because of the way it would be read in Moscow or Jerusalem or Taipei. Once started, you had to at least commit yourself to seeing it through. Maybe that's different now. Maybe you can use force, and if it doesn't work, the backing off hasn't got the same kind of international concern. Maybe you can use force not to achieve something, but to punish people for doing something.⁶⁸

While military power must continue to be used with the greatest discretion, the consequences of unsuccessful military attempts have now changed. Certainly, national leaders must be concerned with the image of the United States. But there is no rival superpower to capitalize on an American "failure." The new approach to military policy calls for less intervention, not more.⁶⁹ When the costs of using military power become higher than the United States should rationally pay, the nation has the freedom to simply disengage.

THE CONTINUING NEED FOR A STRONG MILITARY

In the absence of a clear threat,⁷⁰ the need for a dominant military has been questioned. But when the United States has the obvious will and ability to successfully wage war, it is also best situated to deter war.⁷¹ Somewhat paradoxically, many are unwilling to spend money for a continuing strong military precisely because of America's current military strength. It is well and good to be optimistic and hopeful, but those expectations must be balanced. The point has been made succinctly: "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."⁷²

Leaders must be especially cautious as they seek the "peace dividend" and downsize the military to take advantage of today's improved security environment. They need to learn from earlier experiences.⁷³ Recall, for example, how poorly the nation was prepared to fight global war after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In time, the largest force in the nation's history was built up and it defeated major enemies in both Europe and the Pacific. Five years later, however, after North Korea invaded South Korea, the United States found it had demobilized too far and was able to just hang on in the early months of fighting against a second-rate opponent.⁷⁴

The end of the Cold War left the United States with a large standing army, an historic anomaly.⁷⁵ The powerful military that was built to counter a rival superpower can obviously be restructured now that the threat has been reduced.⁷⁶ Russia

today is less powerful than the Soviet Union had been just a few years ago.⁷⁷ As the world's preeminent military power, the United States has perhaps never been safer from enemy attack.⁷⁸

However, unlike earlier times,⁷⁹ the oceans no longer provide the security of distance and time necessary to fully reconstitute a drawn-down military.⁸⁰ A modern military cannot be cut from whole cloth.⁸¹ The nation cannot return to the pre-Cold War period when a force could be built after a crisis began. Weapons of mass destruction and intercontinental range mean that a clear deterrent with an always-ready military force must be sustained. Modern weapons have become costly and sophisticated, and they require that an adequately trained military always be on hand. A sufficient active duty force, well-equipped with advanced weapons and backed by capable reserve forces, must be maintained.

How strong do American forces need to be? No one wants to buy a gold-plated security system; everyone wants a defense that will serve the nation's needs. Unfortunately, the test for military sufficiency is an art and not a science. The issue was well framed by President George Washington. When he was asked to support a possible Constitutional amendment to limit the size of America's standing forces to 3,000, Washington said he would do so--provided the amendment also limited the size of invading forces to 2,000.⁸²

America's military must be able to protect vital interests and to perform other missions required by political leaders. As

the absolute power of the military continues to be reduced, it is critical that the forces left be capable of defending the nation's interests. The military must be strong enough to convince potential adversaries that they have nothing to win and much to lose should they present a military challenge to the vital interests of this nation. For vital interests--those matters that directly affect the security of the nation--the United States must have a strong enough military to deter potential aggressors, or to defeat them if deterrence fails.

The nation will unquestionably respond with military force when its political system or way of life is tested. Considering the lack of a threat on the North American continent itself, the minimum military requirement is to safeguard the United States against air and missile attack and to assure control of the seas. But under the post-containment approach to national military strategy, the nation should rarely act alone when its own vital interests are not at risk.⁸³

COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

To support the broad range of national interests, the military must remain sufficiently strong to succeed in a variety of overseas engagements. It must be able to unilaterally defeat moderately powerful rogue nations, such as Iraq during the Desert Storm campaign. It must also retain sufficient strength to actively participate in coalitions,⁸⁴ as directed by the national

leaders. It will be neither necessary nor appropriate for the United States to lead every coalition. Under adequate command and control safeguards, American units may participate in coalition efforts led by other nations that have the primary stake and the bulk of the forces.⁸⁵

Unilateral military actions should almost always be reserved for situations of genuine vital importance to the United States. Although alliances have inherent limitations,⁸⁶ coalition actions will provide a valuable force multiplier for the United States to influence events that are important, but less than vital to the national interests. As fewer resources are devoted to the military component, more coalition actions will inevitably become necessary. Humanitarian interventions, almost by definition, call for a collective response.⁸⁷

The United States must not depend on collective security arrangements that would permit any single nation to have a veto over actions American leaders determine to be suitable.⁸⁸ Such a requirement for agreement among the major powers has limited the ability of the United Nations to respond to crises.⁸⁹ It has been a central reason the United Nations is not ready for more active leadership on issues of world peace.⁹⁰

Collective security arrangements are not likely to be as formalized as during the Cold War, when the European Command, for example, had an expansive staff and extensive plans.⁹¹ Nations will simply not be as willing to reach the compromises necessary to maintain alliances in the absence of a clear, formidable

threat.⁹² Friendly nations will need to work together, however, to maximize the benefits of complementary forces. When coalitions must be formed, the various military units need to be as interoperable as possible in order to integrate and accomplish the mission quickly and well.

An early post-Cold War test came when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The United States led an international coalition through diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions in an effort that culminated in a large-scale military engagement. A relatively inept opponent was crushed on the battlefield. The ability of the United States to build the Gulf War coalition and execute its strategy was impressive, but it is not likely to serve as a prototype for many trouble-spots of the future.⁹³ Rarely will most of the world be able to reach such a consensus for dealing with an aggressor. Seldom will the military option offer such a predictable victory at such a comparatively modest cost.⁹⁴

In the Gulf War, the United States took the lead of an international coalition with a clearly defined mission to remove a clearly defined enemy from the sovereign nation it had invaded.⁹⁵ By contrast, neither the mission nor the enemy has been certified by the international community in Bosnia, and no nation has taken the lead to organize a coalition. The current problems in the Balkans, however, may well provide the better guide to potential military roles in foreign policy crises.

Vital American interests are not directly at stake in

Bosnia;⁹⁶ any intervention would be primarily for humanitarian or political purposes.⁹⁷ Powers in the region have shown a reluctance to act. As the situation is evaluated, it becomes clear that a complex history of provocations ensnarls yesterday's victims and today's aggressors.⁹⁸ When the underlying grievances are understood, neither the "good guys" nor the "bad guys" can be pictured in white hats.⁹⁹ The capability of an outside military force to reach desired political goals is slight,¹⁰⁰ and the effort is more likely to result in heavy casualties than either a quick or a lasting settlement.¹⁰¹ In that respect, it has been asserted that the "West's indecision about intervening in Bosnia reflects not so much a fear of casualties--many countries have sent soldiers to do the dangerous job of supporting humanitarian-relief efforts--as a reluctance to lose a lot of men for nothing."¹⁰²

REDESIGNING AMERICA'S FORCES

Decisions on force size and structure will be especially critical because of the twin realities of tight budgets and an uncertain threat. Potential traps await military policy as defense spending is reduced.¹⁰³ There is a danger that cuts may be made in a "salami slice" fashion. Some of the early post-Cold War budgets understandably called for less money for the same basic type of military forces. The budgetary concern for the military is not simply that less money will be allocated, but

that increasingly precious dollars will be squandered on ill-advised purchases.

On the positive side, the need to continue to produce "leapfrog technologies" has been somewhat reduced, since the powerful Soviet military is no longer America's biggest threat. Most future American military efforts will likely be of limited scope, against opponents that will not have weapons systems as advanced as those of the United States.¹⁰⁴ Sophisticated weapons will remain important to this country,¹⁰⁵ but since most prospective adversaries will not have such advanced systems, the nation will be able to reduce its overall weapons development program.¹⁰⁶

Especially as the force structure becomes smaller, the United States must become more selective in its use of military force. The forces that are retained must be matched with political requirements to insure that the military is capable of meeting national objectives. Certain core capabilities must be maintained. Those essential capabilities have been described as: forward presence; strategic defense and deterrence; crisis response; and reconstitution.¹⁰⁷

The United States is returning military forces from overseas with dramatic speed. As regional security arrangements evolve, the American military presence in many overseas locations can prudently be reduced to a largely symbolic level. But allies have grown comfortable with the American military presence, and many do not want to see it withdrawn. United States forces offer

both a real and a psychological protection to our allies. The issue is not wholly one of finances,¹⁰⁸ as the costs of smaller contingencies of forward deployed troops is manageable. Many allies also pay substantial sums for the American military forces based on their lands.¹⁰⁹

As America reshapes its military for the post-Cold War period, leaders must consider the improved conditions of friendly nations. The Europeans and Japanese, for example, have recovered quite well from the devastation they suffered in World War II. They are now substantially capable of caring for their own conventional defense needs. The United States is certainly not obligated to extend additional military assistance to compensate for those occasions when such nations opt to lower their level of military spending.¹¹⁰ This nation no longer needs to have substantial numbers of its troops forward deployed,¹¹¹ especially to countries that can adequately respond to the conventional threats they will likely face with their own defense resources. It will, however, continue to be appropriate for this nation to provide sufficient assurances that will minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation among friendly nations.¹¹²

The United States will need to retain a sufficient nuclear deterrent. Inventories of nuclear weapons are being reduced by both Russia and the United States and those initiatives should certainly be encouraged. Perhaps the best policy would be to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction, but that is not feasible. The technology is widely known¹¹³ and a nation with

enough money and desire may well be able to acquire such weapons.¹¹⁴ The United States should continue to try to limit the spread of mass destruction weapons, but the nation must also maintain its own strategic capability, both as a deterrent and as protection against blackmail.

In addition to general strategic preparation and readiness, the United States needs a flexible and deployable conventional warfighting capability. As military forces are downsized, more emphasis will be placed on power projection.¹¹⁵ The nation must have the ability to immediately inject military power when and where political leaders require. Increased emphasis will be placed on forces that are highly mobile, capable of quick action, and can be tailored to meet complex political requirements. Conventional forces will continue to feature multi-service, joint warfare capabilities. Teamwork will be the cornerstone as the services become increasingly compatible.¹¹⁶ Primarily because of constrained budgets, the services will have fewer redundant capabilities in the future.¹¹⁷ This gives additional importance to planning and building forces that will be increasingly complementary.

History teaches that the United States must be able to rebuild forces that have been drawn down. American leaders must be careful to preserve the capability to reconstitute its military so that the nation can respond when the next major hostile threat emerges. Decisions on the timing and quantities of procuring new weapons systems must be based in part on

retaining capacities for defense industries that will have substantially reduced military contracts in the future.¹¹⁸ The nation's reconstitution strategy must provide the capability to create new forces as needed.¹¹⁹

Another issue concerns noncombat (sometimes called "nontraditional")¹²⁰ uses of American military forces. In the face of uncertain and ambiguous threats as well as national fiscal austerity, it is not inappropriate for the military to assume more noncombat roles.¹²¹ Those new responsibilities can justify larger forces than may be needed for currently defined threats. Increased noncombat roles for the military make sense economically, providing immediate tangible benefit for dollars expended and saving money that would otherwise have to be spent on the problem. No new organizations are likely to be created to perform roles the military can accomplish in the noncombat sphere. For many of the new missions, the military will be able to work with other agencies to provide services. It has even been suggested that the military be given a greater noncombat role at the expense of existing civilian agencies, because of the military's proven capabilities "to come in quickly and effectively after a mega-disaster."¹²²

Leaders must remember, however, that the combat mission justifies the military.¹²³ Forces are established for that purpose and other roles must not be permitted to cause deterioration of combat effectiveness. Political leaders should not be overly seduced by noncombat roles for the military.¹²⁴

Noncombat considerations must not dominate military procurement, training, or force utilization decisions.¹²⁵ Only truly compatible noncombat functions should be encouraged. Even then, the military should be used only to the extent capabilities in excess of current military needs are available.

CONCLUSION

Under any scenario, the United States intends to remain actively engaged in world affairs. During the transition from the Cold War to the new era, the United States alone has the power to lead across the political, economic, and military spectra. Leaders must not permit that capacity, however, to dominate decisions on the use of military power.

A fundamentally new approach to national military strategy should be undertaken. The starting point must be to maintain an adequate defense for the protection of vital national interests. Fiscal imperatives as well as general prudence dictate more efficient use of the military. More noncombat roles can be assumed, to the extent they do not detract from the military's ability to meet its primary functions. The services must continue to increase the trend of acting jointly. When the United States does send its military to fight for less than vital national interests, it should rarely act unilaterally. The nation should participate in coalitions when appropriate, but the United States should not desire or expect to lead every such

coalition.

The new approach to the employment of American military power must be grounded on a full awareness that the military can't solve every problem. In a post-Cold War era dominated by economic concerns, even a powerful military will frequently have no direct role to play. In a world less susceptible to American leadership, it is critical for America's leaders to understand the national interests and to limit the combat role of the military accordingly. Unlike the recent past, the military instrument need not be used in a reflexive manner to counter undesirable actions across the globe. The United States now has the freedom *not* to engage its military unless truly significant national interests are at risk. A smaller military can be adequate, provided leaders carefully limit the occasions when military solutions are sought to foreign policy problems. Now is the time to adopt and enforce a new strategy for the use of American military resources.

NOTES

1. The latest detailed statement of national security policy is contained in a final report from President George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, 1993). The Clinton administration has basically pledged to continue the Bush approach to foreign policy. See, e.g., Ann Devroy and Ruth Marcus, "Foreign Policy's Week in the Sun," *Washington Post* 19 Mar. 1993: A1.
2. The central objective of containment has been described as preventing "territorial expansion by the Soviet Union while simultaneously avoiding a major war." Stephen M. Walt, "U.S. Grand Strategy for the 1990s: The Case for Finite Containment," *U.S. National Security Strategies for the 1990s*, ed. Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP: 1991) 136.
3. In the words of one scholar: "Since the challenge was worldwide, it had to be met everywhere, at once." Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, 6th Rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1991) 80.
4. "The Cold War required the United States and its allies to be prepared to contain the spread of Soviet power on a global basis. Developments in even remote areas could affect the United States' relative position in the world, and therefore often required a U.S. response." Dick Cheney, *Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy* (Washington: Dept. of Defense, 1993) 8.
5. For a discussion of American perceptions of Soviet intentions, especially at the beginning of the Cold War period, see John L. Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford UP, 1987) 20-74.
6. As originally formulated by George Kennan, the doctrine of containment carefully limited the areas of the world that fell within the ambit of vital interests of the United States. John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1982) 30. Just before the Korean War, however, NSC-68 stretched the meaning of containment: "the assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere." NSC-68, April 14, 1950, quoted in Gaddis, *Containment* 91.
7. "For different reasons Americans arrived at a common conclusion: the Soviet Union had to be contained." David C. Hendrickson, "The Renovation of American Foreign Policy," *Foreign*

Affairs 71 (1992): 53. While most presidential administrations attempted a distinctive approach, each accepted the basic doctrine of containment. See generally Gaddis, *Containment*.

8. Consider, for example, Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Angola.

9. "The object [of American Cold War strategy] was to have so much military strength that a foe with a huge military of its own could not afford to attack This worked. Finally the Soviet Union, saddled with a malfunctioning economic system, could no longer keep up the military rivalry." "Collision Course: Pentagon Resists Reshaping the Military," editorial, *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* 1 Feb. 1993: 18.

10. While few would claim any nostalgia for the Cold War, that era did at least provide a certain consistency of mission. President George Bush thus took a cautious approach to the ending of the Cold War. His "first and strongest impulse was to fear a breakdown in the stability that had kept the peace during four decades of the Cold War." Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, *Marching In Place: The Status Quo Presidency of George Bush* (New York: Simon, 1992) 187.

11. "With the collapse of the Soviet empire, the old American compass no longer works. As a result, both the 'realist' school of American foreign policy and the 'idealist' school seem to have lost their way." Thomas L. Friedman, "It's Harder Now to Figure Out Compelling National Interests," *New York Times* 31 May 1992: E5.

12. As one columnist asserts: "No longer are the Soviet Union and communism the driving force of American policy." Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Detached From World Turbulence," *Washington Post* 19 Feb. 1993: A21.

13. The issue of "strategic depth" is discussed in *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, 1993) 13:

During the global struggle of the Cold War, developments in even remote areas could affect the United States' relative position in the world, and therefore often required a U.S. response. Today, the United States remains a nation with global interests, but we must reexamine whether and how particular challenges threaten our interests. A clear understanding of our interests and responsibilities along with the growing strength of our friends and allies will allow us to be more selective in determining

whether U.S. forces must be committed.

14. After the 1992 presidential elections, the incoming Clinton administration pledged to "focus like a laser on the economy." Jack Nelson, "Clinton Plans Diverse Staff, New Jobs Package," *Los Angeles Times* 5 Nov. 1992: A1.

15. One especially experienced observer states that: "military security threats have diminished, thereby elevating the relative importance of economic issues. But matters of national security retain a higher priority in absolute terms." Richard Nixon, *Seize the Moment: America's Challenge in a One-Superpower World* (New York: Simon, 1992) 24. It must also be noted that American military power retains its relative superiority even as it diminishes in absolute terms, because other powerful nations are also lowering their force levels and military budgets. See, for example, David White, "Shrinking Budgets But Defence Stays at the Core," *London Financial Times* 25 Feb. 1993: 18; Marc Fisher, "Kohl Plans Cut in German Forces," *Washington Post* 7 Feb. 1993: A26.

16. One commentator notes:

It is true, of course, that many, indeed the great majority of, international transactions take place without coercion and certainly without the use of force. Equally, it is true that other forms of coercion exist besides armed force and that these can be efficacious even against states with superior military power. It does not at all follow, however, that economic and other instruments of foreign policy are a universal substitute for force or that force cannot often trump all other means.

Laurence Martin, "Is Military Force losing Its Utility? II" *American Defense Policy*, ed. John F. Reichart and Steven R. Strum, 5th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1982) 39.

17. The impact of employing overwhelming force against Iraq was predictable: "[t]he direct application of force is a trump card; there is no immediate answer but defense or surrender." Martin 46. Indeed, "force remains the ultimate form of power in a self-help system." Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic, 1990) 180.

18. "It seems to be becoming recognized that armed forces justify themselves in large part by their role in transmitting diplomatic signals, inspiring confidence in allies, discouraging foes, influencing crises, and signifying degrees of commitment." Martin 40. The national security advisor to President Bush noted

that the underlying importance of a 1992 United Nations Security Council enforcement resolution against Serbia was to convince their leaders "that when we say something we mean it, and that there are penalties involved." Brent Scowcroft, interview, *NBC's Meet the Press*, 27 Dec. 1992, transcript by Burrelle's Information Services: 4.

19. According to one scholar:

Military preeminence has never ensured political and economic preeminence. But it does put one nation in a stronger bargaining position that, if skillfully exploited, can be fashioned for non-military goals. Force cannot be irrelevant as a tool of policy for America's economic relations with her great power allies: America's military preeminence politically pervades these relations. It is the cement of economic interdependence.

Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?" *International Security* 4 (1980): 29.

20. Joseph V. Stalin, quoted in Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., ed., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis: Naval Inst., 1966) 94.

21. See Hans J. Morgenthau, "Vietnam and the National Interest," *Vietnam: History, Documents, and Opinions on a Major World Crisis*, ed. Marvin E. Gettleman (Greenwich: Fawcett, 1965). 366.

22. As military strength becomes less important in international relations, it is well to remember that:

. . . while engaging Moscow in an expensive arms race, America has had to compete for world market shares against allies like Japan and Germany which have allocated smaller percentages of their national resources to the military, thus freeing capital, personnel, and R&D for commercial manufacture that has undermined parts of the American military base.

Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random, 1993) 293.

23. The intricate relationships have been aptly described by one commentator in the following terms:

The distribution of power in world politics has become like a layer cake. The top

military layer is largely unipolar, for there is no other military power comparable to the United States. The economic middle layer is tripolar and has been for two decades. The bottom layer of transnational interdependence shows a diffusion of power.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?" *Foreign Affairs* 71 (1992): 88. Of course, the transition to a more complex power structure did not occur overnight. One writer submits that it was during the decade of the 1960s that "the world had changed from a bipolar one to a multipolar one, with several seats of power emerging to challenge the American-Soviet hegemony." John R. Greene, *The Limits of Power: The Nixon and Ford Administrations* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1992) 79.

24. For a discussion of the shift in measures of power from the traditional military gauges to "soft power" considerations, see Nye, *Bound to Lead*, especially ch. 6.

25. It has been argued that the United States should be placed alone, a tier above any other world power, because only America has the "military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself." Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1991): 24.

26. It is worthwhile to recall that in the immediate post-World War II years, the United States dominated the world economically. While one writer cautions that: "American [economic] power in 1945 was, for want of another term, *artificially high*," he also notes that "the actual dimensions of its might were unprecedented in absolute terms." Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Vintage, 1987) 357. The extent to which the improved economic situations of various nations might be a harbinger of future changes in relative military power is worthy of contemplation.

27. The issue of linkages is discussed further in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "An Interdependent World," *Theories of International Relations*, ed. James A. Hirsch (Washington: National Defense University, 1990) 235-38. Linkages can also be used in a positive manner, as "promissory notes that say, 'We will support you on this issue, if you support us on that issue.'" Seyom Brown, "Is Military Force losing Its Utility? I" *American Defense Policy*, ed. John F. Reichart and Steven R. Strum, 5th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1982) 26.

28. There is also the observation that democracies do not go to war against other democracies. One expert notes: "The spread of democracy in Europe, in Latin America, even in East Asia might

bring about a more peaceful international order than what we have known in the past. Liberal democracies, as Immanuel Kant suggested at the end of the eighteenth century, do not make war on each other. . . . In fact, for over 150 years there has been no case of war breaking out between democratically constituted states." James Chase, *The Consequences of the Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford UP, 1992) 184.

29. "[P]articularly among industrialized, pluralist countries, the perceived margin of safety has widened: fears of attack in general have declined, and fears of attacks by one another are virtually nonexistent." Keohane and Nye 233.

30. Of course, localized problems of instability (such as territorial, ethnic, religious, and political conflicts) may spread and become a threat to vital interests of the United States.

31. One author lauds the "power of balance" possessed by the United States during the Cold War. The United States "not only had massive military might but supreme economic clout, and the world's best supply of power-knowledge, ranging from the finest science and technology to a popular culture much of the world wished to emulate." Alvin Toffler, *Power Shift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence At the Edge of the 21st Century* (New York: Bantam, 1990) 428.

32. See Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs* 71 (1992): 39. The manner in which the United States has intervened has been tailored to individual circumstances. Consider, for example, the variety shown by American responses to: Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989); Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990-91); and the current United States efforts in Somalia and Bosnia.

33. Economic as well as political realities are driving down the size, budgets, and capabilities of the American military--thereby limiting the nation's ability to respond.

34. Even if the United States still possess the world's most powerful military after force reductions are completed, as the military becomes smaller it simply cannot meet all of the challenges of a larger force (i.e., a force built for one "Desert Storm sized" major regional contingency cannot be expected to simultaneously handle two major contingencies and two minor ones. See also Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options," House Armed Services Committee, Washington, 25 Feb. 1992).

35. "'Foreign policy,' wrote Walter Lippmann in 1943 in an oft-quoted phrase, 'consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation's commitments and the nation's power.'" Samuel P. Huntington, "Coping With the Lippmann Gap," *Foreign Affairs* 66 (1987): 453, quoting Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, 1943) 9. In his critique of Lippmann, Huntington concludes that "some gap between capabilities and commitments may be inevitable." Huntington, "Lippmann Gap" 477.

36. "In the absence of established guideposts our policies will be determined by impulse and image." James Schlesinger, "Quest For a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1993): 18.

37. Then-Defense Secretary Weinberger acknowledged: "We can never afford to buy the capabilities sufficient to meet all of our commitments with one hundred percent confidence." Caspar W. Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (1986): 678.

38. It has been argued that the original doctrine of containment was itself pragmatic. Problems later arose because the founders of the Cold War policy "left a costly legacy for successors who were neither as pragmatic nor as flexible when it came to balancing commitments with resources." Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York: Simon, 1986) 34.

39. Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century* (New York: Simon, 1990) 12.

40. Of course, the United States is not the only nation facing policy debates on such issues. For example, the following has been reported: "Mr. Malcolm Rifkind, Defence Secretary, yesterday said that the [United Kingdom] should not commit military forces to international peace enforcement operations where there was no military solution but merely public clamour for 'something to be done.'" Robert Mauthner and Ivo Dawnay, "Rifkind Warns On Military Deployment," *London Financial Times* 21 Jan. 1993: 6.

41. A distinguished commentator who has long opposed the role of the United States as a "global interventionist power" writes that: "Only through costly experience have we begun to recognize that, more often than not, intervention has been against our own best interests--and in many if not most cases, too, it has not served a useful purpose in the other countries involved." J. William Fulbright, *The Price of Empire* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989) 153.

42. Even though the United States maintained a powerful military through the Cold War period, the underlying priorities of the nation did not really change. Any decision to intervene militarily must be clearly justified within the best interests of the nation. As one author notes: "Since 1789 the president's responsibility has been to safeguard the well-being and security of the American people, not to reform the world." William G. Hyland, "Foreign Policy: The Agenda Is Easy," *Washington Post* 24 Jan. 1993: C7. In the post-Cold War era, those basic policy concerns must be remembered.

43. Many Americans question, for example, why the United States should become actively involved in Bosnia when the Europeans have shown a reluctance to do so. See "We Don't Want to Fight, and Heaven Help Us If We Do," *The Economist* 22 Aug. 1992: 35. In early 1993 the United States supported a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing enforcement of a ban against Serbia military flights over Bosnian territory. However, it was reported that "a senior State Department official complain[ed]: 'Our British friends are wimping again. So are the French--and it's their goddamned resolution.'" Russell Watson, "Where the World Can Draw the Line," *Newsweek* 4 Jan. 1993: 35.

44. Vietnam became a quagmire for the United States because the military effort put into the war was not first matched with clear thinking on political goals. Americans "set ourselves goals which [could] not be attained with the means we were willing to employ." Morgenthau 368.

45. "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1976) 87.

46. Lord Palmerston, Speech to the House of Commons, 1 Mar. 1848, quoted in John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations* (New York: Oxford UP, 1992) 194.

47. Will Marshall, "U.S. Global Leadership for Democracy," *Mandate for Change*, ed. Will Marshall and Martin Schram (New York: Berkley Books, 1993) 295.

48. As one observer notes: "If objectives are truly vital--if physical security or the continuance of America's democratic values and institutions are at stake--costs and risks can never exceed benefits." Alan Tonelson, "What Is the National Interest?" *The Atlantic* July 1991: 42.

49. President Kennedy eloquently presented this expansive view of global engagement in his inaugural address: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty." John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, January 20 - December 31, 1961* (Washington: GPO, 1962) 1.

50. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, *The Global Rivals* (New York: Knopf, 1988) 42.

51. James Smith, "Engagement: A National Strategy for the 1990s," *Comparative Strategy* 11 (1992): 469.

52. Under the proposed approach to the use of American military forces, alliances (including current ones) which commit the United States to military involvements must be carefully reviewed.

53. Consistent with a more pragmatic approach to national security strategy, it has been asserted that:

In a perilous strategic world, it is usually a mistake to consider foreign policy to be an activist instrument at all. Rather, Americans should start thinking of foreign policy in terms of avoiding problems, reducing vulnerabilities and costs, maximizing options, buying time, and muddling through--objectives that may be uninspiring but that are well suited to a strong, wealthy, geographically isolated country.

Tonelson 42.

54. Reflecting on the current situation in the Balkans, one observer submits: "What we are seeing now in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union may be the beginning of the wars of the communist succession." Robert Rudney, "Europe: Integration or Fragmentation?" *Armed Forces Journal International* (Feb. 1993): 13.

55. One of the primary "buffers," of course, was the Soviet military, which buttressed the Soviet policy of intervention in satellite nations (e.g., Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968).

56. On this point, it has been argued that "ethnic conflicts once suppressed during the Cold War are creating a type of war for which we are poorly prepared." Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Self-Determination Trap," *Washington Post* 15 Dec. 1992: A23.

57. A foreign policy expert suggests that:

To quote Winston Churchill, "the war of the giants" has been followed by the "war of the pygmies"--but their wars will not be easily ignored. At the end of the twentieth century, even weak and underdeveloped states are arming themselves with weapons of mass destruction. Their conflicts will be very destabilizing and will touch directly the interests and security of the United States, not least through the threats they pose to U.S. friends and allies. . . .

Robert G. Neumann, "The Next Disorderly Half Century: Some Proposed Remedies," *Washington Quarterly* 16.1 (1993): 44.

58. It is recognized, of course, that many nations are displeased with their boundaries and are not willing to forego the military option to effect changes.

59. Consider the situation in Cyprus, for example. No real, final solution to that island's problems has been reached, but violence has been minimized. Many nations have helped to manage the problem while a real "solution" has been deferred. See, for example, "Cyprus," *Lebanon, Cyprus: Country Report*, Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report No. 4 (1992): 25-28; Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey's Travail's," *Foreign Affairs* 58 (1979): 92-95.

60. Some 218 instances in which the United States "used its armed forces as a political instrument" in a 30-year period (1946-1975) are detailed in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington: Brookings Inst., 1978) 547-53. Another 44 such incidents, covering the period from 1975 to 1982, are discussed in Philip D. Zelikow, "Force Without War 1975-82," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 7.1 (1984): 29-54.

61. For example, nations in the region or those with former colonial ties will often have more at stake than the United States.

62. This general observation has been made:

In the democratic parts of the world, it is much harder than it used to be for governments to put their soldiers in harm's way. To do so, they need either a clear threat to national security or, as America judged in Somalia, at least the prospect that a lot of good can be done at minimal risk to

soldiers' lives. Unhappily, few trouble-spots are so simple.

"Who Will Fight for the World?" *The Economist* 30 Jan. 1993: 15.

63. The absence of a hegemonic threat to the United States has been described as:

. . . truly a watershed event, and it should fundamentally change how we view regional or internecine conflicts. In most cases such disorders will not impinge on vital U.S. security interests. Washington can, therefore, afford to view them with detachment, intervening only as a balancer of last resort when a conflict cannot be contained by other powers in the affected region and is expanding to the point where America's security is threatened.

Ted Galen Carpenter, "Collective Security Pitfalls," *Proceedings of Conference on Security Roles of the United Nations*, Sponsored by National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, Oct. 1991: 18.

64. For example, when United States Marines were sent to Lebanon as part of a multinational force, they were originally "warmly welcomed by the local populace." United States Department of Defense, *Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983*, 20 Dec. 1983: 3. "Unfortunately, in a surprisingly short time, the Americans gave up their impartiality by supporting" forces of the Lebanese government. Michael D. Malone, William H. Miller, and Joseph W. Robben, "From Presence to American Intervention," *Survival* 28.5 (1986): 423.

65. There is wisdom in Vermont Senator George Aiken's proposal for getting out of the intractable war in Vietnam: "Declare victory, and get out." Quoted in Charles Krauthammer, "Enough of Sideshows," *Washington Post* 12 Mar. 1993: A23.

66. See, e.g., "At Least, Slow the Slaughter," editorial, *New York Times* 4 Oct. 1992: E16; Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," *New York Times* 8 Oct. 1992: A35; Harry Summers, "Enlisting Public Support," *Washington Times* 8 Oct. 1992: G3.

67. Secretary of State Christopher said during his confirmation hearing: "I want to assure the American people that we will not turn their blood and treasure into an open account for use by the rest of the world. We cannot let every crisis become a choice between inaction or American intervention." Warren Christopher, Statement to Committee on Foreign Relations, United States

Senate, Washington, 13 Jan. 1993.

68. Quoted in George C. Wilson, "A Tomahawk Chop to Punish Serbia?" *Washington Post* 7 Mar. 1993: C3.

69. See Joseph Lepgold, "Aspin's Views on Use of Force: A Closer Look," *Christian Science Monitor* 21 Jan. 1993: 19.

70. The perception of a "threat" can be measured to some degree by attitudes about strategic depth. Currently, those assumptions provide Americans with a relative sense of comfort. As one author notes, today the United States has a "relative strategic insularity on a continent devoid of adjacent military challengers. During the decades of intense military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union along the forward lines of containment in Europe and Asia, this feeling of insulation from attack was diminished. . . ." Andrew C. Goldberg, "Challenges to the Post-Cold War Balance of Power," *Washington Quarterly* 14.1 (1991): 52.

71. "We cannot dissuade an attacker if he believes we are not willing as well as able to fight back." Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, "Discriminate Deterrence," *U.S. National Security Strategies for the 1990s*, ed. Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP: 1991) 129.

72. Attributed to Thomas Jefferson, *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations*, gen. ed. Justin Kaplan, 16th ed. (Boston: Little, 1992) 351.

73. Referring to United States policies immediately after World War II, Alexander Haig states:

Quick to disarm, the United States was slow to understand the dangerous strategic reality created by the presence of a heavily armed totalitarian state beyond the Polish plain. Although our rhetoric was robust, our military capabilities were inadequate. Not until the fateful Korean summer of 1950 did we begin serious rearmament and effective organization of the Western alliance.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Inner Circles: How America Changed the World* (New York: Warner Books, 1992) 553.

74. See Gaddis, *Containment* 109-26; Richard Whelan, *Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953* (Boston: Little, 1990).

75. Since the Revolutionary War, America has quickly downsized its military once a war ends. Under President George Washington, for example, the Secretary of War "had little . . . to do as there was hardly any standing army." James Thomas Flexner, *Washington: The Indispensable Man* (New York: Signet, 1984) 221. The administration of Thomas Jefferson "was suspicious of all standing military forces." Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1973) 45.

76. "Admittedly, the world is still a dangerous place. But the U.S. military establishment was created to confront a massive Soviet army that has simply ceased to exist." "Deep Defense Cuts Needed," editorial, *Atlanta Constitution* 26 Jan. 1993: A8. A cautionary note must also be sounded: "The threat of an unauthorized launch or nuclear accident may have increased, in part because one nuclear superpower has been replaced by four successor countries with strategic nuclear weapons on their respective territories." Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, "Still a Soviet Threat," *Washington Post* 22 Dec. 1992: A21.

77. One author concludes that "post-Soviet military power is but a shadow of its former self." Stephen M. Meyer, "The Military," *After the Soviet Union: From Empire to Nations*, ed. Timothy J. Colton and Robert Legvold (New York: Norton, 1992) 114.

78. Former Secretary of Defense Cheney has observed that today, "[t]here are no significant hostile alliances. To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the world remain our friends." Cheney 7. A columnist adds: "Today the nation is more physically secure from foreign attack than at any time in its 216 years." George F. Will, "A Continental Shrug," *Washington Post* 5 Nov. 1992: A23.

79. As expressed by one scholar:

From the second decade of the nineteenth century to the fourth decade of the twentieth century, Americans had little cause to worry about their security. Security was a given fact of nature and circumstance, an inheritance rather than a creation. . . . One of the more basic and obvious facts of our time is that changes in technology and international politics have combined to make security now the final goal of policy rather than its starting assumption.

Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1959) 2-3.

80. Reconstitution involves both personnel and equipment, each of which requires time to prepare for military requirements. "Preserving the potential for expansion of air, ground, and maritime forces will require extraordinary foresight and political courage to lay away infrastructure, stockpile critical materials, protect the defense industrial base, sustain a cadre of quality leaders, and invest in basic science and high-payoff technologies." *National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, 1992) 24.

81. In this respect, it is necessary to draw lessons from Operation Desert Storm with caution. "'Unlike the Persian Gulf, the next time we may not have the luxury of taking half a year to build up our forces.'" Suneel Ratan, "Staying Strong Without Breaking the Bank," *Fortune* 8 Feb. 1993: 92 [quoting Will Marshall].

82. Michael S. Dukakis, Campaign Address to American Legion National Convention, Louisville, Kentucky, 8 Sep. 1988.

83. It is also worth considering whether the American public will tolerate substantial casualties except for the unambiguous defense of the highest priority national interests, such as defense of the homeland.

84. The distinction between coalition warfare and collective security must be understood. Simply stated, collective security arrangements are formalized and enduring, while coalitions "are for the most part ad hoc arrangements designed to respond to a rapidly emerging crisis when no formal security arrangement exists." Don M. Snider and Gregory Grant, "The Future of Conventional Warfare and U.S. Military Strategy," *Washington Quarterly* 15.1 (1992): 221.

85. Historically, of course, when the United States has provided military support, "its president insists on being in control. Paradoxically, this insistence keeps America in the unenviable role of number-one world cop and makes it harder to create an alternative that could lighten the American burden." "World Cop?" *The Economist* 19 Dec. 1992: 13.

86. See generally Gray 245-89.

87. See "Choosing Wars of Conscience," editorial, *New York Times* 17 Dec. 1992: A34.

88. One commentator disdains collective security arrangements in general: "The very inclusiveness of ideal-type 'collective security' organizations, such as an institutionalized CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), ensures their failure as vehicles for security. The inclusion of wolves, or potential wolves, with sheep, historically has proved to be an

overly bold experiment" Colin S. Gray, "Deterrence in the New Strategic Environment," *Comparative Strategy* 11 (1992): 255.

89. In only two instances has the United Nations played an important role in military actions against aggressors: "the Korean War, when Moscow boycotted the Security Council debate and thus negated its veto power, and the Persian Gulf War, when all the major powers had a common interest in stopping Iraq." Nixon 34.

90. For a discussion of a proposal to eliminate the Security Council veto, see Keith L. Sellen, "The United Nations Security Council Veto in the New World Order," *Military Law Review* 138 (1992) 187-262.

91. See generally Douglas L. Bland, *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1991).

92. Discussing the endurance of alliances during the Cold War period, one expert says: "alliances, in the end, are the product of insecurity; so long as the Soviet Union and the United States each remain[ed] for the other and for their respective clients the major source of danger in the world, neither super-power encounter[ed] very much difficulty in maintaining the coalitions it control[led]." Gaddis, *Long Peace* 222.

93. It has been suggested that "the United States is considerably less likely to dispatch forces abroad in the post-Cold War era. In this sense the gulf crisis belongs to the past, not the future, of American foreign policy." Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 69 (1990): 12.

94. One commentator cautions against drawing erroneous conclusions because of "the many special circumstances that make the Gulf War an unlikely model for future collective responses." Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1993): 7.

95. See, e.g., George Bush, "Why We Are In the Gulf," *Newsweek* 26 Nov. 1990: 28-29; George J. Church, "Raising the Ante," *Time* 19 Nov. 1990: 48.

96. Of course, it may be argued that the United States does have a vital interest in preventing a general or major land war in Europe. Insofar as the situation in the former Yugoslavia may expand in that manner, the United States would have an interest in joining other nations in an intervention. See Flora Lewis, "From Paranoia to Peril," *New York Times* 20 Mar. 1993: A21 ("The Clinton administration has determined that the war in the former Yugoslavia is a 'strategic interest' of the U.S. because of the

implications of a widening conflict.").

97. See, e.g., Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Frozen By Fear," *Washington Post* 19 Mar. 1993: A31.

98. Columnist Richard Cohen filed the following from Bosnia:

In order to understand what is happening in the former Yugoslavia, turn back your clock. Keep going to World War II and then to World War I and then back to the 15th century, when the Ottoman Turks seized this area and converted some inhabitants to Islam. That might sound like irrelevant history to an American, but here it is used to justify an exceedingly ugly war. Children are dying for what their great-great-grandparents once did.

Richard Cohen, ". . . And a Mad, Mad War," *Washington Post* 15 Dec. 1992: A23.

99. It is noted that those who focus on the current fighting typically conclude the Serbians are the aggressors. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, "Lessons of Yugoslavia," *New York Times* 26 Feb. 1993: A27; Julia Preston, "U.S. Options Slim in Balkan Morass," *Washington Post* 12 Feb. 1993: A32.

100. Those familiar with the history of the region should doubt the chances of even a substantial military commitment to be successful. See, e.g., Center of Military History, United States Army Pub. 104-18, *German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944)* (1954; Washington: GPO, 1989); "Into Bosnia: But Is There a Plan to Get Out?" *The Economist* 4 Jul. 1992: 14. For a contrary view, see George Kenney and Michael Dugan, "Operation Balkan Storm: Here's a Plan," *New York Times* 29 Nov. 1992, sec. 4: 11.

101. In the words of a former secretary of state:

If the United States opts for altering the situation on the ground by military means, it will face the dilemma of Vietnam--an open-ended commitment with no visible exit. If it undertakes a major enforcement role, it will be on the road to an embarrassment similar to that in Beirut.

Henry Kissinger, "Avoiding the Quagmire in Bosnia," *Washington Post* 1 Mar. 1993: A17.

102. "Who Will Fight for the World?" *The Economist* 30 Jan. 1993: 15.

103. It may be noted, however, that a smaller military can perhaps cause political leaders to be more reluctant to get involved when less than vital interests are at risk, simply because less of the military asset will be available for any purpose.

104. One author submits the United States would have a prohibitive advantage in such battles because of America's advanced weapons systems:

Almost unnoticed, the technology that drives the science of war has taken a giant leap forward, and the Third World has been left behind. In any conventional conflict in which the United States or any of the major Western powers is pitted against a Third World adversary, the outcome is preordained. In effect, the change is so significant that we have returned to the military equation of the 19th century, when colonial wars pitted small numbers of disciplined, well-trained Western troops with rifles against hordes of tribal warriors armed with only shields and spears.

Wayne K. Maynard, "Spears vs. Rifles: The New Equation of Military Power," *Parameters* 23.1 (1993): 49.

105. See "We Have the High Tech, They Have Not," *The Economist: A Survey of Defence in the 21st Century* 5 Sep. 1992: 12-14.

106. When your opponent is substantially less well armed than you, your need to work on the "next generation" weapons system is diminished. Of course, American leaders cannot assume that today's well armed allies will remain amicable. Efforts to modernize weapons systems must therefore continue, even if the pace can be scaled down from the Cold War effort.

107. Cheney 11-18.

108. The reduced presence of American forces overseas should not be viewed as a solution to domestic economic problems. "Defense savings do not translate directly unto cures for domestic ills; reducing defense spending and foreign aid should not be mistaken as a strategy for solving America's internal problems." Stephen W. Bosworth, "The United States and Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 71 (1992): 128.

109. The Japanese government, for example, agreed in January 1991 to pay approximately three-quarters of the costs associated with stationing United States forces in Japan (exclusive of U.S. military and Defense Department civilian personnel costs). In

June 1991, the Republic of Korea pledged to pay one-third of the non-U.S. personnel costs for United States forces in that nation. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Region), *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress 1992* (Washington: Dept. of Defense, 1992) 23-27.

110. See, e.g., Steve Vogel, "German Defense Cuts Worrying NATO," *Washington Post* 13 Feb. 1993: A27.

111. In any event, "a residual U.S. overseas presence means little in and of itself. What the overseas forces represent is the tangible commitment of U.S. might." Robert J. Art, "A U.S. Military Strategy for the 1990s: Reassurance Without Dominance," *Survival* 34.4 (1993): 17.

112. It has also been submitted that "the retrenchment of U.S. forward-deployed forces and withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons will leave strategic nuclear weapons and extended deterrence as a unique symbol of leadership power and means of reassurance for allies and friends." Keith B. Payne, "Deterrence and U.S. Strategic Force Requirements After the Cold War," *Comparative Strategy* 11 (1992): 269.

113. The judicial system has provided an example of just how widely known the technology has become. See *United States v. Progressive, Inc.*, 467 F.Supp. 990 (W.D.Wis. 1979). Publishers of *The Progressive* magazine planned to print an article entitled, "The H-Bomb Secret--How We Got It, Why We're Telling It." Although the district court restrained publication because the article contained "restricted data," the general information the proposed article contained was later "independently reconstructed and published by other sources." John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., "Freedom of Expression," *National Security Law*, ed. John N. Moore et al. (Durham: Carolina Academic P, 1990) 981. See also Tom Clancy and Russell Seitz, "Five Minutes Past Midnight--And Welcome to the Age of Proliferation," *The National Interest* 26.4 (1991): 3-12.

114. Many unstable regimes are finding a marketplace that did not exist during the Cold War for materials, scientists, and possibly even completed weapons. It has been reported, for example, "that North Korea is determined to develop a nuclear weapon." R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Denounces N. Korea for Quitting Nuclear Pact," *Washington Post* 13 Mar. 1992: A1. It is also widely speculated that such nations as Iran, Iraq, and Libya are interested in acquiring nuclear arms.

115. See David C. Morrison, "Over Here," *National Journal* 6 Feb. 1993: 326-30.

116. See, e.g., John G. Roos, "Joint Task Forces: Mix 'N' Match Solutions to Crisis Response," *Armed Forces Journal International* Jan. 1993: 33-39.

117. William Matthews, "Fewer Hardware Differences, Less Rivalry?" *Air Force Times* 4 Jan. 1993: 24.

118. See Carnegie Endowment National Commission on America and the New World, *Changing Our Ways* (Washington: Brookings Inst., 1992) 63.

119. See Cheney 17.

120. Noncombat uses of the military are frequently described as "nontraditional." However, "nontraditional uses of the military" connotes non-customary uses of the military, which is not accurate. Whether referring to such roles as riot control, drug interdiction, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peacemaking, or others, the military has a long tradition of performing such tasks.

121. For a cautionary tale about increased noncombat roles for the military, see Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters* 22.4 (1992): 2-20; see also Stephen S. Crane, "Not a Mission for the National Guard," *Chicago Tribune* 6 Nov. 1992, sec. 3: 22.

122. William Claiborne, "Enlisting a Better Response to Disaster," *Washington Post* 28 Jan. 1993: A19. See also William Claiborne, "After Storms and Controversy, What's In Store for FEMA?" *Washington Post* 6 Oct. 1992: A19; William Booth, "Hugo Survivor Wonders: Does Washington Learn?" *Washington Post* 16 Sep. 1992: A6.

123. "The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time." Clausewitz 95 (emphasis in the original).

124. The rationale for previous limitations on use of the armed forces must also be understood. The Posse Comitatus Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1385, for example, imposes criminal penalties for improper use of the military in domestic law enforcement matters. Any changes to that law or to other procedures should be made with great care.

125. Referring to military leaders' acceptance of an expansion of noncombat roles, one writer concludes: "Nothing good will come of a military as bewildered about its purpose as the nation it is supposed to defend. Congress needs to make sure that both the military and the new administration are clear about the primary mission of the U.S. armed forces." Seth Cropsey, "The