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Semin B

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

CORE COURSE (5) ESSAY

STRATEGY AND CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR DEFEATING SERBIAN AGGRESSION

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Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE 1994		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-1994 to 00-00-1994	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Strategy and Campaign Plan for Defeating Serbian Aggression				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National War College, 300 5th Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319-6000				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT see report					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 17	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

STRATEGY AND CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR DEFEATING SERBIAN AGGRESSION

Sun Tzu said:

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy; Next best is to disrupt his alliances; the next best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative. (Griffith : 77-78)

The purpose of this paper is to develop a national strategy and theater campaign for defeating Serbian aggression in the former Yugoslavia. It builds upon the assessment that Bosnian Serb attacks have their source in Serbian policy and support. If the alliance between Bosnian Serbs and Serbia is broken, and if Serbian will to fight can be broken, victory can be attained at a relatively low cost. Any ground combat that will be required to defeat remaining Bosnian Serb forces can be undertaken by the Bosnians themselves once the arms embargo is lifted and U.S. and other nations begin supplying them with the wherewithal to defend themselves.

Political Guidance

The following televised speech was given by the President at the National War College on April 28, 1994:

The United States cannot permit raw unjustified aggression by Serbia and its minions to continue. The violations of international law prohibiting genocide in the case of non-Serbian citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina also cannot be permitted to continue. To permit these actions to continue without resolute action by the United States and NATO would send a clear message to other potential aggressors around the world that armed unprovoked aggression against their neighbors will be tolerated. The Serbian policy being carried out by Serbian leader Milosevic of attempting to unite all Serbians under one state, and ensuring through a policy of "ethnic cleansing" that Serbian nationals are the majority population in a new Greater Serbia, must be defeated. The Bosnian Serbs are misguided in their attempts to support and further this policy. The United States believes that the arms embargo should be maintained against Serbia, but should be lifted immediately in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia should also understand that the international community opposes any "ethnic cleansing" policies that might be undertaken elsewhere in

the former Yugoslavia, including Kosovo and Macedonia. Prison camps must also be closed and their prisoners freed.

The United States believes that the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be returned to their pre-war status, and that all Serbian and Bosnian Serb tanks and heavy artillery should be immediately withdrawn beyond these borders. Any such equipment and forces that remains within Bosnia and Herzegovina one month from now will be subject to allied air attack. Should a withdrawal not be underway within the week, the United States will assume that no such withdrawal is planned and act accordingly. Should additional harm be threatened or inflicted on the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States will also be forced to act. The United States will begin working immediately with the Muslim, Croatian, and Bosnian leadership to ensure that they understand our humanitarian and democratic objectives for the region.

As President, I must always consider the risk of the loss of American lives that any military action entails and carefully weigh any such costs against the potential gains, and the risk of inaction. Certainly, we will undertake our actions in a manner designed to attain victory at the lowest possible cost. But again, the risk of loss of life is there. The American people have a right to know what these lives are being risked for. The answer is both abstract and obvious.

Some have called what is going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina a "civil war." They are incorrect. This is a war planned, prosecuted, and supplied by Serbia. It is a grab for territory and resources. It is an attempt by a relatively small number of civilians aided and supported by the Serbian military -- aided and led by Milosevic, to take advantage of and exacerbate fear of one strong minority against a weaker one. Just as Hitler convinced good people in Germany that the Jews were their enemy, Milosevic has convinced Serbian people and many Bosnian Serbs that "ethnic cleansing" rather than shared power and representative government are in their interests.

After World War II, the United States said of the Nazi Genocide "Never Again." The Serbian policy of "ethnic cleansing" is genocide. If the United States stands for anything, believes in anything, and is a world leader, it must be that our power will be used not just to defend our own lives, but the lives of innocent men, women, and children, whose only crime is that they are a minority religion and that someone wants control of their land. In Nazi Germany, Jewish possessions and property were quickly confiscated. The same policy is underway in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbian leader Milosevic has sponsored a policy advocating the creation of a "Greater Serbia." In this Great Serbian policy, all Serbs have the right to live in one country. Rather than be represented as a political minority in Bosnia or Croatia, they have been persuaded by the Serbian nationalists to undertake military and genocidal action to ensure that they are the majority. In order to accomplish this, other ethnic and religious groups must be eliminated from the territory desired by the Serbs -- the result is the horror that has become reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina

these past three years.

When I assess the risk of inaction, I conclude that to stand by and watch the horror continue, or to seek the Bosnian state chewed up and its people "cleansed" out of existence, I fear for what our inaction would make the United States. First, those currently deterred from hostilities will no longer be deterred. Second, the United States would be akin to people who watched out their window while a woman was raped in front of them. If that is who we become, we will not be the United States that we want our children to read about in the history books.

Some of our NATO allies may be willing to support our policies. Some may not. The EC, however, has not succeeded in addressing the problem. We must. We must because the United States cannot permit there to be established in the post Cold War World a model of action based on Serbian aggression. We have been called a "reluctant superpower." So we are. But the consequences of permitting raw aggression to be used to acquire territory and the consequences of continued inaction in the face of genocide must call this reluctant superpower to resolute action.

But again, what of the costs?

Serbian and Bosnian Serb aggression has continued when faced with weak, unarmed, and helpless victims. In the face of the credible threat of force, backed up as needed to support the credibility of the threat, the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs have backed off. We can hope that they will take our threat of an air campaign seriously and withdraw beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina's borders. If not, we will make it more difficult for the Bosnian Serbs to operate and will raise the cost of aggression to Serbia. We hold no animosity against the people of Serbia who may themselves be opposed to their leadership's policy and to the Serbian war of terror. We do not support a Bosnian war of retaliation against Serbia or Bosnian Serbs. What we seek in the former Yugoslavia is peace, democracy, and an opportunity for all the people of the region to heal and enjoy their freedom from the terror of ethnic cleansing.

I thereby direct that U.S. policy is that the continuation of the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina is contrary to the UN Charter's proscribed right to self defense. The United States will therefore seek its revision to apply it only to Serbia; if this cannot be accomplished expeditiously, the United States will not continue to recognize its validity. The United States will carefully observe Serbian and Bosnian Serb action to determine if they are withdrawing their forces back into Serbia. If they are not, the United States will, in coordination with our NATO allies when possible, and in every case with the duly appointed representative governments in Croatia and Bosnia/Herzegovina, attack these and other Serb and Bosnian Serb military targets. We will continue to seek a peaceful solution, but this solution will not reward aggression.

Thank You.

Strategic Military Objectives

The strategic military objectives deriving from the President's speech are as follows:

- 1) Prepare to interdict Serbian lines of communication and support.
- 2) Prepare to attack Serbian heavy artillery and tanks, beginning with those causing the largest civilian casualties.
- 3) Achieve air superiority and eliminate all known anti-aircraft capability.
- 4) Assist Bosnian forces in training in use of ground equipment.
- 5) Prepare to evacuate to safe location all UN, NATO, and civilian observers.
- 6) Establish facilities for the detention of all captured Serbian forces and ensure their safety.

Mission Statement: The mission is to use air power and logistical and training support for Bosnian forces to move all Serbian and Bosnian Serb forces beyond the UN recognized borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Minimize civilian casualties to the degree possible, primarily through coordination with UN, NATO, civilian, and local forces on the ground. At the earliest possible occasion, free prisoners from detention camps and in coordination with local Bosnian authorities, provide detainees with transportation to safe locations, medical treatment, and food.

War Termination Objectives: The war termination objectives or end state identified by the President are: 1) return of Bosnian borders to their pre-war status; 2) withdrawal of all Serbian and Bosnian Serb tanks and heavy artillery beyond these borders; 3) closure of Serb prison camps and release of prisoners.

Enemy Forces

Clausewitz was specific regarding the knowledge of the enemy required including the critical factor of the enemy's will:

If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter -- through not exclusively -- of figures, and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it. (Paret, page 77)

Composition, Location, Disposition, and Strengths: *Attachment I* indicates the Serbian forces as of August 1992. Some tanks and other equipment has subsequently been captured by Bosnian forces. These forces "are with some exceptions very poorly trained and led:

There is a great shortage of junior officers and NCOs. The morale and discipline of the troops is very low. This is even true for the Serbian and Montenegrin reservists, despite the fact that they are well-paid; their salary is reportedly three times what an average worker earns. The units withdrawn from Slovenia and Croatia were poorly structured and largely unsuitable for combat employment in their new deployment areas. A similar situation prevails even in the units sent as reinforcements to the former 2nd MD from other parts of the country. The only troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina which have any combat effectiveness are heavy and rocket artillery, and the military police. (Vego, Oct 92: 447)

The author of the above statement concluded his assessment of Serbian forces by saying that the former federal troops are poorly organized, trained and led. He notes that their successes have been almost entirely due to their overwhelming superiority in firepower, but also highlights that "whenever they have met a well-armed and motivated opponent they have suffered defeat or severe setback." (Vego, Oct 92: 448)

Enemy Strategic Concept: The Serbian strategy is to create a "mini-Yugoslavia," carving up Bosnia and Herzegovina in the process. The eastern portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be attached to Serbia. The southern part to be attached to Montenegro, and "the western part to Serb-populated and occupied regions in Croatia." (Gow: 8) The Yugoslav military, cleansed of minority opponents, undertook its military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina after conducting an assessment of the probability of western intervention and concluding that there was little reason to expect international armed intervention in Yugoslavia. (Gow: 6) Their view was that Europe would be unwilling and unable to intervene without the United States, and that the United States would be crippled by the specter of Viet Nam. Their fear was that Yugoslavia and Serbia would be addressed in the same manner as Iraq.

The Serbian strategy for ensuring that it did not have to encounter Western, and particularly U.S. forces was a deception strategy focused on portraying itself as not directly involved in a war against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It thus has undertaken a number of deception efforts primarily in the international public affairs arena. It has also sought to improve domestic support for its war by asserting that Serbs in the other former Yugoslavian republics were or were going to be the victims of genocide and in highlighting territorial gains achieved at low cost.

The primary weakness of Serbian strategy is that it relies on the inaction of Western nations and on its overwhelming military power to defeat its enemies at a low cost in Serbian lives.

Probable major enemy strategic and operational objectives: Strategically, the Serb forces will seek to undermine the will of the United States to act by conducting a public affairs effort. This effort will seek to portray Bosnian Serb forces as a legitimate combatant in a civil war and to attempt to portray U.S. actions as causing civilian casualties. Operationally, the Serbs can be expected to seek to maximize and hold ground, and to continue "cleansing" the local population to try to assert that turning the held territory back over to the Bosnian Government would jeopardize the rights of the majority population in those areas.

Enemy operational and sustainment capabilities: Bosnian Serb forces are supplied from Serbia. While their armaments and ammunition supplies are considerable, cutting off continued supplies from Serbia would weaken these forces. Preemption of their command structures and communications with Serbia would also leave the Bosnian Serb forces blind and could be sufficient to undermine morale and cause them to seek a peaceful settlement with the Bosnian Government -- if their fear of retaliation by the populations they have terrorized can be overcome.

Enemy Vulnerabilities: The greatest vulnerability faced by Serbian forces in Bosnia is their overconfidence that the West would not intervene, and the fatal blow to already low morale both in the military and in Serbia that military intervention could deliver. The second greatest vulnerability faced by those forces are their lines of communication with their suppliers and reserve forces in Serbia. *Attachment II* indicates these supply routes crossings from Serbia.

Enemy Strategic and Operational Centers of Gravity: The strategic center

of gravity is the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic. His rise to power was based on his adoption of the Serbian nationalist agenda of a "greater Serbia," but his continued support could be severely undermined if such a goal could only be attained at the risk of high casualties of Serbian forces in Bosnia and potential U.S. air strikes on strategic targets in Serbia. Operationally, the centers of gravity of Serb and Bosnian Serb forces are twofold: first, the heavy artillery forces; and second, the lines of communication with Serbia.

Friendly Forces:

The Bosnian presidency formally established the 'Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina' on May 14, 1992 to represent the common armed forces of the three peoples of the republic, namely Muslims, Serbs, Croats, and other ethnic minorities. (Vego, Feb 93: 64) As of February 1993, five corps with about 80,000 fighters have been created, but only about 44,000 men were reportedly armed. *Attachment III* indicates the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina as of January 1993. Each corps, consisting of four to five brigades of about 1000-15000 men, is assigned responsibility for the defense of a specific region of the republic. Most of the units are led by former officers and NCOs of the Yugoslavian Federal Army who defected as late as two or three months after hostilities broke out. Some of the high ranking commanders in the field are Croats. (Vego, Feb 93: 65)

In addition to local forces, there is an unknown number of muslim fighters who have joined Muslim forces in Bosnia. While reports vary, "reliable sources say that no more than 400 to 600 volunteers from the Muslim countries are currently fighting in

Bosnia." (Vego, Feb 93:66) The largest number of these come from Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. These forces should be brought under Bosnian Muslim control.

Because of the existing UN arms embargo, the Croats and Muslims have relied on black market purchases of weapons, with much of the funding coming from the Middle East. The precise inventory of weapons is unknown, and information regarding capabilities should be elicited. It is reported, however, that the primary deficiencies are in small arms, mortars, anti-tank missiles and guns, heavy weapons such as large caliber field guns, armored vehicles and tanks. (Vego, Feb 93: 66)

Intent of Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting Allied or Other Coalition

Forces: While it is not clear that all of our NATO allies will be prepared to join U.S. efforts in Bosnia, their support for our operations should be sought. Additional support, either in the form of finance, weaponry, or participation should be sought from the Middle Eastern states, and Saudi Arabia in particular. The support of our NATO allies is likely to be more forthcoming if they are faced with American resolve. The support of certain Middle Eastern states, such as Iran and Libya, should not be sought or expected. In each case, commitment to U.S. objectives, including democracy and human rights (i.e., protection of captured Serbian forces and commitment not to use our forces and support for retaliation beyond what is necessary to attain our objectives) should be elicited.

Commanders Concept: The concept of operations is that U.S. forces will provide active support to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in driving Serbian and Serbian

supported forces from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This support will be primarily in the form of air strikes against Serbian targets and the provision of ground equipment for Bosnian use. Other support will include logistics and coordination of the war.

Theater Organizational Concept: The air war should be under U.S. command and control and should be organized under a Joint Task Force Commander. This Commander will also have liaison with the ground forces commander who should be the Commander of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The JTF Commander should be supported with Logistical, Intelligence, Security and Communications commanders as well as a Special Operations Force Commander.

Direct Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity: The strategic and operational centers of gravity identified above will be attacked using U.S. airpower. Resupply of enemy forces will be interdicted. The withdrawal of enemy forces from the territory will not be halted so long as it is expeditious.

Tasks

- 1) Observe movement of military equipment to determine if and when it will be removed beyond the Drina river.

- 2) Provide necessary military equipment to the Bosnian Government under an agreement that they will provide for humanitarian and democratic rights for Bosnian Serbs and will not use the equipment to invade Serbia. Since the question of war trials will arise, begin working with civilian agencies to provide for war crimes tribunals after the war.

3) Establish ground liaison for selection of targets within Bosnia/Herzegovina and ensure that UN, NATO, and humanitarian workers are in safe zones prior to air attacks on Serbian forces.

4) Interdict Serbian and Bosnian Serb lines of communication and support from Serbia.

5) Secure facilities in Sarajevo for use of aircraft.

6) Prepare informational material to be provided to local population as well as Serbian population informing them of U.S. objectives and willingness to seek a stable and peaceful solution. Emphasize points made in the President's speech.

Phases

The campaign plan envisions three phases for the operation. Phase I entails U.S. or U.S. led air strikes against Bosnian and Bosnian Serb artillery and tanks and Special Operations attempts to secure the release of Muslim and Croatian prisoners of war as feasible. Phase II entails the Bosnian ground campaign against remaining Serb forces within Bosnia and Herzegovina with U.S. air support provided. The air support should be negotiated with the Commander of Bosnian forces; the CINC is directed to conduct those operations in which he believes air support is most effective with the lowest risk. Phase III entails the termination of U.S. air support and transition to activities related to ensuring that Serb prisoners are treated fairly. Should UN forces be introduced to observe the border or prisoner treatment, liaison should be established.

Federal Army Deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina — August 1992

ATTACHMENT

I

East Northeastern Bosnia

III North Bosnian Corps¹ (Bijeljina)

2nd Motorized Bde (Brčko)
145th Motorized Bde
195th Motorized Bde
6th Inf Bde
11th Partizan Bde² (Bijeljina)
29th Partizan Div
417th Mixed Arty Regt
454th Mixed Arty Bde
17th Light AA Arty Regt
31th Light AA Arty Regt
17th Engr Regt (Bijeljina)
522nd Engr Regt
3x Border Troop sections
6x Independent bns
1x Military Police bn
Rear Service Units

Western Bosnia

I Krajina Corps³ (Banja Luka)

140th Mech Bde (Banja Luka)
12th Motorized Bde (Prijeđor)
149th Inf Bde (Derвента)
41st Partizan Div (Mrkonjić Grad)
5x Territorial Defence bdes (Mrkonjić Grad)
2x Mountain bdes (Mrkonjić Grad)
389th Rocket Arty Regt ('FROG-7') (Banja Luka)
5th Mixed Arty Regt (Mech)
5th Mixed A.Tk Regt
149th Medium AA Arty Regt* (SA-6)
5th Light AA Arty Regt
5th Engr Regt
Several Independent bns
1x Military Police bns
3x Rear Service regts

II Krajina Corps⁵ (Drvar)

4th Armd Bde
140th Motorized Bde
257th Motorized Bde
127th Engr Regt
10th Mixed Arty Regt
580th Mixed Arty Bde (?)
10th Mixed A.Tk Arty Regt
10th Light AA Arty Regt
471st Mixed A.Tk Regt (?)
513th Engr Regt
10th Bridge Laying Bn
6x Independent Special Purpose bns
42nd Border Troop Section
43rd Border Troop Section
374th Auto Vehicle Bn
940th Rear Base
970th Rear Base

Knin Operational Group⁶ (Bosansko Grahovo?)

221th Armd Bde
189th Motorized Bde
316th Inf Bde
9th Mixed AA Arty Regt
9th Light AA Arty Regt
9th Engr Regt
1x Military Police bn
Several Independent bns
Rear Service units

East Central Bosnia

IV East Bosnian Corps⁷ (Pale)

49th Mech Bde
6th Motorized Bde (Doboj)
7th Mountain Bde (Travnik)
13th Partizan Div (Doboj)
1x Rocket bde ('FROG-7')
4th Mixed Arty Regt
4th Mixed A.Tk Regt
4th Light AA Arty Regt
4th Engr Regt
1x Military Police bn (Doboj)
Several Independent bns
Rear Service units

Užice Corps⁸ (Nevesinje)

325th Armd Bde⁹
10th Motorized Bde¹⁰ (Mostar)
5th Motorized Bde
6th Motorized Bde
145th Motorized Bde
437th Motorized Bde
19th Mountain Bde
215th Mountain Bde
216th Mountain Bde¹¹ (Romanija)
31st Arty Regt
208th Arty Regt
417th Mixed A.Tk Regt

Herzegovinian Corps¹² (Bileća)

8th Motorized Bde
13th Motorized Bde
145th Motorized Bde
473d Motorized Bde¹³ (Trebinje-Bileća)
5th Montenegrin Mountain Bde (Nikšić)
6th Montenegrin Mountain Bde (Podgorica)
1x Partizan div
13th Mixed Arty Regt
13th A.Tk Arty Regt
13th Light AA Arty Regt
13th Engr Bn
Several Independent bns
1x Military Police bn
Rear Service units

Air Force and Air Defence

43 combat aircraft (Orao-2 and Jastreb fighter bombers;
MiG-21 reconnaissance aircraft)¹⁴

20(+) helicopters

Air Bases

Banja Luka (fixed-wing aircraft)
Zalužani (helicopters)
Udbina (transports)¹⁵

Air Defence


1x SAM division (SA-2) (Banja Luka)
1x SAM battery (SA-6) (Banja Luka)
1x AA Gun battery (40 mm L70 AA guns with 'Giraffe' fire
control radar) (Banja Luka)

2x SAM divisions (SA-3.5.9) (around Sarajevo)

Large number of the SA-7 (Strela-1/2M) missiles

Large number of the triple 20 mm AA guns and twin Czech
30 mm AA guns

ATTACHMENT II



The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (January 1993)

ATTACHMENT

III

Supreme Commander (Mr Alija Izetbegovic, Muslim)

Defence Minister (Mr Jerko Doko, Croat)

Main Staff (Sarajevo)

— Commander (Colonel Safir Halilovic, Muslim)

— Deputy Commander (Colonel Stjepan Siber, Croat)

Territorial Defence Forces (TDF)

- 80 000 men (44 000 men fully armed)
- 7 District Staffs (Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zenica, Mostar, Tuzla, Livno, Bihac)
- 23 Municipal 'Crisis Staffs'
- 5 corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- 30-33 brigades¹
- 2 'Tactical Groups'
- Special Forces
- Military Police

Air Force

- One J-2 Jastreb fighter-bomber²
- Dubrava airbase (near Tuzla)
- Zeljava airbase (near Bihac)

Deployment of Forces

Sarajevo Area³ (22 000?)⁴

- 1st Corps (Sarajevo)
- 3-4 brigades (Sarajevo)⁵
 - One brigade (Visoko)
 - 1st 'Tactical Group' (Kiseljak)

Central Bosnia⁶ (15 000)

- 3rd Corps (Zenica)
- One brigade (Zenica)
 - One brigade (Zavidovici)
 - One brigade (Maglaj)
 - One brigade (Vitez)
 - One brigade (Kakanj)
 - One brigade (Vares)
 - *Kata'ib el-Muminin* (Phalanx of Believers) (Novi Travnik) (400-600 *mujahedin*)

Eastern Bosnia⁷ (10 000?)

- 2-3 brigades (Gorazde)
- 2-3 brigades (Srebrenica)

Northern Bosnia (15 000)

- 2nd Corps (Tuzla)⁸
- 1st Brigade (Tesanj)
 - One brigade (Tesiic)
 - One brigade (Dobo)
 - One brigade (Tuzla)
 - One brigade (Gracanica)
 - One brigade (Banovici)

Northwestern Bosnia (The Bihac Enclave)⁹ (10 000?)

- 5th Corps (Bihac)¹⁰
- 2nd Brigade (Kljuc)
 - 111th Brigade (Bosanska Krupa)
 - 3 brigades (Bihac)
 - One brigade (Cazin)
 - One brigade (Velika Kladusa)

Herzegovina (8000?)

- 4th Corps (Mostar)
- 1st Mostar Brigade (Mostar)
 - One brigade (Jablanica)
 - One brigade (Stolac?)
 - 4th 'Tactical Group Igman' (Konjic)

Notes

1. Many brigades are no larger than a battalion.
2. Observed at the Dubrava air base. Probably non-operational.
3. Includes the besieged city of Sarajevo and some of the unoccupied suburbs.
4. This includes about 10 000 fighters currently concentrated on the Igman Mountain in preparation for the expected offensive to lift the siege of Sarajevo.
5. The name in parenthesis denotes the municipality where the unit was raised, not necessarily its current deployment area.
6. The Joint Command of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council forces was established in November 1992.
7. Reportedly, several hundred fighters of the Croatian Defence Forces (HOS), the armed wing of the Croatian Party of the Right, operate jointly with the Muslim forces in eastern Bosnia.
8. In addition, six brigades of the HVO are currently and temporarily subordinate to 2nd Corps.
9. The total population in the Bihac enclave, mostly Muslims, is estimated at 400 000.
10. Several of these brigades are organized into the 'Una-Sana Operational Group'.

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