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THESIS

SUCCESS IN CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

by

Thomas José Brown

September 2005

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

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   To determine what causes success or failure in CMO, this thesis will conduct three different case study analyses of Iraq based on the three predominant ethno-religious regions of the country: Kurdish North, Sunni Center, and Shi'a South. In order to analyze, compare, and contrast these three separate cases, this thesis will use three independent variables: integration of CMO in all phases of the operations; balance of CMO between the combat or civilian operations; and attitude of the Host Nation (HN) or occupied area. These variables set the conditions necessary for CMO success.

   In conclusion, this thesis provides essential principles for CMO planning and identifies requirements in doctrine, training, organization, and structure of CMO forces for future operations.

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SUCCESS IN CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

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Major, United States Army
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requirements for the degree of

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I. INTRODUCTION

The object of war is to attain a better peace—even if only from your point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with a constant regard to the peace you desire.[1]

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.[2]

— B. H. Liddell Hart

A. PURPOSE

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein and the occupation of Iraq, many governmental institutions have devoted significant amounts of time and energy to study why and how the United States should involve itself in future Iraqi operations, specifically in the tasks of security, reconstruction, humanitarian aid, nation building, and stability. Along with these studies come debates over how the United States should organize as well as participate in these tasks more commonly known by the military as Civil Military Operations (CMO) missions. Before debating such issues, one important question should be examined: What determines the success of CMO? This question is the overall purpose of this thesis.

If CMO is to be effective in influencing successful operational outcomes, principles for success should be developed and analyzed. Currently, in military doctrine, there are no such principles.[3] The lack of understanding of what CMO encompasses, and the wide diversity of players involved, coupled with the lack of principles, creates an environment that is confusing and difficult for any military planner. Although they are not the only CMO force capable of conducting CMO,

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[1] B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1967), 353.

[2] Ibid.

[3] William Flavin. *Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan: Observations on Civil Military Operations During the First Year of Operation Enduring Freedom.*

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Civil Affairs (CA) are doctrinally the chief planners for CMO. Due to this fact, CA should have a vested interest in understanding a framework for what determines success in CMO.

B. THE PROBLEM

What determines success in Civil Military Operations? Key to answering this question is testing my hypothesis with the most current and relevant case study today: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

1. Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this thesis states that the success or failure of CMO is dependent on three variables: Integration of CMO in all phases of the operations, the balance of CMO between combat operations and civil operations, and the attitude of the Host Nation (HN) or occupied area.

2. The Independent Variables

These three tentative independent variables were developed from historical examples, doctrine, and personnel experience. While Chapter II will explain how the variables were derived, the purpose of this section is to provide the reader with a definition of each variable.

a. Integration of CMO into All phases of the Operations

If CMO are activities that are conducted as part of an overall operation, they need to occur as an ongoing process, incorporated into all phases of the operations. The degree of this integration is the independent variable. The phases of the operation include pre-crisis, preparation, deployment, hostilities, and post-conflict.[4] If the operations are absent of combat, the hostilities phase may be minimal, but for the scope of this thesis all phases are considered.

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[4] U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57*, I-10.

b. Balance of CMO Between the Combat and Civilian Operation

Joint Publication (JP) 3-57 states that "CMO can be broadly separated into support to military operations and support to civil operations."[5] For Iraq, an example of a CMO supporting the military operation would be CMO missions intended to help hunt down insurgents. An example of a CMO supporting the civilian operation would be CMO in support of reconstruction. With a limited number of CMO forces and resources, key to success is establishing the right balance between the applications of CMO into the overall operation. The independent variable is the extent to which the proper balance is achieved. An example of an inappropriate balance would be a task force's CA units supplying humanitarian aid to a village to win the "hearts and minds" of the locals, while neglecting population and resource control (PRC) measures to establish security and prevent looting. Since many of the CMO missions cannot always be neatly divided into these two categories, appropriateness of the CMO mission for the given situation is essential.

c. The Attitude of the Host Nation or Occupied Area

Development of Host Nation (HN) government, military and other existing institutions is essential to achieving the long term goals of any CMO. However, if coordination between the U.S. military and the HN is to occur, the HN must be cooperative. The independent variable is the HN's attitude towards the collective U.S. and HN goals. Although behavior of the HN can be examined as a dependent variable when discussing CMO, this thesis will consider the deep rooted attitude already instilled in the HN as the independent variable.

3. The Dependent Variable

The degree of success or failure of CMO is the dependent variable of my hypothesis. Since CMO is defined as the activities under the commander, providing a definition of what constitutes success or failure of CMO is far more complex than defining success or failure for the overall operation. My definition of success is focused on CMO; however, it is impossible not to consider the success or failure of the overall operational success.

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[5] U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57.*

Success in CMO can be defined in relation to the overall operations. In the case of peacekeeping or post conflict operations, this would be mostly associated with establishing the conditions for peace and the transition to legitimate civilian control.[6] For example, in support of peacekeeping operations, CMO success might be defined as creating the conditions for all warring parties to cooperate. This type of success may also be defined as "cultivating ripeness."[7] The concept of "ripe," which is a perception of the conditions necessary for a peace process to begin, is explored in the "theory of ripeness."[8] In diplomacy, this "ripeness" refers to "whether particular circumstances are conducive for negotiated solution or even progress."[9] When a conflict is involved, this can be considered the end goal of any CMO. However, for a post-hostility operation following major combat, success in CMO might be considered the establishment or reestablishment of legitimacy in the HN institutions.

One of the most difficult tasks in CMO is establishing the measure of effectiveness (MOE) of an operation. In the military there is a tendency to establish MOE quantitatively. An example would be counting the number of terrorists or insurgents killed or captured during a given operation. In CMO, this quantitative measure usually comes in the form of number of projects built or amount of aid distributed. This thesis will attempt to establish indicators of success that are based on the ability of the HN to keep the peace in a secure and stable environment. Probably the strongest indicator of success in any CMO is the development or strengthening of friendly institutions that can maintain stability themselves. MOE are relative to this thesis's dependent variable and

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[6] Christopher J. Holshek COL, "Civil-Military Measure of Effectiveness: What is it all about?" (DRAFT), Cornwallis X Analysis for New and Emerging Societal Conflicts, 7.

[7] Mark Stover "Cultivating Ripeness Through UN Peacekeeping Operations," Journal of International Affairs; Spring (2002): 55, 2: 520. Mark Stover advances the "theory of ripeness" in his article in the Journal of International Affairs. Although the article focuses on UN peacekeeping missions, the same concept can be applied to CMO.

[8] I. William Zartman, "Ripeness." *Beyond Intractability.org, (*accessed 05 July 05), available from http://www.intractableconflict.org/m/ripeness/.jsp

[9] Richard N. Haass, "Ripeness and the Settlement of International Disputes," Survival, Volume: 30, Issue 3, 1988, p 232.

should not be confused with the measurement of the three independent variables.

MOE in this thesis is not confined to tactical indicators but is relevant to the politico-military end state based on U.S. objectives and strategy. In this thesis MOE for CMO is based on the overall desired outcome of the operation. If the military's role is to fight and win the nation's wars, finishing the battle does not end when an opposing army is defeated. As seen in Iraq, the fight may continue if an insurgency develops. The mission is only accomplished when a peace is won and an acceptable transition to civilian authorities is complete.

4.   Framework

My hypothesis states that, in order for CMO to be effective, there must be a confluence of the three variables listed above. All three variables are important in determining the success of the CMO. Although the hypothesis states that all three variables must be addressed to be successful, some of the variables may be more important depending on other factors. Two key factors are the security level and the existing capacity of the HN institutions. Depending on the situation, the importance of the factors may vary.

C.   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

A general framework of cause and effect with three different independent variables will be utilized to test my hypothesis. In this attempt, the purpose of this study is to determine what makes CMO successful. Although the post-hostility phase of operations may be the most intensive for CMO, all phases of military operations must be examined. This examination begins with doctrine and planning, and eventually leads to the execution of the CMO.

This thesis will examine the initial period of OIF as three separate case studies. The initial period of any operation is the most relevant; therefore the focus of this thesis will be on that period of time. The basis for my selection of Iraq is that it is currently the most relevant case and it is a case with enough complexity to explore different variables. Just as our current doctrine and understanding of both CMO and CA is based on previous experiences in areas such as Haiti and the Balkans, current changes in CMO will most likely reflect the

experience in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In order to make positive changes in CMO, a detailed study of the most relevant case should be considered first.

To start with, a general understanding of CMO must first be established. The definition from *Joint Publication 3-57* for CMO will be used. According to the joint doctrine, CMO are the activities under the commander. The military often misunderstands the concept of CMO and thinks it only needs to be integrated into the operations after major combat ceases. Additionally, CMO is often thought of as an event to the operations, as opposed to an ongoing process or activity. This attitude toward CMO can be also seen in the military educational system. Traditionally, very little thought or time has been put into covering CMO in the military's advanced schools. In addition, unit training scenarios and exercises usually end prior to the post-conflict phase, where CMO is usually the most intensive. This absence of training does not allow the units to train for CMO and impedes any learning and understanding of CMO concepts. Lack of this conceptual understanding puts forth a valid reason to examine the different case studies and test whether my hypothesis is correct.

D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This thesis will address the following questions.

1. Main Question

What determines the success of CMO?

2. Secondary Questions

- Did the ground commanders integrate CMO into all the phases of the operations?
- Did the ground component commanders accept the role of the CMO commander?
- Were the CMO missions appropriate for the operation?
- Did the ground force neglect any vital CMO missions?
- To what degree did the attitude of the HN affect the ability to conduct CMO missions?

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E.   ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

      1.   Chapter I: Introduction

This chapter provides the purpose, background and scope of the problem, research methodology, and the hypothesis of the thesis.

      2.   Chapter II: Historical Background and Defining Principles

This chapter provides the essential concepts and understanding of CMO necessary for this thesis, showing how the variables were derived through literature, historical references, a doctrinal review, and personnel experience. This chapter will also provide a list of essential players in CMO and a basic understanding of CMO terminology.

      3.   Chapter III: Case Study Analysis

This chapter provides a detailed analysis of Iraq, sub-divided into the Sunni Arab, Shi'a Arab, and Kurdish areas. In each case study, a brief background of the operation will be given, along with a detailed study from planning to the execution.

      4.   Chapter IV: Comparing and Contrasting of the Case Studies

This chapter will compare and contrast the case studies from the previous chapter.

      5.   Chapter V: Conclusion, and Recommendations

This chapter will provide a summary and conclusion of the thesis based on the analysis. Additional recommendations for policy and future studies relevant to CMO will be presented.

F.   RELEVANT LITERATURE

Very little literature has been written on either CMO or CA. Although small anecdotes can be derived from books on war and low-intensity conflicts, only a few historical examples can be found that directly cover the subject of CMO or even CA. A few other references to CMO can also be drawn from academic studies on peacekeeping and other interventions. The following are examples of literature relevant to CMO, but these few samples only scratch the surface of understanding the complexity of CMO.

A Bell for Adano, written by John Hersey, is a fictional book based on a Civil Affairs officer in Italy. Although the book is fictional, there are key concepts and lessons that can be drawn from the main character. Major Victor Joppola is a Civil Affairs officer who is essentially in charge of the military governance in a small Italian town. Major Joppola becomes the American authority in this town and uses his influence to empower the locals to take charge of their own affairs. He does this in way that gives credit to the locals and not the occupying force. At the same time, Major Joppola must coordinate loosely organized American forces in the area while not always having the direct authority to do so. Conflicting interests and ideals over what needed to be done as opposed to what he was allowed to accomplish eventually gets him relieved of the assignment.[10] The book advances concepts and ideals that can be applied to situations during CMO today.

Waging Peace, by Rob Schultheis, is a non-fictional account of a civil affairs team in Iraq. In contrast to the previous book, Civil Affairs Team–A (CAT-A) 13 did not have the authority to empower the locals. Regardless, CAT-A 13 goes beyond what they are required to perform to deliver aid and make lives better for Iraqis. Although an interesting and enjoyable book to read, *Waging Peace* does not go beyond a limited picture that the team members see at the tactical level. The book concludes by providing recommendations for CA in Iraq which focus on either more CA or more training. The recommendations are limited and do not provide any basis for how CA relates to the bigger picture of CMO.[11]

Winning the Peace is a collected study supported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United

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[10] John Hersey, *A Bell for Adano* (New York: Sun Dial Press, 1945). This book was a required reading for Anna Simon's Military Advisor class at the Naval Postgraduate School. Although John Hersey won the Pulitzer Prize for the book in 1945 and is one of the few books written on the subject, it is not a widely read by Civil Affairs officers.

[11] Rob Schultheis, *Waging Peace: A Special Operations Team's Battle to Rebuild Iraq.* (New York: Gotham Books, 2005). Although I criticize the book for being limited and not covering CMO, credit should be given to the author who has written the first book on CA in 50 years. The book at the very least should be read by military officers wanting to gain an understanding of how a tactical CAT-A operates.

States Army (AUSA) that focuses on how the United States should address the problem of post-conflict reconstruction. Although the book focuses primarily on the "nation building" aspects of the aftermath of conflict, it still provides essential concepts and background necessary for this thesis. The book sets out to answer the following questions: "What is needed to rebuild countries after war? How can the United States improve its capacity to succeed at post-conflict reconstruction? And, when and how should the United States use this capacity?"[12] One concept that should be a constant reminder while developing ideas on CMO, is that whether or not we want to, the United States is in the business of doing "nation building**."** Robert C. Orr discusses how state failure will essentially lead to war in some form, whether it is inter- or intra-country specific.[13]

A recently published Rand study, *America's Role In Nation Building,* is an analysis of U.S. involvement on "nation building." James Dobbins, the lead analyst, provides an understanding of the most advantageous methods for these operations. The study's central thesis is that the key variable in measuring success in these "nation building" operations has been the "level of effort" put forth to conduct the missions. Dobbins states the main distinguishing feature between the success or failure of "nation building" has not been culture, development or cultural homogeneity of the country but "the level of effort." He measures this level of effort with time, manpower, and money.[14]

The concepts in these readings support the need to more systematically address "nation building" and "post-conflict reconstruction." However, these books appear to neglect the importance of a limited "window of opportunity" that exists in an operation. Even if the military does not have the primary role to conduct "nation building," it may be the only organization in the position to

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[12] Robert C. Orr ed. *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction.* Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004, 3.

[13] Ibid.

[14] James Dobbins et.al. *America's Role In Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*: (Santa Monica. RAND, 2003), xxv. This book provides an understanding of the big picture regarding operations that rely heavily on CMO; however, there is little information of what occurs in CMO or CA.

capitalize on that "window of opportunity." For this reason, this thesis will address issues that occur in "nation building" from the military perspective and further focus on the initial timeframe known as the "window of opportunity."

II. UNDERSTANDING CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

This chapter provides the basic information needed to understand the scope of this thesis. Much of the information in this chapter may appear very basic to an experienced CMO planner; however, even in the active component of CA, there are newly designated field grade officers that have no CMO or CA experience. This chapter is intended to benefit both, either as a review or as an introduction. Since CMO occurs along the full spectrum of combat operations as well as stabilization, it is inherently a complex task to devise a doctrine that would suggest the techniques and procedures that are the most effective for any given situation. It becomes even more difficult to apply the terminology of governmental and civilian agencies involved and translate them to more familiar military terminology. This section will review CMO doctrine and terminology, discuss the different players involved, give a brief history of modern CMO and explain the development of the hypothesis.

A. CMO DOCTRINE

The military views doctrine as a playbook of the principles an organization or institution uses to operate in its environment.[15] In CMO, multiple organizations and institutions are involved who all have their own playbook and view of how operations should be conducted. This section will review CMO doctrine.

1. Defining Civil Military Operations

The Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations defines CMO as:

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other

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15 Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare,* (London: Franc Cass Publishers.1998), 13.

military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO.[16]

This thesis will begin explaining CMO by providing the joint definition. JP 3-57, the joint doctrine for CMO, gives a broad definition for CMO that encompasses almost every level of CMO that the U.S. may perform throughout the full spectrum of military operations. Key points in this definition are that CMO are activities of the commander; they must support the overall plan in accordance with U.S. objectives; and they can be performed by any force.

Currently CMO has seven different missions. Although it is not the purpose of this thesis to have this list act as a limitation, it does provide a baseline understanding for the possible CMO missions that can be conducted during an operation. CMO forces can perform these missions separately or simultaneously:

> Foreign humanitarian assistance – is conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions.
>
> Population and resource control – assists HN governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers and resources to preclude complicating problems that may hinder accomplishment of the Joint Force Command's (JFC's) mission.
>
> Nation assistance operations – involve civil or military assistance rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation.
>
> Military civil action – involves activities intended to win support of the local population for the foreign nation and its military. Military civic actions are predominately conducted by indigenous military personnel, while US forces provide advice, supervision, or technical support.

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[16] U.S. Joint Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57*, Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Staff, 08 February 2001.

Emergency services – are all the activities and measures designed or undertaken to: minimize the effects upon the civilian population which would be caused by a disaster; deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such disaster; and effect emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such disaster.

Civil Administration – is a unique action undertaken by US commanders only when directed or approval by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Civil administration support consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives in friendly or hostile territory.

Domestic Support Operations – usually occur after a Presidential declaration of a major disaster and are designed to supplement the efforts and resources of state and local governments and voluntary organizations. The US military normally responds to domestic emergencies in support of another agency.[17]

2. Defining Civil Affairs (CA) and CA Activities

To further understand CMO, Civil Affairs must also be defined. Both the Joint and Army doctrines define CA as a force, not the activity being conducted. Civil Affairs is

Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 3-57)[18]

The Department of Defense Dictionary defines CA activities as:

Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations.[19]

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[17] U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57, viii-ix.

[18] Ibid, 86.

[19] Ibid.

Key points to understand in both of these definitions are that although CA may not be the only force that conducts CMO, they are inherently the main force involved in the planning of CMO. This is due to the fact that their activities are those that directly support CMO. Unfortunately, the similarities between the CMO and CA terms cause them to be used interchangeably. Along with the confusing terminology comes a misconception of what is involved in CMO and CA. Two other common misconceptions about CMO and CA are that CMO only occurs after the combat is over, and that CA has the responsibility of CMO, not the operations commander. Civil Affairs also has the following missions known as civil affairs activities:

- Foreign Nations Support
- Population and Resource Control
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Military Civic Action
- Emergency Services
- Support to Civil Administration

One significant point to note is that the capacity to conduct civil governance falls under the CA mission Support to Civil Administration. These skills are known as the CA functional areas, which are present only in the reserve forces. This specialty is what separates the CA Generalist from a CA Specialist. The functional specialty areas are divided into four different areas to include: Government, Economics and commerce, Public facilities and Special Functions.[20]

To simplify CMO/CA terminology, JP 3-57.1 explains the relationships with a diagram. Overall, this is the best attempt to explain the role of CMO forces. Civil Affairs activities are conducted to support the CMO plan, which in turn must be integrated to support the overall military operation. (see Figure 1).

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[20] Dennis J. Cahill, LTC, "What is Civil Affairs?," *Special Warfare*, April 2003, 24-25.

CIVIL – MILITARY OPERATIONS RELATIONSHIPS

Joint Force Military Operations

The Range of military operations stretches from war through military operations other than war

Civil-Military Operations

Usually planned by civil affairs but implemented by all elements of the joint force

Civil Affairs Activities

Civil Affairs Activities May involve the application of civil affairs functional specialty skills

Figure 1.   Civil-Military Operations Relationships[21]

One other important definition to understand is the NATO version of CMO, Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC). CIMIC Operations are very similar to CMO but the NATO definition is narrower and focuses more on the need for coordination and cooperation to support the overall mission. Overall, the NATO doctrine regarding CIMIC has fewer complexities than the U.S. CMO doctrine, but still has the same overall concepts with respect to command responsibility and support of the overall operation.   CIMIC is also how UN military forces address CMO. NATO defines CIMIC as

> The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national

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[21] U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs. Joint Publication 3-57*, II-7

population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.[22]

B.   CMO TERMINOLOGY

Some military and civilian operations are so CMO intensive, they are often just called CMO.   Currently, joint doctrine categorizes military operations as either war or Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW).   The army has changed its doctrine in these two categories and divided these activities to offense, defense, stability and support.   Stability and Support (SASO) is the term that has essentially replaced MOOTW in army doctrine.   Currently, JP-3 is under revision with the proposal of replacing War and MOOTW with three operations categories: homeland defense & civil support; stability operations; and major combat operations.   If this wide range of terminology creates confusion within our own military, one can imagine the troubles for a foreign military, or civilian agencies, working with the military.

With regard to U.S. military terminology, the following DOD definitions are pertinent to CMO.   In the DOD dictionary, there are no definitions for nation building, state building, or post-hostility operations.[23]

> Civil Military Operations Center – An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations.   There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situations dependent. Also called CMOC.[24]

> Peace building – Post conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (JP 3-07).

> Peace enforcement – Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel

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[22] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Joint Staff. (*AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Co-operation Doctrine.* Brussels. June 2003), 1-1.

[23] U.S. Joint Staff. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated terms.*

[24] U.S. Joint Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication Gl-7.*

compliance with resolutions or sanctions to maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 3-07)

Peacekeeping – Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 3-07)

Peacemaking – The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it. (JP 4-07)

Peace Operations – A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Also called PO. (JP 3-07.3)

Stability Operations – promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crises (FM 3-0)

With regard to civilian terminology, other concepts are essential to understanding what CMO may encompass during operations. Many of these terms have not been incorporated in military doctrine; some may never be incorporated or even accepted by the military. The following terms are often misused terminology in CMO:

State Building – the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones.[25]

Nation Building – creating or repairing all the cultural, social, and historical ties that bind people together as a nation.[26]

Post Conflict Reconstruction – the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of society and the reconstruction of the enabling

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[25] Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), ix.

[26] Francis Fukuyama. "Nation Building 101," *The Atlantic Monthly*. Jan/Feb 2004,159-162.

conditions for a functioning peacetime society [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law.[27]

C.   KEY PLAYERS OF CMO

Although this list is not comprehensive, these are some of the key players that conduct CMO and that are addressed in this thesis.

1.   Military

a.   *Civil Affairs (CA)*

Usually the primary planners for CMO, CA should augment CMO staffs at every level.   The active component (AC) consists of only one battalion, the 96th CA, which is structured to deploy rapidly and provide the initial assessment for follow on CA support to be supplied by the reserve component.[28] The reserve component has 95% of the Army's CA assets and provides both tactical CA support and support in functional areas not covered by the AC. The CA functional specialties are the distinguishing characteristics that the reserve component (RC) brings to CA.[29]

b.   *Psychological Operations (PSYOP)*

PSYOP units actively support CMO missions. One of their stated objectives is to "facilitate reorganization and control of occupied or liberated areas in conjunction with CMO." PYSOP can provide key support to CMO by "influencing the attitude" toward the U.S., "maximize CA efforts in the area of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance by exploiting goodwill," and by directly supporting the Populations Resource Control mission.[30]

c.   *Special Forces*

Special Forces (SF) have been the lead force in major operations that were CMO intensive.   Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, and

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[27] Robert C. Orr ed.   *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction.* Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004. Robert Orr used the definition that the World Bank has used since 1995.

[28] A second BN will be formed by 2008.

[29] U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57*, II-5.

[30] Ibid, II-7-8.

Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994, are two prime examples where SF conducted CMO and even CA activities in order to accomplish their mission.[31]

d. Engineers, Medical, and Military Police

Engineers, Medical and Military Police are all essential in CMO missions involving humanitarian aid and/or dislocated civilians.[32]

e. CIMIC

CIMIC is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) version of the U.S. Civil Affairs. CIMIC has been involved in Bosnia and Afghanistan as well as Iraq.

2. Governmental Agencies

Numerous governmental agencies are important to CMO. The two agencies essential during CMO are listed.

a. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

USAID is the lead U.S. agency for economic aid under the Department of State. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is a USAID organization formed in 1992 to conduct interagency activities with the military in response to humanitarian disasters.[33] A Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) is a deployable USAID team whose size varies depending on the size of the overall operation.

b. Department for International Development (DfID)

Not as well-resourced as USAID, the British version is nevertheless able to make a significant contribution in terms of humanitarian aid and development assistance programs.[34]

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[31] U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57*, II-7-8

[32] Ibid, II-8-14.

[33] Robert C. Orr, ed. Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004.

[34] Pamela Aall and others, Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations, Washington, D.C.:(United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 13.

3. International Governmental Organizations (IGO)

IGOs are International Organizations (IOs) of two or more countries with a treaty that governs their existence. Although some are not as large as the ones listed below, they nevertheless may be able to make significant contributions and are important to consider during CMO.[35]

a. *United Nations (UN)*

The UN is an organization that includes more than just the governing body in New York City. There are specialized programs, agencies and numerous affiliated organizations that make up the UN. Some of their affiliated organizations include the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), the World Bank Group, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).[36]

b. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)*

NATO is an alliance of twenty-six members from both Europe and North America. Created in 1949, the focus of the original twelve members of NATO was the defense of Western Europe. With the addition of fourteen new members to include countries in Eastern Europe, NATO has changed its focus to the cooperation of all of Europe. Since the Cold War, NATO has also participated in many peacekeeping missions throughout the world.[37]

4. Non Governmental Organizations (NGO)

NGOs are private, non-profit local, national, and international organizations that are designed to benefit others according to their own mandate. Each NGO is different in size, dedication level, budget and the services they provide. Most NGOs will claim complete neutrality during conflicts but this is not always the case when security is required for their operation. Some common characteristics of NGOs are a decentralized approach to planning, an independent nature, and an existence that is often dependent on the dedication

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[35] Pamela Aall and others, Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations, Washington, D.C.:(United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 13.

[36] Ibid, 5-32.

[37] Ibid, 75-76.

of their employees. The American Red Cross, OXFAM America, and the U.S. Institute of Peace are all important NGOs to consider when planning CMO.[38]

5.   Host Nation (HN) Institutions

Often the most neglected players in planning, but the most important for the long term goals of CMO, are the HN institutions. Institutions may vary from country to country but they are still important to consider in planning. The HN might have military, police, social, and economic institutions already established that could be instrumental during CMO.

C.   HISTORY OF MODERN CMO

The purpose of this historical background is to provide a basis of understanding for the types and frequency that CMO have been used in U.S. wars and interventions throughout the world.

Although the concept of CMO may have been around since the beginning of warfare, the beginning of modern day U.S. CMO began during World War II when the War Department activated a Civil Affairs Division (CAD) as part of the Army General Staff. Initially, CA officers trained by the British, established a three-month training course to be taught at ten different American universities. The British trained their officers at Cambridge. These officers became the military governors in the former German occupied areas. This program was called military governance in the German areas and Civil Affairs in the friendly areas formally occupied by the Germans.[39]

Led by MAJ General John H. Hilldring, the CAD had over 6,000 trained CA officers by the end of World War II. Although the CA officer's primary mission was governance, they assisted civilians in other missions similar to CA today. The CAD also assisted civilians in humanitarian projects.[40] Toward the end of

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[38] Pamela Aall and others, Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations, Washington, D.C.:, 89-180.

[39] Earl F. Zeimke, "Civil Affairs Reaches Thirty," *Military Affairs*, Vol. 36, no. 4 (December 1971): 130-131.

[40] Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare*. (London: Franc Cass Publishers.1998). 39-40.

1945, Secretary of War Henry Stimson attempted to transfer the control of the post-conflict territories to the State Department. However, no civilian organization had the trained personnel or the resources to take control. Once governance began to be handed over to the HN, the CAD was eventually disbanded, retaining only one reserve unit.[41]

Immediately after the occupation of Germany, a constabulary force was formed to take on police duties and to establish law and order. This force was intended to make up for the regular combat troops that were beginning to rotate home. These soldiers performed occupation duties such as checkpoints and security patrols. The force grew to 30,000 and took on duties until the HN police could be trained. This force eventually trained the German police.[42]

During the Korean War, there was little emphasis on CMO besides what could be done to control the movement of refugees. Commanders treated Civil Affairs as an afterthought, and usually involved CA after operations as "disaster relief." Since the South Korean government was mostly functional throughout the war, the opportunity for military governance did not present itself as it did in World War II. In addition, more NGOs began to appear on the scene, as well as the UN and State Department assets, specializing in civil assistance. This created more confusion within the realm of CMO, with "overlapping responsibilities and unclear mandates."[43]

During the Vietnam War, CA and PSYOPS were used in conjunction with Special Forces units in a counterinsurgency role. At the "A" team level, the PSYOP officer was in charge of CA, which amounted to nothing more than small scale projects. Larger scale PSYOP projects were conducted also by the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), which focused not only on the Viet Cong with themes of surrender, but also on the civilian population to promote themes

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[41] Earl F. Zeimke, "Civil Affairs Reaches Thirty," 133.

[42] James Dobbins and others, *America's Role In Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*: Santa Monica, (RAND, 2003), 9-11.

[43] Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations in Action: *The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare*, 49.

of village defense. However, all this was minimal compared to the overall war effort. After the war, the CA component was once again reduced in size.[44]

During Operation Just Cause in Panama, CMO were needed to control the power vacuum caused by removal of General Manuel Noriega and the military police force. As in Vietnam, CA worked with SF, PSYOPS, engineers and military police.   With the combat over, CA missions took priority in the post-conflict operations. Unfortunately, the integration of these CA units and the planning for this post-conflict phase did not occur in the 22 months of planning leading up to the invasion. However, once in country, the Military Support Group (MSG), consisting of both Special Operation Forces (SOF) and Conventional support units, rebuilt the police force and instilled in the Panamanians confidence in their government. Although meeting with a considerable amount of success, this CMO mission was eventually closed due to pressure by the U.S. embassy.[45]

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, CMO planning was once again an afterthought. Once CA units did arrive in theater, they were organized under Army Central Command (ARCENT). Most of these units were reservists who required a significant amount of preparation before they could be deployed. Once in theater, CA units worked on the post-war planning with the U.S. State Department. When the ground war was over, CA units helped restore basic services and informed commanders and troops about Iraqi culture.[46]

Once again, in Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, CA and PSYOPS units teamed with SF to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurds who were in refugee camps near the Turkish border. While SF units worked directly with the Kurds, CA worked with the NGOs and other relief organizations. PSYOP teams acted as a communication link to distribute information to the Kurds and helped provide an orderly flow of aid to the population. Eventually the

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[44] Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations in Action: *The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (London: Franc Cass Publishers.1998), 13.

[45] Ibid, 228.

[46] Ibid, 236.

mission was transferred to the UN while NGOs remained in Northern Iraq to continue the humanitarian work.[47]

During Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti in 1994, deploying SF units received their CA and PSYOP attachments early for planning. During these operations, CA was involved in two different CMO missions, one was Civil Administration, and the other was Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Civil Affairs attached to the Conventional units set up Civil Military Operation Centers (CMOCs) in the principal cities to coordinate with the NGOs, while SF, along with CA and PSYOPS, operated in the countryside. Essentially these elements acted as the local government until they could bring the local Haitian government to a operational status. To help with the judicial system, a 15-member Ministry Advisory Team, consisting of CA reservists, was attached to the U.S. Embassy. In 1995, the mission was transferred from the U.S. to the UN. The Haitians would take control after the elections.[48]

Just two years after Haiti, the U.S. began one of their largest CMO missions since World War II with Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia. U.S. Army CA officers worked with CIMIC to help coordinate the civilian agencies with the military. In the case of Bosnia, CA and CIMIC worked mostly with the IGOs, and NGOs on the reconstruction, which could be considered part of Nation Assistance Operations. Central to the CMO mission of Bosnia was the cooperation of the civilian organizations and the military.[49]

During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) In Afghanistan, the 96th CA Battalion was the first CA unit to deploy to Afghanistan with the primary mission of humanitarian aid. CA and CIMIC units worked with IGOs, and NGOs to provide aid and small impact projects while the combat will still going on. In addition to CA units on the ground, CMO coordination was helped by having UN

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[47] Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare*, 244-254.

[48] Ibid, 266-281.

[49] John J. Tuozzolo, "The Challenge of Civil-Military Operations," *Joint Forces Quarterly.* Summer (1997): 54-58.

and NGO representatives at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters. Today, there are still CA units working in a joint military and civilian capacity at the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Although aid during this conflict was considered a success for CA, the outcome in Afghanistan today could be considered less than optimal.[50]

Currently, there is a large focus of CMO on Iraq and on how to develop the CMO capacity in the military. Plans have been made to expand the AC Battalion at Fort Bragg to a Brigade and add more CA specialists to the Reserves. Under the direction of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Army is considering moving Civil Affairs from under the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) to the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). With the development of the Army's Unit of Action (UA) concept, CA officers are being assigned at the brigade level. The following chapter will cover the focus of CMO in Iraq.

D.   DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES

Identifying the variables in the hypothesis that are key for successful CMO began with reviewing doctrine, relevant literature on intervention and peacekeeping, current government and academic studies on post-conflict operations, historical background of CMO, and my own personal experience as a Civil Affairs Officer. Although no one source provided the key to CMO success, each contributed to the development of a framework that might determine what makes for effective CMO. The purpose of this section is to give the reader an understanding of this framework through the development of my variables.

1.   Integration of CMO into All Phases of the Operations

Historically, CMO had always been a required activity in American warfare. Before the creation of Civil Affairs as a dedicated CMO force during World War II, the level of CMO conducted depended directly on the ground commander. Before World War II, a CMO force was by default the same force

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[50] Olga Oliker and others, *Aid During Conflict: Interaction Between Military and Civilian Assistance Providers in Afghanistan, (September 2001-June 2002*: Santa Monica. Rand. 2004), 23, 43, 59-63, 72.

that did the fighting. Whether the operational ground commander exploited the relationship between his forces and the civilian populations was completely up to him. The classic U.S. military example of this relationship was that of General Winfield Scott during the U.S.-Mexican War. Almost all references to U.S. forces conducting effective CMO, refer to how General Scott turned his conquering force into an effective occupying force. This was experienced again in U.S. interventions in both Cuba and the Philippines during the Spanish-American War.

The formation of the Army CA and military governance brought a whole new dimension to CMO. This signified a dedicated force to conduct CMO. The added complexities of faster communication, larger populations and international laws affected the way the peace was to be established. Creation of a dedicated force alleviated some of these complexities but also created difficulties in integration. If commanders in both Europe and Japan had not emphasized the need for CMO as far back as 1942, its success might not have occurred. As soon as the territory was either liberated or occupied, the CMO force was prepared to conduct their job and facilitate transition to peace.

Since World War II, the best degree of integration of CMO into operations has come with Special Operations Units. This was seen in Northern Iraq, Haiti, and Panama. This could be attributed to two different reasons. One is that Special Forces (SF) Groups are the only active duty units that have CA companies dedicated to them, which can deploy rapidly and plan with them as soon as a mission is received. Second, these operations were so CMO intensive from the start that SF detachments were essentially the ones responsible for carrying out the CMO missions. SF Groups planned with the CA and PYSOP forces and deployed with the same forces. This integration allowed for effective integration of CMO during planning and the exploitation of the relationship with the civilian populations. These historical examples have contributed to the development of the first variable.

2. Balance of CMO Between the Combat and Civilian Operation.

In World War II, the CMO mission was military governance. However, other missions became important, such as constabulary duties, humanitarian

efforts, and reconstruction. Today, the process of what occurred in Germany and Japan is often referred to as "nation building," which is more often considered "Nation Assistance" in CMO terminology. The CMO missions in Germany and Japan can be grouped under what current doctrine considers support for the civilian operation. After the fall of Germany, the allied force did prepare for German resistance forces to continue fighting. The anticipated continual fighting from partisan German forces never did occur and these occupational forces were able to concentrate on what current CMO doctrine calls support for the civilian operations.[51]

With the increase of asymmetric warfare in the world today, in addition to the information technology that allows instant world viewing of military operations, the need has increased to have CMO integrated into every aspect of the operations. In a sense, this has created more missions that the traditional CMO forces are not capable of fulfilling. In addition, conducting a CMO mission in the wrong circumstance can have negative long term effects. An example would be giving humanitarian aid to an area that is capable of supplying themselves. Not only is this wasteful, it can cause an area to depend on this aid. Deciding what types of missions are essential for the operation is a delicate balance of assets and resources. Without this proper balance, the effects may be counterproductive to what the CMO plan is supposed to accomplish.

JP 3-57 is vague on what it describes as a combat operation and as a civilian operation. For this thesis, understanding the difference is not essential in understanding this variable. The key point of this variable is that the balance between the types of CMO missions can vary greatly. The important consideration is that there is an appropriate balance. Even if the activity is not listed as a CMO mission or CA activity, any aspect of Civil-Military relations may fall under this variable. Applying the appropriate balance for this variable is essential.

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[51] James Dobbins and others, *America's Role In Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*, 21.

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3.   Attitude of the Host Nation or Occupied Territory

There is no doubt that by the end of World War II, very few Germans or Japanese were fond of the Allies. Both countries had been bombed to a pulp, and almost everyone in both countries had a relative or friend who had been killed during the war. However disgusted Germans and Japanese were with the allied occupiers, they did have one thing that stuck in their minds: they had been beaten, and were ready for peace. Both countries had surrendered unconditionally and were at the complete mercy of the occupiers. The events during this time period provide the third variable in this thesis.

No matter how much effort is put into the first two variables, the HN will ultimately determine the outcome of any "nation building" or post-conflict operations. If the people of the HN are the only ones capable of ensuring that collective goals are concurrently met, there is no wonder why their attitude should be a deterministic variable in the hypothesis.[52] In successful CMO, to include Germany and Japan, the attitude of the HN was conducive for achieving the U.S. goals. Even if at the beginning of the CMO, the attitude is conducive, the U.S. must reinforce it through intentional communications and instilling ownership of the stabilization and reconstruction to the HN.[53]

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[52] Robert C. Orr, ed. Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 12.

[53] Ibid, 20-21.

III.   IRAQI CASE STUDY

A.   OVERALL OPERATION

1.   Background

Figure 2.   Map of OIF from DoD briefing, March 26, 2003.[54]

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) commenced on the night of 19 March 2003 when two F-117 Stealth fighter-bombers took off from Al Udeid airfield in Qatar with the hope of destroying the Iraqi leadership. Their mission was to strike a "decapitating" blow at Dora Farms located south of Baghdad. Concurrently, Special Operations Forces (SOF) from the Joint Special Operations Task Force –

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[54] Global security. Operation Iraqi Freedom maps. (Accessed 03 August 2005); Available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi_freedom ops maps_03 2003.htm

West (JSOTF-W) infiltrated western Iraq to cut off the main highway to Jordan. JSOTF-N had begun linking up with the Kurdish Pershmerga forces in the north to expel Ansar Al Islam (AI) forces and was also succeeding in keeping the Iraqi divisions from pulling away from the Green line, the contested demarcation line separating Kurdistan from the rest of Iraq. SOF also entered from the south to mark the way for a two-pronged offensive where the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) lead the attack in the west and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1MEF) and the 1st British Armored Division (1UK) lead the attack in the east.[55]

Briefly after crossing the border, the initial ground units were joined by elements of the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) (101st ABN) and the 82nd Airborne (82nd ABN). The 173rd Airborne joined SOF in the north, the 82nd ABN joined the west, and British forces continued fighting to secure Basra. After the initial "shock and awe campaign" destroyed much of the communication capabilities of the Iraqi units, the 3ID swiftly moved through southern Iraq continuing their push toward Baghdad. The major fighting went so well these heavy units were able to quickly move on toward the Sunni dominated center of Iraq. The 101st ABN and the 82nd ABN remained in the south to continue fighting Fedeyeen Saddam irregulars. The 3ID defeated Republican Guard forces outside of Baghdad and entered the city on 7 April 2003. By 9 April, the city was secure. Less than a week after the fall of Baghdad, the Pentagon declared that most of the combat operations had ceased in Iraq. While the 101st and 82nd ABN secured Baghdad, the 4th Infantry Division (4ID) had maneuvered through Kuwait to provide added security to the central part of Iraq. On the first of May, 2003, President Bush made his historic speech on the USS Abraham Lincoln, declaring that "major combat operations have ended."[56] Leadership at Central Command (CENTCOM) would soon realize, however, that "winning the peace" is sometimes more complex than fighting a war.

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[55] Tommy Franks, *An American Soldier: (*New York: Harper-Collins Publishers Inc, 2004), pp. 453-471.

[56] AUSA News. "Operation Iraqi Freedom Timeline." June 2003. Accessed 10 August 2005; Available from http://www.ausa.org/www/ausanews.nsf

Although planning for OIF spanned 15 months, it is not completely understood why Phase IV operations, the stabilization and reconstruction plan for Iraq, was not clearly understood by operational and tactical units as well as CMO forces. Long processes and the fog and friction of combat operations made it difficult for commanders intent concerning Phase IV operations to matriculate to lower echelon forces. From February 2002 until October 2002, CENTCOM conducted no planning for Phase IV. The directive for CENTCOM to stand down from planning Phase IV came directly from the SECDEF, as responsibility for this phase of the operation was to be assigned to the U.S. State Department. In October 2002, the Office of Secretary of Defense allowed military planning for the initial 30 days of the occupation. In February 2003, the SECDEF put retired lieutenant General Jay Garner and the staff of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid (ORHA) in charge of Phase IV operations. The concept of ORHA was to have a civilian organization operating under DoD. The CENTCOM CA staff joined OHRA in planning for Phase IV operations. This isolated the chief CMO planners from conducting operational planning with CENTCOM's principal staff.[57] As a result, Phase IV plans for reconstruction and stabilization did not reach the operational units. Once in Iraq, Ambassador Paul Bremer and the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority (OCPA) replaced OHRA. This organization also turned out to be understaffed and ill organized to handle the scope and scale of a military occupation of Iraq.[58]

The CENTCOM CMO plan developed by the 352nd Civil Affairs Command (352nd CACOM) focused on the possibility of a humanitarian crisis and dislocated civilians (DC). CENTCOM assumed ORHA was in charge of the planning and policy for Phase IV of Iraq. However, a synchronized CMO plan for the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq was not provided to the CA units or the maneuver ground units.[59] Instead, the division and brigades were left to their

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[57] Interview with 352nd CA BDE staff officer.

[58] James Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad." (*The Atlantic Monthly.* 293,1, (Jan/Feb2004)), 52-74.

[59] Tommy Franks, *An American Soldier, p. 524-525.*

own devices to develop a CMO plan for the post-hostility phase.[60] Some of these units achieved a higher degree of success than others. With a large variety of CA units, supported ground units, and different civilian and HN players to work with, there was a large variety of CMO that occurred in Iraq. This thesis investigates CMO in the three distinct ethno-religious areas to determine the causes of CMO success and failure.

Figure 3.   Map of ethno-religious areas of Iraq.[61]

2.   Measure of Effectiveness

As stated before, success in CMO can be characterized as setting the stage to "win the peace." For the case of Iraq as well as most stabilization and reconstruction, peacekeeping, security, or nation building operations, this would begin when the HN warring parties reach a condition of "ripeness".[62] This is the

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[60] CALL (Center for Army Lessons Learned). Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) CATT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR), No. 04-13. Fort Leavenworth, 2004.

[61] Briefing slide from 352nd CA BDE.

[62] Richard N. Haass, "Ripeness and the Settlement of International Disputes", p. 232.

condition when a positive transition to peace can be accomplished. As in the case of Iraq, there are certain indicators that can be used to determine if CMO are "cultivating" the "ripeness"[63] necessary to make the transition to civilian authorities and peace possible. Once this "ripeness" is met, it must be exploited. Traditionally, "winning the hearts and minds" or gaining popular support is the baseline measure of CMO success and coming closer to reaching "ripeness." However, gaining popular support is not always possible. In these cases, areas might have to be isolated in order to mitigate their disturbance. CMO success may require unconventional actions that conventional military forces are not trained or equipped to execute, but must be accomplished to achieve the conditions required for peace. Many times this success might be revealed in second and third order effects that may only be observed over time. In Iraq, CMO success can be evaluated by the peaceful transition to civilian authorities. The following are all possible indicators of this type of success in Iraq.

- Security of the Iraqi people.
- Basic life necessities being met (food, water, electric power, shelter)
- Support to the Coalition
- Economic Conditions: Employment
- Sustainable, Iraq-managed institutions
- Level of insurgency[64]

B.   SUNNI AREA

This case will focus on CMO in the northern part of the Sunni Triangle. Tikrit has traditionally been the center for the Ba'ath party and the home of

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[63] Richard N. Haass, "Ripeness and the Settlement of International Disputes", p. 232

[64] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Evolving Insurgency," (DRAFT), Center for Strategic and International Studies, (Washington DC, June 23, 2005), 3. Perhaps more of an indicator of failure, Cordesman states that the U.S. failing to plan effectively for "meaningful stability operations and nation building was the most serious strategic mistake that led to the insurgency and crime."

Saddam Hussein. The most concentrated Sunni Arab area of Iraq, the Sunni Triangle, reaches from Baghdad to Ar Ramadi to Tikrit.[65]

Figure 4.   Map of the Sunni Triangle[66]

1.   Background

Sunni Arabs, comprising only 20-30 percent of the total Iraqi population, have controlled the politico-military infrastructure of Iraq since the existence of the state. This ruling legacy began with the Iraqi monarchy when the middle and upper classes of society dominated governance. This control continued during

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[65] Although the cities of Baghdad and Ar Ramadi are in the Sunni Triangle, they both contain a large percentage of both Sunni and Shi'a populations. It is the intent of this thesis to study three areas distinct ethno-religious areas. In order to preserve this consistency in the Sunni case, Baghdad and Ar Ramadi were left out.

[66] Wikipedia, Sunni Triangle. (Accessed 04 August 2005) available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunni_Triangle.

the republic years when the lower class Sunnis ruled, and continued once again with Saddam Hussein when the Ba'ath party came into power.[67]

In order to maintain control of Iraq, Saddam Hussein ruthlessly purged many of his military officers that he perceived as unfaithful. This purging also included many Sunni Arabs. Nevertheless, most of the key positions held by the military continued to be Sunni Arabs. The Sunni Arabs had a fear of the Shi'a uprising and usurping their control in Iraq. This fear, combined with the brutal rule imposed on the Iraqis, allowed Saddam to keep control of the Sunni Arabs as well as the rest of Iraq. Even after the Iraqi Army's defeat during Desert Storm, Saddam was still able to mobilize the Sunni Arabs against the uprising of the Shi'as in the south.[68]

In the days prior to the Coalition invasion, most of the senior leadership of the Ba'ath party and military were Sunni Arabs from Tikrit. The Special Security Organization, a special security guard for Saddam, and the Special Republican Guard higher commanders were also mostly Tikritis. These organizations's primary job was to protect the regime against any challenges to Saddam's authority. Saddam's eldest son, Uday, was in charge of the Fedeyeen Saddam irregulars, another military organization loyal to Saddam. The presence of the thick layers of regime protection offered by these organizations spoiled any possible coups and destroyed much of the Sunni Arab middle class, where many of the educated Sunnis came from. Sunni Arabs that were not completely loyal to Saddam were always at risk from being persecuted by Saddam.[69]

During OIF, U.S. Marines were the first forces to reach Tikrit. The 4th Infantry Division (4ID), originally scheduled to come through Turkey and attack from the north of Tikrit through Kurdistan, was unable to participate initially due to Turkey's unwillingness to support combat operations. 4ID, also known as Task Force Iron Horse (TFIH), found themselves in the port of Kuwait City unloading

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[67] Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillian. 2004.), 139-146.

[68] Ibid, 146-150.

[69] Ibid, 148.

their vehicles in a rush to head across the border and provide follow-on forces and extra security for the assault into the Sunni Triangle. The first elements of the 4ID crossed the Kuwait-Iraq border on 16 April 2003 and completed a road march of over 600 kilometers. This was nearly a month after the start of OIF. It was the end of April 2003 when the rest of the division was downloaded from the ships and began moving towards Tikrit. While in Kuwait, CA forces joined the ground component units and integration finally begin at the battalion level.[70]

Originally, 4ID had two CA units supporting the division. The 418th Civil Affairs Battalion (418th CA) provided direct support teams while the 446th Civil Affairs Battalion provided the Government Support Teams (GST). The GST was a non-doctrinal development that was supposed to precede the civilian teams during an interim period. Late in October, 402nd Civil Affairs BN, originally assigned to support British units in the south, joined these two battalions.[71] To begin planning with the 4ID, two 418th CA soldiers mobilized in October of 2002 and augmented the 4ID CA (G5) staff. In January of 2003 these two battalions received orders to mobilize and proceed to Fort Bragg. The 418th CA stayed at Fort Bragg until moving to Kuwait at the beginning of April to join the 4ID. It was not until their arrival in Kuwait that teams were integrated into their units. However, these CA teams did cross the border into Iraq at the same time as the 4ID. By the end of April most of the 4ID, as well as most the CA teams, had arrived in Tikrit. The 418th CA attached 12 of their Direct Support Teams (DST) to the battalion level. The maneuver battalions had operational and tactical control of these teams. The lead CA teams had the primary mission of minimizing civilian interference and administering humanitarian aid when required.[72]

When 4ID first arrived in Tikrit, the original coalition forces in the area had done little CMO. The 418th CA DST teams began conducting the initial assessments of the city, identifying "civilian requirements, infrastructure, attitudes

[70] 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, *Operations Iraqi Freedom After Action Report.*

[71] Hugh Van Roosen, COL. Interview by author, 26 August 2005, Fort Bragg.

[72] 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, *Operations Iraqi Freedom After Action Report.*

and key leaders."[73]   Destruction of institutional structures was not the only problem CA teams faced. If government buildings had not been destroyed by the bombing, looters had completely gutted them.[74]   In addition to finding Iraqi personnel to fill government positions, the CA units had to help rebuild the infrastructure from scratch. The 418th CA set up a main Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Tikrit and separate CMOCs in each of the Brigade Combat Team's (BCTs) Areas of Responsibility (AOR). The purpose of these CMOCs was to act as the interface between the civilians and the military to include any IOs or NGOs. The initial HA and PRC missions were completed faster than expected and the teams began to work on quick impact projects to help gain support from the local populace.[75]

For CMO support to the civilian operations, the 4ID Command delegated to the ground and functional commanders the responsibility of the different Iraqi ministries. For example, the Brigade (BDE) Commanders were responsible for the hiring, supervising, and firing of the province governors. In addition, the Finance BN Commander worked with the banking ministry, the Engineer BDE Commander worked with the Construction and Public Works Ministers, and the Signal BN Commander worked on communications within the area. It was the job of the GSTs to work with the ministries since there was a limited amount of NGO expertise, and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was not yet functional.[76]   The functional commanders provided counterparts for the ministries, while the CA forces provided the functional expertise to reconstitute the Iraqi ministries. The functional teams were organized into Public Works, Public Health Administration, Public Administration, Public Communication, and the Civilian Supply.   Their first mission was to find qualified non-Ba'athist personnel willing to fill the required roles in the ministries. The second task was to refurbish buildings and offices that were completely destroyed by looting. This

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[73] 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, *Operations Iraqi Freedom After Action Report*, E-1.

[74] James Suriano, phone interview by author, 29 August 2005, Fort Bragg, N.C

[75] 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, *Operations Iraqi Freedom After Action Report*, D-1-3.

[76] Ibid, K-9-10.

reconstitution would prove to be a challenge throughout the area. Due to the CPA's de-ba'athification policy, it was difficult to find qualified Iraqis to fill governmental jobs.[77] In addition, CPA representatives would not stay in many parts of Iraq for extended periods of time.[78]

The 418th CA assumed the role as the chief CMO force within Task Force Iron Horse (TFIH). The 418th CA Commander established the TFIH Project Coordination Cell (PCC) and also provided over 90 percent of the manning of the 4ID G5 staff section. The PPC acted as a CMOC and command and control for coordinating all the reconstruction efforts of the Division, focusing the efforts of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Department of Defense (DOD) and Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) Funds. The 418th CA kept the PCC open 24 hours a day. The main purpose of the PCC was to track projects, but it also became the center of coordination for all the "division staff, maneuver units, Information Operations, the Effects Cell and the Provisional Iraqi Government".[79] Additionally, the PCC facilitated the integration of CMO into the civilian operations.[80]

At the Division level, the 4ID began to effectively plan and coordinate projects into the overall operation at the Effects Coordination Cell (ECC). The Division Fire Support Officer supervised the cell, with the intent to integrate both lethal and non-lethal effects of fires into operations. The ECC became the focal point for integrating CMO into the operations. The 418th CA augmented the ECC with CMO planners. At the Brigade level, 418th CA teams provided tactical CA teams to conduct CA activities as well as to provide expertise for CMO planning. At the battalion level, the commanders expected to have CMO planning augmentation from either the AC or Individual Ready Reserves (IRR). This did not occur. Some of the battalion commanders put excellent non-CA officers in those positions and provided dedicated support to the CA forces. It often took a

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[77] John Keegan, *The Iraq War*, (New York: Random House, Inc. 2004), p. 210.

[78] James Suriano, phone interview by author, 29 August 2005, Fort Bragg, N.C.

[79] Ibid, E-2.

[80] James Suriano, phone interview by author, 29 August 2005, Fort Bragg, N.C.

month before these officers could effectively integrate CMO/CA into the planning. Once done, these battalions achieved positive results from CMO. 4ID battalions that poorly performed CMO shared common characteristics. The ground component commander either assigned a weak officer as the S5 or had none at all. In some cases the CA team leader had to perform as both a team leader and a CMO planner. Aside from CMO planning, another common trend for poor CMO performance occurred when the CA teams were moved around and therefore were unable to build trust with either the ground unit or the locals.[81]

2. Integration of CMO into All Phases of the Operations

Did the ground commanders integrate CMO into all the phases of the operations? The 418th CA BN sent plans officers to Fort Hood. These planners had the advantage of previously working with the 4ID and going through the planning process numerous times. However, they did not have any central guidance on planning for anything other than DC operations. While 4ID was en route to Iraq, the CA forces were still being mobilized at Fort Bragg. The 418th CA attempted to conduct planning with 4ID by using secure communications.[82] Not only did CMO planning consist of minimal guidance from higher echelon, it was also conducted partially in a separate location. The CMO/CA plan consisted of DC operations and a limited HA/PRC. The most a CA team leader could plan for was some quick impact projects and moving civilians away from the battlefield. Also, these CA officers often performed the S5 functions as the CMO planner for the supported battalion. With the 4ID arriving in Tikrit almost three weeks after the initial forces, the timeframe for conducting CMO lagged. Effective systems for integrating CMO into the overall operations did not become effective until almost mid summer.[83]

Did the ground component commanders accept the role as the CMO commander? The 4ID initially assumed it would be entering Iraq through Turkey as the main assault element from the north. Accordingly, planning was focused

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[81] 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, *Operations Iraqi Freedom After Action Report*, G-5.

[82] Ibid, D-1.

[83] 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, *Operations Iraqi Freedom After Action Report,* G-6.

on DC operations. The 418th CA put six-man CA teams at each maneuver battalion, a Civil Affairs Planning Team at each BCT, and the battalion commander stayed at the division. The 4ID commander accepted the role as the CMO commander and gave the 418th CA commander full support. However, there was mixed reaction from the Brigade commanders on how much support to provide CMO. The 418th CA commander could only give advice to the maneuver commanders and provide a limited amount of guidance to his teams that were attached to the battalions. Some of the maneuver battalion commanders fully embraced CMO. While others did not actively hinder CMO activity, they did not integrate it in their operations.[84]

Overall integration of CMO into all phases of the operations in the Sunni Arab section was less than optimal, starting with the lack of planning. The only CMO planning conducted was for HA and PRC missions. Although CA teams did join their supported units in Kuwait prior to moving into Iraq, this was late for planning CMO at the tactical level. Much of the level of CMO support was personality driven by the battalion commanders. The largest hindrance for integration at this level could be attributed to an Army culture that focuses mostly on the kinetic aspects of warfare. This culture might be attributed to many years of not planning and training for the civil dimension of the battlefield and the post-conflict phase.[85]

3.   Balance of CMO between the Combat and Civilian Operation.

Did the CMO missions provide the appropriate balance between the combat and civilian operation? Although HA and other quick impact projects are important CMO missions, they may not be appropriate for the given situation. CMO may need to be re-prioritized in these instances, where projects are not directly helping with either the combat operation or the civilian operations. It may be more appropriate in these situations to concentrate CMO on improving security through training the police and providing support to the local population,

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[84] 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, *Operations Iraqi Freedom After Action Report,* G-6.

[85] 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Lessons Learned: Executive Summary, (17 June 2004). This assertion is reinforced with 4IDs lessons learned from OIF. While there is mention of the importance of CMO and the need for integration at all levels, there are no lessons learned regarding CMO in the Issue: Discussions.

which the 4ID and 418th CA did. CMO in the Sunni Center attempted to apply the appropriate balance but was handicapped mainly by the insurgent attacks. Once the attacks began, CMO became limited due to 4ID limited resources and focus on hunting down the insurgents.[86]

Did the ground force neglect any vital CMO missions? Once major combat operations were declared over and Phase IV was beginning, an extreme amount of looting occurred. After the Iraqi Army dissolved and the police force had abandoned their posts, a huge vacuum of power was created. Establishing the "rule of law" is an inherent task for civil administration or military governance. If establishing "rule of law" equates to establishing civil control, it would also be correct to say that there was no attempt to establish this type of control. Initial units in the Sunni Triangle did not establish control. Even if establishment of the "rule of law' does not fit perfectly into one of the six CMO missions, it is still essential to CMO in Phase IV. Whether it was a lack of policy or restrictive rules of engagement, the initial ground units did not stop the looting with either lethal or non-lethal means.[87] Although constabulary duties may not be an Army mission, they are not prohibited. What must be remembered is the obligation an occupying force has to an occupied country.[88]

4. Attitude of the Host Nation (HN) or Occupied Area.

To what degree did the attitude of the HN affect the ability to conduct CMO missions? The initial air and ground campaign made it difficult to win the "hearts and minds" of the Sunni Arabs. Although much of the fighting occurred in the south, a majority of the Iraqi Army were Sunni Arabs. For anyone with a relative or a friend killed, this must have resulted in a deep-rooted hatred. Once major combat operations ended, the Sunni Arabs had very high expectations that the U.S. would be able to provide everything they needed. The 418th CA Commander described this attitude by giving the example of how Iraqis would

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[86] 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, *Operations Iraqi Freedom After Action Report.*

[87] James Suriano, COL, phone interview by author, 29 August 2005, Fort Bragg, N.C.

[88] Christopher Todd Burgess, MAJ. "The U.S. Army Doctrine and Belligerent Occupation," School of Advanced Military Studies, Unites States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2004. 1907 Hague Convention provides the basis for belligerent occupation. An essential task for occupation is to restore order and safety.

say, "You are a rich and powerful nation and have put men on the moon, and we expect that as the rebuilding standard."[89] Sunni Arabs were happy to have Saddam Hussein taken out of power but they were not happy having the U.S. as occupiers. Even if the Sunni Arabs were frustrated by the slow process of reconstruction, the lack of security made them even more reluctant to support the coalition. In addition, Ambassador Bremer announced his de-ba'athification strategy, which disqualified many of the Iraqis from obtaining a job through the coalition.[90] This was compounded by the fact that complying with the coalition would also be recognizing the reality that the Shi'a would likely control a democratic state of Iraq.

5.   Summary

Trying to determine whether there was CMO success in the northern Sunni Triangle is a difficult task. By judging the accomplishments of the 418th CA, which included thousands of projects and assistance delivered, one could say that the unit did reach a degree of success in their CA operations. However, CMO success is more than just projects and supplies delivered. The 4ID was never able to fully exploit CMO in the northern part of the Sunni Triangle.

Looking at the indicators previously discussed, the security of the Sunni Arabs decreased within a month of the regime's fall. Basic life necessities were met, but a very large young male population remained without employment. The coalition received very little information to fight the insurgency, an indication of lack of popular support. CMO was rebuilding the physical infrastructure but was lagging on building the institutions to maintain this infrastructure. Once the insurgency took hold, CMO became even more difficult to conduct due to the force protection requirements.

The level of insurgency that took hold is the biggest indicator of CMO failure in the Sunni Center. At the same time the 4ID was beginning to effectively integrate CMO into their operations, the Iraqi insurgents had already become an

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[89] 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, *Operations Iraqi Freedom After Action Report*, K-12.

[90] John Keegan, *The Iraq War*, p. 210.

effective fighting force and had popular support in most the Arab Sunni areas.[91] Despite the CMO efforts and ground combat operations, the main insurgent groups continued to locate in many of the populated areas of the Sunni Triangle.[92]

The conditions as they related to the variables discussed resulted in CMO failure for the Sunni Center. The integration of CMO into all phases of the operations was poor. Despite efforts to integrate CMO planning at all levels, implementation took at least two to three months. In the beginning of the occupation, few of the commanders understood CMO. Although some of the commanders were receptive to integrating CMO, they had mixed success which was often dependent upon their relationships with CA forces. The time needed to build an effective working relationship was inadequate when an attachment arrived at a battalion immediately before crossing into Iraq. Most of these ground units did not see their CA attachments until right before going into Iraq. Additionally, the CA forces attached may have had CA expertise but this did not necessarily equate to CMO expertise. The second variable, balance of CMO between the combat and civilian operation, was satisfactory once the looting had stopped and a degree of civil order was established. However, this proved to be a lasting problem in the Sunni Center. Without establishing the "rule of law" from the beginning, the ground forces never could gain control.[93] The third variable, attitude of the HN or occupied area, set impossible conditions for CMO success. Arab Sunnis were never willing to work with the coalition. This attitude, perhaps a result of the air and ground campaign, was reinforced by the lack of security. The Sunni Arabs were angry and did not want to be occupied by a western country. Instead of mitigating or isolating this attitude, the coalition allowed the insurgents to exploit it.

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[91] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Evolving Insurgency," (DRAFT), Center for Strategic and International Studies, 38.

[92] Ibid, 38.

[93] Interview with CA officer attached to the 352nd CA BDE.

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C.   SHI'A AREA

This case will focus on the Shi'a area of Southern Iraq. Karbala, An Najaf and An Nasiryah are all major cities which have had a significant impact on the history of Iraq (Figure 5).

Figure 5.   Map of Shi'a area of Iraq.[94]

1.   Background

Shi'as in Iraq number approximately 14 million, more than 60 percent of the population. Since the beginning of the Iraqi state, as well as the entire history of the territory, the Shi'as have never risen to topple the Sunni Arabs and assume power. Despite this lack of power, the Shi'as have always had a strong sense of Iraqi nationalism and do not strive to be autonomous like the Kurds. However, their absence from power is a recurring theme in Iraq, and their desire for representation has continued since the beginning of the state.[95]

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[94] Briefing slide from 352nd CA BDE.

[95] Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?* 117-122.

The Shi'as, like the Kurds to the north, were given the opportunity to revolt after the Iraqi Army was defeated during Desert Storm. However, there was a huge division between the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), based out of Iran, and Shi'as, who had fought against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. The uprising did not gain the required momentum and backing from all the Shi'a political parties. What occurred afterwards is known as the "destruction of the Marsh Arabs."[96] Once the uprising in the south was crushed, Saddam's military force drained the south's marshes, which turned out to be an environmental catastrophe for the Shi'as. In addition, Saddam used a Blitzkrieg of attacks on the Shi'as, resulting in up to 190,000 dislocated civilians.[97]

Since the 1990s, numerous religious leaders have emerged to represent and also divide the southern Shi'as. These include Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of SCIRI, with the powerful backing of Iran; Muqtada al-Sadr, the son of Ayatollah Satiz al-Sadr[98], Abdul Majid al-Khoei, who was supported by the west; and probably the most influential, the Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Although the Shi'as are not absent leaders, they do not have one single voice, and Saddam had used this division numerous times to keep the Shi'as suppressed.

When the coalition forces crossed the Kuwaiti border, the British 1st Armored Division (1UK) had a separate mission from the U.S. forces: Secure the city of Basra.[99] Being the second largest city of Iraq and the historical commercial center for the Marsh Arabs, the Shi'as there resented any Sunni control of the area. The British knew this and they had built a significant intelligence network in the area since Desert Storm. Even though the British had lost their influence in Iraq many years prior, they did not completely lose touch with the region, maintaining numerous local experts who spoke Arabic and had significant information on all aspects of the culture. Once the British commander

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[96] Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?*, *130.*

[97] Ibid, 129-133.

[98] Ibid, 129-130. Ayatollah Satiz al-Sadr was assassinated in 1999.

[99] John Keegan, *The Iraq War*, (New York: Random House, Inc. 2004), p. 145.

arrived, he chose not to assault the city but patiently wait outside the city until the proper intelligence was obtained. The Ba'ath party still controlled the city, but departing residents would provide all the needed information on enemy resistance inside. These Shi'as coming out of the city were seeking food, water, and safety as promised to them on printed leaflets. Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) infiltrated the city and made contact with friendly Shi'a groups.[100]

Ali Hassan al-Majid, also known as "Chemical Ali," attempted to turn the battle for Basra into a messy urban fight. Most of the 11th Iraqi Division had deserted, but a substantial number of Fedeyeen fighters remained in the city. For an entire week, the British crept forward into the city using their Special Operations teams and snipers. Once the 1UK Commander felt he had enough intelligence, sniper teams started selectively taking out the Ba'athist leaders. The goals of this operation were twofold: (1) not harm civilians, and (2) strike a heavy psychological blow to the Iraqi fighters. For the next week, beginning in early April, the British began striking enemy positions with light armor. Eventually, the British launched a final assault on Basra and completely took control of the city. Once the fighting was complete, the British took off their flak vests and did everything possible to promote normalcy in the city.[101]

As discussed earlier, the British version of CMO is based on the NATO's Civil Military Co-operations concept. To the British, CMO is not only a task that CIMIC officers specialize in, but the idea of coordination and cooperation is inherent to the British Military.[102] To help the British with specific Civil Affairs tasks, the 402nd CA BN provided the British with direct support teams. The British CIMIC incorporated them into their operations, but they were not used initially for CMO planning. This tasking came at the last minute in Kuwait. The 402nd was one of many CA units that were attached to a ground unit at the last

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[100] John Keegan, *The Iraq War*, (New York: Random House, Inc. 2004), 176-178.

[101] Ibid, p. 145.

[102] Every U.S. CA officer I interviewed for this thesis that had worked with the British commented on the large degree of understanding of CMO the British military has compared to the U.S. military.

minute. Problems with the attachment of CA teams to the British included administration and maintenance, and funding of projects. However, the British provided what they could and even used their commander's discretionary funds to facilitate CA projects.[103]

To the west of Basra, the pockets of Fedeyeen resistance still fought against the U.S. forces in Najaf and Karbala. However, the 3ID and 1 MEF had blown through the area enroute to Baghdad and the 82nd Airborne (82nd ABN) and 101st Airborne (101st ABN) were left to smash any remaining resistance of the Ba'ath party in the cities of Najaf and Karbala. At first, the 1 MEF and 3rd Army were bottlenecked in Al Nasiriyah and had to fight their way though. The U.S. forces were unable and perhaps unwilling to be as methodical as the British were in Basra. Nevertheless, as the U.S. armored forces rolled towards Baghdad and Tikrit, the two light infantry units secured the cities in the south.

The 82nd ABN had two CA planning officers and a CA Team from E/96th CA had been attached for almost three months. The Division G-5 was deployed to Afghanistan when this attachment began planning at the 82nd in November 2003. Their focus was immediate humanitarian aid and minimization of civilians on the battlefield. The 82nd stayed in this area for approximately one month, where CMO consisted of bringing in humanitarian aid flights to supply the hospitals, meeting with key leaders, and conducting assessments for the follow on forces. The people in the area treated the ground forces as liberators but also wasted no time in looting whatever they could from former Ba'athist buildings. The 82nd ABN did not control the looting.[104] In addition to this looting, Abdul Majid al-Khoei was assassinated while meeting with other clerics at a mosque in Najaf. Having met with Tony Blair during his 12 years in exile, it is believed he was killed by assassins sent by Al Sadr to prevent the cooperation with the coalition.[105]

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[103] 402 Civil Affairs BN. BN OEF/OIF AAR (DS).

[104] Interview with CA personnel attached to the 82nd ABN from October 2003 – May 2004.

[105] PBS Online News Hour. "Shiite Muslim Leader Assassinated In Najaf." Accessed 10 August 2005; Available fromhttp://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/clerics_04-10-03.html

Once the Marines returned to the Shi'a area in the south, they immediately began to assert control over their assigned area. The Marines had their own Civil Affairs Groups (CAG); however, U.S. Army Civil Affairs were also attached. The 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion (402nd CA) supplied direct support teams that worked along side the Marine CAG, while the 304th CA BDE supplied government support teams (GSTs) that were attached to every Marine battalion. These GSTs consisted of medical, engineer, legal, education, and even maintenance personnel, and were designed to help the newly formed ministries. Although headed by a CA Lieutenant Colonel, it was the Marine battalion commander that was in charge of GST and supported them. This relationship was effective and all the Marine commanders accepted responsibility for the GSTs. The GSTs did not have a problem finding locals to begin the reconstruction of the country. Additionally, in the south, the Ayatollah Sistani, although not in direct contact with the U.S, did tell the Shi'as to cooperate with the coalition.[106] For the Marines, CMO was not treated as a separate staff function but was an inherent part of their operations.[107]

2. Integration of CMO into All Phases of the Operations

Did the ground commanders integrate CMO into all the phases of the operations? Although the British 1UK did not have enormous resources, they did have access to supplies and the benefit of the Humanitarian Activity Center (HAC) in Kuwait. This made it easy to coordinate for HA. Once in Basra, the British set up a city council to work with the local leaders. Receiving direct support teams from the 402nd CA BN was an added benefit. Before crossing into Iraq, Marine CAG officers briefed the 1 MEF staff on Phase IV and the Marines began integrating CMO planning into their operations. Once the major combat operation ceased in the Shi'a south, the 1 MEF increased the integration of CMO in their daily operational planning. In addition, the Marines directly linked the CMOC activities into their operational planning.[108]

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[106] Interview with 304th CA BDE XO.

[107] Although marines do not have CMO and CA doctrine, they do prize themselves for following principles on the relationship with civilians found in their Small Wars Manual.

[108] Conversation with a Navy Civil Engineer Corps officer attached to the 1 MEF.

Did the ground component commanders accept the role as the CMO commander? Marine and British commanders, both tactical and operational, accepted their role as the CMO commander. This was evident by the British Commander using his discretionary funds to resource projects by the 402nd CA and the Marine commander taking responsibility for the GST teams. The British took into consideration the implications of fighting in urban areas, and ran a slow, deliberate campaign to avoid civilian casualties. This is one instance where CMO during the major combat was fully integrated and proved effective in influencing the operational outcome.

3. Balance of CMO between the Combat and Civilian Operation.

Were the CMO missions appropriate for the operation? The British forces effectively used CMO to gain information when conducting combat operations in Basra. Once major combat operations ceased in the south, U.S. Army CA units continued to provide HA and a limited amount of PRC. Throughout the advance through southern Iraq, units used the appropriate amount of PRC to ensure that civilians were not on the battlefield. Once fighting ceased, CIMIC and CA units in the British and Marine sectors utilized CMO to maintain security and rebuild the country. Since the infrastructure in the south was in disrepair after Saddam's rule, HA came at the right time and was appropriate.

Did the ground force neglect any vital CMO missions? There is very little information available on military civic action that occurred in the 1UK and 1MEF sectors. However, the CA units did attempt to use Iraqis at every opportunity in reconstruction or humanitarian projects. The Marines in the south did establish civil control and imposed security and protection for the Iraqis.[109]

4. The Attitude of the Host Nation or Occupied Area.

To what degree did the attitude of the HN affect the ability to conduct CMO missions? As mentioned before, Shi'a Arabs have been a divided people and that has been their downfall. However, they maintained a positive attitude as long as they perceived the U.S. as liberators and not occupiers. The Shi'a are the majority in Iraq. Cooperating with the coalition gives them the opportunity to

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[109] Christopher Holshek, COL, phone interview by author, 09 August 2005.

control Iraq and no longer be repressed. The attitude of the Shi'a Arabs from the beginning of the occupation was conducive to coalition efforts. The Shi'a Arabs knew that they would have to work with the coalition in order to have more control in Iraq.[110]

5. Summary

It is difficult to gauge the level of CMO success in the Shi'a South. Security was high when the British and Marines controlled the area, but declined as they left. Although basic life services were easily delivered, the number of unemployed Shi'a was still very high. Since the end of major combat operations, the Shi'as have given the coalition varying levels of support, but the Iraqi military and police have received more support from the local populace. Institutions are being built in the south at a slow but steady rate; however, within six months of the first units arriving, the Iraqi institutions were at a stage where they could be handed over to civilian authorities.[111]

Very little insurgency has occurred in the Shi'a South. Even Moqtada Al Sadr, who led Shi'a uprisings in Najaf in April 2004, appears to be posing few problems for the coalition forces. Since this "peak of insurgent activity," attacks in the Shi'a South have significantly declined. There is no certainty that an insurgency will not rise in the Shi'a South, but for the time being, most of the governates are relatively peaceful.[112]

The conditions that resulted from a combination of the variables discussed resulted in partial CMO success for the Shi'a South. The integration of CMO into all phases of the operations was fair. Although Army CA units were attached at the last minute in Kuwait, both the British and the Marines had a concept of what would occur in Phase IV. The planning might have been less than optimal, but throughout the Shi'a South, the coalition exerted themselves and quickly integrated CMO into their operations. The second variable, balance of CMO

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[110] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Evolving Insurgency," (DRAFT), Center for Strategic and International Studies, (Washington DC, June 23, 2005), 53.

[111] Christopher Holshek, COL, phone interview by author, 09 August 2005.

[112] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Evolving Insurgency," (DRAFT), Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12, 53.

between the combat and civilian operation was also fair. The Marines did establish order after some looting occurred. While CA forces concentrated on humanitarian aid and reconstruction projects, GST teams supported the support to civil administration mission. The third variable, attitude of the HN or occupied area, was not as conducive as hoped for. However, the idea that the Shi'a needed to comply with coalition goals in order to gain power in Iraq was a motivator for the Shi'a Arabs.

D.   KURD AREA

This case will focus on the Kurdish controlled area of Iraq. Since Mosul and Kirkuk are no longer predominantly Kurdish cities, they will not be included in this case.


Figure 6.   Map of Kurdish inhabited areas.[113]

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[113] University of Texas libraries. (Accessed 04 August) A *Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Iraqi maps.*

1. Background

The area of northern Iraq that is inhabited by the Kurds is distinctively different from the rest of Iraq. Some key geological and geographical features include the oil-rich lands near Kirkuk, fertile lands near the lakes and rivers, and the heavily mountainous areas that separated Iraq from Turkey and Iran. These mountains, and a strong will to survive, were what provided the Kurds with a means of survival for over a thousand years. As a people, the Kurds are "Indo-European," with 75% being Sunni Muslim, 15% Shi'a Muslims, and 10% following various other religions. Although Kurds practice the same religion as the Arabs, the Kurds are distinctively different. The Kurds wear different traditional clothing, have different physical features, and have their own separate history from the rest of Iraq. The Kurds also exist in large numbers in Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Nowhere in the world is there such a large nation of people without a state of their own.[114] Although independence may be every Kurd's wish, reality will dictate they must remain part of Iraq.[115]

By the time JSOTF-N began operations in the north, the Kurds had endured extreme harshness under Saddam's government. Examples include a massacre that occurred in Suleimanayah in 1963. General Satiq Mustafa, the Ba'ath party military commander, took nearly a hundred Kurds including the best athletes, artists and teachers and executed them. This harshness reached its most extreme point during the Iraq-Iran War, when Ali Hassan al-Majid al-Tikriti, a cousin of Saddam, unleashed chemical weapons in the highly strategic border town of Halabja. In a matter of minutes, these chemical weapons killed approximately 5,000 people.[116]

During the aftermath of Desert Storm, the Ba'ath Party government withdrew from much of the Kurdish territory, allowing the Kurdistan Democratic

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[114]Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillian. 2004.), 156-182.

[115] BBC News online. "Full text: Jalal Talabani interview," (accessed 03 September 2005) available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4455063.stm.

[116] Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division? 170-171.

Party (KDP) to take control in the West and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) take control in the East. Both the U.S. and the U.K. unofficially encouraged this uprising.[117] When it was realized that such an uprising would leave the region even more unstable, both countries decided not to support the Kurds. Saddam's republican guard wasted no time in moving north to begin another campaign of destruction until the UN finally established a safe zone near Dohuk. With both the Kurds and Saddam weak from the Desert Storm Operation, they made a deal that left control of the northern provinces with the Kurds, but the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul would remain under control of Baghdad, where Saddam could continue his "Arabization" policy.[118]

The area of northern Iraq began to prosper during this time of Kurdish autonomy, and nationalism began to grow. The younger generation of Kurds began speaking Kurdish instead of Arabic and the economy of the area started prospering to a much higher degree than the rest of Iraq. But once again, internal and external factors affected the area of northern Iraq. Massoud Barzani, leader of the KDP, and Jabal Talabani, leader of the PUK, were at odds with each other, and supposedly Barzani invited the Iraqi forces into Erbil to help unsettle the balance between the KDP and PUK. The PUK fled to Sulaymaniya and since then the area known as Kurdistan was divided into two sections; the area to the west was the KDP and the east was the PUK. These areas began to ideologically separate even more until the anticipation of a coalition invasion after September 11, 2001. This brought an essential need for them to cooperate and act as one people again.[119]

When JSOTF-N began its operation in March of 2003, an established network of political leaders of both the KDP and PUK already existed. Each area already had institutions in place that facilitated a stable economy and basic governmental functions. A combined militia of Pershmerga soldiers from both

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[117] Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division? 170-171.

[118] Ibid, 180-181.

[119] Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?* 180-181.

the PUK and KDP amounted to 80,000 soldiers. These forces would provide the basis for security and civil order throughout the north.[120]

Integration of CMO into the operational planning for northern Iraq began approximately six months prior to the invasion. Delta Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (D/96th CA) and the 404th Civil Affairs Battalion Airborne (404th CA) sent planners to work with 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (10 SFG) which would eventually become JSOTF-N. The 404th CA planners worked with 10 SFG staff to develop the CMO plan and the D/96th CA planners worked with the two battalions to develop their plans. The CMO plan for the entire north was based on two priorities; (1) a possible dislocated civilian (DC) population, and (2) support for civil administration. The DC mission was more directly related to combat and took priority in the eyes of JSOTF-N Commander.[121]

JSOTF-N soon learned that there would no expected mass exodus of refugees. The Pershmerga forces, assisted by SOF, routed the Ansar al Islam out of Halabja and into Iran, while the Iraqi army was either destroyed or removed their uniforms and headed for home. During this timeframe, the first CA forces infiltrated into Iraq with 10 SFG. D/96th CA was split into three different elements. The command section stayed with the JSOTF-N headquarters in Erbil, while three Civil Affairs Teams Alpha (CAT-A) with a small command element went to each SF Battalion in the KDP and PUK sectors. Although JSOTF-N made it clear they were not there to repeat Operation Provide Comfort, they nevertheless allowed the Active Duty CAT-As to do assessments and prepare for the arrival of the 404th CA.[122] The 404th CA began arriving in the beginning of April.

After major combat operations were declared over, 10 SFG, along with many other elements of the JSOTF-N, began to redeploy back to the U.S. The

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[120] Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?* 180-181.

[121] Harry J. Schute, "Submission of Meritorious Unit Commendation for 404th Civil Affairs Battalions (Special Operations). Erbil, Iraq.

[122] This assessment came from personal experiences and also from interviewing other D/96th CA personnel attached to 10 SFG.

404th CA soon fell under the command of the 101st ABN which controlled the Kurdish areas. Due to the perceived security situation and the need for more combat forces in the south, the 101st ABN Commander left the 404th CA as the only U.S. military force in the three northern governates of Erbil, Dahuk and As Sulaymaniyah. The 404th CA was given brigade level status and the responsibility of being the only coalition force north of the Green line.[123]

For the next 10 months, the 404th CA conducted CMO and security missions, actively collected intelligence, helped create the Iraqi Defense Corps, and served as the coalition ground component in the north. When they began their mission in Iraq, the 404th CA immediately aligned themselves with the existing governmental and security organizations of the area. The Pershmerga, which 10 SFG and 3 SFG had fought alongside, would help the battalion conduct their mission with a high degree of freedom of movement. The 404th CA maintained strong connections with the Pershmerga forces and civilian leadership. This relationship enabled a proper shaping of the Pershmerga forces into the future Iraqi forces as well as providing a base for other security jobs such forest officers, the police force and other non-military employment.[124]

Usually a sensitive subject for Civil Affairs, the 404th CA saw their role as being a base for coordinating intelligence and information within the region. The 404th CA facilitated the coordination between the KDP and PUK Intelligence with the activities of U.S. Intelligence agencies. In addition to meeting with the ministers, the 404th CA helped organize and operate joint intelligence-sharing meetings with local security and intelligence agencies. These intelligence operations came more out of a necessity than a desire. To fill the intelligence void, the 404th CA used soldiers with prior intelligence backgrounds or with law enforcement experience to gather actionable intelligence.[125]

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[123] Robert Bruce, MSG, phone interview by author, 14 August 2005.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Harry J. Schute "Submission of Meritorious Unit Commendation for 404th Civil Affairs Battalions (Special Operations). Erbil, Iraq

The 404th CA conducted Information Operations (IO) by first keeping strong ties with the local political leaders of both the KDP and PUK political parties. The 404th CA had to duplicate many of their efforts to work with both parties, but this did allow a steady flow of communications between the CPA and the leadership of the north and helped to avoid any misunderstandings. The 404th CA further exploited these channels by hiring local public affairs officers to conduct press conferences throughout the three provinces. In addition, the 404th CA participated in public forums and university lectures.[126]

The 404th CA established their main battalion CMOC in the city of Erbil. Their primary duty was coordination with the international community, which consisted of NGOs that had been in Iraq, even during Saddam's rule. The Erbil CMOC became the center for coordination for the entire Kurdish area as well as areas below the Green line. The USAID Disaster Assistance Relief Team and the CPA representatives also co-located at the CMOC. In addition to the CMOC, the 404th CA sent liaisons (LNOS) to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Ministry of Humanitarian Aid Cooperation (MOHAC) to help coordinate with local governmental authorities throughout the rural area. From the CMOC, the 404th CA was able to coordinate with the different ministries on issues ranging from education to public sanitation.[127]

The CMOC also was the focal point on issues with the Pershmerga Forces. The Pershmerga's 80,000 soldiers had fought with the coalition and required demobilization and reintegration into civilian society. The 404th CA trained the staff for three Veteran's Employment Offices in order to find employment for this large force. The soldiers were transitioned into the Facility Protection Service (FPS), the KRG Ministry of Interior, and two Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) Battalions. To further increase security, the 404th CA established the Erbil Police Academy. This police academy was established to provide training for over 500 police officers for each academy class. The 404th CA left Iraq in February of 2003 and transitioned to the 416th CA which was able

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[126] Harry Schute, Email to author to author, 26 August 2005.

[127] Personal observation and conversations with the staff of foreign NGOs while in Iraq.

to continue the mission with approximately one third of the strength of the 404th CA. Before leaving in February, the priority for the 404th CA was increasing the strength of the ministry of justice and developing a stronger security force.[128]

2. Integration of CMO into All Phases of the Operations

Did the ground component commanders integrate CMO into all phases of the operations? Although D/96th CA and 404th CA sent planners to 10 SFG as early as October 2002, 10 SFG did not initially integrate the CA aspects of CMO into the operational planning. However, the possibility of a DC problem did become the focus of CMO planning for the 404th CA Commander. Phase IV planning never took a priority; however, 10 SFG did integrate CMO into all their planning. As far as the execution, one could say that inserting CA forces had a mixed utility with 10 SFG. Their focus was on CMO for the combat operation and not the reconstruction or post-conflict phase. They did, however, fully support both the D/96th CA and 404th CA with resources. The 404th CA Executive Officer (XO) was the chief CMO planner for 10 SFG. Deploying to 10 SFG location six months prior to the invasion, he was eventually well received by 10 SFG in their planning cycles. The 404th CA XO became the commander before deploying to Iraq, which only strengthened his relationship with 10 SFG.[129]

During the execution, JSOTF-N infiltrated all of the D/96th CA teams that conducted the initial assessments and made key leader contacts with local NGOs and local ministers. Doctrinally, this is the responsibility of the AC CA forces. Once the 404th CA arrived, they immediately continued preparations for Phase IV. The Kurdish area appeared completely stabilized but the ground forces had to contend with the Ansar Al Islam terrorists, the PKK/KADEC terrorists and the possibility of in fighting again between the KDP and PUK. The area was by no means completely stabilized and had the potential to go bad. JSOTF-N exploited CMO successes with a strong PSYOP and IO campaign.[130]

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[128] Harry J. Schute "Submission of Meritorious Unit Commendation for 404th Civil Affairs Battalions (Special Operations). Erbil, Iraq

[129] Personal observation made while meeting the both the 404th CA commander and the 10 SFG staff.

[130] Robert Bruce, MSG, phone interview by author, 14 August 2005.

Did the ground component commanders accept the role as the CMO commander? The JSOTF-N commander had complete responsibility for northern Iraq. Keys to JSOTF-N success included working closely with the two political parties. His two battalion commanders accomplished this by working directly with Talabani and Barzani. Once the 101st ABN Commander took over the AOR, he allowed the 404th CA Commander to continue this relationship with the Kurdish leadership. This presented a unique opportunity for the 404th CA but also a challenge in obtaining the resources needed for CMO. The 404th CA would still have to compete with for CERP money and resources from the 101st ABN. However, the 101st ABN commander supported CMO and provided the 404th with the needed resources. In addition the 404th CA kept a liaison team (LNO) at the 101st ABN Command HQ to and utilized the 101st ABN LNOs at the Erbil CMOC.[131]

3. Balance of CMO between the Combat and Civilian Operation

Were the CMO missions appropriate for the operations? The 404th CA conducted an appropriate mix of CMO missions to support the combat operation as well as the civilian operation. Since they were the only ground force in the area, the missions were geared toward either the reconstruction of their AOR or on developing a strong security apparatus to support stabilization. Key to this support of the civilian operation is developing strong HN institutions that continue to support U.S. politico-military goals.

Did the ground force neglect vital CMO missions? Once the D/96th CA and 404th CA entered northern Iraq, they immediately concentrated on reconstruction and stability after initial humanitarian aid was provided for returning DCs. The 404th CA thought they would be focused on coordinating the return of DCs. However, as the situation required, the 404th CA changed their focus to establishing a stronger security system and strengthening Kurdish institutions.

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[131] Robert Bruce, MSG, phone interview by author, 14 August 2005.

4. The Attitude of the Host Nation (HN) or Occupied Area

To what degree did the attitude of the HN affect the ability to conduct CMO missions? The attitude of the Kurds was conducive for what the 404th CA was attempting to accomplish.[132] The Kurds had enjoyed a high degree of autonomy for the past 10-12 years and did not want this to change. This created a concern that the Kurds might act on their desire to become an independent state. Acting on this desire would not only upset the possibility of a strong Iraqi state but certainly cause problems with their northern neighbor Turkey. Having a small U.S. force to work with the Kurds allowed the coalition to exploit the positive attitude of the Kurds. Having that same force that was with the Kurds from the beginning remain with them was an added benefit.[133]

5. Summary

The indicators of success for the Kurdish controlled areas of Iraq appear positive. While looking at the possible indicators presented earlier, CMO has worked to set or maintain the necessary conditions for "peace." The Kurds still have a sense of security. This includes internal security as well as external security from Turkey or terrorist elements from Iran. Northern Iraq received a sufficient amount of humanitarian aid to help meet their basic life necessities although it was not as needed as in the rest of Iraq. The economy and employment for the Kurds is also doing well in the north. The local populace is in full support of their Pershmerga formed police and the coalition efforts. Institutions are continuing to be strengthened and are definitely self-managed.[134]

The Kurds are not supporting the Iraqi insurgency. However, a few terrorist attacks aimed at the Kurdish leadership have occurred. The worst occurred in February 2004 in Erbil when two suicide bombers killed over 105 Kurds at a political gathering. Besides this attack, very little insurgent activity in the Kurdish North has transpired. The security system in the Kurdish North ran

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[132] Harry Schute, Email to author to author, 26 August 2005.

[133] Robert Bruce, MSG, phone interview by author, 14 August 2005.

[134] Ibid.

by the former Kurdish Pershmerga force appears to have been mostly effective.[135]

The variables presented resulted in CMO success for the Kurdish North. The integration of CMO into all phases of the operations was fair. Although CMO planners planned with 10 SFG early, there was some resistance towards Phase IV planning. However, 10 SFG did support the CA forces in their perceived future operation of reconstruction. Once the 101st ABN commander took over, he focused on CMO.[136] The second variable, balance of CMO between the combat and civilian operations, was good. The CA forces applied the appropriate CMO from the beginning. The key here was exploiting already established institutions. The third variable, attitude of the HN or occupied area, was always favorable. CMO success in northern Iraq can be attributed to a very receptive attitude of the Kurds. The bonds forged between 10 SFG and the Kurds continued with the 404th CA. The proper combination of these three variables reflected the amount of success CMO had in the north.

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[135] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Evolving Insurgency," (DRAFT), Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14.

[136] Harry Schute, Email to author to author, 26 August 2005.

IV. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE CASE STUDIES

The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast the cases presented in Chapter III. This thesis analyzes the results of the overall CMO in the Kurdish North, Sunni Center, and Shi'a South. Accordingly, a comparison will be made of the units and the situation, to include: the external factors that arose from the environment, as well as the factors internal to the U.S. military and governmental actors involved in CMO.

A. COMPARING CMO BY REGION

Table 1 includes a summary of the analysis of CMO outcomes by region. Evaluation of each aspect of CMO performance is analyzed below.

Case Study	Integration[137]	Balance[138]	Attitude[139]	CMO Outcome[140]
Kurdish North	Fair	Good	Good	Success
Sunni Center	Poor	Fair	Poor	Failure
Shi'a South	Fair	Fair	Fair	Partial success

Table 1.   Comparison of CMO Outcomes by Region

1. Integration of CMO into All Phases of the Operations

None of the ground combatant units went beyond planning for dislocated civilian (DC) operations and humanitarian assistance (HA) during the initial CMO planning. Although not all the ground units prepared for Phase IV, the attached CA units independently planned for what was needed in the reconstruction phase. The ground combatant units in each area thoroughly planned for the major combat phase of the operation but did little planning for the stabilization

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[137] Variable 1: Integration of CMO into all phases of the operations.

[138] Variable 2: Balance of CMO between the combat and civilian operations.

[139] Variable 3: Attitude of the HN or occupied area.

[140] Dependent variable: Success or failure of the CMO.

and reconstruction of Iraq. Once Phase IV began, the overall ground commanders for each of the areas supported CMO for their assigned areas.

The difference in CMO support and integration came at the brigade level and below. In the Sunni Arab area, the ground component units had the advantage of having their "wartrace" CA units attached.[141] However, this advantage was not enough to break through the U.S. Army's cultural bias of focusing only on major combat and not what occurs afterwards. In the Shi'a Arab area, neither the Marines nor the British forces did much planning for CMO, but once major combat operations were over, they fully transitioned to Phase IV and integrated CMO into the overall operation. The Kurdish area was a unique situation where the majority of the units were SOF that had had a history of conducting CMO in the very same area almost a decade prior.[142]

It is evident from the analysis of the cases that there was a problem in integration of CMO in all phases of the operations. CMO were not integrated in every phase of the operation even in circumstances where there were sufficient CMO forces and planners. Not integrating the CMO early can be attributed to more than just a lack of policy and direction from a higher command. When the higher command did not provide this guidance, combat leaders could have "reached back" and demanded the answers they needed. Yet, this did not occur. The U.S. military expects combat leaders to plan, fight and accomplish the combat phase on minimal guidance; it should be the same for Phase IV.

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[141] Global security. Military: Wartrace. Accessed 11 September 2005; Available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/agency/army/wartrace.htm. Instituted in 1995, the U.S. Army's "Wartrace Program" aligned reserve units with active units for planning and training exercises in the case of going to war.

[142] SOF includes SF, CA and PSYOP forces.

2.   Balance of CMO between the Combat and Civilian Operations

In all three regions, the coalition forces applied a variety of CMO throughout the full spectrum of combat operations, including the stabilization and reconstruction phase. The units in these areas had to divide their resources in order to appropriately handle their unique situations.   In each area, units attempted to apply the appropriate balance between the combat and civilian operations. At first, in all areas, the emphasis was placed on DC operations and then on providing basic life necessities. Once this was complete, all areas focused on security and finally, reconstruction.

The most significant difference among the regions centered on establishing the "rule of law" and creating civil order.   In the Kurdish North, the Pershmerga forces and the civil police had control and the CA units involved were able to move immediately to strengthen this "rule of law" and security while devoting a large amount of their CMO to the on-going long term civilian operations.   The Sunni Arab area was completely ransacked with looters which caused a setback in reconstruction and stabilization. The units in the Shi'a South did exert a larger amount of control from the beginning. Once Phase IV began in the Shi'a South, providing the basic life necessities remained a continuing focus. CA activities could have focused more on support to civil administration to empower the local Shi'a institutions.

3.   The Attitude of the Host Nation (HN) or Occupied Area

In all three areas, the people were glad to have Saddam Hussein gone. However, this does not translate into trusting the coalition and supporting their efforts. People in all areas, including the Kurds and the Shi'a Arabs, have a certain amount of distrust of the coalition. In the history of all the regions, the people have been willing to receive help and aid, but no group wants to have an occupying power within their lands. There are major differences in the attitudes in each region. The Sunni Arabs had been the ruling class for over a hundred years. Losing this status puts the Sunni Arabs in a non-cooperative situation.[143]

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[143] Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?* 152-153.

Of all the regions, the Shi'as probably had the greatest reason to distrust the coalition but nevertheless were willing to receive aid and become the ruling majority of the country. Being the majority would allow the Shi'as to rule a democratic Iraq. The Kurds appear to fully support the coalition; although this could change if they do not get at least a portion of what they want, which is a degree of autonomy and the city of Kirkuk.[144]

4. The CMO Outcome

Despite some successes in CA activities, the degree of overall CMO success varied greatly across the three areas.[145] The Kurdish North had substantial success. In the Sunni Center, CMO failed to achieve the desired results. In the Shi'a South, CMO was generally successful. Perhaps the greatest indicator of success is the degree to which insurgents operate in each of the areas: generally none in the Kurdish North, the most in the Sunni Center and very little in the Shi'a South.[146]

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[144] Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?* 178-183. Kirkuk has traditionally always been the spiritual center for Kurdistan.

[145] Although basic life necessities were met within a short amount of time, this is not enough to achieve overall CMO success.

[146] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Evolving Insurgency," (DRAFT), Center for Strategic and International Studies.

B. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to the variables discussed in the hypothesis, there are other significant comparisons that should be made that might reveal important factors. CMO is a complex topic; therefore it is always beneficial to look at other considerations that might present some explanations for the degree of success or failure of CMO. Table 2 incorporates these other considerations.

Case Study	The Units	Level of CMO Experience	Initial Units in Area	Existing Institutions
Kurdish North	SF, CA, ABN	High	Yes	Good
Sunni Center	Mech. Div, CA	Low	No	Fair
Shi'a South	UK, Marines, CIMIC, CA	Medium	Mixed	Poor

Table 2.   Other Considerations for the Case Studies

1. The Units and Their CMO Experience

The type and capabilities of the units in different regions varied greatly. In the Kurdish North, SOF was very effective. The 10 SFG had a large amount of CMO experience from previous operations. These missions included the Joint Commission Observer missions in Bosnia, de-mining missions throughout Eastern Europe, and Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq. The 4ID did not have near this same experience. Although some soldiers had CMO experience, as a unit they had not conducted CMO. This lack of experience was only compounded by a lack of CMO training. The British in the South had gained CMO experience in Northern Ireland. The Marines did not have this same level of experience, yet were capable of making quick changes and adapting to fluid situations. In summary, the amount of integration in each of the areas varied depending on the level of CMO experience of the unit.

2. Initial Units in Area

SOF were present in the Kurdish North from the beginning of the coalition invasion (March 2003) and remained until at least May 2003. This allowed SOF

to continue exploiting any relationships that had been built. The Sunni Center was different. The original units that first arrived in the city did not stay. The 4ID prepared for operations in Tikrit, but did not arrive there until later. In the Shi'a South, the British stayed in their original area and were joined by the Marines shortly after the major fighting ended. The local expertise and relationships are important for three reasons: first, for developing the trust and consistency that is needed for a successful military to civilian relationship; second, to exploit the "window of opportunity" that may exist for only a few days or a few weeks; and third, for the unit to take responsibility during this critical "window of opportunity." This consideration is much a factor of time as it is familiarity.[147]

3. Existing Institutions

The Kurdish North had existing security, administrative, and social institutions that allowed for a faster exploitation of CMO. The CMO forces usually had existing functional institutions to work with when conducting these missions.[148] The Sunni Center did not have an effective security institution and any administrative institutions had been severely damaged by Ambassador Bremmer's decision to de-ba'athify Iraq. The Shi'a's infrastructure in the south had been damaged by years of neglect during Saddam's rule. In the south much of the infrastructure had to be developed from scratch.[149] Although this factor might not determine CMO success or failure, new infrastructure requirements will effect the time required for CMO success.

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[147] Personal experience of author while in Iraq.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Conversation with CA officers deployed to the Shi'a South.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

> New capabilities are required within the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Department of Defense for security and nation building missions. It does not matter whether these are called post conflict, Phase IV, stabilization, or reconstruction missions. The U.S. must be as prepared to win a peace as it is prepared to win a war.[150]
>
>   - Anthony H. Cordesman

A. THE OVERALL RESEARCH QUESTION

The intent of this thesis is to identify the conditions required for success in Civil Military Operations. As stated in Chapter I, the hypothesis of this thesis states that the success or failure of CMO is dependent on three variables: Integration of CMO in all phases of the operations, the balance of CMO missions between combat operations and civil operations, and the attitude of the Host Nation (HN) or occupied area. Key to understanding and evaluating CMO success was testing the hypothesis against the most current and relevant case study: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This thesis tested the hypothesis in three distinct ethno-religious areas of Iraq.

Based on the evidence of the case studies, the author draws the following conclusions:

- Integration of CMO in all phases of the operations was demonstrated in each case to be the variable that could most easily be influenced internally by the unit involved. U.S. Military culture and the lack of CMO experience of the ground units played the largest role in causing this variable to be neglected.

- The balance of CMO missions between combat operations and civil operations required the most CMO expertise. Understanding the responsibility of an occupying military power is critical. When the ground units attempted to distribute their resources between the

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[150] Anthony H. Cordesman, "The "Post Conflict" Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan: Testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, May 19, 2004.

combat and civilian operation, the appropriate balance could not be met without an effective counterinsurgency strategy.

- Attitude of the HN or occupied area appeared to have the greatest effect of helping or hindering the success of CMO. This variable was the most difficult condition to either set or understand without proper intelligence and research.

- All three variables had an effect in determining the degree of success or failure in each area.

B.   RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations of this thesis are built upon lessons learned from the case study analyses. Additionally, this thesis proposes ideas for future studies. Many of these ideas are briefly discussed but were beyond the scope of this study. Recommendations are either intended to exploit or mitigate the determining effects from the three independent variables of this thesis. Key to all the recommendations is to remember that CMO is the commanders' responsibility. For CMO to be effective, commanders must make CMO inherent to operations and not a separate sideshow that occurs only after the battle.

1.   Military Educational System

Based on personal experience and observance of the educational system in the military, CMO is barely covered in the military's basic or advanced officer schooling. If any aspect of CMO is covered, it is limited to CA operations that directly influence combat operations. This lack of training begins with commissioning programs and continues through the basic and advanced officer courses. The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Army's new Intermediate Level Education (ILE) do not integrate CMO into their staff training exercises. Aspects of Information Operations, PSYOPS, and CA are all covered as part of the curriculum but CMO planning is not taught.[151] To resolve this deficiency CMO should be introduced into every level of an officer's military education.

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[151] This observation was made by both a SF and CA officer currently going through the ILE program. A CGCS graduate mentioned that any CMO/CA instruction was given by students.

One way to introduce the military to CMO is to put an active CA officer at the brigade level of each maneuver unit.[152] Although this is a step in the right direction to integrate CMO, the education of the selected officer also needs to be examined. The CMO training of these officers may not be adequate for this position. This officer will most likely have completed 4-6 months of basic language training, a four month regional studies course, and a 3 ½ week CA course. This training program is adequate for an already experienced Army Captain to conduct CA missions at the tactical level, but provides only a minimal amount of training in CMO, let alone integrating CMO into operations.[153] There are no courses dedicated to CMO at the Naval Postgraduate School, where many CA officers receive advanced schooling.[154] CA officers' advanced schooling should include specific courses on CMO.

2.   Organizational

Proposed changes in CMO organization currently call for additional CA forces. Although this addresses a maneuver commander's capability to plan for CMO, it may not address the concepts for CMO success. The most important issue is to ensure that additional forces do not take away the ground commander's responsibility for integrating CMO. For example, during OIF, there was a mentality within the Army that once ground combat ended, Army combat units could just turn Phase IV over to CA and redeploy. Of course this was not the case. Karen Guttieri, a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, identified this problem at a speech delivered to the World Wide Civil Affairs Conference, "Given that civil affairs is a command responsibility, perhaps it is worth investigating an approach that integrates rather than segregates civil-

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[152] Currently Brigade Combat Teams rotating into combat zones are being assigned an active duty CA officer.

[153] Once complete with the CA pipeline, the officer will usually do 12-24 months at the 96th CA. The experience is limited and is not enough to plan for CMO beyond tactical level CA missions.

[154] The Defense Analysis Department offers courses in counter-insurgency and the National Security Affairs Department offers courses in Stabilization and Reconstruction. There is an abundance of literature for these topics but very little related to CMO.

military operations".[155]   The number of CA forces in Iraq did not effectively influence the degree of success or failure that occurred in the areas.

Recommendations for changes to organizational structure should emphasize proficient CMO planning at every level instead of an increase in the number of CA forces. Likewise, if there is an increase in CA forces, there should also be an increase of CA specialists who have the expertise with one of the functional areas that focus on support to civil administration. Civil administration is the most intensive and expensive CA functional area for the military to develop. However, this investment ensures that the CMO knowledge exists to support the civilian operations at the beginning of operations.

Recommendations to alter organizational culture are more difficult. First, the military needs to fully realize that although peacekeeping and "nation building" operations are CMO intensive, they are not the same.   In the past, CMO may have been neglected as a result of a cultural bias in the Army against anything to do with "nation building." To avoid this misconception, CMO training should in pre-commissioning officer programs. There is no reason why aspects of CMO cannot be introduced as a vital part of military operations. Fundamental to the conclusions of this thesis is that CMO must be integrated into all levels of the operations. This integration of CMO should start at the beginning of an officer's education.

3.   Doctrine

Currently the Army does not have doctrine specifically for CMO. Joint CMO doctrine is not sufficient to integrate CMO into all phases of the operations. In addition, proposed Army CA doctrine puts an emphasis on "Effects Based Operations" in order to ensure proper integration into the current system of maneuver units. Joint doctrine emphasizes stabilization and reconstruction.[156]

Recommended changes in doctrine include putting more emphasis on CA/CMO to support counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare.   Current

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[155] Karen Guttieri, "Historical Junctures of United States Civil Affairs: Drawing from the Past to Plot the Future", Center for International Security and Cooperation (Stanford University), 71.

[156] All this doctrine is still in draft form and has not yet been released.

doctrine only briefly explains how CMO can help to legitimize the HN through Military or Humanitarian Civic Action missions.[157] Increased study in this area could improve a unit's ability to apply the appropriate balance of both combat and civilian operations. This ability is an integral part of unconventional warfare. If CMO is going to be used to win the "hearts and minds" or popular support of the HN there must be doctrine on how this should be done. Further study on how to synchronize all aspects of CMO should be considered.

C.   CONCLUSION

By examining the three cases using the framework of three independent variables, this thesis was able to draw some conclusions on what determines success or failure of CMO. It is important for any unit to realize the implications of not properly integrating CMO into the overall operation. Yet reading CMO unit AARs from Iraq gloss over the impact of the initial planning deficiencies. For units to improve in CMO, they must conduct an honest assessment of CMO as part of an overall assessment of the entire operation. It is as if CMO was a subject that few units would want to discuss afterwards in AARs. If CMO is discussed, it is reduced to targeting operations to find insurgents. This demonstrates the previously discussed Army's culture bias against operations not considered combat operations.

As stated before, CMO is a complex subject. If changes are to be made in CMO, studies and discussion on the subject should center on the factors that can influence the outcome of any CMO. The ideas contained in this thesis can be applied to any CMO, whether during war or peacetime. When CMO-intensive operations are required in the future, the military should be better prepared to succeed in making a peaceful transition to civilian authorities than what occurred in Iraq. Even with success in the Kurdish North, and moderate success in the Shi'a South, the failure in the Sunni Center will overshadow the entire operation. The entire operation should be viewed when attempting to transform CMO. As

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[157]U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57* and Department of the Army. *Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.* Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2000.

difficult as it is, CMO must be better understood and appreciated for a positive transformation to occur.

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