


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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
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**JAPANESE ARMY
DISCIPLINE AND MORALE
SPECIAL TRANSLATION NUMBER 76**

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

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3 July 1945 - Serial DIS-031445.

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas.

To: Distribution List.

Subject: SPECIAL TRANSLATION No. 76.
Japanese Army Discipline and Morale.
(CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin No. 171-45.)

Enclosure: (A) Subject Special Translation No. 76.

1. Enclosure (A), forwarded herewith, need not be reported and when no longer of value should be destroyed. No report of destruction is necessary.

M. Legendre
M. LEGENDRE,
By direction.

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Item #10,577

JAPANESE ARMY DISCIPLINE AND MORALE
Army Secret General Order #3833,
17 December 1942. Source unknown.

EDITOR'S NOTE

This document comprises a general report on the numerous problems of discipline and morale encountered in the Japanese Army. The report is divided into four sections.

1. The first section deals with crimes committed by army men against officers. Elaborate graphs and tables break the problem down into number and types of such crimes committed, comparisons as to frequency within given years and localities, rank of the men involved, and classification of the reasons for the crimes. One conclusion reached is that the Japanese are prone to get drunk.

2. The second section deals with the allied problems of communism in the army and of desertion to the (Chinese) enemy. A brief historical sketch of the growth of communism in the military service and of communist tactics is given. Case histories are included. Of particular interest are the cases in which Japanese soldiers have deserted to the Communist-led armies of CHINA. Many were indoctrinated by the Chinese and sent back to their outfits to engage in propaganda work.

3. Section III deals with the problems of friction between civilians and the military. Root of the problem seems to be the high-handed, arrogant attitude of army men in their dealings with the civilian populace.

4. Section IV is a discussion of crimes (mostly financial) committed, presumably, because top officers have been lax in enforcing discipline. Many case histories are included.

The entire report is a study in disaffection. As such, it may be of some value particularly to those interested in the problems of Psychological Warfare.

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17 December 1942

Army Secret General Order #3833

From: KAWAHARA Nauchi, Adjutant, War Dept.
To: All Army Units.

Subject: Forwarding of Report #6 on Army Discipline and Morale,
Notification Concerning.

The annexed volume is being forwarded for use as a training manual.

Report #6 on Army Discipline and Morale

Table of Contents

- I. Crimes against Superior Officers Since the Outbreak of the GEA War.
- II. The Communist Movement in the Army and Desertions since the CHINA Incident.
- III. Factors Tending to Create Friction between Civilian Authorities and the Military.
- IV. Crimes and Misconduct Caused by Dereliction of Duty by the Staff.

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I. Crimes against Superior Officers since the Outbreak of the GEA War.

A. General Situation

B. Special Trends in Recent Crimes against Superior Officers.

- 1 Group Crimes (TN: TOYO HANZAI)
- 2 Crimes Involving the Use of Firearms
- 3 Crimes against Immediate Superiors
- 4 Crimes against Superior Staff Officers

C. Observations on Causes and Motives

D. Methods of Preventing Crimes against Superior Officers

Attached Table: Analysis of causes of crimes against superior officers.


A. General Situation.

In the entire army during the period from January to the end of July 1942, crimes against superior officers known to or handled by the military police (insubordination, violence against a superior officer, killing, wounding, and insults) numbered 126, involving 152 persons. In comparison with the overall situation since the beginning of the CHINA Incident, as shown in Graph 1, there is still reason for optimism. In the present period the most serious offenses from the standpoint of discipline, i.e., use of firearms, group offenses, and offenses against immediate superior officers, have been especially frequent. Moreover, in contrast to the decrease in offenses committed by enlisted men, there has been an increase in the offenses by junior officers, WOs, and NCOs. Such a situation is deplorable. This kind of crime cannot be judged simply by the number of times it is committed. In a war of long duration there are many opportunities to study soldier psychology. Officers of all ranks must bend every effort to discover the causes of these crimes and to strive for a marked improvement in leadership and supervision.

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Graph 1



*Note: Omitted here is the fact that in 1938 a case of insubordination involving 292 men occurred at the KUMAMOTO Army Hospital.

B. Special Trends in Recent Crimes against Superior Officers

Crimes against superior officers occurring in 1942 up to the end of July are classified in the following table according to the locality and the type of crime. Threats of violence to superior officers (including group offenses and offenses involving firearms) were most numerous (71 persons). Killing or wounding of superior officers comes next with 45. The greatest number of these offenses occurred in KWANTUNG with JAPAN proper next in order.

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TYPE OF CRIME AND LOCALITY IN WHICH COMMITTED 1937 - 1942					
Analysis by type of crime					Total
	Insubordination (including mutiny)	Threats of violence against officers*	Wounding or killing of superior officers*	Insults to superior officers	
Analysis by Area					
Japan proper	13	19	3	5	40
KWANTUNG	2	18	26	3	49
N. CHINA	4	14	6	4	28
C. CHINA	1	13	8	4	26
S. CHINA	-	-	1	-	1
Southern Areas	-	7	1	-	8
Total	20	71	45	16	152
* Includes group crimes and crimes in which firearms were used.					

Special trends in these crimes were as follows:

1. Group Crimes

Group crimes against superior officers in this period were:

a. Insubordination	2 cases;	4 men
b. Group threats of violence	11 cases;	31 men
Total	13 cases	35 men


Classified by locality

a. JAPAN Proper	3 cases	6 men
b. KWANTUNG	5 cases	14 men
c. North CHINA	1 case	4 men
d. Central CHINA	3 cases	6 men
e. Southern Areas	1 case	5 men

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Hence, the area of greatest frequency is KWANTUNG. Of the years since the CHINA Incident, 1938 and 1940 lead in the number of offenses. (See Graph 2)

Graph 2



2. Crimes Involving the Use of Firearms

For this period crimes involving the use of firearms are as follows: classified according to type of offense).

- a. Murder or attempted murder of superior officer: 6 cases, 6 men (4 cases in North CHINA).
- b. Wounding a superior officer by means of firearms: 22 cases, 23 men (including 13 incidents in KWANTUNG).
- c. Wounding of officers by groups using firearms: 3 cases, 8 men (all in KWANTUNG).
- d. Threats of violence with firearms against a superior officer: 17 cases, 17 men (including 6 incidents in North CHINA).
- e. Threats of group violence with firearms against superior officers: 2 cases, 4 men (all in Central CHINA).

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TOTAL 50 cases 58 men

Classified according to locality, these crimes are as follows:


	<u>Cases</u>	<u>Men Involved</u>
JAPAN Proper	5	5
KWANTUNG	20	26
N. CHINA	12	12
C. CHINA	10	12
S. CHINA	1	1
Southern Areas	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	50	58

It must be noted in regard to the general situation since the CHINA Incident that there has been a marked increase in occurrences since the outbreak of the GEM War. (See Graph 3.)

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Graph 3



Notes: 1. Includes persons who murdered or attempted to murder superior officers by the use of firearms.

2. No distinction is made between crimes committed before the Army Criminal Code was amended and those acts which are crimes under the new laws.

3. Crimes against Immediate Superiors.

As shown in the following table, 15 men were guilty of killing, wounding, violence, threats, or insults (insubordination excluded) against immediate superior officers who held the rank of company commander or above during this period. (In this period they represent 10.6% of the total number of crimes against superior officers, excluding those of insubordination.) Crimes against commanders of companies of men who are called up from the reserves are most frequent. The greatest number of violations occurred in JAPAN Proper and in Central CHINA.

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
CRIMES AGAINST IMMEDIATE SUPERIORS HOLDING RANK OF CO COMDR OR ABOVE										
1 Jan 1942 - 31 July 1942										
Injured Person	Post	Comdr	Regt'l Comdr	En Comdr	Co Comdr			Co of Hospital	Ship's Capt	Total
	Rank	Gen (a)	Col (a)	Lt Col (a)	1st Lt (r)	Unknown	Capt (?)	Lt Col (Medical) (?) 1	1	14
Offender		WO (r)	1st Lt (r)	Pvt (a)	Sgt (n)	Cpl (r)	Pvt (a)	Pvt (r)	Civilian Employee	15
					3	3	2	1		
Locality			JAPAN Proper		KWAN-TUNG		Central CHINA		North CHINA	JAPAN Proper

(a) Active service
(r) Reserve

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The general situation since the CHINA Incident is shown in Graph 4. It is to be noted that the frequency of outbreaks has increased radically since the start of the GEA War.

Graph 4



Note: This table includes cases of killing, wounding, violence and insults against immediate superior officers.

4. Officers' Crimes against Superior Officers.

Classified according to rank, the offenders against superior officers during this period were as follows:


- Officers 4 (conscripts)
- WOs 3 (1 on active duty, 2 conscripts)
- NCOs 35 (23 on active duty, 12 conscripts)
- Privates 106 (50 on active duty, 56 conscripts)
- Civilian employees 4

- Total 152 (78 on active duty; 74 conscripts)

Officers of the rank of NCO and above commit a comparatively large number of crimes. It should be particularly noted that compared to the downward trend in the number of crimes committed by enlisted men, crimes of officers, WOs, and NCOs actually show signs of an increase. (See Graph 5.)

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Graph 5



Note: The KUMAMOTO Army Hospital Incident, a case of group insubordination in 1938 involving 292 men, is omitted from this table.

C. Observations on Causes and Motives . (Cf. annexed table)

A compilation of major immediate causes of these crimes of violence, injuries, and insults to superior officers shows the following:

1. Anger at being warned or reprov'd concerning one's own mistakes. 38
2. Anger at the severity of a superior officer's correction of one's mistakes. 14
3. Crimes due to drunken violence. 14
4. Crimes arising from dissatisfaction over promotions or privileges. 8

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There are others, but violent acts caused by drunkenness make up 85 cases out of a total of 126, or 67.5 per cent of such offenses.

Let us proceed with a thorough analysis of the causes of crimes committed against superior officers.

1. Indirect causes based on changes in social conditions.

a. After the (TN: MEIJI) Restoration, our society tended to have increasing respect for the western ideas of liberty and popular rights. These ideas gained wide circulation and stirred the popular imagination. However, at the time of the SINO-JAPANESE and the RUSSO-JAPANESE Wars, these ideas had not become firmly entrenched. Nevertheless, under the impetus of such events, these ideas not only gained increasingly high regard among the people, but finally assumed the form of individualism and capitalism. Respect for the common man developed side by side with contempt for authority, ending in social chaos. Moreover, army men living at home in this environment sometimes completely forgot the rules and regulations of army life. Men who have been trained only a short time and untrained men do not understand that army discipline has fundamentally different characteristics necessary for military organization. As a result, these men make army life a hateful and oppressive thing, creating dissatisfaction and discontent with the result that discipline is destroyed. The comparatively large number of offenders among First Reservists, especially replacements and Transport Troops, proves this.

One gets a clear indication of the views of the men if one studies the comments of the offenders against their superior officers on the occasion of their crime. For example: "When we go back home, you will be just small fry." "Is there a law saying that a superior officer shall strike a subordinate?" "One or two stripes of gold braid don't make you a big shot." Admittedly, these quotations reflect the views among the men.

b. At the time of the RUSSO-JAPANESE War, generally speaking, there were extremely few soldiers who received even a middle school education. A unit normally had not more than two or three graduates. However, in the present situation, the general level of popular education has improved greatly, and many men of middle school education or above are entering the army. Moreover, the average soldier, by means of young men's schools, night schools, study, books, and the like, has improved his scholarship and talent. Many wonder if they are not superior to the NCO's. At the present time, adopting the wicked attitude of the population at large, they have developed the habit of criticizing everything. Consequently, they are, to say the least, arrogant

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and have a feeling of superiority toward their immediate superior junior officers. They criticize their officer's every salute or step. If an officer commits an improper act, they secretly insult him. Such conduct gives rise to disobedience and infractions of military discipline, which, increasing gradually, often become crimes. Because of this, the military ability, education, and common sense of officers and NCOs must be improved. We must recognize the need for the kind of training that maintains high standards of essential principles and conduct.

2. Causes based on a great difference in rank relative to age.

a. In the ordinary society of our country, respect for age is a deeply engrained custom. This sentiment has a profound bearing upon this problem. Privates and others, especially reservists who are called to the colors, reflect this social custom, and they feel strongly about inverting the relationship of age to rank. /The rank system/ disturbs them; it causes dissatisfaction and results in speech and conduct of an extremely undisciplined type. Some of them, when an opportunity presents itself, commit inexcusable crimes such as offenses against their superior officers.

At the time they commit their offenses they say such things as: "Why you're only a greenhorn." "A short time ago you were only a probational officer." "You are 23 years old and I'm 34. Why you're just a kid!" "Instead of going around with a grouch on, a young fellow like you ought to do more work." With such insulting remarks they amuse themselves. It is easy to guess that the logical extreme of such language is an act of violence.

b. It is expected that officers on active duty, especially officers who graduated from officer schools, will be given rank out of keeping with age, so violent acts directed at them are based on other reasons. There is a rising number of reserve officers, especially OCS graduates, who are attacked. Usually these reservists are lacking in military ability or the question is one of relative age.

Among the NCOs, regulars and reservists alike, the causes of insults and insubordination seem to be numerous and complicated, but presumably a substantial number arise from rank being out of line with age. Remarks like the following are heard, "You joined the Army the same time as I did. Should I call you Honorable Master Sergeant?" "I was a trained soldier when you were just a rookie." "You're still wet behind the ears."

3. Defects in the Character, Training, and Actions of Superior Officers.

a. If he is unfair in handling personnel matters and duty, a superior officer incurs animosity. If his subordinates also believe

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that in many practical matters he is a mean fellow and is biased against them, a superior officer will be hated by his subordinates. By that fact alone he betrays his incapacity as a superior officer and it should be recognized that he lacks the qualifications of command. A superior officer, knowing there are points in which he has defects, must always be on the lookout. If he recognizes signs that he has incurred the enmity of his subordinates, he should immediately examine his past behavior. It is essential that he quickly rectify such a situation.

When one considers how many Officers, WOs, and NCOs are men of high character, receive absolute trust, obedience, and respect from their subordinates, and are as highly esteemed as FUJIYAMA, one cannot always ascribe strong animosity against an officer solely to the malice of the subordinate.

One should inquire whether the attitude and conduct of the superior officer, before he became the victim of crime by a subordinate, was befitting an officer or whether he acted in a cruel manner, shouting and cursing, being abusive or shoving or striking his men. /Such a situation/ is lamentable. It casts suspicion on the ordinary day-to-day conduct of the officer. If one seeks the underlying cause of such crimes, one is forced to the conclusion that one-half can be traced to short temper, abuse, and blows from the superior officer.

b. Deficiency in military ability of low ranking commanding officers such as cowardice in battle, negligence of duty, habitually bad conduct, etc.. severely damages subordinates' trust; and even though the officers' actions are good in other respects, they can neither enforce obedience from their subordinates, nor receive their respect. They end up being insulted at every opportunity.

If the officer lacks military proficiency, even if his orders are as strict as possible, they give rise to discussion, rather than action. If he uses an imploring tone, his subordinates imply something that wasn't intended. Discipline is lost, and superior officers are insulted.

Some officers of their own accord frequent bawdy houses and play around, get drunk with subordinates and engage in violence. It is no exaggeration to say that it is quite natural that they should receive violence from subordinates. Such men are encouraging insubordination.

c. Defects in leadership and supervision on the part of junior officers affect discipline. These defects inadvertently cause crimes by presenting opportunities for the commission of offenses.

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4. Drinking.

It is obvious that SAKE often is either the cause or the motive of crime. In the first place, drunkenness aggravates normal animosity. Thus, liquor emboldens men to commit premeditated offenses.

Secondly, the present day drinking places are noted for violence which gives rise to crime. It is proverbial that liquor causes crimes. At any rate, 67.5% of all crimes involve liquor, indicating a considerable causal relationship between crime and liquor. From the standpoint of establishing military discipline, liquor is a factor which warrants deep concern.

D. Methods of Preventing Crimes against Superior Officers.

1. Need for improved leadership, supervision, and judgment among high ranking commanding officers.

a. Unlike other offenses, overt acts against superior officers are not apt to occur suddenly. There are invariably preparatory indications. If the high ranking commanding officer thinks he detects symptoms of laxness in the discipline of his subordinates or judges that he lacks aptitude for leadership, he should exhaust all possible remedial measures before trouble develops. In a military unit which has good discipline and esprit-de-corps, crimes against superior officers should never occur. However, there are high ranking officers, who, because of their positions of leadership should certainly be able to hear of any disaffection, but are unaware of the existence of trouble or knowing it, they neglect it. When the situation gets to be very serious they deal with it for the first time. There are many of these weak-spirited men among reserve field officers and captains. Hence, many crimes break out among rear echelon troops or forces stationed in the homeland and the like. It is possible to know about imminent trouble, and since the army of the nation is fighting a war of survival, it is extremely urgent to correct this condition.

b. It is necessary that high ranking commanding officers pay attention to the following matters in order to be forehanded in preventing this type of crime:

(1) Certain tones of voices among NCO's and men. A complaining or dissatisfied voice, a voice implying criticism of the superior officer, or a resentful and grieving voice should be marked.

(2) Cases where superiors show cruelty or unfairness toward their subordinates.

(3) Cases where officers are men of loose character.

(4) Cases where men have violent dispositions, or are habitual drunkards, persons of loose character, etc.

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Note such cases and pass this information along through the regular channels. There is reason to believe that if one can devise suitable measures it will generally be possible to prevent trouble beforehand.

c. There have been numerous cases where an offender committed a number of crimes, some totalling 10 or more, because of the lack of a suitable commanding officer at the outset of his career of crime.

Underlying such cases we usually find defects of leadership indicating that the superior officer's judgment was inaccurate in the beginning, or that he was not aware of the situation until too late. If his leadership had been suitable he could probably have prevented the trouble or limited it to a single occurrence.

2. Need for Improvement in Ability of Officers of Low Rank.

a. Because junior officers lack ability, they lack self-confidence in leading and governing their men, thereby forfeiting their authority. As a result, they are insulted by their men. There are innumerable instances in which this has been the cause of crimes committed against superior officers. Among officers, the weak points are reserve officers of the rank of Second and First Lieutenant; among NCOs, they are Sergeants and Corporals in the reserves and an element of the regular army.

b. Graduates of the Reserve Officers Schools, although inexperienced, are already achieving greater success than previously graduated officers. They must improve even more in the future. Training of special volunteer officers must improve greatly. In addition to improving the proficiency of officers who graduate as 2nd Lieutenants, defects of 1st and 2nd Lieutenants must be systematically eliminated.

c. In improving the ability of NCOs, attention will be paid to the following points:

NCOs who are graduates of the NCO Preparatory Schools are generally of superior /ability/. However, because they form an extremely small part of the total number of NCOs required in war time, they cannot be more than a nucleus.

Specially appointed NCO's differ remarkably from one another. There are excellent men as well as low-grade men. Especially at the time of replacement, disputes occur among the men. Most complaints about unfairness in handling of personnel matters stem from this source. In the future, it will be necessary to give careful consideration to the handling of this type of replacement.

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3. The discipline and morale of the Home Guards must be strengthened. The Home Guards at the present time are infected by social corruption at home. They forget the military spirit and especially the discipline inculcated during active duty. They soon fall into weak habits and finally become lax in discipline. This condition is especially widespread among replacements and transport troops who received only a short course of training. Consequently, in order to be prepared for war in the future, the popular resolution must be steeled, and more attention must be paid to the training and leadership of reservists.

4. Extra-legal punishments by officers must be eliminated.

Even though extra-legal punishment has been strictly prohibited in the past by orders and instructions of commanding officers, such punishment is being meted out with considerable frequency.

An element of low ranking officers believes that extra-legal punishment is the only way of keeping insolent individuals in line. According to this view, discipline is thus tightened directly. There are many enlisted men who desire the simplest possible army type of stern private punishment instead of /formal/ punishment or repeated warnings. The word has got around /among the men/ that if an officer has not the spirit to strike a soldier he is unfit to be a commanding officer. With such a befuddled situation in our forces, neither the instructions of authorities nor the caution of superior officers will have any good results.

A superior officer should be impartial; he should give punishment openly. Whether it is a trivial offense or a serious crime, he must never mete out punishment on his own. The mentally-developed enlisted men of the present day invariably resent extra-legal punishment strongly. In the end, such action widens the gulf between ranks.

It is certain that extra-legal punishment cannot be stamped out within the ranks as long as commanding officers themselves are guilty of the practice.

When we consider that the majority of offenders against their superior officers resent the way their officers settle such matters and a part of them suddenly revolt when they receive private punishment, it is not difficult to realize that the majority of crimes against officers is due to hatred of extra-legal punishment.

Officers who mete out punishment on their own must be classed with drunkards and persons who have abnormally violent dispositions. How can the men be obedient and patiently submit to officers with such characteristics? Revolt is natural. Bluntly speaking, such officers promote crimes against other officers.

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5. Counter-measures against the evil effects of liquor.

a. Liquor creates a fine spirit among the troops; since it is the only comfort of soldiers, the /success of the/ army and liquor actually have a very close connection. However, the evil of excessive drinking has already been noted. After the RUSSO-JAPANESE War, the Russian Army prohibited drinking because liquor was an important cause of their defeat. This fact should suffice to indicate the extent of the danger.

b. Even though drinking is a widespread habit among the people of JAPAN, there are demonstrably many evil practices connected with liquor. For example, it has reached the point where at least a few guests at a banquet must get drunk if the function is to be considered a success. Also, even in the home it is considered excellent hospitality to get your guests drunk. No matter how violent or abusive drunks become in speech or behavior, they are treated as privileged characters and generally condoned. Adults and Home Guards who are raised in this kind of environment are cursed with the habit. Even when they enter the army, they sometimes exceed their capacity and become involved in infractions of discipline.

c. In order to root out this evil practice, strict enforcement of temperance should be sought in preference to the prohibition of drinking, and drunkenness should be strictly punished. Also it should be known that it is morally improper to force liquor on a guest at festive occasions or even in the home. Some concrete counter-measures are suggested below:

1) Strictly enforce the prohibition of drinking by minors. Many people are violating this prohibition in spite of the fact that it is established by the Police Regulations for Criminal Punishment.

2) Eliminate possible encouragements and temptations to drinking by young men who have reached their majority.

In investigating how young men in a certain locality began to drink, it was found that almost always an older person was responsible.

3) In bars, restaurants, and the like, restrict the volume of liquor sales and see that temperance is enforced. Stiff punishment must be imposed for disorderly conduct on the street, as well as for drunken violence.

4) Drunkenness producing speech and behavior detrimental to public morals must not be condoned.

5) People must be taught that forcing liquor on guests is not the way to entertain.

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6) Among the troops as well, limit the size of liquor rations and the volume of sales. Enforce temperance with great determination. Take a stern attitude in the handling of infractions of discipline and morals resulting from drunkenness.

6. In organizing units, as far as possible avoid mixing men of disparate ages and ranks.

In the CHINA Incident, the maximum age of the soldiers was approximately 30 years. It was said that men over that age were not fit for duties in the front line. However, in most of the country men of 34 and 35 are in the prime of life and are not necessarily unsuited to military duties. Of course older men are low in vitality and slow in movement, compared to crack soldiers. Moreover, because most of them have wives and children, they are solicitous of their families. The criticism that they are more or less cowardly is sometimes made without understanding this fact. As Japanese, they reject the argument that they cannot bear front line duties.

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of crimes against superior officers, it is regrettable that there is a disproportionate number of offenders among the reservists, especially against young officers. The reservists boast that they are older; they have contempt for the young officers. They mislead younger soldiers' thinking and set a bad example for them. They do many things to incite the young men. Moreover, negligence is rife among the older soldiers themselves. The result is that the young soldiers are incensed. This is the source of the bad reputation of the old soldiers.

Therefore, in organizing a unit consider these factors. Take measures to minimize the mischief of the older soldiers.

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CAUSES OF CRIMES AGAINST SUPERIOR OFFICERS (Number and Locality) (Jan - July 1942)							
	JAPAN Proper	KWANG- TUNG	N. CHINA	C. CHINA	S. CHINA	South- ern Area	TOTAL
1. Violent acts, threats, wounding, and insults to superior officers							
Causes of Crimes							
Anger at being caution- ed or reprimanded	4	11	7	12	1	-	35
Anger at having one's mistakes corrected with severity	2	4	2	6	-	-	14
Dissatisfaction with promotions and privileges	4	3	-	1	-	-	8
Anger at being restrained from violence	-	4	1	1	-	-	6
Drunkenness	6	3	4	1	-	-	14
Personal contempt	1	1	2	1	-	-	5
Being insulted	2	1	-	-	-	-	3
Natural animosity	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
Anger at someone else's being scolded	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
Resentment at punishment	1	-	1	-	-	-	2
Resentment at change in duty	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
Discontent over training methods	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
	3	7	-	1	-	4	15

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CAUSES OF CRIMES AGAINST SUPERIOR OFFICERS (Cont.)

(Number and Locality)
(Jan - July 1942)

	JAPAN Proper	KWANG- TUNG	N. CHINA	C. CHINA	S. CHINA	South- ern Area	TOTAL
<u>2. Insubordination</u>							
Drinking and seeking amusement	7	1	1	1	-	-	10
Fearing disclosure of an offense	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
Tardiness in returning to duty (AOL)	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Others	2	1	1	-	-	-	4
TOTAL	36	38	23	24	1	4	126

Notes

CRIMES AGAINST SUPERIOR OFFICERS COMMITTED UNDER
INFLUENCE OF LIQUOR

Crimes committed under influence of liquor	17 men 47.2%	32 men 84.2%	21 men 91.3%	15 men 62.5%	-	Average 85 men 67.5%
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II. The Communist Movement in the Army and Desertions to the Enemy Since the CHINA Incident.

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- Annex #1. Examples of the Communist Movement within the Army during 1942.

- Annex #2. Special Examples of Desertion Since the CHINA Incident.

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A. The Communist Movement Within the Army.

1. General Tendencies.

The Communist movement within the army was organized as the "Japanese Branch of the Union of Anti-Imperialists", a wing of the Communist Party, in November 1929. (It was subsequently renamed the "Japanese Anti-Imperialist Union".) With such slogans as: "Down with Imperialist Wars", "Defend SOVIET RUSSIA, our Fatherland", it initiated a vigorous anti-military movement which gained increasing support. At the time of the MANCHURIAN Incident, seeing their opportunity, they formed a "Military Department" within the Communist Party and planned for a rapid acceleration of their activities against the Army and against war.

As a result, the left wing movement within the army, up to that time composed principally of individual activities of left wing adherents, came under the direct leadership of the Japanese Communist Party, and vigorous movements began aimed at communizing the Army, at breaking down the Army from within, and at forming cells within the Army. In 1933 there were nine cases of arrest for sedition. At that time the left wing movement was flourishing within the country. This created an extremely tense situation.

Thereafter, in 1935, in accordance with the decision of the Comintern's 7th World Convention, the Communists adopted the policy of the so-called Popular Front. They abandoned such crude tactics as refusing to enter the army and fleeing /to avoid conscription/, or refusing the military oath and neglecting their military duties rather than fulfilling them. As rookies they were diligent in their basic military duties and set an example for other men. They sought to be trusted both by their superiors and subordinates. Subsequently, within legal limits, they criticized the general rank system in inflammatory terms, slandered their superior officers, and fomented discontent with the training. Seizing on such issues as improvement in the treatment of personnel, they gradually gathered people of similar views. As they have changed their course 180 degrees and are now very skillful and work in secret, exposure is very difficult. The number of members prosecuted by judicial proceedings has been severely reduced.

2. Situation Since the CHINA Incident.

In their activities in 1942 Communist tactics as well as crimes do not follow the pattern of past years. They are led by comrades outside the Army. In an outspoken and determined manner they plan to organize cells within the Army. An alarming situation has come to pass in which the Communists are winning brothers-in-arms.

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The cases handled by the Military Police between the beginning of the CHINA Incident and September 1942 are listed in the following table together with pertinent facts:

Branch of Service and Rank

Total: 15 Cases involving 23 men.

Officers:	Reserve	1 case; 1 man involved.
NCOs:	Reserve	1 case; 1 man involved.
Privates:	Active	5 cases; 5 men involved.
	Reserve	1 case; 2 men involved.
	Conscript Reserve	3 cases; 4 men involved.

(One of these incidents involved collusion with a member of the regular Army)

Civilian Employees 5 cases; 10 men involved.

(Of these 4 were KOREANS)

Motives

An investigation of the motives in the 10 cases in the Army, involving 18 men arrested for their activities while in the service (excluding men who were arrested after entering the service for pre-service activities) reveals the following:

Men with a record of distinct Communist views	5
Men who had left wing sympathies	7
Men who got radical ideas from indoctrination received while in the army	6

A comparatively large number, after entering the army, were subjected to ideological propaganda and provocation and finally manifested disaffection. For the successful administration and supervision of unit duties, special caution is necessary on this point.

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PROGRESS OF COMMUNISTIC MOVEMENT WITHIN THE ARMY

January 1937 - September 1942

	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942 thru Sept	Total
Cases							
7							
6						6	
5							
4					4		
3		3					
2							
1			1	1			
0	0						
Persons Involved							
Officers Reserve						1	1
NCOs Reserve						1	1
Pvts Active					2	3	5
Reserve		2					2
Replacements		2				2	4
Civilian Employees		1	2	1	6		10

Notes: Not included in this table are the following:

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- (1941) One case involving one person who was active before entering the army and who was arrested after entering the army.
- (1942) One case involving a person who was arrested on basis of proof before he entered the army and who is on trial at present; his activities within the army are not clear.

One case involving a person who was active before entering the army and who was arrested after entering the army.

3. Concrete Examples from the Current Year.

Among the sedition cases handled by Military Police in JAPAN proper this year (up to September), two warrant special mention. From the standpoint of counter-measures to be taken in the future and from the standpoint of control /of the Communist movement/, within units the following cases are noteworthy.

The Organization of Communist Cells within Army Hospital "X".

Case of Conscript Reserve Superior Private (Medical) ISHIGAWA Shizuo stationed at Army Hospital "X", Moral Training Unit #1. At the time 27 years old.

ISHIGAWA was an illegitimate child, raised as an adopted child in an impoverished home. After leaving middle school during the first year, he worked as a vegetable merchant in TOKYO and subsequently was proprietor of a small meat shop. Because of misfortunes in his own /adopted/ family and in society at large, from the beginning he hated existing social institutions. While selling candies and cakes in the market place, he fell in with NAGASAWA Sada, the wife of a Communist named KOMATSU Kunio. Through her introduction, he became acquainted with KAMIYAMA Shigeo, the ringleader of the KYUZENKYO SASSHIN DOMEI (TN: a reform league), and his wife HOMMA Hana. He received indoctrination under their supervision.

He entered the army in the special levy of December 1939. In June 1940, on a 36-hour pass, he went to EJIMA seacoast with the aforementioned NAGASAWA, where he took a solemn oath to retain his Communist views, to link his fate with the Communists, to dedicate his life to the oppressed proletariat class, and to take an active part in the Communist movement.

Thenceforth, he received instruction from NAGASAWA and KAMIYAMA in methods of organizing cells within the army. They told him, "On account of the prolongation of the CHINA Incident, JAPAN'S shortage of resources and the rise in prices are becoming more and more severe;

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a popular movement opposing militarism and war is swiftly growing and the prerequisites of revolution are rapidly developing. Therefore at this time, by virtue of the power of leadership of the Japanese Communist Party, the nucleus of revolutionary force, a proletarian revolution is possible in the near future. Reconstruction of the party leadership is an urgent need. For this reason, first of all organize strong cells within your army units, taking our position into account. We must not fail to be ready for a favorable opportunity."

He boldly gave ideological indoctrination to a large number of his comrades, principally by newspaper articles. He observed FUKUHARA Ryocho, (Medical), Conscript Reserve, who was attached to the same unit, and who at that time was 25 years old. He was raised in extreme poverty and grew to hate the existing order. ISHIGAWA loaned FUKUHARA such left wing literature as Mother by GORKI (translated by MURADA Harumi) and A Discussion of Life by MIKI Kiyoshi, and sought further opportunities.

"The present actual situation resembles the eve of a revolution. It may be compared to a dried, withered field; if the soldiers should lift the torch of revolution, an immediate conflagration and the overthrow of the capitalist system would surely follow.

"War is the greatest tragedy of mankind. In the words of the greatest sage in history, Christ, 'All men are brothers'. The resources provided by heaven for a happy life are now used to wage wars. Moreover, the sacrifice of capable young men for the sake of an extremely small plutocracy is contrary to the basic underlying purpose of life.

"People hailing from wealthy homes, no matter how stupid they may be become officers, but the lower classes, regardless of their ability, find it very difficult to advance in rank. Great inequalities are to be found in the army." With such words he endeavored to infuse anti-army and anti-war sentiments.

In February 1942, finally, FUKUHARA was made to swear, "As an atom in the "X" Army Hospital cell for bringing about social revolution. I will have no fear of life or death and will fight to the bitter end."

Early in April, ISHIGAWA declared to several of his comrades-in-arms, "We are on the threshold of a revolution. The downfall of capitalism is coming ever closer." In order to indoctrinate them he showed them newspaper articles about the Imperial Household. FUKUHARA discussed these articles very irreverently and ISHIGAWA voiced his approval. Some of the others tried to refute these statements but FUKUHARA interfered and displayed the same irreverence.

On 18 April, when American planes raided TŌKYŌ, FUKUHARA saw an article printed in that night's paper on "The Safety of the Royal Household"

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and showed it to ISHIKAWA.

"Hey, ISHIKAWA, look at this silly article. If they can spend that much space on them, why can't they devote a little to the victims?" he said angrily.

ISHIKAWA replied, "Isn't that what I've been telling you all along? This is the stuff put out by the ruling class, in other words, the capitalists!"

In regard to overthrowing the capitalistic society by spreading their principles, by creating movements of unrest, and by other disloyal words and deeds. they planned to acquire sympathizers and strengthen their cellular organization.

Lessons

This case is noteworthy in that the activities described were conducted under outside auspices. It is regrettable that over a considerable period /the authorities/ were not able to discover such radical activity nor such open practices within an administrative unit. It is impossible to overlook the lack of interest in thought control of personnel within the unit to which they were attached as well as the complete lack of leadership and supervision displayed within the unit. For this reason in the future,

- a) Personal effects, especially books and documents should be inspected.
- b) Speech and action within the administrative sections should be kept under surveillance.
- c) Caution should be exercised in regard to visitors. (Special caution should be exercised regarding persons who make frequent visits; their speech and actions should be noted.)
- d) Observe the conduct of personnel before going on leave. (At least in the case of a person requiring attention, close contact with the local military police is essential)

Through such methods the national ideological defenses will be strengthened. In view of the present situation in JAPAN, these methods will become more and more important as the GEA War continues.

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The Case of the "RIAN" (Kana) Society Organized by a
Second Lieutenant Called Back to Duty

Unit to which originally attached: Hq, "X" Unit, Central CHINA Expeditionary Force.

Unit to which presently attached: Eastern District Unit "X".

1st Lieutenant (Reserve) TAKENAKA Kyushichi - Age 35.

TAKENAKA was called to the colors December 1939 and was sent to the Central CHINA front. (At the time of the discovery of his crimes, on 1 August of this year, he was assigned to the Unit to which he is presently attached.) Prior to being called up, he organized a secret society called the "RIAN Society" to aid the Japanese Communist Party. He became the ringleader himself. Through an illegal publication called "RIAN", he developed a theory of proletarian art from the viewpoint of materialistic dialectics. In this way he planned to win sympathizers and strengthen the solidarity /of the association/. Relying upon the changing situation, he carried on an underground movement to found a revolutionary association. In issue #15 of RIAN the Lieutenant printed the following views regarding the movement within the army as well as articles for the enlightenment of sympathizers:

"Down with Imperialistic Wars!"

"However, it is wrong to refuse to join the army, to refuse to answer the call to the colors, or to evade conscription. In order for us to grasp military tactics and technique and destroy the army from within, that is to say, from the viewpoint of materialistic dialectics, we must advance one step and retreat two steps. This has been our course of action among new soldiers since 1933."

"It is important for us to seek particularly to enlist in mechanized divisions. In them there will be many soldiers who come from the industrial proletariat. From their number we will be able to acquire /adherents/ much more easily than from the usual sort of troops which heretofore were drawn chiefly from the lethargic peasant class."

"It is especially profitable for party members to enlist in mechanized divisions. They probably will be the technical nucleus of our anti-Soviet campaign plan. This is extremely important and quite possible. The destruction of even one screw or a single lever is worthwhile. It is not only possible to eliminate Japanese fighting strength, but we will have the opportunity to act in small numbers or independently."

"In order to protect SOVIET RUSSIA and to incite armed uprising it is essential to 'bore from within' the army. The Party thesis on

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this matter is considerable but surprisingly it is not complete."

"After entering the army the soldier must memorize the Imperial Rescript. It is a big error for the party not to have literature criticizing this."

"It is absolutely impossible to propagandize within the barracks. Select field exercises for that purpose."

"It is necessary to feel out the reservists, giving consideration to their ages. An unusual effort is necessary among those who have experienced the prosperity era of World War I; besides, the situation is fraught with danger. Even among reserve officer candidates you must remember that a graduate of a university differs from a graduate of a technical school or of a middle school. Technical school and middle school graduates are quite similar."

"Low ranking officers in war time are generally from the reserve officer candidate ranks and they are, by and large, discontented. There are nearly 8,000 of them every year. Winning them over will have important results."

"Passing out handbills, singing revolutionary songs at court martial trials, denouncing the capitalist Army, and crying, 'Down with Imperialistic Wars' will only prolong the term of imprisonment."

"If we do not misbehave or resist superior officers, many shallow minded persons will mistakenly think we are not Marxists."

"When a party member enters the Army, resistance is not his goal. He must acquire /military/ technique to make him a superior soldier."

Lessons.

These items are taken from actual Army life. As they are based on the reflections of a Communist who had actual experience as a junior Army officer, none of them should be overlooked as a potential counter-measure against /communistic/ thought in the army. Since the activities of Communists in the army, at present, are under cover and disguised, the army officer should redouble his caution. He must pay close attention to the everyday words and actions of his subordinates; he should observe their thoughts and activities and endeavor to eradicate the roots of trouble.

B. Desertion to the Enemy.

1. General Situation.

From the CHINA Incident to July of this year, 99 persons guilty of desertion to the enemy in MANCHURIA and CHINA were handled by the

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military police. The detailed table which follows shows that 1939 had the greatest number with 35 persons. Since then there has been a gradual reduction. The majority of the cases occurred in CHINA.

Deserted to	Where	1937 July to Dec	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942 Jan to July	Total
Soviet Army	MANCHURIA	-	-	2	1	3	-	6
CH'UNG-CH'ING (TN: CHUNGKING) Army	North CHINA	1	6	33	24	16	3	83
(Chinese Com- munist Party)	Central CHINA	-	1	-	1	5	2	9
British Army	South CHINA	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Total		1	7	35	26	25	5	99

Cause

In looking for the immediate motives of these 99 men the following has been compiled:

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Cause		NCO		Privates			Civilian Employees	Total
		Reg	Res	Reg	Res	Replacements		
Outright Desertion	Holding left wing ideas before entering the Army or championing the cause of the SOVIET UNION				3			3
	Dislike of personal restrictions or hatred of Army life				2			2
	Fear of discovery of crimes				2			2
	Believing enemy propaganda				1			1
Captured while AWOL	Dislike of personal restrictions or hatred of Army life			1	4	3		8
	Escape from prison			1				1
	Suffering from disease				1			1
	Need for gratification of sexual desires		1					1
	Being wounded and unconscious during battle	1	1	14	24	15	4	59
	Taken prisoners during battle	2	3		11	1	1	18
	Separated from unit by straggling				2	1		3
Total		3	5	16	50	20	5	99

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In other words, the largest part of the group were taken prisoner while unconscious during battle. Nevertheless, some of the group either possessed left-wing ideas prior to entering service or held SOVIET RUSSIA in high esteem or were swayed by enemy propoganda. Moreover, since nearly all of these persons are on active duty, extreme care must be exercised in their guidance and supervision. A breakdown by rank reveals the following:

NCOs	8	(5 active duty)
Privates	86	(50 active duty)
Civilian employees	5	

It is seen that the greatest number of desertions occurs among enlisted men. Important examples are cited in Annex #2.

2. Recaptured and Returned POWs.

Once the aforementioned 99 persons fell into the hands of the enemy, they underwent enemy indoctrination and in some cases even became enemy operatives. The following is a breakdown of those who entered Japanese occupied areas, or who themselves escaped and returned:

Persons who were returned after receiving anti-Japanese indoctrination from the enemy.	63
Persons who escaped by themselves and returned to their unit.	18
Persons who were captured while engaged in anti-Japanese movements.	7
Persons who invaded /our territory/ as spies after receiving enemy indoctrination.	5
Persons who were rescued from enemy imprisonment	5
Persons who escaped by themselves, entered a Japanese-occupied area, and were recaptured while escaping	1

The greatest number of persons was sent back by the enemy, while only 18 persons, or less than 14%, escaped and returned of their own accord. Among the total was a deplorably large number who invaded our area with the object of espionage or who were engaged directly in anti-Japanese activities. It must not be overlooked that although these men were made enemy prisoners, they were subsequently given good treatment and ideological indoctrination.

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In spite of many opportunities to escape, they remained with the enemy and engaged directly in anti-Japanese and other seditious activities. This cannot be overlooked in spiritual training.

3. Military Personnel and Civilian Employees in the Hands of the Enemy.

The military police have knowledge of a total of 1,620 persons missing (living or dead) in foreign areas since the CHINA Incident. Of these, 331 are military deserters who have not yet been captured. However, from interrogation of persons who have returned and from propaganda messages directed to comrades, it is strongly suspected that they are active in the fighting line against the Japanese.

NCOs	2 (1 in the SOVIET UNION)
Pvts	33 (3 in the SOVIET UNION)
Civilian Employees	<u>5</u>
Total	40

On the basis of the overall situation it is deduced that /the following/ are held prisoners by the enemy:

Pvts	25 (10 in the SOVIET UNION)
------	-----------------------------

The grand total is 65 persons; but it is thought that the actual number may be larger.

It was ascertained that the enemy first interrogates Japanese soldiers and civilian employees in detail about the Japanese military and domestic situation. Subsequently, the SOVIET UNION gives them espionage training and has them infiltrate Japanese lines as spies. On the CH'UNG-CH'ING (TN: CHUNGKING) side (TN: probably used loosely for "Chinese side") ideological work is done by the Chinese Communist Party. Besides using converts for anti-Japanese propaganda, they are extremely active in using them in creating anti-war and anti-militarist movements, making use of radio and correspondence. Instead of being killed or forcibly detained, Japanese prisoners who desire to return to JAPAN are allowed to do so and are used in peace movements. The persons who were returned as well as those whom we recaptured belong for the most part to the group that desired to be returned; for this reason special precautions must be taken regarding them.

The number of deserters and stragglers behind our lines in foreign areas totals 3,006 persons, and there tends to be an annual increase. Still more care must be exercised in each step of the spiritual training and ideological guidance of the troops; this is our basic problem.

The present communistic trend within the Japanese Army as well as desertions to the enemy permit no optimism. By the very nature of communist ideology, these superficial phenomena will come to a head. The intangible, evil influence which these deep currents exert upon the military strength of JAPAN cannot be overlooked.

* * * * *

Annex #1

Examples of the Communist Movement within the Army during 1942.

A Summary of Case Histories and Activities

KOSHIRO Koshin, Corporal, Reserve. Formerly of HIRASHIMA TAI, South CHINA X Force

Graduated MEIJI University Law School in March 1935. Joined a force stationed in MANCHURIA in 1936, and during the year when the CHINA Incident flared up, he fought in various battles in North CHINA. In October 1938 he became a corporal and was transferred to the reserves in the same year. He was kept on duty and served with garrison troops in KOREA. In March 1939 he was put on the inactive list and was employed as an office worker in the HAKUSHINSHA (博進社) (Vanguard Association). However, in May of that year he received orders from an American Comintern member who had been previously dispatched, and at the persuasion of MIYAGI Yotoku (who was working under cover in JAPAN) he became affiliated with an international spy ring headed by a German named ZORGE (ゾルゲ). He studied the strength and weakness of Japanese military dispositions, equipment, and weapons.

In July 1941, he was called up for a second time, assigned to Eastern District Army, 38 BUTAI, and departed for the Manchurian front. He was transferred to South CHINA; and until arrested on 26 March of this year, he received orders from MIYAGI Yotoku. He had been active chiefly in discovering information and collecting reports on military matters and offering them to MIYAGI.

KASUGA Yoichi Pfc Active Duty Inf Gun Co, X Inf Regt Age 27

KASUGA was separated from both parents at an early age and was brought into his uncle's home. After 3 years of elementary school he left school because of poverty and helped support his family. When he was 12 years old, he heard a rumor that his real father

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was living in ŌSAKA. Leaving home, he proceeded to ŌSAKA, but couldn't learn his father's whereabouts. After that he held odd jobs such as mechanic, etc. While knocking around, he was convicted three times of theft and burglary. In 1938, while an inmate of MATSUMOTO prison, one of his cellmates taught him about the Comintern, the objectives of the Japanese Communist Party, and the justness of Communism. KASUGAI was responsive; and, following his release from prison, he read left-wing literature with increasing interest.

After entering the regular army in April 1940 he deserted and was sentenced to a year and six months at hard labor. Along with Cpl AOKI and Pfc TACHIKAWA, who were returned from service at the front to his own squad in April of this year, he criticized the present war and fed a comrade anti-war propaganda. On top of this, he deserted for a second time on 29 April of this year. On many occasions during this time he pointed out critically the contradictions of the social system to average people on trains and in parks, thereby planning to create class consciousness. He was arrested on 29 May.

SHIMADA Mishige, Pfc, Active Duty;
HORII TAI, Eastern District Army; X BUTAI. Age 26

SHIMADA was the eldest son of an assistant civil engineer. As a child he liked pictures and hoped to earn his living by painting. After matriculating in ASAHIGAWA Middle School, he entered the art department, but he soon began to embrace left-wing ideas and was influenced by the teachings of UENO of the same school. Moreover, he read left-wing literature and attended the New Leftist Revolutionary Aid Association (TN: SAYOKU SHINKYO GEKIDAN 左翼新十協 慶川 團). He became imbued with the inevitability of the class struggle. In April 1937, he entered the TOKYO Art School and attempted to correct the conditions and contradictions of existing society through his profession. He joined the communistic "North Wind Art Society" when this was organized by ASAHI SHI and ASAHI Middle School art departments. He portrayed leftist ideas in such pictures as "Servant" and "View of a Factory". He exhibited thirteen paintings of this type at art exhibits and inserted leftist descriptions on prints of these paintings. While active in the instruction of sympathetic colleagues he entered the armed forces.

After entering the Eastern District Army, 78 BUTAI, in Feb. 1942, he was arrested on 20 June.

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TANAKA Misao, Sup Pvt, Medical, Active Duty
 XX Emergency Army Hospital Age 24

TANAKA grew up as the second son of a poor farmer. He withdrew during the first year of advanced courses at the elementary school in his district and went to TOKYO. He worked as a vegetable merchant, rice merchant, and apprentice and workman in a factory before entering the service.

Although he had shown superior merit and a deep interest in study at elementary school, he came to hate the present social system because he had to go to work on account of the extreme poverty of his family and because of the social hardships he experienced during this period. After being assigned as a medical corpsman attached to a hospital in December 1939, he held an antipathy against the class system in the army. He read publications such as The Struggle for Unity, Our Struggle, Carry the Torch, and Students and JAPAN. Finally, he embraced communism. During the period December 1940 to June 1942, he propagandized seven of his comrades-in-arms on such subjects as: "Differences in poverty and wealth among general localities; the lack of resources", "Contradictions of the class system in the Army", "The Soldier is the slave of the capitalist", "Society should be a dictatorship of Communists without differences in wealth; a society of liberty, equality, and fraternity". In this way he strove to increase class-consciousness, to foment anti-militarism, and to teach communistic doctrines. Hence, he was arrested on 13 June.

FUKUHARA Yoshitada, Pfc. Medical, Active Duty
 X Emergency Army Hospital Age 25.

FUKUHARA was raised in a poverty-stricken family, and, while still young, lost his father and was adopted by another family. During his attendance at elementary school, while also working at job work with his mother, he moved to TOKYO where he and his mother were barely able to eke out a living. In the sixth year of school he entered the apprenticeship of another home-workshop. Gradually beginning to realize the misfortune of his lot, he became despondent and turned to wine and women. In 1937 he completed his term of apprenticeship and set up a shop, but his dissolute living brought failure; and finally he began to resent the world in general and to curse society.

After being called up as a medical corpsman attached to a hospital in December 1939, he retained his long-standing antipathy towards the soldiers and NGOs. Just about that time, August 1940, he received ideological instruction from Superior Pvt ISHIGAWA. From

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the same person he received such left-wing literature as Mother (Gorky) and Discussion of Life (a work of MITSUGI Kiyoshi), which he read avidly. Finally, he began to embrace communistic doctrines.

He became convinced that: "In modern JAPAN anti-war and anti-government movements both inside and outside the army should be fostered and a revolutionary situation developed gradually; the Japanese Communist Party, the chief support of the revolution, should be established firmly. If its leadership is effective the proletarian revolution is possible. There is a pressing need for rebuilding as its nucleus a guiding unit (party). In this frame of mind, he decided that he should take positive action by supporting ISHIGAWA to the utmost as an element of the communist cell of X hospital which ISHIGAWA led. In February 1942 he formed an alliance with ISHIGAWA and persons of the same ilk, and thenceforth acted in sympathy with their disrespectful anti-military and anti-war sentiments. Moreover, he strove to win over his comrades-in-arms by stating his opinions along these lines. He was arrested on 27 July.

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Annex #2

Special Examples of Desertion Since the CHINA Incident.

SUSA (諏佐) Tokuji, Pfc, Active Duty
MANSHU X BUTAI; Age 24.

Period Absent from Unit: 21 Jan 1940 - 17 Oct 1941

It was discovered that SUSA was taking issue clothing and selling it. He used the proceeds for liquor. Fearing punishment, he deserted. Thinking, "I will enter the SOVIET UNION but if I volunteer to give them our military information I will not be killed", he entered the USSR and was trained as a spy by the VLADIVOSTOK OGPU. He was ordered to secure military information and other data, in the vicinity of MU-TAN-CHIANG. He entered MANCHURIA and was arrested.

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OSATO Katsumi, Pfc, Active Duty
 MANSHU X BUTAI: Age 22.

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Period Absent from Unit: 15 Sept - 22 Dec 1941

Prior to entering the service, OSATO, a common laborer, embraced communism and participated in labor disputes. After he entered the service he tried to forget the past; but when on leave on 15 Sept, as a result of drunkenness he found it past time to return to the barracks. Fearing punishment, he reverted to his former ideas. Thinking "workers know no frontiers", he decided to enter the USSR. He deserted and entered the SOVIET UNION, and at this time he revealed information about JAPAN and received training as a Soviet spy. He was sent to MANCHURIA but because execution of his orders proved impossible he surrendered voluntarily.

UENO Hiroi, Pvt 2nd Cl, Active Duty
 MANSHU X BUTAI; Age 22.

Period Absent from Unit: 21 May - 27 Oct 1941.

UENO had had an interest in literature since his attendance at commercial school. He liked Russian literature especially, and became infatuated with the SOVIET UNION. After entering the service, he hated army life because of the training with its severe personal restrictions. He decided to enter the service of the SOVIET UNION and deserted. After entering the USSR he received training as a spy, re-entered MANCHURIA, and was arrested.

HIRATSUKA Shintaro, Pvt 2nd Cl, Active Duty
 MANSHU X BUTAI

Period Absent from Unit: 22 Aug 1941 - 29 March 1942.

Before entering the service HIRATSUKA had been brought up in an under-privileged household and had a grudge against society and capitalists. He liked Russian literature and became infatuated with the SOVIET UNION. After entering the service, he hated the personal restrictions. It happened that he rushed down the stairs before an inspection and injured his leg. When the army doctor who examined him said there was nothing wrong, he deserted, feeling that the doctor was biased. He entered RUSSIA intending to live permanently in the SOVIET UNION; but he agreed to become a spy. After receiving training he was ordered to secure military intelligence as a Soviet spy. He entered MANCHURIA and was arrested.

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NAMASE Fusao, Pfc, Reserve
 xx Inf Reg, x North CHINA Div.

Period Absent from Unit: 9 Feb - 31 July 1938

He escaped from military prison in North CHINA and entered the 8th Route Army of the enemy. When questioned he revealed military secrets. He was used in enemy "counter"-propaganda, (TN: sic) sending anti-military pamphlets of the Chinese Communist Party to the prison warden. Later he left the 8th Route Army and sneaked into CHI-NAN. He was arrested after committing more than 80 thefts.

KOMATA (小、又) Nagafuku, Pfc, Replacement
 xx Bn, x North CHINA Ind Mixed Brigade Age 27

Period Absent from Unit: 13 June 1940 - 27 Aug 1941

On 13 June 1940 during a punitive expedition KOMATA was caught in an enemy encirclement and was wounded and captured. Thereafter, he was given anti-military instruction, and in March 1941, he conspired with three prisoners at the CHI-CHUNG (TN: Central HOPEH) Military Headquarters and aided in forming the CHI-CHUNG Branch, Anti-war Alliance of Japanese Residing in CHINA. He took charge of Japanese language instruction of Chinese workers. After being transferred to the 4th Army Sector Political Dept of the frontier areas of SHANSI, CHAHAR, and HOPEH Provinces in April, he conspired with the SHANSI and CHAHAR Branches of the Anti-war Alliance of Japanese Residing in CHINA. While participating in preparation of propaganda he was arrested on 27 August, during a punitive expedition by the Imperial Army.

KAGAMI Takaji, Pfc, Replacement
 xx Inf Reg, xx North CHINA Div

Period Absent from Unit: 22 Jan - 26 Feb 1940

During battle KAGAMI was repeatedly afflicted with piles and dropped out of ranks. Since he did not overtake his unit, he tried to return to his station independently, but on the way he was captured by the 8th Route Army. Thereafter he remained with the enemy for about a month and received instruction in anti-war and communistic ideas. He was released on the condition that he engage in propaganda in the Japanese Army after his return. He returned to his unit.

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MORIOKA Takeshi, Sup Pvt, Replacement
 xx Arty Regt, xx North CHINA Div Age 27

Period Absent from Unit: 29 Sept 1940 - 3 Mar 1941.

While stationed at CHU-LU, HOPEH Province, MORIOKA deserted 29 Sept 1940, because he detested army life. He was captured by the (Communist) 8th Route Army. He revealed military secrets and then was sent back to his unit with anti-war journals which had been given to him by the 8th Route Army.

HANDA Teiichi, Pfc, Active Duty
 x North CHINA Inf Regt Age 23

Period Absent from Unit: 1 Oct - 21 Dec 1940

During an enemy siege HANDA was wounded in the thigh and was captured. Up to the time he was sent back (10 Dec) he submitted tamely to enemy treatment. On his return, however, he peacefully handed over to the authorities the revolutionary literature which had been entrusted to him.

FUJISAWA Choichi, Sup Pvt, Replacement
 xx Bn, x North CHINA Ind Mixed Brig Age 28

Period Absent from Unit: 2 Jan - 27 Aug 1941

During a punitive expedition on 3 Jan 1941, FUJISAWA was surrounded by the enemy, lost consciousness, and was captured. When questioned by the enemy regarding the military strength, equipment, names of units, and organization of his force, he answered truthfully.

In March of the same year he conspired in the organization of the SHANSI, CHAHAR, and HOPEH Branches of the Anti-war Alliance of Japanese Residing in CHINA. He was with the 4th Army Sector Political Department of the frontier areas of SHANSI, CHAHAR, and HOPEH Provinces. He became a military delegate and carried out various duties.

On 27 August while escaping with the enemy at the time of a punitive action by the Imperial Army, he was taken into custody at NAN-TUAN-YING, LING-SHOU HSIEN.

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SHIMADA Masaro, Pvt 2nd Cl, Active Duty
xx BUTAI, xx North CHINA BUTAI

Period Absent from Unit: 7 Mar - 21 April 1941

Hating the strict army life, SHIMADA deserted his unit on 7 March and entered the house of a Chinese. While asleep he was captured by enemy partisans. When questioned he revealed the condition of the Japanese Army. As a condition of return he vowed to carry on anti-war work in the Japanese Army and returned to his unit.

IMANO Mitsuo, Pfc, Active Duty
xx TAI, x BUTAI, North CHINA xx BUTAI; Age 24

Period Absent from Unit: 15 Aug - 4 Sept 1941

While stationed at YANG-AN-CHEN, LO-LING HSIEN, SHANTUNG Province, IMANO worried about his previous criminal record and hated army life. On 15 August while on guard detail duty he stole weapons and ammunition. Under the guidance of a Chinese who had been in custody, he went to join the KUOMINTANG Army, but on the way he was captured by the Communist Army. Thereafter he worked with the political department of the 6th Training Brigade of the 11th Division. During a punitive assault by the Japanese Army on 4 Sept, he was taken into custody.

TANAKA (太 一 中) Takenosuke, Sup Pvt, Active Duty
xx Ind Inf Bn, North CHINA x Ind Mixed Brig; Age 23

Period Absent from Unit: 8 Apr - 12 May 1942

TANAKA had lost the trigger of the grenade discharger which was in his personal custody. Fearing punishment, he became so worried that he became troublesome to his friends. At the time of a punitive expedition, believing propaganda which he frequently read, such as "we treat Japanese soldiers kindly", he deserted to save his own skin and went over to the enemy. Under enemy interrogation he volunteered /information about/ his unit, its organization, equipment, etc. Subsequently, he cooperated with the CHI-CHUNG (TN: Central HOPEH) Sector Army Hq and the CHI-CHUNG Branch of the Anti-war Alliance of Japanese Residing in CHINA. On 12 May during a punitive expedition by the Japanese Army he was captured while hiding at TUNG-CHAO-SHIH-TS'UN, WU-CH'ANG HSIEN, HOPEH Province.

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NAGATOMO (長友) Norigi, Sup Pvt, Active Duty
 xx TAI, HIRO xx BUTAI, Central CHINA Detachment (TN: Possibly
 58th Div) Age 24

Period Absent from Unit: Oct 1941 - 26 Apr 1942.

NAGATOMO hated army life. While on patrol as a scout leader, he deserted during an independent patrol. He was captured by the New 4th Army. Under the interrogation of HIRAMATSU Keiji, a deserter who was active as a member of the Political Department of the Anti-Japanese Peace Unit (TN: KO NICHU HOANTAI 抗日保安隊) of the 5th Div of the New 4th Army, he revealed such military secrets as the organization, equipment, and strength of his unit. Later, on 26 April, he escaped and rejoined his unit.

YAMAGUCHI Seiji, Pfc, Active Duty
 xx TAI, YODO xx BUTAI, Central CHINA Expeditionary Force
 Age 23

Period Absent from Unit: 6 Mar - 27 Nov 1941

On 5 March, on being reprimanded by a 2nd year soldier, YAMAGUCHI deserted. He was taken into custody by the New 4th Army. Under interrogation by the enemy, he revealed military secrets about his unit and its equipment. After that in spite of opportunities for escape, he evinced no desire to return. He was satisfied with his treatment by the enemy army. In addition, he conspired with the Anti-War Alliance, produced anti-war propoganda, and taught the Japanese language. He was ordered to purchase materials and to investigate movements of the Japanese Army. He sneaked into Japanese occupied territory; but while carrying out his work was arrested at HANKOW.

YOSHITAKE Masao, Pfc, Active Duty
 xx Ind Mortar Bn, South CHINA Expeditionary Unit
 Age 27

Period Absent from Unit: 16 Sept - Dec 1941

YOSHITAKE had a previous record of 3 convictions for fraud. After breaking out of the stockade at SHEN-CH'UAN, KWANGTUNG Province by using the insignia of a 2nd Lt, he swindled more than 6,000 yen from Japanese residents. Fearing discovery, he ran away and entered British territory where he was arrested by the HONGKONG authorities. Later he was used by the enemy in their war effort but was rescued from imprisonment by the Imperial Army at the outbreak of the GEA War.

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III. Factors Tending to Create Friction between Civilian Authorities and the Military.

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 - 3. Conditions arising because of the special distribution of personal articles and their use outside the station.
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C. Observations.

- | | |
|----------------|--|
| Attached Table | A study of violence with drawn swords and other weapons since the CHINA Incident. |
| Annex 1 | Examples of misconduct towards civilians by drunken officers since Jan 1942. |
| Annex 2 | Examples of improper action in procuring munitions, supplies, and land for military use. |

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A. General Situation.

Since the outbreak of the GEA War, the Imperial Army has generally been trusted by the people, but elements of the military personnel and civilian employees have been guilty of misconduct; e.g. improper attitudes and methods in acquiring and using munitions and unbecoming actions in cases where damage has been inflicted on the countryside. Moreover, there has been a gradual increase in untoward actions, especially violence with drawn swords, because of drunkenness among junior officers. These actions are severely criticized and resented by the populace and exert an adverse effect upon military strength and war potential.

B. Factors tending to create friction between civilian authorities and the military.

The principal factors tending to create friction between the civilian authorities and the military in cases which have been handled by, or are known to, the military police between January and the end of September 1942, are as follows:

1. High-handedness and violence by military personnel and civilian employees. Between January and the end of September 1942, 287 cases of this nature were handled by the MPs and reports sent to COs (this excluded criminal offenses such as rape, robbery, murder, assault and battery). A broad classification is as follows:

Drunken violence while on liberty	216 persons
Forcing sales of liquor during restricted times	32 persons
Rape, intimidation	9 persons
Riding buses or eating without paying	16 persons
Entering private homes without permission	10 persons
Miscellaneous	4 persons

Among the above, there were 51 instances of violence with drawn swords. Moreover, harsh language such as the following was used:

To several civilians in the waiting room of a station:
 "You can travel comfortably only because you have us soldiers."

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To the motorman in a city street-car: "TSINGTAO street-cars are free. People at home are too damned impertinent to the front line soldier. Cut it out!"

At a restaurant: "Don't you know I'm waiting for the Order of the Golden Kite. Cut out the complaints!"

To a policeman who was interfering with his violent conduct: "What makes you think you have any right to make your snivelling policemen's complaints against us? Just because you think soldiers and civilians are all the same you fellows are all puffed up."

On procuring provisions: "I don't give a damn if the city residents don't eat vegetables for 2 or 3 days. I'll requisition all of today's vegetables."

Since such persons had military backing and seemed ashamed of ordinary courtesy, such speech and behavior repeatedly aggravated the anti-military sentiment of the people.

The offenders classified by rank were as follows:

Officers (Including probational and WOs)	40	(18 active duty (22 conscripts)
NCOs	79	(50 active duty (29 conscripts)
Privates	91	(34 active duty (57 conscripts)
Civilian employees	77	

In comparison with the record of enlisted men, the offenses among NCOs and above are relatively numerous. Not only do violent acts involving drawn swords or other weapons, which produce general fear and resentment, seem to be increasing, as shown in the appended table, but also there is a decided increase in such offenses among junior officers (probational and WOs).

Officers are the nucleus of the National Army and should be respected in society. It is unnecessary to dwell upon their responsibility. If officers holdly commit offences in spite of their positions involving the supervision and guidance of subordinates, they incur the disdain of the general public. "If the superior can do it, it is not out of place for the subordinate." Not only is control of the NCOs and privates utterly impossible, but one

must consider the reverberations in society and the difference in officers' position from that of enlisted men. Self-respect and self-discipline among officers is absolutely essential.

Moreover, the general public has frequently criticized military personnel for drunkenness with such remarks as the following:

"We business men have hovered between life and death because of the shortages of materials and the multiplicity of regulations of enterprise. The troops, unfamiliar with this feeling, drink SAKE and act outrageously. In view of the present situation, we urge a more serious attitude on their part.

"Recently inducted officers seem to think that a condition of plenty exists. When officers or probational officers enter bars and talk boastfully, it is not a happy situation.

"On the day of the Promulgation of the Imperial Rescript there were many persons on the streets under the influence of liquor and smoking tobacco. There were also many military personnel who indecently flirted with women. Soldiers nowadays are indeed disorderly as compared with soldiers of old."

"Today it is chiefly soldiers who hire geisha girls and throw parties. Their pay is high and supplies abundant. With us it is exactly the opposite.

"Lately soldiers are haughty and incorrigible. Even the police can't touch them and they denounce the police before the people. This is indeed regrettable.

"During air raid drills some individuals stroll freely and nonchalantly about at night. When we think of warning them, they boast, 'We are officers of the division and we came to town to drink sake'. If the staff is like this nowadays, we wonder about the methods of training the troops.

"During the orders for a precautionary alert we put on dungarees and continue working, but soldiers get drunk and wander around in the red-light district. We request that army authorities exercise a little stricter control.

"Military personnel nowadays are very haughty. Only the other day when a policeman cautioned a soldier because he was drunk and creating a disturbance, he was attacked. Boasting is not the only thing the soldiers can do."

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The main point of cataloguing these criticisms of the soldiers is to show the basic causes of friction between soldiers and civilians. From the point of view of army responsibility it is a matter of immediate concern.

2. Improper Actions in procuring munitions, supplies, and land for military use.

The army's methods of requisitioning materials and purchasing land are criticized in such statements as, "The army is arbitrary and domineering." Among the cases which came to the attention of the military police are the following:

- a. Materials were ordered but after being prepared, they were not purchased.
- b. On the occasion of maneuvers MISO soup, hot tea, etc., had been prepared at the municipal office of a certain locality, but the army never arrived, so the effort was wasted.
- c. Lumber and hardware for construction of positions were requisitioned without payment.
- d. In order to provide abundant stocks for canteens, civilian supplies are increasingly restricted.
- e. Agencies for controlling materials are ignored, and materials are obtained independently and directly.
- f. Payment of the contract price for provisions, rice, and grain is delayed as long as 14 months.
- g. Threats are used when buying land or materials.

In view of the fact that the shortage of domestic materials will increase in the future and the general public is angered by these actions, strict caution is absolutely necessary.

The general public reveals its attitude by such statements as the following:

"When military supplies are purchased, we can't request even 1/4 of the payment in less than a year. If we press for payment they brow-beat us and are annoyed, saying 'JAPAN is in the midst of war.' The army is indeed arbitrary. The army is not fighting the war alone".

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"The war department restricts our rations beyond all reason. The department is very capricious. We cannot help doubting its actions."

"At a time when all the people are enduring shortages, it is absurd that the army alone should receive an abundance."

"Nowadays the armed services are given No. 1 priority in everything, so they have goods in abundance. While our devotion has not changed, we are envious. However strong the army is, if the people are weak we cannot win the war."

"Just when supplies of meat were extremely limited the army took an amount equal to about half the supply at YAMAGATA SHI for one meal. When we see the army we are indeed envious. We crave meat but it is difficult to get even 100 MOMME (TN: about 5/6 lb.). Seeing plentiful supplies for military use has a telling effect upon the attitude of the people of YAMAGATA SHI."

The situation demands attention, regardless of whether this sort of speech and behavior was prompted by Fifth Columnist rumors inspired by anti-military ideas. We must exercise self-discipline so as not to give openings for mischief by these agitators.

3. Conditions arising because of the special distribution of personal articles and their use outside the station.

Since attention was directed to the subject by the notification of the Vice-Minister of War, Army Secret General Order #1562, 5 June 1942, the distribution and use of personal articles have been carefully watched. Since then no violations of this notification by our forces have been noted, but certain practices of individual soldiers and military civilian employees have not yet been eradicated. For instance:

Military personnel and employees bring back a large quantity of rationed goods from battle areas and incur general envy. They also sell or give these goods to other people.

Example: A WO and 19 subordinates of the xx Air Transport Section acquired and brought back sugar, cotton goods, leather goods, cameras, etc., on the return trip of the planes from the Southern theater of operations. They used the goods at home, traded them for other goods, or sold or gave them to other people. Furthermore, they bragged about the fact to their neighbors.

Persons returning home on leave took many canteen articles and issued goods outside the station.

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Examples:

(1) An investigation on 21 Sept of articles carried by 220 men who were being returned after a period of training with a division revealed that they had purchased and were attempting to bring home canteen articles such as the following:

Toilet paper	6 or more bundles	130 persons
"HOMARE" Cigarets	10 or more packs of 20	200 persons
Matches	5 boxes or more	50 persons
Soap	3 or more bars	20 persons

(2) A search of the articles carried by about 600 NCOs and privates of a garrison unit who were returning home for the harvest leave revealed that 48 persons had stored up and were trying to bring home cotton socks, gloves, etc., which had been issued to them. The amounts involved were as follows:

Socks	266 pairs
Gloves	82 pairs
White work clothes	5 suits
Bed sheets	8

There were also large quantities of other types of goods.

Just when the shortage of ordinary necessities taxes the temper of the general public, the soldiers and civilian employees complacently brag about their personal sacrifices. Moreover, the facts are greatly exaggerated by wives who circulate rumors of their acquisitions of special goods, so there is much criticism of soldiers.

For example:

"At a time when goods are scarce, persons in military departments even waiters and servants are supplied with everything. Naturally we are envious. Because of this situation the shortage of goods grows more acute."

"Soldiers on leave can buy anything. Nowadays only the soldiers have plenty of SAKÉ."

"Today is certainly the day of the soldier. We are envious when we hear that even scarce goods are distributed by servicemen's clubs."

In view of the fact that such complaints and anonymous letters continue to appear, greater consideration and self-discipline will be required hereafter.

4. Other Improper Military Measures.

a. Unwarranted speech and behavior toward public officials.
 Examples: The director of the Bureau of Social Education in a certain prefecture, accompanied by a person not on the official staff, visited the commander of a certain unit of the Western District Army to give a welcome address. Because the commander was out on maneuvers, they went into the maneuvers area. The commander, a colonel, refused to acknowledge the greeting, saying angrily, "You are a fool to come out on the maneuvers area for a welcome." The incident intensified the anti-military sentiment of the local authorities.

A lieutenant-colonel, inspector of the reservist muster at a certain prefecture, struck and reprimanded about 30 persons who were not properly trained or whose behavior was bad. Moreover, he was indignant because the mayor was absent on that day because of official duties and had delegated an assistant to attend as his representative. Not only did the inspector insult the official, but at the time of the critique he said: "Such things as the absence of the mayor at the muster indicate the corruption of the city government. It leads to lack of discipline among those present." He went on to attack the mayor's lack of interest in the customary rites and ceremonies of the army.

Moreover, an attached NCO, a master sergeant, assaulted and knocked down the District Attorney who was among those present. He inflicted external injuries on the attorney's ears, with the remark "Because such as you are District Attorneys, the courts are useless. When you return you must resign immediately."

The mayor made these actions a local issue. The District Attorney said: "It is not just a personal matter. Considering the dignity of the judicial power, I shall urge the judicial authorities to demand reconsideration by the army." Later the situation was settled amicably.

b. Improper action when damage is inflicted upon the countryside.

Example: At a certain flying school agricultural products were damaged by explosives dropped during special bombing practice.

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The persons who sustained damage criticized the army's reluctance to assume responsibility.

About 50 men of xx Company of the Central District Army xx BUTAI entered a mushroom field while at rest during field maneuvers under a 1st lieutenant. They took mushrooms and trampled on the field, but the commander took no punitive action whatsoever.

In installing a military telephone line, civilian employees of the headquarters of a certain fortress climbed upon people's houses without permission and inflicted some damage. They tried to leave unnoticed but were discovered by the residents. When the residents challenged them, they retorted, "We're on army work; what are you going to do about it?" Moreover in answer to their application to a passing police officer /for assistance/, the residents received an angry reply that "There is no need for civilian employees to be investigated by the police."

c. Excessive Oppression of Inhabitants.

When positions were being constructed by a certain border garrison company, the patrolling sentries required salutes of the local people. They took a threatening attitude, saying, "Persons who do not salute sentries shall not pass." Moreover, they claimed that nearby public roads outside the positions were actually within the positions and posted sentries at two points. Passers-by were subjected to strict questioning and examination, and at times women were molested.

d. Non-cooperation during air raid drills.

Considerable light was showing at the guard house of the ordnance warehouse of the xx Division because the electric lights had no covers. When warned by the air raid wardens to black-out the lights, the commander of the guard aroused the wrath of the wardens by replying, "The army certainly need not submit to interference by local authorities."

During a civilian air raid drill under the jurisdiction of the police department, when there was a hypothetical hit by an incendiary bomb on their apartment house, a 2nd lieutenant, a WO, and a master sergeant attached to the headquarters of a certain division remained in the building although all the other residents participated in the drill. This lack of cooperation in the civilian air raid drill was severely criticized.

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e. Use of military vehicles.

When a probational officer of a certain unit was ordered by his company commander to lead a two-day automobile field march, he led his men from the station. However, when he arrived at FUKUCHIYAMA, which had been designated as the field camp, he arbitrarily extended the march to MIYAZU MACHI. After arriving at that place, he permitted the NCOs and men to carry on independently while he visited a house in the red-light district. Later he took a prostitute of enemy nationality for a ride in a military automobile. With a soldier as driver, they drove for more than an hour going as far AMA-NO-HASHIDATE.

f. Immoral conduct by returned servicemen and persons returning after conscript service.

g. Army treatment of persons killed in action and their families.

The frequency of such incidents, it is feared, is the cause of much of the friction between military personnel and civilians.

C. Observations.

As the nucleus for waging the GEA War, the army must take a positive stand in all affairs, strengthening the unity of the home front, promoting war morale, and conquering all difficulties. It must rigorously exercise war leadership. With the lengthening of the war the supplies of various goods will become even more limited and the life of the people will become increasingly difficult. Consequently, we must demand even stronger self-discipline in the actions of the army because it is certain that the public interest in the military services, even as to their interior administration, will become more and more zealous.

Moreover, recently the ideological schemes of enemy countries and the propaganda activities of the Comintern and National Communistic elements have grown more effective. Of course, these elements skillfully exploit circumstances such as those described above and increase the hostility between military personnel and civilians. Therefore, the army, down to the lowest private, must maintain dignity and exercise self-discipline, forestalling even momentary criticism by outsiders. Even in their personal lives they must set the example for civilians and endure hardships. By standing at the head of the troops and encouraging the civilians, we must lead on to total victory in the GEA War.

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IV. Crimes and Misconduct caused by Dereliction of Duty by the Staff.

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- B. Examples of crimes arising from inappropriate action by the staff.
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- A. Examples of crimes and misconduct on the part of the staff itself.

Case 1. Offense: Inflicting injury.
2nd Lieutenant, Reserve.

On 21 June the officer in question drank about a pint of SAKE in the officers' wardroom and went out in plain clothes. Soon he returned to his station and ordered a leading private to put on his bathrobe and come outside with him. They went to several bars and drank with acquaintances. Then he had the soldier bring uniforms from the station. They went to another bar, and in his drunkenness he cut four passing Koreans. The cuts and bruises he inflicted required medical treatment of from 8 days to two weeks.

Remarks: Such action as forcing a subordinate to visit public places in a bathrobe reveals an appalling lack of the spirit of military discipline.

Case 2. Fraud; Probational Officer (Reserve Officer Candidate).

While on Type 2 inspection duty, this officer stopped at a restaurant and under the pretense of a hygienic inspection looked around without buying and examined the sanitary arrangements. Moreover, he visited a brothel and was entertained without paying. When the

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proprietor demanded payment he said, "I came here after consulting with the military police unit. You can't demand the fee because I had relations with the woman for purposes of inspection." When pressed for payment, he signed a fictitious name on a slip of paper and left.

Remarks: Such an act, based on lack of sense of responsibility, diminishes the dignity of inspectors. Care must be taken with regard to the duties and leadership assigned to this type of probational officer.

Case 3. Graft (corrupt practices)
1st lieutenant.

While serving as commander of an infantry gun company he accepted, on 16 occasions, more than 650 yen and considerable amounts of goods from the father of a subordinate soldier, although he knew full well that the money and goods were offered with the understanding that he would expedite the son's application for reserve officer candidacy. Moreover, on 30 occasions he received bundles of commercial goods, food and drink, valued at more than 150 yen, from 12 guardians of soldiers, again with the understanding that he would facilitate applications for reserve officer candidacy or for promotions in rank. He misappropriated these gifts for his personal expenses.

Remarks: This practice must be strictly prohibited. It seriously undermines military discipline and dignity.

Case 4. Embezzlement.
2nd lieutenant, Finance Officer, Reserve (OinC certain sub-branch).

Between November 1941 and July 1942, after conspiring with his predecessor in office, the officer in question appropriated and concealed 80 cases of goods sent from FRENCH INDO-CHINA (current value 35,000 yen). He arbitrarily disposed of 40 cases to individuals both inside and outside the army, either for a consideration or gratis. He diverted the money received to departmental expenses or misappropriated it for amusement. The remaining 40 cases were recovered from military and civilian warehouses where they were hidden.

Remarks: It is necessary to strengthen the supervision of the higher authorities over operations offices under junior conscript officers.

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Sergeant, Active Duty.

While carrying out duties at headquarters of the unit guarding the palace, he mistook a copy of a "Very Secret" document, which had carelessly been left on the desk in Hq duty room, for one of his own documents. When going off duty, he returned to his unit, and put it away. In the search for the lost item on the following day, he confidently assumed it was not in his possession, although the troops had been ordered by the commanding officer to examine personal effects. Another search was ordered for the same purpose, and on the following day when he found it in with his personnel records he feared he would get into difficulty with the authorities. In trying to conceal his own guilt, he went to the NCO barracks, cut up the papers, and burned them.

Remarks: An officer who is charged with the custody of documents must be careful about improper procedures when he receives or lends them. Also officers who borrow them must not fail to return them and must be careful about leaving them lying around on desks forgotten.

Case 6. Misconduct
1st Lt, Active Duty (Volunteer Specialist).

While a company commander, this officer indulged in sensual pleasures and when short of entertainment money he went out with officers and NCOs of the company. He accepted their entertainment and finally incurred the dislike of his subordinates to the extent that no one would go out with him. He then took up with a dissolute leading private and was entertained by him on 34 occasions at various bars and restaurants. As a result this private became pressed for spending money and swindled 320 yen from three concessions at the KEIJO Station.

Remarks: When a company commander is unqualified, his word cannot be trusted and his assistance to officers of his company is inadequate. Hence, the battalion and regimental commanders must watch the leadership of their subordinates.

Case 7. Misconduct
Lt Col (Medical), Active Duty.

Despite the fact that the staff of his unit was composed mainly of reservists, and he should have paid special attention to discipline and morale, this OinC of a hospital selected beautiful girls from among the nurses who came under his command and took them to his

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own quarters or to a hotel. Moreover, he told the landlady of his lodging house that he couldn't bear his loneliness and had geisha girls sent to his room. He not only caused rumors among persons outside the unit, but also could not exercise sufficient authority over his own subordinates.

Remarks: There are many serious pitfalls for staff members who go independently to a new post. With misconduct such as this by the hospital chief, the military discipline of the hospital can only deteriorate.

Case 8. Probational Officer (Reserve Officer Candidate).

On the occasion of a two-day motorized field march in which he commanded 9 NCOs and privates, he arbitrarily extended the distance and went to a park in MIYAZU MACHI of KYOTO FU where they bivouacked. He gave his subordinates liberty from 1830 to 2300, and after visiting a house in the red light district, he took a prostitute for a ride in a military vehicle with a soldier as driver. He returned to the bivouac the following morning.

Remarks: Caution is necessary in selecting the leaders of automobile units on test marches, field exercises, and the like.

B. Examples of crimes arising from inappropriate action by the staff.

Case 1. Insubordination; threats and insults to superior officers. Pfc, Reserve.

Being of a wild and disobedient disposition, he treated superior officers and their orders lightly. In October of last year he was given five months' confinement for being AWOL. Resentful when the sentence was carried out in a military police prison, he violently insulted his company commander, saying: "I was sentenced to the guard house, so what's the idea of putting me in a military police prison? You bald old fool! You and I may be from the same place but you're a fool." In spite of this action he was not punished, so he grew more presumptuous. He perpetrated further infractions of military discipline with threats against the squad leader and insubordination.

Remarks: It is necessary to take stern measures upon the first instance of such transgression. Unless this is done, subordinates become increasingly presumptuous and exert a bad influence upon others.

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Case 2. Threats against superior officers; insubordination; insults; disobedience of orders; theft; invasion of private homes during war; robbery; resisting arrest.

2 Sup. Pvts, Reserve.
2 Pfc's, Active Duty.

The unit went to HOKKAIDO for special maneuvers. After the unit was out on maneuvers, the four persons mentioned above, who were engaged in rear echelon duties, conspired, and, pretending to leave the barracks under orders, went AWOL. While wandering around in the city, they were discovered by the probational officer who was the OOD of the rear echelon forces. When ordered to return to the barracks they answered angrily: "Today we are going to drink whatever happens. We are prepared to face the army criminal code when we return." Because they refused to obey the order, the officer, to get them to return, accompanied them to a bar. After they had each had four whiskeys, the soldiers grew presumptuous and made threats, such as "Let's kill YAMASHITA (the probational officer) today." "That's what I say, too." Finally, the officer returned alone because he could not make the soldiers return.

The four soldiers, being drunk, entered private homes, demanded food and drink, and generally caused trouble with their violence, destruction of articles, and thievery.

Remarks: The recent tendency of superiors to adopt an ingratiating attitude toward subordinates has become pronounced among the lower ranking staffs. In this case the initial action by the duty officer who was a probational officer was extremely inappropriate. A lack of sense of responsibility must be assumed.

Case 3. Disgraceful Conduct.
Pfc, Replacement.

This private was indignant because he had been reprimanded and struck by his commanding officer when departing for Central CHINA. In trying to evade going into the field, he wounded himself with a Type 38 rifle, but because of a superficial examination the company commander published a confirmed report that the explosion was a result of carelessness. Furthermore, when later questioned by the hospital, the platoon leader explained that the wound was caused by an enemy shell. As a result, the soldier was returned to JAPAN proper and was given first class treatment for a year and a half as an honored wounded veteran.

Remarks: Offences against the conscription service should not be overlooked by the staff. It is essential in dealing with them to distinguish strictly between excessive leniency and kindness.

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Case 4. Misconduct.
2nd Lt, Reserve.

Between Oct 1941 and May 1942, while living with a barmaid, the Lieutenant was informed that the woman was the wife of an overseas soldier. However, he continued to live with her. Moreover, he encouraged her divorce and finally caused trouble about it. Although his company commander had learned of the situation, he let it go with a simple caution, with the result that the offence continued.

Remarks: The staff must respect the principle of prudence.

C. Examples of crimes arising from inadequate supervision by the staff.

Case 1. Forgery and misuse of official documents; fraud.
4 military civilian employees.

These persons, while in charge of the branch warehouse of a certain clothing depot, conspired with a civilian with whom they had business relations. On four occasions they pretended to deliver military clothing materials to a military sub-contractor. They falsified the receipts of withdrawal from storage under the name of a 1st Lieutenant who had custody of military goods and they secured his seal, showing it to the commander of the transportation section. Over a period of 2 months they obtained by fraud 429 bolts of cloth (value 5,445 yen) and sold it locally, pocketing the proceeds.

Case 2. Theft; embezzlement; fraud.
Sergeant (Intendance Technician), Active Duty.

While carrying out various duties as assistant of the intendance board of his unit, as supervisor of a clothing factory, and as custodian of articles in an ordinary clothing warehouse, he ran short of spending money. Over a period of one year and four months, he took a total of 1,886 items of military clothing (current value 3,400 yen) from the clothing warehouse of his unit and sold them to civilians. Moreover, in carrying these away he was AWOL. With an accomplice, an NCO, he passed the sentry post pretending to have official orders. He used the Military Club as a go-between in his sales and purchases of cloth, and obtained 120 yen from two civilians by fraud. Prior to being sent out, he dropped in at the homes of his old subordinates and obtained 14 yen on various pretexts.

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Case 3. Fraud; forgery and misuse of public and private documents.
Civilian employee (copyist).

While engaged in paying wages to drafted workers as assistant to the disbursing officer, he took advantage of the pressure of duties which made it difficult for the accountant to keep close tabs on him. Between May and July 1942, he drew up accounts for wages and family allowances using fictitious names of workers. These he handed to the cashier and obtained his signature and seal. In this way he fraudulently obtained 5,428 yen of public funds. He ransomed his favorite prostitute and used the money for other entertainment expenses.

Case 4. Embezzlement in office
Sergeant (Intendance), Reserve.

While performing his duties as the acting disbursing officer of an L of C Veterinary Hospital, he indulged in sensual pleasures and ran out of spending money. As a result, on more than a hundred occasions he embezzled funds and spent a total of over 3,000 yen in the year beginning August 1941.

Case 5. Theft.
Sup Pvt, Reserve

While on duty as an automobile driver in his unit, he took advantage of lack of inventory inspections and watchfulness to steal 180 items of automobile tools (valued at more than 4,000 yen) which he was bringing back from the Southern theater. He took these outside the unit and sold them to automobile repairmen who were old acquaintances, pocketing the proceeds.

Case 6. Fraud; corrupt practices.
Civilian employee (Laborer).

While acting as caretaker of an army maneuver field, he rented an area of 23,000 TSUBO (TN: about 19 acres) to neighboring residents, utilizing out-of-the-way parts of the field which would not be observed by his superiors. He collected as rental 1,000 yen and considerable quantities of agricultural products. Also he received presents of 60 yen and considerable quantities of goods from 7 Korean farmers, with the understanding that he would permit them to use the same maneuver fields.

Again, a civilian received the free use of about 1,000,000 TSUBO of the unused area of a maneuver field from the intendance department of a certain division. He rented this to residents of a nearby village

and illegally collected about 2,000 yen.

Case 7. Embezzlement in office; destruction of public records; desertion.

Corporal (Intendance), Reserves (Staff B)

While carrying out intendance duties concerned with provisions, as the assistant to the disbursing officer at a certain army hospital and sanatorium, he stole more than 2,300 yen in funds from the sale of surplus military property to government contractors and from collections for issue rations from hospitalized residents who did not occupy public quarters. Over 20 separate offenses occurred between the middle of January and the end of June. He spent this money for entertainment and destroyed various records in order to conceal his crimes. Fearing discovery, he deserted.

Remarks: In spite of the need for caution and supervision at all levels of persons who officially handle or have custody of receipts and disbursements of this nature, these crimes have been allowed to continue over a long period. This condition stems from indiscriminate granting of authority to subordinates and blind approval of their actions. The greatest defect in staff supervision is the failure to discover these crimes in the early stages. The everyday behavior of subordinates requires the most careful scrutiny

(End)