

Apache Wars: A Constabulary Perspective

**A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

APACHE WARS: A CONSTABULARY PERSPECTIVE by Major Jeremy T. Siegrist, US Army, 66 pages.

Although seemingly as antiquated as the horse cavalry, the lessons from the Apache Wars of 1865 to 1886 are still relevant to the US Army. Indeed, the US Army's current occupation of Iraq is remarkably similar to the occupation of New Mexico during the Apache Wars. The inadequacies of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), mirror the inability of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) of the late 1800s to provide long-term security or social development to the population. Consequently, as on the frontier, the Army has been given a wide array of combat, security, and nation-building tasks for which it is untrained and under resourced. The resultant inability of the Army to provide security in Iraq has allowed an array of distinct insurgencies to thrive. Similarly, the frontier Army was also unable to conduct simultaneous combat, security, and nation-building tasks, which led to repeated Apache insurgencies. Consequently, lessons from the frontier Army may assist planners who face similar circumstances today.

Analysis of the Apache Wars demonstrates that the success of historic constabulary operations may be explained by constabulary principles. This monograph contends that principles of counterinsurgency, drawn from theory and doctrine, are nearly identical in post-conflict environments to principles that guide constabularies, and that each can inform conclusions about the other. As a result, constabulary principles may be derived from the wealth of counterinsurgency theory and doctrine in order to compensate for the paucity of constabulary theory. The resultant counterinsurgency-based constabulary principles are well suited for use in post-conflict environments such as the Southwest American frontier or Iraq.

Further, these constabulary principles may help planners today in crafting more effective actions in Iraq and in future Army operations. Indeed, current events in Iraq highlight the need for a trained force that is capable of conducting not only combat, but also security and nation-building tasks. The need to have trained and ready forces for constabulary type operations is actually increasing. Future conflicts are more likely to end quickly with few forces in place to conduct constabulary operations, as in Iraq, rather than ending after a prolonged campaign with huge forces in theatre, as in post-WWII Germany or Japan. As a result, the Army should train and resource forces, in concert with proven constabulary principles, to conduct security and nation-building tasks in post-conflict environments. The Army should also more effectively and realistically address constabulary operations in emerging counterinsurgency doctrine.

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ACRONYMS

AIM	American Indian Movement
BIA	Bureau of Indian Affairs
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field Manual
GARIOA	Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas
JOC	Joint Operational Concept
JP	Joint Publication
KFOR	Kosovo Force
NDU	National Defense University
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OMGUS	Office of the Military Government, United States
OPSEC	Operations Security
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
STR	Stabilization, Transition, Reconstruction

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Upon cessation of the conventional war in Iraq, the US Army's mission necessarily changed. Post-conflict Iraq required immediate stabilization and reconstruction. Although highly successful in their combat missions, deployed Army and Marine Corps units were simply untrained and under-resourced for the complex tasks involved with the sudden transition from combat to the more ambiguous stabilization and reconstruction of a nation. Further, the US policy of dismantling Iraqi armed forces, security organizations, and the Ba'athist government, left a security vacuum in Iraq that was not adequately filled by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) or the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Consequently, an unforeseen period of lawlessness occurred in Iraq characterized by widespread looting, crime, and danger to the population. The breakdown of security allowed opportunists to create an array of insurgencies, each with distinct political objectives. In hindsight, the immediate presence of a force dedicated to constabulary type operations in post-conflict Iraq may have averted the descent into lawlessness that allowed insurgents to organize.

Remarkably, the current situation in Iraq displays similarities to the environment in the United States during the Apache Wars of 1865 to 1886. Rule of law, economic resources, and social structure too slowly followed the fast-paced western expansion, creating a security vacuum on the western frontier that affected both Indians and settlers. The US Army, victorious in the Civil War, was tasked with simultaneous stabilization of the frontier, and reconstruction of southern states. The small, overstretched US Army became "not so much a little army as a big police force."¹ As with the current Army in Iraq, the frontier Army was untrained and under-

¹ Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars, The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 56.

resourced for the sudden transition. Similar to the CPA in Iraq, the US Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) could not provide the requisite social development and economic well-being to Apache tribes to ensure security. As a result, disenfranchised Apache bands repeatedly rebelled against the US government.

From Apacheria to Iraq

Today, the US Army occupies hostile territory in Iraq, just as it did in Southwest America after the Treaty of Hidalgo ended the war with Mexico. These occupations are similar in that the US Army sought to maintain security, defeat enemy forces, transform a culture, and create social structure on the frontier, just as it attempts to do today in Iraq. Stuart Cohen, a Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University, Israel, appropriately characterized the combination of military, security, and nation building tasks so common during occupations as ‘fuzzy.’² In addition to conducting combat tasks, occupying forces also execute police-like security tasks to include prevention of looting, and training of host nation law enforcement personnel. Occupying forces must also perform nation-building tasks, such as the organization of governing bodies, development of social structures, and creation of economic infrastructure. The US Army refers to this ‘fuzzy’ combination of combat, security, and nation building tasks as counterinsurgency operations (COIN). It is interesting to note that this ‘fuzzy’ blending of tasks also fits perfectly the typical definition of a constabulary, which is an organization that provides internal defense and stability. In most post-conflict occupations, despite the labeling of the force as counterinsurgent or constabulary, a mixture of combat, security, and nation building tasks are required to defeat the insurgency and create conditions for long-term stability (see figure 1).

This monograph argues that because of the similarities between counterinsurgency and constabulary operations that the principals underlying each are nearly identical, and that each can inform conclusions about the other. Most importantly, the monograph argues that the US Army

² Stuart Cohen, “Why do they Quarrel? Civil-Military Tensions in LIC Situations,” in *Democracies and Small Wars* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass and Co. LTD, 2003), 33.

can draw lessons from the Apache Wars and other historic constabulary experiences that can help planners craft more effective actions in Iraq, and in other nation building challenges the Army is likely to face in the future.




Figure 1. Convergence of Tasks in a Post-Conflict Environment

CHAPTER 2

CONSTABULARY PRINCIPLES

“Analogically, the guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog’s disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough - this is the theory - the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close its jaws or rake with its claw.”³

Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea*

In 1971, Brigadier General Frank Kitson, of the United Kingdom, developed an influential COIN theory in a book entitled *Low Intensity Operations, Subversion, Insurgency, and Peace-keeping*. Kitson’s expertise was drawn from his experiences countering insurgencies in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland. As the title of his book implies, Kitson found the label of insurgency too broad for the range of conflict to be encountered in low intensity operations.⁴ He defined insurgency more narrowly as the use of “armed force by a section of the people against the government,” and the term subversion as “all measures short of the use of armed force.”⁵ Both types of conflict share the same goal, namely to force the government to do something that it does not want to do. The elegance of Kitson’s simple division of low intensity conflict is that it recognizes the ‘fuzziness’ in COIN operations. Further, the division allows for a more detailed separation of tasks necessary to counter the distinct types of conflict. It also separates peacekeeping into an entirely different class of operations from insurgency and subversion.

³ Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002) 13.

⁴ Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1971) 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

Insurgency

All insurgencies seek a political end state. Bard O'Neill, an acknowledged counterinsurgent expert, identifies seven distinct insurgent political goals, identified in Table 1.⁶ An understanding of political goals is key to determining which strategy insurgents will likely use to achieve their goals. O'Neill identifies four historical insurgent strategies: protracted popular war, conspiratorial, military focus, and urban warfare.

<u>TYPE OF INSURGENCY</u>	<u>GOAL</u>
Anarchist	Eliminate organized government
Egalitarian	Empower a government based on social equality and centralized control
Traditionalist	Empower a government based on religious or historic values
Pluralist	Empower a government based on individual freedoms and power sharing
Secessionist	Create a separate and independent political community
Reformist	Create political reforms within the framework of the current political system
Preservationist	Maintain the current political organization and policies

Table 1. O'Neill's Insurgency Classification

Mao Tse-tung developed the most broadly imitated insurgency strategy, the protracted popular war. In Mao's theory of protracted popular war, four distinct phases lead to political success. In the first phase, a like-minded group organizes a political base through subversion. In the second phase, supporters conduct terrorist activities to coerce the population into support of the group. When the politically motivated group becomes strong enough, terrorist actions transition to guerrilla tactics in order to apply more pressure on the government. Finally, in the last phase, the group conducts conventional attacks against the legitimate armed forces of the government. Throughout all four phases, subversive actions continue to encourage popular political support.

⁶ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism, Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Herndon, VA: Brassey's, 1990) 17.

Also widely copied, the military focus insurgency strategy uses military actions to stimulate subversion. In the military focus strategy, which is most associated with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, a small, armed group conducts independent guerilla actions against government targets. These actions give impetus to other discontented groups to act against the government; these groups are often not even politically aligned with the military focus group. Political unity and organization is not a requirement in the initial phase of this strategy, but becomes necessary to achieve long-term results. The actions of the military focus group allow other groups to conduct subversive acts, which builds into popular support of an insurgency.

The conspiratorial strategy seeks modification of the legitimate government through the use of sudden, decisive violence to remove legitimate government members. By replacing deposed leaders with others favorable to their goals, the insurgents accomplish their overall purpose of changing policies or the political system. Key to the conspiratorial strategy is that the conspirators form a relatively small, secretive group powerful enough to overthrow the government. The conspiratorial group manipulates opposition from defending the current government, and then deposes government leaders through the limited application of violence. The removal of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh of Iran in 1953 is a striking example of a successful conspiratorial strategy. During the coup, British and American secret agents assisted a group of Iranian Army officers and mullahs in creating national chaos through subversion. Conspiratorial Iranian Army Officers used the chaos to justify and facilitate the violent removal of Mossadegh. The conspirators replaced Mossadegh as Prime Minister with retired General Fazlollah Zahedi, and established the authority of Mohammad Reza Shah. The overall purpose of the conspiratorial strategy, which was stopping the nationalization of the Iran oil industry, was accomplished.⁷

Emerging in the last half of the twentieth century, the urban warfare strategy uses

⁷ O'Neill, 32.

subversion and terrorism in densely populated areas to erode the will of the government and the confidence of the population in the government.⁸ As with the military focus and popular protracted war strategies, the urban warfare strategy seeks the eventual mobilization of the population in support of the group's political goals. To accomplish the mobilization of the masses, the group conducts acts that inspire fear or discontent in the population. The group exclusively uses the cover of urban terrain to multiply the effects of their actions, and to mitigate the military advantages of the government. Although the urban warfare strategy has historically been unsuccessful, groups continue to use this strategy. The Irish Republic Army (IRA) used the urban warfare strategy in Northern Ireland to influence the will of the British Government and the confidence of the population.

Subversion

An insurgency is simultaneously a measure of the "success and failure of subversion" by a politically motivated group.⁹ The initial subversion failed to accomplish the political objectives of the group, but nevertheless gained enough support to escalate to insurgency. Like insurgency, subversion has several forms, each capable of gaining political concession or contributing to the evolution of the movement to an insurgency. Dr. Gene Sharp, who has been called "the Clausewitz of nonviolent warfare," created the most universally accepted theories on subversion. Dr. Sharp identifies nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention as the three broad classes of subversion. Sharp argues that subversive, nonviolent operations are extremely powerful in gaining political considerations, and are governed by the same principles as combat.¹⁰ Like combat, subversive operations match opponents, require a strategy, and demand soldier-like attributes from its participants. These non-violent, subversive

⁸ Ibid., 45.

⁹ Thompson, 28.

¹⁰ Gene Sharp, *The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle* (Cambridge, MA: The Albert Einstein Institution, 1990) 9.

operations derive power from attacking the most critical aspect of a government, its dependence on the governed.¹¹

Nonviolent protest and persuasion are the most non-intrusive category of subversion.¹² The purpose of nonviolent protest and persuasion may be simply to arouse attention or influence a decision-maker. Sharp identifies 54 methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion, to include walkouts, marches, and public speeches.¹³ Nonviolent protest and persuasion has historically been very effective in achieving reformist goals. For example, on the eve of the 1972 presidential elections, the American Indian Movement (AIM) and other Indian organizations conducted a very successful nonviolent protest march for Indian rights. The group marched across the US to Washington D.C., where it protested at several sites in the capital. Later referred to as the Trail of Broken Treaties, the march was one of a series of nonviolent protests that led to reform of Indian rights in the 1970s.¹⁴

The next level of subversion is noncooperation, which takes the form of social, economic, or political discontinuance.¹⁵ The power of noncooperation is that it seeks to create a loss of legitimacy to the government, and may provoke repression.¹⁶ Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's challenge to the "Black Act" in South Africa is an example of noncooperation. In 1906, the Transvaal Government enacted an ordinance that forced Indians to carry identification, register with authorities, and be fingerprinted.¹⁷ Forewarned of the legislation, Gandhi asked the Indian population to deliberately disobey the law. Gandhi and several of his supporters were arrested for the subsequent widespread disobedience. These actions became the beginning of Satyagraha, or

¹¹ Ibid., 18.

¹² Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston, MA: Porter Sargent Publishing, 1973) 117.

¹³ Ibid., 118.

¹⁴ Vine Deloria, Jr., *Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties, An Indian Declaration of Independence* (New York, NY: Dell Publishing, 1974) 62.

¹⁵ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 183.

¹⁶ O'Neill, 80.

¹⁷ Betty Schechter, *The Peaceable Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 1963) 65.

‘nonviolent resistance’, which eventually caused compromise on the discrimination of Indians in South Africa.¹⁸ Gandhi later used noncooperation tactics in India with great effect.

The final form of subversion is nonviolent intervention, which is the most direct challenge to the government. According to Dr. Sharp, there are four forms of intervention: physical, psychological, economic, and political.¹⁹ A physical intervention actually impedes a government or social function, such as the interruption of government agencies through a sit-in type intervention. A physiological intervention is imposed on oneself, such as a hunger strike or prolonged exposure to the elements. An economic intervention is designed to specifically degrade economic systems, and might include the defiance of blockades, or black marketing. Finally, a political intervention inhibits normal operations of the government through intrusive, nonphysical measures. Political intervention may include formation of a parallel government, or overloading administrative systems. Rosa Parks’ refusal to sit in the ‘colored section’ on a segregated bus in Montgomery, Alabama provided a vivid example of a nonviolent intervention. Parks’ one small act contributed in a series of nonviolent interventions that eventually desegregated buses in Alabama in December 1956, and played a role in the larger civil rights movements.

Understanding the relationship between subversion and insurgency gives an appreciation of the ‘fuzziness’ in post-conflict environments. Because subversion lies at the root of insurgency, successful operations must counter subversion effectively in order to diminish the emergence of insurgencies. While US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are well trained to combat insurgency, they are not likewise trained or equipped to counter subversion. The lack of trained units to counter subversive acts such as smuggling (nonviolent economic intervention), large scale demonstrations (nonviolent protest and persuasion), and shadow governance (nonviolent political intervention), to name but a few, indicates the lack of an Army capability to defeat subversion.

¹⁸ Ibid., 79.

¹⁹ O’Neill, 357.

The Theoretical Foundation

Unlike many theorists, Kitson devotes part of his theory directly to the resolution of subversion. He asserts that the aim of the host government in facing subversion is to regain control of the population.²⁰ Key to gaining control of the population is making the determination very clear to the population that the government will end the subversive movement, regardless of cost. Kitson proposes that the government's program to end subversion must increase the prosperity of the country while destroying the subversive organization.²¹ He also posits that for legitimacy of the government, the rule of law must remain impartial, without changes favorable to certain segments of the population. If an insurgent force emerges from the subversive element, Kitson insists that unity of effort between forces countering the subversives and those combating insurgents is required. Unity of effort, at a minimum, includes joint planning, centralized control, and a single point of responsibility. Another requisite element to combat the unified group of subversives and insurgents is a common intelligence agency with psychological and propaganda capabilities.²²

A precursor to Kitson, Sir Robert Thompson also established principles that apply to both constabulary and counterinsurgency operations. Like Kitson, Thompson based his principles on personal experience, which included sixteen total years in both the Malayan Emergency, and the Vietnam Conflict. Thompson summarized his principles in an equation: development + legality + results = successful government.²³ The first variable in the equation, development, summarizes the principle that a government must have the clear aim of political and economic stability. Without stability, the conditions for subversion persist, and the government cannot achieve a lasting solution. The government has treated the symptom without addressing the malady. Legality in the equation represents the principle that the government must act entirely within its

²⁰ Kitson, 50.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., 74.

²³ Thompson, 68.

own laws. This ensures that the government maintains legitimacy, allowing it to continue to demand that its people obey the law as well. The final variable in the equation, ‘results’, subsumes three principles. The first mirrors Kitson’s principle of unity of effort. The second subsumed principle is that the government must secure bases in order to fight insurgents. This allows for self-preservation, and denies strategic areas to the subversives. And finally, and perhaps most critically, the aim of the government is to defeat the subversion, not the insurgency.²⁴ In defeating the subversion, Thompson argues that the government must demonstrate both its determination and its capacity to win.²⁵ The determination of the government must include an offensive spirit, tempered with patience, proportionality, and discretion.

In 1965, nearly the same time as Thompson was publishing his theory, Lieutenant Colonel John McCuen, US Army, wrote *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* based on his experiences in Vietnam and Thailand, as well as a detailed study of French experiences in Indochina.²⁶ His methodology in deriving principles was unique from Kitson and Thompson in that he postulated that the principles of counterinsurgency mirror the principles of protracted popular war espoused by Mao Tse-tung. Although McCuen uses a different methodology, the derived principles are similar to his British peers. According to McCuen, the government must first determine the phase of the insurgency. Based on this determination, the government secures the proper strategic bases, and conversely, denies important bases to the insurgents. After securing bases, the government must mobilize the population against the insurgency, and request outside assistance as needed. And finally, the government must ensure unity of effort.²⁷

Along with these strategic principles, McCuen added operational and tactical principles. In dealing with subversion, McCuen argued for organization and rapid expansion of a police, or

²⁴ Ibid., 55.

²⁵ Ibid., 69, 171.

²⁶ McCuen, 17.

²⁷ Ibid., 73.

constabulary organization, to destroy the administrative network of the revolution. A requisite piece of this constabulary is a unified intelligence, and counterintelligence, agency. As much as possible, the constabulary should maximize the use of indigenous forces. Breaking ‘rebel’ control is the first objective of the constabulary, followed by organizing local militias, or home guards, for self-defense. McCuen used the Philippine Constabulary during the early 1900s Moros pacification, and the British Special Constabulary in Malaya, as examples of effective constabularies. Viewed in their entirety, these principles show that McCuen also clearly identified the strong relationship between counterinsurgency and constabulary theory.²⁸

Twenty years after the theories evolved from the British and American experiences in Malaya and Vietnam, Colonel Alexander Aguirre wrote *A Critique on the Counter Insurgency Strategy of the Marcos Era*. In this critique, Aguirre used his experiences in operations against the Muslim secessionist rebellion in Mindanao to demonstrate the flaws in the Philippine Government’s strategy.²⁹ Although Aguirre agreed with the principal tenets of the Philippine Government’s plan of concurrent security operations and economic development, he argued that the government was not executing sound principles. The lack of a dedicated security force was the glaring deficiency in Aguirre’s analysis. Operations had been conducted using a triad of intelligence, psychological, and counterinsurgent operations. Aguirre argued that the three types of operations were insufficient to achieve the government’s goals of security and development. He proposed a new methodology, which he called the public safety approach within the context of a graduated and flexible response. This approach combined safety operations and developmental programs with the existing ‘triad’ of intelligence, psychological, and counterinsurgent operations. Aguirre’s approach highlights the principles of proportionality, determination, and unity of effort identified by earlier theorists. Likewise, he also insisted that the

²⁸ Ibid., 141-153.

²⁹ Alexander P. Aguirre, *A Critique on the Counter Insurgency Strategy of the Marcos Era* (Quezon City: Pan Service Masters Consultants, Inc., 1986) 3.

government return to the normal rule of law for legitimacy. This ‘public safety’ approach synthesized the principles of earlier theorists, while adding developmental programs that lead to long-term stability.³⁰

More recently, Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson edited a group study at the National Defense University (NDU) that drew strategic concepts from American post-conflict operations in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.³¹ The methodology of the study was decidedly analytic, and drew upon an array of quantitative factors such as post-conflict duration, troop strength per capita, and multilateral involvement. From this detailed study, the group derived strategic concepts for post-conflict operations. The group defined post-conflict operations as those that include stabilization and reconstruction.³²

The strategic concepts developed by the NDU group complement the theories of Kitson, Thompson, and McCuen. The NDU group’s concepts of unity of effort, a unified intelligence agency, early use of indigenous forces, and concurrent civic and military operations are well grounded in the theories already presented. NDU also postulated a few new strategic concepts, two of which are addressed here. The first unique concept is that the government must have a coherent war-winning and peace-winning strategy.³³ This is similar to Thompson’s assertion that a successful government defeats the subversion, not the insurgency. Political goals, such as Aguirre’s economic and political stability in the Philippines, must be linked to military goals. Most importantly, the NDU group argued, the goals of the military force during heightened conflict phases must not overshadow subsequent political goals.

Another unique concept from the NDU study is precision targeting of ‘rejectionist’ elements. The capability of “collection, processing, analysis, fusion, and dissemination of timely

³⁰ Ibid., 35-37.

³¹ Hans Binnendijk, and Stuart Johnson, eds. *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*. (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2003) 4.

³² Ibid., xiii.

³³ Ibid., 18.

information” has dramatically increased recently through information technologies.³⁴ The ability to conduct precision strikes has correspondingly increased, giving the commander a new capability, precision targeting. Precision targeting of insurgent elements, although seemingly new, is really only an improved tactic. Discrete operations, through ambushes, raids, and other ‘surgical’ operations, have long been the norm in COIN operations, and are the technological precursor to precision targeting.

Constabulary Principles

From these diverse theories, common principles emerge that may be used to evaluate historical constabulary operations and guide future post-conflict operations:

Simultaneous social development and security are necessary to defeat the subversion, and hence the insurgency. It is intuitive that significant social development occurs only in secure environments. The less obvious corollary, however, is that security exists in the long term only when social development progresses to a level satisfactory to the population.³⁵ In order to simultaneously achieve security and social development in post conflict environments, the ‘fuzzy’ tasks of combat, security, and nation building must occur. Constabularies generally focus on security and nation building tasks, while military forces focus on combat tasks.

A good example of the interdependence of security and social development was illustrated in the Moros Rebellions of the Philippines. The Moros were denied both development and security under Spanish control in the 1800s, and consequently, near continuous insurgency denied unification of the Philippine Islands. The American rule that followed the Spanish American War initially brought security to the Moros, but economic disparities caused by the Spanish *Encomiendas* Land Grants were not addressed.³⁶ Consequently, despite added security, Moros uprisings continued to occur. Perhaps as a direct result of this experience, the USMC

³⁴ Ibid., 23.

³⁵ Aguirre, 68.

³⁶ Ibid., 67.

Small Wars Manual of 1940 asserted in its opening chapter “peace and industry cannot be restored permanently without appropriate provision for the economic welfare of the people.”³⁷

General Sir Gerald Templar, Britain’s High Commissioner and Director of Operations in Malaya in 1952, also eloquently affirmed this principle, “the answer [to insurrection] lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle but rests in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people.”³⁸

In September 2004, the Post Conflict Reconstruction Project, sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), identified measures of effectiveness for Iraq that indicate success or failure in simultaneous social development and security.³⁹ The complex array of tasks that must be accomplished to answer ‘yes’ to the questions in Table 2 illustrates the ‘fuzziness’ of tasks that an occupying force must accomplish to facilitate success of the government:

Security: <i>I feel secure in my home and in my daily activities.</i>
Governance and Participation: <i>I have a say in how Iraq is run.</i>
Economic Opportunity: <i>I have a means of income.</i>
Services: <i>I have access to basic services, such as power, water and sanitation.</i>
Social Well-Being: <i>My family and I have access to health care and education</i>

Table 2. CSIS Measures of Effectiveness for Security and Social Development

Determination must suffuse the constabulary. As with a combat force, constabularies must seek victory, not safety.⁴⁰ Constabulary forces must take positive measures to generate success, measured in security and social development, in order to convince the population that the subversive movement will be defeated.⁴¹ This entails a proactive stance that generates effects rather than reacting to subversive or insurgent actions. This precludes the establishment of a constabulary solely to defend infrastructure or personnel. An offensive spirit,

³⁷ Chief of Staff, U.S. Marine Corps. *NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual, Reprint of 1940 edition.* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1987) 1-9.

³⁸ Efraim Inbar, ed., *Democracies and Small Wars* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass and Co. LTD, 2003) 25.

³⁹ Bathsheba Crocker, ed. “Progress or Peril, Measuring Iraq’s Reconstruction, September 2004,” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.: 2004) 4.

⁴⁰ Charles E. Calwell, *Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996) 75.

⁴¹ Kitson, 50.

however, must not be confused with aggressive behavior. An offensive spirit is intended to create positive effects, not just create action.

Endurance is another key to determination.⁴² The perception of long-term dedication denies subversive elements any hope of gaining ascendancy, and emboldens the indigenous population to resist subversives. As in combat operations, one side alone cannot dictate the tempo of a campaign. Constabularies must prepare to outlast subversives if needed.⁴³

Establish a unified Intelligence and Information Operations organization. Information superiority is essential to countering subversion and combating insurgency. A single agency that manages intelligence for constabulary and combat forces ensures that gaps in collection plans are more reliably filled, contradictory information is resolved, and operations are synchronized. Incumbent in successful intelligence gathering is the recruitment and development of local intelligence sources.

Further, information operations must be unified between constabulary and combat forces. This includes psychological operations (PSYOPS), electronic warfare (EW), public affairs, operations security (OPSEC), computer network attack and defense, and deception. Information operations may be the most important element in countering subversion. The popular protracted war, military focus, and urban warfare insurgent strategies all rely on mobilization of the population, which can only be accomplished in the information domain. Information operations are paramount to shaping pro-government perceptions in the population, as well as criminalization of discontents.

⁴² James Dobbins, et al, *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003) xxvi.

⁴³ Rod Thornton, *Historical Origins of the British Army's Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorist Techniques* (Geneva, SW: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Conference Paper, 2002) 14.

Legitimacy is essential. Key to the legitimacy of a constabulary is that it operates under the laws of the host nation.⁴⁴ This simple principle facilitates the early use of indigenous forces, ensures cultural sensitivity, and sets a foundation for gradual change. Using the laws of the host nation allows for rapid employment of trained and educated law enforcement and justice system personnel from the host nation. This early use of law enforcement personnel may contribute significantly to suppressing subversives before the emergence of insurgents. Enforcing host nation laws also ensures cultural acceptability. Representatives of the host nation may, in due course, gradually modify those laws that are deemed unacceptable.

Legitimacy also demands a keen sense of proportionality. Foremost, this applies to the use of minimum force.⁴⁵ While the maxim of minimum force supports the American value of fairness and equality, it also has more pragmatic benefits. Excessive force may lead to resentment and bitterness, and eventually add to the number of subversives. A proper balance of force and restraint also exhibits long-term commitment to the population.

In the final analysis, the conclusion of most internal conflicts ultimately hinge upon the will of the governed, the population. Legitimacy is a key objective for the insurgent force, as well as the government. Consequently, every action or policy taken by the government, and constabularies, must necessarily enhance the ability of the government to “control its territory and govern its people in that territory with rectitude.”⁴⁶

Unity of effort is imperative at all levels. Constabulary and combat forces must have unified control and a single point of responsibility.⁴⁷ In a remarkably illustrative metaphor, Stuart Cohen likened the actions of constabulary and combat forces to runners in a three-legged

⁴⁴ Kitson, 69.

⁴⁵ Thornton, 3.

⁴⁶ Max G Manwaring, *Internal Wars: Rethinking Problem and Response* (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001) 14.

⁴⁷ Kitson, 53; Aguirre, 50; Binnendijk, 12.

race.⁴⁸ When out of step, the two forces are likely to trip themselves up. However, when the actions of both forces are coordinated, a fluid race may be run. Unified control may be accomplished via committee, with constabulary and combat force representatives and a head administrator, or through the appointment of a single commander, with advisors from both forces.⁴⁹ Beyond just unity of command and control, the policies and strategies of constabulary and military forces must be aligned. Unified planning must occur to synchronize efforts.

Current Doctrine in Relation to Theory-Derived Principles

Contemporary doctrine also serves to strengthen the utility of the theory-derived constabulary principles. As with theory, stand-alone US Army constabulary doctrine is lacking. It has not been written since 1943, when the US was preparing to conduct constabulary operations in Germany and Japan. Nevertheless, counterinsurgency doctrine again provides a good source for doctrine that applies equally to constabulary operations. US counterinsurgency doctrine is presently found mainly under the aegis of foreign internal defense (FID), and is particular to Special Forces. Nevertheless, doctrine is finally emerging that is not exclusive to Special Forces, but is aimed at the larger conventional Army.

FID doctrine, at both joint and Army level, is consistent with the theory-based constabulary principles. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07-1, Foreign Internal Defense, describes FID as efforts that support “the host nation’s program of internal defense and development (IDAD)” that protects a nation from “subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”⁵⁰ Again, this is consistent with the division of subversion from insurgency, as observed by Kitson and other theorists. JP 3-07-1 outlines the following planning imperatives: maintain host nation sovereignty and legitimacy; understand the strategic implications and sustainability of US efforts before implementation; tailor military support of FID programs to the environment and needs of the host nation; ensure

⁴⁸ Inbar, 21.

⁴⁹ Kitson, 54.

⁵⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995) ix.

unity of effort; and, understand US foreign policy. These imperatives, while unique to circumstances of the US in a support role, complement the theory-based constabulary principles.

Still in draft form, FM 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, provides a definition of insurgency that is comparable to Kitson's: "an insurgency is an armed political movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government, or separation from it, through use of subversion and armed conflict."⁵¹ Despite the inclusion of subversion in this definition, the manual focuses almost exclusively on combating insurgents, rather than countering subversives. This may be in part because the manual recognizes only two types of insurgencies, offensive and defensive, each with the purpose of a 'counterstate'.⁵² This is a shallow analysis of insurgency as compared to Bard O'Neill's seven types of insurgencies. FM3-07.22 characterizes current insurgent activities in Iraq and Afghanistan as offensive, which does not require a subversion phase that mobilizes the population. Consequently, the manual neglects the counter subversion operations that Thompson argues are required to defeat an insurgency.

Nevertheless, FM3-07.22 does provide a set of principles, labeled as desired effects, which compare well with the principles derived from theory. The first effect is 'protection', and its importance is in allowing social institutions to function and economic development to flourish.⁵³ This principle complements the theory-based principle of simultaneous security and social development. The second effect, 'establish,' fleshes out the first theory-based principle by establishing the conditions favorable for the development of social conditions necessary to meet US objectives. Next, the 'reinforce' effect is intended to highlight the integration, or reinforcement, between the host nation and US Army forces, and includes close coordination between security and military forces. 'Reinforce' is also intended to display the determination of the government to create conditions favorable to ending the insurgency.

⁵¹ Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, *FMI 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2004) 1-1.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 1-5.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 2-2.

‘Eliminate’ insurgent capabilities to exploit grievances, and ‘exploit’ intelligence to gain access to the insurgent’s base round out the desired effects of FM3-07.22. These final effects amplify the theory-derived principles of determination, and an unified intelligence agency.

Emerging as a result of recent Global War on Terrorism operations, a Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction Joint Operating Concept (JOC) also strengthens the constabulary principles derived from theory. The concept describes the principles that the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) posits will guide joint stabilization, transition, and reconstruction (STR) operations when “opposed by enemies seeking to employ a strategy of protraction.”⁵⁴ This ‘strategy of protraction’ is a clear reference to Mao Tse-tung’s popular protracted war strategy. Labeling insurgents, terrorists, and criminals as spoilers, limited spoilers, and greedy spoilers, the JOC clearly recognizes the need for concurrent operations against subversives and insurgents.⁵⁵ The principles of STR are synonymous with the principles of a constabulary acting in concert with a coordinated combat force:

<u>Constabulary Principles</u>	<u>Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction Principles</u>
Simultaneous social development and security are necessary to defeat the subversion, and hence the insurgency.	Pursue interim conditions for ‘next state’ in the stability, transition, and reconstruction process.
Determination must suffuse the constabulary.	Impose security by adopting both an assertive and engaging posture. Neutralize, co-opt, or induce others who threaten security and the creation of a new ‘normal’.
Establish a unified Intelligence and Information Operations organization.	Develop reliable local intelligence. Incorporate information operations into every action: tactical and operational.
Legitimacy is essential in constabulary operations.	Act from a position of legitimacy. Act with precision; balance restraint and overmatching power. Operate within the law.
Unity of effort is imperative.	Organize the efforts of military and civilian agencies to achieve integrated, multiagency unity of purpose and coherence of actions.

Table 3. Theory-Derived Constabulary Principles Compared to STR Principles

⁵⁴US Joint Forces Command, *Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, Joint Operating Concept, Draft Working Paper, ver. 1.6*, (Washington, D.C.: Department Defense, 2004) 3.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 40.

Drawn from accepted counterinsurgency theories, and verified by current doctrine and concepts, the theory-derived principles of constabulary operations provide a framework for critical analysis of historic constabulary operations.

CHAPTER 3

BACKGROUND TO THE APACHE WARS

“We have before us the tiger of the human species.”⁵⁶

Brigadier General George Crook

During the Mexican-American War, General Winfield Scott proclaimed to the 3rd United States Cavalry Regiment that it had been “baptized in fire and blood and come out steel!”⁵⁷ When the United States signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ending the war in 1848, it gained the better part of nine current states, land that also came with many Indian tribes. One associated group of tribes, the Apaches, would both fight and serve the US Cavalry for the next forty years, and more closely fit General Scott’s description. The Apaches had literally been baptized into slavery by the Spanish, survived bloody scalping by Mexican bounty hunters, and in the end, emerged as tempered warriors.

The Apache Culture

In many ways, the label ‘Apache’ was as ambiguous as the label ‘American’ during the Apache Wars, with one major difference. Like their American counterparts, Apaches shared a common language, and had similar customs and values. But to really understand a specific American in 1870, one would need to know the individual’s home state, city, political memberships, and religion. After all, an 1870s Quaker from Philadelphia would have very little in common with a Mormon from rural Utah. Likewise, to understand an individual Apache, one would need to know the specific tribe, band, local group, and clan membership of the person.

⁵⁶ Peter Cozzens, ed., *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, The Struggle for Apacheria* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001) 602.

⁵⁷ Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, *Third Armored Cavalry Regimental History, Honors, and Traditions* [on-line], accessed 23 January 2005); available from <http://www.carson.army.mil>.

For the Apache, family was the most important social group. The Apache family structure was matriarchal; young men would join their wife's family upon marriage. Multiple families joined into local groups, which organized primarily for common interests, such as hunting and gathering. Likewise, local groups formed into larger bands, primarily based on proximity. Generally, bands occupied a distinct geographic region, such as the Dragoon Mountains, or Tonto Basin. Multiple bands in contiguous geographic areas formed into tribes. The four major tribes of Apaches were the Mescaleros, Jicarillos, Chiricahuas, and Western Apaches, although many different systems of classification have been used for the Apaches.⁵⁸

The main difference in the analogy of 'American' vice 'Apache' is the importance to the individual of the described social structures. The individual Apache simply did not consider decisions at the tribe, band, or even local group level as binding. The only important Apache social organization was the family. As a result, the broader American concept of loyalty to social organizations was perpetually misplaced upon the Apache, and created uncertainty and anger during the Apache Wars. The Apache sense of honor and loyalty came from duty to the family, which also extended to a collection of distant relatives, which formed into a clan. The closest American parallel to a clan is perhaps political membership. The clan cut across local groups, and bands, and was the primary organization for raiding and war.

Apache raiding was also culturally misunderstood. Apaches usually raided for subsistence and wealth, not from animosity. Usually, raiding was required to supplement Apache subsistence in war, droughts, or other difficulties. Nevertheless, Apache adversaries continually treated raiding as an act of war, rather than a crime, and consequently escalated raiding into outright warfare by violent retribution. Apache custom required family members to avenge the death of their kin, so violent retribution on behalf of the raided led to a cycle of violence.

⁵⁸ Grenville Goodwin, *The Social Organization of the Western Apache* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1942) 12-30.

Consequently, retribution for Apache raids would escalate into warfare, which then involved larger Apache bands as more Apache deaths impacted more clans.⁵⁹

Warfare for the Apaches was also a way of life. By 1700, lands inhabited by Apache tribes, called Apacheria, were threatened by the Spanish to the south, the powerful Comanches to the northeast, the Pueblos and Utes to the north, and the Pimas, Opatas, Seris, and Tarahumaras to the south.⁶⁰ Consequently, the Apaches became excellent warriors. The warriors chose leaders based on military effectiveness and bravery, and had no fixed allegiance. So, in warfare, the loss of a leader was unlikely to end a conflict. The individual's commitment to a battle or war was measured only in proportion to the needs of his family or the requirements of retribution required by the loss of a family member.

Although threatened on all sides, Apacheria was an immensely large area. Roughly bounded by the current border with Mexico to the south, by the Colorado River to the north and east, and by the San Carlos River to the west, Apacheria encompassed over 250,000 square miles (see Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix A). Although Apacheria is generally arid, it has a diversity of landscapes, from desert to mountain to grassy plains. Year-round hunting included buffalo, deer, and antelope. The Apaches supplemented hunting with abundant mescal, prickly pear, saguaro, and other uncultivated native plants. Apaches also cultivated, but the relatively harsh climate did not favor farming as much as in other climes. This harsh, but abundant, environment contributed to formation of the Apache lifestyle as predominantly hunter and gatherer, rather than cultivator.⁶¹ The Apaches necessarily supplemented this lifestyle with raiding when required.

The Apache culture made warfare extremely difficult for their adversaries. The lack of tribal allegiance or fixed leadership made negotiation and treaties nearly irrelevant, as it applied

⁵⁹ Keith H Basso, ed. *Western Apache Raiding and Warfare, From the Notes of Grenville Goodwin* (Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 1971) 1-64.

⁶⁰ Max L. Moorhead, *The Apache Frontier: Jacobo Ugarte and Spanish-Indian Relations in Northern New Spain, 1769-1791* (Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968) 3.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

only to the band of the leader present. The nomadic lifestyle of the Apaches, coupled with abundant food sources throughout the region, refuted the common Indian tactic of destroying villages. And, finally, the enduring existence of war made the warriors extremely cunning, capable of enduring extreme hardships, and cruel. The Apaches also considered themselves a chosen people, and consequently had little regard for non-Apaches.⁶² Nevertheless, the Apache tribes had many weaknesses when compared to their eventual Spanish, Mexican, and American adversaries. Apaches depended on outside sources for everything except the bare subsistence that could be gleaned from the land, they were always severely outnumbered, and they lacked all but family unity.

The First Apache Insurgency: Spain

The Spaniards were the first Europeans to encounter the Apache. Prior to confronting the Apaches on the northern frontier of New Spain, however, the Spanish had already defeated several indigenous tribes, including the Aztecs, Tlaxcalan, and Chichimecos. Pacification of the Chichimecos, however, had proven extremely difficult, as the Chichimecos had a lifestyle very similar to the Apaches. Despite the difficulties, conflict became inevitable with the Chichimecos when Spanish explorers discovered silver deposits in the Gran Chichimeca. From 1550 to 1580, New Spain defended settlements from *presidios* positioned astride key routes, conducted punitive attacks on the Chichimecos, and sold captives into slavery. In retaliation, the Chichimecos raided Spanish villages with renewed vigor, and after stealing horses, become even more difficult to fight. In 1580, the Viceroy of New Spain, the Marquis de Villamanrique, created a new policy for subjugating the Chichimecos.⁶³

The policy envisioned by the Viceroy focused almost exclusively on social development of the Chichimecos. First, the Viceroy prohibited enslavement, freed all Chichimeco slaves, and

⁶² Joseph A. Stout, *Apache Lightning, The Last Great Battles of the Ojo Calientes* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1974) 5.

⁶³ Moorhead, 11-12.

prosecuted slave traders. He then reduced the military force in Gran Chichimeca to one company, and spent the surplus military budget on food, clothing, and agricultural tools for the Indians. The Marquis also sent in missionaries and settlers that provided religious instruction, and trade, to the Indians. By 1589, the Chichimecos had voluntarily settled, and although small raids continued, the Chichimeco threat was mostly eliminated.⁶⁴ The Viceroy had settled the insurgency by addressing the roots of subversion, namely the need to raid caused by the encroachment of settlers onto hunting and gathering lands.

Less than a century later, the Spanish encountered the Apache tribes, and appeared to have forgotten the lessons of the Chichimecos. By 1680, Spanish settlers had expanded past the Gran Chichimeca to the northern frontier bounded by Apacheria, which was bypassed using the Rio Grande Valley to colonize New Mexico (see Figure 3 in Appendix A for a map of Northern New Spain). From 1680 through 1786, the Spaniards employed the same technique to deal with the Apaches that had initially failed against the Chichimecos. A series of defensive *presidios* was established along the northern frontier, punitive attacks were made on the Apache bands by “flying companies” of mounted cavalry, and slavery was imposed upon captives.⁶⁵ From 1700 to 1750, at least 800 Apache children were taken through Spanish military expeditions, aided by Pima and Opatas Indians.⁶⁶ The captives were then forcibly baptized into Catholicism, and sold as slaves. Unlike the Gran Chichimeca, however, there was no silver or other economic incentives in Apacheria for settlers to withstand the reciprocal Apache depredations. Consequently, by 1765, violence from Apache bands on villages in Chihuahua and Sonora was depopulating the provinces.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Francis C. Lockwood, *The Apache Indians* (New York, NY: The MacMillan Company, 1938) 19.

⁶⁶ Lynn R. Bailey, *Indian Slave Trade in the Southwest* (Los Angeles, CA: Westernlore Press, 1973) 20.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 29.

In 1786, after multiple failed operations against the Apache tribes separating Sonora from New Mexico, Comandante General Jose de Galvez devised a new Indian policy, detailed in the *Instruccion of 1786*. This policy, approved by the King of Spain, was a compromise between Apache extermination espoused by some Spaniards, and the peaceful resolution envisioned by the King.⁶⁸ Galvez recognized that the encroachment on Apacheria, and the resultant scarcity of game, had caused the Apaches to increase raiding for subsistence. He also recognized that the Apache bands had nothing to trade, as they had no industry, which also increased the need to raid. Although Galvez had no estimate of the true number of Apaches, he felt that the only way to militarily defeat their combined numbers was to use indigenous forces.

Galvez's policy started with regulating trade on terms favorable to the Apaches. He accepted losses from the imbalanced trade with the Apache bands as a cost of peace. Further, he directed that costly gifts should frequently be made to Apache leaders so that they would have something to trade. Galvez also took the ban off of trading liquor and firearms to the Apaches. He reasoned that liquor would weaken the Indians, and perhaps allow for better gathering of information. He also reasoned that the Indians would be less lethal with long muskets than with their native arms, especially on horseback. Having muskets would also force the Apache bands to rely more upon trade, as they would require gunpowder. Most importantly, all peace treaties would be accepted and followed by the Spanish, even if they assumed the Apache bands would shortly break the treaty. Any treaty, even short-lived ones, would allow for trading and gift giving, which might eventually induce the Apache bands to maintain peace longer.⁶⁹

Militarily, the Spanish Army would maintain constant pressure on Apache bands by employing Indian scouts and warriors, even other Apaches. The Spanish Army would coerce other Indian bands to fight against the Apaches through their traditional animosities, food and gifts given for service, and in the denial of trade upon refusal. Additionally, the *presidios* of the

⁶⁸ Moorhead, 124.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 144-288.

northern frontier would be reorganized in order to provide more security to the population. Establishments of peace, or reservations, would be established near the *presidios* so that the Spaniards could protect the Apaches as well as monitor them more effectively once on the reservations.⁷⁰

Using Galvez's policy, the new Comandante General, Jacobo Ugarte, was able to bring relative peace to the northern frontier in just four years. Marques de Rubi, commander of the Royal Engineers, reorganized defenses, creating fifteen *presidios* about 100 miles apart from each other, and garrisoned with a combination of Spanish troops and Indian scouts.⁷¹ Upon completion of the *presidio* system, General Don Hugo O'Connor operated against the Apaches from New Spain with 'flying companies' joined by Indian scouts. Meanwhile, Don Juan Bautista de Anza, in New Mexico, created alliances with Navajo and Comanche bands and operated against the Apaches from the north. Apache bands soon began to submit, and were forced to fight with the Spanish. The Apache bands that sued for peace were settled near the *presidios*, where they were housed and fed.⁷² Notably, the Spanish Government did not require the Apaches to work in return. From 1790 through the start of the Mexican Revolution in 1810, Spanish forces on the northern frontier were reduced to constabulary operations.⁷³ At the peak of the reservation system, the Spanish reservations in New Spain held over 6,000 Apaches.⁷⁴

Galvez's successful policy against the Apaches compares well with the derived constabulary principles. Galvez addressed the economic woes of the Apaches by beneficial trade status and welfare-type subsistence at the reservations. Further, he displayed determination in solving the insurgency by creating a long-term policy. The reorganization of the *presidio* system was a long-term commitment, as was the establishment of reservations. Continual operations

⁷⁰ Ibid., 272.

⁷¹ Lockwood, 27.

⁷² Moorhead, 277.

⁷³ Ibid., 289.

⁷⁴ Bailey, 32.

against the Apaches from all sides also displayed an undeniably offensive spirit and unity of effort. The use of indigenous forces as scouts allowed Galvez to overcome intelligence disparities. And finally, Galvez operated within acceptable norms and laws to subjugate the Apaches, which gave his forces legitimacy. From 1790 to 1810, constabulary and counterinsurgency operations had combined to create an acceptable level of violence.

The Second Apache Insurgency: Mexico

In September 1810, Padre Miguel Hidalgo called for Mexican independence, and after a decade of war, during which Hidalgo's head was piked in front of the city of Guanajuato, Mexican masses expelled the Spanish Government. Power was quickly usurped after the revolt by Agustin de Iturbide, who declared equality for all Mexican citizens, and then proclaimed himself Emperor in 1822. Iturbide was short lived however, as he was exiled and then executed in 1823, thereby creating the conditions for a new Federalist government. The government quickly approved a constitution, and settled into governance of the new United States of Mexico (see Figure 4 in Appendix A for a map of Mexico's Northern frontier in 1822).⁷⁵

Amidst a host of other serious difficulties, the newly formed Mexican Government was unable to manage the Apaches in the Northern Provinces. The long revolutionary war had weakened the economy, and Spanish administrators had been expelled. Organization of the new government was a monumental task. The Catholic Church, long a bastion of economic and political power, was also crumbling due to the weakening economy and lack of support from Spain. Further, the Russians had landed in Alta California and established Fort Ross in 1812, and Americans were continuing to press ever west into Northern Mexico. The Apaches left the reservations from neglect, returned to their homelands, and began raiding again.

In 1834, the weak Federalist Government was overthrown by Antonia Lopez de Santa Anna, signaling the ignominious start of the Centralist Government. From 1833 to 1855, the

⁷⁵ David J. Weber, *The Mexican Frontier, 1821-1846, The American Southwest Under Mexico* (Albuquerque, NM: The University of New Mexico Press, 1982) 04-82.

Presidency changed thirty-six times. The average tenure for a Mexican President was less than eight months. The turbulent government was unable to create Indian policy. As a result, the only national level policy regarding Indians was Iturbide's legacy: the equality of all people born in Mexico. This decree had been put into the 1824 Constitution, was approved by the Church, and remained in effect throughout the Apache insurgency. The equality policy placed the Government in the position of being unable to create effective policies towards Indian populations. The policy precluded consolidation, movement, or even assimilation. In the end, the lack of government stability and the overly idealistic equality policy meant the absence of realistic policy towards the Apaches.

Compounding the lack of national policy, the Mexican government was incapable of maintaining the *presidio* system, and of manning and equipping a frontier Army. The weakening of the *presidio* system stemmed from the poor economy and the need to keep troops close to Mexico City to ward off coups. Often, the *presidios* that had once held the Spanish 'flying columns' that had effectively pacified the Apaches were abandoned. Or, as in the case of the Santa Fe Presidio in 1828, the troops were so ill equipped and under manned, that protecting the *presidio* itself was difficult.⁷⁶ New trade from American settlers also shifted the balance of power to the Apaches, who were often better armed than the Mexican troops. Americans set up illegal trading posts along the frontiers, most notably along the Red River, and created a market for stolen Mexican goods.

The inability of the Mexican government to feed or suppress the Apaches led to a resurgence of raiding, which resulted in the usual cycle of reciprocal violence. Provinces organized militias to defend towns and punish the raiders. Unfortunately, the Apache raiders were not the only insurgent Indians troubling Mexico. The Yaquis, Navajo, and Comanche also raided Mexico. Frontier Mexico fell under control of the Apaches. In 1846, a member of the Chihuahua

⁷⁶ Ibid., 111.

legislature stated of the Apaches that “we travel the road at their whim, we cultivate the land where and in the amount that they wish; we use sparingly things they have left to us.”⁷⁷ In modern day Arizona, which was then a part of New Mexico, the population dwindled from over 1,000 Hispanics in 1821, to only a handful by the mid 1830s. Mexico lost an estimated 5,000 citizens killed by Apaches between 1820 and 1835.⁷⁸ In 1831, the Mexican government evacuated over 100 towns, and Apache bands threatened the Sonora capital of Arispe with annihilation.⁷⁹

In response to the lack of a national policy or military assistance, the Sonora Governor began paying for Apache scalps in 1835, regardless of age or sex, in what amounted to a policy of genocide against Apaches. The State of Chihuahua also started a similar bounty system. Bounty hunters from America, Mexico, and hostile Indian tribes gathered to hunt the Apache. Two American bounty hunters, James Johnson and James Kirker, organized successful groups that hunted the Apaches from 1838 through 1845.⁸⁰ In 1849, bounty hunters in the two Mexico States collected 17,896 pesos for Apache scalps, at the common rate of 200 pesos per scalp. The Apache bands responded by increasing levels of violence in Mexico, including the reciprocal taking of scalps, and captives.

The lack of determination and means to combat the Apaches plagued the Mexican Government until the Mexican-American War brought the US into conflict against the Apaches. Between the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, and the Gadsden Purchase of 1854, Mexico lost over half of its territory to America. The overwhelming problems of defending its frontier were drastically reduced, and the Mexican Government was able to focus more on the Yaquis Indians, an insurgency that lasted well into the twentieth

⁷⁷ Ibid., 87.

⁷⁸ Michael Lieder, and Jake Page, *Wild Justice, The People of Geronimo vs the United States* (New York, NY: Random House, 1997) 9.

⁷⁹ Stout, 7; Lieder, 10.

⁸⁰ Stout, 12.

century. The Hidalgo Treaty also stipulated that the US would stop Apache raiding into Mexico, perhaps the most important provision. Nevertheless, the weakness of the new Mexican frontier, as well as the rage inspired by the bounty system, ensured the continuance of Apache raiding into Mexico through the 1880s. The lack of coordination between Mexico and the US further compounded the Apache problem, as fear of American expansion also inhibited border-crossing agreements between the nations until the 1870s.

CHAPTER 4

THE THIRD INSURGENCY

After the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States needed only four years to enact a treaty with a band of Apaches, the Mimbres band of the Chiricahuas. Because of the Apaches' unflinching hatred of Mexico, and the lack of American settlers in the new territories, a brief honeymoon of sorts existed between the Apache tribes and the Americans. The Bascom Affair in 1861 contributed to ending this honeymoon, however, and twenty-five years of near continuous Apache insurgencies wreaked havoc upon New Mexico and Arizona citizens. The history of two Apache tribes, the Chiricahua and Western Apaches provide depth for an analysis of the US government's overall Apache strategy, without detailing the broader history of all Apache tribes and bands. Nevertheless, an understanding of US Indian policy, and the frontier US Army, is essential prior to analyzing the final Apache insurgencies.

US Indian Policy

From first contact, European settlers perceived indigenous people as inferior, and based policies for their interaction on perceived subhuman aspects. The US Declaration of Independence, after acknowledging the universal equality of man, described the indigenous population as "merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions."⁸¹ Like their predecessors, Americans grouped the diverse indigenous peoples that populated North America under the common and derisive term "Indian."⁸² From inception, consequently, US Indian policies formed from the principle that Indians should either be destroyed outright, culturally assimilated, or removed from the path of American progress.

⁸¹ John Hancock, et al, *The Declaration of the Thirteen United States of America* [on-line], accessed 23 January 2005); available from <http://www.archives.gov>.

⁸² Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars, The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (Bloomington, In: Indiana University Press, 1973) 3.

The early US policy of ‘removal’ displaced Indian tribes west of the Mississippi River. A strong advocate of US expansion, Thomas Jefferson espoused the idea of Indian removal in a letter to Governor William Harrison of the Indiana Territory, writing “should any tribe be foolhardy enough to take up the hatchet at any time, the seizing the whole country of that tribe, and driving them across the Mississippi, as the only condition of peace, would be an example to others, and a furtherance of our final consolidation.”⁸³ The Indian Removal Act of 1830 authorized President Andrew Jackson to do just that. From 1830 to 1850, US treaties with Eastern Indian tribes traded 32 million acres west of the Mississippi River for 100 million acres east of it, and promised annuities of 68 million dollars.⁸⁴

The ‘permanent’ Indian frontier created by the removal policy did not last, however, as the American population rushed west with the promise of land and wealth. In 1852, the great orator and congressman, Stephen A. Douglas, exhorted Americans to expand into the “Great West,” because “increase is the law of our existence and of our safety” and is in the noble cause of “progress, humanity, and civilization.”⁸⁵ The migration of three and a half million settlers from 1860 through 1880 completely overwhelmed the permanent frontier, and created the need for the Indian reservation system.⁸⁶

Unlike the Indian Removal Act of 1830, the policy of restricting Indian tribes to specified reservations evolved, and was not directly approved by Congress. Indian Commissioners, including Luke Lea (1850-1853) and George Manypenny (1853-1857), strongly advocated the reservation policy and authorized agents to make treaties with Indian tribes to effect the removal of each tribe to “a permanent home, a country adapted to agriculture, of limited extent and well

⁸³ Francis P. Prucha, ed. *Documents of the United States Indian Policy*, 2nd Edn. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994) 23.

⁸⁴ Robert M. Utley, *The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), 37.

⁸⁵ John G. Clark, ed. *The Frontier Challenge, Responses to the Trans-Mississippi West* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1971) 121.

⁸⁶ Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 2.

defined boundaries...within which all should be compelled constantly to remain.”⁸⁷ The subsequent treaties, of which there were 52 from 1853 to 1857, acquired 174 million acres of land from Indians west of the Mississippi, and set defined boundaries for most tribes. The understood intent of the policy was officially articulated in 1871 when Commissioner Francis Walker stated that “Indians should be made as comfortable on, and uncomfortable off, their reservation as it is in the power of the government to make them.”⁸⁸

The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834 also regulated contact between Indians and settlers. In one of the few legislative acts that supported Indian rights, the purpose of the Trade and Intercourse Act was to “preserve peace on the frontiers.”⁸⁹ The legislation stipulated that only licensed US citizens could trade with Indians, and that trading alcohol was forbidden. Further, the Act prohibited the acquisition of Indian land by any person except under authority of the US government. It also authorized agents of the Department of Indian Affairs to conduct law enforcement on Indian land with regard to Indians, including the use of the Army if needed. Significantly, though, the laws of the US applied only to crimes between US citizens and Indians, not to crimes between Indians. And, unlike the beneficial trade discounts given to the Apaches by Spain in the late 1700s, private trade houses made exorbitant profits at the expense of the Indian. By 1865, the Trade and Intercourse Act, which was written prior to Indian Removal, was sorely outdated and poorly enforced.

The transfer of the BIA to the Department of the Interior in 1849 also created huge difficulties by 1865. Congress had removed the BIA from the War Department because of the tranquility of Indian relations in 1849. Jefferson’s Indian removal policy had been effective in creating space between settlers and Indians because the great western migration had not started by 1849. By 1865, however, many Indian tribes were in direct conflict with the US government as

⁸⁷ Ibid., 82.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Prucha, 64.

the great wave of settlers reached all parts of present-day America. Secretary of War Schofield argued to Congress on November 20, 1868 that the BIA should be transferred back to the War Department “for the sake of economy to the government, for the sake of more efficient protection to the frontier settlements, and for the sake of justice to the Indians.”⁹⁰ Three days later, Indian Commissioner Nathaniel Taylor responded to Schofield’s arguments in Congress, stating within a long litany of reasons that the Army was incapable of managing Indian affairs because it had failed for seventeen years before the transfer, and by its nature, would fail again. This tone was standard for the difficult relationship between the War Department and BIA throughout the Indian Wars.

In 1865, with the Civil War drawing to a close, Congress commissioned a committee to investigate the “condition of the Indian tribes and their treatment by civil and military authorities.”⁹¹ The resultant Doolittle Commission returned to Congress in January 1867 and reported that a flawed Indian policy and widespread corruption was causing depopulation of Indian tribes. Doolittle attributed the cause of Indian uprisings and their subsequent decline to “the aggressions of lawless white men, always to be found upon the frontier, or boundary line between savage and civilized life.”⁹² Doolittle recommended that the BIA remain in the Department of Interior, but that Congress create an independent Board of Inspection to curb corruption.

Instead, Congress created an Indian Peace Commission in July 1867 to resolve the Indian Wars by making treaties and selecting reservations. After sending representatives across the nation to assess the state of Indian conditions, the Peace Commission delivered a scathing report to Congress in January 1868. The Peace Commission’s report stated flatly that the real US Indian

⁹⁰ Prucha, 118.

⁹¹ William A. Keleher, *Turmoil in New Mexico, 1846-1868* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982) 352.

⁹² Prucha, 103.

policy, “perverted in execution,” was aimed simply at “how best to get (Indian) land.”⁹³ The commission attributed the perversion in Indian policy to three overwhelming problems. The first problem was that “corrupt” agents of the Indian service “have pocketed the funds appropriated by the government and driven the Indian to starvation.”⁹⁴ This problem was considered, without doubt, to have caused the recent Plains Indian Wars. Next, the inability to coordinate the actions of the Department of War, the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and State and Territory Governors caused divided responsibility, inefficiency, and corruption. And finally, the Peace Commission argued that the lack of humanity and respect displayed by the frontier settler ultimately caused their inability to coexist with the Indian.

Although the Peace Commission recommended solutions to the ‘perverted’ Indian policy, the resultant “Peace Policy” reforms were ineffectual. In response to the allegation of corruption, President Grant authorized church nominations of Indian agents, in what became known as the Quaker Policy.⁹⁵ By 1872, seventy-three Indian agents were serving from appointment by the principal religious denominations. However, these agents proved just as corrupt as ever, if not more so.⁹⁶ The religiously appointed Indian agents brought an agenda to their agencies, which was usually not compatible with the Indian culture, nor conducive to cooperation with the US Army.

In response to the issue of divided responsibility, inefficiency, and corruption caused by the lack of centralized control over Indian policy, Grant commissioned a Board of Indian Commissioners. The intent of the Board, as first articulated by Doolittle and echoed by Grant, was that it would govern all agencies involved in Indian affairs, and ensure a unified effort. The Board soon found, however, that it had little actual power. In trying to gain authority, the Board drove honest Indian Commissioners from office, and never moved beyond an advisory role to the

⁹³ Ibid, 106.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Utley, *The Indian Frontier*, 132.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 155.

separate departments.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, Board Commissioners such as Vince Colyer would occasionally be empowered by the President to make autonomous decisions on Indian policy, which unfortunately led to an even less unified effort across the US government.

The reforms of the peace policy were ineffectual, at best, and harmful in many instances. Most importantly, no real reforms were created that impacted the social or economic development of Indians on the reservations. In 1865, the average reservation staff consisted of only a dozen members. This staff usually included laborers, clerks, a blacksmith, a teacher or two, and possibly agriculture instructors. The agent was usually not an administrator, but was rather selected by his denomination for his missionary abilities. Often the agent's staff was his family, or friends from his denomination. At best, the agent was hard working but understaffed. At worst, he was corrupt and unscrupulous. The tension between the BIA and the War Department also strained the agents' relationship with the Army. Army officers, in turn, often usurped the power of the agent because they held the only significant power over the Indians, military might. The Army also managed the distribution system that provided sustenance to reservation Indians.

The Frontier Army

In addition to the government's inability to coordinate effective national Indian policy, other factors conspired to hamper creation of an Army strategy on the frontier. Most importantly, the division of functions between the Commanding General and the Secretary of War barred formulation of a strategy.⁹⁸ War Department regulations gave the Commanding General operational command of the army, while the Secretary of War retained political, administrative, and fiscal control. Because each office issued its own directives, two equally strong strategy makers vied for control of the Army. The strategy that the Army most closely followed became dependent upon the strength of the relationship between the President and the Secretary of War

⁹⁷ Ibid., 154.

⁹⁸ Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988) 21; Utley, *Frontier Regular*, 29.

vice the Commanding General. The location of army frontier posts was a common dispute that illustrates the grave faults of strategy making in this command structure. As frontier posts meant increased trade and safety for settlers, the decision to locate or move a post became as much political as military, and pitted the politically appointed Secretary of War against the Commanding General.

The separation of command from staff extended into the Army structure as well, which further compounded the difficulties in creating Army strategy. The War Department's ten Staff Bureaus, encompassing quartermaster, engineer, legal, medical, signal, ordnance and other functions, did not answer to the commanding general, but instead to the Secretary of War. Each of the ten distinct Bureaus was independent of the others, and had long standing processes that mitigated control even by the Secretary. Moreover, Army staff bureaus were not mandated to support commanders. A commander could only request support from his parallel staff officer. This shortcoming unduly complicated the ability to make long-standing strategies, as any one of a number of decision makers could easily undo the means to the strategy. Further, the separation of staff and command officers created resentment within the officer corps, and led to bitter clashes between high-ranking decision makers.

The organization of the frontier Army also made a coherent Indian strategy more difficult. The frontier was organized into the Division of the Pacific and the Division of the Missouri (see Figure 7 in Appendix A for a map of Army Departments and Divisions in 1870). These divisions were further broken into departments. Unfortunately, the Army could not have established departments corresponding to the complexity of 125 different groups of Indians west of the Mississippi River. Instead, departments were organized along territorial lines.⁹⁹ Consequently, in the case of the Apaches, a unified strategy became difficult as it involved the consensus of commanders of two divisions, and three departments. The commander of the

⁹⁹ Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 4.

Division of the Missouri kept headquarters in Chicago, while the commander of the Division of the Pacific headquartered in San Francisco. Apache tribes also ventured into Texas, also in a different Department, and Mexico, which created the need for the State Department's involvement. Also complicating strategy for the Apache tribes was the sheer immensity of New Mexico and Arizona compared to the numbers of troops that could be allocated to those states. In 1874, for instance, the Division of the Missouri had one soldier per one hundred square miles.¹⁰⁰

Consequently, Army strategy regarding Indians was reactive during the late nineteenth hundreds, and determined most often by department commanders with regard to their unique short-term situation. Department commanders, such as Brigadier General (BG) George Crook, devised their own strategies in accordance with ambiguous Indian policy, and tried to coordinate with adjacent department commanders and Indian agents in their area. However, department commanders had to rely on staff structures outside of their chain of command for support, and to contend with mostly corrupt Indian agents that had the authority to prohibit military activities on their reservations. Compounding the problems of strategy, the Army had very little doctrine to guide its operations.

Frontier Army Doctrine circa 1870

Personal experiences in the Civil War, Mexican-American War, and previous Indian Wars formed the basis of US Army doctrine, supplemented by West Point instruction and Army manuals.¹⁰¹ As the Army did not have a professional officer education system during the Apache Wars, officers at frontier post 'lyceums' educated junior officers assigned to the frontier using their experiences in recent wars. More importantly, officers were accompanied during campaigns by experienced scouts, of both European and Indian descent. These scouts knew the terrain, enemy, and proven tactics, and advised the officers accordingly. For example, Al Sieber, chief of

¹⁰⁰ Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1997) 59.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 67.

scouts for George Crook during his major Apache campaigns in Arizona and New Mexico, provided expertise based on his civil war experience, knowledge of Arizona, and countless Indian engagements.¹⁰² Sieber not only provided invaluable experience, but he also commanded the Indian scouts, who provided insight into the distinct cultures and behaviors of specific Apache bands. The experience of the scouts was indispensable in countering the relative inexperience of many frontier officers.

The frontier officer would also most likely have received a West Point education, including the teachings of Dennis Mahan. Mahan gave lectures to cadets at the Academy that focused on the proven techniques of frontier Indian warfare. He advocated the destruction of the social and economic resources of the Indians, thereby compelling their defeat. The experiences of the Civil War served to confirm this total-war mentality. Tempering this instruction, cadets were also given law and ethics instruction that advocated the proper treatment of prisoners, and noncombatants. Mahan also provided instruction on conventional tactics that would serve as a basis for modification under unconventional circumstances, such as the need for continual security and reconnaissance.¹⁰³

Although several War Department publications addressed tactics during the Indian Wars, none established effective counterinsurgency doctrine, or addressed specific tactics regarding Indian adversaries. Published in multiple versions during the 1860s and 1870s, Brigadier General Philip St. George Cooke's *Cavalry Tactics* manuals provided instruction techniques for cavalry troopers, platoons, troops, and squadrons.¹⁰⁴ These instructions focused on individual drills while mounted and dismounted, and then built into collective drills in platoon and higher formations. Emory Upton's series of *Infantry Tactics for Double and Single Rank Adapted to American*

¹⁰² Dan L. Thrapp, *Al Sieber, Chief of Scouts* (Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964) 178.

¹⁰³ Wooster, 56; Birtle, 60.

¹⁰⁴ War Department, *Cavalry Tactics in Three Parts: School of the trooper, of the platoon, of the Squadron, and the evolutions of a Regiment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1864).

Topography and Improved Firearms guided infantry soldiers and formations in the same manner. Neither series of manuals addressed the formations or tactics necessary to operate against Indian adversaries. In 1872, Cooke added a four-page section entitled *Special Service of Cavalry in the West*, which covered the selection of camps in desert environments, camping without water, grazing at night, and escorting convoys. In the 1872 preface, Cooke wrote that he had “freely chosen what (he) judged best in the systems of France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England” when writing the manual.¹⁰⁵ Apparently, these systems did not account for North American indigenous environments and Indian tribes. More notable is the absolute absence of any doctrine pertaining to the establishment of military rule over a reservation, or pertaining to stability operations, despite the ongoing experiences of doing these exact operations during southern reconstruction.

The War Department did publish one influential manual that assisted troopers during the Apache insurgencies, *The Prairie Traveler*, by CPT Randolph Barnes Marcy. In *The Prairie Traveler*, Marcy covered essential field craft specific to operations on the frontier, such as fording rivers, packing mules, and jerking meat. Marcy also gave advice on how to contact and communicate with specific Indian tribes. He also drew comparisons from Turkey’s experiences in Algeria to the Army’s situation on the frontier. On warfare with the Indians, Marcy was critical of conventional tactics:

“To act against an enemy who is here to-day and there to-morrow; who at one time stampedes a herd of mules upon the head waters of the Arkansas, and when next heard from is in the very heart of the populated districts of Mexico, laying waste haciendas, and carrying devastation, rapine, and murder in his steps; who is every where without being any where; who assembles at the moment of combat, and vanishes whenever fortune turns against him; who leaves his women and children far distant from the theater of hostilities, and has neither towns or magazines to defend, nor lines of retreat to cover; who derives his commissariat from the country he operates in, and is not encumbered with baggage wagons or pack-trains; who comes into action only when it suits his purposes, and never without the advantage of numbers or position-with such an enemy

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., ii.

the strategic science of civilized nations loses much of its importance, and finds but rarely, and only in peculiar localities, an opportunity to be put in practice.”¹⁰⁶

Like Mahan, Marcy advocated attacking Indians in their camps and destroying their economic resources. He also detailed methods for tracking and then attacking Indians. Thorough in every aspect, *The Prairie Traveler* not only became an essential item during the Apache campaigns, but also for settlers crossing the continent to California or Oregon during the late 1800s.

Guided by poor Indian policy, without a consistent strategy or doctrine, and in conflict with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Army was ill prepared to conduct missions on the frontier. Nevertheless, the Army was scattered throughout the west and tasked with providing security. The Apaches would prove an implacable foe given the self-imposed complications of the US government. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the Apaches Wars was never in doubt, as 1LT James S. Pettit claimed in 1886, due to the “zealous and ambitious” officers and “willing and courageous” soldiers.¹⁰⁷ More appropriately, however, the issue was never in doubt because of the unstoppable flood of settlers that overwhelmed Apacheria. The real issue on the frontier was the ability of the Army to keep security on the frontier between the Apaches and the new residents of Apacheria, and the ability of the BIA to reform Apache culture to allow their assimilation into America.

The Chiricahua Apaches

As Apache tribes cannot truly be lumped together into an Apache nation, neither can Apache insurgencies truly be grouped together into a homogenous insurgency. The separate, unrelated insurgencies of the Chiricahua vice Western Apaches offer a contrast in constabulary operations. The US effectively settled Western Apaches into compliance with US policy, including the reservation system, because constabulary principles were followed, if only by

¹⁰⁶ Randolph B. Marcy, *The Prairie Traveler, A Handbook for Overland Expeditions* (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1859) 45.

¹⁰⁷ James S. Pettit, “Apache Campaign Notes,” in *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*, Vol. 7, (New York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1886) 335.

chance. The Western Apache's compliance was so complete that, after subjugation, they provided indispensable assistance to the US Army in countering the Chiricahua insurgencies. In contrast, the Chiricahua Apaches continued an insurgency for over twenty-five years against US rule, caused mainly by negligent US policy, and the lack of security provided by the US Government. Taken together, the constabulary operations offer an insight into the validity of operating within theoretical constabulary principles.

The official history of conflict between the Chiricahua Apaches and the US started with Brigadier General Stephen W. Kearney's bloodless seizure of New Mexico in August 1846.¹⁰⁸ Upon reaching Santa Fe, Kearney declared New Mexico as a territory of the United States of America. Kearney also declared himself the first Governor of New Mexico. He quickly learned that the primary concern of the populace was the government's obligation to protect the citizens from Indians.¹⁰⁹ Consequently, when Kearney moved on to secure California with the Army of the West, he left the new territory under the protection of a regiment of Missouri Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Alexander Doniphan. Although Colonel Doniphan could defend against the slight Mexican response to the invasion, he could not possibly defend the huge territory against an estimated 40,000 hostile Indians, including Navajo, Comanche, and Apaches.¹¹⁰ Doniphan chose to operate against the Navajo first, and so the Apaches were left at liberty to raid in Mexico and New Mexico.

In response to New Mexico Governor James C. Calhoun's pleas for support in response to "murders after murders, depredations after depredations, and innumerable other evils to the people," the Army sought out the Apaches in order to make peace.¹¹¹ In 1852, Colonel E.V. Sumner, US Army, and John Greiner, Indian Agent for the Territory of New Mexico, met with

¹⁰⁸ Ralph E. Twitchell, *The History of the Military Occupation of the Territory of New Mexico from 1846 to 1851 by the Government of the United States* (Chicago, IL: Rio Grande Press, 1963) 80.

¹⁰⁹ Keleher, 22.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 71.

¹¹¹ Dan L. Thrapp, *Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches* (Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974) 27.

Chiricahua Apache chiefs to arrange a treaty. Seven Apache chiefs representing “the Apache Nation of Indians,” whom in reality only represented a few bands of the Chiricahua Apaches, signed the first US-Apache treaty.¹¹² The treaty provided trading houses to the Chiricahuas, assistance in cultivation, and, most importantly, food allowances. As a result of the benefits provided to the Chiricahuas, the treaty significantly reduced Apache conflicts with US settlers.

Because the treaty of 1852 did not allocate reservations to the Chiricahuas, but rather indirectly tied the Chiricahuas to specific areas by the location of forts that distributed food allotments, settlers began to claim Chiricahua lands. The expanding population in the new American territory inevitably caused conflict with the Chiricahuas. Land was the root of the problem. As with the earlier Spanish and Mexican Apache insurgencies, cultural intolerance escalated minor acts of theft and raiding into violent counteractions, which spiraled into widespread violence.¹¹³

The Bascom affair of 1861 was the landmark event that pushed Chiricahua bands into insurgency against the United States. John Ward, a rancher in Sonoita Valley, asked Lieutenant George N. Bascom, commanding an infantry company from Ft Buchanan, to recover cattle and a young boy supposedly kidnapped by Chiricahuas.¹¹⁴ Bascom set up a meeting with Cochise, leader of the accused Central Chiricahuas, and demanded the return of the boy and stock. Although Cochise returned the stock, he claimed to not have the boy, prompting Lt Bascom to order his arrest. Cutting through the side of a tent, Cochise escaped, but a group of his band was captured. In response, Cochise captured civilian hostages from the Overland Line, a well-used wagon trail. After abortive negotiations, Bascom hung the Chiricahua captives, and Cochise did likewise with his civilian captives. Compounding the mistakes of Bascom, US Army and New

¹¹² Charles Kappler, ed., *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties*, vol 2, treaties, (Washington DC, Government Printing Office, 1904, accessed 14 December 2004); available from <http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/treaties/apa0598.htm>; internet.

¹¹³ Thrapp, *Victorio*, 69.

¹¹⁴ Stout, 24.

Mexico volunteer forces reacted indiscriminately against all Apaches, Chiricahua and others; consequently, the insurgency expanded throughout the territory of New Mexico, including modern-day Arizona.

The Civil War, followed by southern reconstruction, and numerous concurrent Indian revolts put the Chiricahua insurgency low on the nation's priority list in the 1860s. In July 1861, Confederate forces under Brigadier General Henry Sibley temporarily drove Union forces from New Mexico. The Overland Line was abandoned, and thriving mines, such as those at Pinos Altos, were deserted.¹¹⁵ Upon recovering the territory in May 1862, it was discovered that "the invasion of (the) Territory by the Texans had a most unfortunate effect upon some of the Indian tribes" in the territory.¹¹⁶ The sudden and dramatic reduction in military forces had further encouraged Navajo and Comanche insurgencies, and facilitated the ongoing Chiricahua insurgencies. The widespread loss of protection to settlers eventually caused wholesale abandonment of towns and ranches in southern New Mexico. Federal presence was finally reestablished in July 1862 by the California Column, which eventually drove Confederate Forces from New Mexico, but the damage to US legitimacy had been done.

The long-standing Superintendent of Indian Affairs for New Mexico, Dr. Michael Steck, estimated that continuing to fight the Chiricahuas would require three million dollars annually, while feeding them would take one-twentieth of that.¹¹⁷ Steck argued that a reservation system was necessary because "the rich gold fields and other mineral wealth (of New Mexico) cannot otherwise than draw a vast population, before which the buffalo, deer and elk will disappear, and for the support of which every available acre must necessarily be appropriated."¹¹⁸ The "irresistible conclusion" of the argument was "that we must either locate and feed these wild

¹¹⁵ Thrapp, *Victorio*, 73.

¹¹⁶ Keleher, 280.

¹¹⁷ Thrapp, *Victorio*, 86.

¹¹⁸ Stout, 413.

tribes, or hunt them in their fastnesses until they are exterminated.”¹¹⁹ Although Steck appealed to monetary reasons for establishment of reservations in New Mexico, he also reasoned that the alternative would cause the extermination of the Apaches, a high moral cost.

Brigadier General James Carleton, who had arrived in New Mexico in command of the 1800-man California Column, also recommended forcing Indian bands onto reservations. Acting under martial law, because of the fear of further Confederate invasions, Carleton formed the first official reservation in New Mexico at Bosque Redondo in 1864 (see Figure 5 in Appendix A for a map of New Mexico, 1862-1890). Taking the field, Carleton used multiple columns to force Chiricahua Apaches to continually abandon their *rancherias*, akin to temporary villages, and began to slowly weaken the Chiricahua ability to subsist without assistance. The formation of Fort Stanton at Bosque Redondo allowed Apache bands to settle and draw food allotments. The combination of Carleton’s persistent military actions, and Steck’s food allotments, finally induced some bands of Navajos, Mescaleros, and Chiricahuas to settle at Bosque Redondo. Cochise’s Central Chiricahua band, however, did not settle at Bosque Redondo, and continued to fight throughout the 1860s.

The lack of social and economic development caused the reservation at Bosque Redondo to fail, and its slow dissolution from 1865-1868 put Chiricahua bands back into conflict with the US Army. Foremost, placing Navajo and Apache bands on the same reservation created innumerable difficulties. The tribes continually destroyed or raided the others’ property, and committed crimes to which there was no common law. The Indian Agent at Bosque Redondo, Lorenzo Labadie, highlighted the problems between the tribes:

“During the summer many difficulties have arisen between the two tribes—the Apaches in defense of their fields and gardens, and the Navajoes in endeavoring to destroy them. The commander of the post made use of every means to prevent these abuses, but without effect. They fought; Navajoes were confined in the guard house; shots were sometimes

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 414.

fired at them by the guard, but all could not prevent them from stealing from the Apaches; in fact, their fields were, in some cases, completely destroyed.”¹²⁰

Further, Indian agents and Army officers proved corrupt; they continually overcharged the Government for food and supplies, and underfed their wards. Lack of cooperation also hindered programs that may have improved the quality of life on the reservation. For instance, Indian agents favored letting hunting parties off of the reservation, while Army commanders forbade it. Consequently, game on the reservation was completely exhausted, and the Indians were given no recourse but to break rules in order to provide subsistence beyond the meager agency rations. Disease, strife, and starvation, led to wholesale abandonment of the reservation.

The failure of Bosque Redondo led to significant problems, because settlers had used the period to settle on Chiricahua lands in great numbers. At Pinos Altos, in the heart of Chiricahua lands, prospectors discovered six minerals, including gold. This discovery, as well as the western exodus caused by the end of the civil war, increased the population of the mining community at Pinos Altos exponentially. From October 1866 to June 1867, the population increased from 60 to over 800.¹²¹ Subsequent years brought an even heavier population flow to New Mexico. The Chiricahuas returned from Bosque Redondo to territorial lands that were covered by settlers. The need for reservations had increased exponentially as Bosque Redondo was failing.

The next Chiricahua reservation was formed in 1870 at Canada Alamosa. Although Cochise’s Chiricahuas and other bands still remained at war, the Mimbres band of Chiricahuas, led by Victorio, voluntarily settled at Canada Alamosa. The reservation was short lived because of the consequences of the ‘Camp Grant Massacre’. In 1871, a group of 148 settlers from Tucson, Arizona, killed 100 Western Apaches, mainly women and children, in the ‘Camp Grant Massacre.’¹²² The Arivaipa band of Western Apaches had been waiting at Camp Grant for

¹²⁰ C.L. Sonnichsen, *The Mescalero Apaches* (Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958) 107.

¹²¹ Kelleher, 348.

¹²² Lockwood, 179.

approval from Washington on whether they could settle on a reservation. While waiting, Tucson citizens accused the Apaches of depredations while under protection of the Army. The massacre created an outcry in the East, and spurred Indian Policy reform.

In response to the Camp Grant Massacre, Vincent Colyer of the Indian Peace Commission was sent to New Mexico and Arizona to determine a new course for Apache policy.¹²³ Colyer decided that the cost of buying out 300 settlers living in the area of Canada Alamosa made the fledgling reservation too expensive, so he decided to move the reservation to Tularosa. The Mimbres, who had started to create irrigation systems and homes at Canada Alamosa, objected to the move. Nevertheless, the reservation was closed, crops were abandoned, and the Mimbres forced to begin anew at Tularosa.

Less than a year later, General Oliver Otis Howard, moved the Mimbres again. Sent by the Board of Indian Commissioners to make peace with Cochise, Howard remarkably made it through to Cochise's stronghold. Cochise was granted a reservation in Southern Arizona for the Central Chiricahuas.¹²⁴ Howard also moved the Mimbres, at their suggestion, to a new reservation at Ojo Caliente, just north of the old Canada Alamosa Reservation. Further, Howard also stipulated the establishment of separate Mescalero and Navajo reservations in New Mexico.

Unfortunately, the locations of the Chiricahua reservations were not politically acceptable. Howard's honest attempt to peacefully settle the Chiricahuas was not aligned with Federal Indian policy. The Ojo Caliente Reservation was in the densely settled, and highly coveted, Canada Alamosa Valley, near residents who feared and hated Apaches. The Dragoon Mountains in the Chiricahua reservation also had minerals deposits that miners demanded. Additionally, the Chiricahua Reservation was located on the Mexico border, and Mexican

¹²³ Edwin R. Sweeney, ed., *Making Peace with Cochise, the 1872 Journal of Captain Joseph Alton Sladen* (Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997) 13.

¹²⁴ Sweeney, 94.

authorities in Sonora rightfully accused the Apaches of using the reservation as a sanctuary for raiding.

Consequently, decision makers in Washington decided to consolidate the Chiricahuas with the Western Apaches at the San Carlos Agency in the new Arizona Territory. From Washington, it may have seemed that Apaches were all alike, but the Chiricahuas were not related to Western Apaches except in language and culture. Further, Western Apaches filled to capacity the San Carlos reservation, leaving very little area or resources for the Chiricahuas. Nevertheless, Cochise's band, now led by Geronimo because of Cochise's death, was moved to San Carlos in 1876. Victorio's Mimbres at Ojo Caliente were next. Forced to move to San Carlos in 1877, Victorio and his band of Mimbres soon departed the miserable conditions at San Carlos and took refuge in the Dragoon Mountains. Told once more that they could settle at Ojo Caliente, Victorio moved his band back to the old reservation. Inexplicably, in August 1879, the 9th Cavalry arrived at Ojo Caliente to guide Victorio's band back to San Carlos. Victorio had finally had enough; the 'Victorio War' had started.

From 1879 through 1886, the US Army fought almost continuously against Chiricahua bands under Victorio and then Geronimo. After fleeing the consolidated reservation system, Victorio established a stronghold in the northern mountains of Chihuahua, the Sierra Madres, and raided in New Mexico, Arizona, and Chihuahua. Despite employing several cavalry regiments against Victorio, most notably the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments, Victorio's band of less than 200 eluded capture by the US Army and harassed civilian populations for over fourteen months. Finally, crossing agreements were made between Mexico and the US, and Victorio was denied sanctuary. Mexico also organized forces to fight Victorio. In October 1880, Victorio was cornered by a combined US-Mexico effort, and his band of Mimbres Chiricahuas was destroyed by Colonel Joaquin Terrazas' 400-man volunteer force, at Tres Castillas.¹²⁵ His campaign had

¹²⁵ Thrapp, *Victorio*, 297.

cost several hundred lives and millions of dollars in damage. Further, smaller bands of Mimbres remained active in the region for the next two years, raiding at low levels and keeping the frontier on edge.

The Central Chiricahuas, which had moved from their promised reservation in the Dragoon Mountains to San Carlos peacefully in 1876, rebelled in September 1881 mainly because of fraud on the reservation. Subsequent to the outbreak, a Federal Grand Jury found Indian Agent J.C. Tiffany “in open violation of law and in defiance of public justice.”¹²⁶ Corruption had caused discontent on the reservation, which a medicine man stirred into revolt, claiming that several old chiefs were returning to drive the white man from Apache lands. The Chiricahua bands, now amalgamated due to the rapid decline in their numbers, also took to Mexico. In September 1882, Brigadier General George Crook, an experienced Indian fighter with experience against the Sioux and Apache Indians, reported to New Mexico to counter the insurgency.

Crook’s resultant ‘Sierra Madre’ campaign was relatively efficient for many reasons. First, Crook was familiar with the territory, and forces. He recalled Al Sieber as his chief of scouts, and Tom Moore, as his pack train leader. He was also able to use Apache scouts effectively throughout the campaign. Second, the Victorio War had led to ongoing crossing agreements with Mexico in the pursuit of hostile Indians. These agreements allowed Crook to make several train trips to Mexico prior to the campaign to discuss strategy with counterparts. And finally, the reservation at San Carlos was placed under military command, so Crook could coordinate all aspects of the campaign. So empowered, Crook personally led 193 Apache scouts, one cavalry troop of 42 troopers and 2 officers, and a pack train of 350 mules into Mexico and tracked down Geronimo’s 325 Chiricahuas and made peace bloodlessly.¹²⁷ Once back on the

¹²⁶ George Crook, *General George Crook, His Autobiography* (Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946) 243.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 248.

reservation, Crook ensured security by instituting reforms that addressed the Chiricahua grievances.

In 1885, the lack of social development for the Chiricahuas again created discontent on the San Carlos reservation. Geronimo and his Chiricahuas yet again departed the reservation for Mexico, committing depredations along the way. General Crook used the same techniques to end the final Apache insurgency. Finally arranging a meeting with Geronimo in Mexico, Crook convinced him to surrender. Unfortunately, Geronimo was deceived on the way back to San Carlos by a liquor trader, and again fled to Mexico. Crook was dismissed and General Nelson Miles was assigned to capture Geronimo. Miles ordered all Chiricahuas at San Carlos, including loyal scouts, to be sent to a prison camp at Fort Marion, Florida. Learning of the fate of his family and band, Geronimo surrendered at Skeleton Canyon on September 3, 1886, and began the long trek into captivity in Florida.¹²⁸ So ended the last Apache insurgency that had bested Spanish, Mexican, and American forces for over two centuries.

The Western Apaches

In contrast to the Chiricahuas, the Western Apaches were settled fairly effectively. Prior to the Civil War, present-day Arizona had only two Army forts, Fort Buchanan and Fort Breckinridge. Both forts were abandoned after the Bascom Affair, and during the Confederate invasion of New Mexico. In 1862, Carleton sent forces back into Arizona, established Fort Bowie, and battled insurgent bands operating throughout New Mexico, which still included Arizona.¹²⁹ After the civil war, numerous small forts were organized in the new Arizona Territory to protect fledgling settlements. In 1865, the Army founded Camp Goodwin and began distributing food to Western Apache bands that had started to sue for peace in small bands. At

¹²⁸ Peter Aleshire, *The Fox and the Whirlwind, General George Crook and Geronimo, A Paired Biography* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2000) 300; Thrapp, *Victorio*, 366.

¹²⁹ Lockwood, 131.

times, the ad hoc reservation that sprung up near Camp Goodwin held up to 900 Western Apaches.

Nevertheless, misguided Army strategy during the remainder of the 1860s caused poor protection of settlers and the Western Apaches. According to Assistant-Inspector Colonel Roger Jones, who reported to General H.W. Halleck, Commander of the Division of the Pacific, the Army in Arizona was ineffectual for four reasons.¹³⁰ First, the Army was spread out across Arizona in company sized forts and garrisons, primarily for the protection of small settlements. These small detachments not only failed to protect settlers, but they were also ineffective in an offensive role against the Apache bands. Second, the units were primarily infantry, and the environment required mounted cavalry. Third, soldiers were miserable; they had poor accommodations and were required to work more as laborers than soldiers at the under-resourced forts. And, finally, Arizona's unique situation and large area required that it be organized into a separate department from New Mexico. Unfortunately, these recommendations were not realized. Arizona was not organized into a separate department until 1870, and by then, the State was in turmoil.

Miners and farmers from Prescott were some of the first settlers to come into sustained conflict with the Western Apaches. Prescott was founded in April 1864, near gold deposits. Ft Whipple, which held one US Army company, was also established in 1864 to protect the fledgling settlement. Accusing the Apaches of raiding local ranches and committing depredations, groups of Prescott men formed into expeditions to retaliate against the Apaches. Three such expeditions in 1864, each led by King S. Woolsey, killed a total of 216 Western Apaches, including women and children.¹³¹ Likewise, in 1866, the ad hoc Volunteer Arizona Cavalry, mainly of Tucson, killed at least 60 Western Apaches. This pattern of violence continued

¹³⁰ Ibid., 165.

¹³¹ Dan L. Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* (Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967) 32.

unabated despite the Army posting of two full regiments of infantry and nine cavalry companies to Arizona in 1868. The culmination of the outrages occurred during the Camp Grant Massacre, where the ‘Tucson Ring’ killed over 100 Western Apaches.

The outrage in the East caused by the Camp Grant Massacre led to a resurgence of Grant’s Peace Policy. Grant sent Vincent Colyer of the Indian Peace Commission to review and modify policy regarding the Apache tribes. After revising the reservation system in New Mexico, Colyer created the first official reservations in Arizona. On September 7, 1871, Colyer created a reservation at Fort Apache (see Figure 6 in Appendix A for a map of Southwest Army Forts from 1850 to 1870). In the next month, Colyer also created reservations at Camp Grant, and at Camp Verde, where informal reservations had existed. The citizens of Arizona were not enthused by the reservations. John Marion, editor of the *Arizona Miner*, wrote of Colyer that Arizonians should “dump the old devil into the shaft of some mine, and pile rocks upon him until he is dead.”¹³² It was clear that the population desired a more active solution than the Peace Policy envisioned.

As Colyer traveled through Arizona under the Peace Policy, Brigadier General George Crook prepared to enforce an opposite policy through military force. Arriving as the Commander of the Department of Arizona in July 1871, Crook had planned a winter campaign into the Tonto Basin of Arizona to force Western Apaches onto the ad hoc reservations. During Colyer’s mission, however, military activities were suspended. But within a year of Colyer’s departure back to Washington, more than forty settlers had been killed in Arizona, including the widely publicized ‘Wickenburg Massacre’ of a famous scientist and his party.¹³³ Eastern sentiments swung back in favor of protecting settlers, and President Grant ordered Crook to force Western Apaches onto reservations.

Crook’s Tonto Basin campaign stands as perhaps the finest American Indian campaign, and quickly forced Western Apaches onto Arizona reservations. Upon arrival to Arizona, Crook

¹³² Lockwood, 185.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 192.

immediately reorganized his forces.¹³⁴ He consolidated the troops into larger formations, which he called columns. He then forced the columns to patrol Arizona from fort to fort, as preparation for actual campaigns. He often accompanied these patrols, which sometimes covered over 700 miles. Crook reorganized his pack trains on these treks so that the columns could subsist for long durations without having to return to forts. Crook also took command of the reservations, and took measures to eliminate corruption and ensure security. And finally, Crook employed the Apaches as scouts, which closed his intelligence gaps.

Through the use of multiple columns operating throughout the winter of 1872-1873, Crook forced each Western Apache band in turn to sue for peace and settle on the reservations. Crook's powerful columns displayed with finality to the Western Apache bands that US policy would be enforced. The campaign also displayed to the Western Apaches that they would not have security except on reservations. One band leader, Cha-Lupin, told Crook upon his surrender, "we are nearly dead from want of food and exposure- the copper cartridge has done the business for us. I am glad of the opportunity to surrender, but I do it not because I love you, but because I am afraid of General."¹³⁵ Excepting a breakout of renegades in 1874, which was defeated in the same manner as in 1872-1873, the Western Apaches did not fight in significant numbers again.

Fortuitously, soon after conclusion of the Tonto Basin Campaign, the Western Apaches became the wards of John Clum, Indian Agent at San Carlos, who created security and stimulated social development. Clum, appointed from the Dutch Reformed Church as part of the Quaker Policy, inherited an explosive situation at San Carlos in 1874.¹³⁶ Agitated warriors filled the reservation, fresh from surrendering to Crook. Crook's policy for dealing with rebellious bands that fled their assigned reservation was to have other Apache bands track down and kill the leader of the rebellion, before negotiating for the band's return to the reservation. Consequently, the

¹³⁴ Crook, *Autobiography*, 175.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 179.

¹³⁶ William T. Hagan, *Indian Police and Judges, Experiments in Acculturation and Control* (New Haven, Ct: Yale University Press, 1966) 33.

severed heads of seven Apaches were brought to San Carlos in the summer of 1874 to prove their leader's death to Crook. By this method, the Army was enforcing security at San Carlos. Clum obviously saw the value of using Apaches to enforce order and provide security, but figured that it could be done more humanely.

In pursuit of a peaceful solution to rebellious Western Apaches, John Clum established one of the earliest Indian Police Forces in the US at San Carlos, which allowed the Western Apaches to secure the reservation internally in accordance with their own customs.¹³⁷ Initially, Clum appointed only four police officers. Although he wanted Al Sieber, Clum hired an experienced police chief, Clay Beauford, to both train and lead the indigenous police officers.¹³⁸ Clum paid for police equipment and salaries out of the agency's operating budget. Further, he collected Apache firearms and established an arms room where the Apaches signed out rifles for hunting. The small, effective police force enabled Clum to remove the Army presence from San Carlos. It also curtailed recurring problems, such as alcohol related crime and theft, which in the past had led to rebellious bands leaving the reservation for fear of punishment.

The use of indigenous police forces also contributed to cultural assimilation of the Western Apaches, a goal that had long eluded Indian Agents and reformers.¹³⁹ Inadvertently, Clum had imposed a new social structure on the Apaches by organizing the Indian Police. The police officer role, which was not paralleled in Apache culture, somewhat replaced the warrior role. Further, the police officers wore uniforms and followed 'western' standards of behavior. Consequently, a valued role in Apache culture found a valid replacement role that encouraged acceptance of some traits of the settler culture. The police officers were paid a salary, which was also novel to the Apaches. In appreciation of the effectiveness of Clum's model police force, in

¹³⁷ Ibid., 131.

¹³⁸ Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria*, 164.

¹³⁹ Hagan, 69.

terms of both security and development, reservation police forces became Federal policy in May 1878, when Congress appropriated money for salaries and equipment.¹⁴⁰

San Carlos' effective police force contributed to an unforeseen consequence, however: the consolidation of Apaches onto San Carlos. Due to the efficiency of the San Carlos Agency, 1500 Tonto Apaches were moved from Camp Verde to San Carlos in February 1875. Another, perhaps more important contributor to the consolidation policy was the lobby of 'Indian rings,' which stood to profit from the consolidation. In May 1875, the White Mountain and Coyotero Apaches were also moved to San Carlos from Camp Apache. Throughout, Clum's police force continued to grow at San Carlos. By 1876, 4200 Western Apaches were consolidated at San Carlos, and peace was effectively maintained despite tensions between the different bands.¹⁴¹ In Washington, as well as the Arizona capital of Prescott, consolidation looked like an effective way to open Apache land to settlers, and reduce administrative costs. Consequently, minor criminal acts on the Chiricahua Reservation in southern Arizona gave Governor A.P.K. Safford the justification to consolidate the Mimbres and Central Chiricahua Apaches at San Carlos, starting the Victorio War and Geronimo's subsequent insurgencies.¹⁴²

Analysis of Apache Constabulary Operations

Despite the costs of the insurgency, US policy continued to focus almost exclusively on combating the insurgency vice addressing the roots of the Chiricahua subversion. Repeatedly brought to terms by combat operations, the Chiricahuas were inevitably disenfranchised by social and economic difficulties, which led to further insurgencies. In the end, only severe attrition and the wholesale removal of the Chiricahuas to Florida ended the string of insurgencies. The costs were immeasurable. For the Army, at least 137 soldiers and 12 officers perished at the hands of

¹⁴⁰ Prucha, 151.

¹⁴¹ Hagan, 32.

¹⁴² Lockwood, 218.

the Apaches. For the citizens of Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico, the cost was infinitely higher. And, for the Apaches, the destruction of their culture was ensured.

Analysis of the US Army's experience on the Southwest frontier confirms the value of the theory-derived constabulary principles:

Simultaneous social development and security are necessary to defeat the subversion, and hence the insurgency. The contrast in social development and security for the Western Apaches vice the Chiricahuas is stark. Clearly, the root of the conflict between American settlers and Apache tribes was land. For Western Apaches, land ownership was addressed in the early development of reservations. The US policy was also relatively consistent in sustaining the reservations for the Western Apaches. Further, John Clum's Indian Police at San Carlos provided security to the reservation, and curtailed potential problems with settlers. In turn, the normalization of life on the reservations led to increased social and economic development as the Western Apaches evolved an increasingly agrarian lifestyle. Because the roots of subversion were addressed, the Western Apaches did not conduct insurgencies after being forced onto reservations.

In contrast, the lack of consistent US policy regarding Chiricahua land, most notably in the frequent shifting of reservations, amplified the social difficulties that led to sustained Chiricahua insurgencies. Initially, the problems of the Bosque Redondo reservation, including corruption, the mixing of disparate Indian cultures, and the lack of natural resources, caused the disenfranchisement of the Chiricahuas, who returned to tribal lands which had been settled in the interim. Further attempts at the reservation system were undermined by inconsistent government policy. The consolidation policy of the late 1870s further deteriorated attempts at Chiricahua social development. Because of the lack of social development, security provided by the US Army on the reservations was insufficient in stopping continued insurgencies.

Determination must suffuse the constabulary. The operations of General Crook in the Tonto Basin Campaign of 1872-1874 and the policies of Indian Agent John Clum created positive effects that led to lasting pacification of the Western Apaches. As commander of the Department of Arizona, Crook's Tonto Basin Campaign forced the Western Apaches onto reservations where he encouraged social and economic development. The fortuitous arrival of John Clum furthered the positive effects envisioned by Crook. Clum's programs to develop security on the reservations were decidedly proactive, and long term in nature.

In contrast, neither the US Army nor the Bureau of Indian Affairs generated consistent positive effects with the Chiricahua tribes. For the most part, actions and policies in regard to the Chiricahua Apaches were reactive. Carleton's campaigns against the Chiricahuas in the 1860s forced some Chiricahua bands to Bosque Redondo in the 1860s, much like the Tonto Basin Campaign had forced the Western Apaches onto reservations. Once on the Bosque Redondo Reservation, however, the lack of positive programs by the Army and the BIA caused the failure of the reservation. Thereafter, the policies of the Board of Indian Commissioners, the BIA, and the US Army were reactive. A long term solution to the Chiricahua insurgencies was never formulated or implemented.

Establish a unified Intelligence and Information Operations organization. Although intelligence as a 'battlefield operating system' was not in US doctrine during the Apache Wars, Crook understood the value of information in combat and constabulary operations. The use of Apaches as scouts and a policeman, which was decidedly against normal practices of the US Army, provided the best information available on adversarial Apache bands and the status of Apache bands on the reservations.

Crook also implicitly understood the value of information operations, although the concept was also unknown to the US Army during the Apache Wars. Nevertheless, Crook used psychological operations to influence Apache behavior, as evidenced by his policy of

decapitation of leaders prior to readmission of rebellious Apache bands onto Arizona reservations in the 1870s. He also used military deception during both the Sierra Madre and Tonto Basin Campaigns.

Legitimacy is essential in constabulary operations. Operating within an ambiguous legal system eroded US legitimacy with the Chiricahua Apaches. Foremost, the legal status of the Apache was not determined until after the Apache Wars ended. Consequently, while crimes by settlers against the Apaches were subject to the US legal system, US law did not cover crimes by Apaches against settlers and amongst themselves. Accused Apaches were therefore subject to the ungoverned rulings of the local US Army commander, Indian Agent, or in the worse case, by local citizens. This led to widely varying policies amongst Army commanders and Indian agents regarding Apache crimes. Corruption and cultural bias made this ambiguous legal system even more unfair to the Apache. For Western Apaches, the lack of a legal system was somewhat mitigated by the formation of the Indian Police Force at San Carlos.

Unity of effort is imperative. The lack of unity of effort severely eroded US effectiveness in instituting US policy in New Mexico and Arizona. At the national level, Congress, the War Department, and the Department of the Interior struggled incessantly to shape coherent Indian policy. Legislation enacted to relieve the lack of unified effort, the creation of the Indian Board of Commissioners, only served to exacerbate the problem. The creation of government structure to solve problems continually failed, as evidenced by the BIA, the Peace Commission, and the Indian Board of Commissioners.

Moreover, unity of effort at the Department or Agency level was not consistently achieved because no mechanism forced Army commanders and the Bureau of Indian Affairs to cooperate. The extreme case of the ever-shifting Mimbres Apaches reservation, from Canada Alamosa, to Tularosa, to Ojo Caliente, and finally to San Carlos was the result of the absence of coordinated intermediate level policy, as well as the influence of Territorial Governors. The

continual argument between the War Department and the Department of the Interior over the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the lead on Indian policy, created animosity between the two organizations, which precluded cooperation. Consequently, unity of effort relied on the cooperation of Army commanders and Indian agents at the local level. For the Western Apaches, the efforts of George Crook and John Clum combined into an effective and consistent effort. For the Chiricahuas, unfortunately, local policy between Indian agents and local commanders was overtaken by national policy decisions and corrupt local Indian agents and Army commanders.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Analysis of the US Army's constabulary operations on the Southwest frontier confirms the value of constabulary principles. Only a dozen years after Geronimo's final surrender at Skeleton Canyon, the Army landed in the Philippines, where the lessons of the Apache Wars were put into practice. Most senior leaders in the Philippine War of 1898 to 1902 were Indian War veterans, including Major General Elwell S. Otis, and Major General Adna R. Chaffee.¹⁴³ The lessons learned by these commanders on the American frontier helped them to defeat Emilio Aguinaldo's Republican Army and his protracted popular war strategy. The combination of combat, security, and nation building tasks provided the simultaneous security and social development required to pacify Luzon by 1902.¹⁴⁴ The unwritten constabulary principles learned in the Apache Wars helped the Army achieve success in short order.

US Army experiences in twentieth century post conflict environments also support the utility of operating in concert with constabulary principles. The occupation of post world war II Germany and Japan have become the benchmark studies for successfully achieving post-conflict policy. In post-conflict Germany, the US stationed over 200,000 troops to demilitarize the Wehrmacht. This force effectively deterred insurgent operations against the Office of the Military Government, United States (OMGUS). For security, OMGUS created a 30,000-man constabulary, which was operational by July 1946. The US Constabulary in turn trained a German police force. Protected by a large occupation force and a constabulary, OMGUS conducted land reform, prosecuted war criminals, and established German governments from the local level in 1945 to the national level in 1949. Additionally, the nation-building force in Germany, the military-led Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA), was so successful that

¹⁴³ Birtle, 79-82; Linn, 10, 26.

¹⁴⁴ Linn, 25-26

Germany's GDP showed double-digit growth from 1947 to 1952. This economic boom, coupled with reliable security, was instrumental in achieving the US policy of democratization in Western Germany.¹⁴⁵ Clearly, the US Army's success in Germany may be explained by adherence to constabulary principles formed in frontier America and confirmed in the Philippines.

The twenty-first century environment shows an increasing need for distinct combat, and constabulary forces. Wars of the twentieth century predominantly occurred after a long buildup of forces, took months or even years to complete, and ended with large occupation forces in place and with a thoroughly defeated enemy. Germany and Japan are prime examples of this industrial-age war. Conflicts in the twenty-first century environment are increasingly less likely to follow this pattern. Indeed, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq all indicate that wars of 'precision' may lead to catastrophic success, in that the enemy may capitulate without large occupying forces being present, without the populace feeling the sting of defeat, and before the US is able to prepare for the aftermath (see Figure 2). This creates a capabilities gap that arguably caused the inability of US forces to provide security in Iraq following the cessation of conventional operations against the Iraqi Army. The small number of Army forces in Iraq, when compared to those of the Army in post-WWII Germany and Japan, were unable to deter insurgent operations. Further, no dedicated security forces were present, and the Iraqi police forces were disbanded, rather than reorganized. And, finally, the inadequacy of planning in ORHA led to delays in essential nation building tasks. Consequently, the Army was simply unable to follow constabulary principles that may have averted the descent into insurgency in Iraq.

¹⁴⁵ Dobbins, et al "America's Role in Nation-building, From Germany to Iraq," 11-19.




Figure 2. Emerging Gap in Security and Nation Building Capabilities

In light of the growing need for ready forces to close the security and nation-building gap, the Army should prepare distinct forces for the combat, security, and nation-building roles needed in post-conflict environments. Clearly, the Army is already well prepared for the combat role. The small numbers of forces likely to be present after a quick victory, however, mitigates the likelihood that these combat forces could be used simultaneously for post-conflict low-intensity combat, security, and nation-building. Consequently, the Army should deploy dedicated constabulary forces that can conduct parallel planning with the combat force prior to conflict, and then initiate operations as a supporting effort during hostilities. Upon conclusion of major combat operations, constabulary forces would then become the main effort, while the combat force refits and reorganizes, and then supports as required.

In order to deploy appropriate units, the Army should train and resource forces for security and nation-building tasks. A number of Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) should be assigned post-conflict security tasks as part of their mission essential task list (METL). Designated BCTs should be resourced and trained in accordance with the new METL tasks. This would increase the ability of the Army to provide both combat and security forces. Commanders and planners could tailor pre-deployment preparations, resource soldiers properly, and train suitably for the unique set of tasks needed in the post-conflict environment. While Military Police

(MP) units currently fulfill this requirement, they are scarce, and not integrated well into larger units that are required to conduct missions such as the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 2 and beyond.

Further, the Army should also ensure that the emerging COIN doctrine is not limited in scope to purely combat tasks that the Army would traditionally provide in a conventional conflict. The interim field manual, FMI 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency*, identifies that “the joint force command may be required to provide more units, and a different mix of units, than would be required for operations against a conventional force”.¹⁴⁶ While FMI 3-07.22 adequately identifies the requirement to provide security in the host nation beyond the defensive role of purely combat forces, it lumps security tasks under the heading of civil-military operations. The FMI emphasizes the role of CMO in organizing indigenous security forces, and in coordinating nation-building tasks with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Ambassador and his country team. However, this assumes away many of the well-documented problems in the interagency process, and also assumes that a trained and ready host nation security force will be on hand to conduct security operations. This clearly reflects thinking prior to the emergence of a security and nation-building gap. Until such time as the Army can rely on other agencies, such as USAID, to fulfill their roles immediately and capably upon conclusion of major hostilities, the Army must build the capability to close the gap.

And, finally, the importance of theory and historical research should not be overlooked. The theory-derived constabulary principles in this monograph demonstrate that constabularies in post-conflict environments are guided by a well-established set of principles. Understanding these principles, and their exceptions, could assist planners and commanders involved in post conflict environments. Indeed, the US Army has extensive experience in post-conflict environments. However, the emergence of professional Special Forces in the US Army has perhaps led the

¹⁴⁶ Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. *FMI 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2004).

larger conventional Army to assume that it will not be involved in post-conflict operations. A cursory study of American history shows the fallacy of such thinking. Indeed, as in the Apache Wars, the Philippines, Germany, Japan, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the conventional Army will play a major role in post-conflict operations in the future, and may learn much from its storied past.

GLOSSARY

Constabulary: An organization that provides internal defense and stability; also, a force that maintains order, promotes security, prevents interference with military operations, reduces active or passive subversion, relieves occupying forces of civil administration, and mobilizes local resources in aid of governmental policies. (Adapted from FM 27-5, 1943, therein referred to as “civil affairs control”)

Counter guerrilla: Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies against guerrillas. (JP 1-02)

Counterinsurgency: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02)

Foreign Internal Defense: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

Information Operations: Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. (JP 1-02)

Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted Government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

Legitimacy: Lawfulness by virtue of being authorized or in accordance with law.

Occupation: Territory under the authority and effective control of a belligerent armed force. The term is not applicable to territory being administered pursuant to peace terms, treaty, or other agreement, express or implied, with the civil authority of the territory. (JP 1-02)

Operations Security: A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

Peace building: Post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (JP 3-07)

Peace enforcement: Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 3-07)

Peacekeeping: Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or

- other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 3-07)
- Peacemaking:** The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it. (JP 3-07)
- Peace operations:** A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. (JP 3-07)
- Policy:** A plan or course of action, as of a government, political party, or business, intended to influence and determine decisions, actions, and other matters.
- Post Conflict:** That period subsequent to the date of ratification by political authorities of agreements to terminate hostilities. (JP 1-02)
- Principle:** A rule or law concerning the functioning of natural phenomena or mechanical processes.
- Psychological Operations:** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOPs. (JP 1-02)
- Security:** A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. (JP 1-02)
- Subversion:** Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. (JP 1-02)
- Transition:** Passage from one form, state, style, or place to another.

APPENDIX A

MAPS




Figure 3. Map of Northern New Spain, 1787




Figure 4. Map of Mexico's Northern Frontier, 1822




Figure 5. Map of the Southwest and Southern Plains, 1862-1890




Figure 6. Map of Army Forts, 1850-1875




Figure 7. Map of Army Departments and Divisions, 1870

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