A Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan Concept:
The Galula Compass

A Monograph
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# A Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan Concept: The Galula Compass

This monograph describes the nature and dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations citing David Galula’s theory. In his book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Galula sets a clear mark for planning future COIN operations against the increased likelihood of insurgencies following an Orthodox Pattern in semi-authoritarian countries.

This monograph extrapolates Galula’s theory and frames it in contemporary campaign planning doctrine to demonstrate its applicability to COIN warfare. Joint doctrine serves as the common lexicon for commanders and planners to conceptualize COIN plans. But application of doctrine alone does not address how to put the plan into context. David Galula’s COIN theory and the Boer War serve as examples of theory and history to contextualize the plan.

The Contemporary COIN Campaign Plan Concept, proposed by the author, illustrates how commanders may effectively synchronize the available resources and required capabilities. It attempts to be predictive, but not mistaken, as the definitive COIN campaign design concept. Instead, it aims to serve as a compass by pointing in one direction supported by history, theory, and doctrine.

## Subject Terms
- Counterinsurgency
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- David Galula
- Boer War
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Abstract


This monograph describes the nature and dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations citing David Galula’s theory. In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Galula sets a clear mark for planning future COIN operations against the increased likelihood of insurgencies following an Orthodox Pattern in semi-authoritarian countries.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Decisive combat operations in Iraq have evolved in 2004 into sustained counterinsurgent (COIN) operations. The history of both successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgencies provides insights from which commanders and planners may design effective COIN campaign plans. This monograph will extrapolate David Galula’s counterinsurgency warfare theory to determine if current United States (US) military campaign plan design is applicable in unconventional warfare. Galula’s, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, serves as the compass in this research and as such does not declare a definitive model, but only one path, albeit a less traveled one, to successful COIN campaign design.

Background

During the 20th Century the US military has become an unmatched peer in competently waging conventional warfare. Today, the insurgency in Iraq has resurfaced a necessity for a review of unconventional warfare history and theory for application in relevant COIN doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures. As the US acknowledges the prevalence of insurgencies worldwide and the nation’s growing role in leading COIN efforts, the practical application of COIN planning must be addressed at the operational level.

The problem is that no two insurgencies are exactly alike and consequently actions that countered previous insurgencies may prove ineffective for the next. Part of the answer may lie in the complexity of insurgencies. Several authors have suggested that insurgency may be the most challenging mission the US military has faced. Another part of the answer may be a function of not having the right tools to orchestrate effective planning and operations. Crosschecking Galula’s COIN theory against the current doctrinal elements of operational design serves useful in looking for a way to organize this complex problem.

This monograph provides an in-depth study of COIN operations and addresses a number of issues with regard to operational-level COIN planning. Specifically, what are the nature and dynamics of...
insurgent and COIN operations? How does a commander synchronize the available resources and required capabilities effectively? Does current operational design and campaign planning doctrine apply to COIN warfare? What does a COIN campaign plan concept look like? The answers to those questions will result in a COIN campaign plan concept with recommendations on shortcomings of Galula’s theory and doctrinal revisions.

**Methodology**

This monograph begins with a summary of Galula’s COIN warfare theory to set the stage for further analysis. Galula attempts to define the laws of COIN warfare, its principles, and to outline corresponding strategy and tactics. Galula acknowledges, however, the dangers of extrapolating and relying on intuition, as well as the pitfall of dogmatism. His work attempts to clear a bit of the fog of war.

Next, a historical summary of a British COIN operation, one deemed as unsuccessful, is offered. The purpose of this historical analysis is to determine the nature and dynamics of COIN operations and to evaluate lessons learned at the operational level of planning. The intent is to further compare and contrast Galula’s theory against this historical context.

After reviewing Galula’s theory of COIN warfare and setting a historical context, a survey of current US military doctrine is in order. Service and joint military doctrine of a COIN-related nature will be reviewed. Doctrine, history, and theory will then be applied progressively in three campaign plan concepts. The next step, analysis, emphasizes the importance of using a common framework for campaign planning and makes recommendations for contextualizing a COIN plan using Galula’s theory as a framework.

The conclusion will describe several concerns with the use of current campaign design in a COIN context. A look at lessons learned from the Boer War will provide additional insights to improve Galula’s approach and provide a methodology for better planning in COIN operations.
Definitions

The following definitions will apply throughout this monograph.

Campaign: “A series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.”

Campaign Plan: “A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.”

Centers of Gravity (COG): “Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”

Counterinsurgency (COIN): “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.”

Critical Vulnerabilities: “Those aspects of critical capabilities that are deficient or vulnerable to neutralization or interdiction.”

Decisive Points (DPs): “May be a place, an event, or an enabling system that provides an advantage over the adversary and greatly influences the outcome of an attack.”

Foreign Internal Defense (FID): “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”

Insurgency: “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”

DoD’s definition doesn’t explicitly recognize the political nature of this organized movement. Bard O’Neill, in *Insurgency and Terrorism*, focuses on the

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2 Ibid., IV-2.
3 Ibid., IV-12.
5 Joint Publication 5-0, IV-13.
6 Ibid., IV-20.
7 Joint Publication 1-02, 208.
8 Ibid., 228.
political nature of an insurgency and identifies four aspects of politics that may serve as targets for the insurgent: the political community, the political system, the authorities, and the policies.\(^9\) He defines insurgency as “a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”\(^10\) This monograph agrees with the prominence of political action O’Neill describes and interprets the DoD definition to implicitly recognize the political nature of an insurgency.

**Internal Defense and Development (IDAD):** “The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, and social) that respond to the needs of society.”\(^11\)

**Lines of Operation (LOOs):** “Lines that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives.”\(^12\) These lines are commonly referred to as physical lines, but may also be used conceptually as logical lines of operation. Commanders often use logical lines of operation to help visualize how the military supports other instruments of national power.\(^13\) This monograph uses logical lines of operations to help depict conceptual campaign plans.

CHAPTER TWO

**COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY AND DOCTRINE**

**Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory**

Galula’s, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, is summarized on the next five pages because the text is out of print and existing copies are difficult to acquire and considered rare.

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\(^10\) Ibid.

\(^11\) Joint Publication 1-02, 265.

\(^12\) Joint Publication 5-0, IV-26.

Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency

Galula describes four prerequisites for a successful insurgency: (1) an attractive cause, (2) a weakness in the COIN camp, (3) a not-too-hostile geographic environment, and (4) outside support in the middle and later stages of an insurgency. The first two are musts, geography is usually predetermined, and the last one is a help that may become a necessity.\textsuperscript{14}

According to Galula, the insurgent’s cause must be attractive in order to draw the largest number of supporters and it must be meaningful enough to last until the insurgent movement is established. In unconventional warfare, where intangible assets often outweigh tangible assets, an ideological cause is the precursor to forming a formidable strength in the will of the population. Once the insurgent has identified a cause, the other absolute prerequisite is a weak COIN effort.

The host nation (HN) government must be strong in order to address the political nature of insurgent warfare. The strength of the host nation political regime will be evident as it competes for the support, allegiance, and loyalty of the population. This battle is primarily a protracted political engagement waged in an unconventional manner through the use of propaganda and fear. It is usually a cheap war for the insurgent, but likely very costly for the COIN.\textsuperscript{15}

COIN warfare is expensive financially, in manpower, and in time. The host nation’s resolve will be tested by the protracted nature of this asymmetric form of warfare. Knowledge of COIN warfare at the national level will prove to be critical in determining objectives and assigning resources to control the population. Galula describes four instruments of control organic to the government infrastructure: (1) the political structure, (2) the administrative bureaucracy, (3) the police, and (4) the armed forces.\textsuperscript{16} The administrative bureaucracy runs the country day-to-day and may or may not be directly impacted by decisions and actions of the political leadership. The loyalty of police forces must be gained and held because they are the first level of government interaction with the people and police are key to the

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 27.
government’s ability to provide security for its citizens. Similarly, loyalty or repatriation of the members of the armed forces is required, as they will serve dual roles as security maintainers and ambassadors of the government among the people.

A not-too-hostile geographic environment is the third prerequisite for an insurgency. Geographically, the insurgent desires a massive land area in a temperate zone, heavily vegetated and mountainous along the borders, and swamps spreading across the plains. The larger the country, the more difficult it is for the government to provide security for a large and dispersed rural population dependent on a primitive economy. Preferably, neighboring countries would be favorable to the insurgency and provide continuing external support.

Outside support comes in the form of moral, political, technical, financial, and military assistance. Moral support is expressed by public opinion, and propaganda is the chief instrument of moral support. Political support may be direct pressure on the COIN leadership or international diplomatic action in favor of the insurgent’s cause. Technical support is advice on the organization and conduct of operations. Financial and military support may come openly, as well as covertly.

According to Galula, an attractive cause and a weak COIN effort are the two most profound prerequisites for a successful insurgency. Geography and demographics aren’t prerequisites as much as they are key enablers. Outside support may be necessary, but it is not required for the insurgent to complete his campaign.

Insurgency Doctrine

Galula describes two patterns insurgents follow: the Orthodox and the Shortcut. They both consist of five steps of development, but differ in only the first two steps (Figure 1).

Insurgents following the Orthodox Pattern attempt to organize a strong, stable grass roots movement designed to withstand the natural longevity of insurgent warfare. The first step, which is the most difficult and possibly the slowest part of creating an insurgency, is to create this strong, reliable party. Men of strength and intellect, usually rejected or disenfranchised, are recruited in order to establish
and maintain an elite party consisting of both overt and clandestine structures. Creating a united front is the second step and insurgent activity remains mostly legal and nonviolent in this step. Insurgents seek support from the population by promoting political struggles against the government. The government is targeted to prevent or sabotage future reactions to insurgent activities. Activities of internal and external allies are channeled to prevent a split in the united front. Step three, guerrilla warfare, is marked by the seizure of power by politics, subversion, and/or armed struggle. Armed struggle gives the party organizational and operational experience and eliminates the weak members. Guerrilla operations, based on persuasion and force, are planned primarily to gain participation, if not complicity, of the population. The tested and reliable military establishment will be the party’s guarantor in the political changes to come. Step four, movement warfare, is complete when an insurgent regular army is created and equipped. Movement warfare will be supported by the fluidity of forces equipped with light armament, and supported by intelligence and logistics networks among the organized population matured in Steps 2 and 3. Step 5, the final step, is to completely destroy the government and bring the insurgent political party to the forefront.17

The Shortcut Pattern abbreviates the process to seize power at the expense of building a sound and seasoned military establishment and political party. Blind terrorism, the first step in the Shortcut Pattern, is aimed at getting sensational publicity for the movement and attracting support to the cause. The second step, selective terrorism, quickly follows the first step. Selective terrorism includes killing, in various parts of the country, low-ranking government officials who work directly with the population.

17 Ibid., 58.
The purpose of this step is to isolate the government from the masses and to gain active support, if not complicity of the population in the struggle. Galula writes that killing high-ranking government officials is pointless as they are too removed from the population. The deaths of police, mailmen, mayors, and teachers however, serve as direct examples of the insurgent’s power and presence at the local level.

Although an insurgency in the Shortcut Pattern may save years of tedious organizational work, it is vulnerable to a backlash of bitterness from the population bred by extensive terrorism.¹⁸ In contrast, an insurgency in the Orthodox Pattern is vulnerable to defeat as it enters Step 3, Guerrilla Warfare, when its military power is comparatively weak relative to the armed forces of the host nation or allies.¹⁹

**COIN Operations**

Galula’s theory of counterinsurgency warfare is premised on assumptions about the prerequisites and doctrine of insurgents. Based on these assumptions and patterns, he suggests a strategy offering four courses of action for a successful COIN operation. These COAs consider the laws and principles of COIN warfare and arrive at an eight-step process to build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward—the mandate of COIN warfare.

Galula lists four courses of actions (COAs) available to the COIN and they are not mutually exclusive: (1) direct action on the insurgent leaders, (2) indirect action on conditions that are favorable to an insurgency, (3) infiltrate the insurgency and disable it from within, or (4) reinforce the COIN political machine.²⁰ These COAs are not mutually exclusive, as they may constitute the full spectrum of operations required to defeat an insurgency. Galula suggests that the last COA listed is the preferred one; reinforce the COIN political machine, because it leaves the least room for uncertainty and it fully engages the COIN capabilities.²¹

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¹⁸ Ibid., 60.
¹⁹ Ibid., 61.
²⁰ Ibid., 64-65.
²¹ Ibid., 69.
In addition to the four laws of COIN warfare cited by Galula (Figure 2), six principles of COIN warfare are discussed as considerations in developing a successful COIN strategy. Galula’s principles are consistent with current COIN doctrine although not exactly the same. Economy of force is essential for COIN forces because the insurgency needs so little to achieve so much. The insurgency must be prevented from developing into a higher form of warfare, namely, organizing a regular army. Irreversibility is that critical turning point when local leaders have everything to lose from a return of the insurgency. The local leaders have proven themselves in this regard by actions and deeds, not just words. The government should pursue an offensive counterinsurgency strategy and seize the initiative to confront the insurgent with a dilemma: accept the challenge and thus a defensive posture, or leave the area and forfeit the battle to win the population’s support and allegiance. Counterinsurgency forces should be fully focused on winning and holding the support of the population to mitigate the terrain-focused nature of conventional forces. Simplicity of action provides the necessary clarity in pursuit of the population’s favor in waging what former USMC Commandant, General Charles C. Krulak called the “three-block war,” the full range of military operations, all within three city blocks. Success in a “three block war” depends on seamless transitions between COIN, civil military operations, and major combat. Synchronizing military actions with political actions under a single leader ensures that military action is not the main activity to achieve the final political end state.

22 Ibid., 74-86. Six principles: economy of force, prevention, irreversibility, seize initiative, simplicity of action, unity of effort.
Coherently gathered into a general strategy, the principles and laws of COIN warfare laid out by Galula suggest eight tactical steps to build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward. First, maneuver enough armed forces to destroy or expel the main body of armed insurgents. Second, mass static units where the population lives, to ensure local security. Third, establish contact with the people and control their movement to isolate them from the guerrillas. Fourth, destroy the local insurgent political organizations. Fifth, hold elections and establish provisional local authorities. Sixth, test these new authorities and organize self-defense units. Seventh, group and educate the leaders in a national political party. And finally, win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.

Galula describes COIN operations in textbook fashion. He describes guiding laws and principles for planning and executing operations against an insurgency. Each of the four COAs he describes is incorporated in the COIN campaign plan concept developed later in this monograph.

**Current US Counterinsurgency Doctrine**

Before a brief survey of current American COIN doctrine, a reminder of the definition of COIN is appropriate. Counterinsurgency is the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Notice the two additional considerations for COIN warfare beyond those of conventional warfare—paramilitary and civic actions. This becomes especially relevant when considering lines of operation in a COIN campaign plan concept.

On the operational level, single Service COIN doctrine is rather general and immature in its attempts to address the preponderance of insurgent warfare in the 20th Century. Joint doctrine, however, has existed in a fairly relevant context for nearly 15 years.

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24 Ibid., 136.
Single Service COIN Doctrine

The 1940 Small Wars Manual still stands as the historical standard for tactical COIN operations. The draft Small Wars (2004) publication found at the Marine Corps Small Wars Center of Excellence website addresses the tactical, operational, and strategic level from a contemporary perspective. The Marines’ 1980, FMFM 8-2, Counterinsurgency Operations, frames the insurgent problem and then applies USMC doctrine with an emphasis on planning and conduct of internal defense and internal development (IDAD) operations. Galula’s influence seems apparent in more than one part of this manual. FMFM 8-2 defines the nature of insurgency and matches Galula’s prerequisites for a successful insurgency almost verbatim. Insurgent levels of intensity also mirror Galula’s insurgent orthodox pattern as nonviolent, guerrilla, and war of movement phases. The pursuit of dual objectives, destroy the insurgent in strike operations and consolidate operations to provide security for the population, is also consistent with Galula’s COIN recommendations. Special Text 3.05.206, Counter Urban Insurgency Planning Guide, was published in 2003 by the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School specifically for Central Command and builds on the strike and consolidation operations described in FMFM 8-2 and in DA Pamphlet 550-104, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies. While neither the Special Text nor the DA Pamphlet are doctrinal, they are attempts by the US Army to address contemporary COIN warfare.

In 1986 the US Army published FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, and then, in 2004 it expedited FM-Interim 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, into print. FM-I 3-07.22 was written for division level leaders and below and is more of a TTP than operational-level doctrine. FM 90-8 was written for brigade and below leaders and provides ample insight for COIN planning, training, and operations. It also mirrors Galula’s description of the insurgent nature, but distinguishes between

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26 Small War Center of Excellence website: www.smallwar.quantico.usmc.mil
28 Ibid., 3-4.
29 FM-Interim 3-07.22. Counterinsurgency Operation. (01 October 2004), iii.
counterguerrilla and counterinsurgency operations. Counterguerrilla operations only address the military aspect of the insurgent movement, whereas COIN operations focus on IDAD programs and address all the disparate elements of an insurgency.\textsuperscript{31} Clearly, FM 90-8 focuses on the tactical considerations of Foreign Internal Defense (FID). It, like FMFM 8-2, mirrors Galula in COIN dual objectives: defeat or neutralize the guerrillas and conduct noncombat operations to provide an environment where the population can become self-sustaining.\textsuperscript{32}

**Joint Doctrine**

In 1990, FM 100-20 / AFP (Air Force Pamphlet) 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, was coauthored by both the US Army and the USAF. While not joint doctrine, it was multi-Service doctrine that applied to Army and Air Force units in joint and combined low intensity conflict (LIC) operations.\textsuperscript{33} It filled the void from which LIC operational planners and leaders could develop implementing doctrine. Appendices provide quick references on several topics to include how to analyze an insurgency, how to counter an insurgency, and a guide to COIN operations. Chapter Two consisted of more than 20 pages on the nature of insurgency and COIN and the role the US might play in supporting them. FID was the primary means of supporting counterinsurgency, and the language and processes described could easily be construed as the precursor for the current joint doctrine for FID published in April 2004.

Joint Publication 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, describes how the US supports the HN’s program of IDAD.\textsuperscript{34} IDAD is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 1-5.
\textsuperscript{32} FMFM 8-2, 3-2.
\textsuperscript{33} FM 100-20 / AFP (Air Force Pamphlet) 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*. (05 December 1990), Preface.
\textsuperscript{34} Joint Publication 3-07.1, ix.
It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society.\textsuperscript{35}

The role of the military in FID is to provide a secure environment for the other instruments of national power to bolster the host nation’s IDAD program. Military assistance is described in three types of operations: indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations. Indirect support consists of security assistance, joint and multinational exercises, and exchange programs. Direct support (not involving combat operations) includes operations such as civil-military operations, military training to host nation forces, logistics support, and intelligence and communications sharing short of combat. It is imperative that any combat operations are conducted with the host nation government and security forces remaining in the forefront to demonstrate control and substantiate claims of legitimacy. All three of these types of military assistance are appropriate in the conduct of COIN warfare and each type must be synchronized across all LOOs.

Two other FID planning imperatives operational COIN planners should consider are maintaining host nation sovereignty and legitimacy, and understanding the strategic implications of all US assistance efforts. The FID program is only as successful as the HN’s IDAD program and as such, the HN must remain at the forefront of key decision-making.\textsuperscript{36} Strategic implications of foreign policy are delineated in each combatant commander’s Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP). All theater campaign plans must be integrated with the aims of the TSCP, and as such, are an extension of the long-term theater strategy.\textsuperscript{37}

While current US COIN doctrine at the Service level lacks an operational-level appreciation for the increasing number of contemporary insurgencies, joint doctrine provides an ample framework for planners and commanders. Joint doctrine extrapolates Galula’s COIN theory beyond the scope of quelling an internal insurgency to bringing a coalition of foreign forces and agencies to the COIN effort.

\textsuperscript{36} Joint Publication 3-07.1, III-1.
\textsuperscript{37} Joint Publication 3-07.1, III-5.
Galula’s focus on a political solution seems to be joint doctrine’s predominant premise in foreign forces and agencies assisting the HN IDAD programs.

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL APPLICATION

The 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War in South Africa provides an excellent case study to illustrate the nature and dynamics of campaign design in a COIN operation. The conflict was at the zenith of British imperial power, similar to current US dominance. In many ways the Boer War was similar to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in that foreign forces entered another nation as a liberating or occupying force in the midst of cultural and ethnic tensions. References to OIF will be anecdotal, however, with the primary emphasis on the nature and dynamics of population control in this British COIN operation. The purpose of this historical analysis is to evaluate lessons learned in order to identify the most significant factors affecting internal and external populations. The intent is to further integrate these factors into the elements of campaign planning.

Summary of 1899-1902 Boer War in South Africa

Just over 105 years ago, on October 11, 1899, the Anglo-Boer War erupted as a clash of ideologies fanned by the discovery of gold more than a decade prior. The two political ideologies were Afrikaner nationalism in two Boer republics, Transvaal (South African Republic) and Orange Free State, and British imperialism in pursuit of South African unification under the British flag. Britain’s war was a dichotomy, a liberal democratic nation attempting to maintain law and order by force. The United Kingdom attempted to deal with their desire to suppress violent challenges to Boer sovereignty without eroding civil liberties. British strategy missed the mark and helped introduce the term “concentration

“camp” to the international lexicon.\textsuperscript{39} The war was notable for the high casualty rates among civilians (Figure 3), the imprinting of numerous future prominent Britons, and the second phase of the war, guerilla warfare.\textsuperscript{40}

The influx of Dutch newcomers to South Africa (Uitlanders) after the discovery of gold was seen as a threat to the independence of the South African Republic (SAR). The British South African League, under Sir Alfred Milner, cited the grievances of the Uitlanders in opposition to the SAR and called for further involvement by the British government. Milner even swayed public opinion to favor war if a settlement was not reached. Then, he broke off talks with the SAR in June 1899. He also marshaled a consensus among European powers to not intervene on behalf of the SAR in the event of war. British military reinforcements were dispatched from England in September and the SAR responded by issuing an ultimatum on 9 October. Boer leadership ordered the removal of imperialist troops within 48 hours based on the premise that “you don’t send reinforcement to defend yourself, but to secure something or somebody.”\textsuperscript{41}

Field Marshall Lord Roberts, the British military leader in South Africa, convinced the government and the British public back home, the engagement would end with the capture of the two Boer capitals. But the Boers failed to capitulate and forced the British to conduct six months of sieges.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & \textbf{Military} & \\ \hline
British & (5\%) & 21,042 \\
Boers & (11\%) & 6,000 \\
\hline
\multirow{2}{*}{\textbf{Concentration Camps}} & Women and children & (25\%) & 26,370 \\
& Blacks & (17\%) & 14,154 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Casualties:}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{41} James P. Murphy, \textit{The War in South Africa: British Initial Plan of Campaign}, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1930), 1.
and suffer multiple setbacks before insurgents eventually lost their capital cities. The Boers justified their guerilla warfare as a duty-bound responsibility by citizens defending their state capital from attack by a foreign military. And thus began the Brit’s search for a way to defeat the guerrillas.

Lord Roberts returned home to reap the praise of an empty victory and his Chief of Staff, General Lord Kitchener, stepped up operations and adopted a three-pronged approach that would take time and many resources to separate the guerrillas from their support. One prong was a scorched earth policy. Farms of known Boer supporters were burned to reduce the availability of food and shelter for the nomadic guerrillas. Another prong was resettlement of civilians and prisoners of war. The resettlement of Boer women and children and Black farmers into protected camps denied the guerrillas food, labor, transportation, livestock, a recruiting pool, and intelligence. There were more than one hundred concentration camps around the country. Prisoners of war were shipped overseas to reduce the burden on forces in country. More than 26,000 prisoners were sent to countries such as India, Sri Lanka, and Bermuda. The third prong of Kitchener’s strategy was a frontier garrison network to protect the railroad from guerrilla interdiction. As the campaign matured, the British escalated troop numbers with reinforcements from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Coalition forces outnumbered the guerrillas 10:1, but it was sheer time that proved Kitchener’s COIN strategy productive. Eventually, the guerrillas were hurt strategically and individually by the denial of food for their horses, their primary source of mobility. Additionally, the news of the suffering in the concentration camps afforded the guerrilla no recourse but to end their own starvation and the ensuing genocide of their citizens.

Lessons Learned in Counterinsurgency Warfare in the Boer War

Two lessons in operational design are clearly discernable in the Boer War, and both of them deal with correctly identifying the adversary’s center of gravity (COG). Lord Roberts prematurely declared victory after falsely identifying the Boer capitals as the adversary’s COG. Instead, capturing the Boer

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42 Townshend, 174.
44 Ibid., 389.
capitals incited the citizens to the second phase of the war—guerrilla warfare. Lord Roberts not only forced an escalation of the conflict, but he also failed to tie the tactical objectives to Britain’s strategic aim of a unified South Africa. In fact, testimony to the British Commissioners on the war in South Africa by Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary of State for War, stated he “could not see that anybody was prejudiced by the absence of a definite plan of campaign.”

In contrast to Lord Roberts, Lord Kitchener correctly recognized the Boer COG as the support the guerrillas received from the population. His response was to limit their sustainability, to decrease their ability to blend into the population, and deny them intelligence. His three-pronged offensive of rural population resettlement, scorched-earth policy, and blockhouse lines to protect the railroad eventually forced the guerrillas to surrender or starve. Kitchener identified the correct adversary COG, but used a socially and economically unacceptable way to pursue it. Resettling the Blacks and burning the farms crippled the agricultural economy temporarily and British sentiment at home waned amidst reports of the disease and death rampant in civilian concentration camps.

The macro-level lesson learned is that all war is a political activity. “Military planning is an absurdity if not synchronized with political aims.” British leadership, neither military nor political, recognized this and did not adequately address the insurgent movement at the infrastructure or individual levels. The population was physically manipulated to control the guerrillas, but the community infrastructure such as newspapers, churches, and schools were not targeted to change the attitudes of the public at large. Newspapers could address the static presence, churches the moral conscience, and schools could serve as the intellectual guideposts to shape the collective opinions and agendas. Instead, the British relied on the use of martial law and a methodically physical program to strip away the guerrilla’s logistical base.

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45 Murphy, 1.
46 Townshend, 30.
47 Ibid., 180.
Local public opinion didn’t support the British imposition of martial law because security was seen in their culture as a police role supported by the military and not vice versa.\textsuperscript{48} Additionally, the public had to be convinced that guerrilla attacks were a real threat to them personally, not just to the government or foreign forces.\textsuperscript{49} The Boers had a common language, a shared experience of hardship, and a common culture based around farming and religion.\textsuperscript{50} The Boer’s fit Eric Hoffer’s description of a pathological mass movement and the British underestimated their faith.\textsuperscript{51} The Boer Uitlanders were emigrants with a desire for a new beginning and the need to be recognized as they aspired for an independent Boer nation. Roger Trinquier, a peer of Galula’s, writing about mass revolutionary movements described the control of the masses as “the master weapon of modern warfare.”\textsuperscript{52}

British efforts failed to exploit mass psychology and sway popular sympathy to their side. Recognizing the conflict was more of a war of ideas than physical means would have led the leadership to pursue courses of action that tied the tactical actions to the British strategic objective of unification, not destruction. Political considerations would have undercut the more onerous military activities including the farm burning, concentration camps, and martial law. The conflict between a military solution and a political desire for civility has become a more prevalent concern since the Boer War.\textsuperscript{53}

CHAPTER FOUR

A CONTEMPORARY COUNTERINSURGENCY PLAN

Current US Campaign Planning Doctrine


\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 61.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 149.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Rob B. McClary, \textit{Learning the Hard Way, or Not at All: British Tactical and Strategic Adaptation During the Boer War, 1899-1902}, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1999), 8.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Eric Hoffer, \textit{The True Believer}, (NY: Perennial Library, 1966), 28.
\item \textsuperscript{53} McClary, 43.
\end{itemize}
planning actions and Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (2001) contains detailed discussion on all the facets of operational art.\(^{54}\)

Planners and commanders should not be lured into their comfort zone by the current conventional war-focused doctrinal definition of a campaign plan. The Department of Defense defines a campaign as a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.\(^ {55}\) The campaign plan, then, embodies the strategic vision of the arrangement of related operations (meaning, more than just military operations) necessary to attain strategic objectives.\(^ {56}\) The definition is not meant to constrain the commander to only military operations, but primarily to guide the use of military power in conjunction with the other three instruments of national power; diplomatic, informational and economic. This is especially important in COIN planning due to the primacy of diplomatic, economic, paramilitary, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. Because Joint Publication 5-0 lacks an Operations Other Than War (OOTW) focus, it essentially leaves the application of operational art in a COIN environment up to individual interpretation by the planners. The DIME, plus paramilitary and civic actions, are integrated to serve as the basis for the arrangement of related operations necessary for analysis of a COIN campaign plan (Figure 4).

Conventional campaign plans orient on the adversary’s centers of gravity, protect friendly centers of gravity, synchronize simultaneous employment of all available land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces, define an end state, mission success, and mission termination criteria, and serve as the basis for subordinate planning.\(^ {57}\) All of these aspects of a campaign plan are incorporated into the

\(^{54}\) Described in the Preface of each publication on page i.
\(^{55}\) Joint Publication 5-0, IV-1.
\(^{56}\) Ibid.
\(^{57}\) Ibid., IV-2.
concept of the operation (CONOPs) or the concept for their sustainment.\textsuperscript{58} The considerations for developing a campaign plan include (Figure 5): military conditions (objectives) required to accomplish the strategic objective (ends); sequence of actions most likely to produce those conditions (ways); resources necessary to accomplish that sequence of actions (means); and the likely cost to the joint force of performing that sequence of actions (risk).\textsuperscript{59}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{campaign_plan.png}
\caption{Campaign Plan = Objectives + Sequence of Actions + Resources + Cost (Strategy) = (Ends) (Ways) (Means) (Risk)}
\end{figure}

Joint Publication 5-0 says campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of major combat operations, but it can also serve as an effective methodology for situations other than war.\textsuperscript{60} The interagency aspect of campaign planning is especially relevant for COIN. Doctrine encourages the use of campaign planning principles for COIN, but the operational concept must be adapted to minimize the military role and emphasize the political, economic, and civic elements. The most significant adaptation required in COIN planning is addressing Galula’s suggestion towards a primarily politically-focused approach. Adding paramilitary and civic actions from the US doctrinal definition of COIN into the campaign planning LOOs is another adjustment to Galula’s theory which increases its relevance to contemporary campaign planning doctrine.

**Selected Elements of Operational Design**

The elements of operational design help the commander visualize and shape the operational concept for the campaign.\textsuperscript{61} The key elements of operational design are: (1) understanding the strategic guidance (determining the end state and military objectives), (2) identifying the critical factors (principal adversary strengths, including the strategic centers of gravity, and weaknesses), and, (3) developing an operational concept (CONOPS) that will achieve the strategic objectives.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} Ibid., IV-3.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Ibid., IV-4.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Ibid., IV-6.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Ibid., IV-8.
\end{itemize}
The first key element, strategic guidance, defines victory or success (ends), describes the limits of using military force (ways), and allocates forces and resources (means) to achieve strategic objectives.\textsuperscript{62} Matching the military strategic objectives with the strategic political objective is one of the most important considerations in operational design. The desired end state is the thread of continuity promoting unity of effort and facilitating synchronization of the strategic objectives to the operational and tactical levels of warfare. Normally the end state includes crisis resolution, transition to a civil authority, the resumption of normal military operations, or the removal of military forces.\textsuperscript{63} In all cases, the strategic end state means the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives.\textsuperscript{64} Joint doctrine differs on what conditions are required. JP 5-0 states political and military conditions, whereas JP 3-0 is all encompassing and addresses the necessary conditions across the DIME. Not only is the military responsible for military operations, but also responsible for fulfilling a plethora of non-military tasks on behalf of the other instruments of national power, such as restoration of essential services, protection of distribution centers, and census-taking.

Campaign planners must understand both friendly and enemy critical factors, their sources of strength, and key points of vulnerability. Understanding the critical factors and translating them into the counterinsurgency environment will enable planners to identify friendly and insurgent strategic centers of gravity.\textsuperscript{65} The challenge is the difficulty of discerning the insurgent’s COG. Critical requirements are those essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects of critical capabilities that are deficient or vulnerable to neutralization or interdiction.\textsuperscript{66} Often, the insurgent’s critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities are easier to identify and will often lead to the insurgent’s COG. The higher the level of war, the less tangible and fewer centers of gravity. At the strategic level, the COG might include an alliance or coalition, national will or

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Ibid., IV-9.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} Ibid., IV-10.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Joint Publication 3-0, \textit{Doctrine for Joint Operations}, (10 September 2001), III-2.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Joint Publication 5-0, IV-12.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} Ibid., IV-13.
\end{itemize}
public support, or the insurgent leadership’s will to fight. These are fairly tangible and the government has a wealth of programs and “tools” to affect these possible COGs. If, however, insurgent ideology is the correct COG, this falls into the intangible category and is extremely difficult to “attack” with the “tools” typically associated with the military LOO. An operational COG is normally more tangible and is frequently a concentration of the insurgent’s military power. Galula moves beyond the insurgent’s military power (the clandestine apparatus and the guerrilla forces) as the center of attention and focuses on the population as the hub from which the insurgency draws its strength.

Campaign planners should never lose sight of the fact that strategic objectives must dominate the campaign planning process. Commanders will have to balance the US and HN strategic goals as they are not always the same. This balancing of US and HN strategic objectives serves as the compass for development of the concept of the operations. A CONOPS is a vision of what the commander wants to accomplish and how it will be done with the available resources. In the CONOPS, use of COGs, DPs, and phasing are critical.

Conventional campaign planning doctrine says commanders may pursue direct or indirect attacks on the adversary’s center of gravity. Indirect methods at the strategic level of war include denying outside support from allies, undermining public support for the war, and breaking up adversary alliances. Indirect attacks at the operational level aim to divide the enemy combat forces, destroy his reserves or base of operations, prevent external reinforcement, reduce the adversary’s operational reach, isolate the combat forces from their command and control, and suppress protective functions like air defense. But in a COIN environment, campaign planners may find the indirect approach offers the most successful method to exploit insurgent critical vulnerabilities by affecting the decisive points.

Decisive points are the key to attacking or protecting centers of gravity. Decisive points may be a place, an event, or an enabling system that provides an advantage over the adversary and greatly

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67 Ibid., IV-14.
68 Ibid., IV-17.
69 Ibid., IV-19.
influences the outcome of an attack. Normally there are many more decisive points in an area of operations than can be attacked or protected with the forces and capabilities available. As such, planners need to recognize the context of the crisis and array only those DIMEPC actions that are significant. Synchronizing DIMEPC actions to maximize effects at the decisive time and place is one of the government’s critical capabilities facilitated by proper sequencing and phasing of operations. Lines of operations define the orientation of decisive points through each phase of the campaign to achieve the government’s strategic objective.

Phases are a logical way of organizing a combination of actions when more than one major operation is required to obtain a strategic objective. Phasing is generally event-driven rather than time-driven, and meshing the sequence of phases is best achieved by a combination of forward and reverse planning. In a COIN context, the operational commander orchestrates all the elements of DIMEPC along LOOs. Phasing must address sustainment of the integrated campaign plan. Similarly, phasing must permit the flexibility to exploit insurgent vulnerabilities along any LOO (branches) or adapt to unforeseen outcomes (sequels).

In both conventional operations and COIN operations, the CONOPS is the principle opportunity for the military to demonstrate operational art because the CONOPS is the only element of operational design that is not wholly dictated by strategic guidance. Political leadership will often dictate the limits of military force, but rarely direct how the military masses effects across the DIMEPC against the insurgent’s critical vulnerabilities. Creativity, ambiguity, and deception should be pursued during campaign planning, while discernible patterns and predictability avoided. The joint intellectual effort to correctly identify the insurgents’ COG creates an opportunity for military commanders to demonstrate

70 Ibid., IV-20.
71 Ibid., IV-26.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., IV-22.
74 Ibid., IV-23.
75 Ibid., IV-22.
cunning, as it “is the essence of operational art, at its best.” A CONOPS that provides an operational framework to visualize the commander’s strategy, yet cunning enough to deceive the insurgent, also provides the campaign plan a comprehensive view of the theater.

While JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, states that campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of a major theater of war, we’ve seen how the tools and methodology of campaign planning can be applied to operations other than war. The three campaign plan concepts which follow will expand this idea and demonstrate how a planner might extrapolate conventional theory and doctrine to an unconventional environment. Current doctrine emphasizes the importance and difficulty of gaining and maintaining a political consensus among the leaders, nations, and organizations involved, but falls short of conceptualizing an insurgency or COIN using doctrinal campaign plan design. The author addresses this conceptual shortfall by progressing from Galula’s template of an insurgency in current doctrinal design, through Galula’s concept to counter that specific insurgency, to the author’s extrapolation of Galula’s COIN concept.

**Galula’s Insurgency Campaign Plan Concept**

In the spirit of Sun Tzu’s maxim, “know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundreds battles you will never be in peril,” a look at Galula’s view of an insurgency is in order before developing a plan to counter the insurgent’s efforts. Galula’s view of an insurgency following the Orthodox Pattern is conceptually depicted in Figure 6 using current campaign design elements.

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78 Ibid., I-6.
Galula's Insurgency Campaign Plan Concept – Orthodox Pattern

Figure 6.
The Orthodox Pattern was described earlier, so only a few elements of operational design are discussed, including: phasing, COGs, DPs, and critical vulnerabilities. It is also necessary to note that the Orthodox Pattern has been used in history sparingly, perhaps because of the time it requires to form the party and unified front. Building a political party actually means engaging in the democratic process whereas the Shortcut Pattern approximates a quick, violent initial phase to gain emotional support, rather than addressing grievances representatively. The Orthodox Pattern remains nonviolent and legal for the first two stages and resorts to force in a more deliberate manner.

Of the five phases of a successful insurgency, the first, Create a Party, is the most difficult as it sets the tone for the quality of the party leadership. Following the turmoil of creating a party, specific conditions are required in the third and fourth phases to ensure success. Two conditions must be met to close out Phase II, Build a United Front. They are, the population largely won over, or at least compliant with insurgent’s cause, and a relatively safe area where the party organization is strong. Both conditions are critical to the success of the first guerrilla warfare action. Similarly, Phase IV, Movement Warfare, is unique in the insurgency because it is initiated with the first force-on-force engagement between insurgent regular forces and COIN conventional forces, instead of the more traditional strike and withdraw tactics used during the guerrilla warfare phase. Differences in phasing and weighting the main effort of a COIN will be contrasted later in the depiction of Galula’s COIN Campaign Plan Concept (Figure 7).

Each LOO listed in the insurgency campaign plan is derived from Galula’s text, although this monograph adds a Media LOO to the contemporary use of the instruments of national power: diplomatic, information, military, economic (DIME). Given that the insurgency is attempting to build a political party from the grass roots upward and the desired end state is a political change in government, the political LOO is the primary cardinal direction along which the other LOOs are arrayed. All diplomatic,

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80 Galula, 46.
81 Ibid., 48.
informational, military, media, and economic actions are synchronized toward political objectives and a political end state.

Given the political nature of an insurgency, the insurgent COG is control of the population, the party’s intended constituency. Actions across the DIME (and Media) described by Galula are listed as decisive points in the campaign plan. This is not to imply that each and every DP must be pursued, but each should at least be considered as a possibility to gain a marked advantage over the adversary. Most theaters of operation have numerous DPs, yet only a few will truly have operational or strategic significance. Even with a refinement of potential DPs there are likely to be far more DPs than can feasibly be effected with the forces and assets available. The art of identifying DPs is a critical part of planners work, as is the assessment of the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.

An insurgency following the Orthodox Pattern has three critical vulnerabilities; two that correspond to specific events, and one that remains at risk for the duration of the campaign. The first critical vulnerability is tied to initiating Phase III, Guerrilla Warfare. The danger for the insurgent is if the COIN forces mass combat power rapidly when the insurgent’s combat power is still immature. The second critical vulnerability is the insurgent’s inability to replace personnel losses. Once terrorism or combat operations begin, the insurgent recruiting effort will have to offset any casualties. This becomes even more critical in Phase IV, Movement Warfare, when the insurgency creates a regular army and attempts to increase the size of its armed force to balance COIN military and police force presence. The third critical vulnerability is the one not tied to a specific time, but instead to the enduring demand to control the population. This is an ongoing vulnerability because it is directly related to Galula’s third law of COIN warfare: support from the population is conditional. Anytime the COIN forces can convince the population they have the will, the means, and the ability to win, the insurgent is at risk of disproportionate and decisive negative actions at the hands of the population.

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82 Joint Publication 5-00.1, II-14.
83 Galula, 61.
84 Ibid., 78.
Galula’s COIN Campaign Plan Concept

With a fresh view of the insurgent’s campaign plan, the type of war embarked upon must be clearly identified. Returning to the previously cited definition of COIN serves as an appropriate starting point: the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. For the purpose of this monograph, each of these elements will define a line of operation extending the practice of using the instruments of national power from the DIME to DIMEPC. 85

Galula’s COIN Campaign Plan Concept (Figure 7) is designed in response to an insurgent following the Orthodox Pattern. Despite the Orthodox Pattern not being the predominate method followed by insurgents in the past, there is sufficient reason to believe with over 100 democratic governments in the world today, it provides an inroad for change to dissatisfied political movements. Most democracies fall short of being complete democracies and are instead semi-authoritarian regimes determined to maintain the appearance of a democracy without exposing themselves to the political risks that free competition entails. 86 A deliberate nature is their defining characteristic, which means they will typically protect their authority at all costs, regardless of where they are on the scale between an authoritarian or a democratic government. Demonstrating legitimacy with a foreign force in these regimes will prove to be especially difficult because the government’s legitimacy may already be in question. The Orthodox Pattern insurgency should find its voice in those countries that are decaying toward an authoritarian government or are stable, yet deliberately short of representative governance. Given the propensity for insurgent warfare worldwide, several specific elements of operational design as they apply to COIN are described next: phasing, COGs, critical vulnerabilities and DPs.

85 As listed previously in Figure 4, COIN Planning Actions, DIMEPC is not a doctrinal concept but the author’s application of doctrine.
Figure 7. Galula's Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan Concept – Orthodox Pattern

Military Objectives:
1. Destroy insurgency forces
2. Destroy insurgent political organizations
3. Permanent isolation of the insurgents from the population

End state - Order restored under political regime

Military Objectives – Active support of the population

Strategic Level
1. Establish contact with the people
2. Implement/enforce control measures
3. Put INS cause/problem in context and counter propaganda
4. Infiltrate the insurgency
5. Break military power of insurgents
6. Denye signal network
7. Ground support and observation
8. Mobile fighting forces
9. Reinforce loyalty and training of police and armed forces
10. Enforce blockage
11. Withdraw current benefits (public services, pensions, equal rights)
12. Adapt the judicial system to the threat
13. Show situation of COIN is better than insurgency
14. Observation
15. Transport (planes and helicopters)
16. Prevent insurgent return and track remnants
17. DA on insurgent leaders
18. ID, arrest, interrogate political agents
19. Judge insurgent political agents
20. Rehabilitate political agents that can be won over
21. Organize local elections
22. Test new leaders
23. Organize new leaders into a party
24. Separate the political programs from reforms
25. Publicize reforms locally
26. Publicize reforms nationally
27. Provide security in the AO for civilians
28. Install garrisons to protect population
29. Social work, education
30. Public works, medical assistance
31. Schools, civil engineer projects
32. Non-military tasks ISO restoring order (census, enforce movement regulations, inform the public, implement economic and social reforms)
The four phases of a campaign listed in Joint Publication 5-0 are flexible enough for conventional and unconventional planning.\textsuperscript{87} In fact, the phases seem purposely suited for the political nature of COIN warfare. Combat operations are shaping operations in the political context of COIN rather than the decisive action they are in conventional warfare. Cessation of combat operations merely sets the conditions for political and civic actions to reestablish contact with the population and instill confidence in the government—the decisive part of the campaign. Galula predicted, rightly so, that the military would have to perform a plethora of non-military tasks in support of the political end state. While the military is not the first choice for these tasks, it usually falls to them by default. Sheer presence may dictate that military personnel temporarily fulfill civilian responsibilities. Non-military tasks might include taking a census, enforcing movement regulations and curfews, informing the public in the media and person-to-person, and implementing economic and social reforms.\textsuperscript{88} With the preponderance of non-combat operations in COIN, placing the main effort on combat operations is a key potential mistake in COIN operational planning.

Identifying the adversary’s COG incorrectly is another hazard for planners as all actions are orchestrated in pursuit of this focal point.\textsuperscript{89} Even when the COG is properly identified, it must be assessed in the planning continuum, an iterative process, to ensure it has not changed. If the adversary’s COG changes throughout the campaign the COIN plan must also change. An additional consideration is if the population is the COG. While this notion defies conventional planning wisdom, it could be possible, especially if the active minority and not the masses are the group pushing political change. It is also possible for an insurgency to decapitate a political regime and replace them from the top down. The population would then have to fall in line with the new regime or else suffer the consequences. Again, the primary point to take away is that there is not a standard COG for all insurgencies. The British erroneously targeted the Boer capitals as the adversary’s centers of gravity, which incited the citizens to

\textsuperscript{87} These same phases are used in Figures 7 and 8 but discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
\textsuperscript{88} Galula, 94.
\textsuperscript{89} Auentulio J. Echevarria II, \textit{Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine – Again!}, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 1.
orchestrate Phase Two of the Boer War: guerilla warfare. Just over 100 years later, it appears that the US-led coalition in Iraq might have ended up in a similar situation.

Galula, however, templates the population as the COG for both the insurgent and the COIN. This may be due to the age of the book (writing in 1964, during the height of the Cold Ward). But the onus of gaining and retaining the active support of the population is on the COIN because the population must be convinced that the status quo is not in their best interest. The insurgent can be quite comfortable and successful with the passive compliance or submission of the population, whereas the COIN usually loses by allowing the insurgents to maintain an environment of disorder and discontent. The responsibility to restore and maintain a secure environment entails a myriad of tasks that often prove exhaustive for the resources the COIN has available. Galula says the battle for the population is the focal point for each adversary and the conditional support of the population serves as a common critical vulnerability for both adversaries.

Aside from the conditional support of the population, Galula describe three critical vulnerabilities of the COIN effort. Most immediately noticeable is the government’s perceived or actual weakness in the COIN effort. Weakness may be ignorance of guerilla warfare by the COIN leadership or demonstrated incompetence. A government unable to provide essential services, security, and stability loses the loyalty of its citizens if the insurgent can promise them a better, or at least a decent, life. Important to remember is that the insurgent has no obligation to deliver on the desired services, security, and stability, especially in the early phases of the insurgency, whereas the government is being scrutinized and judged on it’s ability to perform reliably and effectively. Responsibility is also a critical vulnerability of the COIN. “Protect and serve,” a common US civilian police organization motto, finds its equal at the government level in its responsibility to ensure respectful and humane treatment of the population. In contrast, insurgents have no such demanding responsibilities. The third critical vulnerability Galula describes is resolve. The mere presence of foreign forces supporting or conducting the COIN effort demonstrates a

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90 Galula, 27.
weakness in the government sovereignty, and calls into question its legitimacy. Foreign forces also complicate the political agenda as they reflect the consensus of their own nation; a poor showing in the COIN effort could likely lead to a withdrawal by the foreign forces and send an unintended message of victory to the insurgents.

The LOOs described in Figure 7 are based on the six actions taken by counterinsurgents as listed previously—DIMEPC. The military LOO is subdivided into space, air, land, SOF, and maritime for synchronization of the military decisive points to achieve military objectives supportive of the strategic objective.

Galula cites disrupting the economy as one method to promote disorder and discontent by the instruments.\textsuperscript{91} He describes an economic LOO when he templates the insurgent, but fails to counter it in his COIN discussion. Therefore, the economic LOO (Figure 7) is devoid of any DPs. However, several of the actions listed under the civic action LOO could contribute to progress and success in the economic stability of the subject region. Some actions apply across multiple LOOs. Alternatively, LOOs with limited roles in Galula’s concept include the maritime and air LOOs. Improved technology and globalization have increased the role of all three of these LOOs, however, in contemporary COIN warfare.

Most notable among the decisive points is the political nature of the campaign. Galula suggests that a COIN should be 80 percent political and 20 percent military.\textsuperscript{92} This is evident in the number of military and non-military decisive points to be considered by planners. The political and civic actions LOOs are the decisive operation of the campaign. Not only does the political LOO set the tone for the civilian effort, but all military assets not engaged in tracking down insurgents or providing security perform non-military tasks in support of the decisive operations (Figure 7, Decisive Point 32).

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 90.
A Contemporary COIN Campaign Plan Concept

Analysis of Galula’s COIN warfare theory demonstrates a contextual shortfall that is attributable only to its 1964 printing—modernization. Modernization has enhanced the capability of the military across the spectrum of operations through global reach, information sharing, and developments in technology. Galula’s work preceded the Internet and was also denied the lessons learned from the American experience in Vietnam and various other insurgencies since 1964. Nuclear parity and subsequent nuclear arms proliferation, the dynamics of modern revolutionary warfare, and economic interdependence have redefined the battlespace for commanders. This does not mean Galula’s concepts are irrelevant, but they need updating to address modern instruments of national power with their greater capabilities and, correspondingly, added responsibilities.

In order to modernize Galula’s COIN concept, a Contemporary COIN Campaign Plan Concept (Figure 8) updating Galula’s theory to the 21st Century is offered. It is an interpretation of US doctrinal COIN warfare and campaign plan design. It is also a checklist, with a host of decisive points, phasing, and LOOs for consideration, as opposed to a template for the future. The concept offered by this monograph is a starting point to contemporize Galula’s COIN warfare theory and is meant to frame an operational concept. Each insurgency is unique and, as such, the concept offered can be easily customized and artistically shaped to address the realities of future insurgencies.

Galula lays out a viable concept that is still relevant today, but he limits his theory by only addressing what a country needs to do internally to confront the insurgency. This reflects the prevailing view of COIN in the 1960s. Today’s COIN environment is much different. The complexities for another country assisting or leading the COIN effort are exponential. In phasing alone, the foreign COIN forces have to deploy and integrate with the HN forces/government, often after the insurgency has matured. Experience has shown that the likelihood for a swift victory for the newly arrived and inexperienced foreign COIN forces is limited. Foreign forces will usually enter an environment composed of seasoned insurgent leadership, established logistical networks across the country, and likely infiltration of all the
Figure 8.

A Contemporary Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan Concept

Phase I
Deter/Engage

Phase II
Seize Initiative / Access

Phase III
Decisive Operations

Phase IV
Transition

Lines of Operations

Diplomatic (Political)

Informational (Psychological)

Military

End state - Political Nature

End state - Political Nature

Military Objectives

1. Neutralize insurgency propaganda
2. ID and neutralize the insurgents
3. ID and neutralize the insurgent political organizations
4. Permanent isolation of the insurgents from the population
5. Create a secure environment for the other DIMEPC actions

Own Critical Vulnerabilities
1. Weak COIN effort (ignorance, incompetence)
2. HN Legitimacy
3. Resolve
4. Responsibilities (over-committed)

Decisive Points - Numbered by phase, top to bottom, then left to right

34
Decisive Points
(for A Contemporary COIN Campaign Plan Concept)

1. TSCP and MPP (w/HN IDAD Programs) - All
2. FDOs - All
3. Deploy (w/cultural awareness, COIN training and doctrine, HN Government aims) - M
4. Address local concerns to reinforce public perceptions of fairness, balance, and accountability - I, D, C
5. Review the organization of the police, armed forces for need of locally raised forces - D
6. Gain international spt and sense for coalition building - D
7. Protect government officials and others at particular risk - M, SOF
8. Impose/enforce control measures - D
9. Put INS cause/problem in context and counter propaganda - I
10. SR - Space, Air, SOF, Maritime
11. Combat actions, IO, and STOs to break military power of insurgents - Land, Air, Maritime, SOF
12. FID (w/HN IDAD Programs) - SOF
13. Establish conditions for entry of US/Multinational forces - SOF
14. Infiltrate the insurgency - P
15. Increase respect for HN law enforcement, legitimacy - SOF
16. Curtail external spt, including cross-border sanctuary - D, E
17. Withdraw current benefits (public services, pensions, equal rights) - D
18. Draft emergency legislation specific to the insurgency to adapt the judicial system for the police and military - D
19. Attack the insurgents will - SOF, I, D
20. Show situation of COIN is better than insurgency - I
21. Inform public of available services (water, medical, shelter, sanctuary) - SOF, I
22. Reduce effectiveness of rumors and disinformation - SOF, I
23. Dense signal network - Space
24. Observation - Space
25. Air Superiority - Air

26. Ground support and observation - Air
27. Air supremacy - Air
28. Air interdict insurgency supply routes - Air
29. Mobile fighting forces destroy/expel guerrilla forces - Land
30. Resettlement - Land, SOF
31. Reinforce loyalty and training of police and armed forces - SOF
32. DA on insurgent leaders - SOF
33. Enforce blockage - Maritime
34. Naval supremacy - Maritime
35. ID, arrest, interrogate political agents - P
36. Facilitate civil order - P, D, SOF
37. Prepare population for and organize elections - SOF, D
38. Test new leaders - D
39. Organize new leaders into a party - D
40. Separate the political programs from reforms - D
41. Publicize reforms locally - I
42. Publicize reforms nationally - I
43. Provide security in the AO to civilians - Land, Air, SOF
44. Non-military task ISO restoring order (census, enforce movement regulations, inform the public, implement economic and social reforms) - Air, Land, SOF, Maritime
45. Prevent insurgent return and track remnants - Land
46. Install garrisons to protect the population - SOF, Land
47. Support CMO - SOF, Land, Air, Maritime
48. Judge insurgent political agents - P
49. Rehabilitate political agents that can be won over - P
50. Social work, education - C
51. Public works, medical assistance - D
52. Schools, civil engineer projects - C
53. Establish civil control - P, D
54. Self-sustaining security - P, D
55. Facilitate exit conditions for US/Coalition forces - All
56. Redeploy - Space, Air, Land, SOF, Maritime
57. Revised TSCP and MPP (w/HN IDAD Programs) - All
branches of the population control machine; the political structure, administrative bureaucracy, police, and armed forces. Foreign forces typically enter the conflict unable to see, understand, or gain the initiative, and a decisive victory is therefore more likely for the insurgent than the COIN.\textsuperscript{93}

American forces attempt to mitigate the risk of entering the conflict too late by maintaining a modicum of situational awareness through the TSCP. In contrast to GEN Tommy Franks’ description of a need for a Phase 0 (zero), preparatory tasks should have been inherent in his TSCP as the CENTCOM Commander and progressed nearly seamlessly with the initiation of Phase I.\textsuperscript{94} In Figure 8, each of the six LOOs begin in Phase I and end Phase IV, with at least a monitoring role in the TSCP. Each phase is described next to demonstrate the flexibility of joint doctrine to array a large number of forces for both combat and non-combat operations.\textsuperscript{95}

In Phase I, Deter/Engage, actions are taken to define the crisis and gain situational awareness. The DOD TSCP, DOS MPPs and Flexible Deterrents Options (FDOs) are the primary resources by which the US remains engaged in the region. On-going FID operations aimed at the host nation’s IDAD program also serve as useful starting points. Preliminary sensing for coalition building would also be exercised early in the campaign.

Phase II, Seize Initiative, assumes gaining access to the theater infrastructure and integration with the host nation forces. It also requires friendly freedom of maneuver and the ultimate objective of forcing the adversary to culminate; quite likely in the form of combat operations and special technical operations. Combat action endeavors to force the insurgent to commit to stand and fight or flee and possibly lose control of the population to the COIN forces. When the insurgent does not dictate the time and location of engagement, which he traditionally does, he loses the initiative.

In Phase III, Decisive Operations, the predominant tasks are of a political and civic action nature, as insurgency is a political movement. Security must be maintained and some combat may continue to

\textsuperscript{93} US Army White Paper, Concepts for the Objective Force. 
\textsuperscript{95} Joint Publication 3-0, III-18.
establish the dominant force capability, but the focus is not on military matters. Combat forces are seeking an overmatching force to destroy the adversary, but the true measure of success is the destruction of the adversary’s will to fight (Clausewitz’ moral force) across the range of operations.

Phase IV, Transition, establishes civil control and rule of law before redeployment. At this phase in the COIN plan, the insurgent party has been destroyed and prevented from returning at the same time strengthening the resolve and capability of the government. Troops may be withdrawn when the host nation military and security forces are self-sustaining. US forces will continue to interact with the host nation through the TSCP and FID on its IDAD programs.

While maintaining situational awareness through the TSCP and FID reduces the inherent risk of foreign forces entering another nation, it does not negate it nor suggest that an ongoing relationship will enable the adversary’s COG to be readily identifiable. United Kingdom COIN doctrine is steeped in history and comprehensive theory that provides a sound base to articulate the adversary’s COG. Key to determining an appropriate response are examination of (1) the root cause(s) of the insurgency, (2) the extent of support it enjoys (both internally and externally), (3) the insurgent’s depth of commitment, (4) their likely weapons and tactics, and (5) the operational environment they seek to create and develop in their campaign. Assessing the insurgency as a complex system allows planners and commanders to recognize both the proverbial trees and forest. Products of the assessment include identifying the critical vulnerabilities for friendly and adversary forces as well as the supporting decisive points.

Numerous decisive points are listed in the concept to provide a range of characteristics to build a more accurate picture of the thinking behind a COIN campaign plan. While this list is not exhaustive, it does reinforce the doctrinal notion that there are more DPs than assets available to attack or defend them. It also reinforces the dynamic nature of COIN problems and recognizes there is more than one contributing factor with operational and strategic significance. Identifying an array of DPs allows

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planners and commanders the most flexibility by prioritizing and sequencing branches, sequels, and operational pauses as needed.

CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS

Conceptualizing a COIN Campaign Plan

Current doctrinal campaign plan design is applicable to unconventional warfare, at least for an insurgency or counterinsurgency. Extrapolating Galula’s theories on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies and accurately conceptualizing them with several of the elements of operational design (see Figure 8) demonstrate doctrinal relevance. Galula predated US joint doctrine on campaign planning by over 30 years, but clearly addressed phasing, COGs, DPs, and critical vulnerabilities in his writing.

These four elements are part of the common language operational planners and commanders use to describe a campaign plan. It is the commonality of the language that enables the commander to clearly articulate his vision for victory and direct actions toward that vision. While these four elements are not the only noteworthy elements of operational design, they do serve as fundamental starting points in telling the story behind a military campaign. The framework planners design has to work sequentially from C-day (deployment day) to redeployment, but it also has to be a product of reverse planning. The plan must begin with the end in mind. A COIN plan aims to restore a political regime’s legitimacy, a political action.

Unfortunately for the military, a political end state will often be vague and increase situational uncertainty. Strategic aims are by necessity ambiguous, for politicians need room for diplomatic negotiation and ambiguity provides this room.97 An unclassified and published national security strategy is important for what it says, but also for what is does not say explicitly. Diplomats, the President of the

United States naturally being one, have to negotiate from a position of strength and as such fear revealing concessions too early. An example of this with military applications is an unwillingness to publicize the degree of acceptable violence or casualties in any crisis. In a supporting role, the military has a responsibility to educate its political leadership on the dynamics of military actions, as well as continually soliciting clear guidance from strategic leaders.

Lieutenant General James M. Dubik emphasized the importance of the interaction between military and political leaders when he described the three parts of the intellectual component of a successful campaign plan as a lieutenant colonel on a School of Advanced Military Studies Fellowship. The plan must have clear, achievable strategic aims and supporting operational objectives. The plan must be coherent and express the unitary vision of the commander. And the plan must properly use the correct principles and campaign design concepts. Dubik’s first component relies on the quality of interaction between the military and the politicians. The next two components refer to a common language for communicating the campaign. In this manner, this monograph has attempted to move beyond the conventional application of the DIME as LOOs to encompass the six doctrinal actions of a COIN (DIMEPC). A critical vulnerability of this monograph was to rely solely on doctrine as the foundation for envisioning the LOOs. Doctrine was the starting point and as such a more sophisticated approach would have compared and contrasted COIN theory and history to synthesize more predictive LOOs.

As discussed in Chapter 4, phases and LOOs give structure and provide a means to sequentially portray actions leading to the strategic aim. However, a strictly sequential portrayal is misleading in a COIN plan because insurgents in what Galula calls “red areas” will need to be dealt with differently from a neighboring “white” or secure area at any given time throughout the campaign. But phases do allow the commander to synchronize a large number of force and capabilities in mutually supporting activities. The phases will likely be determined to counter a templated insurgent activity and what the government determines as its decisive operation may be a supporting effort at the strategic level. For example,

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98 Ibid., Dubik is currently I Corps Commander.
99 Joint Publication 3-0, III-18.
Special Text 3-05.206, *Counter Urban Insurgency Planning Guide*, defines three necessary conditions for an effective insurgency: (1) popular discontent, (2) leadership, and (3) lost confidence in the government.\(^{100}\) COIN planners need to identify effects the COIN forces can achieve to counter these three conditions. Key tasks include neutralizing adversary propaganda, identify and neutralize the insurgents, separate the insurgents from the population, and create a secure environment.\(^{101}\) These tasks may appear to be sequential in nature, but simultaneous execution is more likely to counter the range of insurgent activities throughout the theater of operations. Phasing is a useful construct when used in conjunction with COGs and supporting DPs.

HN legitimacy is a concern in COIN planning for foreign forces and serves as one of the guiding principles in assessing a COG. The COG is magnetic north for synergy across the national instruments of power. DPs are the incremental steps toward the strategic aim with the COG in mind. These elements of current campaign plan design provide part of the common language that makes the doctrinal framework useful, but the greatest challenge is for planners and commanders to put their crisis in context.

### Contextualizing a COIN Campaign Plan

In order for operational planners and commanders to put their crisis in context they have to apply the concepts of campaign design by keeping the end in mind (the strategic aim) and describing the plan relative to the adversary and the environment. By keeping the end in mind, operational commanders can ensure they are perfecting, or at least focusing on, the operational art instead of micromanaging the tactical fight.

The purpose of this monograph was to extrapolate Galula’s COIN warfare theory to determine if current US military campaign plan design was applicable in unconventional warfare. The monograph drew its conclusions from a snapshot of doctrine, theory, and history. The COIN campaign plan concept described here is not doctrine, but a modification based on the author’s attempt to depict a specific

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\(^{100}\) Introductory letter by Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert.

\(^{101}\) Ibid.
relationship between theory and application. The three campaign plan concepts were presented to illustrate ways to organize information, conduct analysis, and check synchronization within a campaign plan.

Before analyzing a campaign, planners must be clear about what a campaign is. LTG Dubik’s work moves planners beyond the doctrinal definition of a campaign (Chapter 1) and the depiction in Figure 5 to state that a campaign is an expression of operational art. Campaign planning is a tool to link the tactical and the strategic levels of war. Therefore, the success of a campaign plan is determined by how well the strategic aims are facilitated.

In regards to strategic guidance and situational awareness, planners have to move beyond the TSCP and be politically astute enough to recognize the integrated nature of international relations. This refers to interagency coordination and recognizing that the mission of the military is short-term while the Department of State has a commitment to maintain relations with a country. A growing appreciation for the brief nature of military operations may be founded on a situational understanding of the DOD’s Security Cooperation Guidance and the DOS Mission Performance Plan (MPP) for each country in the crisis region. The MPP puts the crisis in context by providing a starting point for a social investigation and an area assessment.

The other key contextual caveat is to address the reality on the ground. To paraphrase Mao, “...just as the cobbler should shape the shoe to fit the foot so as to allow a person to walk well, the campaign planner should fit the plan to the specific situation he faces to attain strategic aims.” The point is not to identify a COG just to have one or to list an array of DPs and critical vulnerabilities, but to actively engage in the intellectual effort to consider only those DPs that are operationally or strategically significant. This is not necessarily meant to encourage the devil’s advocate or constrain the collaborative effort to planning canon or tribal lore, but to wade into the fog of uncertainty and expend the energy required to simplify the complexity into discernable patterns or behaviors.

102 Dubik, 5.
103 Ibid., 8.
The HN COIN plan and military strategy are critical to contextualizing an effective plan.\(^{104}\) IDAD programs are a key inroad to understanding the HN’s infrastructure capability. Dr. Steven Metz, at the US Army Strategic Studies Institute, combines the major non-combat functions of FID into four programs: security assistance, intelligence, PSYOPS, and Civil Affairs. These four programs must be fully integrated to overcome the “bifurcated and transitional nature of planning responsibility.”\(^{105}\) Identifying how the military can best employ Dr. Metz’ four tools of COIN is conditional on an understanding of the HN situation. Interagency and DOD actions need to be synchronized. The joint effort must agree on a coherent method if political, economic, and military resources are to change repeatedly from supporting to supported roles and back again.

HN IDAD programs serve as the framework for synchronized efforts across the DIMEPC functions. IDAD programs consist of four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats: balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization. The primary premise for IDAD programs is that there is some attempt by the host nation government to promote its own growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.\(^{106}\) Each of these four functions may be addressed in a COIN campaign plan following the six LOOs proposed (DIMEPC) (see Figure 9).

IDAD programs attempt to address the reality that public support grows from actions. Public support comes from effective political leadership using information, economic, and civic actions beyond those of military activities. In Haiti, during Operation Uphold Democracy, Special Forces were able to

\(^{104}\) Steven Metz, “Counterinsurgent Campaign Planning,” *Parameters* 19, no. 3 (September 1989): 65.
\(^{105}\) Ibid, 64, 66-67.
\(^{106}\) Joint Publication 3-07.1, B-1.
hear what the people needed by gathering “street rhythms”\textsuperscript{107} This ability to sense and respond demonstrated active resolve to address the crisis and the public could attribute positive environmental changes to US presence.

Another obstacle to contextualizing a COIN plan is the daunting task of synchronizing actions against the insurgents and actions on behalf of the population in many geographical areas. This difficulty was already addressed in conceptualizing a COIN plan above (Figures 6-8), but the complexity of the crisis cannot be understated. Even if the insurgent supported the COIN plan, the COIN leadership would have no guarantee of success if it could not adequately integrate its capabilities and resources with those of the HN. Any success would still be contingent upon orchestrating the COIN effort alongside a local populace faced with varying degrees of insurgent influence.

A planner should use the Contemporary COIN Campaign Plan Concept (Figure 8) as a starting point. An assessment of HN IDAD programs and effectively integrating capabilities and resources across the DIMEPC are critical to envisioning a viable COIN campaign plan. There is limited value to operational design if the campaign plan fails to address the situational context.

**Recommendations**

Recommendations for the future focus on one specific COIN critical vulnerability—weakness of the COIN effort. Four topics for further development have surfaced through the research and analysis process: end state, HN capabilities, research, and operational experience.

“If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.”\textsuperscript{108} Beginning with the end in mind in a COIN, a political aim, and then adhering in thought and deed to that aim is operational art. Liddell-Hart echoed Clausewitz’ sentiment and went


further and emphasized an even greater risk in any war that is waged by a coalition. He argued that coalitions complicate achieving a negotiated settlement because what is just and wise for one nation will not always be so for some of the other nations of the coalition. Given that coalitions are the norm today, the ambiguity of political aims within one’s own nation and within the context of a coalition of nations, adds to the uncertainty and complexity of operational planning.

Beginning with the end in mind often means taking a long-term approach to resolving a crisis. By adhering to the preeminence of political and civic action over military action, long-term aims in COIN will provide a stronger foundation for winning the peace and not just the war. Winning the support of the population is more of a war of ideas than a war of destruction. As such, the operational commander must recognize that his military role in COIN operations as a supporting one.\textsuperscript{109} In this manner, COIN requires greater application of moral force than physical force. This is contrary to Clausewitz’s assertion that the moral force is irrelevant in war.\textsuperscript{110}

Clausewitz relegates moral force to simply the state and the law, yet he is very precise about defining war as an extension of politics. As such, other aspects of politics, the law and the state, are contributors to the whole political macrocosm. Law, state, and war are not separate, but integral elements which planners and commanders must consider alongside diplomats, politicians, and law enforcement professionals. The dismissal of the moral force as extraneous, especially in a contest over the population and ideology, is an attempt to solve the problem myopically. The US Army’s lionization of Clausewitz has perpetuated its obsession with “destroying stuff,” only to have to rebuild civilian infrastructure after conflict termination. America’s military planning seems to trivialize the moral force and instead relies on physical force, at the risk of repeating history. Escalation of conventional warfare to nuclear parity and now nuclear arms proliferation has given rise to asymmetric or unconventional warfare. Moral force is of primal importance as the world engages in more and more asymmetric clashes of civilizations and

\textsuperscript{109} Patricia J. Bushway, \textit{The Role of the Operational Commander in Counterinsurgency}, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1993), 32.
passionate ideological struggles. Beginning with the end in mind, it is clear that the moral approach is the long-term answer to address the current and future propensity towards revolutionary warfare. On the other hand, focusing on physical force appears to be a shortsighted approach. Galula’s COIN theory is based on several assumptions about the nature of revolutionary warfare and prerequisites for a successful insurgency. As assumptions go, they have to be continually reviewed for fact or falsehood and relevance to the end state.

The second recommendation of this monograph is that the HN’s legitimacy must remain foremost. Doctrine already supports this idea and experience shows it is easier to commit the military to entering another country than to extract it. By analyzing and focusing on HN COIN methods and HN military strategy, operational planners may ensure unity of effort. In order to restore or boost the population’s confidence in its government and security forces, the HN must have a leading role in the COIN campaign. Over-committing a foreign military relieves the host nation from its legitimate obligation to serve and protect its own people. Supplementing the HN efforts should be the rule rather than substituting for the HN. Police and host nation armed forces must maintain responsibility for security operations. Keeping the HN capabilities and resources at the fore meets long-term objectives of national stability rather than short-term demonstrations of combat power as an illusion of COIN progress.

Thirdly, continuing research on insurgency and COIN is necessary. Research should focus on mass movement theory and small wars history to identify patterns, to identify what a COG may be or when it may change and why it changes. History may be useful to revise doctrine, but it also enables the planner to identify an assortment of decisive points. It is the actual application of doctrine, the joint intellectual effort of operational art, which will enable planners and commanders to contextualize their environment. A broad exposure to history provides a variety of situational exposures and hones the ability to decipher subtle or abnormal, yet operationally and strategically significant, decisive points that will provide an advantage over the adversary or greatly influence the outcome.

Research must include the lessons learned from mistakes, but also overcome the natural reluctance to find lessons in successful operations. In *The Defence of Duffer’s Drift*, a British army
captain has six dreams in which he prepares a terrain-oriented defense in the Boer War.\footnote{111}{E.D. Swinton, *The Defence of Duffer's Drift*, (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, Inc. 1986).} Each dream ends in defeat and subsequent lessons learned until a successful defense in the sixth dream. The captain learns 22 lessons through the fifth dream and the book ends as soon as one way is found to accomplish the task at hand. This approach reinforces doing just enough to get by and not addressing the variety of methods, contributing factors, or a long-term solution set. COIN planning requires a more systems analysis approach because as soon as one way is identified to effectively defeat an adaptive insurgent, it doesn’t.

United Kingdom COIN doctrine appears to already be a product of such a comprehensive analytical research effort. Other sources of study should include primary accounts from the perspective of the insurgent, like Mao Zedong, T.E. Lawrence, and Christian DeWet (Boer War). One interesting topic for further development is the notion of negotiating with insurgents. This is not to imply making concessions, but to engage in dialogue.\footnote{112}{Based on a conversation about the current doctrine and application of COIN in the Philippines with LTC Roy Devesa, an infantry officer in the Philippine Army, 28 November 2004.} Given the protracted and political nature of insurgency, negotiation, even from a position of power, is a risky prospect but not without purpose.

The final recommendation of this monograph is for US military leaders to consider the protracted operational environment of an insurgency when determining troop rotations. Guerrillas build operational experience and strengthen their party during their campaign, whereas foreign soldiers typically rotate home at a predetermined date without regard for the situation on the ground. Instead of staying in country until the job is done, commanders and entire units sever relations with a contested population and essentially force fresh arrivals to learn anew. While this may alleviate the conscience of the American public it does not further the strategic aim and is ultimately a failure to demonstrate operational art. Leaving the country before the job is finished also makes it difficult for commanders to take ownership in the long-term objectives of the plan.
CONCLUSION

This monograph has demonstrated that current US military campaign design can be applied to counterinsurgent warfare if primary consideration is taken of the non-military elements of planning. The joint doctrine serves as a useful starting point to conceptualize a plan to counter an insurgency. Its primary value is providing the common language for planners and commanders to communicate effectively during the campaign planning, execution, and assessment processes.

Application of doctrine alone does not address how to put the plan into context though. David Galula’s COIN theory and the Boer War have served as examples of theory and history to contextualize the plan. In applying operational art, planners and commanders must use history, theory, and doctrine collaboratively. To deny a review of history is to fail to learn the lessons of previous campaigns. Ignoring theory limits the ability to anticipate the actions of the enemy. Discarding doctrine leads to a failure to adapt to the warfighting circumstances. An ongoing collaboration between these three components ensures a joint intellectual effort that will result in better predictive analysis for the staff and greater flexibility for the commander.

The doctrinal review demonstrated that a wealth of COIN resources exists to better prepare operational planners and commanders for COIN operations. Galula is a comprehensive theorist whose COIN theories should be considered for inclusion in future joint publication revisions. His Orthodox Pattern departs from the norm by looking beyond Maoist Peoples’ Protracted War insurgencies. Instead, Galula sets a clear mark for planning future COIN operations against the increased likelihood of insurgencies following an Orthodox Pattern in semi-authoritarian countries. Additionally, United Kingdom COIN doctrine has a rich history and operational experience from which to draw input. Continued US efforts must also attempt to incorporate Information Operations as a core competency into campaign planning and assess its influence on combat actions.

113 Special Text 3-05.206 and DA Pamphlet 550-104 are not doctrinal, but are especially relevant.
This monograph has suggested a process to visualize, describe, and direct COIN campaign planning. Perhaps the Contemporary COIN Campaign Plan Concept may serve as a simplified tool to conceptualize the potential for the System of Systems Analysis using an Operational Net Assessment as the common language for Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters in 2005.\textsuperscript{114} It has attempted to be predictive, but not mistaken, as the definitive COIN campaign design concept. Instead, its aim was to serve as a compass by pointing in one direction supported by history, theory, and doctrine.

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