The United States once again demonstrated its capability to defeat any nation state’s military forces as evidenced by the actions of the Joint Forces of the United States in the decisive victory in Iraq. However, we see that the decisive phase of the campaign was not the Major Combat Operation but the follow on Stability and Reconstruction Operation. The Members of Congress and others are asking questions as we complete the task in Iraq and continue to fight the Global War on Terror. Chief among the questions is the question that deals with the Army’s structure and organization. The author demonstrates that the most appropriate solution is a full spectrum general-purpose force and not a dedicated special purpose force. The analysis is by the use of a theoretical model and an assessment along lines of operation and measures of effectiveness.
Title of Monograph: Full Spectrum Forces or Special Purpose Forces? A strategic Decision

Approved by:

__________________________________  Monograph Director
Alice Butler-Smith, Ph.D.

__________________________________  Director,
Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR
School of Advanced Military Studies

__________________________________  Director,
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
Graduate Degree Programs
Abstract

Full Spectrum Forces or Special Purpose Forces? A Strategic Decision by LTC Tim Parks, 46 pages

The United States once again demonstrated its capability to defeat any nation state’s military forces as evidenced by the actions of the Joint Forces of the United States in the decisive victory in Iraq. However once again, we see that the decisive phase of the campaign was not the Major Combat Operation but the follow on Stability and Reconstruction Operation. The United States has won the battle to replace the regime in Iraq but the outcome of the war to establish a stable and pro-liberty regime remains a question as of this time. The Members of Congress and others are asking questions as we complete the task in Iraq and continue to fight the Global War on Terror. Chief among the questions is the one that deals with the Army’s structure and organization.

The question of the best structure for Stability and Reconstruction Operations has sparked the debate on the best way for the Army to proceed in the Global War on Terror. There are two schools of thought: first, the Army should dedicate a portion of its forces to execute Stability and Reconstruction Operations, while the second, argues the Army should, through modularity, increase the capability of the total force to conduct Stability and Reconstruction Operations.

The Army Chief of Staff (CSA) stood up Army Focus Area Stability Operations to review the arguments, provide the Army Staff with an overview, and offer a solution based on independent study and comprehensive in its process. The author participated in Task Force Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations and this paper documents the process that was used to consider the question of, “What is the most appropriate force structure for the Army as we continue to execute Stability and Reconstruction Operations”?

In this monograph, two opposing perspectives are examined and assessed. The idea that the Army should dedicate a portion of its forces to Stability and Reconstruction Operations and the idea that the Army should make itself more capable through modularity and maintain a general purpose force. The author argues that the most appropriate solution is a full spectrum general-purpose force and not a dedicated special purpose force. The theoretical model used in this paper and developed by Task Force Stability and Reconstruction Operations allows the reader to frame the relationship between the elements of national power and the spectrum of operations. An assessment of each proposal along lines of operation and measures of effectiveness argues for the author’s conclusion and recommendation. The author concludes the document by suggesting areas that require further study and recommendations for the Army’s way ahead as it determines the most appropriate structure to conduct Stability and Reconstruction Operations.
Table of Contents

Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... iv
Table of Figures............................................................................................................................... v
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
   Method of Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 3
Chapter 1. Task Force Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations ...................... 3
   Background.................................................................................................................................. 4
   Key Accomplishments................................................................................................................. 7
   The Framework for the Effort ..................................................................................................... 8
   The Security Environment ......................................................................................................... 9
   What are Stability and Reconstruction Operations?............................................................... 10
   The Model ............................................................................................................................... .. 11
   Key Terms and Definitions ....................................................................................................... 16
   Measures of Effectiveness ......................................................................................................... 17
   Conclusion............................................................................................................................... .. 18
Chapter 2. The argument for Special Purpose Forces. .................................................................. 19
   Background............................................................................................................................... .1 9
   Analysis ............................................................................................................................... ...... 24
   Conclusion............................................................................................................................... .. 29
Chapter 3 The Modular Army and Full Spectrum Capability ....................................................... 29
   Background............................................................................................................................... .2 9
   Analysis ............................................................................................................................... ...... 33
   Conclusion............................................................................................................................... .. 37
Conclusion............................................................................................................................... ...... 38
   Current Situation of TF AFA S&RO ......................................................................................... 39
   Recommendations ................................................................................................................... 41
Bibliography............................................................................................................................... ... 45
Table of Figures

Figure 1-CSA guidance and Task Force Essential tasks ................................................................. 5
Figure 2-Task Force Model ........................................................................................................... 12
Figure 3-Range of Military Operations ......................................................................................... 31
Introduction

The goal is Full Spectrum Dominance—the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations.\(^1\)

Recently the author reviewed the argument that the US Army should designate a portion of the force to be trained, equipped, organized and specifically dedicated to conducting Stability and Reconstruction Operations. The context from which this argument emerged is the current operations by the US military as it continues Global War on Terror (GWOT). From this review process it became apparent that Special Purpose Forces are not appropriate for the US Army in the Contemporary Operational Environment and that Full Spectrum Forces with modular capabilities are the most appropriate for conducting Stability and Reconstruction Operations. The Army is not well served by forces that are designated against a limited number of Operations in the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). Additionally, specifying units against particular operations in the spectrum of conflict is equally inadvisable. Recently, several opinions proposing the creation of Special Purpose Forces provoked both discourse within and formal inquiry by the US Army. One idea in particular has gained some support and that is to designate a portion of the Army as a dedicated Stability Operations Force. This idea was included as a requirement to the Army by the Defense Strategic Planning Guidance (DSPG), and directed the Army to develop special purpose forces for conducting stability operations or demonstrate with modular forces the capability to adequately address stability operations. This paper describes the author’s conclusion and the conclusion of Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations.

The Defense Strategic Planning Guidance requires the Army to address this issue within the context of Transformation.\(^2\) There are several significant studies and articles written that indicate

---

\(^1\) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy. Department of Defense., p viii.
there was a strong desire by some for the Army to approach the Contemporary Operating Environment with an alternative approach to training, equipping and organizing its forces for the Range of Military Operations. One of the strongest arguments was made by Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, who published, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations in April 2004. Additionally the Senate testimony of Anthony H. Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published as, The “Post Conflict” Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan in May 2004, also recommended dedicated forces for stability operations. Both propose the idea that a portion of the Army’s structure should be dedicated to Stability Operations in a post conflict environment. In January 2005, the CSA stood up three additional Army Focus Areas (AFAs), to augment the sixteen established previously. The new Focus Areas that were established are Homeland Defense, Irregular Challenges, and Stability Operations. Training and Doctrine Command has the task of conducting two of the three focus areas and the Combined Arms Center has taken the lead for Army Focus Area Stability Operations. Each Focus area was formed with a general officer to lead it, and Stability Operations was formed with the Deputy Commandant of Command and General Staff College as the Director, and students from the School of Advanced Military Studies as the initial force to frame the problem. The specific tasks assigned to Focus Area Stability Operations were to provide an answer to the question: Which is more appropriate for the US Army to have as it conducts Stability and Reconstruction Operations, Special Purpose Forces dedicated to Stability Operations or General Purpose Forces with modular capabilities? Other tasks included identifying the required capabilities by the US Army to conduct Stability Operations; define what capability the Modular Army currently has thus delineating where the shortfall might be; and finally to provide initial recommendations for overcoming areas of shortfall as well as capabilities required but not currently existing.

Transformation is the title of the efforts by DOD and the Army to change the organization, structure, and direction of the force to remain relevant and ready to the nation.
Method of Analysis

The first chapter sets out a model that offers a way of thinking about the environment of which stability operations is a part. The model also demonstrates how the author, as a member of Task Force Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations approached the requirement to answer the questions posed by the Defense Strategic Planning Guidance. Chapter One details the roadmap developed by the Task Force and a portion of the research that led to the model that provided the framework for the thinking about this issue. In Chapter Two the author outlines the argument made in several significant works, including studies done by NDU and CSIS that proposed the Army transition some of its forces to Special Purpose Forces for Stability and Reconstruction Operations. Chapter Two describes the research done by NDU and CSIS resulting in the recommendation to establish a dedicated force structure for Stability Operations, and assesses the argument in relation to the lines of operation and measures of effectiveness. Chapter Three examines the argument for General Purpose Forces and assesses the position by applying the lines of operation and measures of effectiveness. Chapter Three includes analysis by SAIC from its report Strategic Planning Guidance Study on Stability Operations, and demonstrates why the author’s thesis is valid. The conclusion provides recommendations for the Army’s way ahead on this issue and details several areas for future effort.

Chapter 1. Task Force Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations

“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few”\(^3\)

Background

The current CSA assumed duty in 2003 and established sixteen focus areas to energize Army Transformation and provide recommendations in order to accelerate the solution sets to the problems through which the Army is working. In 2005, he established three additional Focus Areas including the ongoing focus area of Stability Operations. In January 2005, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) assigned the responsibility for AFA Stability Operations to the Combined Arms Center (CAC), and CAC further assigned the requirement to the Command, and General Staff College (CGSC). CGSC stood up Task Force Army Focus Area Stability Operations (TF AFA SO). The Deputy Commandant of CGSC continues to lead the task force, which was comprised initially of students with support of standing organizations in CAC and the Army. The core student team had a Fellow from the Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF) and four Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) students. Since January, the Task Force has undergone a number of changes in its organization as additional guidance dictated, and it is currently made up of a second year AOASF Fellow, several Army officers as well as Department of the Army civilians. The future of the Task Force is unclear, but it is expected to continue to exist here at Fort Leavenworth at least for the next year. On January 28, the Task Force provided a brief back to the CSA and gained his approval for the mission.

4DAMO-SSP, Subject: Army Focus Area Planning Directive from 2005 ASPG AFA Stability Operations. Department of the Army, “The Defense Strategic Planning Guidance tells the Army to “either create standing units focused on stability operations or develop the capability to rapidly assemble the modular force elements that achieve the same effect as standing units”. To that end the Army as a member of the Joint Force, must ensure its ability to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict, with an inherent ability to simultaneously conduct both sustained combat operations and operations to ensure stability. To achieve this goal, the Army must improve its capability to perform stability operations as a member of the joint, interagency, and multinational team. The Army must also participate in and facilitate interagency and multinational processes that seek to integrate efforts. The stability Operations focus Area Lead will identify ongoing and recommended future initiatives to increase Army capabilities to plan and conduct stability operations in a joint, interagency, and multinational context.
essential tasks of the effort. The Task Force also received additional guidance for the parameters of the effort, and clarification from the CSA on how to approach the challenge.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential Tasks</th>
<th>Restated Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Develop recommendations on whether to create standing units for S&amp;RO or focus on improving capabilities in the current force</td>
<td>TF Stability and Reconstruction Operations determines requirements for Army S&amp;RO capabilities and identifies gaps in current capabilities in order to identify initiatives to increase the Army's capability and capacity to plan &amp; conduct S&amp;RO in a JIM environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Identify gaps in current Army capabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Identify initiatives (near, short, long-term) to increase the Army's capability and capacity to plan &amp; conduct S&amp;RO in a JIM environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initial CSA Guidance

“Broad solution sets rather than detailed specific initiatives”
“Coordinate closely with Ambassador Pascual’s office”
“Include analysis of capacity as well as capability”
“Talk big to little (scope), then talk how's later”

Source: TF AFA S&RO Brief to CSA 1 April 05

Figure 1-CSA guidance and Task Force Essential tasks

The Task Force then began an intensive period of time reviewing the ongoing work including a doctrinal review of published and working doctrinal publications. As the initial Chief of Staff for the Task Force, the author developed an additional team to allow the development of a model to frame the problem and establish linkages between the Task Force and numerous resources in and out of the Army to assist the effort and shape the outcome. The first In Progress Review (IPR) to the CSA took place on 1 April, that event allowed the Task Force to provide a recommendation to the General Purpose vs. Special Purpose essential task of the Task Force. The Task Force received additional guidance to shape the ongoing Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, in
addition to providing a set of initiatives using DOTLMPF as a framework. Doctrine, Organizational, Training, Leadership and Education, Material, Personnel, and Facilities. (DOTLMPF) is the organizational format through which the Army pursues change. It is a holistic approach that accounts for the impact across the organizational and institutional Army. At present, the Task Force expects to execute another event with the CSA that should complete the first phase of the Task Force’s efforts and usher in the next phase that synchronizes the effort to execute the Task Force’s recommended initiatives over the coming years.

The Task Force developed a model to assist the effort by framing how its members thought about the problem. The model had to be adaptive enough to provide objectivity when looking at both the Special Purpose Force vs. General Purpose Force issue, as well as to assist with the additional tasks of the Task Force, including a capability and capacity analysis, and initiatives organized along the lines of DOTLMPF. The model was developed by the Task Force but was influenced by a variety of sources. The book Winning the Peace, An American Strategy for Post conflict Reconstruction, edited by Robert Orr, was significant in framing the model. Additionally the draft works of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (O/CRS), and the Joint Operational Concepts were both important influences on the model and the terminology used. After the Task Force developed the model, it traveled extensively, so members might conduct numerous vetting events with senior Army leaders and members of governmental agencies, and various academics. One of the outcomes of the coordination was changing the term

5 Joint Forces Command. Draft Joint Operating Concept for Stability Operations v 1.07. proposes four cases under which Stability Operations will be required. They are Case 1- an allied or friendly nation-state requests U.S. or multinational assistance in protecting itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Case 2- U.S. and it allies conduct major combat operations to defeat a hostile nation-state that acts in ways that are inimical to the vital or important interests of the U.S. or its allies or employs a level of coercion against its own population that exceeds accepted norms of international behavior. Case 3-U.S. and its allies intervene in a nation, or region that becomes ungovernable, collapses economically and disintegrates into sub national units under the control of warlords and their militias or worse, complete anarchy. Case 4- U.S. and its allies conduct operations to defeat a transnational non state organization, whose ideology involves significant degradation of human rights that places at risk large segments of a population and acts in ways that destabilize legitimate governments, threatens whole regions, and exceeds in accepted norms of international behavior. This is available online at http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/finalstab_joc.doc
of Stability Operations to the currently used term of Stability and Reconstruction Operations. As Task Force Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction began its work it was evident that the initial step undertaken was to gain insight into the specific problem set that was the motive for the effort, and gain a clear understanding of the body of work available in order to fully enable a comprehensive range of solutions. Key to the effort was the creation of an initial bibliography of the current works in the area of Stability and Reconstruction Operations and building an efficient organization capable of harvesting the key concepts within a very profuse source list. The Task Force had to have the ability to leverage numerous Army and civilian organizations conducting work in the area of Stability and Reconstruction Operations.

**Key Accomplishments**

From January through May 2005, the Task Force executed the tasks assigned and made some key contributions to the ongoing discussion and to the Army. Among the contributions made was adding to the dialogue within the Army as to the idea of improving capability for Stability and Reconstruction Operations. By participating in the dialogue the Task Force assisted numerous agencies as they continue to work organizations, equipment and doctrine for Stability and Reconstruction Operations. Another important contribution was the interaction with the representatives of the O/CRS. By better understanding their charter and in turn educating them with the current Army capabilities and the improvements made through modularity, the Task Force greatly assisted both Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the O/CRS with developing their doctrine in the area of interagency work groups and the composition of the O/CRS deployable elements. The Task Force has contributed to the ongoing TAA by providing a recommended list of Stability and Reconstruction Operations tasks in addition to the task list used by the TAA, and the nomination for permanent inclusion in the Army Universal Task List and the
Universal Joint Task List. Additionally, the Task Force assisted the Army Proponents with organizational recommendations to adjust the unit organizations used in the TAA. In April 2005, the Task Force provided a comprehensive rationale back to the Army Staff suggesting why the best course for the Army will remain a General Purpose Force with modular capabilities rather than a Special Purpose Force for Stability and Reconstruction Operations. Additionally, the Task Force provided a comprehensive list of initiatives to improve Army capabilities.

**The Framework for the Effort**

Historically the United States has participated in numerous operations that fit within the current understanding of Stability and Reconstruction Operations. During the forty years from 1950 to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the US Army participated in ten notable operations that meet the definition of Stability and Reconstruction Operations. These operations included, among others, Lebanon in 1983, domestic riots in Chicago and Detroit in 1967, and the Dominican Republic in 1966. This period was shaped by the Cold War and the US military (along with all elements of national power) was engaged in preparation for major combat operations with the Warsaw Pact nations. The anticipated nature of tactical combat operations in that future conflict left so little margin for error that political and military leaders were reluctant to divert any military resources to other endeavors. Since 1989, the Army alone has had more than forty notable deployments, the vast majority of which would be defined as Stability and Reconstruction Operations. These deployments ranged from domestic humanitarian assistance operations to the present operations in Iraq. A partial list included the following operations:

- Multinational Force Observers (Sinai) 1982
- Operation Just Case (Panama) 1989
- Los Angeles Riots (United States) 1992
A cursory review of these operations revealed their complexity and diversity. If the spectrum of military operations runs from humanitarian assistance on the low end to major combat operations on the high end, then these and the other operations of the period nearly cover the full spectrum. More significantly, each of the operations covered more than a single point on the spectrum; individual operations often moved up or down the spectrum of conflict during the course of events.6


of the veracity of this precept\textsuperscript{8}. But the examples, namely WWI/II have also shaped the military’s view. The idea of global war and the price nations pay influenced our perspective so that the military began looking at other operations to accomplish the objective without waging “war.”

Terrorism, with a global reach has become the most consequential contemporary threat facing the United States. As such, the Global War on Terror is multi-layered and involves all elements of US national power. Another hallmark of the security environment is the rise in regional tensions around the world. This increase in regional tensions is primarily a result of the collapse of the system of restraint imposed by the Cold War. These tensions are related to lingering effects of decolonization and the dismantling of European colonial systems. Much of the political instability in established and emerging nations in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America stem from issues unresolved in the wake of decolonization and national movements. The conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s are examples of regional conflicts that re-emerged in the post-Cold War environment after they remained dormant for more than forty years.\textsuperscript{9}

**What are Stability and Reconstruction Operations?**

Stability Operations is the current term used to describe military activity at the low end of the spectrum of conflict in pursuit of the establishment of a stable end-state.\textsuperscript{10} Recently, the term has often been applied to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction activities, (frequently referred to as “Phase IV” operations). Historically, these operations have been called small wars, pacification operations, or humanitarian intervention. Other terms used today to describe this

---

\textsuperscript{8} World War I, and WW II., represent unambiguous conflicts with clear political objectives.

\textsuperscript{9} SAIC., p 18.

\textsuperscript{10} In February 2005 the term Stability Operations was changed to Stability and Reconstruction Operations, this was done to better integrate the military with the efforts of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability Operations.
type of military activity include complex contingencies, Stability and Support Operations (SASO), Operations Other Than War (OOTW), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (STRO), Peacekeeping (PK), Peace Building, and Peace Enforcement, among others. This frequent change in terminology was more than semantic; it represented a fundamental ambivalence the United States has at a strategic and doctrinal level to the use of limited force in pursuit of specific peaceful end-states in low-intensity environments. Stability and Reconstruction Operations are increasingly important not only in relation to the American strategic perspective of the world, but also because of America’s adversaries’ perceptions of the United States. The United States is well equipped for high-end conflict; its proficiency in this area has deterred competition in major combat operations. However, the United States’ strategic interests are increasingly challenged outside of major combat operations through asymmetric means. To counter these threats, the United States needs to be proficient in conducting Stability and Reconstruction Operations.

The Model

The Task Force reviewed numerous models and in the end constructed a model using DIME as an axis primarily because of the familiarity of DIME (see figure 2). The axis (arrow) demonstrating the spectrum is influenced by the O/CRS by using the term intervention rather than conflict. This allowed the model to remain relevant for all types of tasks present in a stand alone Stability and Reconstruction Operation while still encompassing the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, the Task Force focused on the Joint Operating Concept (JOC) for Stability Operations to provide four scenarios for the conduct of Stability and Reconstruction Operations.

11 SAIC., p 4.
12 DIME stands for Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic, and make up the elements of National Power.
Operations. As well as establishing four scenarios, the JOC for Stability Operations identified “spoilers” as the main obstacle to Stability and Reconstruction Operations. Spoilers are those who oppose the order that the joint force is attempting to impose.\(^\text{13}\)

The DIME is one axis of the model and are the lines of operation for the study of the issue. DIME is further clarified by adding security to the military category and governance to the diplomatic category. DIME is appropriate as a fundamental construct of the model because the model must demonstrate the relationship of the elements of national power with each other and with the type of operations identified on the other axis. The model describes the strategic end states of each line of operation and identifies the tasks that are essential to accomplishing the objectives of an operation to achieve the end state.

---

\(^{13}\) SAIC., p 206.
The D of DIME also shown as governance, encompasses the diplomatic element of national power and is primarily the responsibility of the Department of State, for the purpose of describing the environment the Task Force added the term Governance because it better describes the effect and scope of the diplomatic efforts in a Stability and Reconstruction Operation. The term includes the concepts of civil institutions that are created or preserved for a country to successfully achieve lasting stability. Stability and Reconstruction Operations present the possibility of persistent insecurity or rapid fluctuations in violence. Because these conditions make it impossible for civilian agencies to function and because the establishment and preservation of security is essential to the success of a Stability and Reconstruction Operation, the military may sometimes need to take on a wider variety of non-combat tasks such as development, governance, and reconstruction, in support of strategic objectives.  

The I of DIME is the informational domain and as an element of national power, the government does not control information. The informational element of national power is in fact a domain that is open to any group or individual with the technology to participate, what the government controls is the level of effort given to the domain and the synchronization across the departments and institutions of the government. Additionally from the military perspective, as USMC Commandant Krulak noted there is a recent development known as the “strategic corporal” has influenced the domain. The idea is that there is a strong message sent by the military community and received by the population as well as the world because of the almost unlimited access by the media, both domestic and foreign. All forces operate in the information domain and it is powerful in its effect, though neutral by its nature.

---

14 Ibid., p 224.
15 Ibid. p 11, as former USMC Commandant Krulak noted, this proximity creates the “strategic corporal.” The concept of the “strategic corporal” was illustrated in stability operations in Iraq, when Corporal Chin wrapped the American flag around the face of the statue of Saddam Hussein. This low level action was captured on many cameras and instantly broadcast around Iraq and the world, signifying to some Iraqis, at the very beginning of the stability operation, America’s interest in dominating, rather than liberating Iraq. Rules of engagement alone will not be sufficient to guide decision-making in stability operations.
Security is the term used by the Task Force to better describe the M in DIME. The Military domain for a Stability and Reconstruction Operations is first and foremost that of establishing a security condition conducive to the other elements of national power. The security aspect of national power is the most closely controlled element, and the best organized and resourced. The Task Force chose the term security to describe the ability of the military to impose or ensure a level of security that is imposed and maintained enabling the success of the other elements of national power. Establishing security among a local population or society not ensuring the security of Stability and Reconstruction Operation forces is the primary objective for Stability and Reconstruction Operations. The rapid establishment of a sustainable secure environment would help bound the military’s role and would enable civilian agencies to proceed with the long-term components of a stabilization strategy, to include economic assistance.\[16\] Establishing security requires that power vacuums left in the wake of natural hostilities, combat operations, or natural disasters be rapidly filled. Because security requires local institutions and has subjective components, any period of instability geometrically compounds the difficulty of establishing a new stable order. Stability and Reconstruction Operations are often characterized by a “security gap”.\[17\] Because of the challenge of pre-positioning needed resources in a region of interest, even in permissive environments, military forces need to provide security and initial support to other elements of national power. This initial lack of capability is often referred to as the security gap. The E in DIME is the economic domain. The government does not wholly control the economic element of national power but, it can influence it greatly through policy and for the conduct of

\[16\] Ibid., p 9.
\[17\] Ibid., p 10-11. The “security gap” suggests that the military may sometimes temporarily need to take on a wider variety of non-traditional tasks in the areas of development, public works, public health, and reconstruction. In doing so, military officers will be forced to operate outside of traditional military responsibilities, with extensive and sustained interaction with civilians in command and subordinate relationships. This may frequently place military officers outside their “comfort zone.” Military doctrine should be made to reflect the possibility that the military may need to assume nontraditional responsibilities in stability operations. Professional military education should prepare officers to fulfill these roles until civilian agencies can take over.
Stability and Reconstruction Operations, it is essential and usually concurrent with the security line of operation. Economics like politics are local and as such, the requirement for the military to understand and facilitate economic development is critical. The economic line of operation also addresses the basic services and infrastructure requirements that are essential to make progress in a Stability and Reconstruction Operation.

The Spectrum of Stability and Reconstruction Operations (see figure 2) is the circumstance in which the United States takes military action and is shown as an arrow near the bottom of the model. The status quo is the state of a nation or a region not perceived to be a threat to the vital or important interests of the United States or its allies. This is the condition where the Regional Combatant Commander (RCC), engages the nation or region through Theater Security Cooperation. Pre-intervention also know as pre conflict, is the state of a nation or region that is a candidate for intervention because it represents a threat to the United States or its allies. This condition is usually transitioned through and in many cases, is perceived as a potential safe haven for the adversaries of the United States and its allies. Intervention, often referred to as conflict, is when the United States and it allies forcefully execute operations against the nation or region’s will in an effort to eliminate a threat against the US and its allies, or when the state of the population effected is no longer acceptable by universally understood standards. Post intervention is often referred to as post conflict, and is the time following intervention when the state or region begins to transition to the new status quo. This is usually the primary transitory period where the lines of operation in a Stability and Reconstruction Operation are difficult to separate and must be synchronized toward the effects desired. Security remains the primary task for the military but the facilitation of numerous other tasks is equally important. Often transitions between lead and supporting agencies occur in this period. There is not a well-defined point of transition to reconstruction, it is understood that it is gradual and simultaneous in this period. Reconstruction is often simultaneous with post intervention to the degree that reconstruction becomes the primary task while there is progress made with the security condition. One of the
most important concepts is the ability to conduct simultaneous security and reconstruction tasks as dictated by the geographical nature of the operation. The new status quo is a state of being that is beneficial to the United States and its allies as well as beneficial to the region and its population. Once the new status quo is effective, the institutions in the country or region are firmly in control of their own future and the United States moves back to a status quo footing. Key to understanding the model is that the new status quo is better than the previous status quo that led to intervention, and that the new status quo is consistent with the President’s National Security Policy for the region.

The framework of DIME and the spectrum of Stability and Reconstruction Operations along with the strategic end states and key tasks are a useful way of thinking through the required capabilities of the US Government necessary to conduct a successful campaign.

**Key Terms and Definitions**

Key terms and definitions were essential to this effort and research, primarily because the lack of common understanding has revealed many of the issues involved in the ongoing dialogue. The decisions to use the following definitions below were consistent with the model constructed to frame the effort and in some cases provide a new understanding of common terms. General Purpose Forces are standing units with modular force elements capable of rapidly assembling within their service a force with the equivalent capabilities of a standing special purpose unit. For this study, General Purpose are those forces in the inventory of the United States that are relevant across the full spectrum and range of military operations. That is to say, they are not generic but have the key capabilities of integrating functions and functional capabilities that through modular task organization are tailored and relevant across the
Special Purpose Forces are forces organized, trained, and equipped with narrowly focused capabilities. Special Purpose forces accomplish a specific mission, often of limited scope and duration. Special Purpose forces are those forces specifically dedicated to a limited range in the ROMO, like Stability and Reconstruction Operations and organized for maximum efficiency in a narrow portion of the full spectrum. They are stand alone units with integrating capabilities and functional capabilities and only committed to Stability and Reconstruction Operations. For the purpose of this work, a Special Purpose force is resourced by reducing the General Purpose force, and using the allocated resources within the current end strength of the Army. Stability Operations are military and civilian activities conducted in peacetime and across the full spectrum of conflict to establish order in failed or failing states and regions.

Reconstruction Operations are the efforts of the US Government in coordination with coalition partners and other nations, international organizations, and non governmental organizations to create a stable and self governing polity by establishing the rule of law, rehabilitating the economy and otherwise improving the welfare of people. Capability is the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks.

**Measures of Effectiveness**

The measures of effectiveness used by the author are security overmatch, institutional capacity and mission longevity. Security overmatch is the inherent capability of a task-organized force to

---

18 Taken from the SECDEF requirement to the Army in the DSPG
19 Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force definition in JP 1-02. (Modified by the Task Force)
20 From DOD Directive 3000 (28 Jan 05 draft).
21 From SECDEF Memorandum (8 Oct 2004-draft definitions).
22 From the JEL, Joint Concepts, Developmental Information Capabilities Bulletin Board.
defeat the adversary as long as the force is committed to the operation. The commander of the force executing an operation must have under his immediate control the inherent capability to defeat the enemy’s capabilities even when they are latent.\textsuperscript{23} Institutional Capacity is understood as the organizational agility and processes to organize, man, motivate, train, equip, modernize and support the forces provided to the combatant commanders’ for stability and reconstruction operations.\textsuperscript{24} The mission longevity measure recognizes that Stability and Reconstruction Operations are at least 3-7 years in duration before a significant reduction in forces is practical.\textsuperscript{25} Because of their duration, a rotation policy is critical for a successful operation and this indicates that it takes three like-sized elements to sustain long duration operations. Three units are needed because while one element is executing the operation, one is training to replace the committed force, and one is recovering following redeployment.

\textbf{Conclusion}

As part of Task Force Stability and Reconstruction Operations, it fell to the author to organize the effort and frame the method in which the Task Force accomplished the tasks given by the Army Planning Directive. It was, and remains, clear that the CSA directed this as an Army Focus Area to get both an outside unconstrained look at the issues involved and provide a method for beginning change as the process continues. The responsibility given to a TRADOC institution indicates that the CSA believes that the most significant outcome of this effort is to influence the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The author’s definition, Developed while a member of TF AFA S&RO.
\item Schoomaker, the Army Game Plan 2005, (Department of the Army). 2005., p 19.
\item L. Brownlee, P. Schoomaker, “Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities.” \textit{Parameters Vol XXXIV}, 2 (Summer 2004) : p 7. “The campaign quality of an Army … is not only its ability to win decisive combat operations, but also its ability to sustain those operations for as long as necessary, adapting them as required to unpredictable and often profound changes in the context and character of the conflict. The Army’s pre-eminent challenge is to reconcile expeditionary agility and responsiveness with the staying power, durability, and adaptability to carry a conflict to a victorious conclusion no matter what form it eventually takes.”
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
professional education system of the Army and gain the support of the Army’s educating and training institution. The CSA also directed the Task Force to vet its findings with a broad group of senior leaders and academics. This vetting allowed the Task Force to not only acquire current views of the subject but also begin the process of influence on a group that has much to say about the Army and its future.

Chapter 2. The argument for Special Purpose Forces.

Background

The argument for Special Purpose Forces is compelling and the factors that the various studies used to reach the recommendation for Special Purpose Forces was linked directly to the Global War on Terror as well as current operations in Iraq. There was also the impact of the commonly held belief that the Land Component has held on to the idea of fighting a “big or real war”. Over the last 15 years where the military, particularly the ground component has been involved in numerous small wars and activities aligned at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict.

The Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study set the framework for the discussion of changing Army structure. While it stops short of specifically recommending that the Army create a Special Purpose Force, it clearly suggested that the US Government needed to be more adept at transitions and capable while conducting operations short of major combat. The DSB study showed what American’ adversaries have learned about conflict and this prompted many of the fundamental arguments used by the proponents of Special Purpose forces. Potential adversaries of the United States have learned in peacetime, to discourage any coalition of nations, manipulate the media both international and American, harness anti-American attitudes in the United Nations, leverage economic relationships, and to leverage sympathetic elements of “Diaspora”
and “opposition” politicians. During combat operations, they have learned to conserve assets for post-U.S. departure. During stabilization they endeavor to hasten declared victory and departure, employ a stealthy defense using civilian infrastructure, and use insurgency tactics against the United States and its partners. The adversaries learned to attack US logistics, re-supply locally and globally, bring the fight to middle America, disrupt continental US bases, manipulate the media with riots, demonstrations, and staged U.S. atrocities. They would take advantage quickly of any power vacuums, looting, extortion and other crime, divide international coalitions by political appeals, hostage taking, and media manipulation.  

In the spring of 2004, Anthony Cordsman testified before the Senate. In that testimony, he stated:

The US needs to develop more mobile forces that are better tailored to rapid reaction, power projection in areas where the US has limited basing and facilities, and capable of dealing better with the kind of low intensity combat dominated by terrorists or hostile movements that require an emphasis on light forces and HUMINT rather than heavy forces and high technology.  

He based this statement on the nature of the current strategic environment in which the United States finds itself, and on the belief that the United States has committed to a path of multiple operations to include regime change operations in the future. He further stated:

At the same time armed nation building is a challenge only the US is currently equipped to meet. While allies, the UN and NGOs can help in many aspects of security and nation building operations, They often cannot operate on the scale required to deal with nation building in the midst of serious low intensity conflict.

---

28 Ibid., p ii. “in more cases than not, the aftermath of conventional conflict is going to be low intensity conflict and armed nation building that will last months or years after a conventional struggle is over”.
29 Ibid., p iii.
He then discussed the need for a more rapidly deployable force to execute Stability and Reconstruction Operations and identifies the need for an interagency process that accounts for the interagency mission in nation building.³⁰

In April 2004, a study by the National Defense University entitled Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations edited by Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E Johnson, of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University was published. This study is a comprehensive study that looked at historical case studies, the current environment, and the problems encountered in Operation Iraqi Freedom from the perspective of a military that is transforming and has the continued capability to change.³¹ The study promoted the idea of Special Purpose forces for Stability and Reconstruction Operations because: our current forces have the skills to deal with Stability and Reconstruction Operations but the skills are scattered throughout the force. The forces in Iraq were unprepared to respond to lawlessness, destruction of civilian infrastructure, and attacks on coalition forces. The current force was unable to rapidly field a stabilization force to capitalize on the conventional force's ability to rapidly defeat an enemy, and the “US was caught without a mature plan for post-conflict operations.”³² Other conclusions of the study included: the Department of Defense (DOD) needs stronger stability and reconstruction forces, but the department also needs analytical standards for determining size and design. The study went on to say that scenario analysts suggest that multiple, different Stability and Reconstruction Operation contingencies could occur in future years in all regions and can

³⁰ Ibid., p 3. “Security and nation building not only require new forms of US “Rapid Deployment” but major financial resources and the development of new approaches to providing economic aid and the necessary contract support”.

³¹ Hans Binnendijk, and Stuart E Johnson, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, (National Defense University), p 32. “The Global War on Terrorism presents the Army in particular with the opportunity to reevaluate its role in stabilization and reconstruction missions in a way that will guide the Army transformation along new paths for future operational success. As Field Marshal Rommel said” Mortal Danger is an effective antidote for fixed ideas”. This necessitates the transformation of Army thinking and culture into a force organized, trained, and postured for global joint expeditionary warfare that will include post conflict activities such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan”.

³² Ibid., p 52.
vary greatly in size and difficulty. Additionally the study discussed that Stability and Reconstruction Operations forces for one medium size contingency similar to Iraq, likely will not be big enough, and that larger contingencies than Iraq could occur simultaneously.\textsuperscript{33}

The study was comprehensive and made several recommendations; one suggestion was to include committing a portion of the current force or standing up additional forces to focus on stability and reconstruction missions. Other recommendations from the study included the suggestion to create two joint military headquarters to organize units critical to stability and reconstruction missions (S&R JCOMs). The headquarters would be responsible for monitoring the status of units, overseeing training and exercising, developing doctrine, and planning Stability and Reconstruction Operations. The study also recommended that the Army field two stability and reconstruction division-equivalents with joint assets. The first division-equivalent would consist of mostly active personnel; the second division-equivalent could include a large number of reserve personnel. Each division-equivalent would be organized to be flexible, modular, scaleable, and rapidly deployable with four brigade-size stability and reconstruction groups that include military police, civil affairs, engineers, medical, and psyop supported by a tactical combat capability. The study went on to suggest that new strategic concepts should be developed for future stability and reconstruction missions. Key examples were concurrent planning for major combat and stability and reconstruction missions and concurrent deployment of combat and stability and reconstruction forces. Among other recommendations the study identified that the Army should designate an adequate number of ready units for stability and reconstruction missions by rebalancing the active component and reserve component mix because enough units are needed in the overall stability and reconstruction force to sustain a rotation basis. The most important suggestion was to revise professional military education curricula to include more instruction in stabilization and reconstruction operations, civil military cooperation, interagency

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
planning, media relations, and negotiations. Equaling compelling was the suggestion to add instructors with a background in sociology, law, and psychology; and especially with experience in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The study went on to list numerous other recommendations which included: the suggestion to develop systems and technologies for Stability and Reconstruction Operations. High-priority examples were wireless and land based communications for civil/military interoperability, expert stability and reconstruction tailored mission-training packages for security and infrastructure, unmanned systems, non-lethal weapons, detection devices for urban operations, and course of action analysis and planning tools. A recommendation that is currently ongoing was to establish a process for more efficient multi agency planning, coordination and engagement for Stability and Reconstruction Operations. The study added that there should be a National Interagency Contingency Coordination Group (NIACCG) under the National Security Council with responsibility for planning. Additionally the department should create Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG), counterpart organizations in the combatant commands and the stability and reconstruction JCOMs, with representatives from other federal agencies embedded in a J-10 Directorate and C-MAC. The study also recommended that the US Government establish multi agency civilian rapid response capability to deploy with stability and reconstruction forces and prepare for the transition from Stability and Reconstruction Operations (military control) to the nation-building mission (civilian control). The study concluded its recommendations with suggesting that the US Government strengthen international stabilization and reconstruction efforts by identifying countries with niche capabilities, training and equipping an international peacekeeping force, and encouraging North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) to develop an independent stability and reconstruction force that mirrors the proposed US force."34

34 Ibid., p 129-130.
To execute many of these recommendations, the NDU study provided a way to organize a Special
Purpose Force by designating a divisional-equivalent in the active component and a divisional-
equivalent in the reserve component under the command and control of a Joint Command. The
study concluded with an assessment of the urgency required to change in order to be prepared for
the next series of challenges.

“There is a pressing need for transforming the way the US Military organizes for stabilization and
reconstruction operations from secondary, separate and adhoc operation into co-equal operation in
tandem with combat”.  

Analysis

While the NDU and other studies correctly identified the lack of preparedness of U.S.
forces for Stability and Reconstruction Operations as a major problem, its focus on the time
compression of modern combat misconstrued stability operations as solely a “Phase IV,” post-
combat phenomenon.

“Stability operations do not always follow major combat, as is apparent in many historical
eamples. The chronological perception of stability operations as something that takes place after
the fighting is over does not capture the range of these missions or their dynamic, unpredictable,
and complex nature. The “three-block war” concept is more useful in this respect in that it posits

35 Ibid., p 68. “Strategic Employment Context. The United States deploys highly flexible,
maneuverable JTFs composed of smaller, lighter but more lethal high tec combat forces to conduct
counterforce operations rapidly. The JTFs area occupation capabilities are limited. Therefore an S&R
JCOM deploys with the combat forces and operates in close coordination to take over rapidly from
advancing combat forces as the battle progresses. S&R JCOM Ops Employment Concept. US Combatant
Commands integrate S&R JCOM elements in the combat force deployment flow so they are in position to
take immediate control of liberated areas. S&R JCOM establishes stability and begins initial infrastructure
reconstruction under the JTF or its land component command. An S&R JCOM is supported and sustained
by the JTF Theater Support Command. S&R JCOM security needs are met by main JTF combat f. S&R
JCOM can also deploy as a separate JTF, with its own security and support force augmentation. S&R
JCOM Tactical Employment Concept. An S&R JCOM is organized with four subordinate JTF Commands-
combined capability teams capable of area/sector stabilization and reconstruction-supported by S&R JCOM
and JTF assets. Subordinate Joint S&R groups are normally OPCON to combat commands in assigned
sectors, but may operate under overall S&R JCOM control, depending on the combatant commander’s
scheme of maneuver”.

36 Ibid., p 68.
the possibility that many different kinds of tasks and security environments can exist simultaneously during a stability operation. However, even the “three-block war” model misses the critical point that the same force may be responsible for conducting a variety of different tasks at various levels of security simultaneously”.  

The Line of Operation M for military and as the Task Force uses the term security is the only line needed to consider because it is evident and compelling by the inherent weakness of a special purpose force. The provision of security is an essential element of any Stability and Reconstruction Operation and provides the foundation for long-term sustainable governance, reconstruction, and development. Recent events in Iraq have shown that establishing security on the ground is the highest priority in a Stability and Reconstruction Operation. Establishing security is a primary military mission in Stability and Reconstruction Operations because the military is uniquely suited to this task. Civilian agencies generally are not prepared for every contingency, and where security problems exist, civilian agencies cannot operate at maximum effectiveness or capacity, endangering their own lives and the objectives of the operation.  

The author assessed a Special Purpose Force by the measures of effectiveness. Security Overmatch is the concept of inherent capability to withstand the efforts of the adversary as it attempts to prevent the objectives of the stability and reconstruction force from being fully realized. Any adversary can do this by asymmetric means and can be successful while the stability and reconstruction force continues to operate, since the stability and reconstruction force cannot establish a secure environment that allows the cooperating agencies to operate then the adversary wins. Additionally once committed to the operation the Special Purpose Force described would be expected to prevent the situation from degenerating to a point where the operation moves from Stability and Reconstruction Operations to Major Combat Operations, thus requiring the influx of new forces and command and control elements to defeat the adversary. A Special Purpose Force will have a security capability but to consider it capable of more than

---

37 SAIC., p 194-195.
38 Ibid., p 164.
securing the friendly forces and executing police-like enforcement of security as a condition would be to equip it with the requisite combat power making it difficult to differentiate from a force designed for major combat. As the NDU study acknowledges, Stability and Reconstruction Operations encompass a range of military activities in dynamic environments in which security can rapidly scale up and down the spectrum of conflict. Stability and Reconstruction Operations are highly unpredictable; each situation is different and can change quickly during the course of an operation. Additionally, given the unpredictability and variety that forces face when involved in these operations, the NDU study’s recommendation to create two division-equivalents of forces designed specifically for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations threatens the security of those forces and the missions themselves. Forces organized solely for post-combat reconstruction would find them dangerously unprepared for combat should the security context suddenly deteriorate. Stability and Reconstruction Operations forces must be able to adapt swiftly to new missions and a rapidly changing security environment. It is essential, therefore, to retain general war fighting skills among forces involved in Stability and Reconstruction Operations. In addition to endangering the force involved, a force that cannot seamlessly escalate up and down the spectrum of conflict also invites challenges from adversaries. This invitation to challenge was vividly apparent in the ways in which Bosnian Serb leaders responded to United Nations Provisional Forces (UNPROFOR). Able to take UNPROFOR hostages, Bosnian Serbs successfully shut down the use of air strikes. Later, UNPROFOR was unable to stop Bosnian Muslims from launching attacks out of U.N.-declared “safe areas.” In response, Bosnian Serbs succeeded in forcing the lightly armed UNPROFOR personnel out of the Srebrenica “safe area,” leading to the largest massacre in Europe since World War II. UNPROFOR’s predicament illustrates the innate dangers in organizational solutions to Stability and Reconstruction Operation

40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid.
requirements. The ability to overwhelm a stabilization force not trained or equipped for combat can cause a damaging breakdown in security. This breakdown in security undermines the legitimacy of the stability operation and can enhance the legitimacy of the adversaries. The Special Purpose Force is also lacking when it is considered by the measure of Institutional Capacity. The ground component’s (Army) institutional capacity to organize, train and equip a Special Purpose Force dedicated to conducting Stability and Reconstruction Missions exists, however, the challenge becomes a constant change in personnel and training modules for the personnel to enable a mission focused approach. The success of units in an stability and reconstruction environment is hinged upon the relevant, culturally focused capabilities of the unit. With a limited number of units the institutional Army would constantly be adjusting personnel skills sets by rotating personnel in and out of units or routinely find itself embedding culturally appropriate skill sets into the deploying force. Additionally, the challenge to properly organize a force is dependant upon how well one can identify the capability and predict the action of the nation or region that is a candidate for a Stability and Reconstruction Operation. A larger challenge is that current doctrine, especially the Army’s, attempts to categorize each operation after it occurs and then sets forth how the that type of operation should be conducted in the future. Stability and Reconstruction Operations present “an infinite number of forms impossible to classify under a limited number of types of operations,” as the Small Wars Manual\textsuperscript{42} reminds us. Listing in capstone doctrine the types of operations, and then developing manuals for each, leaves the military with a false sense of the nature of Stability and Reconstruction Operations. No two look alike, and it is unlikely that an operation in the future will have the same characteristics as one from the past.\textsuperscript{43} Stability and Reconstruction Operations do not present complex training requirements. Most of the unique requirements of stability and reconstruction missions are more properly addressed through professional education. The reforms to professional military

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p 43.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
education necessary to prepare the military for Stability and Reconstruction Operations will improve U.S. military capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. On the other hand, training for high-end conflict is a demanding, full-time job that requires mastering complex operations and a high-level of sophistication with combat technology. It also requires operational and contingency planning, flexibility, leadership, and command and control, skills, which are essential to success in operations across the spectrum, including Stability and Reconstruction Operations.44 The Mission Longevity of Stability and Reconstruction Operations are thought to be at least 3 to 7 years in duration,45 and the current twelve-month cycle for a unit committed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) seems appropriate. While there are historical examples of American units remaining deployed in an operation longer than 12–18 months, recent experiences demonstrate that the ability to remain sharp and effective is approximately 12 months.46 Therefore, a rotation policy is required for an Stability and Reconstruction Operation and that indicates the need for a cycle to sustain ongoing operations while maintaining a capacity to respond to additional requirements. With just two divisional-sized units, the assessment is that one would be committed and one would be in some stage of preparation for the next rotation. This severely constrains the military’s ability to respond to contingencies. Currently the US military is committed to two operations that could accept a divisional-sized unit. This is clear evidence that indicates that two divisional-equivalent sized units would not be enough for current requirements, let alone additional contingencies.47

44 Ibid., p 218.
45 Robert C Orr, Editor, Winning the Peace, An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction. CSIS 2004. p 298-299. “As all the case studies in this volume show, success to the extent it is achieved is one only over the course of many years. While the initial goals of stabilization may be achieved in a year or two in some cases, lasting stability and a sustainable and successful trajectory are generally only achieved over a course of three to seven years.”
46 Authors notes. It is largely dependant upon the unit and the level of training and discipline as to how long they can be effective in combat, the Army’s plan to stabilize units in a three year cycle will certainly assist in the time a unit can remain effective while in contact.
47 Binnendijk., p 48. NDU determined for illustrative purposes that a brigade size S&R Force: can handle one small contingency, and a division size S&R force: one medium event or three small events,
Conclusion

All the studies conducted on Stability and Reconstruction Operations have much to offer the military and can greatly assist in furthering our understanding of the complex environment that exits when executing Stability and Reconstruction Operations. These studies also assist by reinforcing the requirement to improve or in some instances create capabilities required for S&RO that do not currently exist in the Modular Army’s force structure. In no way should they convince the Army to dedicate two Divisions to Stability and Reconstruction Operations.

Chapter 3 The Modular Army and Full Spectrum Capability

Background

Transformation of the Army is happening now in a holistic way and the organizational changes are executed through modularity. In fact, the CSA recently directed that the Army be referred to as the Modular Army. The war fighting and contingency operation forces of the Modular Army are made up of the Unit of Execution Y (UEy), and Unit of Execution X (UEx), and Brigade Combat team (BCT). These three levels of command and control are equivalent to an Army, Corps and Division, and Brigade or Regiment. Additionally, Unit of Actions (UAs) at the theater (UEy level) is reorganized as part of the Modular Army. The Expeditionary Army is fundamentally made up of two types of capabilities: Integrating capabilities are the headquarters
that exercise command and control in full spectrum operations (UEy and UEx). Functional
capabilities, consisting of trained and equipped organizations with a wide range of capabilities
that allow them to perform functions under the integrating organizations and accomplish the
objectives of the Operation (BCT and UA). Functional capabilities have embedded command
and control capabilities and therefore are a self-contained unit, and the similarity of organizations
enhances the continued capability to task organize large organizations against a broad set of
requirements. All units have specific functions, but those do not eliminate the ability to utilize
the capabilities against other functions that require a sophisticated organizational structure to
accomplish.

The UEy is organized and equipped as the Army Service component for a Regional Combatant
Commander. It also has the capability to serve as a Joint Forces Land Component and provides
support to Army, Interagency and Joint Assets. As part of the RCC, the UEy integrates the Army
forces assigned into Theater Security Corporation plans (TSC). The UEx is the primary tactical
and operational level war fighting headquarters. The UEx can control up to six BCTs and UAs
and because the UEx is a stand-alone structure, the functional BCTs and UAs can be assigned
according to mission requirements. The UEx will normally control different types of BCTs and is
task organized for the execution and supervision of both missions and the support of subordinate
units. Brigade Combat Teams are standing organizations and it is not considered practical to
further task organize, therefore the BCT is the smallest combat unit to be assigned to a War
Fighting Headquarters. This is not to imply that a BCT cannot accept additional forces but to
make clear that BCTs will deploy and operate as a BCT. There are three types of BCTs, Heavy,
Infantry and Stryker. All three have embedded command and control and organic support
structures in the unit. All have differing capabilities in the numbers of personnel assigned and
mobility, protection and firepower, but all are fully capable of performing full spectrum

48 Authors notes and Task Force Working documents. The two types of capabilities correspond
largely to the two types of deployable units in the Army’s inventory.
operations. The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade controls forces that execute shaping and sustaining operations, additionally the ME brigade enables full dimensional protection and freedom of maneuver of the force. The Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BCB) is designed to coordinate and synchronize the reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence operations in support of a UEEx commander and is a key resource to provide full spectrum capabilities to the war-fighting commander. The Civil Affairs Brigade (CAB) is a key component of the team, and is specifically designed to provide full spectrum capability to the UEy. The CAB is regionally focused and, if necessary, an additional brigade can be designated for the UEy. The UEEx will normally receive a civil affairs battalion to provide a capability for complete integration of civil affairs giving it a full spectrum capability in any of the Range of Military Operations.49

![Range Of Military Operations](image)

**Range Of Military Operations ** ROMO

Much of the discussion about the best way to move forward to ensure the Army is a relevant member of the Joint Team and capable of full spectrum operations has been an “either- or” context. The problem with this approach is that it did not account for the complexity of military

---

operations; the idea that one can commit a portion of the force against a limited number of tasks and have that unit be functional in Full Spectrum Operations defies common sense. General Purpose Forces not only allow the Nation to maintain full spectrum capability but make the full array of military capability available to execute national policy. The commander on the ground in a combat operation or a peace-keeping mission remains the decisive element with regard to how operations designed to destroy or operations designed to preserve are executed. Max Boot, who has written on Transformation for Foreign Affairs, has taken a general view that is not helpful in determining what is most appropriate for the Army as it continues to fight in Iraq and what specific capabilities units must contain. However, at the macro level, he made a good point about needing more infantry no matter how the Army moves ahead through Modularity. This was an accurate observation as it spoke to the requirement for presence by a capable military force in Stability and Reconstruction operations and directly countered the “less is more” approach espoused by the Secretary of Defense. The fundamental way the Modular Army must move forward is that it needs to accept Stability and Reconstruction Operations as core military missions and include them in all facets of training and leadership development. As the study produced by SAIC states:

Furthermore, in the contemporary security environment, it is imperative that the military must be prepared to respond to conflicts along the full spectrum of capability. Overwhelming U.S. military dominance makes asymmetric warfare more likely, yet

---

Max, Boot., “The Struggle to Transform the Military. “Foreign Affairs”, March/April 2005. “The U.S. military must first focus on training and equipping infantry for irregular warfare. Counterinsurgency and peacekeeping are manpower intensive. Tanks and armored vehicles provide vital support, and high-tech surveillance systems and precision-guided munitions bring important advantages. But when all is said and done, controlling a civilian population requires using soldiers to patrol the streets like cops on the beat, and the United States does not have nearly enough of them. None of this is intended to suggest that the U.S. military be reconfigured exclusively for operations against guerrillas. Although conventional conflict may look unlikely now, the United States must maintain its ability to fight major states--something that the British Army failed to do, thereby inviting German aggression in 1914 and 1939”.

Ibid., “The continued fighting in Iraq, however, shows the limits of what he has accomplished. The U.S. military is superb at defeating conventional forces--as its three-week blitzkrieg from Kuwait to Baghdad in the spring of 2003 demonstrated--but not nearly as good at fighting the kind of guerrilla foes it has confronted since. To be sure, many of the current problems in Iraq result from Rumsfeld's failure to send enough troops there and from the precipitous disbandment of the Iraqi military”.

32
challenges from growing peer or regional competitors cannot be overlooked. Hence, general forces, not specialized forces, are desirable.\textsuperscript{52}

**Analysis**

T consider the strengths and weaknesses of the General Purpose Force and its capability to conduct Stability and Reconstruction Operations it is useful to think of it along the DIME and along measures of effectiveness. The M in DIME is the military component of national power and the Task Force further utilized security to better assess the impact in a Stability and Reconstruction Operation. The modular force maintains the command and control to conduct full spectrum operations by having as inherent capabilities the ability to conduct control over complex missions and bring the functional capability to impose security.\textsuperscript{53} The ability to provide a secure environment allows the Army to initially execute the provision of security as an essential element of any Stability and Reconstruction Operation and provides the foundation for long-term sustainable governance, reconstruction, and development. Recent events in Iraq have shown that establishing security on the ground is the highest priority in a Stability and Reconstruction Operation. Establishing security is also a primary military mission in Stability and Reconstruction Operation because the military is uniquely suited to this task. Civilian agencies generally are not prepared for every contingency and, where security problems exist, civilian agencies cannot operate at maximum effectiveness or capacity, endangering their own lives and

\textsuperscript{52} SAIC., p 217.

\textsuperscript{53} TF AFA S&RO. Working papers. “Modular forces in stability and reconstruction operations. As populated areas are liberated of hostile forces during offensive operations, some portion of the campaigning force must secure urban areas and critical infrastructure, defeat bypassed force remnants and unconventional elements, and eventually return territory to the control of civil authorities. During the conduct of stability operations, Army forces must retain the ability to resume offensive or defensive operations as the situation demands. Future campaigns will place greater emphasis on the dynamic interaction between the types of operations, particularly as rapid and decisive offensive operations create the conditions for protracted stability operations”.

33
the objectives of the operation. The D in DIME is diplomatic and the Task Force added the term of governance to clarify how the term was used. The ability to secure Other Government Agencies (OGA) in the efforts is critical but so is the initial understanding of the processes that the Civil Affairs Brigade bring to both the planning process for Stability and Reconstruction Operations as well as the execution of missions at the Operational and tactical levels. This allows governance and civil institutions to be factors in the planning and execution of security operations, and establishes a security environment that supports the establishment of initial processes of governance until OGAs are capable of responding and assuming the role of orchestrating them. The economy as a line of operation is critical as both a single endeavor and in its relationship with assisting the security and governance lines of operation. The modular force can facilitate the environment that is conducive to initial economic requirements. As basic needs are met, the force can assist OGAs with establishing a formal and sound economy. The informational domain is important because the modular force and its intelligence capabilities and apparatus has the capability of influencing the informational domain. The commander can facilitate the efforts of OGAs and the growing domestic processes to effect the domain and provide a legitimate counter to the efforts of the various adversaries found in Stability and Reconstruction Operations.

It is important to assess the General Purpose Force by the measures of effectiveness in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the differences between a general purpose and special purpose force. The security overmatch of the Army is an inherent quality when full spectrum forces are the base building block committed to an operation. Stability and Reconstruction Operations may be distinct from other operations but may also be a subset of a larger operation conducted by the Army as part of the Joint Force. Therefore, it is clear from a resource and posture point of view, and from the theater perspective that the Army needs to retain a credible

54 SAIC., p 164.
combat capability in order to be capable to defeat any threat that may be prevalent or in an incubation stage. The Army’s Strategic Planning Guidance states:

Over the past decade the Army as a member of the Joint Force, has participated in a variety of stability operations including the ongoing ones in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. Given the nature of the GWOT, combined with that of the projected security environment, the Army as a member of the Joint Force must ensure its ability to conduct both sustained combat operations and nearly simultaneous operations to ensure stability. The Army recognizes the criticality of preserving the success of major combat operations and establishing conditions that will provide for an enduring peace.55

This perspective shapes our understanding that the Army must be prepared to effectively counter threats to the operation, regardless of what type of operation and that the force committed to the operation requires the inherent capability to do so. In the case of Stability and Reconstruction Operations, there is a high likelihood that the threat will be an insurgency utilizing terrorist tactics or other asymmetric approaches, but the Army should never conclude that the adversary would not use a traditional form of combat (i.e., raids, ambushes, deliberate attacks to seize and hold terrain). If the adversary is capable of using these traditional forms of combat to gain his objectives, he in fact will. This would cause the Army, as part of a Joint Force, to conduct an expeditionary operation to dislodge the adversary. Preparedness on the ground, effectively allowing the force to meet and defeat the adversary, remains an essential requirement. In the case of the Army following WWII, the unpreparedness demonstrated by the initial Eighth Army units deployed to Korea, after years spent peacefully occupying Japan, reveals the importance of maintaining training and equipment for high-end conflict.56 Moreover, it illustrates the critical advantage of defeating the adversary with the force already committed to the operation. The requirement to maintain overwhelming advantage in the security environment is essential as a condition to enable other elements of national power to proceed in a Stability and Reconstruction Operation. The proponents of a Special Purpose Force do not understand that the fact that an infantry battalion in the Modular Army is equipped, trained and organized to conduct a key role

56 SAIC., p 218.
in a major combat operation does not rule out the use of the organization to achieve objectives not wholly constrained to fighting an armed adversary. The measure of mission longevity of Stability and Reconstruction Operations as stated previously in Chapter Two generally range from 3-7 years and as such, the Army must focus on the longer versus the shorter commitment. The CSA said it best:

The campaign quality of an Army …is not only its ability to win decisive combat operations, but also its ability to sustain those operations for as long as necessary, adapting them as required to unpredictable and often profound changes in the context and character of the conflict. The Army’s preeminent challenge is to reconcile expeditionary agility and responsiveness with the staying power, durability and adaptability to carry a conflict to a victorious conclusion no matter what form it eventually takes”.

Even the NDU study suggests that multiple and different stability and reconstruction scenarios can occur simultaneously in all regions of the world and directly effect a vital national interest. These operations can vary greatly in size and duration and simply having an ability to effectively handle a medium sized contingency such as Iraq will not provide enough forces. Even short duration contingencies causing simultaneous deployments would exceed the recommended Special Purpose Force capability: only a full spectrum capable General Purpose Force can effectively operate over the long term and remain relevant and ready while meeting its purpose of fighting and winning the nations wars. The Army’s institutional capacity is an important measure to analyze the Modular Army. General Purpose Forces are often mistakenly considered generic and of little capability beyond basic tasks like attack, defend, and force protection. They must be thought of in terms of building blocks with the requisite attributes that are required in all types of military endeavors. However, the ability of the Army to generate special capabilities relevant to stability and reconstruction missions must not be confused with generating dedicated units. As a recent Rand study makes clear, the institution must focus resources that will result in relevant

---

57 L Brownlee,. P. Schoomaker., p 2.
58 Binnendijk., p 52.
skill sets and capabilities that can be added to the Modular Army as the mission and situation dictate. A significant, and arguably the most important portion of the Army’s institutional capability is the professional education apparatus. Each Solider and officer has distinct points of educational opportunity balanced with operational experiences that make for the most fundamental strength of the Army. While improvements must continue, the Army has a self-correcting system that continually inputs the benefit of experience in to the education. Thus, given the spillover of skills from preparing for major combat operations that benefits military activity along the whole spectrum of combat, it is important to continue to train for the high end of combat, rather than develop a small specialized, dedicated force that only trains for low-end conflict programs.

Conclusion

Education, quality training, and a continued leadership approach that reinforces pushing authority down to operational commanders and those with “boots on the ground” is clearly the most appropriate approach. Modular Forces with full spectrum capabilities and the maintenance of an Expeditionary Army provide the nation with the right combination of capability and capacity to win the Global War on Terror. Any other approach is sure to fail and puts the nation’s security at risk more so than it is now. As an example, in this year of the Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship, the author was exposed to many concepts and differing ideas, which resulted in the refinement of the author’s understanding and, relevance to the operational missions of the Army.

---

59 James A. Thomson., RAND, “Iraq: Translating Lessons into Future DoD Policies”. 7 February, 2005., P 7. “In the future U.S. Military forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations must be composed of personnel with training and skills similar to special operations forces, i.e. the language and culture of the country, and in the critically important political, economic, intelligence, organizational, and psychological dimensions of counterinsurgency warfare. Serious attention should also be given to creating a dedicated cadre of counter insurgency specialists and a program to produce such experts”.

60 SAIC., p 218.
For a force conducting operations in our contemporary operational environment, the ability to rapidly transition between the major types of operations is essential. Modular Forces, fundamentally general purpose by design, are optimized to conduct simultaneous operations across the spectrum of conflict. With that inherent capability, Army forces can respond appropriately to any sudden or unexpected change in the level of violence at any point along that spectrum, a capability not present in special purpose forces.  

**Conclusion**

And when people are entering upon a war they do things the wrong way around. Action comes first, and it is only when they have already suffered that they begin to think.

Throughout this paper, and throughout the author’s work undertaken as part of Task Force Stability and Reconstruction Operations, it is clear that Special Purpose Forces are not appropriate for the US Army in the Contemporary Operational Environment and that General Purpose Forces with modular capabilities and relevance across the full spectrum are the most appropriate. The importance of this decision is shown by the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review and the fact that the CSA stood up an Army Focus Area to look at the issue. If in fact the decision were made to reverse the course of modularity, it would have tremendously negative effect on the process of the Army remaining relevant and ready. However, simply because adjusting the course of the Army as it proceeds with Transformation is difficult, is not a sufficient reason for not choosing that course of action. The overwhelming reasons to continue the course of modularity is evident in any analysis done on the utility of a force in the Contemporary Operating Environment and the concept of full spectrum capability. Therefore, the present course, with needed modifications in the form of expanding capability and capacity, remains the best approach to improving the Army’s utility in Stability and Reconstruction Operations.

---

61 TF AFA S&RO. Working Papers.
Current Situation of TF AFA S&RO

Task Force Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations continue to work the process of an Army Focus Area. As of now, the Task Force has finished a series of meetings designed to update and influence the various proponents in the Army to make adjustments to their organizational designs so that the current Total Army Analysis 08-13 (TAA) is informed regarding the tasks and organizations of the Army as the TAA cycle is executed. The TAA will provide feedback to the Army Staff in August of 2005, and the feedback should provide an appropriate framework to determine the Institution’s capacity to conduct Stability and Reconstruction Operations. One should expect that the TAA results to assist in the ongoing process of modularity by allowing proponents to adjust organizations and provide an initial requirement of functional capabilities represented by units in the inventory. The TAA should address the current shortfall of units on hand in the Army’s inventory and the number required to properly accomplish the stability tasks against the scenario stack in the TAA. Another significant accomplishment of the Task Force was the integration of tasks in a format that included stability tasks as an input to the TAA process. By ensuring the stability tasks are identified and the Stability and Reconstruction Operation requirements for organizational design are developed, the current TAA has a much higher degree of fidelity and will provide more accurate organizational recommendations to the Army Staff. At the end of May, the Task Force Director will provide an update to the CSA and recommend where the Army needs to work in the form of initiatives. The initiatives are organized along a DOTLMPF format and phrased in the form of tasks. The tasks are relevant to the overarching recommendation of add the task of Conduct Stability and Reconstruction Operations to the Mission Essential Task List of each UEy assigned to the RCCs. The author anticipates that the significant work of the current manifestation of Task Force Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations is largely complete at the conclusion of the
final update to the CSA. However many of the issues raised have suggested that an important
decision that must be made in the near future to establish a permanent proponent for Stability and
Reconstruction Operations. TRADOC is the most appropriate Major Army Command for this
new proponent primarily because of its ability to synchronize the current functional proponents.
Additionally TRADOC is the appropriate choice because it has the ability to participate in the
current and expected increase of the inter agency process.

One of the most positive outcomes of the work of Task Force Army Focus Area Stability and
Reconstruction Operations was the assistance to the interagency process, specifically to the
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability. It is a very positive development in
the greater scheme of how this nation approaches its security policy, and it will improve the
ability of the government as it continues to promote freedom and liberty. The Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability has begun the planning for and will soon begin the
implementation, of teams of professionals that will assist the Regional Combatant Commanders
in the planning and execution of contingency plans. The planning efforts are not limited to
Stability and Reconstruction Operations but also to contingency plans that include Major Combat
Operations as well. This will result in better plans and regardless of the type of mission set for
the land component there will be Stability and Reconstruction Operation tasks included as a
planning requirement. The relationship between stability and reconstruction tasks and combat
tasks are described in the model the task force constructed and there is an understanding that,
while there are differences in the primacy of task according to the mission, that mission will not
succeed if the relationships are not fully considered and resourced as part of the planning. The
draft National Security Presidential Directive NSPD 42, two Legislative Bills, and DOD

Draft NSPD-42. The draft states the requirement for DOS to have an O/CRS to coordinate and
lead the integrated government effort in R&S. Coordination between DOS and DOD. P 5. “The secretary of
state will work with the secretary of defense to integrate civilian stabilization and reconstruction
contingency plans, where relevant and appropriate, with the military contingency plans. The secretary of
state and secretary of Defense will develop a proposal for coordinating, where appropriate, civilian and
3000, are all part of the effort to improve the interagency process and while their eventual passing into law or adoption by DOD is not clear now they demonstrate the importance of Stability and Reconstruction as part of the ROMO.

The analysis done by NDU and others was very important and jumpstarted the current discussion of organizational design and professional military education. For that the nation should be most grateful because clearly it will be a critical factor in the new missions sure to come to DOD in the continuing GWOT. The vast majority of the conclusions referenced are compelling. It was only the suggestion that a significant portion of the Modular Army be dedicated to conducting Stability and Reconstruction Operations that the author disagrees with. The work done describing the current adversary within the complex security environment faced by the United States, the numerous recommendations that deal with improving military capabilities through education and better more relevant equipment, and the assistance with identifying critical fault lines in the interagency process are all very positive developments. These studies pushed the process of change and greatly assisted the Task Force as it developed the logic for choosing General Purpose Forces and initiatives recommended to the CSA.

**Recommendations**

---

*military aspects, respectively, of civilian stabilization and reconstruction activities on the one hand and military operations, on the other, at all levels.*

64 HR 1361, sponsor Dreier (R-Cal), Introduced 17 Mar 05, Short title-International Security Enhancement. Official Title- A bill to improve the ability of the federal government to coordinate and conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations in counties or regions that are in, are in transition from, or are likely to enter into, conflict or civil strife, and for other purposes. This is a bill designed to stand up, fund the CRS and establish a Foreign Service Institute and International Stabilization and Reconstruction Center, it also establishes the Stability Operations support fund and directs the creation of a Stabilization Corp of up to 250 personnel and authorizes the President to deploy them.

65 Senate Bill S. 192. Introduced by Sen. Richard Lugar on 26 Jan 05. Purpose was to pass into law the actions in DOD 3000, namely to make the Secretary of the Army executive agent for DOD for reconstruction and stability, and ensure S&RO become a core capability of the General Purpose Force.
During the course of this study of the issues surrounding Stability and Reconstruction Operations, there are clear requirements that should receive attention. In many cases decision should be made immediately. The recommendations that follow represent the most important areas identified that require improvement.

The Army should continue the analysis as to the density of Military Police, construction engineers, and civil affairs and quickly increase the numbers available to the RCCs. There is a requirement for increased education in Stability and Reconstruction Operations throughout all levels of military schooling. Revise PME curricula to include more instruction in stabilization and reconstruction operations, civil military cooperation, interagency planning, media relations, and negotiations. Add instructors with a background in sociology, law, and psychology; and especially with experience in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Army should consider increasing the numbers of personnel with skills in special operations, specifically civil affairs and hold them at United States Army Civil Affairs Physiological Operations Command. The Civil Affairs command then could commit them to units as they activate for a contingency operation for the duration of the training period and deployment period.

The Army needs better preparation as part of the base force to enhance its ability to operate in culturally and linguistically alien environments. Include a requirement for foreign language in all pre-commissioning programs and actively seek to expand linguist numbers.

The Army should better resource key technologies that enhance Stability and Reconstruction Operations. Develop systems and technologies to support Stability and Reconstruction Operations. High-priority examples are wireless and land based communications for civil/military interoperability, expert stability and reconstruction tailored mission-training packages for security and infrastructure, unmanned systems, non-lethal weapons, detection devices for urban operations, and course of action analysis and planning tools.

The Army can strengthen international stabilization and reconstruction efforts by identifying countries with niche capabilities and training. Additionally by increasing the liaison with selected
countries to cross train leaders at all levels as part of a training strategy when a unit is preparing for missions with stability and reconstruction tasks.

The Army must expand planning staffs to encompass the full range of specialties necessary to plan and coordinate sustained Stability and Reconstruction Operations. Most of the skill sets already exist within the headquarters, but are not consolidated on a permanent basis within an operational planning group. This is necessary if the intent is to fully integrate Stability and Reconstruction Operations planning with operational planning. Second, operational planning groups at both levels must have representation by a senior civil military operations officer equivalent in rank to the existing deputy chief of operations. This ensures that stability operations planning and coordination receives the same level of command emphasis and priority of resources.66

The Army should increase the capability to monitor ongoing Stability and Reconstruction Operations and conduct coordination with civil authorities within the current operations centers at each level. Within the UEy headquarters, this can be accomplished through the formation of a matrix organization within the Current Operations and Intelligence Center (COIC), staffed by personnel with the necessary skill sets to perform those functions. Within the UEx headquarters, these functions are best performed by the TAC-1 command post with a similarly staffed matrix organization. At both levels, these functions are supervised and orchestrated by a senior civil military affairs officer, equal in rank and responsibility to the existing deputy chief of operations.67

The Army must make a significant effort to streamline the techniques for operational commanders to access and spend funds in an Stability and Reconstruction Operation, while it appears that the procedures are in place, the effort required to efficiently use funds is onerous and impractical until much experience is gained by units.

66 TF AFA S&RO. Working papers.
67 Ibid
That DOD complete staffing DOD 3000, and that it be adopted to include the Secretary of the Army as the executive agent for Stability and Reconstruction Operations.

The process of the Army Focus Area examining Stability and Reconstruction Operations and the choices the Army must make are important and will impact on the organizational adjustments ongoing. The effort by Task Force Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations has made a significant contribution to the dialogue and has allowed the author to mature his perspective on this issue. As the Army continues to transform while fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as operating around the globe it is imperative that the Army make the best choice of the options available. The security condition required in any contingency that includes Stability and Reconstruction Operations is a function only the Land Component can impose or restore to a troubled country or region. The institutional capacity of the US Army as it trains, equips, and organizes the transforming Army, and the mission longevity of Stability and Reconstruction Operations clearly indicate that the General Purpose forces, dominant in full spectrum operations are unquestionably the appropriate choice to make to the question of Special Purpose Forces or General Purpose Forces for Stability and Reconstruction Operations. However, there are some much needed adjustments to better train, equip and organize the force for Stability and Reconstruction Operations.

Dedicating a portion of the Army to Stability and Reconstruction Operations is not appropriate for the current Joint Operating Environment and the course of Army Transformation must continue because the country is counting on the Army.
Bibliography

Primary Sources

U.S. Congress. Senate. Anthony H Cordsman statement to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 
*Hearings on Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act 108th Cong., 2d sess., 3 March 2004*

U.S. Congress. Senate. Hans Binnendijk statement to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 

SAIC, “Strategic Planning Guidance Study on Stability Operations”: Strategy and Doctrine 


Defense Science Board. *Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*. 2004


Books

Turabian, Kate L. *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. 6th ed. 

Binnendijk, Hans, and Johnson, Stuart., Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 
Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations National Defense 
University, April 2004


**US Government and Military Publications**

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2004

The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004


Department of the Army, Army Focus Area Planning Directive from the FY 2005 Army 
Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG)

TRADOC, TF Modularity. “UEy and UEx: Designing a Campaign Quality Army with Joint and 
Expeditionary Capabilities.” COCOM Brief, (8 July 04)

TRADOC, TF Modularity. “UEx Design Scrub. Ver. 5.5.” (14 July 04).

TRADOC, TF Modularity. “How UEx Fights.” (March 04).


Articles


Crane, Conrad C. “Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance While Pursuing a Global War Against Terrorism”. *SSI*. (May 2002)


Boot, Max. “The Struggle to Transform the Military” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2005

Other Research Papers


Colonel Paul F. Dicker, United States Army Reserves, Colonel Larry J. Godfrey, Project Advisor, May 2004. Effectiveness of Stability Operations During the Initial Implementation of the Transition Phase for Operation Iraqi Freedom


Additional Sources

Anonymous Senior Official, Joint Staff

Numerous Anonymous Senior Army Officers