

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ROBUSTLY
SUPPORT PAN-AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

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Using the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as a model, this SRP examines whether robustly supporting pan-African organizations is important to the United States' national security interests. The SRP will then discuss the potential advantages and disadvantages of supporting a sub-regional organization such as ECOWAS versus a regional organization such as the African Union (AU). Finally, it recommends ways that the United States can support these organizations to achieve the ends articulated in the National Security Strategy.

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WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ROBUSTLY SUPPORT PAN-AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS

Ultimately, the path of political and economic freedom presents the surest route to progress in sub-Saharan Africa, where most wars are conflicts over material resources and political access often tragically waged on the basis of ethnic and religious difference. The transition to the African Union with its stated commitment to good governance and a common responsibility for democratic political systems offers opportunities to strengthen democracy on the continent.¹

—George W. Bush

This monograph examines whether it should be United States' policy to robustly support pan-African sub-regional organizations that seek to have Africans help themselves. In order to do this effectively, it analyzes one sub-regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), using the furtherance of stated American policy for peace in the region as a litmus test. ECOWAS' guiding principles and record of accomplishment are highlighted relative to the United States' goals for Africa as promulgated in the National Security Strategy (NSS). The monograph argues that it is in the United States' interest to support sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS as a viable way to promote a self-sufficient Africa. A stable and prosperous Africa provides the conditions for political and economic growth and counters the incidence of "failed states" which can serve as terrorist breeding grounds such as in the Sudan. It contrasts the sub-regional organization, ECOWAS, with the regional organization, the African Union (AU), in terms of policies and performance and draws the conclusion that supporting sub-regional organizations offers a greater return on our investment. Supporting a focused transnational organization such as ECOWAS is a rational strategy to symmetrically defeat a stateless foe such as al-Qaida. Finally, the monograph will recommend that the United States provide financial and logistical support through third party organizations and nations that have existing working relationships with ECOWAS. It is in the national self-interest of the United States to promote democracy, safeguard human rights, and foster development in sub-Saharan Africa in order to promote a peaceful and pro-America region. Collaterally, there are compelling economic and humanitarian incentives to actively engaging African sub-regional organizations. In its assessment, the monograph not only considers ECOWAS' policy and performance, but its stability and the extent to which it is networked with other international organizations and sovereign states.

The NSS has three interlocking strategies for Africa. They are:

- Countries with major impact on their neighborhood such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia are anchors for regional engagement and require focused attention
- Coordination with allies, friends and international institutions is essential for constructive conflict mediation and successful peace operations: and
- Africa's capable reforming states and sub-regional organizations must be strengthened as the primary means to address transnational threats on a sustained basis.²

All of these strategies imply forming "coalitions of the willing" with pan-African organizations. However, the roles of conflict mediation and peace operations are relatively new ones for these agencies. Historically, these organizations have addressed chronic issues on the continent such as promoting democracy, improving access to quality education, confronting the effects of underdevelopment, empowering disadvantaged sub-groups, and documenting human rights abuses. However, both "regional and sub-regional organizations are retooling themselves in two ways: revising their mandates from being purely "developmentalist" to encompass conflict management and where applicable, revamping their fledgling regional security mechanisms. Evolving under circumstances of insecurity, the response of these organizations to crises and conflicts is developing in an *ad hoc* manner."¹³ This contrasts sharply with dealing with acute problems such as the apparent genocide in Darfur and the civil war in Cote d'Ivoire. Joint Publication 1-02 defines peace operations as "a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace."¹⁴ Notably, pan-African organizations "are driven, in their interventions, by an internal logic of common interest in economic development, and peace and security. They tend to have more at stake in conflicts within their regions than do external actors."¹⁵

HISTORY OF ECOWAS AS A SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATION

In May 1975, ECOWAS was founded in Lagos, Nigeria as a sub-regional group of fifteen of the world's poorest countries to jointly work towards economic integration and development.⁶ ECOWAS' goal is to enhance economic stability and relations between member states with the eventual aim of economic union.⁷ S. E. Kufuor, President of Ghana, is the current leader of ECOWAS (see Figure 1 territorial map.) Its guiding principles encompass equality, interdependence, good neighborliness, human rights, social justice, democratic governance,

and a just distribution of economic costs and benefits.⁸ ECOWAS' member states include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. In 2001, ECOWAS represented roughly 247 million individuals and a combined Gross Domestic Product of \$75 billion (of which Nigeria contributed \$40 billion.)⁹ In that year, regional exports were \$26.1 billion accounting for a trade surplus of \$2.5 billion.¹⁰ In terms of economic progress there have been some notable achievements: free movement of persons, construction of regional roads, development of telecommunications links between the States, and maintenance of peace and security.¹¹ However, there is still a low level of intra-regional trade (11 percent) as compared with third countries and the region is challenged by heavy external debt.¹² There are also impediments to ECOWAS' goals of integration of member states in the form of bad governance, political instability, and weak economies.¹³ Some hopeful signs include the prevalence of democracy among most of the member states, the reduction of state controlled economies, and liberalization of trading policies.¹⁴




FIGURE 1, ECOWAS GEOGRAPHIC REGION

The agency also has a peacekeeping/peace enforcement arm known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which was primarily responsible for the restoration of order in Liberia as well as addressing conflicts in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.¹⁵ It has been noted that, "this regional initiative has improved the conditions of the affected civilian population, at least in the short term."¹⁶ While the political aims of ECOWAS are in consonance with United States policy, economic integration has been hindered by widespread civil unrest in West

Africa.¹⁷ As with smaller Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), pan-African agencies are also “fundamentally constrained by the political environment in which they operate.”¹⁸ In political upheavals in both Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1997 and 1999, ill-equipped and poorly funded ECOMOG forces were unable to defeat the rebels and prevent rapes, pillaging, and killings.¹⁹ Previously, ECOWAS received most of its funding from Nigeria raising fears of its being an instrument of Nigerian designs.²⁰ Thus far ECOWAS has received funding from the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), Japan, and Canada. ECOWAS is also networked with the AU under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and joined with them in putting troops on the ground in Liberia.²¹ NEPAD’s goals are to foster peace and stability, by emphasizing pre-conflict early warning, preventive action, and post conflict reconstruction.²² The United States has endorsed NEPAD as laying the foundation for increased economic growth for Africa.²³

Historically speaking, ECOMOG’s intervention into Liberia was a qualified success as chronicled by Colin Scott of Brown University’s Institute of International Studies.²⁴ In 1989, Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) ignited a rebellion in Liberia. After Taylor rejected an ECOWAS diplomatic overture in August 1990, an ECOMOG contingent of 3,500 troops entered the capital of Monrovia in an effort to quell the civil war.²⁵ These forces were successful in pushing the NPFL out of Monrovia by October of that year.²⁶ ECOMOG established a limited security zone within which the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) could operate.²⁷ Here, ECOMOG reduced hostilities, set up a safe haven for refugees, and prevented atrocities.²⁸ In October 1992, the NPFL launched a new attack on Monrovia that was repulsed by ECOMOG that then migrated from a peacekeeping to a peace enforcement role.²⁹ The United Nations (UN) began humanitarian operations under the UN Special Coordinating Office for Liberia (UNSCOL) in March 1990 and subsequently deployed an observer mission, United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in July 1993.³⁰ During this period both indigenous and international NGOs also played a role in humanitarian operations. In this intervention, ECOMOG’s neutrality was placed in question due to its perceived partiality toward the NPFL and, as mentioned above, its being an agent for Nigerian ambitions. Scott endorses backing from the Organization of African Unity or OAU (now the African Union) and the possible introduction of East African troops.³¹ Also, ECOMOG was criticized because of a lack of clarity between its military operations and the UN’s’ political and humanitarian initiatives.³² A clearer command and management structure prior to the onset of combined operations could have been a remedy here.³³ Scott further opines that continued

international funding for these operations should be contingent on adoption of these recommendations.³⁴

ECOMOG is authorized to intervene in the following instances:

- A situation of internal armed conflict within a member state
- Conflicts between two or more member states
- Internal conflicts that threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster or pose a serious threat to sub-regional peace and security or a situation resulting from the overthrow of a democratically elected government.
- Any other situation that council members deem appropriate³⁵

The interventions into Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau all fell under the third rubric of ECOMOG's charter. In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG restored a democratically elected government after a military overthrow whereas it did not achieve its peacekeeping objectives in Guinea-Bissau (the democratically elected government was overthrown.)³⁶ In all three conflicts, ECOMOG was plagued by insufficient funding and logistical support (there were 712 ECOMOG troops in Guinea-Bissau) and political differences between its member states.³⁷ In December 1999, ECOWAS promulgated its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security which "provides for collective armed intervention in the internal affairs of member states, when conditions in those states threaten sub-regional peace and security."³⁸ This was a groundbreaking departure for African states, which historically have viewed national sovereignty as sacrosanct.³⁹ This mechanism also divided the region into four zones of observation in order to provide an early warning of conflict.⁴⁰ In October 1998, ECOWAS also published a moratorium on the export, import and manufacture of small arms and light weapons. This pronouncement has yet to be translated in concrete action.⁴¹

ECOWAS IN CONTRAST TO THE AFRICAN UNION

The African Union (AU) was established in 1999 as a regrouping of the states which comprised the Organization of African Unity (OAU.) The charter of the AU is to promote African solidarity, to defend state sovereignty, to protect people's rights, to advance peace in the region, and to further good governance and democracy.⁴² There is a Peace and Security Council (PSC); a Pan African Parliament; an Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC); and a Court of Justice within the AU.⁴³ There is also an AU Commission responsible for the day-to-day management of the AU. Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria, is the current chairman of the AU. The PSC's charter is conflict prevention, management and resolution, and

combating terrorism. The AU has been involved in monitoring the civil war and attendant atrocities currently being committed in Darfur in Western Sudan. Internally, the PSC has requested that the AU Commission Chairman submit a plan to enhance the cease-fire monitoring mission with a possibility of transforming it into a peacekeeping mission to protect civilians.⁴⁴ Peacekeeping is defined as: "Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement."⁴⁵ The United States has contributed \$144.2 million (another \$600 million is expected) for relief and the UN is in the process of officially determining whether genocide is occurring. The AU has pledged to Darfur a peacekeeping force of 3,320 personnel including 2,341 military, 450 observers, and 815 civilian police to provide humanitarian relief and oversee the return of refugees.⁴⁶ Secretary Powell characterized the extent of AU's role to date as a "presence" only, insufficient to monitor an area roughly the size of France.⁴⁷ The AU has played an observer role in the cease-fire talks in Chad and was delegated the task to set up a Cease-fire Commission in Darfur pursuant to an April 8, 2004 cease fire agreement.⁴⁸ Collaterally, the AU has been involved in nation building in Somalia and in conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire; two countries in various stages of civil war.

Like ECOWAS, the OAU established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) in 1993.⁴⁹ In so doing, the organization recognized that peace and security is a necessary precondition for economic and social development.⁵⁰ The MCPMR thrust the OAU into the peacekeeping/conflict management arena that was formerly the exclusive preserve of the UN and sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS. Prior to this, the OAU provided an Early Warning System that was intended to identify potential conflicts by analyzing social, political, and economic indicators. However, data integrity had been a chronic problem and OAU's system remained underdeveloped.⁵¹ The OAU had also been insufficiently networked with governments, sub-regional organizations, and civil society.⁵² Much of this can be attributed to poor communication and publicity. Today, the AU has a web site that promotes understanding of the organization's goals and objectives, accomplishments, and current actions it is taking in pursuit of peace on the continent. The AU also has a model of successful cooperation with the UN when the OAU jointly deployed peacekeepers to monitor the cease fire between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Here again, the UN deployed 4,200 soldiers while the OAU contributed only eleven.⁵³ It is obvious that the OAU reconstituted itself as the AU to more effectively pursue its peacekeeping mission (the OAU had been constrained by its charter from

intervening in the internal affairs of member states.) The OAU also established a panel that investigated the Rwanda atrocities and published a detailed report on lessons learned.⁵⁴

Organizations such as ECOWAS and the AU have good governance, democracy, and development as goals for their respective regions. Both of their constitutions argue for peace and security, political and economic progress, and unity among peoples.⁵⁵ Therefore, the NSS and the respective charters of these African regional and sub-regional organizations are in consonance. Both organizations have had limited successes in conflict resolution and peacekeeping with ECOWAS also having peace enforcement in its repertoire and more extensive experience in interventions in member states. Peace enforcement is defined as “application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.”⁵⁶ The AU enjoys the higher international regard for being an autonomous organization whereas sub-regional organizations are more subject to being co-opted by hegemonic states such as Nigeria or South Africa (in the case of the South African Development Community.) The AU also has proved to be marginally more adept at effectively working with the UN, sovereign states, and NGOs by agreeing on a framework of operations and then cooperating closely post-intervention to address any emergent issues. Both organizations are moderately strong with the AU evidencing greater unity and ECOWAS having a more extensive record of achievement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations.

Perhaps the deciding factor would be that ECOWAS, as a sub-regional organization, has a greater stake in the prevention and resolution of conflicts in West Africa. The AU is fundamentally an umbrella organization that relies on capable sub-regional organizations to implement its policies. The AU can augment sub-regional forces as is presently occurring in the mini-crisis in Cote d’Ivoire or it can take the primary peace enforcement role where sub-regional organizations are relatively weak (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development as sub-regional organization for Sudan.) However, ECOWAS has maintained a high profile in West Africa and President Kufour has been directly involved in discussions with the AU, UN, and country leaders in member states such as Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. To quote *AfricaFocus Bulletin*

Of all the sub-regional bodies, the West African group ECOWAS continued to play the most prominent role in addressing conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia. In May, the ECOWAS security committee resolved to create a rapid response military force to tackle sub-regional crises, and also agreed to strengthen the regional arms moratorium. ECOWAS is also in the process of establishing early warning centers in the troubled West African region.⁵⁷

A contingent of 1300 ECOWAS troops coordinated with 3800 French forces in monitoring the fragile cease-fire that ended the civil war in Cote d'Ivoire begun in September 2002.⁵⁸ In addition, 3500 ECOWAS peacekeepers were deployed to Monrovia, Liberia after former President Charles Taylor stepped down. ECOWAS then brokered an August 2003 cease-fire and an agreement to establish an interim government in Liberia.⁵⁹ At the direction of the AU, ECOWAS established a Rapid Reaction Force of "6500 highly trained and equipped soldiers that could be deployed immediately in response to crises or threats to peace and security in the region."⁶⁰ Finally, ECOWAS has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA). The MOU is aimed at promoting good governance, democracy, and stability in West Africa; encourages a regional approach to crisis prevention and conflict management; and promotes civil society's participation in early warning systems for conflict prevention and recovery.⁶¹ Ultimately, the AU is not in competition with ECOWAS for maintaining regional security and fostering development in West Africa. Rather, the AU supports and underwrites ECOWAS as a capable organization to fulfill this mission and so should the United States.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR ECOWAS AS A WAY TO COMBAT FAILED STATES

A major reason for the United States to underwrite ECOWAS and other sub-regional organizations is that they act to prevent the rise of failed states such as the Sudan and Somalia in East Africa. Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Liberia are all borderline failed states and the active presence of ECOWAS is a force for stabilizing these states. The Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction provided a number of useful observations with respect to failed states:

One of the principal lessons of the events of September 11 is that failed states matter – for national security as well as for humanitarian reasons. If left to their own devices, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist networks, organized crime and drug traffickers as well as posing grave humanitarian challenges and threats to regional stability.⁶²

The Commission goes on to state that the United States cannot get involved in all failed states and should use discretion based on the interests and values in question. The United States should craft a vision of what role it should play in the region and what roles to share with other international actors.⁶³ In West Africa, ECOWAS can play a major role in shoring up American interests with regard to the prevention of failed states based on their guiding principles. One of the principal recommendations of the Commission is the creation of a multi-

national Integrated Security Support Component responsible for post-conflict security. This role fits neatly with ECOWAS' repertoire and mission. In its report, the Commission made seventeen specific recommendations regarding post-conflict reconstruction, which are particularly applicable to the role of ECOWAS in West Africa. Recommendations include ownership of the reconstruction process by the countries in question, security as the *sine qua non* of post-conflict reconstruction, rapid mobilization of needed resources, and the timing of an operation being driven by circumstances on the ground not bureaucratic fiat or artificial deadlines.⁶⁴ The thrust of the recommendations is that international partners should remain in the background lest their intervention undermine indigenous efforts to stabilize the situation. Though there are states in crisis in West Africa, it has been through the efforts of ECOWAS with international support that there have been no Sudans, Somalias, or Rwandas there over the past twenty five years.

According to Sebastian Mallaby, Sub-Saharan Africa is demographically challenged by high birth rates and diseases which provide conditions which give rise to failed states that can become havens for terrorist activity.⁶⁵ Mallaby posits that the best hope for failed states is for rich countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to finance reconstruction through the World Bank's lending program.⁶⁶ This fund would require money, troops, and commitment of lender nations under the leadership of the United States.⁶⁷ ECOWAS' role is to be an indigenous organization which can broker these resources in the sub-region and thereby reduce the international footprint in sovereign states. By consensus of its member states, ECOWAS is mandated to intervene in the affairs of its member states when peace and security is threatened. When Western powers attempt remedial action in the form of political or military intervention in failed states there is the risk of perception of re-colonization or other suspect motives imputed according to a recent report on failed states.⁶⁸ Such states are no longer able to satisfy the basic needs of their people or their people have been denied or stripped of their rights as citizens.⁶⁹ Ultimately, a failed state is no longer able to uphold the rule of law, it is unable to fulfill its international obligations, and it is unable to prevent transnational criminal organizations from using its territory as a base of operations against other sovereign states.⁷⁰ The report goes on to note that some degree of European action has already been taken by France and Britain and that an institutional architecture needs to be established whereby failed states can be rescued.⁷¹ Here again, the United States can work through European sponsor nations as a third party in assisting ECOWAS. Such a third wave of support could do much to stem one of the principal effects of state failure which is mass exodus of refugees. This pressure of migration out of failed states into neighboring countries and even to developed nations destabilizes the region as the displaced inhabitants attempt to find suitable

living conditions. The report concludes that “security and security structures must be at the heart of a more integrated question of failing states.”⁷² The security structure of ECOWAS as first responders, European countries as the next echelon of support, and United States as third party sponsor holds the promise of an effective mechanism to combat failed states in West Africa. I will return to this theme later in my treatise.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR ECOWAS AS A WAY TO ENSURE ACCESS TO OIL

Besides removing potential bases of operation for transnational terrorism, the United States is interested in oil of which West Africa is a major global producer. West Africa accounts for most of American oil imports from the region with the bulk of the oil being produced by sub-regional anchor nation, Nigeria (Figure 2 shows country daily output of over 2 million barrels per day.) West Africa is the continent’s second largest oil producing sub-region with Nigeria accounting for 99.4 percent of West Africa’s oil reserves.⁷³ As the world’s sixth largest oil producer, Nigeria accounts for 11 percent of the oil imported into the United States behind Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Canada, and Venezuela in order of volume.⁷⁴ This represents roughly 1.2 million barrels of oil per day.⁷⁵ This is also the vast majority of the oil the United States imports from Africa as the continent accounts for approximately 16 percent of incoming oil flows.⁷⁶ Another advantage to importing oil from Africa is the fact that much of the oil is offshore and thereby insulated from domestic political and social turmoil.⁷⁷ In Nigeria, ExxonMobil is currently producing around 600,000 barrels per day (about half of what the United States imports) and plans to invest \$11 billion through 2011 in order to double that output.⁷⁸

With American interest in West African oil production, the United States strategically desires peace and tranquility in the sub-region. However, “political and ethnic strife in West Africa including violence, kidnapping, sabotage, and the seizure of oil facilities, often disrupts Nigerian oil production.”⁷⁹ Fuel theft alone amounts to about \$2 billion yearly and inter-ethnic tensions have disrupted oil production, both domestic supply and exports.⁸⁰ The execution of Ogoni environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa in November 1995 is one manifestation of this ethnic strife coupled with the local youth protests clamoring against the oil companies and government for their share of the profits. Some portion of these benefits accrued to the government through the oil trade needs to be passed on to the people. With between 25 and 35.2 billion barrels of oil reserves in either coastal or offshore oil, Nigeria is a significant source of American oil for the foreseeable future.⁸¹ Therefore, it is a rational policy to support ECOWAS as a capable organization for advancing good governance and economic development in West Africa.

Nigerian Crude Oil Production, 1980-2003




FIGURE 2, NIGERIAN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION

CASE FOR U.S. ECONOMIC STIMULUS IN WEST AFRICA

Concerning economic development in West Africa, the NSS is committed to advancing free trade with Africa under the auspices the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA.) Specifically, the AGOA states that “we will also offer opportunity to the poorest continent, Africa, starting with the full use of the preferences allowed in the African Growth and Opportunity Act and, leading to free trade.”⁸² Enacted in May 2000, AGOA gives preferential trade access to African nations that open their economies and build free markets.⁸³ Of the fifteen nations comprising ECOWAS, eleven are eligible for AGOA benefits. Nigeria is the largest exporter to the United States at \$17.9 billion accounting for almost 70 percent of American purchases from Africa in 2003.⁸⁴ President Bush in signing the AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004 stated that this legislation has encouraged African nations to reform their economies and governments in order to take advantage of the opportunities AGOA provides.⁸⁵ ECOWAS has taken the initiative in the form of two projects, Trade in ECOWAS Countries (ECOTrade) and Growth through Engendering Enterprise in ECOWAS Countries (ECOGEE.) ECOTrade supports a common external tariff for West Africa while ECOGEE is intended remove obstacles to trade within the sub-region.⁸⁶ The Commission on Capital Flows to Africa has stated in a recent report that greater attention should be paid to sub-regional initiatives recognizing that sub-regions differ in commercial and economic drivers.⁸⁷ The Commission recommends that the United States

should support sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS that have begun to create free trade areas to expand markets and facilitate the movement of goods, capital, and services.⁸⁸

ECOWAS is also the sub-regional focal point for AU based New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and United States sponsored Millennium Challenge Account (MCA.) These two initiatives are interlocked with NEPAD providing a framework for growth, development, and globalization and MCA offering a 50 percent increase in development assistance for those countries meeting its qualifications. Both initiatives stress good governance, peace and security, the rule of law, human rights, privatization, and regional integration. One of the principles of NEPAD is to ensure that its partnerships are linked to MCA goals.⁸⁹ Within West Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, and Ghana are NEPAD partners while Benin, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal are eligible for MCA assistance. The Commission on Capital Flows to Africa links Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to economic growth "when there is an educated work force and hospitable conditions for investment."⁹⁰

ENGAGEMENT OF ECOWAS THROUGH EUROPEAN SPONSORS

A promising way for the United States to engage ECOWAS is through the EU. The EU encompasses the former colonial masters of the states comprising ECOWAS and, as such, has historical ties with West Africa. The EU also has adopted a sub-regional strategy for working with ECOWAS and is committed to the principle that economic development is a precursor to peace and stability. Additionally, both ECOWAS and the EU are in agreement that regional economic integration is necessary to fight poverty and prevent conflict in West Africa and are working toward ratifying an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) by the end of 2007.⁹¹ Both organizations share a comprehensive strategy on peace and security aimed at securing porous borders, eliminating trafficking in small arms, and providing jobs for unemployed youth. The EU remains in dialogue with ECOWAS and supports its entering into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the AU. The EU is currently providing \$6.5 million euros to ECOWAS under the 8th European Development Fund for five projects including conflict prevention, regional integration, common currency, regional transport, and computer software support.⁹² Richard Ryan, Irish Ambassador to the United Nations, speaking on behalf of the EU stated that "the European Union enjoys a rich and deep engagement with Africa, both directly and in partnership with the United Nations."⁹³ He punctuated his address by adding, "nowhere has the need for a sub-regional approach been more evident in recent years than in West Africa."⁹⁴

By bolstering ECOWAS through the EU and such former colonial powers as the United Kingdom and France, the United States can leverage their existing relationships while conserving scarce resources and improving our international profile. The United States can effectively collaborate as a third order power funneling resources through the EU and thereby achieve policy goals with a smaller regional commitment. Also, we can allow the United Nations to act as an honest broker for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in West Africa. The United States doesn't need to do all the heavy lifting in a sub-region that is challenged by issues such as the settlement of refugees and trafficking in human beings. By allowing the international community to engage in West Africa while pursuing its own economic incentives, the United States can shift the primary burden to ECOWAS supported by the EU, the UN, the AU, and other interested parties. The current civil war in Cote d'Ivoire is a case in point where ECOWAS has an opportunity to collaborate with France and the UN Mission (ONUCI) to defuse the crisis and pave the way for national elections in October 2005.⁹⁵

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are several recommendations that can be derived from the above discussion. These recommendations, if implemented, could advance American national security interests in Africa and provide policy leverage with minimal resource requirements:

- The United States should support ECOWAS and other African sub-regional organizations as a workable way to promote American interests for good governance and economic prosperity in the region. The United States' goal should be to engage the primary stakeholders, encouraging them to assume responsibility for arresting internal conflicts and promoting development. This can be effectively accomplished through financial and logistical support to ECOWAS and its pan-African peer organizations. There are a number of reasons why it is in the interests of the United States to support such organizations:
 - Through active and resolute support of African sub-regional organizations, the United States can discourage the rise of failed states that can become fertile breeding grounds for terrorism, criminal activity, and pandemic diseases.
 - Supporting such organizations logistically and financially reduces the United States' "boots on the ground" footprint and the expenditure of scarce American military forces. Equally, it preserves the support of American public opinion that is loath to jeopardize the lives of its sons and daughters in a continent where many perceive we have no vital interests.

- Through support of ECOWAS and its sister pan-African organizations, the United States symmetrically opposes an asymmetric foe – transnational terrorism. Such organizations possess the agility and statelessness necessary to counterbalance the emergence of non-state actors such as al-Qaida.
 - By providing monetary support to African sub-regional organizations, the United States can foster development and bolster the international image of America while nurturing potential trading partners. This judicious investment could pay returns in both political and economic capital. On the humanitarian front alone, America stands to gain the respect of the global community as well as the satisfaction for having taken the moral high ground.
- The United States should support sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS as a preferred strategy over regional organizations such as the AU. Sub-regional organizations have a greater stake in conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations because they are policing their homeland. AU nations can return to their own sector of the continent after their deployments are over. Nations comprising sub-regional organizations are there for better or for worse. What the AU seeks to accomplish with limited resources is commendable, yet it is preferable to commit indigenous forces that have a stake in the outcome of the struggle.
- When feasible, the United States should engage sub-regional organizations through their European sponsors with which they have had historical ties. One way to support these organizations is through the EU which has been involved in Africa recently and also shares an interest in peace on the continent. Many of the EU nations have continuing relationships with their former colonies and are well positioned to assist them in their present crises. The United States can work through these European nations in a tertiary role providing our expertise and resources when and where needed.
- Finally, the United States should support ECOWAS because that organization has a history of conflict resolution, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping operations in West Africa. ECOWAS is a relatively stable organization with a commitment to democratic reform and economic progress. ECOWAS has also networked with other international groups such as the United Nations, the AU, and other sub-regional bodies. It has established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security and is united with the AU under NEPAD. It has cultivated relationships with the United States, the EU, Japan, and others.

CONCLUSIONS

This monograph concludes with several assertions that logically follow from the arguments and recommendations presented above. They define a national security policy and strategy towards Africa aimed at effectively furthering the interests of the United States in the region:

- The United States should robustly support pan-African organizations such as ECOWAS because it is in its national self-interest that good governance and economic development prevail in Africa. Without peace and prosperity on the continent, the United States faces the dangers inherent in failed states that are prevalent in Africa in varying degrees. These dangers encompass transnational terrorism, international drug trafficking, and the spread of disease within and outside Africa.
- The United States should support ECOWAS because it is in a well-leveraged position to influence peace and progress in West Africa necessary for industry and commerce to thrive. The United States should analogously examine the benefits of supporting other sub-regional organizations in order to influence their development in the direction of the NSS.
- The United States should primarily support ECOWAS vice the AU in West Africa because the former has a greater stake in the development of the sub-region and a more extensive track record in peace enforcement operations.
- The United States should collaborate in a supporting role with the EU and European nations in supporting African sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS. There is a mutual interest in such “coalitions of the willing” and there is the opportunity to capitalize on existing relationships that these nations enjoy with their former colonies.
- It should be United States policy to robustly support ECOWAS and other such pan-African organizations because by employing these groups as surrogates, it mitigates the risk of political and military entanglements. With a resource-constrained military and a people reluctant to take on additional international commitments, this qualifies as a judicious course of action. Such a policy serves United States’ national security interests, achieves its ends, and is a viable methodology in light of limited resources.

WORD COUNT=5905

ENDNOTES

¹ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 11.

² Ibid.

³ International Peace Academy, "The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa," September 2002; available from <<http://www.ipacademy.org>>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004

⁴ Joint Staff Information Network, "JP 1-02," <<http://jdeis.cornerstoneindustry.com/jdeis/quickSearch/qsOverviewPortlet.jsp?conceptId=473...>>; Internet; accessed 2 October 2004.

⁵ International Peace Academy, "The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa," September 2002; available from <<http://www.ipacademy.org>>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004

⁶ Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "Fact Sheet," 16 July 2003; available from <<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/22519.htm>>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ ECOWAS Home Page, Community Court of Justice, available from <www.sec.ecowas.int>; Internet; accessed 12 November 2004. ECOWAS' guiding principles are:

- Equality and inter-dependence of Member States.
- Solidarity and collective self-reliance.
- Inter-state co-operation, harmonization of policies and integration of programs.
- Non-aggression between Member States.
- Maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighborliness.
- Peaceful settlement of disputes among Member States, active co-operation between neighboring Countries and promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development.
- Recognition, promotion and protection of human and people's rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights.
- Accountability, economic and social justice and popular participation in development.
- Recognition and observance of the rules of principles of the Community.
- Promotion and consolidation of democratic system of governance in each Member State as envisaged by the Declaration of Political Principles adopted in Abuja on 6th July, 1991.
- Equitable and just distribution of the costs and benefits of Economic Co-operation and Integration.

⁹ EIA Country Analysis Briefs, Economic Community of West African States, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/ecowas.html#TABLE1>; Internet, accessed 12 November 2004.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ ECOWAS Home Page, Community Court of Justice, available from <www.sec.ecowas.int>; Internet; accessed 12 November 2004.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Colin Scott, "Humanitarian Action and Security in Liberia 1989-1994," (Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1995), ix.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Dicklitch, Susan, *The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 24.

¹⁹ International Peace Academy, "The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa," September 2002; available from <<http://www.ipacademy.org>>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004.

²⁰ Cawthra, Gavin; "Sub-Regional Security Cooperation: The Southern African Development Community in Comparative Perspective," available from <<http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/cag01/cag01.html>>. Internet; accessed 4 October 2004.

²¹ "G8 Briefing on Africa," The White House, 9 June 2004; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040609-16.html>>; Internet; accessed 1 October 2004.

²² Dr. (Col) Rocklyn Williams, *Aims, Objectives and Activities of the Security Network Symposium* (Maputo, Mozambique: Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, 30 June – 1 July 2003), 2.

²³ United States Diplomatic Mission to Nigeria, "NEPAD: Africans Mapping Africa's Economic Future, Says U. S. Ambassador to U.N.," 20 October 2003; available from <<http://usembassy.state.gov/nigeria/wwwhp102003a.html>>; Internet; accessed 1 October 2004.

²⁴ Colin Scott, "Humanitarian Action and Security in Liberia 1989-1994," (Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1995.)

²⁵ Ibid, 9.

²⁶ Ibid, xix.

²⁷ Ibid, 3.

²⁸ Ibid, 10.

²⁹ Ibid, 11.

³⁰ Ibid, xx.

³¹ Ibid, 36-37.

³² Ibid, 37.

³³ Ibid, 35.

³⁴ Ibid, 42.

³⁵ International Peace Academy, "The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa," September 2002; available from <<http://www.ipacademy.org>>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ "West Africa and ECOWAS: A Sub-regional Approach to Collective Security and Conflict Management," United States Army War College, Course Directive, 13 February 2002; available from <cbnet/orgs/dnss/regionals/africa/africa6.htm>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004..

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ ECOWAS Home Page, Community Court of Justice, available from <www.sec.ecowas.int>; Internet; accessed 12 November 2004.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² "African Union in a Nutshell," available from <http://www.Africa-union.org/About_AU/Abau_in_a_nutshell.htm>; Internet; accessed 1 October 2004. The AU's objectives are:

- To achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa.
- To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its member states.
- To accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent.
- To promote peace, security, and stability on the continent.
- To promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, and good governance.
- To promote and protect human and people's rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and other relevant human rights instruments

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Colin Powell, "White House Interactive," available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/interactive/wallstreetcol.html>>, Internet; accessed 1 October 2004.

⁴⁵ Joint Staff Information Network, "JP 1-02," <<http://jdeis.cornerstoneindustry.com/jdeis/quickSearch/qsOverviewPortlet.jsp?conceptId=474&f=2&searchStr=peacekeeping>>; Internet; accessed 1 October 2004.

⁴⁶ “The Chairperson of the African Union Appoints Ambassador Baba Kana Kingibe as His Special Representative in the Sudan,” African Union Communique (Addis Ababa, 10 November 2004.)

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ “Too Little, Too Late: Sudanese and International Response 2004,” available from <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/8.htm>>; Internet; accessed 1 October 2004.

⁴⁹ International Peace Academy, “The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa ,” September 2002; available from <<http://www.ipacademy.org>>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Dr. (Col) Rocklyn Williams, *Aims, Objectives and Activities of the Security Network Symposium* (Maputo, Mozambique: Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, 30 June – 1 July 2003), 8.

⁵⁶ Joint Staff Information Network, “JP 3-07,” <<http://jdeis.cornerstoneindustry.com/jdeis/detailedSearch/parByPub.jsp...>>; Internet; accessed 8 October 2004.

⁵⁷ “Africa: Peacekeeping Trends, 2,” *AfricaFocus Bulletin*, 31 January 2004; available from <<http://africafocus.org/docs04/hrw0401.php>>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2004.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ “Defence Chiefs Approve Establishment of Rapid Reaction Force,” 18 June 2004; available from <<http://www.sec.ecowas.int/presse/en/presseshow.php?nb=48&lang=en&annee=2004>>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2004.

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⁶² Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U. S. Army (AUSA), “Play to Win,” January 2003; available from <<http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/playtowin.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2004.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Sebastian Mallaby, "The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire," *Foreign Affairs* March/April 2002 [journal on-line]; available from <[http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020301facomment767/Sebastian-mallaby/the-reluctant-i...>](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020301facomment767/Sebastian-mallaby/the-reluctant-i...); Internet; accessed 16 November 2004.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ The African Studies Centre, Leiden, the Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, The Center of Social Studies, Coimbra University, and The Peace Research Center-CIP-FUHEM, Madrid; "Failed and Collapsed States in the International System;" December 2002, 8.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 14.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 4.

⁷¹ Ibid, 20.

⁷² Ibid, 23.

⁷³ Available from <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/archives/africa/chapter4.html>>; Internet; accessed 16 November 2004.

⁷⁴ "Energy Information Administration/Petroleum Supply Monthly," October 2004. Available from <http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/info_glance/importexport.html>. Internet; accessed 18 November 2004.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Thompson Ayodele, "Africa in Bush's Agenda," 15 November 2004; available from <<http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200411160611.html>>; Internet; accessed 18 November 2004.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ "Country Analysis Briefs," August 2004; available from <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nigeria.html>>; Internet; accessed 18 November 2004.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 18.

⁸³ "What is AGOA?" available from <www.watradehub.com/Home%20Page/WHAT%20AGO.A.htm>; Internet; accessed 19 November 2004.

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⁸⁵ The White House. "President Bush Signs Growth and Opportunity Act; 13 July 2004; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040713-3.html>>; Internet; accessed 19 November 2004.

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