


# Joint Publication 3-61



## Public Affairs



9 May 2005



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## PREFACE

### 1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine for public affairs support during joint operations and US military support to news media in conjunction with military operations. It provides guidance to the joint force commander (JFC) when communicating with national, international, and internal audiences.

### 2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other JFCs and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.


### 3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by

the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "NASchwartz", with a stylized flourish at the end.

NORTON A. SCHWARTZ  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director, Joint Staff

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES**  
**REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-61, DATED 14 MAY 1997**

- **Adds a discussion of public affairs responsibilities**
- **Covers fundamentals of information**
- **Discusses the various target audiences**
- **Updates coverage of joint public affairs responsibilities**
- **Covers public affairs relationship to information operations**
- **Discusses media access, to include embedded reporters**
- **Adds a discussion of joint public affairs considerations in homeland defense and civil support**
- **Covers joint public affairs training**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Provides an Overview of Joint Public Affairs Mission and Doctrine**
  - **Covers the Responsibilities for Joint Public Affairs**
  - **Discusses Public Affairs Support of Joint Operations**
  - **Covers Joint Public Affairs in Homeland Defense and Civil Support**
  - **Discusses Joint Public Affairs Resource Requirements**
- 

### Background

*The First Amendment guarantees the freedom of the press.*

All members of our military forces have taken an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America. During our nation's history, there has been tension between the military and the media over the public's right to know. The military's operational mission requires that operations security be practiced at all levels of command to protect the lives of American, allied, and coalition forces, and the security of ongoing or future operations. Though responsible members of the media share these concerns, their job is to report on military operations in real time. These competing goals sometimes lead to friction between the media and the military.

*Public affairs officers are an integral part of the staff at all levels of command.*

The public affairs officer (PAO) is the joint force commander's (JFC's) principal spokesperson and senior advisor on public affairs (PA). To gain such a position of trust, the PAO must have the ability to provide information to the media, to the commander, and to the supporting forces in near real time. The key to success in this endeavor is not limited to planning, training, and equipping PAOs, but integrating PA operations into all levels of the command. Whereas the media may have access to tactical units during hostilities, PAOs may have access to information and to senior-level staff officers on a continuing basis.

## Department of Defense Principles of Information

*It is the responsibility of the Department of Defense to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand facts about national security and defense strategy.*

Requests for information from organizations and private citizens shall be answered quickly. In carrying out that Department of Defense (DOD) policy, the following Principles of Information shall apply:

Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by national security constraints or valid statutory mandates or exceptions.

A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States and their dependents.

Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.

Information shall be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.

DOD's obligation to provide the public with information on DOD major programs may require detailed PA planning and coordination in the DOD and with the other government agencies.

## Fundamentals of Information

*There are several fundamentals of information that guide commanders for effective employment of public affairs (PA) operations and for an appropriate relationship with the media.*

These information fundamentals complement the DOD Principles of Information and describe the best practices to follow when fighting in the global information battlespace.

**Tell the Truth.** JFC PA personnel will only release truthful information.

**Provide Timely Information.** Commanders should be prepared to release timely, coordinated, and approved information about military operations.

**Practice Security at the Source.** All DOD personnel are responsible for safeguarding sensitive information. As sources of information, each DOD member should be aware of operations security (OPSEC) issues, whether being

interviewed by the media or sharing information with family or friends.

**Provide Consistent Information at all Levels.**

Commanders should ensure that DOD PA operations put forth a consistent message through its many voices. Information should be appropriately coordinated and in compliance with official DOD and supported command guidance before it is released to the public.

**Tell the DOD Story.** Every military and civilian member of DOD should help provide accurate information about the Armed Forces and national defense operations to the public. Commanders should educate and encourage their military and civilian employees to tell the DOD story by providing them with timely information that is appropriate for public release.

### Public Affairs Fundamentals

*There are several PA fundamentals that will assist commanders in performing the PA mission in joint operations.*

Commanders and staffs at all levels should anticipate external interest in operations as part of the normal planning process and be prepared to respond.

Well-planned PA support should be incorporated in every phase of operations. Regardless of the type or scope of military operations, PA will facilitate making accurate and timely information available to the public.

There are several ways to evaluate the success and credibility of the PA effort. One is to assess the general tone of the media in their questions and dealings with the PAOs and the command in general. A second is a continuous assessment of available media products and public opinion polls. Another is to estimate the impact of command information on the internal audience from the feedback of other functional areas (morale, welfare, recreation and services, chaplain, and inspector general). PA personnel should also monitor the impact of news coverage on the mission and host nation concerns.

## Public Affairs Management

### *PA activities during joint operations are an operational function.*

Each JFC's PA program includes the responsibilities to conduct media relations, plans and logistics, command/internal information, and community relations, as appropriate. Each of these functions has a part to play in each joint operation although they will vary with each mission.

There are normally two key officers who are responsible to the JFC for the PA program: the joint force PAO and the joint information bureau (JIB) director. The joint force PAO, with appropriate staff support, is on the commander's personal staff and is directly responsible for all the JFC's PA requirements. The joint force PAO also provides oversight of subordinate JIB(s). The JIB director, with supporting JIB staff, is responsible for coordinating all media operations within the operational area, and provides and coordinates support to the JFC through the joint force PAO. The JFC, with the assistance of the joint force PAO and the JIB director, directs the PA program in a manner that most efficiently contributes to the overall success of the command.

## Public Affairs Functions

### *PA has three basic functions: public information, command/internal information, and community relations.*

**Public Information.** While the Internet continues to provide new public information opportunities, military public information is still largely a matter of coordinating media relations. Media relations activities are designed to provide information through the media to the external national and international public. Commanders and their PA staffs should be prepared to respond to media inquiries, issue statements, schedule interviews, conduct briefings, arrange for access to operational units, and provide appropriate equipment, transportation and communications support to the media.

**Command/Internal Information.** A critical joint force PA mission involves informing the various internal audiences about the participation of military forces in a joint operation. Full coverage is particularly important for the participating forces, those military personnel and civilian employees who remain behind, and all family members.

**Community Relations.** During joint operations, joint PA operations will support the JFC's civil-military operations as required. However, the community relations function in communities around or near home stations that are affected by force deployments remains a unit or installation PA responsibility during joint operations.

## Public Affairs Relationship to Information Operations

*PA and information operations entities must be aware of each other's activities for maximum effect and to achieve success.*

PA and information operations (IO) activities directly support military objectives, counter adversary disinformation and deter adversary actions. Although both PA and IO require planning, message development and media analysis, the efforts differ with respect to audience, scope and intent, and must remain separate. Commanders must ensure appropriate coordination between PA and IO activities consistent with the DOD Principles of Information, policy or statutory limitation and security. Effective coordination and collaboration with IO is necessary for PA to maintain its institutional credibility. Successful PA operations require institutional credibility to maintain public trust and confidence. Commanders should structure their organizations to ensure PA and IO functions are separate. PAOs should work directly for the commander and all supporting PA activities should be organized under the PAO.

PA capabilities are related to IO, but PA is not an IO discipline or psychological operations (PSYOP) tool. PA activities contribute to IO by providing truthful, accurate and timely information, using approved DOD public affairs guidance to keep the public informed about the military's missions and operations, countering adversary propaganda, deterring adversary actions, and maintain trust and confidence of the US population, and our friends and allies. PA activities affect, and are affected by, PSYOP, and are planned and executed in coordination with PSYOP planning and operations. PA must be aware of the practice of PSYOP, but should have no role in planning or executing these operations.

Military commands receive calls from the media and public each day inquiring about US forces and operations. In these cases, PA supports OPSEC and is the only organization authorized by DOD for the release of information to the public. As such, it bears key responsibility for OPSEC. Security at the source is the primary method of protecting classified and sensitive material and should govern discussions with media representatives.

PA activities affect, and are affected by, military deception (MILDEC) operations. PA operations should be planned, coordinated and deconflicted with MILDEC operations consistent with policy, statutory limitations, and security. PA must be aware of the practice of MILDEC operations, but should have no role in planning or executing these operations. PA statements and releases must be coordinated with MILDEC to ensure deception plans are not revealed or compromised.

*Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of military operations.*

### Media Access

Media coverage of potential future military operations can, to a large extent, shape public perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead. This is true for the US public, the public in allied countries, whose opinion can affect the durability of the coalition, and publics in countries where US conducts operations, whose perceptions of the US can affect the cost and duration of our involvement. The JFC must organize for and facilitate access of national and international media to US forces, including those engaged in combat operations.

Commanders should expect regular encounters with journalists who show up in their assigned operational areas. Some will embed with the units and stay with them for an extended period of time. Some embedded reporters will be registered by the joint force and will carry identifying credentials issued by the JIB or, as appropriate, Geneva Convention cards. The criteria for credentialing journalists are established by the joint force PAO or the JIB director. Credentialing is not intended to be a control measure or means to restrict certain media outlets from access. It is primarily a method of validating individuals as journalists and providing them with information that enhances their ability to report on activities within the operational area. Additionally, media must be credentialed to ensure they have official status under the Geneva Conventions in the event of capture. Others may be covering military operations without such credentials. Commanders should not provide information to non-credentialed, unregistered journalists without guidance from the joint force PAO or the JIB director. The JIB serves as a logistic and information base for media relations operations. Journalists seeking credentials from the JIB are asked to agree to ground rules tailored to the specific, ongoing joint operation.

### CONCLUSION

This publication provides principles and doctrine for PA support to the US JFC, and US military support to news media in conjunction with military operations. It provides guidance to the JFC when communicating with national, international, and internal audiences. It will also aid joint staffs in planning and training for joint operations by providing PA's purpose, outlining its functions, and providing guidance on organizing and equipping PA organizations to support the JFC.

## CHAPTER I

### JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS MISSION AND DOCTRINE OVERVIEW

*“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”*

**Amendment 1  
US Constitution**

#### 1. Background

a. All members of our military forces have taken an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America. The First Amendment guarantees the freedom of the press. During our nation’s history, there has been tension between the military and the media over the public’s right to know. The military’s operational mission requires that operations security (OPSEC) be practiced at all levels of command to protect the lives of American and allied and coalition forces, and the security of ongoing or future operations. Though responsible members of the media share these concerns, their job is to report on military operations in real time. These competing goals sometimes lead to friction between the media and the military.

#### THE MEDIA AND THE MILITARY

**The dichotomy between the media and the military was of serious concern to General Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1944 when he said:**

***“The first essential in military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and mine to try to reconcile those sometimes diverse considerations.”***

**General Eisenhower’s success in dealing with the discord between the military and the media is evident in the vivid reports by the media that accompanied Allied forces into combat during World War II and by a simple bronze plaque near the beaches at Normandy on which is inscribed:**

***“In memory of General Dwight D. Eisenhower and the forces under his command, this sealed capsule containing news reports of the 6 June 1944, Normandy Landings is placed here by the newsmen who were there.”***

**Source: Multiple Sources**



b. Today, the tempo of military operations and the advances in the global communications technology significantly complicate the challenges faced by commanders in meeting the media's needs. The advent of the 24-hour news cycle, the blurring of lines between traditional audiences created by global information systems, together with the media's capability to provide information on a real-time basis, has created an almost insatiable appetite for information. News and images move as fast as the situation unfolds, therefore it is difficult to provide the media with instantaneous situational awareness. During a crisis situation or during the heat of a battle, tactical-level commanders often experience delays in obtaining real-time information. With the need to protect lives, safeguard operations, and conceal intentions, there is an inevitable delay in processing, reviewing, and releasing information. Commanders and public affairs officers (PAOs) should work to accomplish the mission while minimizing the lag between what is happening and what can be reported.

c. The sophistication and agility of moving information and images around the globe in real time can be used to support the joint force commander (JFC) in projecting force throughout the operational area. Though the environment of the modern battlespace may have dramatically changed the way the media informs the public, so has technology enhanced the JFC's ability to communicate to both internal and external audiences. In today's global information environment (GIE), both the media and the military have the capability to use Internet and satellite communications to transmit targeted or general messages from any operational area. Public affairs (PA) can leverage the technology to help deter potential adversaries through dissuasion. During all phases of joint operations, PA plays an important role.

d. **The PAO is the JFC's principal spokesperson and senior advisor on PA.** To gain such a position of trust, the PAO must have the ability to provide information to the media, to the commander, and to the supporting forces in near real time. The key to success in this endeavor is not limited to planning, training, and equipping PAOs, but integrating PA operations into all levels of the command. PAOs are an integral part of the staff at all levels. Whereas the media may have access to tactical units during hostilities, PAOs may have access to information and to senior-level staff officers on a continuing basis.

e. **The media will report on military operations regardless of accessibility.** It is incumbent upon JFCs and their PAOs to accommodate the media whenever possible for three basic reasons. First, to disseminate accurate and timely information to the public. Second, to ensure the media doesn't disseminate inaccurate information as a result of the command's failure to communicate. Third, to counter adversary propaganda and erroneous information in the adversary's press. A commander's messages to the various publics must be timely, accurate, and project the purpose and scope of the mission.

f. **Timely and accurate release of factual information helps to deter adversary propaganda.** Public support for the US military's presence or operations is not uniform throughout the operational area. There is not only competition for the public's support, but there is enormous competition within the media. The PAO must provide the JFC with an assessment



of public support within the operational area and provide timely feedback on trends in public opinion based on media analysis, published polling data, and professional assessments.

### 2. Mission

The mission of joint public affairs is to support the JFC by communicating truthful and factual unclassified information about Department of Defense (DOD) activities to US, allied, national, international, and internal audiences. PA organizations provide advice to the JFC on media events and operations, and help with the development and dissemination of the command information message. PA helps with information security (INFOSEC) and OPSEC by establishing ground rules for media coverage of military operations. PA plans and assists US military support to the media in conjunction with military operations, and assists the media by helping them understand military events and operations.

### 3. Department of Defense Principles of Information

It is the responsibility of DOD to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens shall be answered quickly. In carrying out DOD policy, the following principles of information shall apply:

- a. Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by national security constraints or valid statutory mandates or exceptions. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.
- b. A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States and their dependents.
- c. Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.
- d. Information shall be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.
- e. DOD's obligation to provide the public with information on DOD major programs may require detailed PA planning and coordination in DOD and with the other government agencies. Such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public.
- f. Propaganda has no place in DOD public affairs programs.

### 4. Public Affairs Responsibilities

- a. **Using Public Affairs to Support Command Strategy.** Public affairs counters adversary propaganda and disinformation by providing a continuous flow of credible, reliable, timely, and accurate information to military members, their families, the media, and the public. This capability



*Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld calls on a reporter during a Pentagon press briefing with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard B. Myers.*

allows PA to help defeat adversary efforts to diminish national will, degrade morale, and turn world opinion against friendly operations. PA must be engaged in operational planning, have visibility into domestic and international press reports, as well as relevant intelligence, understand common adversary propaganda techniques, and be very aggressive by anticipating and countering adversary propaganda — putting accurate, complete information out first so that friendly forces gain the initiative and remain the preferred source of information. Gaining and maintaining the information initiative in a conflict can help discredit and undermine adversary propaganda. The first side that presents the information sets the context and frames the public debate. It is extremely important to get factual, complete, truthful information out first — even information about DOD mistakes. This helps disarm the adversary’s propaganda and defeats attempts by the adversary to use these mistakes against friendly forces. Absolute credibility must always be maintained.

**b. Using Public Information to Attack an Adversary’s Strategy.** DOD’s Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan tasks each combatant commander to consider public information options to deter conflict — before using force. PA assists combatant commanders in planning these efforts. PA uses truthful information to put the international public spotlight on an issue. They clearly communicate US goals and objectives, what we expect the adversary to do to satisfy international concerns, why the US concern is important and what the US intends to do if the adversary refuses to comply. PA activities may involve highlighting the military’s deployment preparations, activities and force projection to show domestic, allied, coalition and adversary publics what the commander is actually doing to prepare for conflict.

In early October 1994, Iraq dispatched 20,000 troops from its Republican Guard to join 50,000 regular army troops on the Kuwaiti border. Some diplomats thought the purpose was either to pressure the UN into easing economic sanctions, or to attempt another invasion of Kuwait. The US reacted and sent a well-publicized combat force to re-enforce US units in Kuwait. US and international media coverage showed aircraft deploying to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Vigilant Warrior to meet the Iraqi challenge. National and military leaders gave interviews stating their commitment to defend Kuwait. Only 10 days after the well-publicized deployment began, Iraqi troops withdrew from their threatening positions near the Kuwait border.

Various Sources

## 5. Doctrine

a. JFCs, as the most visible and credible spokespersons for an organization, play a crucial role in successful PA operations. The PAO is a member of the commander's personal staff. Official communication with internal and external audiences has a significant effect on the GIE. Good planning and message development can have a positive impact on operations. Poor planning and message development is just as certain to have a negative effect. Credible PA operations support the commander's mission and maintain essential public liaisons throughout the spectrum of conflict.

b. There are several fundamentals of information that guide commanders for effective employment of PA operations and for an appropriate relationship with the media. These basics complement the DOD Principles of Information and describe the best practices to follow when fighting in the GIE.

(1) **Tell the Truth.** JFC PA personnel will only release truthful information. The long-term success of PA operations depends on maintaining the integrity and credibility of officially released information. Deceiving the public undermines trust in and support for the Armed Forces and PA activities. Accurate, balanced, credible presentation of information leads to confidence in the Armed Forces and the legitimacy of operations.

(2) **Provide Timely Information.** Commanders should be prepared to release timely, factual, coordinated, and approved information about military operations. Information introduced into the public realm has a powerful effect on each side's decision-making cycle during a crisis. The adversary that releases more timely and accurate information enjoys the benefit of becoming the media's preferred source of information. Timely release of truthful information enables warfighters to stay aware of the latest developments in a crisis, frame the public debate, and make well-informed decisions. Timely release of truthful information also applies to difficult issues and events that are potentially unfavorable to DOD. Attempting to deny unfavorable information or failing to acknowledge its existence leads to media speculation, the perception of cover-up, and lost public trust. These issues, too, should be openly and honestly addressed as soon as possible.

(3) **Practice Security at the Source.** All DOD personnel are responsible for safeguarding sensitive information. As sources of information, each DOD member should be aware of OPSEC issues, whether being interviewed by the media or sharing information with family or friends. Therefore, it is critically important that information be approved for public dissemination before it is released.

(4) **Provide Consistent Information at All Levels.** One effect of the GIE is that the public simultaneously receives information about military operations from all levels of command. For example, media coverage routinely combines reports from the theater of operations with information released at higher levels of DOD. Commanders should ensure that DOD PA operations put forth a consistent message through its many voices. Information should be appropriately coordinated and in compliance with official DOD and supported command guidance before it is released to the public.

(5) **Tell the DOD Story.** Every military and civilian member of DOD should help provide accurate information about the Armed Forces and national defense operations to the public. Although commanders must designate only military personnel or DOD civilian employees as official spokespersons, they should educate and encourage all their military and civilian employees to tell the DOD story by providing them with timely information that is appropriate for public release. By projecting confidence and commitment during interviews or in talking to family and friends, DOD personnel can help promote public support for military operations. PA can contribute to mission accomplishment, communicate restraint, indicate perseverance, demonstrate resolve, and serve as a deterrent.

c. These fundamentals, and the previously described DOD Principles of Information, apply across the full range of military operations. They are the fundamental principles by which military PA activities are conducted and provide the basis for our actions in support of national objectives. It is the commander's responsibility to ensure that they are efficiently and effectively addressed in all stages of planning and execution. The joint force PA staff enables the commander to fulfill this important responsibility.

d. PA provides the following capabilities for JFCs:

(1) **Providing Trusted Counsel to Leaders.** This capability includes analyzing and interpreting the GIE, monitoring domestic and foreign public understanding, providing lessons learned from the past, forecasting the possible impact of military operations within the public information realm and preparing JFCs to communicate with audiences through the media and other methods of communication.

(2) **Enhancing Morale and Readiness.** PA operations enable military personnel to understand their roles in the mission by explaining how policies, programs, and operations affect them and their families. Media interest in military operations can be high, especially during the initial phases. Any military and family members may be interviewed. In order to clearly communicate the mission, all military members need to understand their role in the operation. PA operations keep military members and their families informed about operations, events, and issues to counter adversary propaganda efforts, and reduce stress and uncertainty, and other factors that may undermine mission accomplishment.



(3) **Fostering Public Trust and Support.** With backing from the public and Congress, military leaders are able to effectively recruit, equip, and train forces to perform across the full range of military operations. Effective PA supports a strong national defense by building public trust and understanding for the military's contribution to national security. During national crisis, PA gives the American public the information needed to understand military roles and missions. This understanding is critical to sustaining American public support for military operations.

(4) **Using Global Influence and Deterrence.** JFCs should employ PA to develop and implement communication strategies that inform national and international audiences and adversaries about the impact of US military during operations and exercises. Making these audiences aware of US military capabilities and US resolve to employ them can enhance support from allies and friendly countries and deter potential adversaries. When adversaries are not deterred from conflict, information about US capabilities and resolve may still shape the adversary's planning and actions in a manner beneficial to the US.

### 6. Target Audiences

a. **American Public.** Commanders have an obligation to inform the American public about their nation's military. This communication enhances morale and readiness and increases public trust and support. Through active engagement, the military demonstrates it is a community partner and a responsible steward of national resources. The goals for communicating with the American public are to disseminate information concerning US military power and capabilities, preparations and results to enhance Service members' morale and readiness to accomplish the mission, gain and maintain public support for military operations, communicate US resolve in a manner that enhances global influence and deterrence, and



*Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace (left), US Marine Corps, responds to a question during a Pentagon Town Hall meeting.*

increase public awareness and understanding of the Armed Forces as a respected professional organization charged with the responsibility for national security.

b. **International.** Information flow in today's GIE is faster, farther-reaching and has greater impact than previous information technology. While DOD has an obligation to keep the US public informed about its activities, the same principles of information should be applied to international audiences. Current information technology ensures information in the public domain is available worldwide. Therefore, information provided to international publics is also provided to the US public. Modern military operations are often conducted as part of a coalition force. DOD should keep host nations (HNs) informed about US military operations and activities on their soil and in conjunction with HN armed forces within the constraints of OPSEC. In addition, international media interest in military operations may be just as high, and sometimes higher, than US media interest, especially in military operations conducted overseas.

c. **Internal.** Internal information programs are the primary means commanders use to communicate with military members and their families. As used in this document, military members include active-duty and retired, officer and enlisted, Guard and Reserve personnel. The main purpose of conducting internal information programs, or command information, is to link military members and their commanders. PA professionals must have the knowledge and skills to conduct internal information programs at home, while deployed, and in a joint operations setting.

d. **Adversary Forces.** Credible information regarding US intentions and conduct can undermine adversary propaganda, potentially causing dissent within adversary ranks.

## CHAPTER II

### JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESPONSIBILITIES

*“Public opinion is everything. With it, nothing can fail. Without it, nothing can succeed.”*

**President Abraham Lincoln**

#### 1. Overview

a. Our military is accountable and responsible to the public for performing its mission of national defense. By providing accurate information and clear explanations of its activities, the Armed Forces of the United States fulfill their responsibility to the nation, contributing to understanding of DOD programs and military operations. The media are the principal means of communicating information about the military to the general public. Commanders must recognize their responsibility to communicate to the American people via the media. The Internet also provides new options and challenges for unfiltered communications with important audiences. Increasingly, internal or command information and external communications are more closely linked as military personnel, civilian employees, family members, and the media draw from the same sources of information. Commanders should view military journalists and PAOs as effective means of reaching these audiences and key to mission success.

b. Accurate and timely information is essential to the public’s understanding, morale, and resolve in times of crisis. Similarly, that same information, when conveyed to the military’s internal audience, helps military personnel more clearly understand their roles and responsibilities in accomplishing their missions. Establishing the command information connection with joint forces, and especially their families, is increasingly important. In all internal and external communications, PA must train and exercise the way we intend to operate.

c. Successful relationships between the military and the media are primarily based upon credibility and trust. Such relationships are normally built over time, not during a crisis or combat situation when the commander has a multitude of important issues vying for attention.

d. **Feedback and Analysis.** It is important to analyze the outcomes of PA support to joint operations. Analysis should be conducted to evaluate its effectiveness, document lessons learned, and ensure future PA plans and efforts are improved.

#### 2. Department of Defense Responsibilities

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, in accordance with Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5400.13, Joint Public Affairs Operations:

a. Retains primary responsibility for the development and consistent implementation of DOD public affairs or public information policy.

b. Determines who should serve as the initial source of release of information about joint, multinational, and certain single-Service operations, and delegates public affairs release authority to the appropriate combatant commander as soon as practical.

c. Approves and disseminates PA guidance (PAG), PA plans, and PA annexes written in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance) and DOD Instruction (DODI) 5405.3, Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG).

d. Establishes and exercises procedures for the administrative management, activation, and direction of the DOD National Media Pool (NMP).

e. Serves as lead agent for interagency coordination of PA information and activities.

f. Provides policy guidance for the employment of joint combat camera (COMCAM) teams and the distribution of their products, including follow-on use/release of still and motion pictures supporting internal information operations including PA operations, as established in DODD 5040.4, Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM) Program.

g. Provides representation to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Crisis Coordination Center and establishes, as necessary, a crisis and/or wartime PA cell at the Pentagon.

h. Provides policy guidance for the employment of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) resources and equipment, as established in DODD 5120.20, Armed Forces Radio and Television Services (AFRTS), and DOD Regulation, 5120.20R, Management and Operation of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service.

i. Supports combatant command plans for the command information mission, including the deployment of broadcast facilities from the AFRTS and distribution of print media.

j. Conducts joint PA and visual information and maintenance training at the Defense Information School (DINFOS) for entry- and advanced-level military and civilian PAOs and military journalists, as well as visual information technical and maintenance personnel of all grades.

k. Coordinates PA policy with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Military Departments, combatant commands, and during multinational operations, with respective levels of political or military authorities within HNs, alliances, and coalitions.

l. Develops policy guidelines addressing the intent of, the responsibility for, and the limits of, media ground rules and credentialing criteria.

m. Ensures PAG contained in CJCS warning, planning, alert, deployment, and execute orders is in accordance with established/emerging Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD (PA)) guidance and intent. May provide periodic US military training,



familiarization training, and education to the accredited national and international media to support potential future media embed programs.

### 3. Military Department Responsibilities

The Military Departments have the responsibility to:

a. Develop supportive PA policies and doctrine and provide resources (personnel and standardized and/or compatible equipment) necessary to conduct successful PA activities in a joint environment. Ensure the immediate readiness and prompt availability of necessary active duty and Reserve Component (RC) PA resources to support any assigned mission and validated requests for PA augmentation by combatant commanders.

b. Organize, train, equip, and provide active duty and RC PA personnel and units to conduct PA activities in support of combatant commanders. PA personnel should be trained to function in joint and multinational environments and should receive pre-deployment training tailored to the specific needs of the JFC.

c. Conduct Service-specific PA programs, as required, in support of joint and multinational operations. These include command information programs that serve those who are deployed, those in support roles, and the military forces and families at home stations as well as community relations programs designed to meet existing DOD policies and directives.

*For additional information, see DODD 5410.18, Public Affairs Community Relations Policy, and DODI 5410.19, Public Affairs Community Relations Policy Implementation.*

d. Support PA training at DINFOS and encourage programs that improve military-media understanding and cooperation.

e. Conduct planning and provide resources to support the combatant commander with AFRTS services. Each Service's broadcast service will support combatant commanders with a combatant command AFRTS planner (CCAP), who becomes a part of the combatant command's PA planning staff for the integration of AFRTS command/internal information support in the deployed joint PA staff.

*See Appendix D, "Guidelines for Obtaining Armed Forces Radio and Television Service Support," for specific guidelines.*

f. Train PA personnel, commanders, and key staff on media relations during joint operations.

g. Obtain appropriate security clearances for all deployable PAOs, to include RC augmentees, to ensure timely access to operational planning and execution.



*Adm. Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, speaks to local media shortly after his address to sailors assigned to the guided missile cruisers USS Mobile Bay (CG 53), USS Shiloh (CG 67) and the guided missile destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65) during an "All hands" call at Naval Base San Diego.*

#### **4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Responsibilities**

##### **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

- a. Promulgates joint public affairs doctrine.
- b. Ensures that existing and new PA annexes to operation and exercise plans and orders prepared by the combatant commands comply with published joint PA doctrine, policy, and regulations.
- c. Provides a PA representative to augment the National Military Command Center response cells during times of crisis and conflict to serve as Joint Staff liaison on PA activities to OASD(PA).
- d. Supports DOD in explaining mission aspects of joint operations by providing senior officers with the expertise on matters of media and public interest.
- e. Provides PA coordination and planning assistance for DOD NMP deployment.
- f. Ensures CJCS warning, planning, alert, deployment and execute orders contain appropriate PA guidance paragraphs. This guidance should, at a minimum, provide the expected PA posture, release and approval authority, and delineate responsibility/deadlines for producing PPAG.

## 5. Combatant Commanders' Responsibilities

The commanders of the combatant commands are responsible for the following:

- a. Ensure appropriate coordination and synchronization between PA and IO.
- b. Develop detailed PA annexes to operation plans (OPLANs) to ensure that required PA support is available to meet command/internal information and public information requirements. Ensure appropriate planning for priority in-theater air and ground transportation for movement of media representatives, military journalists, COMCAM teams, and their products. Ensure plans provide for adequate PA resources to be in place prior to the beginning of operations and establish appropriate priorities for the movement of PA assets. Ensure plans provide for appropriate communications assets, including Internet access and/or satellite or mobile telephones for the deploying PA staff, as well as for use by the media if no other means of communications exist. Ensure appropriate communications coordination is conducted for the employment of AFRTS.
- c. Plan for the support of media representatives and military journalists from the earliest predeployment stages of any operation. Ensure commanders grant media representatives and military journalists all possible access to unclassified activities without compromising the mission, including combat operations when operationally feasible. Develop a command climate and procedures that will allow for full, reasonable access for media representatives. Treat media representatives and military journalists as noncombatants, with the understanding that the status of uniformed military Service journalists under the Geneva Conventions is still that of a combatant, and provide support for all reasonable and appropriate attempts to allow them to accompany military units during the conduct of their missions.
- d. Develop and submit proposed public affairs guidance (PPAG) for approval by OASD(PA). PPAG should address PA policy, proposed contingency statements, levels of authority for release or classification of information, declassification guidance, themes, messages and talking points, and responses to anticipated media questions in accordance with DODI 5405.3, *Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG)*.
- e. Prepare for and assist in the deployment and operation of the DOD NMP. Designate personnel to support the DOD NMP when activated.
- f. Establish joint information bureaus (JIBs) to provide timely public and command information products and services. In coordination with OASD(PA), provide direct PA support, policy guidance, and oversight to subordinate JFCs and their respective JIBs. Be prepared to coordinate US military participation in combined information bureaus (CIBs), press information centers (PICs), allied press information centers (APICs), or coalition press and information centers (CPICs), established by the responsible multinational force commander and supported by the contributing nations.
- g. Assist media representatives and military journalists in gaining access to military units and personnel conducting joint and multinational operations, to include commanders, officers, and enlisted personnel directly involved with combat and sustainment operations. In addition, geographic combatant commanders

should plan to ensure operational spokespersons are designated to speak with the media regarding the US contribution to the multinational force commander.

h. Support other information requirements identified by OASD(PA). Provide frequent JIB, CIB, PIC, APIC, or CPIC situation reports (SITREPs) to OASD(PA) during current operations as circumstances require, apprising OASD(PA) immediately of major operational developments, incidents, or other newsworthy events. PA SITREPs should include, at a minimum, ongoing and planned media activities, feedback, updated key themes and messages, and information product distribution.

i. Plan for the conduct of command/internal information programs to support deployed forces (active duty and RC), their home stations, and their family members. Ensure plans include using the capabilities of the deployed PA element, the AFRTS command element, and/or internal computer network and print products to convey joint command/internal messages to those audiences. Ensure planned ground rules for releasing information to civilian media apply equally to military journalists and broadcasters. Plan to ensure information approved for media release is also provided to the command/internal information staff.

j. Resource, train, and direct an appropriately sized PA organization in all force packages developed to support joint operations.

k. If tasked as a supporting commander, provide PA resources (personnel, equipment, transportation, and communications) to the supported combatant commander as identified in approved plans. Be prepared to reinforce the supported combatant commander to meet unplanned resource requirements.

l. As established in DODD 5040.4, Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM) Program, ensure COMCAM imagery requirements are addressed in operational planning and coordinates with PA to obtain imagery collection, editing, and transmission requirements and integrates those requirements into COMCAM missions.

m. Ensure that all imagery that supports joint operations, not only COMCAM imagery, is forwarded to the Joint Combat Camera Center, DOD's central reception and distribution point for joint interest imagery. Develop procedures to ensure imagery is reviewed for security concerns and the JFC PAO, or the JIB director, or delegated authority, clears all unclassified imagery not sensitive to operations for public release.

n. Employ organic PA capabilities of RC units and individuals mobilized and deployed into a theater of operations. Ensure that RC family members and hometown media are provided a continuous flow of information to dispel rumors and anxieties, sustain public awareness, and increase understanding of RC missions in the theater of operations.

o. Ensure that appropriate AFRTS assets are identified and their logistic movements are planned to support the JIB's command information mission by broadcasting command/internal information messages to deployed forces.



*Army Gen. Tommy Franks, Commander of US Central Command, speaks with reporters outside a hotel in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.*

p. Ensure PA temporary duty personnel augmentation requirements are properly identified for all operational or contingency requirements.

## **6. Subordinate Joint Force Commander Responsibilities**

Subordinate JFCs are responsible for:

- a. Providing overall direction and focus to PA activities in the operational area.
- b. Ensuring that the media receive access to military operations, access to command and staff personnel for unclassified briefings and interviews, and the logistic support necessary to accomplish their mission.
- c. Designating a joint task force (JTF) PAO and a JIB director.
- d. Selecting a trained and capable officer to serve as media briefer.
- e. Conducting media interviews when feasible.
- f. Designating an officer to accomplish a security review of COMCAM imagery. All unclassified imagery not of a sensitive nature should immediately be provided to the JIB for potential release to the media.



## **7. Service Component Commander Responsibilities**

Service component commanders when participating in joint operations are responsible for:

- a. Providing a JTF staff PAO and JIB director, if tasked.
- b. Providing JIB personnel and equipment.
- c. Coordinating Service component external news release products with higher headquarters PAO.
- d. Supporting the deployment of media representatives as necessary and feasible.
- e. Assisting commercial media otherwise unable to file their products in a timely manner from the operational area, distributing internal media products to continental United States units and bases, and providing courier service, to include sending products for security review to combatant commanders or OASD(PA) (as required).
- f. Providing a quick reaction audio-visual documentation team if tasked.
- g. Conducting internal and public information programs per guidance provided by the JFC.

## CHAPTER III

### PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT OF JOINT OPERATIONS

*“Our ultimate strategic success in bringing peace and security to this region will come in our longterm commitment to supporting these democratic ideals. Let’s tell the factual story — good or bad — before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions as they most certainly will continue to do.”*

**Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chief’s message to combatant commanders prior the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM**

#### 1. Public Affairs Fundamentals

The following public affairs fundamentals can assist commanders in performing the PA mission in joint operations.

a. Commanders and staffs at all levels should anticipate external interest in operations as part of the normal planning process and be prepared to respond. Most issues, plans, and events contain elements that may be of interest to the general public, the media, and the committed forces and their families. This is particularly true of military operations, which often draw some public attention as personnel and equipment prepare for upcoming assignments. Unit alerts, increased aircraft activity, and rail or ship loading are highly visible and will almost inevitably lead to media inquiries. Such activities may also cause concern among unit personnel and family members.

b. Well-planned PA support should be incorporated in every phase of operations. PA facilitates making accurate and timely information available to the public. Consistent with current DOD PA guidance, and within the constraints of OPSEC, INFOSEC, safety and privacy of US military personnel, their families and DOD civilians; PA shall:

(1) Provide truthful, accurate and timely information to external (domestic and international) and DOD internal audiences of US military operations and objectives.

(2) Support US and international media coverage of US military operations.

(3) Contribute to global influence and deterrence by making public audiences aware of US resolve, capabilities and intent.

(4) Contribute to deterring attacks against US interests by disseminating timely, fact-based, accurate and truthful information to the public.

(5) Counter adversary propaganda with the truth. Actively use truthful, fact-based, accurate, and timely public information products to respond to adversary inaccurate information and deception.

c. There are several ways to evaluate the success and credibility of the PA effort. One is to assess the general tone of the media in their questions and dealings with the PAOs and the command in general. A second is a continuous assessment of available media products and public opinion polls. Another is to



*Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Victoria Clarke and MG Stanley A. McChrystal, US Army, brief reporters on objectives of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.*

estimate the impact of command information on the internal audience from the feedback of other functional areas (morale, welfare, recreation and services, chaplain, and inspector general). PA personnel should also monitor the impact of news coverage on the mission and HN concerns. These reviews assist in evaluating the accuracy of media reporting and help to gauge the editorial tone communicated to the public. PAOs should look to all feedback sources to assist in determining what additional information, explanation, and programs are necessary to improve the efficiency of the PA process.

## **2. Public Affairs Organization**

### **a. Public Affairs Management**

(1) PA activities during joint operations are an operational function. Each JFC's PA program includes the responsibilities to conduct media relations, plans and logistics, command/internal information, and community relations, as appropriate. Each of these functions has a part to play in each joint operation although they vary with each mission.

(2) There are normally two key officers who are responsible to the JFC for the PA program: the joint force PAO and the JIB director. The joint force PAO, with appropriate staff support, is on the commander's personal staff and is directly responsible for all the JFC's PA requirements. The joint force PAO also provides oversight of subordinate JIB(s). The JIB director, with supporting JIB staff, is responsible for coordinating all media operations within the operational area, and provides and coordinates support to the JFC through the joint force PAO. The JFC, with the assistance of the joint force PAO and the JIB director, directs the PA program in a manner that most efficiently contributes to the overall



success of the command. There may be times during routine, peacetime operations when the JFC's PAO can also serve as the JIB director. However, the detailed preparation needed to interact with the media may overburden the PAO and detract from this officer's ability to manage other required PA functions. Thus, it is useful for the JFC to designate a joint force PAO and a JIB director and maintain a distinct separation between their respective PA functions.

(3) The size of a joint force PA organization varies to accommodate mission requirements. It is located with the headquarters element with its media center located within a secure area. The communications capability of this organization should meet operational requirements. Figure III-1 depicts the structure of a typical joint force PA organization.

(4) The JIB will normally be located in a facility convenient to the media. Good coordination links to the joint force PAO and staff are essential.

#### b. Public Affairs Functions

(1) **Public Information.** While the Internet continues to provide new public information opportunities, military public information is still largely a matter of coordinating media relations. Media relations activities are designed to provide information through the media to the external national and international public. Commanders and their PA staffs should be prepared to respond to media inquiries, conduct briefings, issue statements, schedule interviews, arrange for access to operational units, and provide appropriate equipment, transportation and communications support to the media. Plans should include specific provisions for each phase of the operation and, as appropriate, the inclusion of media on deploying aircraft and ships.




Figure III-1. Joint Force Public Affairs Organization



*Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard B. Myers and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld talk to Soldiers, Marines and Airmen in the Al Faw Palace at Camp Victory, Iraq, on May 13, 2004.*

(2) **Command/Internal Information.** A critical joint force PA mission involves informing the various internal audiences about the participation of military forces in a joint operation. Full coverage is particularly important for the participating forces, those military personnel and civilian employees who remain behind, and all family members. Base and organizational publications are traditional ways of reaching these groups. During a joint operation, commanders should consider all assets available to communicate details about the operation and the role of the joint force, national and international events, and information about DOD, Service, and joint force policies and activities. When military families are kept informed, the affected Service member may be more focused on the mission, particularly when forward deployed.

(a) AFRTS and COMCAM assets are resourced to support the PA's command information mission. AFRTS becomes a division within the JIB and works for the JIB director. The COMCAM liaison cell coordinates imagery requirements with the JIB director.

(b) AFRTS can broadcast/deliver command information messages to deployed troops as a primary mission. JIBs employ AFRTS capabilities, including use of the Internet and use of print products to convey joint command messages not only to the deployed force, but also to the home station and to family members. The JIB director ensures the information provided through external and internal channels is coordinated and consistent. During the initial stages of an operation, AFRTS should be considered as one of the timeliest channels to get the combatant commander's message to the deployed force. AFRTS television capabilities should be considered for installation at messing and recreational facilities and further expanded as the operation develops. A wide range of AFRTS options are available to meet operational requirements.

*For more information on obtaining AFRTS assets, see Appendix D, “Guidelines for Obtaining Armed Forces Radio and Television Service Support.”*

(c) In bare base environments, PA can employ an AFRTS small satellite system to monitor radio and television news coverage, obtain electronic copies of DOD products such as the “Early Bird” and “Stars and Stripes Lite,” and other command/internal information releases. In addition, a locally produced command information newspaper can help disseminate policies and activities of the joint force.

*“During World War II the US Army undertook an aggressive hometown news approach when US troops on the stalemated front in Italy came to believe that they had been forgotten by the folks back home. An aggressive Public Affairs program aimed at telling individual soldiers’ stories to their hometown news resulted in a flow of personal mail back to the front, which let the troops know that they were not forgotten.”*

**Charles Moskos**  
***Reporting War When There Is No War***

(d) While command/internal information is primarily a Service responsibility, a properly manned JIB should include staffing to support this vital mission. At a minimum, the JIB director should ensure internal media are treated fairly and equally with external media and allotted an appropriate share of limited resources such as PA seats on military transportation. Further, commanders should provide all external news releases, along with any responses to query, to command/internal information channels.

(3) **Community Relations.** During joint operations, joint PA operations support the JFC’s civil-military operations (CMO) as required. However, the community relations function in communities around or near home stations that are affected by force deployments remains a unit or installation PA responsibility. Concerns include economic, social, and long-term relationships between the communities and those military personnel and families who remain behind. This can also include the relationship of the military with the civilian employers of mobilized RC personnel. Public affairs’ role in community relations during crises or contingencies is key in maintaining the public understanding and support necessary to sustain operations before, during, and after a military campaign or operation.

### **c. Information Bureaus and Information Centers**

(1) An information bureau is a single point of interface between the military and media representatives covering operations. It offers a venue for commanders and their PA staffs to discuss their units and their roles in the joint operation, and helps journalists obtain information quickly and efficiently on a wide variety of complex activities. The early establishment of information bureaus is an important step in the responsive and efficient facilitation of media operations.

(a) An information bureau can be a single-Service facility, usually telling the story of a specific base or major Service component organization; a JIB communicating information about a

particular joint force; or a CIB, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) PIC, APIC, or CPIC in which various allied or coalition nations join together to discuss the common effort and to present the roles of their individual nations.

(b) From time to time, commanders find it necessary to establish and operate subordinate joint information bureaus (sub-JIBs) to accommodate media during a specific phase of an operation or to provide more responsive support in a particular operational area.

(c) While it may prove convenient to collocate all PA functions in a single facility or area, commanders should ensure that the tasks associated with each function are managed separately. While command/internal information remains a command responsibility, it can frequently be most efficiently performed at the JIB location.


(d) Following an incident of national significance, or domestic incident, the National Response Plan (NRP) calls for commanders to establish joint information centers (JICs) to coordinate the federal, state, local, and tribal incident communications effort. A JIC is a central point for coordination of disaster information, PA activities, and media access to information about the latest developments.

**(2) Joint Information Bureau Functions.** While the role of each information bureau is essentially the same, the size and specific structure vary depending on the specific mission. The organizational structure of a JIB is shown in Figure III-2. The functions listed below are common to all information bureaus and require appropriate planning and resourcing to effectively support the media relations mission. In small JIBs, each assigned staff member may be responsible for more than one function.

(a) The JIB director is responsible to the joint force PAO for all activities conducted in support of the media relations mission. This includes close coordination with the joint force operations staff to ensure that releasable information is accurate, timely and is issued with security sensitivities in mind. The JIB director must also ensure that HN sensitivities and media guidelines are considered. The deputy JIB director performs these functions in the absence of the JIB director and assists in the management of the tasks associated with support of the joint operation, including daily feedback summaries that include media support activities, analysis of media reporting, and theme/message development.

(b) The operations officer oversees the operation of the JIB and ensures the integration of the media relations functions. Responsibilities include the preparation of PA plans, oversight of military-media communications, and assessment of available published media products. These tasks are critical elements of the PA process. The operations officer must also establish liaison with the joint force operations staff to ensure a continuous flow of timely information. The operations officer also ensures that JIB “lessons learned” are adequately documented. At a minimum, this process should include a debriefing of departing JIB staff members.

(c) The COMCAM section receives operational tasking from the joint force operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3). As part of operations, COMCAM is trained to perform in a variety of combat environments (e.g., divers/aircrew/etc.) unsuitable for those without specialized training. COMCAM documentation is often the only source for this type of imagery. Much of this imagery is unclassified and after a security review is made available to PA for release to the external media. The



**Figure III-2. Joint Information Bureau**

COMCAM officer must coordinate closely with the JIB director to ensure unclassified imagery is provided on a timely basis for external release, in addition to supporting internal information programs.

(d) The administrative section provides broad administrative support for the JIB staff, with particular attention to automation and information management requirements. The administrative section electronically releases written and photographic material through Internet access and reviews daily publications and Internet articles to provide analysis to the JFC. The section provides administrative and logistic support to the JIB, including input to “plans of the day,” other required routine reports to the command, mail and administrative runs, supply functions, transportation scheduling, and interface with logistic cells. The administrative section also provides support for the designated public Webmaster.

(e) The media response section interacts directly with the media and serves as the primary point of information exchange. Responsibilities include responding to media inquiries, preparing and issuing news releases, arranging for interviews, and conducting briefings. Additional tasks involve conducting media analysis, arranging for and preparing joint force operational briefers, and assisting senior commanders in their encounters with the media.

(f) The media support section is responsible for helping the media cover joint force activities. Specific tasks include coordinating transportation, communications, and logistic support; credentialing media; and supporting media pools. In cases where escorts are required, this section matches the media with knowledgeable persons to facilitate their movement around the operational area. If a security review is required, the media support section ensures that it is done efficiently. In



addition, the media support section may conduct short-notice media training for senior officers and other military spokespersons.

(g) The composition of liaison cells varies with the nature and requirements of the mission. Close liaison should be established between the JIB and key elements of the joint force headquarters such as the J-3, joint information operations cell, intelligence officer, and the joint special operations task force. The exact nature of this liaison will depend on the contingency scenario. A JIB will likely contain personnel from each of the components of the command who represent their Service or functional component command and who help explain the details of the operation. These personnel are separate from the joint staffing of the basic JIB infrastructure who are responsible for acting in support of the JFC. In a CIB, NATO PIC, APIC, or CPIC, various coalition and allied PA personnel will be available to represent their nation's interests and should be integrated into staff positions to reflect the multinational character of the operation. To ensure responsiveness, it is often appropriate to include representatives from non-DOD agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which are directly involved with the operation. Depending on the mission, the Department of State, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)/Department of Homeland Security (DHS), appropriate HN agencies, and various international relief agencies may find it helpful to establish a presence at the JIB. Additionally, the JIB director may elect to send liaison teams consisting of individuals with the relevant subject matter or technical expertise to these organizations as well to ensure a timely, efficient, and accurate exchange of information. For example, during a civil support operation, the JIB director may elect to send liaison teams to FEMA/DHS or to a state adjutant general headquarters, if warranted by operational requirements.

(h) **Public Web Homepage.** Using the Internet provides the DOD with a powerful tool to convey information quickly and efficiently on the nature and scope of the JFC's mission. The web site shall have a clearly defined purpose that supports this mission. The considerable benefits gained by using the web must be carefully balanced through the application of comprehensive risk management procedures against the potential risk to DOD interests, including national security, force protection, and OPSEC. The JFC's public web homepage is overseen by a designated JIB representative. This person should be familiar with the latest DOD policies governing web usage. The main support of this page should come from the commander's home station public affairs office in a "reachback" arrangement, but limited technical support can also come from deployed command, control, communications, and computer systems personnel.

(i) **Internal Information.** A properly manned JIB includes staffing to support the command/internal information mission. During joint operations, commanders should consider all available assets to communicate to the various internal audiences the details of the operation and the role of the joint force.

(j) **Sub-JIBs.** Because of the size of the operational area, the dispersion of the joint forces, the diversity of Service components, and the variety of concurrent missions, the JFC may establish sub-JIBs to support the PA operation. Normally smaller in size than the main joint force JIB, a sub-JIB should operate as a complete unit and perform the same functions assigned to any information bureau. A sub-JIB may be set up temporarily to support a specific mission or at an established location to assist journalists covering a particular sector of the operational area. Sub-JIBs could also be established afloat to support maritime aspects of a joint operation.

(k) **Escorts.** When covering any story, the media seek out a central source of information. In a joint operation, this will normally be the JIB. However, journalists are also interested in visiting organizations participating in the mission to get a more complete view of events. Ideally, reporters should use the joint force media relations system consisting of a PA section, JIB, sub-JIBs, and component information bureaus to obtain their initial orientation to the operational environment. It is mutually beneficial to both the JFC and the media to have escorts available to assist the reporters as they subsequently move about the operational area. These escorts need not be trained PA personnel, but should be knowledgeable members of the visited organizations who have received training in media relations. These individuals support the joint force by serving as facilitators to assist the media. They should neither interfere with the process of reporting nor attempt to inhibit military personnel from talking about their jobs or missions consistent with security and operational restrictions. The JIB director should ensure proper training for escorts, and ensure the appropriate advance planning and preparation for the visit with the unit involved.

(3) **Joint Information Bureau Activities.** The JIB director should develop an appropriate mix of activities in order to communicate to the media essential information about the conduct of the joint operation and the forces executing the mission. Within the context of prevailing PAG, various options include information packets, news statements, orientations, background and operational briefings, interviews with senior commanders, and visits to participating units. In appropriate cases, media pools may also be considered as an effective means of ensuring media coverage. The JIB should also provide materials to the Services' hometown news centers and Services' PA offices.

(4) **Press Information Center.** In the NATO environment, JIB equivalents are designated as PICs. In other multinational operations, equivalent organizations are designated as CIBs, APICs, or CPICs. A PIC is a single point of interface between the military and media representatives covering operations. It offers a venue for commanders and their PA staffs to address issues and PA operational considerations while also helping media representatives obtain information quickly and efficiently on a wide variety of complex activities. The typical PIC organization (see Figure III-3) and functions are also representative of many CIB, APIC, or CPIC organizations formed during multinational operations. US joint forces share staff and leadership responsibilities within the PIC as determined by the appropriate multinational commander.

(a) **PIC Functions.** While the role of each PIC is essentially the same as a JIB, the specific organization varies depending on mission requirements. The PIC is a separate public information entity that coordinates strategy with the allied joint force (AJF) public information officer (PIO) but works directly for the commander, allied joint force (COMAJF), and is responsible for all activities conducted in support of the media relations mission. This includes close coordination with the operations staff to ensure that releasable information is accurate, timely, and compliant with security considerations. Additional staff and section responsibilities are roughly equivalent to corresponding individuals and sections in the JIB. The AJF PIO is a dedicated senior NATO PIO who advises and assists the COMAJF on all public information matters. The PIO and the PIO's designated staff also help prepare and execute all elements of the COMAJF's public information responsibilities.

(b) Subordinate press information centers (sub-PICs), normally smaller than the main PIC, should function as a complete unit and perform the same functions assigned to any information center. A sub-PIC may be set up temporarily to support a specific mission or at an established location to assist journalists covering a particular sector of the operational area. Sub-PICs also may be established afloat to support maritime aspects of an operation.

### 3. Public Affairs Planning

#### a. Public Affairs Planning Considerations

(1) Accurate and timely information is essential to the public's understanding, morale, and resolve in times of crisis. Similarly, that same information helps military personnel understand their roles and responsibilities in accomplishing their missions. Establishing the command information connection with forces and their families is increasingly important. In order to provide timely, accurate information to our audiences, PA must be thoroughly incorporated in every phase of military operations.

(a) During the initial phase it is critical to synchronize PA planning and activities. Authorities to plan, integrate, approve, and disseminate appropriate messages should be clearly established. Coordination of overall themes and messages, as well as a plan to support media coverage, and all applicable PAG, should be approved prior to hostilities in order to effectively shape the information environment. PA is part of an ongoing effort to inform global audiences and will assist DOD in building and maintaining support of the US global defense posture.




Figure III-3. Press Information Center



(b) As planning continues and preparations for operations begin, media will become increasingly focused on the potential for conflict. Once the media learn that forces are preparing for a deployment and determine their location and nature, the information will likely be reported in a manner accessible by hostile forces. The information environment continues to be shaped with themes and messages, and the overall message is one of deterrence. PA facilitates media access to counter or neutralize disinformation efforts of adversaries. PA assists DOD in reducing the adversary's combat effectiveness, morale and confidence, and foreign leadership support.

(c) Following the increased public and media interest, the need for PA programs, activities and personnel will expand. The media makes every effort to observe, film, tape, photograph, record, interview, and otherwise document the activities of US forces. PA demands are highest at the outset of operations or outbreak of hostilities. The public is informed of operations to the maximum extent possible consistent with OPSEC and personnel safety. OASD(PA) may embed media and require a JIB and/or sub-JIBs in geographic areas where operations attract a high concentration of media. Where direct access to operations is not possible, OASD(PA) may require media pools to be established and supported. It is important to continue the synchronization and integration of PA with USG and DOD activities (e.g., daily press briefings, response to query, COMCAM documentation, and declassifying imagery intelligence) to counter propaganda.

(d) Many of the same PA activities continue throughout an operation. PA activities should be coordinated with the USG and DOD to support return to civilian authority, repair of information infrastructure, augmentation of HN radio/television/print infrastructure, and redeployment activities/coverage.

(2) **Exercises.** All exercises should include full PA participation. Failure to include the PA staff and infrastructure in all aspects of an exercise could result in serious deficiencies in PA support during an actual operation.

(a) **Training.** All PA personnel and appropriate members should be trained in basic operational skills and in the tasks involved with joint PA activities. PA is a mission of the commander and, as such, exercising PA should include the entire staff. Prior identification and training of personnel in exercises is essential before their participation in contingency operations. Exercise activities should comprise more complex training than the basic administrative requirements of hosting journalists at a few prescheduled events.

(b) **Exercise Planning.** A PA representative should participate in the exercise planning process to ensure exercise problems are especially designed to replicate real-world media requirements for the JFC and his staff. All aspects of the PA process should be exercised with particular attention paid to coordination with the operational staff, the resourcing of all PA functions, and identifying and addressing OPSEC concerns. Exercise "play" should not be limited to or dependent on the development of a separate PA situation or events list. Because OPLANs and events are central to any exercise, PA activities depend on the operational scenario and should include events specifically designed to train PA personnel.

(3) **Public Affairs Guidance.** The purpose of PAG is to support the public discussion of defense issues and operations and serve as a source document when responding to media representatives, military journalists, and the public. PAG also outlines planning guidance for related PA responsibilities, functions, activities, and resources. The development and timely dissemination of PAG ensures that all information is in consonance with policy when responding to the information demands of joint operations. PAG also conforms to OPSEC and the privacy requirements of the members of the joint forces.

(a) **Proposed Public Affairs Guidance.** PPAG is required for designated military training exercises, certain military-sensitive training activities, multinational activities, and events that could attract national and/or international media attention. It is imperative that a clear set of facts and tenets specific to the mission be established which the general public can easily understand. Initial PPAG should be developed by the combatant commander in advance of military action and forwarded to OASD(PA) in sufficient time for all required coordination to be complete and initial PAG to be published in conjunction with the receipt of an execute order by the combatant commander. At the very latest, PAG should be published prior to the start of any deployment activities. Development of additional or supplemental PPAG continues as needed during the deployment of the JTF. Following deployment, the JFC's PA staff assumes responsibility for the development of PPAG. The JFC's operational staff and the JIB working together are in the best position to recommend PA policy, draft appropriate statements, and identify the issues and responses most likely to be of interest to external and internal audiences.

(b) OASD(PA) will staff the PPAG and issue a PAG message either approving, approving with modifications, or disapproving the PPAG. PAG is not used without approval of OASD(PA) or the JFC. The guidance provided should include an approved PA policy, background, contingency statements, message points, answers to anticipated media questions, community relations guidance, and details governing the release of information to the public. DODI 5405.3, *Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance*, establishes combatant command responsibilities and prescribes procedures for PPAG. It also provides guidance on classification and establishes standards (including timelines), format, and content of PPAG.

(4) **Annex F.** Every phase of PA planning should match the OPLAN it supports, to include coordination with the HN, the country team, government agencies, and NGOs. Annex F of the OPLAN should address all transportation, communications, billeting, equipment, and personnel resources required to support the PA plan (see Figure III-4). The PA plan complements and supports, but does not replace, the PPAG forwarded to OASD(PA).

(5) **Media Operations.** Military public affairs and journalism are not limited to activities conducted at the JIB. It is essential that commanders understand that reporters desire to move as far forward as possible in order to gain a complete understanding of the joint operation and to expand on background information available from the JIB. Similarly, effective PA planning assists public understanding by ensuring that journalists move beyond news briefing abstractions by having the opportunity to personally observe operations and to meet the personnel actively conducting those operations. In support of this concept, commanders are encouraged to "embed" media with selected units for certain operations or periods of time whenever feasible. This practice enables media to provide much more in-depth reporting by staying with a particular unit or following an operation to its termination. When embedding media, it is essential that embedding-specific ground rules be established and that they be thoroughly understood



**Figure III-4. Public Affairs Planning Considerations**

by both the media and the embedded unit. Planning must include detailed provisions for accommodating and supporting the media when deployed with the joint force and escorted by those not formally trained in public affairs. The commander's security concerns must also be addressed in determining what areas the media are allowed to visit. Security at the source will be the guiding principle.

(6) **Combat Camera.** The mission of COMCAM is to provide Office of the Secretary of Defense, CJCS, the Military Departments, combatant commands, and JTFs with a directed imagery capability in support of operational and planning requirements during wartime operations, worldwide crises, contingencies, and joint exercises.

See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3205.01, Joint Combat Camera, for additional details regarding COMCAM policy, procedures, and tasking of COMCAM assets, and appropriate use and distribution of products.

(a) The deployment of joint COMCAM teams offers the JFC a sophisticated capability to enhance operational and PA missions. Combatant commanders should plan for sufficient COMCAM assets to accomplish them. The still and video images produced provide a balance of useful operational information and, once cleared for OPSEC, products may be made available for distribution to media representatives and military journalists. This is particularly helpful for the JIB as COMCAM teams sometimes have access to events and areas unavailable to media representatives and military journalists. Further, they bring with them a technological capability allowing for the timely transmission of images during fast-moving operations and the documentation of operations in austere environments.

(b) Because deployed COMCAM teams are operationally controlled by the J-3 and support the entire spectrum of an operation, it is essential the JFC ensures that PA imagery requirements be identified and prioritized throughout the planning cycle. Additionally, planning should include in-theater declassification and delegation of in-theater release of unclassified COMCAM products to the JIB director in order to meet time-sensitive media requirements. A COMCAM liaison team is normally



*139th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment journalists attached to Task Force Olympia document a live fire exercise at Range Destiny in Mosul, Iraq, June 7, 2004.*

assigned to a division of the JIB to coordinate imagery requirements and release of imagery products to the media. The COMCAM headquarters management team ensures that internal imagery requirements and imagery requests for use by PA are fulfilled in a timely manner. COMCAM teams also may be asked to assist in short-notice media training for military spokespersons.

(7) **Command/Internal Information.** Commanders should plan for the inclusion of command/internal information personnel in operations. The DOD command information program assists commanders in their leadership communications functions. Command information helps inform the internal audience about defense matters, promote personal dedication to duty and pride in country, identify potential adversaries, and explain the military capabilities of allied nations. The internal audience includes active duty, Reserve and National Guard members, civilian employees, cadets, midshipmen, retired personnel, and their families.

(8) **Armed Forces Radio and Television Service.** The deployment of AFRTS offers the JFC and PAO an important means to communicate immediately and directly to DOD personnel in the operational area, as well as DOD personnel and family members in other locations.

(a) Initial consideration for staffed AFRTS facilities should center on radio service to bare-base and forward areas, with television considered for rear areas and further expansion as an operational area matures. PA should anticipate the President's and Secretary of Defense's (SecDef's) desire to communicate directly to deployed forces, especially during major holidays. Additionally, AFRTS can be used to transmit immediate announcements to DOD personnel when approved by the combatant commander.

(b) Coordination with country team (CT) officials may be required based on local factors. AFRTS has a wide range of deployable equipment systems, from small unmanned satellite radio and television decoders used to provide service at small base camps or messing areas to large scale network radio and television systems. Additionally, AFRTS can provide a JIB with video newsgathering capability for joint command/internal messages.

(c) Combatant Command AFRTS Planner. CCAPs are assigned to each combatant command PA planning staff and should be activated to join the combatant command PA planning staff when contingencies arise in accordance with DOD Regulation 5120.20-R, *Management and Operation of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service*. Additionally, the CCAP should coordinate on PA deliberate planning to propose AFRTS capabilities.

(d) AFRTS outlets may not be used for any type of political purpose or psychological operations (PSYOP), and may not produce or broadcast programming to serve interests other than the DOD internal audience. Deployment of AFRTS assets into an operational area usually requires special approvals for frequencies, real estate, and facilities which must normally be coordinated by the JIB. The senior AFRTS officer commands the AFRTS station and serves as a member of the JIB.

(9) **Host Nation.** PA planners should consult with HN governments to identify local issues and concerns that should be reflected in the PAG. This coordination normally is established through the PAO at the respective embassy.

(10) **Allies/Coalition Partners.** PA planning should reflect the possibility of allies/coalition partners joining in the effort. In future operations US military forces will rarely work alone to solve an international crisis. In addition to HN sensitivities, the JIB staff should also be cognizant of allied and/or coalition partner issues when communicating with the media and the public.

(11) **Country Team.** The CT consists of key members of the US diplomatic mission or embassy and work directly with the HN government. Its purpose is to unify the coordination and implementation of US national policy within each foreign country under direction of the ambassador. CTs meet regularly to advise the ambassador on matters of interest to the United States and reviews current developments in the country. Commanders should consider placing liaison teams with selected embassies if warranted by operational considerations and approved by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. The US ambassador, as the senior US representative in each HN, controls information release in country. The JIB director should coordinate all themes, messages, and press releases impacting an HN through the respective US embassy channels.

(12) **Government Agencies and Nongovernmental Organizations.** Close coordination with other governmental agencies and NGOs can also be a vital part of PA responsibilities. For example, if providing military assistance as part of a national response to a weapon of mass destruction or terrorist incident, there normally will be close coordination established between joint forces and civilian governmental organizations such as FEMA/DHS, Department of Transportation, Department of Justice, or various state and local agencies. In foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations, there may be coordination



requirements with international organizations such as the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as others.

(13) **Interagency Coordination.** Combatant commanders operate in a public information arena that is saturated with media messages, both truthful and untruthful, all of which can affect public understanding of the facts. Sending a consistent message and speaking with one voice is even more essential during crisis operations. The goal is to ensure all agencies of the federal government work toward a common goal in contingencies by speaking with many voices that communicate a single consistent message to the international audience. This helps the US coordinate its messages and “get out in front of a crisis,” rather than take a reactive stance. The idea is to proactively provide information to the media, with one organized and orchestrated effort to get DOD messages to all relevant USG agencies. The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs plays a key-coordinating role in this process. OASD(PA) interfaces with the combatant commands, normally through their joint interagency coordinating group, and passes the information down through PAG.

(14) **Dissemination of Interagency Guidance.** Information from the interagency process, DOD, and various levels of command is disseminated through PAG. This guidance is essential to ensure a consistent message is projected. The guidance can change weekly, daily or hourly as the political and military situation changes. Commanders should strive for the release of consistent information and messages at all levels of command. Information and messages should be appropriately coordinated and be in compliance with official DOD, supported command, Service and major command guidance before being released to the public. The development and timely dissemination of DOD-approved PAG ensures that all information and policy are in consonance when responding to the information demands of joint operations. This guidance must be clear in intent and it must be timely.

*See DODI 5405.3, Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG), for additional guidance.*

(15) **Intelligence.** Intelligence activities have the ability to translate and help analyze adversary news broadcasts. This helps PAOs to quickly understand and anticipate adversary propaganda. Intelligence’s historical and cultural analysis of the adversary gives PA a context from which to anticipate propaganda and disinformation. Additionally, PA may require access to relevant intelligence (including imagery) products to assist in the development of PA news releases. However, PA and activities are not intelligence activities. They are separate and distinct.

*“I could argue that you could preempt a was by getting the right information - accurate information - to the right people in a timely fashion. You may not, but if you don’t try you sure won’t.”*

**Marine General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

*See Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, for additional guidance.*

**During IRAQI FREEDOM, public affairs forces in the Joint Air Operations Center monitored current operations for the prosecution of sensitive targets. Public affairs planners in the operations center recommended intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms gather imagery on a couple of sensitive targets to ensure imagery was captured that would prove coalition aircraft struck the intended military target rather than surrounding civilian buildings and infrastructure. The imagery was processed properly for declassification and made available for release via public affairs.**

**Various Sources**

(16) **Public Diplomacy (PD).** PD is a separate function with a unique mission. PD is an interagency governmental effort to communicate prepared messages and themes to allies and international audiences. It is critically important that PA and PD are coordinated in order to ensure consistency of their respective messages and to maintain credibility with their respective audiences.

b. **Public Affairs Support for Other Operations.** Commanders should ensure PA activities are tailored to support joint missions across the entire range of military operations. While reporters are interested in the essential facts of any situation, that information is incomplete without an understanding of the background, underlying rationale, and other fundamental elements of the operation. Experience shows that media interest in FHA, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and similar operations peaks early, then diminishes gradually. PA planning should reflect that trend. US military forces must be prepared to respond to a wide variety of situations, including the use of force to achieve national or multinational objectives. Commanders and their PA personnel should be prepared to discuss, among other topics, organizational structure, strategy, objectives, tactics, training, logistics, intelligence, and troop support issues. Explaining the details of such areas reinforces the media and public awareness of how the military functions within the context of the stated political goals.

(1) **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.** These missions, conducted outside the US, its territories and possessions, involve a delicate balance of political and military objectives. FHA missions include operational and informational coordination with NGO relief organizations and international organizations such as the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees or the Red Cross/Red Crescent, and often the representatives of other involved nations.

(a) In such an environment, commanders and their PA staffs must exercise care so that, in their attempts to demonstrate their responsiveness, concern and assistance, they do not preempt the authority of the political leadership or HN or appear to be taking credit for successes at the expense of other contributing parties.

(b) PA activities should be coordinated through the JTF staff and the civil-military operations center (CMOC). As open sources to foreign countries and the US, PA channels can be used to disseminate international information to counter adversary propaganda.



*See JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, for additional guidance.*

**(2) Counterdrug (CD) Operations.** A number of factors are specific to CD operations. Most significantly, there are legal and law enforcement aspects of CD that are extremely sensitive and generate additional concerns in the release of information to the public. The inappropriate release of information could threaten the personal safety of military personnel, civilian law enforcement officials and other participants pending judicial cases and the security of intelligence systems and sources. Inappropriate release of information could render a plan ineffective and limit the success of follow-on operations. PA plans should account for the appropriate release of information to the public as well as OPSEC measures.

*See JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, for additional guidance.*

**(3) Combating Terrorism.** Terrorist threats and acts occur in media-intense environments. That, in turn, may make it impossible to prevent coverage that could reveal tactics, techniques and procedures used in combating terrorism. That means PA planners have to anticipate and make accommodations for the probability of live and near live direct media coverage and strive to provide as much information to the public about DOD activities as possible, consistent with OPSEC, technology security, and INFOSEC. In making information available to the media, PA personnel must delicately balance the legitimate information requirements of their DOD civilian audiences against providing useful information to terrorists. Principal PA objectives of an antiterrorism plan should be to ensure accurate information is provided to the public (including media) and to communicate a calm, measured and reasoned reaction to the ongoing event. OASD(PA) is the single point of contact for all PA aspects of US military antiterrorist actions.

*See JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, for additional guidance.*

### **(4) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs)**

(a) NEOs are conducted to assist the Department of State (DOS) in evacuating noncombatants, nonessential military personnel, selected HN citizens, and third country nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign HN to an appropriate safe haven. The JFC should ensure that accurate and timely release of information about the operation is made to the media to the maximum extent possible consistent with the security of the operation and the safety of personnel involved. Speed of media transmission makes it probable that a worldwide audience will have immediate access to information about the conduct of the operation and its participants.

(b) To ensure media do not provide intelligence to persons hostile to the operation, the PAO, working with embassy personnel, must plan and coordinate accurate and timely releases concerning the NEO. During NEOs, the JTF PAO needs to ensure that the ambassador or the designated representative has approved all PA announcements. Due to the rapid development of this type of operation, PAOs need to be prepared to conduct JIB operations in any kind of

environment, including afloat (e.g., Liberia NEO in April of 1996 and the Sierra Leone NEO in May of 1997).

*See JP 3-07.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, for additional guidance.*

(5) **Peace Operations (PO).** PO encompass peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO) conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. PKO are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. PEO include the application of force, or the threat of its use, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. While similar in their objectives to ensure stability in a particular region or country, PKO and PEO involve different PA challenges. The legitimacy and support for a PO can be lost if PA does not receive the proper level of attention. A primary PA concern during PO is that the parties to a dispute may release information that is slanted to support their position. These activities may grow into an orchestrated media operation making it difficult for PA personnel to set the record straight. PA can reduce the level of speculation in the news by providing the media with releasable information on a timely basis.

*See JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, for additional guidance.*

#### (6) **Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs (CA)**

(a) CMO encompass the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area. The JFC is responsible for CMO in a joint operation.

(b) CA personnel perform activities to enhance the relationship between military and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and involve the application of CA functional specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility of civil government.

(c) All CA activities support CMO. CA personnel supporting CMO and PA will be conducting operations throughout the combatant commander's area of responsibility. CA personnel will assist with dislocated civilians, public administration, public health and public works in concert with local authorities. By their nature, their missions and their normally positive results are of interest to the local populace and their media representatives. PA personnel and CA assist in the dissemination of information to local populations. PA personnel have the responsibility to engage the local media and can assist CA with passing information to the appropriate audiences through those media outlets.

(d) PA elements also have the responsibility, through command/internal information outlets, to keep military elements informed of the displaced civilian situation, methods and procedures for their orderly withdrawal from the operational area, and any other information on this issue deemed appropriate by the JFC.

(e) Coordination is required to ensure information released about CMO or CA released by PA does not conflict with or complicate the work of the other. Coordination is primarily established through the CMOC, although normal staff coordination takes place through other agencies, such as the IO cell, on a regular basis. A CMOC is the JFC's nerve center for CMO and coordination with non-DOD agencies. CMOC members are primarily CA personnel, augmented by other DOD and non-DOD (e.g., DOS, United States Agency for International Development, FEMA/DHS) liaison personnel.

(f) PA and CMO messages must be coordinated and deconflicted early during the planning process and during execution. Although PA and CMO messages may be different, they must not contradict one another or the credibility will be lost. Although each has specific audiences, information will often overlap between audiences. This overlap makes message deconfliction crucial.

*See JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, for additional guidance.*

#### 4. Public Affairs Relationship to Information Operations

PA and IO activities directly support military objectives, counter adversary disinformation and deter adversary actions. Although both PA and IO require planning, message development and media analysis, the efforts differ with respect to audience, scope and intent, and must remain separate. PA and IO entities must be aware of each other's activities for maximum effect and to achieve success. Commanders must ensure appropriate coordination between PA and IO activities consistent with the DOD Principles of Information, policy or statutory limitation and security. Effective coordination and collaboration with IO is necessary for PA to maintain its institutional credibility. Successful PA operations require institutional credibility to maintain public trust and confidence. Commanders should structure their organizations to ensure PA and IO functions are separate. PAOs should work directly for the commander and all supporting PA activities should be organized under the PAO.

*See Chairman's Memorandum 2077-4, Policy on Public Affairs Relationship to Information Operations, 27 September 2004, for additional guidance.*

a. **Public Affairs Goals.** Reassure and maintain the trust and confidence of citizens in the US, the US military, and the international community through a proactive PA program. Inform American public and international audiences in support of combatant commander public information needs at all operational levels. PA maintains status as a credible and preferred source of information by the media and public. PA is seen as a complementary and related task to IO.

b. **Credibility and Truth.** Credibility and truth are key elements to maintaining PA's operational capability. Credible PA is necessary to support the commander's mission and maintain essential public liaisons. The credibility and reputation of the US military in the international media is vital for combating adversary propaganda. It is imperative that this credibility is maintained; otherwise the media and the public will lose confidence in what DOD spokespersons say. Credibility with the media is earned over decades, yet can vanish overnight. Providing fast, truthful, credible information to the media is essential in order to maintain this credibility.

**c. Psychological Operations**

(1) PA capabilities are related to IO, but PA is not an IO discipline or PSYOP tool. PA activities contribute to IO by providing truthful, accurate and timely information, using approved DOD PAG to keep the public informed about the military's missions and operations, countering adversary propaganda, deterring adversary actions, and maintain trust and confidence of the US population, and our friends and allies. PA activities affect, and are affected by, PSYOP, and are planned and executed in coordination with PSYOP planning and operations. PA must be aware of the practice of PSYOP, but should have no role in planning or executing these operations.

(2) PA activities that concurrently impact PSYOP include print and electronic productions, news releases, the organization of press availabilities, and media facilitation. The PA and PSYOP planning process should focus on coordinating activities to accomplish mission objectives.

(3) Adversaries use disinformation to disrupt operations. The US can fully expect an adversary to use the media to its own advantage by spreading disinformation and propaganda in an attempt to undermine the US position and objectives. Technology allows the adversary to instantly communicate and transfer information to the international and American media. Fast, complete, and credible information provided by DOD PA activities helps disarm adversary propaganda.

(4) Combat Camera. COMCAM is a resource used to support PA and PSYOP objectives. Representatives from PA and COMCAM must coordinate and deconflict documentation objectives.

*See JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, for additional guidance.*

**d. Operations Security**

(1) Military commands receive calls from the media and public each day inquiring about US forces and operations. In these cases, PA supports OPSEC and is the only organization authorized by DOD for the release of information to the public. As such, it bears key responsibility for OPSEC. Security at the source is the primary protector of classified and sensitive material and should govern discussions with media representatives.

(2) OPSEC measures are designed to identify, control, and protect generally unclassified information that is associated with sensitive operations and activities. OPSEC is concerned with denying "critical information" about friendly forces to the adversary. The presence of the media during military operations and their capability to transmit information on a real-time basis can complicate OPSEC.

(3) PAOs should participate in OPSEC planning to provide their assessment on the possible effects of media coverage and should work closely with OPSEC planners to develop guidelines that can

be used by military and media personnel to avoid inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information. OPSEC surveys and security reviews are conducted on an operation or activity to determine if critical information is being protected. A typical OPSEC survey team contains multidisciplined expertise and should include PA. Critical information lists are provided in the OPSEC portion of an operation plan or order.

(4) Commanders must understand that the information most available to the media at the tactical and operational levels is also the most perishable in terms of timeliness. Decisions about information release must reflect that understanding. Ground rules allowing for the temporary delay of transmission of potentially sensitive information have proven to be acceptable to the media and effective in addressing short-term security concerns and media coverage requirements. There is a natural tension between traditional OPSEC and a commander's desire to use operational information to demonstrate national resolve or send a clear signal to the adversary. Operational information in the news may deter potential adversaries before use of force becomes necessary. When adversaries are not deterred from conflict, information revealing US or friendly force capabilities and resolve may still affect an adversary's understanding of the situation.

*See JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, for additional guidance.*

*"There was precisely one reporter who went to war with a personal recommendation from General H. Norman Schwarzkopf in his hip pocket, and you're looking at him.*

*Thanks to that trust, I was sent down to the 24th Mech two weeks before G-day. On my first night there the Division CG called me to his TOC and pulled the cover off the battle map. What he said, as my eyes followed the arrows and the hair stood up on the back of my neck was this: I trust you because Schwarzkopf trusts you; but more than that, I trust you because you're coming with me. I never heard a more compelling argument for operational security in my life."*

**Joe Galloway, Senior Writer, US News and World Report,  
In a speech delivered at The Air War College, 22 October 1996**

### **e. Military Deception**

(1) PA activities affect, and are affected by, military deception (MILDEC) operations. PA operations should be planned, coordinated and deconflicted with MILDEC operations consistent with policy, statutory limitations, and security.

(2) MILDEC includes those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

(3) MILDEC can be employed during all phases of military operations. The safeguarding of MILDEC related information is of such high importance that it is often classified and compartmented.

(4) PA must be aware of the practice of MILDEC operations, but should have no role in planning or executing these operations. PA statements and releases must be coordinated with MILDEC to ensure deception plans are not revealed or compromised. The coordination between PA and MILDEC operations must safeguard the essential elements of deception plans and maintain the integrity, reputation, and credibility of PA as a source of truthful information.

*See JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, for additional guidance.*

*“The word ‘deception’ is an interesting one because it would be wrong to use the word in any context other than a strategic or tactical deception. For example, if the Special Forces of the United States were getting ready to undertake a direct action against a Al Qaeda stronghold someplace in Afghanistan, and they want to come in from the west, they may very well do things that will lead the people in that enclave to think they’re coming in from the north instead of from the west. And that would be characterized as tactical deception.*

*It seems to me that what people have to understand about this is very clear: number one, government officials, the Department of Defense, this secretary and the people that work with me tell the American people the truth. And to the extent anyone says anything that at any time proves to have been not accurate, they correct it at the earliest possible opportunity. I’ve read some of these articles that are floating around, and my advice is to think of it the way I’ve just described it: That’s the way it works. That’s the way it has worked. That’s the way it will work in the future.”*

**Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld  
During a press briefing on February 20, 2002**

## **5. Media Access**

Media coverage of potential future military operations can, to a large extent, shape public perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead. This is true for the US public, the public in allied countries, whose opinion can affect the durability of the coalition, and publics in countries where US conducts operations, whose perceptions of the US can affect the cost and duration of our involvement. The JFC must organize for and facilitate access of national and international media to US forces, including those engaged in combat operations.

a. During Operation DESERT STORM many problems were experienced in providing media coverage of combat activities. Those problems are discussed in the Title V Report, “Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress.” During Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, embedding of journalists provided opportunities for timely, first-hand coverage, without disrupting military operations. Interested reporters were attached to, and traveled with, military units through the conduct of combat operations.

b. **Timely Coverage.** The goal remains to assist the media in getting the information out in an accurate and timely manner – not days or weeks into an operation. The JFC facilitates the media getting a first-hand look at joint operations. To this end, operational planning should:



- (1) Commit communications systems-trained joint PA teams.
- (2) Dedicate lift and logistic support to move PA and media personnel and media products to and from forward locations.
- (3) Hold daily press briefings in theater with international and US media.
- (4) Institute processes for the rapid dissemination of weapons systems video, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data, and COMCAM footage.
- (5) Delegate the authority for the declassification and release of COMCAM and other related products to the lowest possible level.

### **c. Media Embedding, Credentials, Registration, and Ground Rules**

(1) Open and independent reporting are the principal means of coverage of military operations. Commanders should expect regular encounters with journalists who show up in their assigned operational areas. Some will embed with the units and stay with them for an extended period of time. Some embedded reporters will be registered by the joint force and will carry identifying credentials issued by the JIB or, as appropriate, Geneva Convention cards. The criteria for credentialing journalists are established by the joint force PAO or the JIB director. Credentialing is not intended to be a control measure or means to restrict certain media outlets from access. It is primarily a method of validating individuals as journalists and providing them with information that enhances their ability to report on activities within the operational area. Additionally, media must be credentialed to ensure they have official status under the Geneva Conventions in the event of capture. Others may be covering military operations without such credentials. Commanders should not provide information to non-credentialed, unregistered journalists without guidance from the joint force PAO or the JIB director. The JIB serves as a logistic and information base for media relations operations. Journalists seeking credentials from the JIB are asked to agree to ground rules tailored to the specific, ongoing joint operation.

(2) The combatant commander should continue to take reasonable steps to ensure all journalists have proper credentials in a combat zone, although the increasingly open international environment and the large number of journalists who just “show up” in an operational area make it very unlikely that all journalists will have the proper credentials. Even though journalists not credentialed by DOD may not necessarily be given the same access as those who have credentials, all journalists should still be considered for media pools and should be strongly encouraged to register with the JIB. During registration, the JIB director should request that non-credentialed journalists abide by the same established media ground rules. Absent unusual circumstances, media training will not be used as a prerequisite for accompanying US forces. The exception would be training that can be accomplished quickly by unit personnel.

(3) Major news organizations normally make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with US military operations. The decision to suspend

credentials or expel a reporter should only be made after clear and severe violations have been committed and only with the concurrence of the JFC and the combatant commander.

(4) In multinational operations, responsibilities for establishing media ground rules, credentialing media, and, if necessary, expulsion of media, are developed and implemented through appropriate multinational command and staff channels. A further credentialing complication, particularly in multinational operations, concerns the internationalization of the media through corporate mergers and acquisitions. This phenomenon has blurred the lines between American and foreign media, and the respective linkage policies about who may receive military media credentials. Media outlets owned in whole or in part by governments or citizens of rival states might not receive the same considerations as those working for outlets owned by governments or citizens of friendly nations. However, as in joint operations, non-credentialed journalists may not be given the same access to a combat zone as those who have credentials. They should be encouraged to register at the PIC, APIC, JIB, or equivalent organization.

(5) Media ground rules include requirements designed to protect the health and welfare of the media. For example, access to selected theaters may require specific immunizations. The media are responsible for obtaining the required inoculations prior to their arrival in the operational area. Media without proper immunization or refusing inoculations may be denied credentials and should be informed that they are traveling at their own risk if they proceed throughout the operational area.

(6) Escorts. In some cases, the journalists will not be accompanied by trained PA personnel. US commanders, with the assistance of PA personnel, should identify shortages of escorts and provide training for non-PA personnel who will serve as escorts. Commanders must develop unit plans tailored to local conditions to accommodate reporters operating under this provision and issue guidance about



*Media covering press conference prior to the start of a North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Northern Command training exercise.*

what information and support they will receive. Appendix B, “Guidelines for Discussions with the Media,” contains general guidance on support and information to be provided to media representatives.

(7) Central to this provision is the need for continuous dialogue between the joint force and the media who are covering its activities.

### **d. Media Pools**

(1) Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering US military operations. In fact, current communications technology and open media access to most segments of any operational area make media pools more unlikely than in past operations. However, pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and be disbanded at the earliest opportunity — within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools does not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

(2) Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations, on ships, or where space is limited. In such circumstances, PA plans should specify the number and types of media (including internal media) who will form the pool. The military determines the size and composition of the pool, usually establishing categories such as, but not limited to, print, broadcast, and trade media to ensure adequate scope and distribution of coverage. The media representatives should determine who fill the spaces in the pool.

(3) The military is responsible for the transportation of pools. To ensure the most complete coverage, commanders should provide dedicated transportation. Under conditions of open coverage, JFCs should authorize field commanders to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. Commanders should also follow the guidelines in DOD Civilian Personnel Regulations, Joint Travel Regulations, Volume II, to ensure standardization of policy and procedures.

(4) Consistent with capabilities and the operational conditions, the commander supplies PA personnel with facilities to ensure timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool and independent material. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists, as always, file by any other means available. As with transportation support, commanders employing media pools are responsible for providing access to communications facilities for news products prepared by the pool. Similar assistance should be provided on a space-available basis for those reporters involved in independent coverage. Commanders should understand the sophisticated communications capabilities available to the media and recognize that early and regular discussions with the media help ensure electromagnetic OPSEC.

(5) These principles apply as well to the operations of the standing DOD national media pool system. The support of the DOD NMP is a priority mission for the JFC. Besides the tasks outlined in these guidelines, commanders are responsible for transporting the pool into the operational area and providing sustained equipment, communications, in-theater transportation, messing, and medical support for pool members. All personnel involved in any aspect of operation planning should anticipate and include these provisions.

(6) Contingency planning for media pools should include provision of equipment, transportation, and communications assets necessary to help the media gather information and file stories about the joint force. The use of pools should be limited to the earliest stages of an operation or to situations in which the presence of only a few journalists is practical. Commanders should realize that the formation of a pool places additional media support requirements on the organization. In those cases in which commanders decide that media pools are necessary, PA planning should include reimbursement from the media depending on location and availability of commercial transportation. Other media representatives who are not members of, or associated with, the deployed media pool may be encountered. Plans must address measures for handling those reporters who are not members of the pool, but who appear in the operational area. DOD national media pool support issues include the items listed in Figure III-5.

#### **e. Joint Force Accessibility and Support**

(1) The JFC should plan to assist journalists in gaining access to all forces that are participating in and supporting the joint operation.

(2) Military PA personnel should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process. The PA personnel mission includes helping media representatives understand joint force events and occurrences so that media coverage is accurate. Additionally, a PA goal is to gather sufficient resources to develop and sustain a responsive PA infrastructure that can help support journalists' information needs. PA responsibilities include:

- (a) Arranging access for the media.
- (b) Preparing commanders and their units to accept media visits.
- (c) Assisting in logistic support (e.g., communications, equipment, supplies, and transportation) for the media.
- (d) Providing information and explanations.
- (e) Ensuring information released is consistent with security guidelines.

(3) The JFC, or a designated representative, should conduct frequent operational briefings to inform internal and external audiences of current military operations and respond to media questions.

### **6. Security Review**

a. As noted earlier, security issues are fundamental to all PA planning. Inclusion of the joint force PAO in the initial planning process and the JIB director in the operational planning process helps to ensure that information is properly categorized by its sensitivity. Commanders must understand that the information most available to the media at the tactical and operational levels is also the most perishable in terms of timeliness. Decisions about information release must reflect that understanding. Ground rules allowing for the temporary delay of transmission of potentially sensitive information have proven to be acceptable to the media and effective in addressing security concerns and media coverage requirements.

All PA and operation plans should consider such provisions. A commander exercising the principle of security at the source may exclude media representatives from covering an ongoing operation, if media presence is determined by the commander to jeopardize the mission or threaten the lives of military members in the operation.

b. PA officers should work closely with OPSEC planners to develop guidelines to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of critical information. PA supports OPSEC through strict adherence to established security review programs and other measures to ensure critical information is protected. PA support to OPSEC planning may include participation in multidisciplinary survey teams and review cells as well as liaison with OPSEC planners to develop critical information lists.

c. A responsive, efficient, and successful joint PA program provides the best opportunity for public understanding of joint operations. DOD policy mandates open access consistent with OPSEC while protecting the safety and individual privacy of the operating forces. PA planning for any operation should be tailored to anticipate large or small numbers of technologically sophisticated media. Successful joint PA operations are those that have the necessary personnel, equipment, transportation, and communications resources to meet prevailing demands for information.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
NATIONAL MEDIA POOL SUPPORT**

- **Frequent, comprehensive, unclassified operational briefings for pool personnel.**
- **Access to areas of ongoing combat or exercise operations. The personal safety of the news media is not a reason for excluding them. The goal is to treat the news media as noncombatants accompanying forces, allowing them to accompany the organizations in the conduct of their missions.**
- **Reasonable access to key command and staff personnel.**
- **An officer from the supported command in the grade of O-5 or O-6 to coordinate news media pool requirements.**
- **Itinerary planning that will enable news media pool members to disperse throughout the operational area.**
- **Cooperation from all forces participating in the operation or exercise on a not-to-interfere basis.**
- **Supported command planning for logistic support for pool and escort personnel out of existing contingency or exercise funds. Required support may include, but may not be limited to:**
  - ▶ **Airlift from the continental United States to the area of the operation or exercise.**
  - ▶ **Theater ground, sea, and air transportation to allow pool coverage of operations.**
  - ▶ **Messing and billeting on a reimbursable basis.**
  - ▶ **Issuance of equipment considered appropriate to the situation (helmets, canteens, flak vests, and cold weather clothing).**
  - ▶ **Access to communications facilities to file stories on a priority basis.**

Figure III-5. Department of Defense National Media Pool Support

## **7. Lessons Learned**

Documentation of “lessons learned” during the joint operation is critical. Each member of the JIB and the PAO staff should keep a written record of any “lessons learned” and be prepared to report those lessons during the after-action reporting period. The CJCS Joint Lessons Learned Program provides a method to identify, capture, and share information collected as a result of operations, exercises, training events, and other sources for the purpose of enhancing an organization’s ability to accomplish warfighting tasks. PAOs should use this important forum to document and preserve applicable lessons learned for operations and exercises.



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## CHAPTER IV

### JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT

*“Somewhere, a Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine is wounded, and determined to get back to duty. And here in our country, hundreds of thousands of dedicated military and civilian personnel are devoting long hours to America’s defense.”*

**Secretary Rumsfeld to the Senate Armed Services Committee  
February 17, 2005**

#### 1. General Overview

To support the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), the Armed Forces of the United States, in accordance with guidance established in the National Military Strategy conduct planning and operations to detect, deter, prevent and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the US, its territories, and interests, and to mitigate the impact of adversary actions. The DOD also provides military assistance to civil authorities (MACA), including consequence management activities. The Armed Forces of the United States support the NSHS through two distinct but interrelated mission areas — homeland defense (HD) and civil support (CS).

#### 2. Homeland Defense

For most HD missions, PA is conducted as described in other chapters of this publication. However, due to the involvement of other federal agencies in the homeland security mission and the close relationship between HD and homeland security, homeland defense missions may be conducted in a manner similar to MACA (i.e., with a lead federal agency (LFA) other than DOD).

#### 3. Civil Support

CS usually draws extensive media attention. Military PAOs operate in an interagency environment, with emphasis on cooperation, coordination, and unity of effort. News media access to CS operational areas is subject to the approval of the LFA. The LFA has release authority. The military must coordinate all PA activities with the LFA and comply with its PAG. Generally, military support to civil authorities can be categorized into three areas: immediate response, state National Guard support, and DOD support.

a. **Immediate Response.** Normally, a local JIC is established for an event that may require immediate response. The PAO should work in concert with the local JIC to provide information to the media and public.

b. **State National Guard Support.** PA posture and execution is determined by the respective state and executed by the respective state National Guard PAO.

c. **DOD Support.** When the LFA requests DOD support, the request normally originates with the on-scene defense coordinating officer. This request is routed to the SecDef, who then approves or disapproves the support requested. Approved requests are sent to the supported combatant command

for execution. Normally requests for capabilities not available in the civil sector, unique to the military, or those that exceed the ability of other federal agencies to support are accepted by DOD.

(1) Normally, a federal JIC is established. This JIC may be collocated with the state or local JIC or established at another location. Coordination links are established between the federal and state or local JIC. DOD should provide PA support to work in the JIC on a 24/7 basis if necessary.

(2) Where there is a significant DOD presence, a JIB may be established to support military operations, but it must operate within the guidance of the LFA and in coordination with the federal JIC.

(3) Deployed DOD PA must coordinate closely with state National Guard PA to coordinate messages and PA operations. It is difficult for the public and other federal agencies to discriminate between the state National Guard and federal DOD forces, thereby increasing PA challenges during a major event.

#### **4. Public Affairs Operations Under the National Response Plan**

a. The NRP outlines the federal (including DOD MACA) response to incidents within the United States. It includes a detailed PA annex that describes the interaction among supporting federal agencies and operations of the federal JIC. For most events, DOD is in a support role.

b. The goal of PA under the NRP is to ensure all federal agencies speak with one voice and provide consistent, accurate information to the public. The LFA develops the key messages and provides PAG. Supporting agencies conduct their respective PA operations in concert with this guidance and in coordination with the LFA.

c. Emergency Support Function (ESF) 15 describes the responsibilities of federal organizations in public communications and designates the Department of Homeland Security as the LFA for this ESF.

#### **5. Integration of Federal and State Military Forces**

a. JTFs are often assembled to carry out military assistance missions. When state National Guard and federal military forces are in an operational area, a National Guard officer is often dual-hatted and placed in command of both state and federal military forces. When this happens, the state National Guard PAO and lead deploying PAO for US Northern Command must closely coordinate PA operations.

b. Even when the JFC is dual-hatted, state National Guard and federal DOD forces have separate and distinct roles and missions. While PA operations may be combined to support a joint force, it may be more efficient to keep state and federal PA operations separate. For example, the Posse Comitatus Act normally prevents federal forces from directly participating in law enforcement activities. However, state National Guard forces in state status may directly assist law enforcement.

## CHAPTER V

### JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

*“In order to make assured conquests it is necessary always to proceed within the rules: to advance, to establish yourself solidly, to advance and establish yourself again, and always prepare to have within reach of your army your resources and your requirements.”*

Frederick the Great: Instructions for His Generals, ii, 1747

#### 1. General Overview

a. Joint and multinational PA activities require facilities, personnel, and equipment, to include communication and transportation assets (see Figure V-1). Commanders must ensure that the PA assessment of anticipated resource requirements is incorporated as early as possible in the planning process, since PA requirements may exceed available resources. Plans must provide for specific measures to augment PA personnel and procure, lease, or assign other necessary resources. This generally requires assistance from the supporting combatant commands and the Military Departments.

b. All personnel and equipment should be deployable and provided on a dedicated basis so that the responsible commander can sustain PA operations at necessary levels. Each phase of an operation will have specific PA requirements, which require the attention of the commander, the staff, and the PAO. Initial PA personnel and equipment should be capable of being carried on both military and commercial aircraft for quick deployment. Follow-on items are given appropriate priority for deployment through logistic channels. News media interest varies, and military support packages must be able to accommodate surges in media activity. The goal is to anticipate and respond to fluctuating coverage and to tailor resources to ensure no loss of efficiency.




Figure V-1. Joint Public Affairs Resource Requirements

### 2. Facilities

Facilities must be designated for the functioning of the PA infrastructure and for the work of the media covering any joint or multinational operation. This requirement may include the establishment and operation of a JIB. Should a CIB, PIC, APIC, or CPIC be appropriate, similar facilities would also be necessary. Specific requirements include staff and media work areas, equipment storage, imaging facilities, access to helicopter landing zones, and vehicle parking areas. Additionally, work areas are necessary for those personnel conducting the community relations and command/internal information missions. This includes AFRTS broadcast and transmission facilities. Billeting and messing for personnel working at the information centers must be provided. This is also true for media personnel if such support is not available locally.

### 3. Personnel

Once an operation begins, the peacetime staffing of an organization's PA office is likely to be inadequate to respond to the inevitable increase in media and public interest. Contingency planning must address the need for rapid expansion of the PA staff to meet this challenge, especially in the earliest stages of the deployment. While the organization's PA personnel form the core of the effort, their augmentation must be a high priority. This can be accomplished in the following ways:

a. **Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve PA Units.** In developing OPLANs, combatant commanders will plan for the specific PA skills and capabilities needed to accomplish the PA mission. OPLANs and requests for forces must reflect the requirements for PA units or personnel, if such assets are required. On arrival, such units would be subordinate to the appropriate component or the joint force PAO. Members of these organizations should train regularly in various exercise scenarios and should be provided with sufficient dedicated equipment, transportation, and communications support to accomplish their missions of media relations, community relations, and command internal information.

b. **Individuals.** Service component commanders and supporting combatant commanders may also be tasked to support the JFC through the deployment of individual PA personnel. Positions should be identified in advance and individuals matched to specific requirements in support of each OPLAN. Once again, it is important to exercise such a reinforcement scheme in order to refine operational procedures and to help the designated personnel understand the complexities of the missions of the combatant commands they are supporting.

#### MEDIA CONCERNS

**One of the concerns of news organizations in the Pentagon press corps [during DESERT STORM] was that they did not have enough staff in the Persian Gulf to cover hostilities. Since they did not know how the Saudi government would respond to their requests for more visas, and since they couldn't predict what restrictions might be imposed on commercial air traffic in the event of a war, they asked the Pentagon to provide a military plane to take in a group of reporters to act as journalistic reinforcements. Notwithstanding the most intensive airlift since the Berlin blockade,**

**a USAF C-141 cargo plane left Andrews Air Force Base, MD on the morning after the bombing began with 126 news media personnel on board. The fact that senior military commanders dedicated one cargo airplane to the job of transporting another 126 journalists to Saudi Arabia demonstrated the military's commitment to take reporters to the scene of the action so they could get the story out to the American people.**

**SOURCE: DOD Final Report to Congress  
*Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992***

#### **4. Equipment**

The media who cover any joint operation should be outfitted with the most modern and efficient equipment available. The JFC must ensure that the PA infrastructure to support the joint mission is, to the maximum extent possible, compatible with current media technology.

a. Every effort should be made to standardize equipment, software, and communications packages to ensure interoperability and to minimize training requirements in a contingency environment. For example, specific hardware, software, and digital imaging requirements should be identified to support the military writer's mission, the photographer's mission, civilian media assistance, and the PAO's total capability. Considerations include supply, logistic, and administrative needs, media and event coordination and scheduling, briefing preparations, photographic assets with both standard and digital capabilities, Internet access to include release capabilities and local area network access, and establishment and operation of unit and/or contingency Internet homepage sites. Additionally, requirements for translators and analysts who must have access to television monitors, video recorders, and reception capability to review newscasts for the benefit of the command must be addressed. Also the PAO should include requirements for local publications and other useful publications that must be provided on a daily basis for translation or analysis, plus resources for contracts that may be necessary for photo processing, delivery of civilian publications and publication of internal information (e.g., newsletters, newspapers).

b. Deployable AFRTS packages, if available, should be considered in the overall requirements. Most of these items must be provided by the Service components of the supported combatant commander, especially those which support the DOD NMP, the command's primary JIB, and other PA offices supporting the operation in its earliest stages. Subsequent resource needs should be met by balanced support provided by the responsible combatant commander, the supporting combatant commanders, and the Military Departments. The planning process should precisely identify the PA infrastructure requirements for each contingency and then identify who will provide them. Maintenance and service are essential to sustain the resource packages. Commercial contracting may be appropriate in some cases to ensure current technology and maintenance support.

c. While communications requirements vary in each situation, an appropriate mix of the capabilities shown in Figure V-2 is needed to support PA.



d. The mobility of the PA effort must match that of the operational forces in order to ensure the necessary level of media coverage. A package of dedicated transportation assets, in a combination appropriate to the assigned operation, includes:

(1) Vehicles (with drivers and communications) to support PA command/internal, administrative, and logistic activities.

(2) Vehicles (with drivers and communications) to support the movement of media and military journalists.

(3) Force protection assets, specifically assigned to the JIB, travel with PA staffs and media in hostile or unsecured areas.

(4) Aircraft to support the movement of media and military journalists.

(5) Surface and air transportation to assist in the movement and filing of media products.

e. PA personnel should have access to contracting agents in order to expedite the establishment of an operational JIB. These agents should have authority and resources to provide facilities, transportation and equipment, as needed, to establish PA activities in the operational area. Additionally, the contracting agents must be familiar with standard comptroller procedures for obligating government resources and seeking reimbursement for government services, in particular those guidelines addressing appropriate media reimbursement for use of government transportation assets. They also must be familiar with the legal implications of obligating government resources and seeking reimbursements. Maintenance and service should be secured to ensure sustainability of the




Figure V-2. Public Affairs Communications Requirements

resource packages. Rental contracts may be appropriate in some cases to ensure current technology and maintenance support. PA personnel will coordinate in advance of obligation of DOD funds to ensure all contracts comply with applicable law and regulations.

## **5. Training**

Defense Information School, located at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, is the DOD-directed school that conducts career-long training and development of PA and visual information (VI) professionals. Its mission is to grow and sustain a corps of professional organizational communicators capable of fulfilling the communications needs of military leaders and audiences under the most demanding operational conditions. Instruction is given to DOD officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian employees. Limited class space is available for civilian employees of other USG departments and international officers. Resident courses offer entry level and advanced training in courses covering public affairs, journalism, broadcasting, broadcast systems maintenance, graphics, electronic imaging, photojournalism, video production, and VI management. Also, organizational communicators receive professional support through the school's website ([www.dinfos.osd.mil](http://www.dinfos.osd.mil)). There, they can access distance learning courses, search PA-focused databases, or request professional guidance from DINFOS faculty and staff.

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## APPENDIX A

### PUBLIC AFFAIRS ANNEX DEVELOPMENT

The guidance in this appendix relates to the development of Annex F (Public Affairs) of the OPLAN/operation plan in concept format/operation order/campaign plan/functional plan format found in CJCSM 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)*.

#### 1. Situation

a. **General.** Assigns responsibilities and guidance for military PA actions (public information, command and internal information, and community relations).

b. **Adversary.** Identify expected actions of adversary forces and forces hostile to US interests.

c. **Friendly.** Identify friendly agencies not under JFC control that will contribute to the PA effort. Include OASD(PA), State Department, US ambassadors, and allied/coalition PA programs, as appropriate.

d. **Policy.** Outline applicable PA policy pertaining to this plan.

e. **Assumptions**

(1) Describe HN preferences and/or sensitivities to be considered in developing and executing PA programs.

(2) Combatant commanders should be prepared to host the DOD NMP during all stages of operations.

#### 2. Mission

State clearly and concisely the essential PA tasks to be accomplished as they relate to the overall operation.

#### 3. Execution

a. **Concept of Operations.** Outline PA efforts for the operation as part of JFC's mission and concept of the operation.

b. **Tasks.** Outline the PA tasks to be completed during the above listed phases.

(1) Provide any additional information to the supported combatant commander and other supporting commands to include release authority and guidance on casualty and mortuary

affairs, and prisoner of war (POW) or missing in action, and enemy POW matters. Consider the establishment of a JIB. Outline PA visual information and COMCAM requirements.

(2) Provide detailed personnel and equipment support requirements to component commands. Address the following: access to the on-scene commander, supported combatant commander, and the DOS representative, and to the secure voice circuit that connects the JIB; access to hard copy message facilities between the same points; intertheater and intratheater transportation for escorted media; access to secure and nonsecure Internet access that connects the JIB to other public affairs outlets; access to digital imagery receiver equipment (could be through an intranet source); access to equipment for review and release of battle damage assessment-type video footage (could be through COMCAM). Coordinate this annex with logistics, communications, IO, and other planners to ensure required support is detailed.

(3) List Service, component command, and other supporting commands' support requirements.

### c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) **Command Relationships.** List PA command relationships.

(2) **Coordination of Release of Information.** Provide detailed procedures for all supporting commands for handling or forwarding to the supported command queries, responses, and proposed news releases for clearance.

(3) **IO Coordination.** Coordinate elements of PA with IO, as appropriate.

### (4) Other Coordinating Instructions

(a) Coordinate requests for interviews and news conferences with returned US personnel and enemy POW or detained personnel with the individual's unit and Service PA offices.

(b) Outline required PA coordination with other staff elements involved in release of information outside the command.

(c) Establish procedures for keeping PA historical records.

## 4. Security Review

Outline security review procedures if applicable. Security at the source should be emphasized wherever possible.

## 5. Arrangements for the Media

Provide details on planned media support to include messing, billeting, emergency medical treatment, access to transportation and communications facilities at government expense, access to unclassified operational information, and other support.

a. **Facilities.** Members of the DOD media pool or other media will be supported as directed by this annex, the supported commander, and OASD(PA).

b. **Immunizations.** Provide details on immunizations required for correspondents accompanying troops in the field or embarked on ships of the task forces.

c. **Expenses.** Services are to be provided to the media on a reimbursable basis when practical. The annex should address requirements for reimbursement where applicable.

d. **Communications.** Outline established procedures for handling media traffic.

e. **Transportation.** Provide detailed procedures for transporting public affairs/media escorts and media personnel into, out of, and within the operational area.

f. **Travel Orders.** Provide procedures for correspondents' requirements for travel orders issued or authorized by the supported or supporting commanders, OASD(PA), or JIB.

g. **Pools.** News media participation in media pools should be outlined in detail.

h. **Registration.** Media registration ensures credentialed reporters receive access to available support and an opportunity to provide guidelines for military support to the media. Include details of registration process/requirements.

## 6. Security of Operations and Personnel

### a. Operations

(1) Implementation of any PA plan presents a variety of problems in maintaining a balance between security and providing information to the public. This balance should include providing maximum assistance to news media representatives (NMRs) to support their coverage of the operation. Diplomatic and political considerations of all statements and news releases to NMRs should be weighed carefully at all echelons of command.

(2) Guidelines to follow when correspondents are present in the operating areas.

### b. Personnel

(1) Personal security.



(2) Physical security.

## **7. Operations Security**

Provide detailed security procedures to be followed by PA personnel.

## **8. Audio Visual and Visual Information**

Outline the guidelines that apply to providing PA, audio visual, and VI coverage of the operation.

## **9. Internal Information**

Outline internal information requirements for subordinate and component commands.

## **10. Community Relations**

Coordinate with OASD(PA), HN, and internal components (CA, PSYOP, etc.).

## **APPENDIX B**

### **GUIDELINES FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MEDIA**

#### **1. Preparation**

Preparation results in more effective discussions with the media. Central to the process is identifying what information is to be released based on prevailing PAG and OPSEC. Commanders, briefers, and PA personnel should be aware of the basic facts of any operation and sensitive to the various consequences of communicating them to the public.

#### **2. Security**

“Security at the source” serves as the basis for ensuring that no information is released which jeopardizes OPSEC or the safety and privacy of joint military forces. Under this concept, individuals meeting with journalists are responsible for ensuring that no classified or sensitive information is revealed. This guidance also applies to photographers, who should be directed not to take pictures of classified areas or equipment or in any way to compromise sensitive information.

#### **3. Public Affairs Assessment**

Each operational situation will require a deliberate PA assessment in order to identify specific information to be released. The following categories of information are usually releasable, though individual situations may require modifications:

- a. The arrival of US units in the combatant commander’s operational area once officially announced by DOD or by other commands in accordance with release authority granted by the OASD(PA). Information could include mode of travel (sea or air), date of departure, and home station or port.
- b. Approximate friendly force strength and equipment figures.
- c. Approximate friendly casualty and POW figures by Service. Approximate figures of adversary personnel detained during each action or operation.
- d. Nonsensitive, unclassified information regarding US air, land, sea, space, and special operations, past and present.
- e. In general terms, identification and location of military targets and objectives previously attacked and the types of ordnance expended.
- f. Date, time, or location of previous military missions and actions as well as mission results.

g. Number of combat air patrol or reconnaissance missions and/or sorties flown in the operational area. Generic description of origin of air operations, such as “land” or “carrier-based.”

h. Weather and climate conditions.

i. If appropriate, allied participation by type (ground units, ships, aircraft).

j. Conventional operations’ unclassified code names.

k. Names of installations and assigned units.

l. Size of friendly force participating in an action or operation using general terms such as “multi-battalion,” or “naval task force.”

m. Types of forces involved (e.g., aircraft, ships, carrier strike groups, tank and infantry units).

#### **4. Classified Information**

Classified aspects of equipment, procedures, and operations must be protected from disclosure to the media. In more general terms, information in the following categories of information should not be revealed because of potential jeopardy to future operations, the risk to human life, possible violation of HN and/or allied sensitivities, or the possible disclosure of intelligence methods and sources. While these guidelines serve to guide military personnel who talk with the media, they may also be used as ground rules for media coverage. The list is not necessarily complete and should be adapted to each operational situation.

a. For US (or allied) units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies available for support of combat units. General terms should be used to describe units, equipment and/or supplies.

b. Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or canceled operations.

c. Information and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. For datelines, stories will state that the report originates from general regions unless a specific country has acknowledged its participation.

d. Rules of engagement.

e. Information on intelligence activities, including sources and methods, lists of targets and battle damage assessments.

f. During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movement or size, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize OPSEC or lives. This would include unit designations and names of operations until released by the JFC.

g. Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.

h. Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of weapon systems and tactics (to include, but not limited to adversary camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures).

i. Specific identifying information on missing or downed personnel, aircraft or sunken ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

j. Special operations forces' methods, equipment, or tactics which, if disclosed, would cause serious harm to the ability of these forces to accomplish their mission.

k. Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against US or allied units until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the adversary and is therefore released by the JFC. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."

l. Specific operating methods and tactics (e.g., offensive and defensive tactics or speed and formations). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.

m. Requests for interviews or filming of enemy POWs must be coordinated through the staff judge advocate to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations including the law of armed conflict. Generally, photographing, filming, or other videotaping of POWs for other than internal detention facility management purposes is prohibited. Moreover, POWs must at all times be protected against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.

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## APPENDIX C

### PUBLIC AFFAIRS RELEASE OF INFORMATION

#### 1. Release Authority and Public Statements

- a. Until release authority is delegated to them, units should forward queries and proposed news releases to the combatant command PAO.
- b. No public statements concerning operations should be made by subordinate units without prior coordination with the combatant command PAO.

#### 2. Assumptions

- a. All statements will be “on the record.”
- b. News media will have the ability to transmit instantaneous live reports from the operational area. Failure to plan for and accommodate the media will not stop them from reporting.
- c. News media covering the operation will arrive in large numbers, consuming a large portion of the commercial communication, billeting, and transportation available in the theater. Messing, billeting, transportation, administrative, and communications support may be extended to the NMRs on a reimbursable basis, when commercial facilities are not available.
- d. News media coverage will be highly competitive, with a tendency to seek access to the operational area and report events as they happen.
- e. News media already on the scene may find ways to get to the operational area(s) and report the activities as they happen without regard for security concerns.
- f. Independent media may be simultaneously deployed with the NMP at the invitation of the Service component headquarters, under guidelines established by combatant command PAO that differ from those which apply to the NMP.
- g. Military administrative support may be necessary to facilitate NMP members’ print releases for transmission by electronic filing. Media products may have to be transmitted daily to the nearest commercial filing point by military courier.

#### 3. Security Instructions

- a. PAOs submitting or staffing proposed news releases or statements must ensure that the information contained therein is fully coordinated and properly classified until approved for release.



b. Media are not usually given access to classified information that could jeopardize operations or endanger lives. In rare circumstances where this may be appropriate, PAOs must gain specific approval from the JFC and OASD(PA).

c. Some members of the media may be briefed on OPLANs prior to execution if they agree to withhold release until permitted to do so by the appropriate military authorities. Security of classified material is the responsibility of the information source (“security at the source”) and is the normal method to ensure classified information is not compromised.

#### **4. Communiqués, Briefings, and News Summaries**

a. Upon delegation of release authority, components and subordinate commanders may issue communiqués and news summaries within the bounds of policy and guidance set forth by the JIB director.

b. A verbatim record of releases and news conferences should be maintained.

c. Subordinate commanders should report the substance of any interview or responses to query to the JIB.

d. News conferences should be videotaped or audiotaped.

#### **5. Coordination with Government and Diplomatic Representatives Abroad**

a. PA coordinates with appropriate governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

b. The JIB director should coordinate all releases through the US Embassy and/or consulate.

#### **6. Coordination with Psychological Operations Forces**

a. PA and PSYOP activities must remain separate and distinct in practice and in the minds of the public and the media.

b. PA and PSYOP staffs should coordinate activities to preclude any possible negative impact of one operation on the other, but PA officers should remain cognizant of external misconceptions and perceptions concerning any apparent interaction of these two activities.

#### **7. Coordination with Combat Camera**

a. COMCAM is a J-3 asset, unless a separate team is formally assigned to the JIB.

b. COMCAM products may also be used by the JIB. Selected COMCAM products may need to be quickly cleared and released to the media through the JIB to meet civilian media deadlines.

- c. The joint COMCAM documentation team may provide a liaison to the JIB.
- d. The JIB director should provide guidance on PA requirements to the COMCAM team.
- e. Normally, public release authority for COMCAM material is delegated by the JFC to the JIB director.

#### **8. Coordination with Armed Forces Radio and Television Service**

- a. A variety of AFRTS options are available to support military forces.
- b. The AFRTS unified command planner is responsible for developing specific equipment, support, and manning requirements.

#### **9. Coordination with Information Operations**

PA operations must be closely coordinated with, but not subordinate to, IO activities and staffs.

#### **10. Department of Defense Directive 5400.7 Freedom of Information Act Program**

Requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act Program should be coordinated through the staff judge advocate or legal advisor's office.

#### **11. 5 US Code 552, The Privacy Act**

DOD personnel shall not disclose any personal information contained in any system of records except as authorized by DODD 5400.11-R, *DOD Privacy Program*, or other applicable law or regulation. Personnel willfully making such a disclosure when knowing that disclosure is prohibited are subject to possible criminal penalties and/or administrative sanctions.

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## APPENDIX D

### GUIDELINES FOR OBTAINING ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE SUPPORT

#### 1. Armed Forces Radio and Television Service Assets

AFRTS assets are available for tasking through the American Forces Information Service (AFIS). DOD Regulation 5120.20-R, *Management and Operation of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service*, outlines basic procedures to obtain AFRTS service. Additional guidance and sample plans are posted at: <http://www.commlink.osd.mil/>.

#### 2. Combatant Command Public Affairs Offices

Combatant command PA offices have been assigned CCAPs from the Military Department broadcast services to assist in the development of AFRTS systems to meet their deliberate and crisis action planning needs. CCAPs are assigned as shown in Figure D-1.

#### 3. Armed Forces Radio and Television Service Planning

Combatant command PA officials are responsible for planning for AFRTS in any operation as a joint command/internal PA asset. CCAPs should be considered a part of the combatant command PA staff to provide the technical advice necessary to accomplish that planning. It is highly encouraged that during planning exercises CCAPs be tasked to supplement the PA planning cell of the combatant command as they would during real contingency scenarios. Extensive coordination may be required with other staff elements to coordinate communications frequency, power, and logistic requirements, based on the level of AFRTS support required for the operation.

#### 4. Armed Forces Radio and Television Service Options

AFRTS has several flexible response options available to support any operational requirement. Deployable Equipment Systems range from a small satellite receiver that can be connected to a television in a common viewing area with an approximate weight of 100 pounds, through a staffed radio station with an approximate weight of 550 pounds and four personnel, to a staffed radio and television network designed to cover an entire operational area. It should be noted that the small satellite receiver systems are being obtained by individual units to be deployed as unit equipment. AFIS and/or AFRTS encourages individual units to obtain these systems. A listing of units with these receiver systems can be obtained from AFIS and/or AFRTS.

<b>COMBATANT COMMAND ARMED FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE PLANNERS</b>	
<b>Combatant Command</b>	<b>Assigned Combatant Command Armed Forces Radio and Television Service Planners</b>
US Northern Command US Special Operations Command US Strategic Command US Transportation Command	Air Force News Agency 203 Norton Street San Antonio, TX 78226-1848 DSN: 945-6245
US European Command US Southern Command	Army Broadcasting Service 601 North Fairfax Street, Rm 340 Alexandria, VA 22314-2054 DSN: 328-0421
US Joint Forces Command	Naval Media Center* ATTN: Navy Broadcasting Department 2713 Mitscher Road SW Anacostia Annex Washington, DC 20373-5819 DSN: 288-6440
US Central Command US Pacific Command	Air Force Broadcasting Service 203 Norton Street San Antonio, TX 78226-1848 DSN: 945-4307
*Headquarters Air Force News Agency is the Department of Defense Executive Agent to US Joint Forces Command for force development, training, doctrine, and planning requirements for Armed Forces Radio and Television Service support of wartime and military operations other than war.	

Figure D-1. Combatant Command Armed Forces Radio and Television Service Planners

## APPENDIX E

### REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-61 is based upon the following primary references:

1. DODD S-3600.1, *Information Operations*.
2. DODD 5040.4, *Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM) Program*.
3. DODD 5120.20, *Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS)*.
4. DODD 5122.5, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA))*.
5. DODD 5122.10, *American Forces Information Service*.
6. DODD 5122.11, *Stars and Stripes Newspapers and Business Operations*.
7. DODD 5200.1, *DOD Information Security Program*.
8. DODD 5230.9, *Clearance of DOD Information for Public Release*.
9. DODD 5400.7-R, *DOD Freedom of Information Act Program*.
10. DODD 5400.13, *Joint Public Affairs Operations*.
11. DODD 5410.18, *Public Affairs Community Relations Policy*.
12. DODI 5230.29, *Security and Policy Review of DOD Information for Public Release*.
13. DODI 5400.14, *Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations*.
14. DODI 5405.3, *Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG)*.
15. DODI 5410.19, *Public Affairs Community Relations Policy Implementation*.
16. DODI 5435.2, *Delegation of Authority to Approve Travel In and Use of Military Carriers for Public Affairs Purposes*.
17. DOD Guide 4500.54-G, *DOD Foreign Clearance Guide*.
18. DOD Regulation 4515.13-R, *Air Transportation Eligibility*.
19. DOD Regulation 5120.20-R, *Management and Operation of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS)*.



20. *DOD Civilian Personnel Regulations, Joint Travel Regulations, Volume II.*
21. DEPSECDEF Memorandum, *Web Site Administration Policies and Procedures*, November 25, 1998.
22. CJCS message, 182305Z May 90, *DOD National Media Pool Planning Requirements.*
23. CJCSI 1301.1C, *Individual Augmentation Procedures.*
24. CJCSI 3205.01A, *Joint Combat Camera.*
25. CJCSI 3210.01A, *Joint Information Operations Policy.*
26. CJCSI 3213.01B, *Joint Operations Security.*
27. CJCSM 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance).*
28. JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.*
29. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*
30. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations.*
31. JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.*
32. JP 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.*
33. JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.*
34. JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations.*
35. JP 3-07.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.*
36. JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations.*
37. JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.*
38. JP 3-14, *Joint Doctrine for Space Operations.*
39. JP 3-26, *Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security.*
40. JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.*

41. JP 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security*.
42. JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*.
43. JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*.
44. JP 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*.
45. JP 6-0, *Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations*.
46. JP 6-02, *Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical C4 Systems*.
47. *Public Affairs Handbook*, Defense Information School.

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**APPENDIX F**  
**ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS**

**1. User Comments**

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Doctrine and Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

**2. Authorship**

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Joint Forces Command, Public Affairs. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Joint Staff, Public Affairs.

**3. Supersession**

This publication supersedes JP 3-61, 14 May 1997, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*.

**4. Change Recommendations**

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CDRUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA//JO1P//  
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//  
CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DOC GP//

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at <http://www.dtic.mi./doctrine>.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS

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c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, *Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands*.

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b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.



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## GLOSSARY

### PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFIS	American Forces Information Service
AFRTS	Armed Forces Radio and Television Service
AJF	allied joint force
APIC	allied press information center
CA	civil affairs
CCAP	combatant command AFRTS planner
CD	counterdrug
CIB	combined information bureau
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COMAJF	commander, allied joint force
COMCAM	combat camera
CPIC	coalition press information center
CS	civil support
CT	country team
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DINFOS	Defense Information School
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOS	Department of State
ESF	emergency support function
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
GIE	global information environment
HD	homeland defense
HN	host nation
INFOSEC	information security
IO	information operations
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
JFC	joint force commander

JIB	joint information bureau
JIC	joint information center
JP	joint publication
JTF	joint task force
LFA	lead federal agency
MACA	military assistance to civil authorities
MILDEC	military deception
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NMP	national media pool
NMR	news media representative
NRP	national response plan
NSHS	National Strategy for Homeland Security
OASD(PA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
OPLAN	operation plan
OPSEC	operations security
PA	public affairs
PAG	public affairs guidance
PAO	public affairs officer
PD	public diplomacy
PEO	peace enforcement operations
PIC	press information center (NATO)
PIO	public information officer
PKO	peacekeeping operations
PO	peace operations
POW	prisoner of war
PPAG	proposed public affairs guidance
PSYOP	psychological operations
RC	Reserve Component
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SITREP	situation report
sub-JIB	subordinate-joint information bureau
sub-PIC	subordinate-press information center
USG	United States Government
VI	visual information

## PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**active public affairs policy.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**Armed Forces Radio and Television Service.** A worldwide radio and television broadcasting organization that provides US military commanders overseas and at sea with sufficient electronic media resources to effectively communicate theater, local, Department of Defense, and Service-unique command information to their personnel and family members. Also called AFRTS. (JP 1-02)

**civil affairs.** Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

**civil affairs activities.** Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

**civil-military operations.** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

**civil-military operations center.** An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. (JP 1-02)

**combatant commander.** A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02)

**combat camera.** The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of combat, information, humanitarian, special force, intelligence, reconnaissance, engineering, legal, public affairs, and other operations involving the Military Services. Also called

COMCAM. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**command information.** Communication by a military organization with Service members, civilian employees, retirees, and family members of the organization that creates an awareness of the organization's goals, informs them of significant developments affecting them and the organization, increases their effectiveness as ambassadors of the organization, and keeps them informed about what is going on in the organization. Also called internal information. (JP 1-02)

**community relations.** 1. The relationship between military and civilian communities. 2. Those public affairs programs that address issues of interest to the general public, business, academia, veterans, Service organizations, military-related associations, and other non-news media entities. These programs are usually associated with the interaction between US military installations and their surrounding or nearby civilian communities. Interaction with overseas non-news media civilians in an operational area is handled by civil-military operations with public affairs support as required. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**community relations program.** That command function that evaluates public attitudes, identifies the mission of a military organization with the public interest, and executes a program of action to earn public understanding and acceptance. (JP 1-02)

**country team.** The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

**host nation.** A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

**information operations.** Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

**joint information bureau.** Facility established by the joint force commander to serve as the focal point for the interface between the military and the media during the conduct of joint operations. When operated in support of multinational operations, a joint information bureau is called a "combined information bureau" or an "allied press information center." Also called JIB. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**media pool.** A limited number of news media who represent a larger number of news media organizations for purposes of news gathering and sharing of material during a specified

activity. Pooling is typically used when news media support resources cannot accommodate a large number of journalists. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**military journalist.** A US Service member or Department of Defense civilian employee providing photographic, print, radio, or television command information for military internal audiences. (JP 1-02)

**news media representative.** An individual employed by a civilian radio or television station, newspaper, newsmagazine, periodical, or news agency to gather and report on a newsworthy event. Also called NMR. (JP 1-02)

**operations security.** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

**passive or responsive public affairs policy.** None. (Approval for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

**public affairs.** Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)

**public affairs assessment.** An analysis of the news media and public environments to evaluate the degree of understanding about strategic and operational objectives and military activities and to identify levels of public support. It includes judgment about the public affairs impact of pending decisions and recommendations about the structure of public affairs support for the assigned mission. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**public affairs ground rules.** Conditions established by a military command to govern the conduct of news gathering and the release and/or use of specified information during an operation or during a specific period of time. (JP 1-02)




**public affairs guidance.** Normally, a package of information to support the public discussion of defense issues and operations. Such guidance can range from a telephonic response to a specific question to a more comprehensive package. Included could be an approved public affairs policy, contingency statements, answers to anticipated media questions, and community relations guidance. The public affairs guidance also addresses the method(s), timing, location, and other details governing the release of information to the public. Public affairs guidance is approved by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Also called PAG. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**public information.** Information of a military nature, the dissemination of which through public news media is not inconsistent with security, and the release of which is considered desirable or nonobjectionable to the responsible releasing agency. (JP 1-02)

**security review.** The process of reviewing news media products at some point, usually before transmission, to ensure that no oral, written, or visual information is filed for publication or broadcast that would divulge national security information or would jeopardize ongoing or future operations or that would threaten the safety of the members of the force. (JP 1-02)

# JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-61** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

