Personnel Targeting Operations

A Monograph
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Personnel targeting operations

The U.S. military is not currently organized to conduct effective personnel targeting operations outside of the United States. The Department of Defense needs to create an organization that can find, capture or kill designated personnel. With the events of September 11th, and the United States’ emergence of resolve to capture/kill persons who threaten U.S. national security, personnel targeting operations became more important. The U.S. military’s track record at conducting manhunt operations is poor. As evident in Operation Enduring Freedom, or past operations such as Operation Just Cause, or operations in Bosnia to detain Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWC), are evidence to this fact. Planners of sensitive covert operations must have a firm understanding of the bureaucratic process. Government and institutional unit bureaucracies inherently limit the degree of operational success due to the nature of their systems, which is not timely. Bureaucracies can not move effectively beyond a predetermined operational tempo, and impose fatal restraints regarding operational tradecraft and tactics. Successful covert operations demand a flexible capability with full decentralized authority, enabling officers to initiate actions as circumstances dictate, enhancing the operational success-failure ratio. When operational teams incorporate decentralized authority in concert with good trade craft and tactical techniques, success is virtually assured. High Performance Organizations are extremely effective at achieving results. This type of organization was modeled after special operations teams from World War II, but changed to meet the demands of the business world. The recommendation of this monograph is that the Department of Defense should model its personnel targeting unit after the High Performance Organization model because of its focus at achieving results and limiting bureaucracy.
Abstract


The U.S. military is not currently organized to conduct effective personnel targeting operations outside of the United States. The Department of Defense needs to create an organization that can find, capture or kill designated personnel. With the events of September 11th, and the United States’ emergence of resolve to capture/kill persons who threaten U.S. national security, personnel targeting operations became more important. The U.S. military’s track record at conducting manhunt operations is poor. As evident in Operation Enduring Freedom, or past operations such as Operation Just Cause, or operations in Bosnia to detain Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWC), are evidence to this fact. Planners of sensitive covert operations must have a firm understanding of the bureaucratic process. Government and institutional unit bureaucracies inherently limit the degree of operational success due to the nature of their systems, which is not timely. Bureaucracies can not move effectively beyond a predetermined operational tempo, and impose fatal restraints regarding operational tradecraft and tactics. Successful covert operations demand a flexible capability with full decentralized authority, enabling officers to initiate actions as circumstances dictate, enhancing the operational success-failure ratio. When operational teams incorporate decentralized authority in concert with good trade craft and tactical techniques, success is virtually assured. High Performance Organizations are extremely effective at achieving results. This type of organization was modeled after special operations teams from World War II, but changed to meet the demands of the business world. The recommendation of this monograph is that the Department of Defense should model its personnel targeting unit after the High Performance Organization model because of its focus at achieving results and limiting bureaucracy.

NOTE: At the time of the final draft of this monograph the U.S. military recently created a special operations unit whose mission is to conduct personnel targeting operations. In order to keep this monograph unclassified, all references to tactics, techniques, procedures, and capabilities were removed.
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PREFACE: A NEW PARADIGM

Personnel targeting operations are extremely important in the military. When the focus of an operation is the capture/kill of an identified leader of a group, instead of the fielded military forces, it demands a new way of approaching the problem. Traditionally the military viewed leadership, or command and control as an enabler or decisive point, however, when the leadership becomes the center of gravity it requires a new way of thinking of defeating the enemy. As the world has just seen during the current Operation Iraqi Freedom, when the leadership / regime / command and control are destroyed, the threat is eliminated.

Maneuver warfare theory is based on creating conditions and placing forces that put military units in positions of advantage over their adversaries. While this mindset for war fighting works for fighting fielded military forces, it does not work well for combating organizations that are paramilitaries or not military in nature. Because many of the threats that face the United States are not traditional military forces, a new approach to the problem is needed. Unites States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the theater Special Operations Commands (SOC) are using a new approach called Operational Preparation of the Battlefield (OPB) that focuses on eliminating conditions for these threats to exist, eliminates ungoverned areas, safe havens, sanctuaries, and facilitates strike operations on threats (either enemy leadership or organizations).

Personnel targeting operations are not new. The tracking and targeting of personnel has been going on since the first time the United States government wanted someone captured. The units, agencies, or organizations that achieve the most success at personnel targeting operations are those that are relatively small, flexible, react quickly, and have a singular focus. For the military, this is often difficult because of the military’s size, structure, mindset, and approach to problem solving. Military commanders and civilian leaders wonder why it is so difficult for the military to conduct these types of operations. The targeted persons know that they are sought after
and in many cases are aided by an infrastructure that protects them. The people the U.S. is targeting do not want to be found, they know the U.S. is after them and will do anything to stop us. For extreme situations like this, one needs to take extreme measures to achieve success.

Working within the concepts of the military framework for conducting operations, there are some proven methods of how to achieve success. Since the hardest part of the operation is actually finding our targets, the Department of Defense (DoD) can conduct operations which lead us to this end, thus eliminating their safe havens, sanctuaries and ungoverned spaces, eliminating the seams in our operations, flushing them out of their hiding places, and developing a situation that will facilitate conducting a strike. Once we are able to pin down our targets to a particular area, the difficult task of tracking and capturing our targets begins. I contend that we do not have an organization in the military that can take us that final step. It requires an organization that has ground operators adept at tracking and developing a target, who can act quickly to capture or detain targeted personnel, and do so in such a manner that does not reveal our tactics, techniques, and procedures to our enemies.

First, how does DoD develop a target area? Designated targets are able to exist in areas that either are seams in military operations, safe havens, sanctuaries, or ungoverned spaces. The DoD must eliminate these. Where the U.S. has military access, it is quite simple; do it through Operational Preparation of the Battlefield (OPB). Where the U.S. does not have military access, the government has to use other methods such as diplomacy, economic leverage, information warfare, or the harboring country’s law enforcement in order to conduct a modified version of OPB to develop a target area.

This is the OPB process for personnel targeting entails: Operational Prep of the Battlefield (OPB) > Intelligence Prep of the Battlefield (IPB) > Advanced Force Operations (AFO) > Detention/Strike Package.
The OPB process works in the military framework for personnel targeting operations as follows: first, a target area is identified, say country X, which either has a known safe haven or has ungoverned area. The goal is to eliminate these safe havens, sanctuaries, and ungoverned areas through presence of patrolling. Next DoD develops the situation through either Joint Combined Exercises for Training, Security Assistance, Bi-Lateral Training Exercises, or Environmental Training Exercises (for example a Brigade conducts desert mobility training in Mali instead of doing a Sinai rotation). An alternative to this would be to train, equip and resource a targeted country’s own military or paramilitary forces to conduct OPB for the U.S. as an economy of force. Once DoD conducts OPB and the target area or target is identified, we move on to the next step, Advanced Force Operations (AFO). AFO entails conducting

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1 Operational Prep of the Battlefield – non intelligence gathering activities prior to strike operations in likely or potential areas for follow on operations complemented by intelligence prep of the battlefield (IPB).

2 Advanced Force Operations – operations conducted by selected, uniquely capable elements to further refine the locations of an enemy / target and battle-space in direct support of strike operations (example: recon and surveillance, information operations, reception / staging / onward movement / integration, and terminal guidance operations).
reconnaissance and surveillance of the target and developing it for a strike. While DoD has technological systems that can do this, such as satellite imagery, UAVs, or electronic surveillance capabilities, the best method is human intelligence (HUMINT). Currently in the military inventory the assets that conduct this type of operation are limited by laws, do not work in concert with defined objectives, do not train with other organizations, and have a culture and mindset which do not facilitate the final step of the operation, the strike. Once the target is identified, tracked, and DoD has actionable intelligence (time-sensitive intelligence which leads to an action, such as a strike…think of it as confirming the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements or CCIR), then the strike package is called in to conduct the capture/kill of the target. These last two steps of the operation are the most difficult, dysfunctional, and disastrous for the military today (Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein are recent examples). The U.S. needs a capability that can conduct this operation efficiently and effectively. It needs to be seamless, fast-acting, and adaptable. When there is more than one organization conducting the last two steps of the operation, the level of complexity increases. A simple solution would be to have one unit conduct the last two steps, AFO and possibly the strike. DoD needs a high performance organization whose mission it is to conduct personnel targeting. The military does not currently have this capability. Why do we need a force that can conduct these types of operations? To avoid the same problem that faced President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904, the US military in the Philippines against Emilio Aguinaldo, and General “Black Jack” Pershing during his chase of Poncho Villa in Mexico.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This monograph explores personnel targeting operations and the United States military. It demonstrates, with short historical examples, that the U.S. was not effective at conducting
personnel targeting operations in the past. This paper explores historical examples of personnel targeting operations that were models for success, such as the Israeli “Wrath of God” operation, and illustrates why. Finally, this monograph elaborates on what makes a successful high performance organization and applies these principles to a model for developing a successful man-hunting organization for the U.S. military. The focus of the monograph is the section providing the most utility: the model for success. Historical examples show what should and should not be done. However, as an ongoing personnel targeting operation that poses the greatest threat to national security in our history in the War on Terrorism (WOT), we must move forward with great haste.3

The United States military is not currently organized, trained, equipped, or resourced to conduct personnel targeting operations (man-hunts) effectively. This is extremely important when the President says that the U.S. is targeting one man, just as President George W. Bush did about Osama Bin Laden, and a failure to deliver this person is not only seen as an operational failure of the mission, but a failure of the entire nation. In August of 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld formally gave the mission of personnel targeting operations to Special Operations Command (SOCOM).4 Since SOCOM now has the lead in conducting this mission, it is incumbent on SOCOM to determine the best way to achieve success. The question is whether or not SOCOM currently possesses the capability to do this. SOCOM needs to develop this capability and quickly. SOCOM has a great track record of developing high performance organizations such as the Special Forces (Green Berets), SEALs, and other counterterrorist organizations. However none of these organizations are effective at conducting personnel targeting as a core mission. Therefore SOCOM should develop the capability to hunt down and

3 At the time of the last draft of this monograph (24 April 2003), the DoD had organized a new unit whose mission was to find and capture/kill targeted personnel. In order to keep this monograph unclassified, the unit’s capabilities, organization, tactics, techniques and procedures or reference to the aforementioned, were removed.

capture/kill targeted personnel. The quickest and most efficient way to do this is to organize a new unit with that capability.

Since 1900, the U.S. military has conducted several manhunt operations with limited or no success. The Navy went after Sherif Ahmed el Raisuli, a Moroccan known as the last of the Barbary pirates, and leaned on his host country to force him to free American hostages, but Raisuli remained at large. Marines went after Philippine rebel Emilio Aguinaldo and tricked him into captivity after breaking his secret codes, nevertheless, Aguinaldo lived a long and prosperous life and sealed the Philippines fate as a free nation. The Army marched into Mexico searching for border raider Pancho Villa. The Army never caught Villa, despite an 11-month search incorporating both the last use of mounted cavalry, and the first use of air power and tanks in a U.S. military campaign. All three men were denounced as terrorists of their time. More recent failures include Manuel Noriega in Panama during Operation Just Cause, Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWC) in Bosnia from 1995-2003, and Osama Bin Laden after 11 September 2001. Bin Laden remains at large and continues to threaten the United States. Notwithstanding some successes like the Operation Phoenix in Viet Nam, U.S. forces perform personnel targeting operations adequately at best. Why is this? Why is this important?

There are several reasons why the US military is not effective at personnel targeting. A major factor is the culture of an organization. At its broadest level, culture can be defined as the basic beliefs, values and criteria that guide how the people in an organization interact, determine what is right and proper, and make judgments about themselves and others. It is “how we do business around here.” So culture is a common frame of reference that helps people to agree on issues and develop shared goals and objectives. One must examine the culture in the U.S. military to understand the inhibitors to success: mediocrity of standards, sense of equality, bureaucracy, oversight, institutionalism, and doctrine.

Political will is another factor that inhibits our military effectiveness. Personnel targeting operations are dangerous, both for the soldiers conducting the operation and for political leaders.
The persons the U.S. is hunting are difficult to find because they are hiding in places that provide
great cover and concealment, their own friendly territory, which puts our soldiers at great risk.
Political leaders risk their careers if these operations are not successful, especially with the
expanse of resources that the U.S. has today. Why is it that some countries are more successful at
these operations than the U.S.?

Two countries that have conducted successful manhunt operations are Israel and France.
Israel formed the Mossad in 1951. the Mossad developed operation “Wrath of God” in retaliation
for the ’72 Munich Olympic massacre to track and execute reprisals against individuals
responsible for killing their Olympic athletes.\(^5\) France, over the course of several months, was
able to capture and incarcerate the international terrorist Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, “Carlos the
Jackal,” by leveraging diplomatic means against Germany, Algeria, Switzerland, and Sudan, and
then sending elite commandos into Sudan to capture Carlos.\(^6\) While the organizations conducting
these missions were very different, some important lessons can be learned from these two
operations and others like it.

Planners of sensitive covert operations must have a firm understanding of the
bureaucratic process. Government and institutional unit bureaucracies inherently limit the degree
of operational success due to the nature of their systems. Bureaucracies can’t move effectively
beyond a predetermined operational tempo and impose fatal restraints regarding operational
tradecraft and tactics. Successful covert operations demand a flexible capability with fully
decentralized authority enabling officers to initiate actions as circumstances dictate, enhancing
the operational success-failure ratio. When operational teams incorporate decentralized authority
in concert with good tradecraft and tactical techniques, success is virtually assured. Some

\(^5\) Gordon Thomas. *Gideon’s Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad* (St Martin’s Press:

\(^6\) David A. Yallop. *Tracking the Jackal: The Search for Carlos, the World’s Most Wanted
government agencies such as FBI, CIA, and DEA are capable of conducting decentralized, sensitive operations with reasonable success.

Understanding the inhibitors to success and learning from successful operations is critical. What then should the U.S. do in order succeed in these types of operations? The first element is people. The organization needs to select the right people for the job. American culture bases most of its selections on picking “the best” people, where there is an order of merit and a clear winner and loser. In personnel targeting operations, “the best” special operations person isn’t necessarily the “right person” for the job. Operators should be selected on their special abilities such as intelligence, ethnicity, language skills, and personality aptitude.

Historically, organizations with a flat, decentralized structure without bureaucratic interference work best. They also need to be staffed and resourced appropriately: intelligence, cover support, finances, documentation, training, minimal oversight, diplomatic liaison, research and development. Unfortunately, most organizations that do anything that closely resembles personnel targeting have massive oversight, are cumbersome and top heavy; inhibitors for success.

The headquarters and support structure must facilitate relative freedom of movement of their operatives. An ideal organizational structure would include a headquarters section, a support section, an operational support section, and its operators. In order to speed of the approval process for operations, the closer the headquarters is to the National Command Authority (NCA), the better. This will aid in the decision-making process and allow the NCA to see first hand what operations are being conducted and when. The support section should include all of the normal functions found in a personnel section in addition to special cover programs, liaison with other intelligence organizations, liaison with other diplomatic and law enforcement organizations, and a training section. The operational support division’s primary mission would be to facilitate getting operators to their target location, should include information operations, reconnaissance support, country team support, a mobile command and control structure. Finally, this organization can’t be
organized ad hoc. Poorly designed organizations are rarely effective and not efficient because the people working within them do not have a vested interest in the mission, vision, and end state.

The importance of timely accurate intelligence has never been more critical. As the world becomes more globalized, technical intelligence gathering has phenomenal capabilities. Imagery, targeting, weapons, and surveillance technologies continue to expand. However, the most difficult operations require the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT requires the development and recruitment of individuals with access to information that is unattainable through open sources or technical means. Because the intelligence must originate from limited sources, recruiting HUMINT sources is extremely difficult. Since the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is equipped and resourced for these types of operations, they should continue to take the lead, which necessitates working closely with this organization. Appropriate covers enhance the probability of a successful operation, not hinder it. This interagency concept develops the depth of cover necessary for reasonable expectation of success.

Lack of interagency operations, stove-piping of information, and lack of intelligence sharing is the inherent flaw of intelligence agencies acting in complex, sensitive operations within a slow moving, rigid bureaucracy. This demands the formation of a fusion cell for intelligence sharing in order to act on time sensitive information that provides the organization with flexibility and conceptual maneuver space. Effective clandestine operations demand flexibility. Field officers must have the decentralized authority to initiate actions as circumstances dictate to enhance their access, timeliness, and credibility with sources to achieve the end objectives: actionable intelligence. This is not to say that headquarters should give carte blanche to operations officers. Supervisors should understand that the rigid adherence to a process should not hinder the ability to succeed. Time is of the essence in high-risk operations. Opportunities are won and lost in very short time spans. Field operations can’t afford the luxury of decision by committee.
Why use historical examples? The answer is simple. By analyzing the past one can see what worked and what didn’t. By determining why certain operations were successful and others were not, organizations can avoid past mistakes, or at least understand why they occurred. By looking at successful operations we can see what made these operations successful and develop a plan/structure/design a unit for success. Learning from past experiences encourages us to change, it becomes the lens through which we view the world and defines us as people. Gary Klein’s theory on Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) making probably expressed this best, that people make faster and better decisions if they have more experiences on which to base their decisions.7

PAST FAILURES

*Barbary Pirates and Sherif Ahmed El Raisuli*

Almost one hundred years ago the United States was prepared to become one of the global powers. Theodore Roosevelt built the “Great White Fleet” and sailed them around the world to demonstrate our power. However, we did not have the operational reach capability to match, not to mention a capability to rescue persons being held against their will. Ion Perdicaris became the 20th century's first American victim of Middle Eastern terrorism. It all happened in 1904, when the 64-year-old Perdicaris and his stepson were taken hostage from their villa in Tangier, Morocco, by a band of Barbary Pirates.8 The bandits’ chieftain was a power hungry, black-bearded Berber named Mulaí Ahmed el Raisuli, who wanted to extort a heavy ransom from the Sultan of Morocco. This was not his only goal. Because he was in conflict with the Moroccan government, he wanted to show that the current government was not equipped to protect its own citizens or foreigners. This was more than a simple kidnapping. This became an opportunity for President Theodore Roosevelt to start waving his "big stick," use his “Great White Fleet,” and


send them steaming toward the African coast to ensure Perdicaris' safe release. This incident gave President Roosevelt the forum to offer one of the most memorable and blood-curdling proclamations in history, “Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead!”⁹ This statement ensured his reelection.

As far as the American public knew, Perdicaris was an American citizen, but this was far from the truth. He was born to American immigrants and lived in the U.S., but this all changed at the start of the American Civil War. In 1862, in the midst of the Civil War, Ion Perdicaris secretly went back to Greece to forswear his American citizenship and become a naturalized Greek citizen. He decided to do this to prevent the Confederacy from confiscating his mother's huge estate in South Carolina.

Morocco was then the only independent country in North Africa. But the sultan, Mulai Abdul-Aziz, was a weak leader who had trouble controlling his own country because his focus was elsewhere. While rival bands of warlords tore his country apart and the European powers jockeyed for influence, he played with his collection of grand pianos and lived a rather worry free existence.

This carefree existence was shattered on the evening of May 18, 1904. Perdicaris and his stepson, Cromwell Varley, were dining on their terrace when they heard shouts and screams coming from their servants’ quarters. As they ran to the scene of the commotion, a group of bandits grabbed them, clubbed them with gunstocks and bound their arms. Guns to their backs, curved daggers at their throats, they were ordered onto horses and driven off in a wild storm of dust. After a day-long ride, Perdicaris and Varley reached a tent deep in the desert. There they rested on sheepskins, ate a dinner of couscous and came face to face with Raisuli. Raisuli was known as the “Last of the Barbary Pirates.” But to his admirers, he was a Robin Hood doing battle with the corrupt sultan. The raid on Perdicaris was only his latest power play against sultan

Abdul-Aziz. Raisuli issued the hated ruler a list of demands for the hostages’ release: $70,000 in gold, safe-conduct for all his tribesmen and, most outrageous of all, recognition as the sultan's governor over two districts around Tangier.

Roosevelt was the swinger of the big stick, the trustbuster, the man who, months earlier, engineered a Latin American revolution to dig the Panama Canal. And he wasn't going to let an obscure tribe of criminals get away with kidnapping an American. "Preposterous," said Roosevelt's Secretary of State, John Hay, in response to the ransom demands.10

Seven battleships from the Atlantic fleet were dispatched to the Moroccan coast. But even with the public crying for revenge, Roosevelt knew he couldn't send marines on a rescue mission on unfamiliar soil. Roosevelt also knew that he didn’t have the capability to either rescue Perdicaris or capture Raisuli. And on June 1, he was told that, in fact, Perdicaris was a Greek citizen, not American. So the United States quietly asked for assistance from Britain and France to put pressure on the sultan and accept Raisuli’s demands. The sultan finally agreed to do this, but to cover their tracks, the American government sent a series of telegrams to Tangier stating that the American government wants “Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead.”

A few days later, Perdicaris was free and safe, Raisuli was $70,000 richer and Roosevelt was reelected for another term. Forgotten in the excitement was the fact the U.S. government had, essentially, given in to all the kidnapper's demands. The public never learned that Perdicaris wasn't even a citizen. The American public was deceived and the administration knew that they had to keep a secret from its citizens. And confidential it remained. Not until 1933, long after all the key individuals in the Perdicaris drama had died, would a historian uncover the truth in official documents.11

Fortunately, historians have uncovered the facts of this incident. While the U.S. was able to eventually gain release of Perdicaris and save national face, the fact of the matter is that the


11 Ibid., 340.
U.S. was ill-equipped to deal with this situation militarily. Even though the American government was able work the situation through diplomatic channels, it sent a very poor statement to terrorists of Americans: the U.S. would give in to their demands. This type of response to this situation only reinforced the use of terrorism against American citizens and showed terrorists that this was an effective tool to meet their demands. It should have also shown the American government that they were not equipped to handle this type of situation. The operational reach of the U.S. military was limited at best and had no counter-terrorist capability. However, it would not be until 1980 that the American government would form a force specifically designed to fight terrorists. Had the U.S. sent marines from its fleet to find Perdicaris, they most assuredly would have faced a bitter fate.

**Emilio Aguinaldo and the Philippines**

Emilio Aguinaldo is now recognized as the true father of Philippine independence. The son of a part-Indian mother and a Chinese vegetable peddler, Emilio had been mayor of Cavite on the island of Luzon, when he organized armed resistance in 1896 against what was then an oppressive Spanish colonial government in Manila.\(^{12}\) The Spanish paid him off the next year, sending him into exile. In 1898, he returned to the Philippines with the help of the United States, a month after the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. Just as the United States would later fund Afghan guerrillas against the Soviet Union, it encouraged Aguinaldo to incite Filipino resistance against Spain, convincing him that the United States wanted only to secure liberation and democracy for the Philippines.

At the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, Aguinaldo declared the Philippines independent and set up a provisional government. His republic, however, lasted only seven months. President William McKinley acquiesced to imperialists in the United States and decided

that the Philippines were now part of the American booty of war with its triumph over Spain. This policy by the United States was not called imperialism or colonialism; it was called benevolent assimilation, supposedly leading towards eventual independence.

Angry at what he considered betrayal by the United States, Aguinaldo turned back to guerrilla warfare, but this time it was against the Americans. The war lasted more than three years, involved some 70,000 U.S. troops and claimed more than 200,000 lives, most of them Filipino civilians whose houses and villages were torched by guerrilla-hunting soldiers and marines (similar to what U.S. forces did to fight the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War). The American’s real goal was to capture the guerrilla fighter’s leader, Aguinaldo, who hid in the jungles and among the more than 7,000 islands.

The U.S. was eventually able to capture Aguinaldo in February 1901, when they captured one of Aguinaldo’s couriers and were able to break their secret codes. After breaking the code and convincing the courier to deliver a new message to Aguinaldo, they sent anti-Aguinaldo forces in with the courier and captured the surprised guerrilla leader. The American government promised clemency to Aguinaldo if he would swear allegiance to the Americans and denounce the insurgency. In return, he was promised that the Philippines would eventually be granted independence. It would be more than 40 years before the Philippines would be granted independence, but Aguinaldo lived to see it. He died in 1964.

At the expense of three years of jungle fighting, 70,000 troops, and almost as many U.S. casualties, the Philippine Insurrection came at a high cost to the government. The story of Aguinaldo shows a marked resemblance to a current outlaw, Osama Bin Laden. Just as we backed Aguinaldo against the Spanish in the Spanish-American War, we backed Bin Laden and his freedom fighters in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. In both cases, it came back to haunt us with a huge cost of lives, time, money, and national reputation. The Philippine example also shows us how difficult it is to find someone who does not want to be found. Even while

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Auguinaldo was hiding in the jungle, Aguinaldo was able to wage a guerrilla war against the U.S. and inflict heavy casualties. The U.S. military used conventional methods to fight a guerrilla force and it took them three years to finally win, which demonstrated a poor use of forces and functions and asymmetric warfare. Nevertheless, there are still guerrilla battles occurring in Mindanao today. The soldiers and marines that fought in the Philippines had to learn new tactics for jungle fighting, and the first couple of years were extremely frustrating. U.S. Forces learned from their experiences and developed techniques that would win the day. Although they finally did capture Aguinaldo, it was this one man that led a guerrilla war against the U.S. for three years.

Pancho Villa

In what was most likely the largest pre-Bin Laden manhunt operation in American history, Pancho Villa eluded capture by the American military for years. The operation to capture Pancho Villa began in 1916. Villa first became a criminal when, at an early age, he shot a wealthy landowner’s son for raping his sister. He lived by stealing cattle and robbing banks until the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 1910. At the start of the revolution, he joined forces fighting against the government of Mexico.¹⁴

When the Mexican leadership was overthrown and fled to France, Villa became governor of the state of Chihuahua, instituting radical land reforms that won him popular support with the poor people in the region. Villa was a better criminal than a statesman, and in 1916 when the Mexican Revolution turned into civil war, he again joined in the fighting. The United States, which had remained passive to that point, now began to support Villa’s chief rival for power.

In retaliation, Villa led 1,000 of his raiders, in March 1916, to the town of Columbus, New Mexico, where he sacked the town, shot men, women and children, and burned down

houses. In response, the U.S. sent the 13th Cavalry from nearby Camp Furlong. They killed at least 67 of Villa’s men and captured and hanged another seven the next day.  

President Woodrow Wilson promptly ordered 10,000 soldiers into Mexico to search for Villa and his men. Gen. John "Black Jack" Pershing, who would command the U.S. Expeditionary Force fighting World War I in France, led the soldiers in Mexico. Pershing chased Villa for nearly a year and more than 400 miles into Mexico, but never caught him. One of the reasons may have been the rules of engagement placed on Pershing by the administration; portraying itself as an enemy of a terrorist and his army, rather than of a nation or its people. Similar constraints are placed on our soldiers today.

The Wilson administration barred Pershing from using major roads and required that he get the mayor’s permission before entering any towns. He was told to cooperate with Mexican forces whenever possible, but many of these soldiers were sympathizers of Villa. The Mexican populace resented the American expedition into their country and passively resisted any efforts that the American forces made to capture Villa. Skirmishes often broke out between American and Mexican forces.

The rules of engagement hamstrung Pershing and his forces. Villa was a master of the local terrain and surroundings, and he put it to the best use possible. Pershing was able to use aerial reconnaissance planes and tanks in his pursuit of Villa, but it was a wasted effort. The longer the expedition took to find Villa, the larger Villa’s persona grew. Mexicans saw him as a freedom fighter against the Americans. After a year, and America’s entry into WWI, the search

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16 Ibid., 218.

17 Ibid., 225.
was finally called off. Eventually Villa was granted amnesty by the Mexican government and he retired from fighting in 1920.\textsuperscript{18}

The American forces, while well equipped at that time, were not prepared to conduct a manhunt operation; poor use of forces and functions and failure to realize culmination. The forces were trained for traditional fighting based on the experiences of the American Civil War. They were fighting a conventional war against an enemy that was fighting unconventionally thus creating asymmetry which benefited Villa. They were additionally hampered in their efforts by the administration at that time by rules of engagement that didn’t allow them to take the fight to the enemy. The elements of national power were not working in concert with each other. They fought as a large group instead of breaking down into small teams. They were slow and large, not small and fast. This played right into Villa’s hands. The tactics, techniques and procedures that they used didn’t adapt to the environment, their operational reach was limited, and they were not able to achieve success. Even today, many Mexicans see this conflict as a victory over the U.S.

**RECENT FAILURES**

In late December 1989, six soldiers from Operation Just Cause kicked open the door of General Manuel Noriega's office, hoping to arrest him. Instead, they found a good deal of cash, assorted pornographic materials, sex toys, a collection of porcelain frogs, and a framed picture of Adolph Hitler.\textsuperscript{19} U.S. special operations forces had been following Noriega for months and, as Operation Just Cause was beginning, they intensified their tracking of this man. As a matter of fact, at midnight before the invasion started, soldiers reported his exact location. However, in the time it took the assault force to arrive at Noriega’s office, they lost him. Instead they found an


\textsuperscript{19} David Harris. *Shooting the Moon: The True Story of an American Manhunt Unlike Any Other, Ever* (Brown Little: New York, 2001), 120.
empty office and evidence that Noriega knew American agents were following him.

Ultimately, Noriega was cornered in the Panama City Papal Embassy and flown to Florida, where he remains in federal prison. How could such a high profile person like Noriega elude his captors just minutes before he was going to be arrested? This was just one of several U.S. blunders occurring throughout the last twenty years while trying to capture targeted personnel. The next incident occurred in 1993 while U.S. forces were trying to capture the troublesome Somali warlord named Mohammed Farah Aideed. This led to a raid in Mogadishu which failed, leaving 18 American soldiers and some 500 Somalis dead.\(^{20}\) The disaster caused the collapse of the American mission in the East African state; Somalia subsequently sank into a period of anarchy that has been exploited by al-Qaida.

Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995, U.S. leaders insisted that arresting Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWCs) in Bosnia was not the responsibility of the allied peacekeeping forces, but the Bosnian government.\(^{21}\) However, that stance began to shift in 1996 when The Hague published a list of War Criminals and NATO forces started making their first arrests. In early 1997, U.S. special operations forces sent over its first soldiers to conduct a detention of a PIFWC. The task force was over 300 soldiers strong; some said that the force was too large for the operation that it compromised the mission and wasted valuable resources.

The results of the operation were less successful than expected. The secret operation was delayed by disagreements among senior officials over the issue of Operational Security (OPSEC), and distrust among allies. For instance, once the special operations forces were in place, high-ranking officials disagreed on the correct conditions to conduct the raid, questioning whether or not there was enough “actionable intelligence” to guarantee success. These officials began to ask


the assault force tactical questions such as the exact number of body guards the PIFWC had and
the number of stairs leading up to his apartment. The requests were so excessive they bogged
down the operation. By the time the questions were answered, the operation was compromised
and the mission was cancelled.

The climate of mistrust among NATO allies halted attempts to capture other PIFWCs.
U.S. officials accused a French female army major of providing information to Radovan Karadzic
in a series of clandestine meetings. The French acknowledged the breach, but insisted the officer
acted on her own. U.S. officials, however, now refuse to share sensitive intelligence with
French, Italian, Russian, Polish, and other allied troops, even when it applies to the sectors of
Bosnia patrolled by those countries. This creates multiple layers of bureaucracy hampering
operations. This also fuels the dynamic of distrust among allied forces assigned to this mission.

To date, over thirty PIFWCs have been taken into custody; unfortunately, most of them
are low ranking soldiers (with the exception of Milosevic, who turned himself into The Hague).
Many of these have been cleared of their charges due to lack of evidence, showing that the system
in The Hague is far from perfect. In the fall of 2002, the U.S. no longer takes the lead in the
PIFWC detention operations and has instead focused its efforts towards the Middle East and
Central Asia. Arguably, the U.S. has the most capable special operations forces when it comes to
soldiers, training, money and resources, but the lack of success in Bosnia caused many to take a
closer look at tactics, techniques, procedures and capabilities when it comes to conducting
clandestine personnel detention operations.

Currently today there is a sense in the Pentagon and in Washington that targeting
personnel is a mistake. With the forces that we currently have and the way that they are presently
used, this thought has a certain validity. Making one person the focus of an operation causes some
apprehension because of our failures in the past. While we struggle with the War on Terrorism
(WOT) and the role of military forces, conventional forces are not trained to go after targeted

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persons; there are larger goals they must achieve. Terrorist cells exist all over the world that require attention, yet many in Washington think that our special operations forces are not ready to conduct personnel targeting operations either. Special operations have shown, with experiences in operations in Panama and Somalia, that they are the best in the world when it comes to “kicking doors,” however, it is the process leading up to that activity that needs attention, restructuring and analysis.

Early in the War on Terrorism (WOT), the American government realized that victory over al-Qaida did not equate to the death of Bin Laden. The invasion of Afghanistan eliminated many of al-Qaida’s largest and strongest cells. Military and civilian leadership have gone out of their way to emphasize that the death of Bin Laden will not eliminate the al-Qaida threat. However, this does not eliminate Bin Laden as a primary target. Even a year and a half after the invasion of Afghanistan, Bin Laden still threatens the United States. Apparently the saturation bombing of the Tora Bora cave complex had not produced bin Laden, “either dead or alive.”23 The U.S. continues to apply pressure to the Pakistani government to seal its border with Afghanistan to stop al-Qaida members from fleeing. The fact still remains that Bin Laden is at large and continues to control the al-Qaida network through his lieutenants.

CHAPTER TWO
THE SOLUTION: PROPOSAL FOR A NEW ORGANIZATION

There are two personnel targeting operations in the last thirty years that deserve close examination. The first is the “Wrath of God” operation executed by the Israeli government to avenge reprisals against the terrorists responsible for killing Israeli athletes at the ’72 Munich

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Olympics. The second operation is the detention of the international terrorist Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, “Carlos the Jackal.” The French government was able to leverage diplomacy and employ information operations in Germany, Algeria, Switzerland, and eventually Sudan, and capture Carlos by sending in an elite commando force to capture and return him to France. While the Israeli example will focus on how to set up operators for successful field operations, the French example will focus on how organizational structure and interagency relationships enhance success.

“Wrath of God”

In 1972, at the time of the Munich Olympics, Israel had a counterterrorist unit, the Sayeret Matkal. This unit was formed in 1957 and the mission was to conduct a wide spectrum of counterterrorist operations, including hostage rescue. Known as “the unit,” they are known for their exploits during combat operations, to include the Raid on the Entebbe airport in 1976. Even with this unit in existence, Prime Minister Golda Meir knew that she needed a unit with greater flexibility, less bureaucracy, able to conduct decentralized operations, and capable of operating under cover for extended periods of time. It required strong qualities like intelligence, training, tradecraft and spy-manship.

Prime Minister Meir convened a top secret Israeli cabinet, “Committee X,” that devised a retaliatory campaign for the retaliation for the massacre of the Israeli Olympians. The panel concluded that the appropriate response was to authorize the assassination of any Black September terrorist involved in the operation. The panel turned to the Mossad, Israel’s


intelligence service, which was formed on 1 April 1951. The Mossad was established by then Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, who gave as Mossad’s primary directive: “For our state which since its creation has been under siege by its enemies. Intelligence constitutes the first line of defense…we must learn how well to organize what is going on around us.”

The Mossad was tasked with implementing the directive. To accomplish the mission, the Mossad developed several assassination teams, each with specific mission parameters and methods of operation. The headquarters element supported the teams financially, gave broad mission orders, approved operations, and gave each team a list of persons they were to track. When a target presented itself, the mission was approved and the assassination conducted. The most successful teams recruited staff officers and highly trained specialists and set them outside the arm and control of the government. The theory was to support them financially through covert mechanisms and let them operate with complete anonymity outside of the government structure. Teams that operated with full-decentralized authority and freedom of movement achieved significant success in fulfilling their operational objectives and never compromised the operation.

Mossad is comprised of five departments, though some details of the internal organization remain obscure.

“Collections Department: is the largest, with the responsibility for espionage operations, with offices abroad under both diplomatic and unofficial cover. The department consists of a number of desks that are responsible for specific geographic regions, directing case officers at stations around the world, and the agents that they control.

Political Action and Liaison Department: conducts political activities and liaison with friendly foreign intelligence services and with nations with which Israel does not have normal diplomatic relations. In larger stations, such as Paris, Mosad customarily had under embassy cover two regional controllers: one to serve the Collections Department and the other the Political Action and Liaison Department.

**Special Operations Division**: also popular name, Metsada, conducts highly sensitive assassination, sabotage, paramilitary, and psychological warfare projects.

**LAP (Lohamah Psichlogit) Department**: is responsible for psychological warfare, propaganda, and deception operations.

**Research Department**: is responsible for intelligence production, including daily situation reports, weekly summaries, and detailed monthly reports. The Department is organized into 15 geographic specialized sections or desks, including the U.S., Canada, Western Europe, Latin America, Former Soviet Union, China, Africa, the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia), Libya, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran. A nuclear desk is focused on weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”

The Mossad, despite a number of highly publicized blunders, remains highly effective because the organization is modeled after High Performance Organizations. There are five main reasons for this. First, it has kept faith in the principle that human intelligence (HUMINT) is worth more than other intelligence means. Despite many recent investments in electronic surveillance, it continues to view with contempt the reliance on massive banks of computers.

Second, its inner core has remained small enough to avoid the stultifying effect of corporate identity. It is a family, if often a warring and dysfunctional one, and human beings work far better in families than in corporations. This is the secret of the Mossad’s notorious creativity. For example, the KGB or the CIA could never have thought laterally enough to create an operation like the sting on Nezar Hindawi. In 1986, Israel was concerned about Britain’s friendliness with Syria and the ways with which Syrian terrorists could use the facilities of the Syrian embassy in London. Hindawi, an Arab, persuaded his pregnant Irish girlfriend to carry “a present,” that was actually unbeknownst to her, a bomb, onto the El Al flight from Heathrow to

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Tel Aviv. He took his instructions from his cousin, Abu. A man who vanished immediately handed the bomb to Hindawi’s girlfriend in the departure lounge. The girlfriend was arrested immediately. Hindawi sought asylum at the Syrian embassy. Nevertheless, he was imprisoned and Mrs. Thatcher, previously friendly to the Syrians, closed down the Syrian embassy in London. Abu, the brother, was a Mossad agent. No Washington committee would have come up with that plan.  

Third, the Mossad has displayed a ruthlessness that is rare even in the murky world of intelligence. It has carried out, through its specialized units, hundreds of assassinations. That ruthlessness is a function of the fourth characteristic: Mossad’s single-mindedness. Other intelligence services have played games in playgrounds irrelevant to national survival because they could afford to: usually nothing much at stake more than the prestige of the current government leader at the time. This has made those services flabby and corrupt.  

It is difficult for the most upright spies to risk all for a particular national blend of anemic social democracy. It is difficult even for the most depraved spy not to risk everything if his failure might mean the annihilation of his children. For those nations, intelligence is a luxury. For Israel it is the difference between existence and oblivion. The single-mindedness is a consequence of old-fashioned patriotism, which is not unique to Israel, and is synonymous with self-interest. These principles have guided the Mossad to a level of unparalleled audacity and success.  

Carlos the Jackal  

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31 Ibid.
On Sunday, December 30, 1973, Carlos the Jackal carried out his first assassination attempt in London against a Jewish businessman.\textsuperscript{32} This was just the beginning of a career that would span almost twenty-five years and would frustrate several countries that were trying to track and apprehend Carlos, including the Israeli Mossad.

Carlos became a menace to France when several of his terrorist activities were conducted in France and against French citizens. After France, Carlos searched for a country that would provide him with a safe haven, and eventually, after having been rejected by Cyprus and Iran, he settled in Khartoum, Sudan, under the protection of Sheik Hassan al-Turabi, its powerful Moslem fundamentalist leader.\textsuperscript{33} Carlos quickly settled in to his new life in Khartoum spending much of his time socializing and reveling in nightclubs, unaware that his life of freedom would soon come to an end. In order to retrieve Carlos from his new hiding place, the French government knew that they must convince the Sudanese government to give him up. After inviting the heads of the two Sudanese intelligence sections to Paris, the French government offered to sell them much needed communications equipment and even supply them with satellite pictures of their enemies’ positions. The relationship seemed to be progressing smoothly when the French received information on Carlos’ location from the CIA. The French immediately sent Phillipe Rondot, the intelligence officer who had previously tracked Carlos in Algiers and Colombia, to the Sudan to confirm the information was correct. On his arrival he met with Sudanese authorities who promptly denied any knowledge of the terrorist’s presence. Rondot decided to find out for himself and lost no time in locating Carlos; Rondot was able to take photographs of Carlos with a concealed camera as proof of his whereabouts.

Faced with this evidence, the Sudanese authorities acknowledged that Carlos was a guest in their country and negotiations to extract him from his hideout began. To help sweeten the deal,


\textsuperscript{33} David A. Yallop. \textit{Tracking the Jackal: The Search for Carlos, the World’s Most Wanted Man}, 483.
the French Minister of Interior, Charles Pasqua, invited Sheik Hasan al-Turabi to Paris. In the first round of talks, al-Turabi made it clear that to give up a man that was a guest in his country amounted to treachery. Pasqua countered by offering to approach the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on Sudan’s behalf, to secure loans to eventually erase Sudan’s foreign debt. This opened the way for future negotiations.  

Further pressure was applied to the Sudanese government when the Egyptian secret service also tracked Carlos to Khartoum. With multiple countries now seeking Carlos’ expulsion, the Sudanese were being pressured into a decision; give up Carlos or be denounced for sheltering terrorists. The final straw came when a secret video of Carlos at a party was shown to al-Turabi. He was already aware of his guest’s reputation for partying, drinking, and carousing with women, and, as a devout Moslem, it offended him. Finally in August 1994, al-Turabi advised the French that the Sudanese were going to give up Carlos because, as al-Turabi explained to one of his senior officials, “We welcomed him as a combatant, someone who fought for the Palestinian cause, for noble causes. Now he’s a hoodlum, his behavior is shameful. He drinks and goes out with women so much that I don’t know if he’s a Moslem. Given that his presence has become a real danger we are going to hand him over. We have no regrets. Because of his behavior, we are absolved from blame.”

On Saturday, August 13, Carlos was admitted to the Ibn Khaldoum Hospital in Khartoum for a minor operation to correct a low sperm count. Following the procedure, while Carlos was recovering in his room under the protection of his bodyguards, Sudanese policemen entered his room and advised him that their department had uncovered a plot to kill him. Carlos was offered transfer to a military hospital so he could be better protected while he recovered. Carlos agreed, and under armed escort, he and his wife were taken to a villa close to the home of al-Turabi. The

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34 David A. Yallop. *Tracking the Jackal: The Search for Carlos, the World’s Most Wanted Man*, 490.

35 Ibid., 520.
accommodations at the villa were less than splendidous, and Carlos sent his wife home to pick up some needed comfort items. At approximately 3am, Carlos awoke to find a group of men (French counterterrorist commandos) pinning him to his bed. Before he could resist, he was hand cuffed to his bed and a hood was placed over his head. Carlos was then injected with a tranquillizer. He was loaded into vehicle and driven to the Khartoum airport where an executive jet was waiting to fly him to Paris.\textsuperscript{36}

As soon as he arrived in Paris, Carlos was taken to the Villacoublly military installation, met by a judge, and a warrant for arrest was issued for the 1979 murder of two French agents. Once his identity was confirmed, he was transported to La Sante maximum-security prison. Even though the French government had broken international law by taking Carlos out of Sudan by force, his pleas fell on deaf ears. In December 1997, Carlos was tried and convicted of murder and still resides in La Sante today.\textsuperscript{37}

The French operation to capture Carlos is an excellent example of how diplomatic pressure and the application of a well-trained assault force can be applied to achieve success. It also highlighted another facet of covert operations, sharing intelligence with allied countries. Without the assistance of the U.S. and other allies, France would most likely not have been able to capture their man.

The Israeli “Wrath of God” operation by the Mossad and the French capture of “Carlos the Jackal” illustrate how to conduct successful personnel targeting operations by operating off of intent of the commander. The Mossad shows us that flat, decentralized organizations without bureaucratic interference operate best. The French operation shows us how the use of diplomacy, information sharing and the application of a well trained and dedicated assault force contribute to the success of an operation. Using these as examples of successful operations, and keeping in

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{36} David A. Yallop. \textit{Tracking the Jackal: The Search for Carlos, the World’s Most Wanted Man}, 532.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 567.}
mind of past failed U.S. operations, an appropriate unit structure will be proposed for the U.S. military to adopt. Learning from lessons of the past, it is important to keep in mind the essentials for success for the organization:

1) Sustained political and national will.
2) Flat organizational structure, properly staffed and resourced.
3) Eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy...shrink the tail.
4) Internal support structure that allows operators freedom of action/movement (operational flexibility and reach).
5) Human intelligence (HUMINT) is key.
6) Select operators based on abilities and train them for the mission.

Several studies have been conducted on what makes high performance organizations effective. Most of this data was collected from elite military unit performance records and what made them “click.” However, there is new data based on high performance commercial organizations that must quickly to adapt to changing economies. These changes occur faster today than even an elite military unit would have to change in the past. Since the organization that conducts personnel targeting will need to be a high performance organization, arguably the best telescope for looking at efficient organizations would be explore this topic and apply it.

HIGH PERFORMANCE ORGANIZATIONS

The unparalleled success of elite military units, such as the OSS in WWII, prompted people to question what made the units so successful. Early studies concluded it was their organizational structure that made them efficient and effective. Most of these units were very small and their members were hand picked for the operations. Because of the high risk nature of the operations, special emphasis was placed on training, planning, resourcing, and equipping the soldiers. The units were goal oriented and possessed organizational integrity. There was a high
priority placed on training and learning new tactics, techniques and procedures. People were the
essential element. The organizations were normally very flat: from the lowest subordinate to the
commander there were very few levels. These units were quick to react and decisive in
operations. This model most closely resembles an efficient unit capable of difficult missions such
as personnel targeting operations.

The most crucial component of high performance is leadership. Leadership influences
strategy, culture, mindset, morals, ethics, structure, and people. The most successful leaders,
according to a recent army study of general officers, are those that are self-aware and adaptable.
Leadership sets the tone for the organization and provides the vision. Their interaction with
elements outside of the organization influences the perception of the organization. Generally
speaking, these leaders see themselves as facilitators for the workplace and their subordinates.
But in special operations, they have an additional role. The same body of officers must plan and
command. Planning must be shaped by a constant search for circumventing apparent reality. This
means that the planners (and leaders) must become deviant in their outlook to be successful in
their task. Leaders and subordinates, down to the most junior level, must personally participate in
planning. In practice, sustained immersion in the planning and conduct of special operations will
induce a mindset radically different from what is appropriate for regular force operations.
Without this mindset, it is futile to expect success. This means that people need to understand
“how to think,” not “what to think.” Personnel targeting operations deal in ambiguity, therefore
planners and leaders must be comfortable operating in a world that does not have a fixed list of
traditional “tasks, conditions, and standards.”

Another component of leadership and leaders, is the difference between leadership and
management. To understand the difference, you must first think about tasks in terms of problems,
and leaders and operators as problem solvers. To solve problems as a leader, you have to be able
to lead and manage. What is the difference between leadership and management? Management
deals with complexities. Leadership is deals with change. Two characteristics that exist in this
type of operation are complexity and change. The only thing constant is change. And the only thing you can count on is that it is going to be complex. Therefore, the leadership needs to understand their role as a leader of change and a manager of complexity.

**COMPARISON BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND HIGH PERFORMANCE ORGANIZATIONS**

Compare the high performance organization to the traditional organization and figure out the characteristics of high performance units from the stark differences.

**Propensity for change and risk taking:** The traditional mindset is that “if it isn’t broke, don’t fix it.” This stifles innovation and creativity. People in this environment are often punished for taking risks and failing; and if they succeed they are not rewarded. A high performance organization fosters creativity, change, and innovation. In such an organization, those who take risks and fail are asked why they failed and are told to try again. Positive change in an organization is encouraged and rewards are given, often by promotion.\(^{38}\)

**Emphasis on training and self-education:** The legacy mindset is that education and training is not encouraged enough. Cross training in jobs is seen as a useless waste of time. Management training is focused on technical aspects of the job, not on skills of their subordinates. No time is set aside for new education and the emphasis is to learn within the scope of your job. Effective units place a high emphasis on training and education. Cross training in jobs is essential to understand how your job affects and contributes positively to the team: cross

training is the norm. Rewards are given to those who self-educate and time is set aside for this endeavor.  

**Duty description and scope:** Traditionally, jobs are created which require little or no specific training. When employees work, they are given tasks to accomplish and they generally work alone. Since they work alone, they do not see how their contribution affects the entire unit. People in these organizations don’t generally do any of the set up work required for their job, so understanding the interrelationships is difficult if not impossible. The leadership dictates the pace of task accomplishment and, if a problem occurs, the leadership solves it, requiring no thought. In high performance organizations, jobs are designed to require many skills, which take a long time to learn. Task accomplishment is completed as a team and, if problems occur, they are solved at the team level. The team decides how the work will be accomplished and how long it will take. Since they work as a team, it is important to understand each other’s job as well as, their strengths and weaknesses. This builds cohesion and esprit de corps. Because they work as a team, they are able to see how their contribution affects the organization; they are required to do all of the set up and coordination to accomplish their given task. Problem solving and thinking is emphasized.

**Role of the leaders:** Leaders in traditional organizations tell people what and how to do things. These leaders see their job as being in charge and giving orders. Their leadership is based on creating and enforcing standards, not on rewards. They are never evaluated on their performance and interaction with subordinates is viewed as one way. These leaders perceive their position as essential to the organization and speak to higher leadership on behalf of their subordinates, enforcing a strict chain-of-command.

High performance leaders give mission oriented tasks, they don’t give orders, and don’t tell subordinates how to perform a task. They view their role as facilitators for their subordinates’

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40 Ibid., 85.
creativity and not as essential to the existence of the organization. They encourage innovation, even if means breaking the rules on occasion sometimes. They foster free and open communication with subordinates and superiors and they view any interaction with subordinates as a discussion. They urge subordinates to come up with their own work schedules and they base performance assessments on results, not the process. No one is allowed to be a leader who does not possess the requisite interpersonal communication skills.  

**Organizational structure:** Traditional organizations are bureaucratic in nature with a well-defined hierarchy. They have clear divisions within the organization for labor and tasks. These divisions often inhibit problem solving and communication. Because of this, meetings between divisions seldom occur. Most people in these organizations feel they are working in an organization within an organization. Work is generally divided into tasks and staff work, with different departments taking care of these jobs. When there are few levels from the bottom to the top of an organization, subordinate and leader interaction are facilitated. In this type of environment the basic element is the team, and tasks are given to teams to accomplish. In high performance units, the boundaries in the organization are often fuzzy, or non-existent. The organization seeks to eliminate boundaries and foster cross-department communication. Everyone in the organization feels as though they are working for a small organization or family; line and block functions are fully integrated.

**Coordination outside of the organization:** Traditionally coordination outside of the organization is left up to only a few individuals who “speak for the organization.” Because of this, no one really understands how their actions affect others outside of the organization. Alternatively, everyone in the less traditional high performance organization is constantly trying to understand “the big picture,” and communication and coordination are essential. Everyone

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42 Ibid., 90.
within the organization understands the goals, vision, and end-state. Communication and coordination outside of the unit is essential and encouraged.43

**Flexibility and adaptability:** Because of their nature and culture, traditional organizations are slow to respond to change. These organizations are slow to adopt new technology, adapt to new situations and change within the organization. Because the organization is inwardly focused, they fail to notice when the environment around them is changing.

When an organization is outwardly focused, changes are anticipated and the unit adapts quickly out of necessity. New technology is exploited and existing technology is used in new and unconventional ways. When the requirements of the unit change, the organization changes as well.44

**Teamwork, the key element:** When people view themselves as individuals, they seldom go out of their way to help others or work outside of their comfort zone. Because of this situation, there may be competing goals within the group that don’t work towards the organizational goals. If values do exist in this type of an organization, it is difficult to state the values upon which a decision is based. When people perceive themselves as a member of a team, they go out of their way to help others. High performance organizations have a clear vision and everyone understands the values, they are enduring. Different parts of the whole work well together and everyone has a shared sense of what the organization is trying to accomplish.45

**Dedication and selfless service:** Leaders in traditional organizations often feel personally responsible for mission accomplishment. Subordinates seldom do more than just the minimum required to accomplish the task or mission, and there is a feeling that if the boss isn’t looking it is ok to slack off. Because everyone in high performance organizations is involved

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43 Frances Hesselbein and Rob Johnson *On High Performance Organizations: A Leader to Leader Guide*, 94.

44 Ibid., 97.

from the lowest level to the top, there is personal responsibility at all levels for mission accomplishment. Everyone performs at peak level, even when the leadership isn’t around, because standards are group and self-made, and group and self-enforced.\textsuperscript{46}

**Rewards and punishment:** Equity, or inequity, is key. A reward system based on seniority or one not shared at all levels fosters complacency. In traditional organizations, people are rewarded as individuals and by the individual tasks that they accomplish. When people in the organization do not perform to the set of standards, they are reprimanded and placed on probation. When leaders and subordinates share in the reward system, an environment of community and togetherness is created in the organization. In high performance organizations people are generally honored for what they know (usually by promotion), and people are rewarded as a team, not as individuals. When people in these organizations do not perform, they are asked to leave.\textsuperscript{47}

**Information sharing:** In traditional organizations there is a “knowledge is power” mindset. Information is not shared within the organization or is held by the leadership as a commodity. Access to information is tightly controlled and granted on a permission basis by the leadership. High performance organizations share information across all levels because they know that if everyone is “in the know,” then the unit will perform better. Cross communication between people/divisions is encouraged. Information is viewed as a valuable resource that belongs to the entire organization and is key to mission accomplishment.\textsuperscript{48}

**Social behavior in the organization:** Traditional organizations value technology more than the individual. When new technology is introduced, the end user is not consulted. Growth, expansion and up-grades are not fully integrated into the organization and does not allow for

\textsuperscript{46} Frances Hesselbein and Rob Johnson. *On High Performance Organizations: A Leader to Leader Guide*, 103.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 106.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 109.
development. Technical experts are the only ones who fully understand how the technology works or how to fix it. High performance organizations value the individual more than the technology. They recognize that technology is only as good as the people who operate it. Everyone is expected to be a technical expert, which fosters new adaptations and uses for the technology. Before new technology is adopted, the end user is consulted on its application and usefulness. 49

Comparing traditional organizations and high performance organizations, the differences are evident. The most notable difference between these two is the mindset of the people. Normally when people first join a high performance organization, it takes them a period of time to adapt to the new culture. An indoctrination and training period are needed for the individual to feel as though they are an integral part of the group or team.

CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH PERFORMANCE ORGANIZATIONS

Now that the differences between traditional and high performance organizations are understood, what are the acknowledged characteristics that make a high performance organization effective? Looking at the differences between the two types, the characteristics emerge. These characteristics are both qualitative and quantitative in nature.

1) **High performance organizations are clear about their vision, objectives and mission.**

High performance units move toward a mission mentality. Their missions are often defined through a broad-based process involving those with an interest in the outcome rather than the process. The mission statement and the process for developing it bring into focus a compelling

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picture of the future toward which the organization is moving. This clarity of mission sets the
framework for assessing the performance of the organization.\(^{50}\)

2) **High performance organizations focus on results.** Starting with the vision or mission
statement, high-performance organizations define specific outcomes they want achieve. Defining
these outcomes requires the involvement at all levels. Measures of performance are developed
and defined by the entire organization. Outcomes and performance measures are tools the
organization and its members use to focus on results.\(^{51}\)

3) **High performance organizations empower their subordinates.** People are the vital core of a
high performance organization. To attain high performance, subordinates are empowered to apply
their skills, creativity, ability to adapt to change, and capacity to be continuous life-long learners
to achieve the organization’s mission. Subordinates are empowered to form alliances and working
relationships based on their interest in meeting the outcomes and mission of the organization.
They are not limited by organizational boundaries. How well subordinates rise to the challenge of
applying their skills to fulfill the mission of the organization, develop new skills, and dedicate
themselves to continuous learning will, in large part, determine the success of the organization.\(^{52}\)

4) **High performance organizations institute new processes and motivate subordinates to
achieve success.** In high performance organizations, subordinates are encouraged to collaborate
and develop new and decentralized approaches to achieving the desired outcomes. They develop
and reengineer new processes and technology for completing tasks, including rethinking the tasks
themselves in light of the organization's overall mission. There are incentives to form alliances

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\(^{51}\) Ibid., 51.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., 59.
for an essential reason to achieve results. Alliances span teams, departments, agencies, and operating levels. They even cross boundaries inside the organization and outside of it.\(^{53}\)

5) **High performance organizations are flexible, adaptable and quick to adjust to change.** People in high performance organizations understand the mission of the organization and collaborate to institute new processes when necessary. Leaders recruit people with broad, transferable skills. Subordinates are encouraged to initiate, innovate and take risks. They are promoted based on objective measures of performance and knowledge, and both leaders and subordinates are committed to training and continuous improvement.\(^{54}\)

6) **High performance organizations foster healthy competition.** High performance units are clear about their mission. They understand what their mission is and what end-state they must achieve to successfully accomplish their mission. This knowledge provides an opportunity for competition against their win record. High-performance organizations are characterized by collaborative and cooperative working relationships within the organization. The performance of the organization itself, however, is highly competitive with other, similarly focused organizations or with past performance.\(^{55}\)

7) **High performance organizations restructure based on mission needs.** High performance means accomplishing the mission with unequivocal success. High-performance organizations emphasize quality and results rather than compliance with rules and regulations. They are committed to reaching out and involving others in the process of constant improvement.\(^{56}\)

8) **High performance organizations maintain open and productive communications among its members.** Successful organizations develop effective channels of communication to keep subordinates and leaders involved in the process of continuous improvement. Effective

\(^{53}\) Jim Collins. *Good to Great*, 64.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 67.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., 70.

\(^{56}\) Ibid., 75.
communication allows information on progress toward achievement of desirable outcomes and the mission. In addition, open communication allows new ideas to surface. It allows suggestions to be absorbed and acted upon. Mission and outcomes can continually be reevaluated. Communications systems in high performance organizations work effectively for leaders, staffs, and operators.  

CHAPTER THREE

MODEL FOR SUCCESS

Two historical examples illustrate the necessity of having the correct application of force for the mission. Emilio Aguinaldo was able to raise a guerilla army and fight American forces for three years in the Philippines. Finally, after his capture, the U.S. was able to end the guerrilla fighting in the Philippines and restore order. It was the application of a conventional force against a guerrilla force and their inspired leader that had the U.S. chasing Aguinaldo for years. The second example is of a conventional force led by General John J. Pershing against the Mexican bandit Pancho Villa. Not only was this a large, slow moving conventional force against a fast moving, elusive enemy who used terrain and the local populace to his advantage, but Pershing was also hamstrung by the political constraints imposed on him by the Wilson administration.

APPLICATION OF LESSONS LEARNED TO HIGH PERFORMANCE ORGANIZATIONS

Using the characteristics of high performance organizations as a benchmark, what would be the most effective unit to conduct personnel targeting? One must begin with the vision,

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57 Jim Collins. *From Good to Great*, 77.
mission, and objectives of the unit. Then, identify the core of the unit and the enablers for success. The vision of the organization is the one thing that, instead of pushing people to higher levels of success, will create a vacuum that will “suck” people to higher levels when they understand the vision.

An example of understanding the bigger picture follows. Three men were working at a construction site. They were each stacking bricks. When the first man was asked what he was doing he replied, “I’m stacking bricks.” When the second man was asked what he was doing he replied, “I’m building a wall.” When the third man was asked what he was doing he replied, “I’m building a cathedral.” The first man understood his task. The second man understood his objective, to build a wall. The third man not only understood his task and objective, but he understood the mission and the vision of building a cathedral, and he understood what part he played in that role. One of the most important things for members of an organization to understand is the vision, mission and objectives.

**The vision:** Remain flexible, adaptable, and responsive in the pursuit of excellence and unequivocal success. The only thing that binds success is that it is moral, ethical, and legal.

**The mission:** Kill, capture or detain targeted personnel identified by the National Command Authority (NCA).

**The objectives:** Gain access to targeted areas of operations and remain undetected. Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to facilitate strike operations. Conduct strike operations and exfiltrate undetected.

Because people are the essential part of any high performance organization, this shall be the unit’s core. Since the mission of the unit is to “Kill, capture or detain identified personnel,” the people who conduct these operations are the most important ingredient. Operatives should be recruited based on abilities and potential for future performance (the best predictor for future performance is past performance and intelligence). Organizations in the military have personnel
that possess these capabilities, as do other government organizations, so one should not rule out having operators that belong to other government organizations but are assigned to us.

One of the most important factors for cohesion is continuity; they need stability in the unit so they can remain together as a coherent, cohesive team. Ad hoc organizations rarely are effective and recent history in Bosnia has taught us that temporary duty to missions that conduct personnel targeting missions leads to mission failure. The operators must have the freedom to move outside the control of a bureaucracy. The leadership must understand that a team unburdened by a slow-moving command and control structure has the capability of moving with more efficiency and success. Large organizations that try to be high performance aren’t effective because they do not suit the operators that work within them. Most organizations in the military have awkward hierarchical structures with boxes and lines connecting them (Figure 2). They have created structures that resemble machines, mechanistic, sharply defined and inflexible, that force their operators to act like machines too. Such organizations do not work well for this type of operation. To most military minds, this may appear illogical and irrational. Logic and rationality are used to support a decision, not to make one.

**Traditional Hierarchical Structure**

![Diagram](image.png)

**Figure 2: Traditional Hierarchical Structure**
An important aspect of operating within an organization or system is that, by its very organization, it incorporates a predetermined limitation of success. It will only achieve a finite, predetermined level of success. We need to only look at recent personnel targeting operations to see this major shortfall in our current paradigm. For this reason we need to ask ourselves which is more important, the process or the result? What is the best organization to achieve the best results?

New Organizational Structure

The new organizational structure places the vision, mission, and objectives at the top of the organizational hierarchy (Figure 3). This is significant since this is the focus of the unit. It also is important conceptually, because in the traditional structure the headquarters is at the top and everything seems to support the HQ. In the new organizational structure everything supports the vision, mission, and objectives: the focus is on results. Another stark contrast between the traditional and the new model is the lack of lines for a line and block chart, the elimination of
needless bureaucracy. The lines on the traditional model conceptually tell a person for whom they work and define distinct lines of communication and reporting. In the new model the lines are absent. This is significant. This facilitates cross talk and coordination between the ground operatives, the functions that support ground operatives, and the enablers that support ground operatives. It also empowers the subordinates to act in the direction that supports the element above it. The new model delineates a hierarchy, but this is a hierarchy of importance. The traditional model, the conceptually most important figure is the HQ. In the new model, the most important figure is the ground operative. Everything else supports those operations. This also provides flexibility within the organization to make changes and adapt when the situation dictates. Another feature the new model is missing is the leadership hierarchy. The leaders see themselves as facilitators of the organization, and not as the most essential part of it. Leadership is outwardly focused and provides guidance to the elements of the organization focused at the vision, mission, and objectives; they are not the centerpieces of the organization. Based on the vision, mission, and objectives the organization can restructure based on mission needs. The new organization and capabilities must include three elements: ground operatives, functions that support ground operatives and enablers that support ground operatives.

**The Ground Operatives.** Ground operatives form the core element of the organization. These people will conduct the personnel targeting strike operations to kill, capture, and detain identified personnel, in addition to completing highly sensitive sabotage, paramilitary, and psychological warfare projects. They need to be resourceful and be able to think on their feet. While physical fitness is the best predictor of how an individual will perform in combat, intelligence is the best predictor of how an individual will perform in special operations forces. Selection of these individuals must be closely monitored and carefully considered. Passing a myriad of psychological, intelligence, and physical fitness tests is just the first hurdle. Testing individuals under simulated personnel targeting operations would be the next challenge/assessment is to determine whether the individual has the capacity to learn, adapt, and
improvise. Robin Sage and the Meadows exercises in the Special Forces Qualification Course are good examples of training exercises that test an individual’s propensity/aptitude for special operations in various environments. These individuals must also feel comfortable in environments that are foreign to the average American. Of course, once operators are selected, they will go through a rigorous training regime that will prepare them for future operations, but as they say in special forces, “selection and training are an ongoing process.” Operators will be assigned to teams in order to build cohesion and esprit. In the OPB process, once a target area is developed these operatives will infiltrate the target area, conduct advanced force operations (AFO), create actionable intelligence, and conduct the strike operation if appropriate.

**Functions That Support Ground Operations.** This section should include information operations (IO), reconnaissance and surveillance support, country team support, and a mobile command and control organization. This is likely the largest section, responsible for espionage operations, with offices abroad under both diplomatic and unofficial cover. The section consists of a number of divisions that are responsible for specific geographic regions, directing case officers at embassies and the agents that they control. This structure may in fact conduct coordination with agencies such as CIA, FBI leget, DoJ, and DoS to facilitate operations.

The IO section will support ground reconnaissance operations through the use of electronic means. It can also be used to pass information to ground operatives by clandestine communication. The reconnaissance support teams will be responsible for setting up and conditioning safe houses, front organizations, and supplying the operatives with resources. They have the further responsibility for organizing infiltration and exfiltration of team members and “precious cargo” (targeted personnel). Reconnaissance support will conduct collateral missions such as recruiting agents and intelligence gathering. Country team support will coordinate with embassy personnel in order to exploit the intelligence and diplomatic support that an embassy can leverage. They will also be responsible for briefing the embassy personnel of impending operations. The mobile command and control element is able to deploy with a robust
communications package and will be prepared to intervene on behalf of the ground operatives in case of compromise or mission failure. They will be responsible for coordinating contingency plans and communications with any higher headquarters or participating units.

**Enablers That Support Ground Operatives.** This structure may closely resemble an Interagency Joint Task Force (IJTF). This should combine the capabilities of several different agencies, but should remain under military control. This would allow the military to combine the use of other government organizations to take advantage of their distinct capabilities. It is important for participating agencies to understand that the mission is the most important facet of the operation, not their institution. The enablers would be responsible for intelligence production, including daily situation reports, weekly summaries, and detailed monthly reports. Examples of agencies that could enhance the effectiveness of the organization and act as enablers would be CIA (for country access and intelligence sharing), FBI (for law enforcement capabilities and intelligence sharing), DoS (for diplomatic assistance), DoJ (for legal consultation and target handover), INS (for intelligence sharing and seam reduction), DEA (for intelligence sharing and narco-terrorist targets), and Secret Service. These people would conduct political activities and liaison with friendly foreign intelligence services and with nations with which the U.S. does not have normal diplomatic relations.

The military is the only organization that routinely works with outside agencies and is adept at command and control, and the integration of different units and capabilities. The military decision making process and planning methods lend itself to organizing such a diverse group of participants. In addition to these aforementioned enablers, there are other support functions that enable operations and freedom of movement. These include cover, finance, training, legal, intelligence, political liaison, research and development, and diplomatic liaison.
CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

What force structure should the U.S. use to conduct personnel targeting operations? One that is flexible and effective. Unfortunately, we don’t have one in the military inventory. Even in situations where the U.S. has basically “owned” the country, such as in Bosnia, we were less than successful. The formation of an organization of this importance and magnitude requires great effort and understanding. There are several reasons that the U.S. has not achieved success in this endeavor including intelligence, operational flexibility and shrinking the tail.

**Intelligence**: Intelligence is the most important factor in personnel targeting operations. Actionable intelligence is fleeting and must be capitalized on at the moment that it occurs. This being said, operatives must have the latitude to act on this intelligence. While in some instances multiple agencies have participated in personnel targeting operations together (Bosnia, Afghanistan, Panama), they have typically been tied to their agency’s institutionalism and intelligence stove-piping that has led to an atmosphere of non-cooperation. In many cases, it was up to the commander to break down these barriers in order to get interagency cooperation. The gathering of intelligence must occur in a “fusion cell” that supports the mission; the cell may be interagency. One of the first steps the Department of Defense needs to take is to task organize and bundle their capabilities under one headquarters that can control the team based on broad guidance and intent.

**Operational Flexibility**: When actionable intelligence occurs, ground commanders must be able to act on it. This requires a couple of things. First, when operatives deploy they require broad mission orders (commander’s intent). In the past operatives were constrained by deployment orders that restricted their activity; this can be easily rectified. Second, ground commanders must have the operational flexibility to make timely calls based on actionable
intelligence. Commanders and ground operatives must be entrusted to make decisions. This can occur in the target country by working through the country team for release authority. This could occur through either the Department of State, the Department of Defense or the National Command Authority.

**Shrink the tail**: It would be rare if a SOC commander said having “national assets” come into your theater of operation was a good thing. The biggest complaint from these people is that the package is just too big! When it takes two C-141 aircraft full of soldiers to conduct a 5-man operation, someone should be fired. Go back to the drawing board on force packages. Support organizations need to support the mission and the operators and become a culture that supports only their own existence.

The targeted people exist in an environment where chaos provides them cover and concealment. This mandates the development of an organization that can react quickly, with trained operators who thrive in this type of environment. An organization that supports these types of missions is essential to mission success. Personnel targeting operations demand a new approach. Traditional solutions to problems will not work. The new model requires people who work together, who can think, are self-starters, and are bold enough to take action. It is important to consider the factors that enhance mission success in these operations so we can achieve tactical, operational, strategic, and political success.
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