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THESIS

**IRAQ AND FAILURES IN U.S. COMPELLENCE POLICY
1990-2003**

by

Esther R. Robinson

December 2004

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

James E. Russell
Barak A. Salmoni

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IRAQ AND FAILURES IN U.S. COMPELLENCE POLICY 1990-2003

Esther R. Robinson
Civilian, Department of Navy
B.A., Moody Bible Institute, 1996

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2004**

Author: Esther R. Robinson

Approved by: James E. Russell
Thesis Advisor

Barak A. Salmoni
Second Reader

James J. Wirtz
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Image matters; it is regularly funneled through prevailing world leaders and governments using mechanisms to maintain national interest, power, and security. One such instrument is the use of coercive force or *compellence*. Compellence is a strategy of control designed to impose change, using limited military or non-military methods, upon an opponent. The United States implements compellence policy through a mixture of key actors who portray powerful images to the rest of the world. Its leaders reinforce these images internally (with self, local, regional, cultural ties) and externally (with others-based, foreign perception on a larger international scope). As U.S.-led forces in Iraq affect America's image throughout the Middle East and the world, its image of Iraq remains opaque due to U.S. perception and misperception.

Is compellence policy conducive to future U.S.-Iraqi relations? How effective is it? And why did U.S. compellence policy in Iraq succeed on some levels and not on others? This thesis examines the effectiveness of U.S. compellence policy as a viable method in U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1990 to 2003. Key operations and players will be evaluated and an analysis will explore political, social and economic levels of effectiveness of compellence policy in Iraq.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	IRAQ AND FAILURES IN U.S. COMPELLENCE POLICY 1990-2003	1
A.	BACKGROUND	2
B.	SIGNIFICANCE	5
C.	METHODOLOGY	7
D.	ORGANIZATION	8
II.	FOUNDATIONS OF COMPELLENCE POLICY.....	11
A.	RELIANCE ON STRATEGY OF COMPELLENCE.....	12
1.	Defining Compellence.....	14
2.	Compellence vs. Deterrence	15
B.	SIGNIFICANCE	17
C.	CONCLUSIONS	18
III.	MECHANISMS OF COMPELLENCE POLICY	21
A.	OVERVIEW OF U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS 1990-2003	21
B.	KEY ACTORS	22
1.	The United States	23
a.	<i>The President.....</i>	24
b.	<i>Department of Defense</i>	24
c.	<i>Congress</i>	25
d.	<i>Department of State</i>	25
2.	Iraq.....	25
a.	<i>Saddam Hussein.....</i>	26
C.	KEY OPERATIONS AND TREATIES.....	27
1.	The United States	27
a.	<i>Operation Desert Shield, 1990-1991</i>	27
b.	<i>Operation Desert Storm, 17 January 1991</i>	27
c.	<i>UN Security Council Resolution 687, 3 April 1991.....</i>	28
d.	<i>Northern No-Fly Zone, 8 April 1992.....</i>	28
e.	<i>Southern No-Fly Zone 26 August 1992</i>	29
f.	<i>Operation Vigilant Warrior, 1994</i>	30
g.	<i>Operation Desert Strike, 1996</i>	30
h.	<i>Operation Desert Fox, 16 December 1998.....</i>	30
i.	<i>The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002</i>	31
j.	<i>Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), March 2003.....</i>	32
D.	CONCLUSIONS	32
IV.	SUMMARY OF U.S. COMPELLENCE POLICY WITH IRAQ ON POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC LEVELS	35
A.	POLITICAL LEVEL.....	35
1.	Miscommunications, Different Images, Audiences, and Cultures.....	35
B.	SOCIAL LEVEL.....	35

1.	Misperceptions and the Filtering Effect of Images and Interpretation	35
2.	The Gap between Saddam’s Ability to Process and Interpret Info from the U.S. and the Disconnect of Logic of Images.....	36
C.	ECONOMIC LEVEL	36
V.	CONCLUSION	37
A.	FINDINGS AND U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS	37
1.	Foundation.....	37
2.	Mechanisms	38
3.	Explanations for Policy Failure	38
a.	<i>Alternatives to Policies Tried</i>	38
b.	<i>The Impact of Changing Circumstance</i>	39
c.	<i>Relationships of One Policy</i>	39
d.	<i>The Boundary Question</i>	39
e.	<i>Excessive Policy Demand</i>	39
f.	<i>Realizable Policy Expectations</i>	39
g.	<i>Accurate Theory of Causation</i>	39
h.	<i>Choice of Effective Policy Tools</i>	40
i.	<i>The Vagaries of Implementation</i>	40
j.	<i>Failure of Political Institutions</i>	40
B.	TIMELINE	40
C.	FUTURE RESEARCH 2004-2006	43
D.	MAP OF IRAQ	44
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	45
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	47

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Iraq and U.S. No-Fly Zones, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/desert_strike.htm29
Figure 2.	Iraq, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html44

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Scholar Definition of Coercion/Compellence and Coercive Diplomacy.....	19
Table 2.	Defining compellence	20

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I. IRAQ AND FAILURES IN U.S. COMPELLENCE POLICY 1990-2003

The purpose of military force is not simply to win wars ...[but] to deter aggression, while avoiding the kind of threat that may provoke desperate, preventive, or irrational military action on the part of other countries.¹

– Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin

Image matters; it is regularly funneled through prevailing world leaders and governments using mechanisms to maintain national interest, power, and security. One such instrument is the use of coercive force or *compellence*. Compellence is a strategy of control designed to impose change, using limited military or non-military methods, upon an opponent. The United States implements compellence policy through a mixture of key actors who portray powerful images to the rest of the world. Its leaders reinforce these images internally (with self, local, regional, cultural ties) and externally (with others-based, foreign perception on a larger international scope). As U.S.-led forces in Iraq affect America's image throughout the Middle East and the world, its image of Iraq remains opaque due to U.S. perception and misperception.

In the backdrop of a post-cold war era, U.S.-Iraqi relations are characterized by a tumultuous series of protracted maneuvers beginning with Operation Desert Shield in 1990 and continuing with Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Exhausted by U.S.-led operations, U.S. relations with Iraq, during this period, failed largely as a result of four areas: (1) U.S. reliance on compellence policy by diverse mechanisms used to implement policy, (2) U.S. failure to perceive the nature of issues at stake, (3) U.S. inability to understand the nature of the opponent we are trying to compel, and (4) U.S. misperception of regional stakes and global power relations. In sum, failures in compellence policy come from the inability of the United States to properly perceive its parameters and know its limitations. The mechanisms used to implement compellence

¹ Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), 1.

policy, consequently, require a clear perception of the nature of issues (and opponent) and a better understanding the regional stakes and global power relations.

This thesis explores failures in U.S. compellence policy in Iraq from 1990 to 2003. In order to measure U.S. compellence failures in Iraq, an evaluation of mechanisms of compellence policy, e.g., key actors, operations and treaties, will be assessed in addition to political, social, and economic levels of effectiveness in terms of U.S. misperception. Why is compellence policy an impractical method in U.S.-Iraqi relations? Why did U.S. compellence policy in Iraq succeed on some levels and not on others; and why is compellence policy a counteractive strategy for the United States to embrace in the twenty-first century?

A. BACKGROUND

Before August 1990 U.S. policy was to engage Iraq, not coerce it.² Thus, compellence policy in Iraq surfaced from a period of fairly favorable relations in the eighties to strained relations from American military operations, beginning with Operation Desert Shield in 1990. The United States perceived Saddam Hussein as a secular figure opposing radical forces in the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. The Iraqi leader countered Iranian fundamentalism with his secular Ba'ath regime throughout the eighties and Washington applauded. The Iraqi leader was perceived as a man with whom the West could reason and as the Iran-Iraq War progressed a rather close relationship between Baghdad and Washington developed in four phases according to Bruce W. Jentleson.³ From 1982 to 1984 Washington provided political support and allowed Iraq gradually to import U.S. commodities on credit.⁴ Between 1984 and 1986 Washington resumed arms sales to Baghdad and fully restored diplomatic relations that had been

² Jon B. Alterman, "Coercive Diplomacy against Iraq, 1990-98," in Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 276.

³ John A. Olsen, *Strategic Air Power in Desert Storm*. (Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), 19.

⁴ Ibid.

weak ever since the monarchy fell in 1958, but completely severed since June 1967.⁵ From 1986 to 1988 the two countries almost formed an alliance in which the United States became one of Iraq's main supporters, and finally, between 1989 and the invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration, although freezing loan guarantees and considering a ban on technology that could be used both commercially and militarily, continued to provide Saddam with both economic and political assistance.⁶ From a decade of U.S.-Iraqi engagement in the eighties, the emergence and development of compellence policy of the nineties led to souring U.S.-Iraqi relations throughout the nineties and into the twenty-first century. The transformation from friend to foe perhaps became more apparent in a post-cold war setting where the opacity of U.S. perception, in light of key mechanisms, provided a catalyst to altering the political, economic, and social context. Furthermore, differences between the United States and Iraq as a whole should not be overlooked. There are perhaps no two other countries as polarized as Iraq and the United States. In terms of economic, political, and social levels, the countries diverge in every way possible, which perhaps help explain U.S. failure to perceive the nature of its opponent and the nature of the issues. The Iraqi military force, for example, was overestimated by the United States and an employed U.S. policy of compellence sought to prevent a seemingly threat to Middle East stability in the region.

At the start of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, Iraq's greatest worries were economic. Burdened by debt from a protracted war with Iran from 1980-1988, the war transformed Iraq from a rich and prosperous country into a pauper.⁷ In 1980, for example, Iraq possessed over \$30 billion in foreign exchange reserves, but by 1988, it owed nearly \$100 billion to overseas creditors and the cost of repairing the war damage to the country's infrastructure was estimated to be more than twice that amount.⁸ Iraq in desperation turned to Kuwait. Kuwait, Iraq's oil-rich neighbor to the south with nearly 500 kilometers of coastline—compared to Iraq's roughly 60 kilometer coast—

⁵ John A. Olsen, *Strategic Air Power in Desert Storm*. (Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), 19.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Alastair Finlan, *The Gulf War 1991*. (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2003), 14.

⁸ Ibid.

would be the only alternative policy to getting Iraq back on its feet. On 2 August 1990, Iraq exercised force by aligning 100,000 Iraqi forces and nearly 2,000 tanks on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border until full Iraqi mobilization. U.S. coercive force swiftly met the Iraqi invasion on Kuwait to compel or “shield” Iraqi forces from moving on to oil-rich Saudi Arabia. Compellence failed. Saddam neglected the compelling presence of coercive forces and a string of UN Security Council Resolutions. With 15 January 1991 as the marked deadline for Hussein to remove his troops, two days later, the U.S.-led coalition launched strategic air attacks 17 January 1991. This marked the beginning of Operation Desert Storm.

During the U.S.-led operation, the United States was in a much different position than Iraq. In contrast to Iraq’s economic problems, the U.S. was experiencing an economic boom during the post-cold war period in the early nineties and reaped benefits from cutbacks in military spending or what was commonly known as the ‘peace dividend’.⁹ Yet the U.S. was not alone in the global expansion. The United States and large parts of the world began to experience unparalleled prosperity, democratic market capitalism appeared to be the wave of the future, and globalization seemed to be an unstoppable force.¹⁰ The prosperity brought other competing forces in motion. The future of U.S.-Iraqi relations would be determined upon U.S. foreign policy utilizing coercive or *compellent* strategies aimed at altering unwanted Iraqi policies. Once in process, the seemingly, intractable policy of threatened force creates greater complexities for future relations. For the United States, problems materialized in Iraq throughout the nineties due to failure to set clear parameters in implementing a policy of compellence. Furthermore, U.S. national security was at stake in pursuing such aggressive compellent policies in Iraq, especially in the aftermath of September 11. The mechanisms used to implement compellence policy neglected to properly gauge the limits of compellence. Thus, by

⁹ Alastair Finlan, *The Gulf War 1991*. (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2003), 14.

¹⁰ Robert J. Art, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 3.

assessing U.S. compellence strategy on various levels and the mechanisms used to implement the strategy, e.g., the key actors and operations, one can prescribe particular reasons for failures.

B. SIGNIFICANCE

Why compellence? The use of compellence or *coercive diplomacy* has replaced traditional channels of diplomacy. The United States appears to have relied on coercive force rather than negotiations because of the inability to understand the nature of the problem and opponent in U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1990. The military is useful in diplomatic efforts. The growing importance of compellence policy in U.S. foreign policy should not be underestimated in a post-cold war context.

Coercive force is a critical element of U.S. foreign policy.¹¹ By definition, coercion or compellence aims “to force or threaten an opponent towards submission.”¹² While dormant throughout the Cold War, the prosperous nineties unleashed a wave of U.S. compellence policy in U.S.-Iraqi relations starting with the Gulf War. U.S.-Iraqi relations, thus, developed and formed with U.S. compellence policies at the fore. Compellence policy attempts to alter the status quo and change the behavior of its opponent. A feat, possible, only with a military second to none attached to the largest global economy. The need to back U.S. diplomacy with force will not go away; consequently, political-military coercion short of all-out war will remain a highly attractive option to U.S. leaders.¹³

Furthermore, coercive force using military means is nothing new. Throughout history, states have repeatedly employed military force in attempting to persuade other

¹¹ Robert J. Art, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), .

¹² The use of *compellence* and *coercion* are often used interchangeably. For the purposes of this study, I will use them synonymously and maintain Schelling’s definition. Scholars mark distinctions. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, (New Haven and Yale University Press, 1966)

¹³ Ibid, 6.

states to do their bidding.¹⁴ The United States is no exception. It has been a forerunner in employing military muscle or “forceful persuasion”¹⁵ to compel its opponents’. The United States failed at getting Saddam to surrender throughout the decade after the Cold War. Saddam had “held off” much of the world and succeeded in a state of noncompliance with the world’s demands. Thus compellence did not impede Saddam for over a decade. He finally gave up in the December of 2003 but appeared to have circumvented U.S. compellence policy for thirteen years. The external compellence strategy had failed largely in part because of U.S. lack of knowledge and misperception with regards to internal and regional forces within Iraq. Although political, economic, and military actions were designed to fit together in a reinforcing way, the mix of these forces failed to succeed. Hence, the failure of coercive tactics on Saddam Hussein by U.S. forces will make an interesting case study to explore why the strategy of compellence seems to have failed.

Despite its mixed record of success, coercion will remain a critical element of U.S. foreign policy.¹⁶ Coercion, therefore, is dynamic and strategic but is not without limits or failures. Public support, for example, is critical to sustaining credible coercive strategies.¹⁷ As a key catalyst, media technologies, served as precursors to the actual engagement in Gulf War 1991 by identifying images such as Bradley tanks, American ground forces in gear back home. The public’s acceptance of these images lent support toward reasons of confronting Iraq, which, in turn, gave credibility to a U.S. compellence policy that gave way to real engagement.

The critical issue that transformed the situation in the Gulf from a regional dispute into a full-blown international crisis was, above all, the substantial oil reserves in that

¹⁴ Peter Karsten, Peter D. Howell, and Artis Francis Allen, *Military Threats: A Systematic Historical Analysis of the Determinants of Success* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), counted 77 major cases of military coercion in international. This figure underestimates the full universe of military coercion because it leaves out the coercive effect of military threats in wars.

¹⁵ Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 5.

¹⁶ Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 1.

¹⁷ Daniel Byman and Mathew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20.

area and the world's dependence on this 'black gold'.¹⁸ Prior to 1990, Iraq, a battered nation, struggling for political and economic survival after a protracted conflict with Iran, from 1980-1988, looked toward alternative means to compensate its debts and relieve psychological damage to the image of the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, whom enacted multiple images locally, regionally, and internationally. The former image as perceived by his people and the region perhaps explains an obsession of what matters most—local and regional recognition as opposed to an unashamed disregard toward international authority as seen throughout the UN inspectors. The latter image of Saddam, furthermore, involves the idea of the former president portraying a misleading image towards the international community with regards to possessing weapons of mass destruction. The image reinforced Jervis' theory of the logic of images and Saddam's behavior in that the United States perception of Saddam affected his behavior:

Thus one important instrument of statecraft is the ability to affect others' images of the state and therefore their beliefs about how it will behave...such a state that wants to project a misleading image will try to mimic the information that it thinks perceivers would expect.¹⁹

C. METHODOLOGY

The methods used to answer my research questions rely upon traditional and contemporary usages of the theories of compellence: Schelling offers the classic definition in which a distinction lies between compellence and deterrence. Art's *Coercive Diplomacy* and Byman's view on compellence converges Schelling's distinction. Jervis brings the idea of U.S. perception and misperceptions and the logic of images into this thesis. Alexander George addresses to the limits of coercive diplomacy, while Pape, in *Bombing to Win Air Power and Coercion in War*, highlights successful cases of coercion and offers insights into the efficacy of compellence by looking at the strategy of bombing in Iraq in 1991. Iraq is the specific test case for measuring the failure of compellence from 1990-2003.

¹⁸ Ibid., 9.

¹⁹ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Columbia University Press, 1970), xiv.

The five most important sources include Schelling, Thomas C., *Arms and Influence*; Art, Robert J. and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*; Byman, Daniel and Mathew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*; Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Relations*, and Pape, Robert A. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*.

D. ORGANIZATION

Chapter I stresses the growing significance of compellence in terms of U.S. foreign policy in Iraq in the post-cold war; moreover, the chapter emphasizes the transformation in U.S.-Iraqi relations from the Iran-Iraq War of the eighties to the Desert Storm in the early nineties and the stark differences, economically, between the United States and Iraq. The summary highlights strong U.S. ties with Iraq prior to 1990 and notes a shift in U.S.-Iraqi relations from friend to foe in the implementation of U.S. compellence policies in Iraqi relations from post-1990 onward.

Chapter II defines compellence and examines the foundations of compellence policy based on the theories of Thomas C. Schelling, Robert A. Pape, Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman. While leading theorists may use the same word such as “coercion” for example, their meanings differ based upon the particular context. But the overall meaning involves getting the adversary to change its objectionable behavior through threats just short of war, which will be used for purposed of this thesis.

Chapter III explores the mechanisms used to implement compellence policy by addressing the following: an overview of U.S. Iraqi-relations; key actors such as the President Department of Defense, Congress, and the Department of State; and key operations and resolutions such as Desert Shield (1990-1991), Desert Storm (17 January 1991), UN Security Resolution 687 (3 April 1991), No-Fly Zone: Northern (8 April 1992) and Southern (26 August 1992) Watch, Vigilant Warrior (1994), Desert Strike (1996), Desert Fox (16 December 1998), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (19 March 2003).

Chapter IV analyzes why compellence seems to have failed on political, social, and economic levels. The chapter emphasizes the effects of perception, misperception,

and miscommunication of different images, audiences and cultures, the failure in the filtering effect of images and interpretation, and the gap between Saddam Hussein's ability to process and interpret information from the United States and the overall disconnect that the logic of images presents in U.S. compellence policy.

Chapter V summarizes the findings and U.S. policy implications, presents a timeline and suggests future research for 2004 to 2006.

Since compellence policy focuses on control and power by a hegemonic state, the mechanisms used to implement compellence policy within the United States—including bureaucracies such as the Department of Defense, Congress, the Department of State, and the President—require better communication, understanding and consideration to the nature of the issues and the opponent. These key actors have the responsibility to decide what happens in the key U.S.-led operations in Iraq from 1990 to 2003 and ultimately for the failures. Thus, repercussions of the key actors' policy decisions, with regards to the use of force throughout U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1990 to 2003, have brought on costly consequences during a time of post-conflict reconstruction. It is difficult to reverse U.S. compellence policy involving military action in Iraq from 1990 to 2003 and equally challenging for the mechanisms of compellence policy to accurately gauge the situation on political, social, and economic levels.

In sum, *Iraq and U.S. Failures in Compellence Policy 1990-2003* seeks to address an underlying shift from Cold-War containment to post-cold war compellence in U.S. foreign policy. The goal of the United States is to protect its national security as outlined in the *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Thus, the U.S. will continue to reach beyond its borders in an offensive, action-oriented way to force opponents, in this case Iraq, to change behavior or suffer military consequences. Chapter II describes the role of military force as a foundational strategy and emphasizes military coercion (or as Art terms *coercive diplomacy*) as a reality for the twenty-first century.

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II. FOUNDATIONS OF COMPELLENCE POLICY

With enough military force a country may not need to bargain...²⁰

-Thomas C. Schelling

Military coercion *makes* compellence policy work. While the post-cold war era has witnessed vast changes, U.S. military force remains a vital foreign policy instrument.²¹ Without the implementation of force through the institute of the military mechanisms—such as the key actors and operations—used to push the policy, would not have to deal with serious policy implications. U.S. compellence policy, thus, implies an implementation of military threats on an opponent to counter his behavior policies U.S. forces as a form of legitimate power. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. in *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone*,” stresses the importance of U.S. military power but urges patience and cooperation among a spectrum of countries:

Our military role is essential to global stability...the military is part of our response to terrorism. But we must not let the metaphor of war blind us to the fact that suppressing terrorism will take years of patient, unspectacular work, including close civilian cooperation with other countries.²²

An examination of a “U.S. compellence policy” considers the international political context before and after 1990. Attention is given towards the concepts of deterrence and compellence and help frame the idea of a U.S. compellence policy. The concept essentially depicts what Thomas Schelling describes as a “passive” and “inaction” (deterrence) and “offense” and “action” (compellence).²³ Deterrence reflects a pre-1990 cold war environment while compellence describes a post-cold war strategy that has come to a fore throughout the nineties and into the twenty-first century, particularly with regards to U.S.-Iraqi relations. Reliance on a U.S. compellence policy—Robert Art’s

²⁰ Thomas C. Schelling’s *Arms and Influence* (Yale, 1966), 1.

²¹ Daniel Byman and Mathew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2.

²² Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 15.

²³ *Ibid*, 70-71.

*coercive diplomacy*²⁴—makes an interesting case for analyzing the effectiveness of U.S. compellence policy in relation to U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1990 to 2003.

The current strategy of compellence largely derives policies from the *National Security Strategy of the United States*, which, using a brief example, states, “while our focus is protecting America, we know that to defeat terrorism in today’s globalized world we need support from our allies and friends.”²⁵ Not everyone is our friend. The blurred lines drawn between allies and friends are examples of how relations differ in a post-cold war context. Compellence, therefore, in a post-Cold War context differs from deterrence prior to 1990 in that within the comfortable confines, so to speak of the Cold War, our enemies were evident and containment understood. Forward action and mobilization in coercive policies describe an increasing strategy in U.S. foreign policy after 1990.

This chapter contains the theoretical framework that will structure my analysis. It draws on theorist Thomas Schelling, who first used the term *compellence*, Robert Art (*coercive diplomacy*), Robert Pape (*military coercion*), Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman (*dynamics of coercion*), and Alexander George (*limits of forceful persuasion*).²⁶ Theorist, Robert Jervis, will be discussed in Chapter IV; his theories on *the logic of images* and *misperception and perception in international relations* help explain why compellence seems to have failed on political, economic and social levels.

A. RELIANCE ON STRATEGY OF COMPELLENCE

Strategic compellence assumes the threat and utilization of coercive force—i.e., *threatened force*, just short of engagement and to some extent *limited action*—to

²⁴ Quoted in Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace), Robert Art takes his definition of “Coercive Diplomacy” from Alexander George’s “forceful persuasion” that “seeks to *persuade* an opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping. Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 5.

²⁵ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> (Date accessed October 2004), September 2002, 7.

²⁶ Thomas C. Schelling’s *Arms and Influence* (Yale, 1966), Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace), Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press/RAND, 2002), Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Westview Press, 1994).

encourage an opponent to change the status quo and/or to alter objectable behavior.²⁷ Compellence and coercion aim to affect the enemy's will rather than its capabilities.²⁸ Thus, compellence is not narrowly military but rather a politico-military strategy for reconciling a conflict of interest with an adversary; it is a test of wills.²⁹ While economic sanctions and political pressures encourage and permit behavioral change, it is the institution of the military that often resumes the role as *the* primary tool used to "forcefully persuade"³⁰ opponents.

The effectiveness of U.S. forces to utilize the strategy of compellence creates a powerful means. During the dozen years between 1990 and 2001, the United States continued to rely heavily on its military instrument to achieve its foreign policy goals.³¹ During these years the United States maintained more than a quarter of a million troops abroad.³² Desert Shield (1990) and Desert Storm (1991) had a deployed population of 584,342.³³ Desert Fox (1998) had 24,100 military personnel, 29 Navy Ships, including two carriers, and 240+ Military Aircraft in the region.³⁴

Leaders are often drawn to military coercion because it is perceived as a quick and cheap solution to otherwise difficult and expensive international problems.³⁵ Armed conflicts using compellent strategies were found around the globe: from conflicts in

²⁷The definition of "threatened force" just short of engagement comes from Byman and Waxman's *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War* National Defense Research Institute, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), xi., yet the basic idea comes from Schelling's *Arms and Influence*, (Yale, 1966).

²⁸ Gregory F. Treverton, *Framing Compellent Strategies*, National Defense Research Institute, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 4.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 5.

³¹ Ibid, 3.

³² Ibid.

³³ "DMDC Data Request Archive," Base population as of June 30 1990 and includes deployed population between 2 August 1990 to 31 July 1991, <http://dmdc.osd.mil/ids/archive/act01.htm>, accessed October 2004.

³⁴ Desert Strike Quick Stats: <http://www.leyden.com/gulfwar/unscom.html>, accessed October 2004

³⁵ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*, (Cornell University Press, 1996), 2.

Somalia (1993-1994) to Haiti (1994), from the use of force in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) and from conflicts in North Korea (1994) and China (1996).³⁶

Furthermore, U.S. policies favoring strategic compellence intensified in Iraq with the following key operations and treaties: Operation Desert Shield (1990-1991), Operation Desert Storm (1991), UNSC Resolution 687 (3 April 1991), Northern No-Fly Zone (3 April 1992), Southern No-Fly Zone (26 August 1992), Operation Desert Strike (1996), Operation Northern Watch (1997), and Operation Desert Fox (1998).³⁷ Chapter III will further examine these operations.

1. Defining Compellence

Scholars do not agree on the meaning of compellence. They do, however, suggest, that compellence employs the military as *the* primary coercer to carry out the threat. The very presence of a powerful military set on a border conveys a message and an image to the opponent. Various tools enable forces to meet their intended meaning. Instruments used to compel include air strikes, invasions and land grabs, the threat of nuclear retaliation, economic sanctions and political isolation, and support for insurgencies.³⁸ The efficacy of compellence, in fact, lessens in the absence of military coercion even though economic sanctions and political isolation prove to be strong elements of bargaining.

Alexander George and Simmons define the concept of coercion differently than Schelling in that they stress the *defensive* usage of strategy and further distinguish between offensive (*blackmail*) and defensive strategies.³⁹ Thus *coercive diplomacy* implies a nonmilitary strategy which offers the defender a chance to achieve reasonable objectives in a crisis with less cost.⁴⁰

³⁶ Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace), 394-395.

³⁷“History of EUCOM Military Operations,” (<http://www.eucom.mil/50th%20Web/50th%20Web/operations2.htm>) [accessed October 2004 and “Security Council Resolutions Concerning Iraq,” (<http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/01fs/14906.htm>) [accessed October 2004]].

³⁸ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press/RAND, 2002), 88.

³⁹ Quoted in Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace), 7, but taken from Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966), 69.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

George implies that coercive diplomacy intends to bolster future relations. This definition, therefore, assumes a role of a synchronistic policy tool capable of mending souring relations absent of military action. He argues that coercive diplomacy is “only one of several nonmilitary strategies”⁴¹ and “offers an alternative to reliance on military action.”⁴² Nonetheless, military force is employed at some juncture. Coercive diplomacy, like compellence, becomes a venue of implementing policy.

In short, compellence strategy is the art of using active force as a threat in order to change the opponents’ policy or behavior. It is “offense.”⁴³ It rarely acts apart from substantial military means. Without an adequate power source, the strategy will not work.

Furthermore, Schelling stresses that compellence requires definite timing. Coercive instruments such as economic sanctions or air strikes generate bargaining power to compel adversaries into altering their behavior. Coercive diplomacy disrupts the status quo. It acts in ways to suit how the coercer wants the regime to act. An unfavorable decision by an opponent endangers the coercer’s interest; compellence, thus, uses the power of “threatened force” to sway an opponent’s position to favor the interests of the coercer. Hence, the *power* and the *ability to hurt* align within the strategy of coercion.⁴⁴

In 1991, the United States played the role of coercer in Operation Desert Storm. The U.S. targeted Iraq over Kuwait and utilized its military might to compel Iraqi forces. The technologically superior air strikes devastated Iraqi forces and left the world believing a victory. Iraq was not compelled to withdraw from Kuwait by threats but forced to do so by arms.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Saddam was still alive, which would lead one to believe that coercive force failed in this case.

2. Compellence vs. Deterrence

Two forms of coercion involve strategies of *compellence* and *deterrence*. Both encompass the use of force for purposes of threatening or controlling an opponent.

⁴¹ Alexander George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 8.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 10.

⁴³ Thomas C. Schelling’s *Arms and Influence* (Yale, 1966), 71.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Gregory F. Treverton, *Framing Compellent Strategies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), 6.

Deterrence—“a force in check”—puts both parties at a standstill; whereby, the actual force exerted in varying limitations helps define the concept of compellence. Compellence aims to alter an adversary’s behavior while deterrence seeks to keep it the same by using threats of force; thus, compellence can involve both the threat to use force and the actual use of force.⁴⁶ The threat that compels rather than deters often requires that the punishment be administered *until* the other acts, rather than *if* he acts.⁴⁷

The strategy of compellence plays a different role compared to deterrence:

Compellence unlike deterrence has to be definite in its timing: We move, and you must get out of the way. By when? There has to be a deadline otherwise tomorrow never comes. Deterrence, on the other hand, tends to be indefinite in its timing. “If you cross the line we shoot in self-defense, or the mines explode.” When? Whenever you cross the line—preferably never, but the timing is up to you.⁴⁸

Action, therefore, is a factor. The difference between compellence and deterrence is action (compellence) versus inaction (deterrence). Thus, the distinction is between an action “intended to make an adversary do something”—compellence—and an action “intended to keep him from starting something”—deterrence.⁴⁹ To *compel* an enemy’s retreat, though, by some threat of engagement, I have to be committed to *move*.⁵⁰ The threat that compels rather than deters often requires that the punishment be administered *until* the other acts, rather than *if* he acts.⁵¹ Art stresses that compellence aims to alter an adversary’s behavior; deterrence, to keep it the same.⁵² Deterrence generally involves

⁴⁶Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace), 8.

⁴⁷Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966), 70.

⁴⁸Ibid, 72.

⁴⁹ Quoted in Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace), 7, but taken from Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966), 69.

⁵⁰ Thomas C. Schelling’s *Arms and Influence* (Yale, 1966), 70.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace), 8.

only threats to use force, whereas compellence can involve both the threat to use force and the actual use of force.⁵³

Compellent and deterrent similarities exist in terms of manipulation and costs and benefits. Coercion like deterrence, seeks to affect the behavior of an opponent by manipulating costs and benefits.⁵⁴ Coercion involves persuading an opponent to stop an ongoing action or to start a new course of action by changing its calculations of costs and benefits; deterrence, however, tries to persuade a state not to initiate a specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the estimated costs and risks.⁵⁵

B. SIGNIFICANCE

Compellence is engagement. The importance not only deals with the concept of a “threatened force just short of war” but also with varying degrees of engagement and to a large degree the involvement of military force. Thus a mere policy of defense, coupled with nonmilitary means defeats the essence of coercion.

In Operation Desert Storm, 17 January 1991, U.S. forces played a compellent role. Timing was significant. Coercive air power dominated the war and led to a swift victory. Why was it a success? The destruction of a target in this case was set to change the enemy’s behavior.⁵⁶ The success of U.S. compellence policies in Desert Storm influenced subsequent operations and treaties such as the No-Fly Zone of Southern and Northern Iraq in 1991, Operation Vigilant Warrior in 1994, Operation Desert Strike in 1996, Operation Northern Watch in 1997, and Operation Desert Fox in 1998. Chapter three addresses these key operations and treaties.

Schelling discusses force in terms of “military” or “undiplomatic forcible action” concerning enemy *strength*, and he contrasts it with the “coercive use of the power to

⁵³ Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace), 8.

⁵⁴ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Power and Coercion in War* (Cornell University Press, 1996), 12.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*, (Cornell University Press, 1996).

hurt” regarding enemy *wants* and *fears*.”⁵⁷ As examples from the Cold War period surfaced throughout the book, a distinction between compellence and deterrence, with focus on the latter, also surfaced. The meaning of coercion, however, converges rather than deviates in key U.S. operations in Iraq from 1990 to 2000. This convergence of coercive meanings from Schelling suggests that the meanings have developed over time and do not take on the original meaning within the context of the Cold War.

C. CONCLUSIONS

The basis for compellence is the effectiveness of key actors via military use to control adversarial behavior. The foundational structure of compellence involves control, power, and the ability of various players to properly channel control. Effective “forceful persuasion” is conducted to varying degrees and relies on strategies of control that is often defined *after* the operation has occurred. The coercer, i.e., key actors/mechanisms of compellence and key operations, can be perceived as an unmanageable structure that does not know its own limitations by virtue of unparalleled power. For an actor to assert that the operation is “mission accomplished” portrays failure to regard its limits and opponent.

⁵⁷ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*, (Cornell University Press, 1996), 3.

Table 1. Scholar Definition of Coercion/Compellence and Coercive Diplomacy

AUTHOR	COERCION/ COMPELLENCE	COERCIVE DIPLOMACY (CD)
Art, Cronin	(1) Diplomatic use- the issuance of threats to use force; (2) demonstrative use – the exemplary and limited uses of force; and (3) full-scale use, or war- the use of whatever amount of force it takes to get the adversary to change its behavior. ⁵⁸	“Forceful persuasion” ⁵⁹ “The threat or the limited use of force” ⁶⁰ CD entails coercion; CD is a form of compellence ⁶¹ CD intended to be an alternative to war ⁶²
Byman, Waxman	Manipulate the adversaries’ behavior.	Coercion involves coalitions to build threats. ⁶³
Schelling	“Offense” “Coercion” covers the meaning and includes “deterrent” and “Compellent” intentions. ⁶⁴	“Diplomacy is bargaining... [bargaining] can be polite or rude, entail threats as well as offers, assume a status quo or ignore rights, etc. ⁶⁵
George, Simmons	“ <i>Forceful Persuasion</i> ”; A strategy that “seeks to persuade an opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping.” ⁶⁶	“A <i>defensive strategy</i> that is employed to deal with the efforts of an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor.” ⁶⁷ CD resembles the ultimatum. ⁶⁸
Pape	“Conventional” Coercion vs. “Military” Coercion	Does not use term.

⁵⁸ Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace), 9.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 5.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid, 7.

⁶³ Ibid, 156.

⁶⁴ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, (New Haven: Conn., Yale University Press), 71.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 1.

⁶⁶ Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 5.

⁶⁷ Alexander L. George and William E. Simmons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Westview Press), 8.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 2.

Table 2. Defining compellence⁶⁹

Meanings	Characteristics
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ‘Threatened’ Force ▪ Action ▪ Offense ▪ Forcible Power ▪ Coercion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Time-Oriented ▪ Coercion ▪ Requires Deadline/ ▪ Ultimatum ▪ Goal-Oriented ▪ Must Move

⁶⁹ Meanings and characteristics of compellence are taken mostly from works of Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Conn., Yale University Press) and Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).

III. MECHANISMS OF COMPELLENCE POLICY

We build a world of justice, or we will live in a world of coercion.⁷⁰

-President George W. Bush, Berlin, Germany, 23 May 2002

A. OVERVIEW OF U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS 1990-2003

“Building a world of justice...”—a philosophy taken from a speech by President Bush and quoted in the United States National Security Strategy—reflects images of American power playing architect beyond its borders. The idea of “building justice” in sovereign nations requires a careful approach to (and good knowledge of) the nature of the issues and proper implementation of a given set of tools. From the start, U.S.-Iraqi relations post-1990 failed because of the inability of key actors to understand the opponent and operate within its parameters. Compellence policy, thus, has employed a variety of mechanisms to counter Iraqi force; and presidential influence—a conduit of compellence—reinforced these coercive policies.

The diverse mechanisms affected the overall perception and misperception in U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1990 to 2003. Prior to 1990, the United States supported Iraqi efforts to counter Iran’s fundamentalist regime, which in effect, favored policies of engagement over containment. Yet, this was not the case throughout most of the decade. U.S. compellence policy dominated U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1990 onward. The transformation intensified throughout the post-cold war period through a series of the following major U.S.-led operations and UN agreements: Operation Desert Shield, 1990-1991; Operation Desert Storm, 17 January 1991; United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, 3 April 1991; the Northern No-Fly Zone, 8 April 1992; the Southern No-Fly Zones, 26 August 1992; Operation Vigilant Warrior, 1994; Operation Desert Strike, 1996; Operation Desert Fox, 16 December 1998. Thus, the culmination of U.S. compellence policies on political, social and economic levels via key mechanisms coincided with legitimizing U.S. efforts to alter opponent behavior. In this case, the target of removing Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist regime began with the image of

⁷⁰ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, chapter 4: “Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts,” 9.

compellent threats by the simple positioning of U.S. forces in the region using limited coercive force with the first air strikes of Operation Desert Shield in 1990.

On 13 December 2003, U.S. compellence policy in Iraq materialized with the capture of Saddam Hussein. U.S. forces successfully exercised the policy of compellence by use of limited force and troop presence to obtain its objective. Operation Desert Shield in 1990 aimed to compel the Iraqi dictator to withdraw actions in Kuwait and was the reason the United States decided to get involved in the first place. Saddam was a perceived threat and a compellent policy offered by coercive military forces would be the only viable answer in stopping a leader, whom as seen through history, has taken lethal actions against his own citizens, including his own relatives.

B. KEY ACTORS

Much has happened from 1990 to 2003 with U.S.-Iraqi relations. With the string of U.S.-led operations throughout the nineties and the events of the foreign terrorist attacks on U.S. soil September 11, 2001, foreign and national political goals have shifted towards an even higher degree of implementation and legitimization of U.S. compellence policy. The shift transpired whether the international community opposed it or not and operated through mechanisms used to implement compellence strategies. While key actors in international relations do not reside in the U.S. alone, the dominant role of the United States tends to drown out other players in an international environment but should not be given as a reason for miscommunication or misperception Iraq.

The arduous task of examining the effectiveness of the strategy of compellence in U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1990 to 2003 is not trouble-free because operations and agreements are played out in a complex global environment where image matters and opacity flourishes. Thus, the main actors must work and adapt U.S. compellence policies in Iraq amidst a post-cold war international context.⁷¹ Yet, the idea of adapting a compellent policy within a post-cold war environment contradicts the essence of a hegemonic power system such as the United States. The U.S. *will* act in its best interest. Hence, no one can argue that the United States takes the leading key role in a complex

⁷¹ James M. Scott, *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 13.

environment of shifting constellations. Furthermore, the capability of U.S. efforts to coerce opponents, namely via implementing military force or a limited amount of force, simply put, protects national security. The significance of key actors and operations serve as mechanisms used to implement compellence policy. Failures in U.S. compellence policy occur due to perception and misperceptions of images primarily from the U.S. leads to compellence failures on political, social, and economic levels.

Thus, the utilization of compellence policy in U.S.-Iraqi relations is dynamic—it is the diversification of military, political, and economic outputs. The sum of these factors, therefore, indicates that compellence does not lie solely upon the United States. Four major components or key actors of the U.S. government—(1) The President, (2) the Department of Defense, (3), Congress and (4) the Department of State—aid in influencing and implementing compellence policies particularly in addition to key U.S. operations and treaties from 1990 to 2003.

1. The United States

The United States in many ways encapsulates the strategy behind compellence. Its association with coercive force puts it at near synonymous terms. Images of military use of force in operations and occupation surrounding Iraq from the early nineties towards the twenty-first century depict the U.S. flexing its muscles and perhaps paint U.S. inability of setting clear parameters in the implementation of compellence policy. One could not venture far to find the significance of U.S. action (or inaction) and implication with regards to foreign policy. The role of the United States as chief *coercer* in U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1990 to 2003 suggests that the U.S., by its political and economic disposition, maintains an upper hand in strength and victory for future relations and future success in Iraqi government; this could not be farther from the truth. Indeed, U.S. superiority on a political, economic, and social level, greatly influences the global economy; but the significance of adherence to a strategy of compellence places the U.S. in an disadvantage because of a lack of knowing the nature of the opponent, the nature of issues at stake, the regional stakes and global powers relations in addition to the diverse mechanisms used to implement compellence policy.

The President, the Defense Department Congress, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency reinforce U.S. compellence policy primary government mechanisms such as, focus on a few important structures. There are, indeed, other instruments that facilitate the implementation of compellence policy, but for purposes of this thesis, these five components will be briefly addressed.

a. *The President*

The importance of a world leader in facilitating and promoting compellence policy can not and should not be overlooked. President George W. Bush is a key figure of reinforcing America's compellence policy through most of the nineties and into the 21 Century. The president has the task of managing the bureaucracies such as the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The more successful a president is in managing the bureaucracy, the fewer the bureaucratic constraints and the greater his ability to exercise power.⁷²

Image is important. The president's role of commander-in-chief during the key operations from 1990 to 2003 aligns him with an image that drives and channels U.S. compellence policy for the military. The President of the United States portrays a tough image witnessed on a national and international level; his perceived image reflects how effective his leadership skills emanate.

b. *Department of Defense*

The second mechanism that affects the efficacy of compellence policy in a post-cold war relationship with Iraq is the role of the U.S. Department of Defense. Coercive force is a particularly critical element of U.S. foreign policy.⁷³ The military has and always will be the key coercer in any event. Often times, military force is synonymous with coercive force. The Department of Defense plays a vital role in regulating this military force. The Defense Department—with civilian's at the helm—flexes a powerful bureaucratic arm, capable of implementing policy in relation to the

⁷² *The Presidency and U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, Jerel Rosati and Stephen Twing, quoted in James M. Scott, *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 47.

⁷³ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press/RAND, 2002), 2.

utilization of U.S. coercive force. Thus, the relationship of the Defense Department and U.S. compellence policy in Iraq from 1990-2003, reveals a cross-fertilization of Defense design and implementation—in conjunction with U.S. compellent strategies—towards military mobility in Operation Desert Shield.

c. Congress

The third mechanism is the United States Congress. Congressional role in the utilization of U.S. compellence policies allows for decisions to be made with regards to coercive force. The Department of Defense cannot proceed without the “yes” decision of Congress to use military force. Congress approved the wishes of DoD to led key operations in Iraq from 1990 to 2003.

d. Department of State

The Department of State is the diplomatic arm of the United States. Even with the end of the cold war, the Department of State continues to perform its long-standing mission: formulating, executing, and articulating U.S. foreign policy.⁷⁴ Since 1993, the Department of State has been officially committed to “building democracy; promoting and maintaining peace; promoting economic growth and sustainable development; addressing global problem; and providing humanitarian assistance.”⁷⁵

2. Iraq

Iraq underwent significant changes from 1990 to 2003. A country determined to take what it pleases, after the detrimental economic, political, and social effects of combating Iran in 1980 to 1988, Iraq is an combination of tribes, groups and strong ideological beliefs with the Kurds, the Sunni, and the Shi’a. With about 65% of the population Shi’a, a dictatorial leader and Sunni (which is approximately 35% of the population) from Tikrit rose in the Ba’ath Party. Central to the discussion of U.S. coercion, is an analysis of the leader that showed defiance with regards to U.S. efforts to compel him with sanctions or by military means.

⁷⁴ *The Foreign Policy Bureaucracy in a New Era*, Christopher M. Jones, quoted in *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 59.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

a. Saddam Hussein

Saddam Hussein sought power and recognition. Regional dominance in the Middle East was perhaps perceived as the next step in world domination by the United States. In January 1980 Saddam revealed his goal in the international arena: “We want our country to achieve its proper weight based on our estimation that Iraq is as great as China, as great as the Soviet Union, and as great as the United States.”⁷⁶

Saddam epitomized totalitarianism. Fear prevailed. He led by force, power, and control. Opponents quickly were cut off. In contrast to U.S. bureaucratic mechanisms that funneled compellence policy. Saddam had an inflated view of himself. His unsavory, totalitarianism led to widespread fear and mistrust among his people and for those who knew better they chose loyalty and life over disagreement and death. The many faces of Saddam’s tyrannical policies led many to believe the image. Fear of reprisal, thus, played into the various images he projected regionally and internationally. Similar to brutal regimes of the past, a mix of fear, hatred, and adoration characterize the people and party *loyalty* is not only welcomed but essential to survival. Saddam embraced Stalin and Hitler; the results of communism and Nazism were evident throughout the Ba’ath Regime and quest for regional dominance.

In the eighties Saddam projected an image of a preeminent secular figure to the United States from the Iran-Iraq war; he used chemical weapons against Iran and against his own Kurdish minority.⁷⁷ In the nineties, however, his image transformed into *the* central threat to American security chiefly because of the belief he obtained and would use weapons of mass destruction. A common misperception is to see the behavior of others as more centralized, planned, and coordinated than it is.⁷⁸ The United States perceived Saddam and his Ba’ath Regime as more centralized

⁷⁶ Speech by Saddam Hussein, January 2, 1980. Quoted in Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales *The Iraq War: A Military History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap of Harvard University Press, 2003), 28.

⁷⁷ William S. Cohen, *DoD News Briefing*, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 16 December 1998.

⁷⁸ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 319.

and coordinated than it perhaps really was. The fear of reprisal by Saddam may have characterized inexplicable actions such as moving around and hiding operations from the international nuclear inspectors. They may have had no WMDs to hide and could have played the part of possessing deadly weapons in the face of Saddam when they didn't possess them in the first place. Thus, Saddam's top scientists and "entrusted" aides feared him.

C. KEY OPERATIONS AND TREATIES

1. The United States

a. Operation Desert Shield, 1990-1991

Operation Desert Shield was the first test of U.S. compellence policy. It offered the opponent a chance to rethink its actions. It did not, however, result in necessary victory for the United States. Desert Shield aimed at setting up a "shield" before the hostilities began; military coercion would be used. The United States attempted to compel Iraq by protecting the region from Saddam. Yet, U.S. presence of troops did not serve as a tool for compellence policy because it did not compel Saddam to reverse his measures. Although U.S. strategic interests collided with the strategic interest of our allies, it did not dissuade the United States from seeking to secure the region's precious commodity.

b. Operation Desert Storm, 17 January 1991

On 17 January 1991, the U.S. air campaign began in Operation Desert Storm. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to remove Iraqi troops if they did not leave by 15 January 1991. Not surprising, Iraqi defiance opened the doors to military force by which compellence policy involved the key actors ensuring proper timing and execution. The U.S. quickly positioned itself in strategic areas to compel Saddam's forces. The campaign displayed U.S. military might and is perceived as a quick and easy victory, but the fact remains that Saddam was not caught. The job was not finished, which led one to believe in failure over success. Furthermore, the aftermath of an already suffering Iraqi economy and social concerns—just three years after the Iran-Iraq war—the road to rebuilding would be difficult.

c. UN Security Council Resolution 687, 3 April 1991

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 failed as a key mechanism of U.S. compellence policy in Iraq. Saddam Hussein defied the nearly dozen UN Security Council Resolutions. This mechanism is non-military and involves the traditional diplomatic efforts. Resolution 687 is similar to resolutions before and after; it failed. It did not keep Saddam from altering his behavior.

The Joint Resolution states:

Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687.⁷⁹

d. Northern No-Fly Zone, 8 April 1992

The Northern No-Fly Zone was created 8 April 1992 to protect the Kurds in the north of the 36th parallel and ban Iraqi planes from the area.⁸⁰ The joint effort of the United States, Great Britain, and France was an attempt to control the northern area from Iraqi attacks on the Kurds from chemical weapons and conventional weapons. Iraqi refusal to adhere to the zone, however, led to the creation of the Southern No-Fly Zone. This was another failed attempt to compel Iraq from changing its behavior.

⁷⁹ 107th Congress, Second Session House Joint Resolution in the House of Representatives to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq, 2 October 2002, 4.

⁸⁰ http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/desert_fox/timeline.html, *Chronology from Desert Storm to Desert Fox*, Date Accessed 17 September 2004.



Figure 1. Iraq and U.S. No-Fly Zones,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/desert_strike.htm

e. Southern No-Fly Zone 26 August 1992

In 26 August 1992, the United States created a no-fly zone in southern Iraq to protect the area inhabited by Shi'a Muslims after they had been attacked by Iraqi forces.⁸¹ U.S. forces acted as a catalyst to enable implementation of a compellence policy. The United States and its allies begin patrolling the no-fly zone. This compellent strategy succeeded upon withdrawal of Saddam's forces. In December, the U.S. planes intercepted and shot down an Iraqi MIG-25 that violated the no-fly zone.⁸²

⁸¹ Gregory F. Trevor, *Framing Compellent Strategies*, National Defense Research Institute, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), yet ideas drawn from study by Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War*, MR-1146-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000).

⁸² The Long Road to Containment: Chronology from Desert Storm to Desert Fox, http://www.Defenselink.mil/specials/desert_fox/timeline.html (Date accessed September 2004).

f. Operation Vigilant Warrior, 1994

Operation Vigilant Warrior is a successful application of coercive diplomacy.⁸³ The U.S. action took place in a relatively confined time frame, the demands were specific, and the threat of force was real. Operation Vigilant Warrior was an attempt to stop some fifty thousand Iraqi troops massed near the Kuwaiti border on October 5, 1994. The massing of troops was accompanied by Iraqi threat to expel UNSCOM weapons inspectors from Iraq.⁸⁴ In response to the Iraqi troop movement, the United States swiftly deployed thousands of troops to the area and began moving tens of thousands more.⁸⁵ The forward deployment of U.S. forces successfully compelled Iraqi forces into changing their behavior.

g. Operation Desert Strike, 1996

Operation Desert Strike was a response to some forty thousand Iraqi troops massing in northern Iraq. On August 31, 1996, elements of the Iraqi Army attacked and captured the PUK-held town of Irbil in the Kurdish autonomous region of northern Iraq.⁸⁶

h. Operation Desert Fox, 16 December 1998

Two months prior to Operation Desert Fox, UN inspectors unsuccessfully found weapons of mass destruction (WMD) due to Iraqi noncompliance. The House of Representatives' Joint Resolution that authorizes the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq stated: "whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the ceasefire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998."⁸⁷

⁸³ Jon B. Alterman, "Iraq, 1990-1998," taken from Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace), 286.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/desert_strike.htm (date accessed December 2004).

⁸⁷ 107th Congress, Second Session House Joint Resolution in the House of Representatives to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq, 2 October 2002, 1-2.

i. *The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002*

On September 17, 2002, President Bush signed *The National Security Strategy of the United States*. The Strategy highlights *human freedom* for all and the expansion of peace and liberty as the basis for defending the United States; furthermore, the policy takes an offensive posture, rather than a defensive stance towards the national security of the United States. As a cornerstone of U.S. compellence policy, the *National Security Strategy of the United States* takes principles of compellence from Schelling and George's and incorporates them into the strategic policy, which has set the political agenda following the attacks of September 11, 2001:

Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government ... to defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—military power...to cut off terrorist financing; in pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: The United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.⁸⁸

The groundwork for compellence policy is laid by a number of factors. First, the National Security Strategy promotes a framework of compellence policy into the foreign policy. The NSS, contextually, does not speak to a Cold-War era but to a post-Cold War threat. Thus, deterrence becomes obsolete while compellence offers a legitimate strategy of action and offensive measures. The threat against U.S. national security is an impending reality that must be countered or prevented by an offensive plan centered on a moral mandate to defend American freedom. The idea of “pursuing *our* [U.S.] goals” and using “*every tool in our arsenal*” to “defending liberty and justice for all” means that pursuit of U.S. goals are unyielding, progressive and unstoppable because of the “unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence.” Moreover, within the framework of U.S. compellence policy, the NSS provides a general strategy that emphasizes a commitment to defending American freedom beyond

⁸⁸ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> (Date accessed October 2004), September 2002, 3.

America's borders in order to obtain peace and security. President Bush states, "As we defend the peace, we will also take advantage of an historic opportunity to preserve peace."⁸⁹

j. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), March 2003

Operation Iraqi Freedom led to the eventual capture of Saddam Hussein and around \$375,000 in cash from a small hole in the ground 12 December 2003. This was a victory, but why did it take so long? Thirteen years from 1990 to 2003, through operations and treaties; yet is this considered successful? Though compellence policy push its way to a perceived victory, what about the clean-up of a country that had its backbone removed? How would the rest of the body function after 30 years of iron-handed rules and security vices created to keep the dictator abreast? Controversial as it was, OIF represented the culmination and convergence of mechanisms intended to declare victory when the issue and opponent remain to be defined as such. Still too little is known.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The mechanisms used to implement U.S. compellence policy are essentially channels designed to facilitate power. They are either effective or ineffective. Compellence policy represents military force and strength imposed upon an aggressor; yet, the adversary—Saddam Hussein—refused to allow the United States to compel him.

Images are important and become the eyeglasses of another state. A state seeks to influence others whose behavior is based in part on their predictions of how that state will act. Thus one important instrument of statecraft is the ability to affect others' images of the state and therefore their beliefs about how it will behave.⁹⁰ In Operation Desert Storm, the United States perceived Saddam Hussein to be a threat in terms of military strength. The U.S. took the compellent route and attempted to coerce him from obtaining

⁸⁹ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> (Date accessed October 2004), September 2002, 2.

⁹⁰ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, (Columbia University Press: 1989), xiv.

Kuwait. Iraq and failures in U.S. compellence policy from 1990 to 2003 show a quagmire of systemic forces designed to maintain control.

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IV. SUMMARY OF U.S. COMPELLENCE POLICY WITH IRAQ ON POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC LEVELS

A. POLITICAL LEVEL

1. Miscommunications, Different Images, Audiences, and Cultures

The appearance of highly differentiated images perceived on the part of the United States and Saddam's own image of *self* tends to further bring opacity to U.S.-Iraqi relations. Here I will demonstrate how the views of states, i.e., their international image and self-image (in this case is Saddam's inflated image of self), influence decisionmaking and set U.S. foreign policy in light of its perceptions on the opponent. Thus, the impact of the filtering effect of images comes to a fore. Perceptions of the adversary become significant in one's ability to thwart an enemy's strategy:

The key in all of this is to understand how the adversary perceives his interests.⁹¹ The task is hard enough with most adversaries, but when one comes from a cultural, familial, and political background as foreign to most U.S. analysts as Saddam Hussein's, the task is even harder.⁹² One cannot know at this point what U.S. government assessments of Iraqi intentions, likely reactions, and pressure points had been, or how the Bush administration used such assessments.⁹³

B. SOCIAL LEVEL

1. Misperceptions and the Filtering Effect of Images and Interpretation

Increasingly, distorted images and misperceptions in U.S.-Iraqi relations have developed into a pursuit of coercive strategies, which in turn seek some form of *coercive diplomacy* and reflect a failure to connect and resolve certain misperceptions and distortions. On a social level, cultural misperceptions caused the various mechanisms designed to implement compellence policy to misread situations that would otherwise be understood within the social context. Saddam Hussein, for example, may have appeared

⁹¹ Jon B. Alterman, *Coercive Diplomacy against Iraq, 1990-98*, taken from Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace), 280.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ *Ibid.*

to have stronger forces in Operation's Desert Shield and Desert Storm than he really had; furthermore, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam portrayed a faulty image regionally and internationally of possessing and having the capability to use WMDs.

2. The Gap between Saddam's Ability to Process and Interpret Info from the U.S. and the Disconnect of Logic of Images

The gap between Saddam's ability to process and interpret information from the United States and the disconnect of logic of images provides an interesting relationship to explore. The existence of a gap between the decision to either use force or not to use force provides an arena where images and perceptions foster. Saddam Hussein may have believed his forces were stronger than the United States. He portrayed to his people, the region, and the international community a misinterpretation of what really existed.

C. ECONOMIC LEVEL

U.S. perceptions in Iraq viewed through U.S. operations in Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom UN-established trade sanctions failed to induce Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and so a US-led coalition force began intensive air strikes on Baghdad on 16 January 1991. Iraqi forces were soon overpowered by the coalition and were eventually forced to withdraw. Much of Iraq's military was destroyed during the Persian Gulf War, with the remainder positioned in northern and southern parts of the country trying to suppress Kurdish and Shiite rebellions.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ Weltpolitik.net. <http://www.weltpolitik.net/regionen/naherosten/1395.html>.

V. CONCLUSION

A. FINDINGS AND U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

1. Foundation

U.S. compellence policy as a practicable method in U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1990 to 2003 is a strategy that needs to be overhauled. While compellence succeeded on some levels, failures on political, social and economic levels characterize the strategy of compellence from 1990 to 2003 in Iraq. The United States succeeded in coercing Iraq not to use their conventional weapons in for example in dissuading U.S. (and coalition) forces to roam freely. This, however, is not the case, in the example of the broader arms control inspections' arena. Failure was in part due to the lack of U.S. understanding or misunderstanding of the adversary, U.S. misperceptions, and an inability to decipher Saddam's images.

Explicit failures in U.S. compellence policy in Iraq from 1990 to 2003 occurred because of many key reasons. First, in terms of foundations, the U.S. built its foreign policy in Iraq from 1990 to 2003 on a strategy of compellence. Contrary to what may appear to be the reality, and especially when faced with a powerful military force such as the United States armed forces, compellence does have its limits. Compellent threats, unfortunately, tend to take short-term solutions into account over long-term ones. Costly repercussions occur when miscalculating the aftermath of conflicts. Unlike a deterrent solution that waits, a compellent solution must take action, must move in the right timing.⁹⁵

Compellence tactics ignite unnecessary situations from occurring. The problems reoccur and do not stabilize. The opacity of the international playing field, moreover, is another factor to consider that further skews the actors in deciphering messages from one another.

⁹⁵ Shelling, describes compellent threat as offense, action, definite in timing, and requiring the other to act first before administering punishment, see 70-72.

2. Mechanisms

The mechanisms used to implement compellence policy need careful consideration. The overall problem with the four mechanisms addressed—the President, the Department of Defense, Congress, and the Department of State—is primarily an issue regarding the perception and misperception of images of the opponent. These structural channels that implement change require a clearer picture of the adversary. Misperceptions result in a rush to war in OIF without an effective exit plan and post-conflict reconstruction strategy.

Finally, the evolution of the theory of compellence in U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1990 through 2003 point towards a higher probability of misperceptions in future relations. Finally, the chapter will postulate which U.S. foreign policy is most imminent.

3. Explanations for Policy Failure⁹⁶

Helen Ingram and Dean Mann, “Policy Failure: An Issue Deserving Attention,” in *Why Policies Succeed or Fail* list nine explanations for policy failure. These explanations can be assessed for failures in U.S. compellence policy in Iraq from 1990-2003:

1. The Impact of Changing Circumstance
2. Relationships of One Policy
3. The Boundary Question
4. Excessive Policy Demand
5. Realizable Policy Expectations
6. Accurate Theory of Causation
7. Choice of Effective Policy Tools
8. The Vagaries of Implementation
9. Failure of Political Institutions

a. Alternatives to Policies Tried

“Failure needs to be assessed in terms of the “do nothing” option and in terms of the likelihood that other options would have been more or less successful.” Successful policies require consideration to a wide-range of alternatives. Creative policy makers must address and implement other options.

⁹⁶ Helen Ingram and Dean Mann, “Policy Failure: An Issue Deserving Attention,” in *Why Policies Succeed or Fail*, ed. Helen Ingram and Dean Mann (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), quoted in Thomas A. Birkland, “An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and Models of Public Policy Making,” (Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 189. * Note: Charles O. Jones, *The Policies and Politics of Pollution Control* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975).

b. *The Impact of Changing Circumstance*

“Changing circumstances can render policies less successful.” Changing circumstances describe the Iraqi case on political, economic, and social levels from 1990 to 2003. Each U.S.-led operation left little consideration to the nature of the social and cultural issues on the ground. The difficulty of pursuing a policy of compellence in a country that has only known the ruthless, dictatorial structure fails to take the social and political background into account.

c. *Relationships of One Policy*

“Policies are interrelated, and these relationships must be taken into account.” The compellence policy relates to previous containment policy but is dynamic and interrelated with the changing circumstances of the situations.

d. *The Boundary Question*

“Political boundaries (between states, e.g.) will influence policy success.” Political boundaries were, for the most part, useless. Normal diplomatic limitations did not present itself, particularly with Iraqi extreme totalitarian measures and U.S. preemptive, coercive policy. The dichotomy of state structures with Iraq and U.S. compellence policy further exasperated the souring relations.

e. *Excessive Policy Demand*

“We may expect too much from policies.” The United States expected the opponent to behave in particular ways. Thus the adversary often fulfills the expectations and behaves in ways indicative to how he believes the United States or the international community perceives him to be. This often contrary to what is expected.

f. *Realizable Policy Expectations*

Policies sometimes fail when they go beyond what we know we can achieve now. But ambitious policy making can be the result of “speculative argumentation”* that seeks to induce innovation. The stated purpose of a policy may not be the actual purpose; there may be more symbolic goals than substance.

g. *Accurate Theory of Causation*

“Policy will not fail if it is not based on sound causal theory.” If a society that has only known fear from a political structure that has ruled over three decades, then

it would be difficult to predict a successful democratic regime in power. It may take another thirty years or longer.

h. Choice of Effective Policy Tools

“The choice of ineffective tools will likely yield failure. But the choice of tools is often a function of compromise or ideological predisposition.” This is key in determining success; but, if there is a lack of oversight among the same tools that implement policy, then the policy may run the risk of ineffectiveness.

i. The Vagaries of Implementation

“The problems inherent in policy implementation can contribute to policy failure.” This is contingent upon the actors implementing the policy. Effective actors often make effective policies.

j. Failure of Political Institutions

“...Policy failure is simply a symptom of more profound ailments within our political institutions,’ such as the breakdown of political power or devolution of power from congressional leaders to the committees and subcommittees.” The failures of political institutions to balance, protect, and sustain power is problematic. This is particularly true when one dominant power structure does whatever it can to maintain power in its’ own understanding of what power means and why and how it is implemented.

B. TIMELINE⁹⁷

**1990 Operation Desert Shield begins
UNSC Resolution 661 – 6 August**

November The UN Security Council approved the use of force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait if they did not leave by 15 January 1991.

⁹⁷ Taken from “Timeline of post-Gulf War U.S./Iraq Conflict,” <http://www.cbc.ca/news/features/iraq/timeline.html>, “Iraq,” <http://www.worldhistory.com/iraq.htm>, “Chronology from Desert Storm to Desert Fox,” http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/desert_fox/timeline.html and “Poised for the New Millennium: The Global Reach of the Air Mobility Command: A Chronology,” Robert de V. Brunkow with Kathryn A. Wilcoxson, Office of History, Air Mobility Command Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, April 2001.

1991 Operation Desert Storm begins
15 January 1991 Iraq did not leave Kuwait.

17 January 1991 A coalition of 39 countries began bombing Iraq starting the Persian Gulf War

March 1991: Following the Persian Gulf War's end, a ceasefire imposes sanctions on Iraq and the dispatching of UN weapons inspectors, part of the commission known as UNSCOM.

1992

August: A no-fly zone is put in place in southern Iraq.

1993

June 27, 1993: In response to an aborted assassination attempt against former president George Bush by the Iraqis, the U.S. launches a cruise missile attack on Iraqi intelligence headquarters.

1994

30 September 1994

9 October – 14 December - In October 1994, Iraq moved ground forces south of the 32d parallel toward the Kuwaiti border for the first time since Desert Storm in 1991. Consequently, the allies augmented **Southern Watch** forces in an operation dubbed **Vigilant Warrior (Phoenix Jackal)**, which imposed a “no drive” zone on Iraq’s army in the south. The AMC system began flying airlift and tanker missions on 9 October and concluded on 14 December, carrying 14,854 passengers and 8,330 short tons of cargo. Of the 728 air mobility missions, 380 were tanker missions flown mainly for air refueling.⁹⁸

14-15 October 1994 - The C-17’s first operational mission occurred during Operation **Vigilant Warrior**. The C-17 departed Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, for Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, with a load of vehicles, a rolling command post, and supplies for the Army’s 7th Transportation Division. Two refuelings by KC-135s made possible the nonstop mission.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Letter (U), William J. Clinton to Congress, “Letter from President Clinton to Congress on Iraq,” 28 Oct 94; Notes (U), R. deV. Brunkow, AMC/HO, “Commander’s Call,” 12 Oct 94; Report (U), AMC/HO, “A Chronology of Mobility Operations since January 1990,” 20 Jul 95; Report (U), 68 AMC TACC/XOCZR, [Vigilant Warrior MAIRS Totals], 1995; Report (U), AMC TACC/XOCZR, [Vigilant Warrior VWHIST Report], 1995.

⁹⁹ Article (U), AMC/PA, “A New Era of Airlift,” *AMC Global Reach*, Nov 94, pp 3-4; Article (U), “C-17 Makes History in Gulf Region,” *AMC Update*, 27 Oct 99.

December - Iraq accepts a United National Security Council resolution that allows for oil exports to be sold in response for food and medicine.

1998

October 31 - Iraqi authorities stop working with UN weapons inspectors. The United States and Great Britain warn of possible military strikes to force compliance. A renewed military build-up in the Persian Gulf begins.

November 5 -- The U.N. Security Council condemns Iraq for violating agreements signed after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

November 11 -- The United Nations withdraws most of its staff from Iraq.

November 14 -- With B-52 bombers in the air and within about 20 minutes of attack, Saddam Hussein agrees to allow U.N. monitors back in. The bombers are recalled before an attack occurs. Weapons inspectors return to Iraq a few days later.

December 8 -- Chief U.N. weapons inspector Richard Butler reports that Iraq is still impeding inspections. U.N. teams begin departing Iraq.

December 15 -- A formal U.N. report accuses Iraq of a repeated pattern of obstructing weapons inspections by not allowing access to records and inspections sites, and by moving equipment records and equipment from one to site another.

December 16 -- The United States and Great Britain begin a massive air campaign against key military targets in Iraq.

December - UN weapons inspectors are evacuated from Iraq. Between Dec. 17-19, U.S. launches Operation Desert Fox, a bombing campaign in response to the conflict over weapons inspectors.

1999

December - To replace UNSCOM, the UN introduces the Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). However Iraq does not agree to it.

2001

April and August – No-Fly Zones created to counter Iraqi forces against their own people.

2002

September –The National Security Strategy of the United States sought compellence policy to protect U.S. national interest.

2003

March – Operation Iraqi Freedom launched; **December** – Saddam Hussein captured

C. FUTURE RESEARCH 2004-2006

Future research will focus on the next five years from 2004-2006 will focus on Iraqi mechanisms for coercion: Ba'ath Regime, Sunni, and Shi'a religious structures, and intelligence organizations vital to understanding the nature and issues of opponent.

The security situation in Iraq is exacerbated by strong religious ties to the Sunni regime by radical insurgents. It is difficult to ascertain friend from foe in the context of a state that has not yet become master of its own home. The challenge of maintaining peace and security from three decades of dictatorship will be no small feat. The road to Tallulah, a Sunni stronghold and hotbed of insurgency, is a road to destruction for U.S.-led forces positioned to fight for freedom and democracy in a place where the Iraqi freedom fighter believes in his religious fight and mandate over foreign occupiers in their sacred land. Misperceptions literally line each bullet, rocket that opposes the insurgents' fundamental belief system. Furthermore, what are the implications of a future Shiite leader in Iraq?

In sum, a comprehensive study of the use of mechanisms to implement compellence policy needs to be done. The key actors will be required to assess the aftermath of operations from 1990 to 2003; moreover, the effect of images of the various actors will be investigated to better understand the effectiveness of U.S. compellence policy. This is a step towards a successful irreversible policy. Thus a joint effort in examining the "lessons learned" by the before mentioned actors will be developed to explain failures in compellence policy.

D. MAP OF IRAQ



Figure 2. Iraq, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html>

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